
OUR INDIAN EMPIRE


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THE BRITISH RESIDENCY AT HYDERABAD.

The Nizam of the Deccan paying a State Visit to the English Resident to assure him of his adhesion to British interests.



VIEW OF SASSOOR, IN THE DECCAN, SOUTH EAST OF POONAH.

The walled building to the right is a fortified palace, and in 1818 its garrison held out for ten days against a division of the British Army.

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JANGHERA, OR THE FAKEERS' ROCK, ON THE GANGES.



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THE VILLAGE OF KHANDOO, HIMALAYA MOUNTAINS.



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FORTRESS OF SHUHUR, JEYPORE, RAJPOOTANA.



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SIMLA. NEAR BELASPOOR.

A favorite resort for Invalids of the British Army.

VIEW NEAR KURSALEE.

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VIEW AT DEOBUN, NEAR UMBALLAH.

ARRIVAL OF CONTINGENT FORCE OF SIKH IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

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BATTERY AT LUCKNOW _ THE DEFENDERS ON THE LOOK OUT.

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SIKH TROOPS DIVIDING THE SPOIL TAKEN FROM MUTINEERS.

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BLOWING MUTINOUS SEPOYS FROM THE GUNS.

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

MASSACRE OF ENGLISH OFFICERS AND THEIR WIVES AT JHANSI.

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MASSACRE IN THE BOATS OFF CAWNPORE.

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VIEW OF DELHI, FROM THE RIVER SHEWING THE KING'S PALACE.

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may possibly, from personal knowledge supply some facts of which Lord Dalhousie was not aware. The East India Company placed three military officers, and one medical gentleman, in the hands of a competent electrician in London, so that they might be fitted to take the superintendence of the staff to be sent out to India. Sir W. O'Shaughnessy, on his arrival in England, selected a large number of young men who had, in London, also competent instruction as regards the principles of telegraphy; but, owing to a want of knowledge of the practical part of the business, as, for example, the erection of poles, &c., insulation, and other essentials of telegraphic success, they had to acquire such knowledge by trying experience on their return to India. Nevertheless, between 1853 and 1856, there were 4,000 miles of telegraph in working order in that country. Of course the local difficulties were enormous. Wild beasts, geological peculiarities, such as mountains, rocks, rivers, &c., had to be overcome. Poles had to be replaced by granite pillars, as the wild animals, of all kinds, either for the sake of mischief or pleasure, made it a business to destroy all erections for holding the overground wires wherever they lay in their path. The expansion of the telegraph system in India since 1856 will be the subject of subsequent remarks.

Lord Dalhousie next draws attention to the progress of Agriculture, &c., during his tenure of office. It appears that different kinds of seeds had been procured from Europe for the purpose of acclimatisation in regard to improvements in agriculture. The growth of flax had been largely encouraged, and its cultivation had extended to great dimensions. An experiment for the growth of silk had been undertaken, workmen skilled in the business, mulberry plants, and every other requisite having been provided, measures were also taken for improving the breed of horses, and, to aid the exertions of the society for introducing a better breed of sheep into India. Merino rams were procured by the Government, and application was made for the importation of a further supply from the Australian Colonies. An experiment was made as to the possibility of introducing a breed of sheep into Pegu, and a certain amount of success followed. The natives showed a strong desire to possess them, and the animals throve well, and were singularly prolific. Success in this attempt would be of great value to Europeans as a supply, hitherto wanted, of flesh-food for the province.

In the conclusion of this interesting "Minute" Lord Dalhousie enters into various details of local improvements in respect to the Ganges Canal, the condition of the European soldier, &c. These are not of general interest, and, therefore, we shall at once pass on to the History of India under Lord Canning, the successor of Lord Dalhousie.

Lord Canning entered on the duties of Governor-General of India, on 29th February, 1856. Descended from the celebrated statesman, George Canning, and having already held office under Sir Robert Peel, he was chosen by the Palmerston Government to succeed Lord Dalhousie. There was little to disturb the early portion of his administration, and little was it supposed that, under apparent tranquillity the germs of the subsequent Mutiny in 1857 were growing to budding. Russian intrigues had obtained their quietus by the results of the recent war between that country and England and France. Oude seemed to take the question of annexation with quietude; consequently the development of the internal policy of India was the chief object of Lord Canning's care. The school, the development of the canal, railways, and telegraph systems, the extension of Christianity, and other branches of material improvements were the events of the period. A fearful outbreak of cholera during the rainy season of 1856, heavy floods, and other domestic troubles, however were experienced.

But an important event was looming in the distance. For a long time the relations between Persia and our Indian government had been threatening. In 1855, owing to personal insults to the British mission at Teheran, Mr. Murray, our representative had hauled down his flag, and went to Bagdad, with the members of his mission. The Persians refused all redress, and on the 1st November, 1856, the Governor-General, following instructions, sent out from England, declared war with Persia. In the proclamation of the above date the reasons for the war are assigned as follows: "The conduct of the Persian Government has been pronounced by Her Majesty's Government to constitute an act of open hostility to Great Britain. Reparation has been sought,

but without success. The withdrawal of the Persian troops from the neighbourhood of Herat to Persian soil has been demanded as preliminary to the adjustment of differences to which the acts of Persia alone have given rise; but the demand has been evaded, and, according to the most recent accounts, a Persian army still invests Herat.

"Friendly remonstrances having failed, and a reasonable requisition having been rejected or put aside, it becomes incumbent on the British Government to take measures by which the Persian Government shall be convinced that solemn engagements contracted with Great Britain may not be violated with impunity, and by which effectual guarantees against continuous breach of faith shall be secured."

Preparations were made for decisive measures, and by the 13th November the expedition from Bombay was on its voyage to Muscat. The first rendezvous of the fleet and transports was at the port of Bunda Abbas, which was reached on the 23rd. On the 29th November, four vessels of the squadron appeared off Bushire, and on the following day the governor of that place wrote to Commander Jones, the British Resident at the Persian Gulf, begging to be apprised of the ojbect of their visit. Jones, who had left Bushire to join the squadron, replied from on board Rear-Admiral Leeke's ship, by enclosing the Governor-General's proclamation of war, and informed the Persian governor that his own diplomatic functions had ceased. The next step was to take possession of Karrak Island, to the north of Bushire, which was effected without opposition. It was then determined to disembark the troops in Mallita Bay, about ten or twelve miles south of Bushire, and the operations commenced under cover of gun-boats, on the morning of 7th December. A number of the enemy had posted in a date grove, about 200 yards to the left of the beach; but, after a few shots from the boats, they retired, and the troops were landed, without any casualty, on that and the following day. On the 9th, the army advanced to attack the village, and old Dutch fort of Reshire, about four miles south of Bushire, where the enemy had strongly entrenched themselves amid the ruins of old houses, garden walls, &c. They were, however, driven from their defences by our troops, who behaved in the most gallant manner, and carried the places at the point of the bayonet. The fleet did good service by firing shells which burst among the enemy, causing them great loss, while ours was only six officers and men killed and about forty wounded.

The army halted at Reshire for the night, but Admiral Sir Henry Leeke pushed on with the fleet, and early on the morning of the 10th took up a position in the roadstead of Bushire. In the meantime, Commander Jones had proceeded in a small steamer, carrying a flag of truce to the town of Bushire, to summon the garrison to surrender on honourable terms; but on passing the narrow channel that led to the town, two batteries opened upon the steamer, and several shots were fired, which compelled her to return. While the vessels of the fleet were taking up their positions, a Persian boat came from the shore with a flag of truce, to request, on the part of the Governor of Bushire, a delay of twenty-four hours. This was peremptorily refused, and the ships being placed in line of battle, with the Admiral's vessel in the centre, a cannonade commenced, which was kept up between the fleet and the town for four hours and a-half, at the expiration of which time the Persian batteries were silenced, and the flag-staff was cut down in token of submission. This happened before the land force had time to reach the place, so that when the troops came up, all that Major-General Stalker had to do was to receive the surrender of the garrison, and the British flag was hoisted on the walls of Bushire. The Persian force within the walls exceeded 2,000 men; but many effected their escape before the surrender took place, and many also were drowned in attempting to do so. The rest laid down their arms in front of the British line, and were next morning escorted by our cavalry to some distance into the interior, and then suffered to disband. Bushire was, therefore, taken by the guns of the fleet, and it was a remarkable circumstance that during the whole of the bombardment, for upwards of four hours, although the hulls, masts, and rigging of the ships were frequently struck by the enemy's shot, not a single casualty to life or limb occurred. The British colours were hoisted at the Residency, and the town was declared to be a military post under British rule, and temporarily subject to martial law. Among other regulations, it was proclaimed that the traffic in slaves

was abolished, and that newly imported negroes, of every age and sex, would be seized and set free.

Nothing further of importance occurred to the end of 1856. But on the 15th January, 1857, Sir James Outram sailed from Bombay, and landed at Bushire on the 27th. He took immediate steps to ascertain accurately the position and strength of the enemy, who had already assembled a large force about fifty miles from Bushire, in the hope of regaining that town. Outram resolved to anticipate their attack, and march against the enemy. On the 2nd of February he was strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements from Bombay, and on the evening of the next day the force marched out of Bushire. The troops, numbering over 5,000, reached the entrenched position of the Persians on the 5th, but the enemy had already abandoned it, leaving quantities of stores, &c., behind. On the 7th our rear-guard was attacked by the Persians. On the next morning the Persian army, numbering between 6,000 to 7,000 men, was seen drawn up in battle array. General Outram immediately ordered the attack, and by ten o'clock the defeat of the Persians was complete.

The next matter of importance was the capture of Mohamrah, a fortified town on the right bank of the Karoon river. On the 24th March the Persians were found here, with a force estimated at 13,000 men, while General Outram had only about 5,000 men, aided, however, by steamers, and other vessels of war. On the 26th the mortars of our ships opened fire on the Persian batteries, and, in a few hours, the enemy was entirely defeated. The celebrated General Havelock was engaged in this affair. Without entering into any further details, we add that a treaty of peace was immediately afterwards signed between Britain and Persia.

China was next destined to be the scene of our operations. At the end of 1856, the Chinese officials at Canton seized some Chinese sailors from a vessel bearing British colours. The Chinese governor, Yeh, added insult to outrage by trying to pass off a number of convicts for the very men he had promised to surrender, as guilty of the seizure above-mentioned, and that even after most of the forts outside of Canton had been destroyed by the British armies and seamen. In aid of our endeavours, detachments were sent from Penang and Singapore, and Lord Elgin, in the hope of averting war with China, was sent with a special mission to Pekin. At the same time there was an outbreak in the settlement of Sarawak, in Borneo, where Sir James Brooke held a kind of quasi-governorship. But this outbreak was soon quelled. The Chinese were taught in Borneo to play no further treachery, and were placed under sufficient control by the energy of Sir James Brooke.

But we have now to draw attention to an event which at first appeared to indicate that the British Government of India was on the point of dissolution. We refer to the mutiny in India, which commenced early in 1857. The second volume of this work is devoted entirely to the details of this mutiny and its results. But to keep up the thread of the narrative of the history of India, the following brief sketch is given, which is chiefly quoted from the "Annual Register" for 1857. The reader may also consult Mr. Trotter's "History of the British Empire in India," which forms a sequel to "Thornton's History of India," already frequently quoted in this work.

A new kind of rifle, called the Enfield, an improvement on the French *Minié* rifle, was introduced early in 1857, into Bengal, for the use of the troops, and as "greased" cartridges were necessary for its effective use, it was intended to issue a supply of these to accompany the rifles. On January 23rd, Major-General Hearsey, commanding the Presidency Division, informed the Indian Government that at Dumdum, near Calcutta, an uneasy feeling existed among the Sepoys, caused by the belief that the grease used in the preparation of the cartridges consisted of a mixture of the fat of cows and pigs, which would be utterly opposed to the religious tenets both of Hindoos and of Mahomedans. Anecdotes were given confirming this prejudice. A strong feeling of dissatisfaction soon spread among the Sepoys, but the fact was that up to the date of this event, not a single Enfield cartridge had been issued to any of the native troops. The men disbelieved the assurances of their officers, and it only required a spark to set the mine of mutiny into explosion.

Open mutiny for the moment occurred. At Berhampore, on the evening of 29th of February, 1857, when the 19th N. I. were ordered to parade on the following morning, and percussion caps were, according to

custom, about to be issued to them, the men refused to receive them, saying that there was some doubt as to how the cartridges were made; and, on the same night, they broke open the huts used for piling arms, and took possession of the muskets and ammunition. Upon this, Colonel Mitchell called out the cavalry and artillery, and, going to the parade ground, ordered the men to lay down their arms. They promised to do so if the guns and cavalry were withdrawn, and on these retiring they dispersed quietly to their lines.

But this obedience was simply an act of deception. Matters became so threatening that the 84th Queen's Regulars was sent for from Burmah. The 19th N. I. were ordered to march to Barrackpore, and here was sent a wing of the 53rd Queen's Regiment, and two troops of artillery. Preparations were completed by the 30th March, and next day the 84th landed from Burmah. The mutinous 19th were addressed by General Hearsey, who read the order of Lord Canning for their disbandment. The order was obeyed, but in such a manner as showed symptoms of the coming storm that was about to burst on our Indian possessions.

Passing over a variety of anterior occurences, we next turn to those of May, 1857. On the 9th of that month some troopers of the 3rd Native Light Cavalry, at Meerut, were brought up on the parade ground in presence of the whole force, there to receive the sentence of a general court-martial. Their offence was disobedience, in refusing to fire with the cartridges supplied to them, which were, in reality, the same that had long been in use. They were sentenced to a long imprisonment. All remained quiet until Sunday evening, May 10th, when the native regiments rose in mutiny, fired on their officers, and broke open the gaol to release the prisoners. The building was set on fire, and upwards of 1,000 convicts were liberated, who, with the rabble, at once sided with the Sepoys, and committed frightful atrocities. Every European was attacked, and a great number of officers, together with ladies and children, were barbarously murdered by the insurgents before the English troops had time to come up. When the alarm first reached them, they were preparing for church parade, and they immediately marched on the native lines, which speedily dispersed. Many of the latter escaped to Delhi. It was thus at Meerut that the ferocity of the Sepoys first showed its terrible results.

On the next day, May 11th, the outbreak at Delhi took place, and for the description of this we are indebted to the work by Mr. Trotter, already referred to. "Early next morning some troopers of the 3rd cavalry crossed the Jumna into Delhi, after a ride of about forty miles from Meerut. Their presence, and the news they brought of the last night's (Sunday) successful rising, of the speedy approach of their fellow mutineers, at once gave the signal for an outbreak yet more disastrous than that of the night before. In an hour or two the evil passions of a city were raging in full blood over every barrier which had hitherto stood between them and British rule; a murderous rabble of citizens and soldiers was eagerly hunting to their death every man, woman and child of European parentage or European faith. . . . . Inside the very palace of the old pensioner, King of Delhi, did the work of butchery begin. . . . . Before sunset the whole city had fallen into the hands of the mutineers; the few English who escaped outside wounded, or with whole skins, were forced to flee, as best they could, away from a cantonment already ablaze into a country bristling with every danger, through villages inhabited by professional ruffians, by Mahomedan youths, or by Hindoos whom fear withheld from openly succouring the distressed *Sahibs*.

"Not without a struggle worthy of remembrance . . . did the capital pass into the keeping of blood-stained mutineers. While the main body of Sepoys from Meerut were yet marching towards the palace, a few English officers and men of the ordnance service found time to shut the gates of the great magazine. With all possible speed a few guns, double-loaded with grape, were planted here and there inside the defences; arms were dealt out among the yet faithful lascars, and a train of powder was laid down from the magazine itself to a spot some way off, as a last desperate remedy for a not unlikely strait. In a very short time the courage of that small band was tried to the utmost. After a swarm of insurgents had in vain called on Lieutenant Williams Willoughby to surrender, scaling ladders brought from the palace were fixed against the walls of this stronghold. Deserted in a moment by their native followers, the nine Englishmen stood to their guns;

shower after shower of grape swept away the assailants as fast as they showed themselves upon the wall. But two of the defenders were already wounded, and ammunition was running short. At last Willoughby gave the preconcerted signal, the mine was fired, and, with the slaughter of hundreds of the enemy, the fortress was thus destroyed, but Delhi was, for the present, entirely lost to the English, and the few of those that remained fled to Meerut."

The capture of Delhi by the insurgent troops speedily followed. For some time it appeared that Ferozepore might have become, in many respects, a second Delhi, but the English garrison checked the efforts of the mutineers; yet it became very evident that even the best native regiments in Bengal could not be trusted. The condition of Lahore was one of great anxiety, and is thus described by Mr. Trotter:—"When the sad tidings from Meerut and Delhi reached Lahore, on the 12th of May, its fort, and the neighbouring cantonments of Meeanmeer were garrisoned by three regiments of native infantry, one of native cavalry, the 81st foot, two troops of horse, and three companies of foot artillery. On the loyalty of the hundred thousand Sikhs, Hindoos, Mahomedans, who still dwelt within the walls of Runjeet's capital, it was vain to count in the presence of any strong temptation to rebel. The awe inspired throughout the Punjab by the great personal qualities of the Lawrences,* and their worthy subalterns, might not remain proof to the voice of awakened patriotism, to the sting of wounded prejudices, to the cravings of a starved ambition, of an inveterate thirst for change, for revenge, for mere plunder. The great English chief himself, Sir John Lawrence, was seeking a short rest from toil, a little medicine for his jaded health, among the bracing highlands of Ráwal Pindie. But the men who acted for him were worthy of the hour, and Lahore, the Punjab, and, perhaps all India, were saved by their timely daring. On the night of this 12th of May a ball had been appointed to come off at Meeanmeer. It came off as quietly as that other had done at Brussels the night before at Quatré Bras. But the officers who went to it knew that next morning they would have to attend a grand parade of the whole Meeanmeer garrison. During a quiet conference with Montgomery, McLeod, and other high officials, Brigadier Corbett, a worthy old Company's soldier, had proved at once his clear insight and his ready courage by undertaking to disarm every native soldier under his command; a step the more readily sanctioned, as it seemed that plots were even then hatching in the Sepoy lines.

"Early next morning, therefore, the whole of the troops disposable gathered on the central parade to hear the reading of the Governor-General's order touching the half-forgotten mutiny of Barrackpore. After the reading there began a set of manœuvres, which ended in placing the 8th Bengal cavalry, the 16th, 26th, and 49th native infantry, in all about 2,500, face to face with five companies of the 81st, and a battery of guns guarded by some 200 artillerymen. Whatever the Sepoys might have thought as they listened to the shameful story of a British officer hacked nearly to death by one mutineer, and beaten as he lay on the ground by several others, amidst the approving smiles and jeers of half a regiment, the thrill of secret triumph must have yielded to a pang of sudden disappointment when they heard the order given them to unbuckle sabres and pile arms. For a moment they seemed to hesitate; but certain death glowered from 600 stern white faces, from the light of a dozen port-fires, from a steady line of fixed bayonets and loaded muskets; and the order which would overset their deep-laid purpose was sullenly obeyed. . . . Inside the citadel of Lahore a like scene was enacting at the same hour. Three companies of the 81st quietly disarmed a wing of the 26th native infantry, which, two days later, was to have seized, the moment of its relief from duty, to join the wing of the relieving regiment in a sudden onslaught on the small band of English within the city and the fort."

Few instances of British valour exceed in interest that just related. This example of rigour was followed in other places. The native troops at Peshawur were in like manner, and as suddenly, disarmed, and another and very serious danger averted. The strong will of Sir John Lawrence, and the personal sway of Colonel Edwardes, thus effectually stamped out the rebellion over some 50,000 square miles of the Punjab. At this serious juncture, fortunately, the Sikhs were loyal to us, and they flocked in to join our ranks with the greatest zeal and fidelity.

* Lord Lawrence died in June, 1879. A biography of him will be given at a subsequent page.

We must now pass over a great variety of detail in respect to the spread of the mutiny generally in India, of which an extended account is given in the second volume of this work, in the most minute relation of circumstances—the massacre at Cawnpore, the treachery and ferocity of Nana, Lucknow, Agra, &c., in fact, the general convulsion of our Indian Empire.

The successful siege of Delhi in September, and the relief of Lucknow, broke the neck of the mutiny of 1857, although much remained to be done. Reinforcements from England gradually arrived, men stimulated with a desire to revenge themselves on the brutal enemy. The rebels began to see the end of their successes, and were divided among themselves. The British arms gradually achieved success in all directions. The bravery of Sir Colin Campbell, Sir J. Outram, Sir H. Havelock, and others, sealed the fate of the mutineers at Lucknow, and, in December, Cawnpore was regained. Almost everywhere the year closed on fairer prospects for the British army. Delhi was being re-inhabited, and condign, indeed terrible, but richly deserved punishment, was meted out to the chiefs of the mutineers, among whom was the old King of Delhi.

But to return to the general history of India. One historian whom we have previously quoted, remarks that, "If Lord Canning's policy was unpopular in the provinces, in Calcutta itself it had become a byword for everything weak and despicable. From July, 1857, onwards into the next year, his name stank in the nostrils of the whole white community, whose ill-will he had earned at the outset by his slowness in accepting their proffered services, and yet more by his unlucky haste in gagging the whole of the Calcutta press. That last blunder cost him and his government dear. Thenceforth nothing was too bad to believe of a ruler whose main fault sprang from a praiseworthy, if ill-informed, desire to deal justly by all alike. In their distrust, dislike, ere long their utter hatred, to one who clearly would not trust the only loyal section of his subjects, the English in Calcutta, grew ever readier to swallow the wildest stories, to fall into the most unseemly panics, to circulate the most unfounded slanders against a government that dared to differ from them on questions touching their personal safety or their national pride. . . . . Cut off by the censorship of the press from the Briton's time-honoured rights of free discussion, they grew sceptical of all news furnished through official channels, put the darkest face on all passing events, talked openly of deposing so unfit a Viceroy, and at length requested him to forward to the home government a petition for his lordship's immediate recall."

The slanders against Lord Canning, especially in regard to his alleged clemency, were echoed in England, but were refuted. Mr. Trotter states that, "by the same mail which bore home Mr. Grant's (Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal) unanswerable answer to the rash charges so readily believed in England, the Governor-General forwarded to the Court of Directors a minute of his own, wherein were fully and clearly vindicated the terms of his oft-misquoted resolution of July (1857). To Englishmen of a later date, the document thus defended seems all-sufficient for its own defence. But for many months after its first appearance, the noble, the statesmanlike clemency therein so manifest, became in the mouths of Canning's countrymen a very synonym for disgraceful weakness."

The feeling against Lord Canning's apparent clemency was doubtless due to the intense excitement of England against the wretches who had perpetrated the horrors of Cawnpore, and in other places in India where the mutiny had been rampant. There is not the slightest doubt that the reprisals of the English and the Sikhs were of a terrible character, and it was to restrain this vicious revenge that Lord Canning interfered. If this had not been done, he remarks:—"We should have miserably failed in our duty, and should have exposed ourselves to the charge of being nothing better than instruments of wild vengeance in the hands of an exasperated community."

Closing the account of 1857, two incidents may be here alluded to, but running on into 1858. The Bishop of Calcutta, the Right Rev. Daniel Wilson, fell ill and died in his 80th year, on 2nd January, 1858. His loss occasioned universal regret from all classes. He had earnestly laboured in the cause of Christianity, and liberally devoted a large portion of his income to furthering its extension in India. The end of the year was also signalised by the closing of the Chinese war, already referred to at page 463, *ante*. The disarmed Sepoys of India were employed in China, together with the

English and French forces, under Lord Elgin, by land and sea.. The treaty of Tientsin, of June, 1858, put to quiet, for some time, our troubles with China, only, however, to be renewed at no very distant date.

In respect to India itself, the year 1858 opened with great promise. Sir Colin Campbell, and others of our officers, were engaged in stamping out the rebellion, in which they were successful. Numerous battles took place, in which the mutineers were defeated. Early in March, Sir Colin Campbell moved on, with a first-rate army, to Lucknow; and, on the 14th, he found himself, after desperate fighting, master of the place. On the next day, the clearing of the city of the remains of the enemy was undertaken, which was a difficult process. All those who had not been in arms against us were invited to remain, under a reasonable pledge of good behaviour, and by the end of the month the re-conquest of Lucknow was effected.

The following description of the *Times* correspondent affords a vivid idea of that city on the day of its capture :—"Those stately buildings, which had never before been entered by European foot, except by a commissioner of Oude on a state day, were now open to the commonest soldier, and to the poorest camp follower of our army. How their splendours vanished like snow in sunshine! The destruction around one, the shouting, the smashing noises, the yells of the Sikhs and natives, were oppressive. I was glad to get away just as our mortars began to thunder away at the enemy's works again. There were burning stockades, and thousands of pounds of powder near at hand. In every court there was abundance of all kinds of ammunition. . . . . It was late in the evening when we returned to camp, through roads thronged with at least 20,000 camp followers, all staggering under loads of plunder—Coolies, Syces, Kitmutgars, dhooly-bearers, Sikhs, grass-cutters, a flood of men covered with clothing not their own, carrying on heads and shoulders looking-glasses, mirrors, pictures, brass pots, swords, fire-locks, rich shawls, scarfs, embroidered dresses, all the 'loot' of ransacked palaces. The noise, the dust, the shouting, the excitement were almost beyond endurance. Lucknow was borne away piece-meal to camp, and the wild Ghoorkas and Sikhs, with open mouths, and glaring eyes, burning with haste to get rich, were contending fiercely against the current as they sought to get to the sources of such unexpected wealth."

On the re-conquest of Oude, Lord Canning issued a proclamation by which the whole proprietary right in the soil of that district was confiscated to the Indian Government, except in the case of six loyal land-holders. Sir James Outram strongly opposed this course as in the highest degree impolitic. When the news of this proclamation reached England, Lord Ellenborough, who was then President of the Board of Control, sent in reply a bitter despatch to Lord Canning, severely condemning Lord Canning's proclamation. But the course Lord Ellenborough pursued was severely criticised in both Houses of Parliament, and the ministry only escaped a vote of censure by a narrow majority. On the other hand, the Directors of the East India Company passed a vote of confidence in the wisdom of Canning's measures for pacifying the rebellious provinces. But events of the greatest importance were imminent.

The last hours of the East India Company were approaching. A body which for two centuries had governed, or rather misgoverned, millions of the human race in a manner which has been fully related in the preceding pages, had to succumb to a well-deserved fate. The general feeling in England was that the Company should be at once dissolved, and "everyone agreed that, henceforth, the Queen of England must reign, the one acknowledged mistress of our Empire, built up by the agents, and hitherto swayed in name, if not in very deed, by the chiefs of a company of chartered traders."

Early in December, 1857, the Directors had heard from Lord Palmerston, the Premier, that a Bill would be introduced into Parliament to effect the dissolution of the Company. The Directors in vain pleaded and petitioned. They urged the danger of a change in the form of government. But all to no effect. Lord Palmerston's Bill did not become law, owing to a change of ministry. But Mr. Disraeli (subsequently Earl Beaconsfield) introduced another Bill, followed by one from Lord Stanley. This Bill was read a third time on 8th July, 1858. On the second of August the Act for the Better Government of India passed under the Royal hand, and the East India Company passed into oblivion.

On the 1st November, 1858, a proclamation by the Queen was published at Allahabad, by the Governor-General, announcing the fact that the government of Her Majesty over India had replaced that of the extinct East India Company. Mr. Trotter thus describes the scene.—" It was a memorable holiday over all India, the day when this proclamation was read aloud in public places of her chief towns and stations. Amidst the booming of guns, the clanging of military music, the cheers of paraded troops, and the noise of admiring multitudes, the new charter of Indian progress became a widely acknowledged fact. In the hill-girt harbour of Bombay, in the rising port of Kurrachee, on the breast of the treacherous Hooghly, of deep-rolling Irrawaddy, the flags of a hundred vessels waved in mid-air from a thousand points; while at night, both on land and water, burst forth in all directions, the gladdening lustre of fireworks, blue lights, and countless coloured lamps. Bombay's unwarlike fort blazed above the neighbouring water from top to bottom of its many-storied houses. Mosque, pagoda, Parsee temple vied with church and chapel in swelling the full tide of glory, that still for some few hours held darkness back from her accustomed sphere. Rejoicing crowds buzzed along the bazaars, or blocked with carriages the European esplanade. There was feasting not only of English officers, but of many a native gentleman, in other cities than Bombay alone, when translated into twenty native tongues the glad tidings sent out by Queen Victoria speedily found an echo in the farthest corners of Hindostan. Loyal addresses to Her Majesty, weighted with a host of native signatures, seemed to attest a feeling stronger than mere acquiescence in the new rule. Native journalists, and native speakers at public meetings, agreed in welcoming a manifesto which promised to clear away all grounds for mistrusting British policy in things religious, and to raise some noteworthy fruit from principles hitherto neglected, however loudly professed."

In making public the proclamation, the Governor-General announced that henceforth all acts of the Government of India would be done in the name of the Queen alone, and he called upon the millions of Her Majesty's native subjects in India to yield a loyal obedience to the call, which, in words full of benevolence and mercy, their Sovereign had made upon their allegiance and faithfulness.

The result of the proclamation, owing to the prudence of Lord Canning and Lord Clyde's (Sir Colin Campbell) military skill, was the complete destruction of the rebellion. By the end of December, Oude was reconquered. In the April following (1859) Tantia Topie, the ablest leader of the mutiny, was executed at Seeprie. The remainder of the rebels were either executed or punished by imprisonment for life. The fate of the notorious Nana has been variously stated. It is said that he died in Nepaul, in 1859, but there seems some doubt of this statement. Thus at last disappeared one of the most terrible events of history that has yet been recorded in the annals of the world.

The truth of the adage that troubles never come singly, was evidenced at this period in the history of India. Scarcely had the native mutiny been quelled when one sprung up among the old Company's European troops. It has been remarked that:—" The men of the local regiments had been deeply, wantonly aggrieved by the shabby indifference of their new masters to a claim which common gratitude, justice, and prudence would have at once allowed. Without a question asked, or a choice offered them, they had been handed over 'like a lot of horses' from one service to another. . . . . It was not that most of them had any thought of leaving the new service; all they asked was the power to choose for themselves between a free discharge and re-enlistment in the usual way. Nearly all were willing to accept a moderate bounty and serve again."

Lord Canning, at the advice of Lord Clyde, reviewed his decision. In June, 1859, a general order was issued, by which every soldier enlisted in the name of the late Company might take his discharge, with the grant of a free passage to England. But none who accepted these terms were permitted to re-enlist in India. The 5th Bengal Europeans entered on the verge of mutiny, one half refusing to obey orders, while many thousands accepted the discharge, and returned to England. Eventually, in the summer of 1860, against the protests of some of the leading Indian generals, the home government resolved on amalgamating the two armies. Consequent on this but few of the old Indo-European regiments were left, their discontent having

been not only excited, but aggravated, by the illiberality of the British Ministry.

At the conclusion of the mutiny in 1859, numerous changes took place in the civil government of India. Sir John Lawrence returned to England to take a seat in the newly-formed India Council. Lord Elphinstone, whose prompt action in Bombay largely aided in suppressing of the mutiny, went home to die. Sir James Outram resigned his seat in the Legislative Council. New legal appointments were made. Natives were made eligible for office in the High Courts of Justice, and the English system of "going on circuit" for civil and criminal cases was established. A new Code of Criminal Procedure was introduced into India. The Calcutta Council was remodelled, and similar councils were established in Bombay and Madras.

But the Indian financial condition became a source of difficulty. The expenses caused by the mutiny had been very great, and a reduction of expenditure, or an increase of income, became a matter of necessity. At the end of 1859, Mr. (Sir) James Wilson, who had been previously a leading member of the Board of Control in England, and proprietor and editor of the *Economist* newspaper, was selected by the English Government to go out as a financial reformer of Indian affairs. On his arrival he proposed taxes on income, licenses, and tobacco as a means of increasing the revenue; and the plan came into operation in 1861, despite many remonstrances from interested parties. But Wilson did not live long enough to see the effects of his financial proposition. Overcome by the climate, he died 11th August, 1860. This event led to the appointment of Mr. Laing, another English financier. Mr. Trotter remarks that "under his governance the work begun by his predecessor was ably carried out. Everything was done to check the outgoings from a still low exchequer, and to encourage the free development of India's latent wealth. Army expenses were sternly cut down. The duty on raw produce was still further lowered; that on salt slightly raised. Mr. Wilson's plan of a paper currency was eagerly taken up, and moulded into a practical shape. For the first time in British Indian experience, it became possible to travel outside of Calcutta with bits of paper money, instead of bags of cumbersome rupees. At the same time, a fresh spur was given to the carrying out of great public works. In a like spirit did Lord Canning himself issue decrees for the selling of waste lands to the highest bidder, and the redeeming of the land-revenue, on terms well suited to the wants of English settlers."

But another difficulty, which has been repeated to the present time, arose in India. Famine broke out in the North-west Provinces in 1860-'61. Its worst ravages were felt about Delhi, Agra, and Ambala. For months, in 1861, millions of starving wretches wandered about in search of food, or quietly died at home. In spite of the aid that flowed in from India and England, over half a million people died of sheer starvation, besides multitudes who died of a lingering death. Floods and cholera followed, and of thousands that escaped the effects of the famine many died from disease.

In November, 1861, a gorgeous scene was enacted at Allahabad. The newly-instituted order of the Star of India, as a reward for faithful service, was then conferred by Lord Canning, in the name of the Queen, on some of the most eminent of her Indian subjects, for their loyalty during and after the mutiny. On the same day, in England, at Windsor Castle, her Majesty conferred the same honour on Sir John Lawrence, Lord Clyde, Lord Harris, and other Anglo-Indian heroes. Sir Hugh Rose had already received the investiture at Lord Canning's hands. Pensions, awards of lands, and other substantial rewards, were also bestowed on English and native residents in India, for for their past services.

Peace having been restored throughout the empire, attention began again to be paid to its material development. New railways, roads, and canals were undertaken, and other public works, such as barracks, fortifications, civil offices, lighthouses, &c., were commenced. The general trade of the country showed decided signs of progress, especially stimulated, in regard to cotton production, by the civil war that broke out in the United States in 1861, which, to a large extent, deprived English manufacturers of their previous supply of cotton from America. The imports and exports of Bombay exceeded in 1861, by £10,000,000, those of 1857, and in ten years the Custom revenue of Bengal had nearly trebled itself.

Lord Canning did not live long as Governor-General or Viceroy to see the development of his policy. Lady Canning

died in November, 1861, and in March, 1862, Lord Canning left Calcutta for England. He did not long survive his arrival in this country, as he died on 17th June, 1862, at only about the age of fifty. He fell a victim to the climate and the misfortunes of India.

Numerous have been the criticisms on his government. We quote the following from Mr. Trotter's "History of the British Empire in India.":—"In the six years of his Indian government, Lord Canning had gone through a whole lifetime of experience, at once strange, awful, unforseen. Few men so circumstanced would have come out of the ordeal with greater credit; many would not have come out half so well. While he was yet new to his work, before he had learned to swim without help from his official bladders, the successor of Lord Dalhousie had to battle with a storm which even the might of a Dalhousie could not have easily overcome. If none of those around him saw what was lowering, his own blindness, however unfortunate, need not to be reckoned much to his dispraise. After the storm had burst, indeed, a quicker, clearer intellect, would at once have felt the danger, have risen to the occasion. Dalhousie would have quelled the mutiny in its spring. But Lord Canning was no Dalhousie, only an upright, high-minded English gentleman of average talent, very slow perceptions, and unbending firmness. No man could cleave more tightly to a purpose once formed; but few men were ever slower in mastering the preliminary details. Once let him see the way he ought to go, and nothing mortal could make him swerve from it. There is no finer scene in Indian history than that when the last of the Company's viceroys stands forth, calm in the strength of his righteous purpose, stately in the pride of place and patrician training, amidst a roaring sea of hostile criticism, lashed into even wilder rage by the blasts of an armed rebellion. Against that seeming marble the whole strength of popular ill-feeling, the maddest utterances of British fury burning for a boundless, blindly, heathenish revenge, fret and worry themselves in vain. Like the captive tied to the stake he may feel, but will never flinch under the blows and taunts of his savage persecutors.

"In the darkest days of the mutiny Lord Canning never lost his head, never yielded to the councils of time-serving cowardice or panic-stung revenge. His cool courage won the respect of those who most keenly resented the slowness of his movements. Firm, even to stubbornness, in what he deemed to be the right course, he was sure to command the moral sympathies, even of those who rated lowest his general powers; his strong sense of justice, and his honest eagerness to do all his duty, to gain all knowledge needful towards that end, went far to atone for the statesman's inherent drawbacks. Of administrative talent he had a middling, not a remarkable, share. His subalterns might respect, they seldom, if ever, worshipped him, as Wellesley or Dalhousie had been worshipped by them. To inspire enthusiasm was neither his fate nor his *forte*. Brave, impartial, honest, he had little breadth of view. His very impartiality partook of the mere lawyer's rather than the statesman's view. Hence his gagging of the English as well as of the native press, the sweeping harshness of his first dealings with the beaten insurgents at Oude, and his stubbornly, ungenerous conduct towards the aggrieved regiments of the local European force. Slow to learn and to unlearn, he did few things thoroughly, not a few things too late. On the whole, his Indian career might be called a succession of stumbles, relieved here and there by a happy recovery. In his last years the mistakes were certainly fewer, the successes more appreciable. Even at the last, however, his besetting weakness left others to carry out that settlement of the North-West Provinces, on which Lord Canning had set his heart. Still, after all deductions, his name will stand fair in English memories as that of a brave, true-hearted English gentleman, who encountered, on the whole, with credit, the two-fold misfortune of a sudden rebellion and a predecessor unmatched in Indian history."

Attention has already been called to the state of Indian finance at this period, and the efforts of Mr. Wilson, in 1860, to effect reforms in that department (see page 469, *ante*). One of the latest proceedings in the House of Commons, of the Session 1862, was the annual statement respecting the finances of India, which was made by the Minister for that department, Sir Charles Wood. Some additional interest was imparted to this statement by the dissension on several material points of financial policy between the Secretary of State for India and Mr. S. Laing, who had been sent to Cal-

cutta as successor to the late Mr. Wilson. The disapprobation which had been expressed of some of Mr. Laing's financial statements by Sir Charles Wood in his despatches, had led to the resignation of his office by the former gentleman; but his views had been received with much approbation in Calcutta, and had met with the support of some influential persons at home, who considered that he had been rather summarily treated by his chief, and that his confessedly valuable services had not been properly appreciated. The fact that Mr. Laing had no seat in the House of Commons naturally precluded Sir Charles Wood from the same freedom of comment on his proceedings which he would probably have used had his opponent been present; but in the statement which the Secretary of State was called upon to make, it was impossible to avoid some reference to the recent controversy between them. The Right Hon. Baronet commenced his statement by some remarks upon the topics of difference between himself and Mr. Laing, expressing his regret that any personal question should be involved in the matter. He complained of the extreme inaccuracy of the accounts transmitted from India, which, he said, had been a source of the greatest annoyance to him, and which deprived the public of the means to know, what they ought to know—the real state of Indian finance. He then gave figures proving the inaccuracy of these accounts for 1860 to 1862 inclusive, and the estimate for 1862-'63. The result in 1862-'63 was, that Mr. Laing had over-estimated his probable surplus by about £1,000,000, and having remitted taxes to the amount of £725,000, he had really a deficit of revenue for that financial year. He exposed other apparent weaknesses and errors in Mr. Laing's calculations. He then discussed the question as to the loss by exchange of the rupee into sterling money in the railway accounts, being 2d. per rupee, which loss had been omitted in the accounts sent from India, insisting upon the fallacy of the reasons assigned by the Indian Government for their omission. Sir Charles Wood then stated what had been the finances of India for the three years, 1860-'61, 1861-'62, 1862-'63, in each of which there was a deficit, which, however, he hoped, by the end of 1862-'63, would disappear, and he thought that a sound system of Indian finance was approaching. He stated the progress made in public works, and that the growth of cotton was increasing. He expressed his opinion that it was not the duty of Government to interfere in the cotton question; that an adequate demand would induce an adequate supply; but all assistance needed by cotton merchants in conducting their own transactions, should be afforded. He adverted to the changes that had been made in the Indian Councils and the Governmental departments, and in the law tribunals of India; to the state of the Civil Service, and to the reductions in the army. He dwelt upon the good effects which had resulted from the policy that had been pursued towards the native princes of the country, and from the measures which had been taken to create an intermediate class connected with the land between the chiefs and the peasantry. In addition to these measures, the merit of which was due to Lord Canning, the Government had determined, as a proper complement, to carry out, as soon as practicable, throughout British India, a permanent settlement of land tenures. Our Indian Empire had suffered a shock which had left its lesson. Our power had been sustained by military strength; but a source of still greater strength would be found in the attachment of the people of India. In conclusion, Sir Charles Wood pronounced a high eulogium on the character of the late Lord Canning, who, he declared, had brought "the finances of India into their present state by reductions carried out with a firm and unsparing hand. He conciliated the affections of all the princes, chiefs, and great landowners in India. His name has been a tower of strength, continued, as I have no doubt it will be, by the noble Lord (Lord Elgin) who has succeeded him, supported by the Government." As a proof of the esteem that Lord Canning was held in throughout India, Sir Charles Wood quoted an address that had been presented him by the inhabitants of Benares, a city which Sir Charles stated was the most bigotted in Hindostan. Such a testimony was most honourable, as it was offered by a society as little likely to regard favourably Christian rule as any to be found within the borders of the Indian Empire.

We next turn to the government of Lord Elgin, who succeeded Lord Canning in the viceroyship in 1862, and in doing so, it may be desirable to trace briefly his antecedents, as fitting him for the position to which he was chosen. Born in 1811, he

was chosen at the early age of 35 (1846) as Governor of Jamaica. From 1846 to 1854 he was Governor-General of Canada; he became, under the Home Government, Postmaster-General. In 1859, after a varied career, he was appointed plenipotentiary in China, and also in 1860. In the latter year a strong expedition was fitted out to proceed to the Chinese seas, for the purpose of forcing on the Emperor of China the execution of the treaty of Tientsin, already referred to at a previous page, and obtaining reparation for subsequent outrages. General Sir Hope Grant, then in India, was appointed to the chief command, and several Sikh regiments volunteered to serve. They proved to be efficient soldiers. The French joined in the expedition, and Baron Gros was appointed French plenipotentiary, to act with Earl Elgin. Mr. Bruce had, on the part of the British Government, issued on 8th March, 1860, an ultimatum to the Chinese, demanding reparation for insults, and the fulfilment of the treaty already existing (1858). Lord Elgin and Baron Gros left Ceylon, and arrived at Hong-Kong on 21st June, 1860, proceeding without delay to Shanghai. In August, active operations were commenced, commanded chiefly by Indian officers. In the end of this month, in consequence of the professed desire of the Chinese Imperial Commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace, Lord Elgin, in the belief that they had full powers for the purpose, desired his secretaries, Messrs. Parkes and Wade, both thoroughly acquainted with the Chinese language, to wait on them with the draft of a convention, stating the terms upon which alone peace could be concluded. But doubt rested in respect to the powers of the Chinese Commissioners, and Lord Elgin took the decisive course of telling the Commissioners that he had determined on an advance to Pekin, the capital of the Chinese Empire. On the 9th of September, therefore, the English and French forces commenced their advance. A curious incident occurred. Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, Captain Brabazon, were taken prisoners by the Chinese, and the first two, accompanied by a sowar carrying a white flag of truce, were brought before San-ko-lin-sin, who received them with rudeness and insult, and barbarously treated them. Eventually these prisoners were released, and allowed to return to the allied camp. Preparations were made for bombarding Pekin. On the 6th October the Summer-Palace of the Emperor was seized by the allies, and thoroughly looted by the allied soldiery. The following is an amusing description of this act, given by an eye-witness :—

"The Summer-Palace is about five miles by a circuitous road north-west of this camp, outside the earthwork. A description of it is given in 'Stanton's Account of Lord Macartney's Embassy,' and in other works on China; but no pen can adequately describe in full the scene that has taken place there within the last two days. Indiscriminate loot has been allowed. The public reception-hall, the state and private bedrooms, ante-rooms, boudoirs, and every other apartment, has been ransacked; articles of *vertu*, of native and foreign workmanship, taken, or broken if too large to be carried away; ornamental lattice-work, screens, jade-ornaments, jars, clocks, watches, and other pieces of mechanism, curtains and furniture—none have escaped destruction. There were extensive wardrobes of every article of dress; coats richly embroidered in silk and gold thread, in the Imperial Dragon fashion; boots, head-dresses, fans, &c.; in fact, rooms all but filled with them; store-rooms of manufactured silk in rolls, such as may be bought in Canton at twenty to thirty dollars per piece." Such was the first good fortune that fell to the lot of the allied soldiers.

On the 12th, preparations for the bombardment of Pekin being complete, the Chinese Government were informed that the cannonade would be opened on the next day unless the city were previously surrendered, and one of its gates placed in the hands of the allies. The result was that the demand was at once acceded to, and the gate was thrown open for the entry of the English and French troops, the Emperor having already abandoned Pekin on the pretence of going on a hunting expedition. Lord Elgin, to expiate the murder of several British subjects, determined, as an example to the Chinese, to set fire to the Summer-Palace. Eventually, on the 24th October, 1860, a convention was signed, by which reparation was exacted from the Chinese, and, ratifications having been duly exchanged, the allied forces evacuated Pekin on the 5th November, retiring to Tientsin.

By his energetic conduct in this affair, Lord Elgin showed his power of dealing with Eastern potentates, and their deceitful diplomacy, and hence became the fitting

successor of Lord Canning early in 1862. The brief viceroyship of Earl Elgin was characterised by prosperity. The portion of the time devoted by the Home Legislature during the Parliamentary Session was very small; but the circumstance may be regarded as a favourable indication of the steady advance of India to wealth, and the absence of any political complications to disturb its internal condition. Since the great change in the administration of the country by its transference to the Crown from the old East India Company, there was a marked improvement in its material prosperity, especially in the financial department. When, in the latter part of the session of 1863, the Secretary of State for India presented his annual statement of finance, he was able to congratulate his hearers upon the improving prospects which, after a long period of despondency, had dawned on the country. When the estimate was submitted to the House of Commons for the year 1862-'63 it was expected that the deficiency for the financial period would have been £600,000, whereas it was only £56,000, and it was expected that the surplus for 1863-'64 would amount to £816,000. The total sum applied to public works amounted to £5,237,000, but, including the guaranteed interest to railways, to £9,237,000. In summing up his account for 1862-'63, under Lord Elgin's administration, Sir Charles Wood remarked that:—"Throughout the length and breadth of India we hear of a progress and prosperity which must be deeply gratifying to all who have the interests of that country at heart; and from all quarters I receive assurances of the contentment and loyalty of the people. Although the material improvement has been owing to the development of the natural sources of India, still I believe that the measures which have been proposed by the Government, and passed by Parliament, have contributed not a little to this very satisfactory state of things. The natives have been admitted to the highest positions. They have been placed in the Council of the Governor-General, on the Bench, and in other situations of high trust and dignity. The people are, I hope and believe, convinced that India is governed by us for the benefit of the great mass of their population. In referring to these results I should not be doing justice to my own feelings if I did not express my obligations for the assistance I have derived from the Council, and the support which the House has uniformly afforded me."

Lord Elgin's governor-generalship was not destined to last long. In the autumn of 1863 he started on a tour of inspection of the north of India, with the intention of visiting Cashmere. Lady Elgin accompanied him, as did the secretaries and other officials. On the 13th November he incurred an unwonted amount of fatigue by ascending, on foot, one of the Himalayan passes, and was almost immediately seized with illness. Up to the 19th he was fully conscious, made his will, and gave instructions for his burial. He died on the following day.

Sir John Lawrence, whose name has already been so frequently mentioned in connection with the mutiny of 1857 (see p. 465, *ante*), succeeded him. Before entering further into the details of his government, a brief biography of him may be desirable, in more detail than has yet been given, considering the enormous services he rendered to our Indian Empire, and even incurring the necessity of repeating some of the details of his acts already given. Sir John Lawrence was the son of a colonel in the army, and was educated for the Indian service. His father was an Ulster man, and Ireland can therefore claim the Lawrences among the number of her distinguished sons who have won renown in Asia. At Haileybury his college career was one of remarkable promise, and at the age of eighteen he was nominated to a writership, and proceeded to India. Like Clive, he climbed from the lowest to the very highest position, but, unlike Clive, his memory is irreproachable. From 1829 to 1840 he rose in the Indian Civil Service step by step, and then returned for two years to England. On his return the remarkable ability he manifested as magistrate and collector in the Delhi territory brought him prominently under the notice of the Governor-General, by whom he was nominated to the post of Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej Provinces. At the close of the second Sikh war, Sir Henry Lawrence and his brother John, afterwards Lord Lawrence, were appointed by Lord Dalhousie to the Board for the administration of the Punjab, a district more than 50,000 square miles in extent. (See *ante* p. 465). Such was the vigour and ability with which the newly-annexed province was administered, that though it had previously been the most prolific hotbed of disorder, in seven years it had become so prosperous,

contented, and peaceable, that when the Indian Mutiny broke out, so far from sharing in the revolt, its loyalty was a tower of strength to British rule. "Peace hath her victories, no less renowned than war;" and if Lord Gough added lustre to our arms by the brilliant campaign that ended with Goojerat, the Lawrences added immense strength to our power by teaching the conquered to respect our authority, and to admire the equity of our rule. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 only brought out the splendid qualities of many of those who held civil and military commands. Sir Henry Lawrence fell at Lucknow. His brother John organised a movable column of Sikh soldiery, and with characteristic energy sent on men and supplies to assist in the siege of Delhi. So great were the services which he rendered in the terrible crisis that he has sometimes been called the saviour of India. He had been created a K.C.B. in 1856; after the mutiny he received a baronetcy, and was made a K.S.I. In December, 1863, as already stated, on the retirement of Lord Elgin, he was appointed Governor-General of India, which high office he retained until 1868. His administration as Viceroy of India was most successful. Masterly inactivity in regard to equivocal and entangling engagements was his policy; but equally true is it that masterly activity animated the internal government of India. It was a time of prosperity and happiness, when the country was opened up by new railways and its resources developed in an unprecedented manner.

Though he had passed forty years in incessant work, and had well earned his repose, it was difficult for a man of such activity to rest upon his laurels; and the establishment of the London School Board afforded Lord Lawrence a fitting field for the exercise of his administrative talents, and for the gratification of his large-hearted philanthropic sympathies. The first London School Board had before it a most formidable task; all the preliminary work, which, once well done, was sure to make the labours of its successors far lighter than they would otherwise be. When the Board met, Lord Lawrence was elected chairman by a small majority over Sir Charles Reed, who was then elected vice-chairman. On Lord Lawrence's retirement at the end of 1873, all parties bore witness to his courtesy and impartiality in the chair, and to his zeal and industry in the general work of the Board. One of the latest, and not least important of the many services which Lord Lawrence rendered to his country, was when, in the autumn of 1878, he came forth from his retirement to protest against the injustice and impolicy of the war in Afghanistan. That protest was unhappily unavailing, but it was made with all the energy and perseverance which had characterised Lord Lawrence in his youth. The lengthy letters which he addressed to the papers, and the equally able speeches which he made in the House of Lords, merited more deference than they received.

Lord Lawrence had, for some time previous to his death, which occurred on June 27th, 1879, been in delicate health. He had lost the sight of one eye, and that of the other became much affected. Owing to a chill he caught, a serious illness resulted, terminating in his decease, at the above date, at his residence at Kensington. His remains were interred in Westminster Abbey. He was created Baron Lawrence of the Punjab and of Grately, in the county of Southampton (Hampshire), in April, 1869.

The administration of Lord Lawrence was one almost entirely of peace. In the financial statement made by the Secretary of State for India at the close of the Session of Parliament in 1864, in the House of Commons, it seemed also to have been one of prosperity. Sir Charles Wood, the Indian Minister, stated that the results of the year were of a most favourable character, and exhibited in a striking light the improvement which had taken place in the fiscal administration of Indian affairs since the transfer of the government to the Crown. During the three years ending April, 1862, the equilibrium of Indian finance had been so nearly restored, that upon a revenue charge of £49,000,000, the deficiency was only £50,000. At the close of the year ending April 1863, instead of a deficit the accounts showed a surplus of £1,800,000, and for the year ending April, 1864, a surplus of £257,000. This result had been mainly accomplished by the energetic efforts of Sir John Lawrence in reducing the expenditure, notwithstanding a considerable remission of the extra taxation imposed during the mutiny. In addition to this a large amount of debt had been discharged. The various sources from which the revenue was derived, opium, salt, customs, and land, were all in a healthy and thriving condition, and during the year there had been an in-

creased expenditure of £1,000,000 for public works, besides other extraordinary expenditure in respect to the survey of land, the administration of justice, &c. Among other steps that had been taken to promote the material progress of India, were encouragement given to railway enterprise, the extension of the electric telegraph, impulse of cotton cultivation, and the introduction and successful cultivation of the tea and cinchona plants. The latter has been a most important addition to Indian products, especially as the plant in the source of quinine, so essential in treating typhoid, jungle, and other cognate fevers.

Briefly we may notice that during 1864 a civil war broke out in China, which, to a certain extent, involved complications on our part. The conduct of the British Government, then under Lord Palmerston, was severely criticised in the House of Commons. The noble lord, in defending the action of the Government, stated that so far as intervention went, his policy was guided by the principle of the extension of our commerce, and all that had been done was in defence of British interests in China. There was no intention of assisting the Chinese Government in their repression of the Taeping rebellion beyond what was necessary for the protection of English trade and commerce. About the same time we were involved with some difficulties in Japan. On this subject Lord Palmerston stated that after the outrages which had been committed on British subjects in that country it would have been criminal on the part of our Government not to have demanded redress from the Japanese. Towards the close of the session, at the instance of Earl Grey, the policy of the Government towards Japan was again challenged, especially in regard to our commercial relations with that country and our treaties. Earl Russell defended the course that had been taken by Sir R. Alcock in demanding reparation for the outrages on British subjects; and eventually the policy of our Government was approved of in the House of Lords.

In 1864-'65 difficulties arose in respect to Bhotan, which resulted, however, to us as an accession of territory, at the not very serious cost of about £160,000 for the expenses of the war. In financial matters Sir John Lawrence insisted on the maintenance of the Income Tax, but he eventually yielded to what seemed a generally expressed wish of the Indian authorities, but he refused to consent to add to the duty on salt as an increased source of revenue. Some difficulties arose in reference to the treatment of the proprietors of the soil in Oude, but it was determined to adhere to Lord Canning's policy of maintaining, as far as possible, a superior class of landholders in that province. Sir Charles Wood, in his financial statement for the year, traced the progress of the revenue and expenditure for the preceding three years, and said that the improvement in the income showed the general prosperity of the country from one end to the other. At the same time the charge had gone on increasing, especially in the army, owing to the increased price of provisions, the half batta which had been granted, the Bhotan war, increased outlay for public works, and other causes. As regards the construction of public works, the people of India were inclined to sustain any burden in that direction. In two years only preceding, a sum of £13,000,000 had been expended for that purpose. The cultivation of cotton had been largely stimulated during 1865, partly owing to the increased price of the raw material which had been caused by the civil war in the United States of America. And not only so; improved processes had been adopted for cleaning, packing, &c., the cotton wool before exporting it to this country. Certainly, improvements in this respect were needed, for hitherto Surat and Madras cotton had been sent to England with a mass of seed, and other impurities, that greatly depreciated its value. He also adverted to the dispute with the talookdars of Oude, already alluded to, and stated that the rights of that class of proprietors had been established; that a very good feeling existed between them and the reyots, and that there had been no necessity of appealing to a judicial decision. After stating some details about the Bhotan difficulty, Sir Charles entered into statistics of the revenue, which, as already stated, were satisfactory.

The year 1866 opened with forebodings of commercial and other difficulties at home, political and financial. In respect to Japan, it was stated in the Queen's speech at the opening of Parliament in February, that:—"The negotiations which have been long pending in Japan, and which have been conducted with great ability by my minister in that country, in conjunction with the representatives of my allies in Japan, have been brought to a conclusion which merits

my entire approbation. The existing treaties have been ratified by the Mikado; it has been stipulated that the tariff shall be revised in a manner favourable to commerce, and that the indemnity due under the terms of the convention of October, 1864, shall be punctually discharged."

A change of ministry occurred during the year 1866. On the 9th of July Earl Derby became premier. The annual statement of the finances of India was made on the 19th of that month by Viscount Cranborne, the new Secretary of State for that department. After a few preliminary remarks, he observed that it was the practice in treating Indian finance to deal with three years. In 1864-'65 there was a deficit of £193,000. In 1865-'66 the gross revenue was £47,041,000, and the gross expenditure £47,020,000. The estimate of the revenue for the year 1866-'67 showed a deficit of £72,800. The opium tax was estimated at £8,500,000, but that was a high and exceptional estimate; and he feared too much reliance was placed on that source of revenue. This was the more to be regretted as the percentage of other sources of revenue had decreased rather than increased; and thus opium had become the essential element in Eastern finance. For the current year, 1866-'67, there would be £6,000,000 spent on public works, which was a heavy item of expenditure; but it was, in fact, a large surplus which was invested in remunerative works. The cash balances at the close of the financial year would not be more than £10,000,000. The railway expenditure had been a source of enormous success, for the repayment of the outlay was going on with extraordinary rapidity. The Great Indian Peninsula line paid 7 per cent. on its capital, and the East Indian nearly 5 per cent., though neither of them was fully opened. Education was progressing; public works—particularly of irrigation—were going on; railways were advancing; the Ganges Canal had been rendered more fitted for its great purposes, and there was much evidence of general prosperity. The future policy of the Home Government would be peace, public works, and an avoidance of the old system of aggressive annexation. Mr. Laing expressed his views that the future of India would be prosperous, and Mr. Stansfield entertained the same opinion, and fully agreed with the proposed policy of her Majesty's Government.

One Indian event of the year may be noticed. It was the death of the Bishop of Calcutta, the Right Rev. George Edward Lynch Cotton, D.D. He was brought up in Westminster School, and Cambridge. Afterwards he was appointed to a mastership in Rugby School, by the celebrated Dr. Arnold, then head-master (1836). In 1852 Mr. Cotton was elected head-master of Marlborough College, and in 1858 was nominated, on the death of Bishop Daniel Wilson, to the Metropolitan See of Calcutta, he being the sixth bishop who had held that See since its foundation in 1814. He was accidentally drowned on the 6th of October, 1866, aged 53, while disembarking from a steamboat at Kooshtea, in the Gorai river. So highly was he esteemed, that Sir John Lawrence, the Governor-General, in a formal minute, recorded the sense of the loss which the Church, and the whole population of India, had sustained through the Bishop's sudden death.

The affairs of our Indian Empire in 1867 were varied by the outbreak of the war in Abyssinia. King Theodore, of that country, had seized some British subjects, an event which is thus alluded to in a paragraph in the Queen's speech of 21st August. It ran as follows:—"The communications which I have made to the reigning monarch of Abyssinia, with the view to obtain the release of the British subjects whom he detains in his dominions, have, I regret to say, thus far proved ineffectual. I have, therefore, found it necessary to address to him a peremptory demand for their immediate liberation, and to take measures for supporting that demand, should it ultimately be found necessary to resort to force."

At the time when the above statement was made no expectation existed that war would actually break out with Abyssinia. But the reverse occurred, and Parliament was called together on the 19th of November, 1867, in order to provide the means of compelling King Theodore to agree with the British demands, by resort to force. Lord Hylton, in seconding the address to the Queen's speech, pointed out the constitutional necessity of Parliament being called together, as, by the Act of 1858, its sanction was necessary to the employment of Indian troops in military operations out of India. Generally speaking, this intention of the Government was approved of by all parties in the House of Lords. The Commons, however, in part opposed the Government policy, which was further ex-

plained by Mr. Disraeli, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (afterwards Earl Beaconsfield), who, on the 21st November, moved for a vote of credit of £2,000,000, giving a rapid history of the various causes which had led to the impending war. It appeared that the Governor of Bombay had prepared troops for the Abyssinian expedition if required during the year. Mr. Lowe charged the Government with a violation of the spirit of the constitution, in commencing the war without notice to Parliament, while preparations had been secretly made for the expedition. He also charged the Government that they had violated the 55th clause of the Act of 1858, by charging on the Indian revenues the expenses of the Indian troops to be employed in the expedition. Colonel Sykes, as an Indian veteran, held the same view in regard to the payment of the troops out of Indian revenues. After a long debate the vote was agreed to. In the discussion which subsequently arose on the charge of the expenses on the Indian revenues, which required the sanction of Parliament, according to the Act of 1858, sec. 55, two eminent authorities on Eastern affairs supported the Government. Sir H. Rawlinson argued that, as the best interests of the people of India were bound up in the maintenance of British rule and British *prestige*, the expedition was as much an Indian as a British necessity; in fact it might be described as a legitimate measure of Indian precaution, and the Indian revenues ought to bear a portion of the cost. After showing that India, always keeping a large disposable margin of forces, could easily spare what was asked, Sir Henry turned to the general question, and emphatically disclaimed the idea of annexing Abyssinia, chiefly on the ground that it could never be made remunerative, and that it would precipitate the Eastern question. In the same way of support to the Government, Mr. Laing urged, that not only India was deeply interested in the maintenance of British *prestige* in the East as was England, but that an expedition having once been decided on, it was greatly for her interest that Indian, not British troops, should be employed. She would reap substantial benefit from their employment, and would not be taxed one shilling for them; and, contrasted with former precedents, their apportionment of cost was most favourable to her. The motion was eventually agreed to in the House of Commons, as it was subsequently in the House of Lords. General Sir Robert Napier, an Indian officer of engineers (since Lord Napier of Magdala, &c.), was placed at the head of the expedition. The first detachment of troops arrived in Annesley Bay, on the coast of Abyssinia, in October, 1867. The advance guard under brigadier general Merewether, pushed on to Senafe, on the highlands of Abyssinia, and on the 3rd of January, 1868, General Napier arrived in Annesley Bay. The whole force consisted of 11,770 soldiers, most of the regiments being of the native Indian infantry, and about 14,000 followers, attached to transport, train, &c. The army marched from Senafe to Attegrath, and thence through a difficult country to Magdala. Meanwhile, King Theodore became alarmed, and treated the British prisoners more leniently. The march of our army was very difficult, owing to the rocky character of the country, but they reached the Bashilo river early in April. On Good Friday Colonel Phayre was ordered to cross the Bashilo with a reconnoitreing party, and, avoiding the road made by King Theodore, up through the Arogee Pass to the foot of Fahla, to ascend to mountain spurs, which lay on the right of that road, between the Bashilo river and Magdala, Theodore's stronghold and capital. Colonel Phayre, however, instead of marching with his whole force on the right, after he had crossed the Bashilo, divided his troops, and sent a body and a mountain battery, under the command of Colonel Milward, up the Arogee Pass; he, with a larger body of men, proceeded over broken precipitous ground to the right. At the top of the Arogee Pass stood the hill of Fahla, occupied by King Theodore, who opened fire upon the advancing column of Colonel Milward.

Fortunately, Sir Robert Napier had reached an eminence on the left, and, seeing that Colonel Milward was unsupported, he sent down the Punjab pioneers to reinforce him. A hot engagement now took place, in which our naval rocket brigade, under Commander Fellowes, and the mountain battery, under Colonel Penn, did excellent service. In the meantime the 4th regiment, King's Own, came up, and their Snider rifles did terrible havoc in the Abyssinian ranks. But the latter fought bravely; and, even after leaving 500 dead, and three times that number wounded, they

still kept up their resistance. We had no killed, and only 19 wounded.

Next morning, Mr. Flad and Lieutenant Prideaux appeared in the British camp with a flag of truce sent by the King to make terms. Sir Robert Napier, however, insisted that the British prisoners should be unconditionally surrendered, and the result was that they were all sent into our camp.

On the 13th of April, two brigades, consisting of 5,000 men, under Sir Charles Staveley, moved forward to attack Magdala itself. They marched along the road which led up to Fahla, and through what had been Theodore's camp at Islamgee to Salassee and Magdala. Of the strength of this place it is impossible to give an adequate idea. It is protected by lofty, almost overhanging, cliffs, so precipitous that a cat could not climb them, except at two points, north and south, at each of which a steep narrow path led up to a strong gateway. It was by the northern gateway, as being on the side commanded by Selassee, that our men had to effect an entrance. As the troops approached the stronghold they opened a hot fire of shot, shell, and rockets, but made no impression on the gateway, which was protected by a strong stockade. Here was stationed the King, with a small band of faithful followers, but the rest of the army had abandoned the place.

The attacking troops forced their way over the stockade, and, rushing into the fortress, speedily cut down the few Abyssinians, who died bravely fighting to the last. The King retreated to a spot higher up, and there shot himself with a pistol before the soldiers could reach him. Our whole loss was that of ten men wounded.

Sir Robert Napier at first offered to make over Magdala to an Abyssinian chief named Gobaze, who had recently made himself master of the country between Antalo and Magdala, and who had shown himself friendly to the expedition. But Gobaze declined the proposal, and, therefore, to prevent the place from falling in all its strength into the hands of the fierce Mahommedan tribe of the Gallas, the hereditary enemies of the Christians, he determined, as far as possible, to destroy it, and the town was set on fire and burnt to the ground. Upwards of thirty guns were also destroyed, and, to use the expression of Sir Robert Napier, "Nothing but blackened rock remains."

On the 20th April, Sir Robert issued an address to the army, congratulating them on their noble conduct, and the success they had achieved. In a despatch addressed by him to the Secretary of State for India, dated June 18, 1868, from Suez, he thus sums up the results of the campaign, as it affected the future of Abyssinia :—

"On the whole it may be said that the effect of our expedition on the political aspect of Abyssinia has been the following :—The province of Tigre, which we found just struggling into independence, has been somewhat strengthened and settled by us. Wagshoom Gobaze, who at the date of our arrival was attempting a strong opposition to Theodorus, should now be able to establish his position. Theodorus had acquired by conquest a sovereignty which he knew only how to abuse. He was not strong enough to protect the people from their oppressors, while yet able to carry plunder and cruelty into every district he himself might visit. I fail to discover a single point of view from which it is possible to regard his removal with regret. I think it may be said that the object of the expedition has been accomplished without the rights of any of the princes or chiefs of the country having been interfered with by us, and that the prospect of Abyssinia enjoying tranquillity is at this day fairer than it was at the date when our army landed on the coast."

Thus ended the Abyssinian expedition of 1867-'68. After the destruction of Magdala, the expedition set out on its return to India, and Abyssinia was finally abandoned by British troops.

On the 28th April the news of the successful result of the expedition reached England. The intelligence was received with the liveliest satisfaction. On the 2nd July, the despatches from the General-Commanding-in-Chief having, after some delay, been received at home, the thanks of both Houses of Parliament were proposed to be given to the leader of the expedition, his officers and soldiers. In both Houses this resolution was unanimously agreed to. It remained for the Crown and the nation to express in a substantial manner the services of Sir Robert Napier. He was raised to the Peers by the title of Lord Napier of Magdala, and an annuity was granted him out of the Consolidated Fund of £2,000 per annum.

King Theodore had a son of about seven years of age. This youth was sent to England, and in July, 1879, he had nearly com-

pleted his education at the celebrated Rugby School, previous to entering the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich as a cadet. Thus, in the course of a few years, an African barbarian was converted into an educated Englishman.

The internal condition of India in 1868, the last year of the viceroyship of Sir John Lawrence, calls for little remark. In the House of Commons a debate on the merits and disadvantages of the British rule was instituted by Lord William Hay, the occasion being the publication of a number of communications proceeding from the chief British authorities in answer to a circular addressed to them by Sir John Lawrence, requesting their opinions as to the acceptableness of the Imperial administration to the native population. Considerable diversity of opinion existed upon this point in the answers returned, though the majority were favourable to British rule. Calling attention to this correspondence, and expressing his own dissent from those who gave preference to the native government, Lord W. Hay contended that the fair comparison should not be between a British state and a native state under our protection, but with a state entirely unconnected with us, or with native rule before we arrived in India; and he maintained that the real difference between British and native rule was that one was progressing and improving while the other was retrogressive, and incapable of improvement. But there was still a wide gulf between us and the native population, and this he attributed to our tendency to force our own laws and habits upon our subjects; to our carelessness in consulting the wishes of the people, and to our not employing them more generally in the administration of the country. He gave some signal instances of the legislative blunders, unfair taxation, and administrative offences which had been caused by our ignorance of native opinion. He asserted that our safety lay in the happiness and contentment of the people, and advocated a system of government in accordance with our own institutions, both in spirit and letter. Mr. Fawcett remarked that in regard to our treatment of India our faults were not in the heart, but of the head. He contended that India was suffering from centralisation, and recommended the gradual initiation of the natives in the art of self-government. Sir S. Northcote summed up the discussion, concluding that our rule in India had been of great advantage by preserving order and protecting the people from the evils of civil war, also by the example we had set to native governments. He admitted that it was our duty to gradually accustom the natives to manage their own affairs.

In regard to the financial position of India, a statement was made towards the close of the session of 1868 by Sir Stafford Northcote. The actual facts will appear in the table of statistics for 1867-'68, which immediately follows. In regard to the expenditure on public works, the secretary stated that if the charge for them in the estimate for 1868-'69 were transferred to capital (£3,092,000), there would be a considerable surplus instead of an expected deficit of £1,026,000. There had been a very careful discussion on this point in India, and he had recently laid down a rule that only irrigation and special fund works should be in future considered as extraordinary public works, and that all but remunerative works should be provided out of revenue. After showing in detail, under the three heads of land revenue, consumers' taxes, and mercantile taxes, how largely the Indian revenue had grown since 1856, he gave some explanations of what had been done in the home accounts.

It still remains a problem to make the revenue and expenditure of our Indian possessions balance. For the first time in our national history an Indian budget was presented to the British Parliament in the session of 1868-'69, by the Duke of Argyll in the Peers, and Mr. Grant Duff in the Commons. By both of these politicians a very pleasant picture was presented in regard to the financial future of our Indian Empire; but within a month of the prorogation of Parliament the unwelcome news arrived in England that the income of 1869 would be at least two millions below the estimated expenditure. This was supplemented by a statement that reductions of expenditure to that extent would be made in the current and following years. Under these circumstances a brief analysis of Indian Finance for 1867-'68 actual, and 1869-'70 *estimated*, will be of interest. The accounts are made up to the 31st March in each year, and the following particulars refer to this date ending in 1868. They are taken from the "Finance and Revenue Accounts" presented to the House of Commons in May, 1869. From these it appears that the net receipts

and expenditure for 1867-68 were as follows:—

REVENUE.

Land Revenues, from all sources ..	£18,396,679
Income Tax	583,463
Customs	2,303,033
Salt	5,349,028
Opium	7,049,415
Stamps	2,028,527
Post Office	50,585
Telegraph, deficit	272,854
Mint, deficit	32,060
Law and Justice	700,410
Police	230,988
Marine	456,888
Education	73,787
Interest	211,975
Miscellaneous	1,143,812
Army, Miscellaneous	579,112
Public Works, Miscellaneous	550,160
Total Revenue (net)	39,576,948
Excess of Expenditure over Revenue	1,610,157
	£41,187,105

EXPENDITURE.

Administration, Public Departments	£1,317,537
Law and Justice	2,544,359
Police	2,434,125
Marine	1,095,174
Education, Science and Art	783,510
Ecclesiastical	158,707
Stationery and Printing	259,186
Political Agencies and other Foreign Services	277,354
Miscellaneous	849,462
Superannuations, &c.	1,156,619
Civil Furlough and Absentee Allowances	99,159
Army	16,103,296
Public Works	5,881,257
Interest on Indian Debt	3,650,297
Ditto Home Ditto	1,452,490
Dividends to Proprietors of East India Stock	629,970
Guaranteed Interest on capital of Railways, deducting net Traffic Receipts	1,540,438
Public Works, extraordinary	602,462
	£41,187,105

In the above statement, a portion of the charges occurred in England, amounting altogether to £7,251,315. The details of this Home charge were as follows:—Administration, &c., £193,141; Marine Stores, £108,221; other charges, £60,414; Stationery and Printing, £36,457; Political Agency, &c., £35,553; Miscellaneous, £176,470; Civil Furloughs, &c., £99,159; Army Stores, £752,063; other charges, £2,747,766; Public Works, £80,988; Interest on India Debt, £64,351; Interest on Home Debt, £1,452,490; Dividends to Proprietors of East India Stock, £629,970; Guaranteed Interest on Capital of Railways, £1,540,435, making a total of charges paid or payable in England of £7,251,315.

The next point of importance is the Cash and Debt account of the Empire. From these it appears that the aggregate balances in the treasuries of India on 31st March, 1867, amounted to £11,057,054. The total debt incurred during the year was £6,673,933, and the Local Indian Surplus, £6,782,697. On the creditor side of the account there was £7,883,998 of debt discharged; surplus (money) remitted to London, £3,923,669; balance of supplies in regard to unadjusted accounts in the different Presidencies, £806,754; leaving a balance in the treasuries of India on 31st March, 1868, in favour of 1868-69, amounting to £11,899,233; giving on both sides a total of £24,513,684. The *net* receipts paid into the treasuries from each department were as follows:—Those under the immediate control of the Government, £792,967; Oude, £1,179,581; Central Provinces, £652,556; British Burmah, £999,307; Bengal, £13,920,512; North-Western Provinces, £5,283,470; the Punjab, £3,031,960; Madras, £6,507,169; Bombay, £7,380,039. The total tributes and contributions from Native States was £689,286.

As already stated, the usual period of Sir John Lawrence's viceroyship, terminated in 1868. His subsequent career has been described at page 473, *ante*, until his death, in 1879. He was succeeded by Earl Mayo. This nobleman, born at Dublin in 1822, was educated at Trinity College. In 1847 he entered Parliament as the Conservative member for Kildare. In the spring of 1852, as Lord Naas, he was appointed Chief Secretary of Ireland during the Derby administration. In 1857 he was returned for Cockermouth, for which borough he continued to sit till he succeeded to his earldom. In the second Derby administration, in 1858, he again took office as Chief Secretary of Ireland, but quitted office in the following year. In 1866 he again occupied that office. In August, 1867, he succeeded to the earldom on the death of his father.

In November, 1868, Earl Mayo proceeded to India as Governor-General, and, in his energetic and conscientious discharge of that

office he justified the eulogium passed on him by Mr. Disraeli. Soon after his arrival in India he had an important interview with Shere Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan, at Umballa, a subject to which further allusion will be made at future pages, when treating on the Afghan war of 1878-'79. Earl Mayo entered on his viceroyship in the comparative prosperity of the whole of India. The state of Indian finances in 1869, showed, as usual, a large expenditure on public works. But the revenue was rising, the imports and exports were on the increase, railways were rapidly expanding, and further loans were required for their extension, especially for a line from Lahore to Peshawur. The total estimate for the year 1869-'70 for remunerative works was £3,500,000.

Among the events of the year, especially relating to India, may be mentioned the death of Field Marshal, Viscount Gough. He was born in 1779, and entered the army in 1794. He served under Wellington in the Peninsula war, and took a brilliant part in the operation against Marshal Soult, at Oporto, in 1809. Sent out in 1837 to take command of a division of the Indian army, he was called, in March 1861, to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in China, and there greatly distinguished himself. In 1843 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India, and, in the following December, he conducted the campaign against the Mahrattas, and terminated it by the great victory of Maharajpore (see *ante* p. 452). In 1845, and the following year, he was engaged in the Sikh war, and in three memorable battles, closely following each other, at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon, he defeated the Sikhs. In 1848 he was equally successful against them. He died on the 2nd of March, 1869.

In 1868-'69 a terrible famine occurred in India; Rajpootana, as being generally scarce of water, especially suffered. To mitigate the almost annual visitation of droughts in the district, the inhabitants of this country have long had recourse to migration to more favoured spots; but, on the present visitation this resource was of little avail, as all the neighbouring districts similarly suffered. Thousands died, and thousands more threw themselves on the generosity of the adjacent British territories. In the Central Provinces the drought was universal; in the North-West Provinces there was great suffering, as was also in the Punjab, and places south of the river Sutlej. Irrigation works were commenced for the relief of the destitute, and, in the Central Provinces, every endeavour, by employment on public works, and by private subscriptions, was made to alleviate the distress. There were also some rumours of probable disturbances in the Lower Provinces, somewhat resembling those that preceded the terrible mutiny of 1857. In 1869 this took the form of a kind of religious war among a sect of Mahometans against the British power. But, by the firm exercise of power by the authorities, the danger was, at least for the present, quelled.

In the obituary of 1870, the death of Major-General Windham must be noticed. He was born in 1810. After a brilliant career, especially in the Crimea, during the Russian war of 1854-'55, he proceeded to India in August, 1857, a few days after the departure of Lord Clyde (Sir Colin Campbell), in order to undertake the command of a column. His services, in support of that general at Cawnpore, and at the relief of Lucknow, have been already related. He died on the 1st of February, 1870. Generally speaking, the domestic events of this year were not of great interest. Earl Mayo showed every endeavour to conciliate the native princes. One of our Royal Princes paid a visit to India. The Viceroy made numerous visits to the outlying districts. In regard to finance, it was stated that Lord Mayo had endeavoured, as far as possible, to pursue a policy of retrenchment; but owing to the large expenditure on public works, there was, as usual, a deficit between the revenue and expenditure. The total expenditure of the current year, 1869-'70, had been framed to show a saving of £1,500,000, but the actual surplus was only small. There was a hope of better results in 1870-'71. The Duke of Argyll, who presented the financial statement, paid a just tribute to Lord Mayo, whom he described as most anxious to secure the benefits of British Government to India, and was unsparing in the use he made of his time for that purpose, especially in regard to the finances. He had even taken the unusual step for a Governor-General, of charging himself departmentally with the conduct of public works in India, and had taken an energetic part in the discussion of the Council with respect to them. Lord Law-

rence severely criticised the policy of the Government in respect to the Abyssinian war and the telegraph system, the charges of which had been thrown on the Indian revenue.

In 1871 the general course of events in British India require but brief notice. Society was generally peaceful, and public works, &c., showed a steady and material improvement. A predatory inroad of a wild tribe, the Looshais, inhabiting the forest country bordering on Assam, occasioned the only frontier disturbance. But towards the end of the year it was necessary to send an expedition of British forces to repress the marauders.

But a good deal of anxiety was occasioned during the year, both in England and India, in respect to the possible attitude of the Mussulman population, Out of the total number of 150,000,000, who inhabited British India in 1871, omitting the protected territories, about 25,000,000 were Mahometans. They were scattered unequally in numbers over the surface of the country, most numerous in the extreme north-west, in Oude and other northern wealthy provinces, in parts of Bengal, and in particular districts of the South being under Mahometan rule.

When the English became the masters of Bengal they found the Mahometans in possession. The new conquerors regarded them as paramount; the Hindoos or Gentoos, as they were then called, were regarded as a subordinate body. So much was this the case, that when, however, Hastings had leisure to turn his mind to the subject of education, and other civil wants, he recorded a minute, in which he declared:—"That learning was disappearing from the land, and that as the Government considered it expedient to retain the civil administration of the country in the hands of the Mussulmans, an institution for their education should be established. With this view he founded the Mahometan College of Calcutta." But once deprived of their supremacy as conquerors, the Moslems, both of Bengal and other parts of India, diminished in importance; the subordinate races began to assume a position more in accordance with their numerical superiority. The system of education at Calcutta was, to a certain extent, "Anglicised," and reduced, as regarded the upper classes in Bengal, ostensibly to little more than the substitution of the Hindoo college with an English education for Hindoos, for the Mahometan college with a Mussulman education for the followers of Islam. This was a cause of dissatisfaction to the Mussulmans.

But another cause existed. Much has been said on a very curious subject—the position of Mahometan true believers, and their notions respecting that position under an Infidel Government. The letter of the Koran recognizes no such position, and admits of no compromise between the supremacy of Islam and its exclusion. But the severe and unsocial tenets of every faith are gradually modified by necessity. Consequently, whatever dangers may have existed in 1871, these have been averted, to a large extent, in subsequent years. But at the period referred to, some of our Indian malcontents formed a strong and fanatical body of allies in their mountain region, beyond our jurisdiction, on the north-western frontier of the Punjab. It was well known that ever since the mutiny of 1857, communication had been carried on between the leaders and the heads of the disaffected party in Bengal, particularly at Patna and Calcutta. Trials of some of these ringleaders laid bare a series of intrigues, with very wide ramifications, implicating, no doubt, only a small, but still an active class of religionists. A sad event occurred which drew public attention to the danger. In September, 1871, the acting chief-justice of the High Court of Calcutta, Sir Charles Norman, was murdered by a native when just about to enter his court. The assassin was apprehended, tried, and executed. He was a Mussulman, of ascetic life and habits. Whether he acted purely from the impulse of sudden fanaticism, or regarded the judge as an enemy to his faith by reason of certain judicial acts which he had performed in relation to the trials of the Patna conspirators, or whether, again, he had been made the instrument of a knot of conspirators, was never cleared up. But the general Mussulman population remained faithful, although they still cherished a strong sense of the grievances of which they considered themselves the subjects. As regards minor events connected with Indian history for 1871, the following may be noticed. In January one of the most distinguished members of the Indian Council, Colonel Sir Proby Thomas Cautley, died. So early as in 1820 and 1821 he was employed as a military officer in reducing numerous forts

in Oude. In 1825-'26 he served at the siege of Bhurtpore, and was afterwards employed as a civil engineer on the Eastern Jumna Canal, in the North-West provinces. In 1858 he was selected to fill one of the new seats in the Indian Council, which he held till 1868. He was also an eminent geologist, especially in reference to India. Another Indian veteran, Major-General Sir M. Durand, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, died in the same month. His whole life was spent in the Indian service, and during the mutiny of 1857 he drove back Tantia Topee, the leader of the rebels, and thus saved Southern India. The death of Chief Justice Norman has already been noticed. Lord Ellenborough, whose name has already been mentioned in connection with Indian affairs, died in December, 1871, aged 81. He was Governor-General of India in 1842. Under his administration was undertaken the expedition into Afghanistan, under generals Pollock and Nott, which resulted in the recapture of Ghuznee and Cabul, and the rescue of Lady Sale, and other British captives. The conquest of Scinde was also undertaken during his viceroyship, but his policy in this respect led to his recall by the East India directors in 1844.

The history of 1872 was terribly marred by an incident without parallel in Indian records. Lord Mayo, the Viceroy, had held the office since 1868 (*vice* Lawrence). Well-known in early life as a Conservative politician, he exercised the utmost of his ability in India, occupying himself in frequent visitations of various portions of our Eastern empire. It was in the pursuit of this plan that, in February, 1872, he visited the Andaman Islands, which are on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, in company with several official persons. These islands are a penal settlement for the retention of native convicts of the worst class. To personally investigate some supposed grievances, Lord Mayo visited the establishment on the 8th of February, and it was evident that not sufficient precautions had been taken to prevent the danger which, perhaps by too great daring on his part, he became placed in.

The following account of the catastrophe is extracted from the Gazette of India (of February 13):—"After several posts and stations had been inspected, it was nearly 5 P.M. (February 8th), and the Viceroy decided that he would visit Mount Harriet. This is a lofty hill on the main island. . . . . After reaching the top the party descended the hill in order to embark. . . . . By the time the Viceroy reached the foot of the hill it was a quarter past seven, and quite dark, and lighted torches were, by order of an officer of the settlement, sent to meet the party. General Stewart had stopped to give orders to an overseer, and the Viceroy had walked about one-third the length of the pier . . . . when a man jumped on him from behind, and stabbed the Earl over the left shoulder." The assassin was at once knocked down and seized. It was never discovered how the man got to the position which so facilitated his object. Lord Mayo fell into the water, only uttered a few words, and died in a few seconds.

The assassin was interrogated on the spot. He declared his name as Shere Ali, and that he came from a village near Jumrood, at the foot of the Khyber; that he had no accomplices; it was his fate, and that he had committed the act by the order of God. He had used a common knife for his purpose and at the time was under sentence of transportation for life. He was tried on Feburary 20th, and immediately afterwards excuted. Suspicion was a long time entertained that the death of the Viceroy was the result of a conspiracy; but this still remains a matter of conjecture. Lord Napier, of Ettrick, the Governor of Madras, succeeded as temporary Viceroy; but was relieved of the duty by Lord Northbrook in the course of the summer of 1872.

Of the events of the year we have related only a tragic one,—the assassination of Lord Mayo, and while dealing with this sad incident the following brief notices of men who had been engaged in Indian affairs may be given:—General Chesney died in January 1872, aged 83. He undertook the solution of the problem of regular steam communication with India, and in 1835-'36 he accomplished his celebrated Euphrates expedition. General Sir Alexander Lindsay died in the same month in his 90th year, being then one of the oldest generals of the Bengal artillery. He entered the Bengal Army in 1804. General Beatson, also of the Bengal Army, died in February, aged 67. Colonel William Nicol Burns, the second of the three sons of the celebrated Scotch Poet, Robert Burns, and an East Indian officer, died in the same month, in his 82nd year. Among other Indian officers who had died in the year, were General Ash-

burnham, Colonel Sykes, ex-chairman of the East India Company; Sir W. H. Walker, General Sir P. Montgomerie; and Field Marshal Sir George Pollock, one of the most eminent of our Indian generals, aged 87.

As regards the general progress of India during 1872, a few remarks may be made. In former times the only route to India for shipping was by the Cape of Good Hope. The overland route for a long time accommodated what may be termed the passenger traffic, but was far too expensive for the transmission of "goods." But, by the energy of a French engineer, M. Lesseps, the general traffic between Europe and India was wonderfully facilitated. He conceived the idea of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez. This canal was commenced in 1856, and was opened for traffic in November, 1869. In 1872, about 1,500,000 tons of shipping passed through it, of which the greatest portion was from England. In 1879, nearly the whole of the passage and goods traffic passed through this canal, *en route* for India, China, Japan, Australia, &c. Thus the time of transit was reduced from months to weeks, diminishing enormously the cost, and, consequently adding to the profits, of nations and individuals. As will be subsequently noticed, the British Government became possessed of £4,000,000 in value of the shares by purchase from the Khedive of Egypt.

Mr. Grant Duff, in his financial statement for 1872, made comparison, as usual, with previous years. It appeared that for 1870-'71 a surplus of £1,083,000 was expected, but the actual surplus was £1,482,000. The general result for this financial year was £850,000 less expenditure, and about £500,000 more revenue. It was fully expected that for the financial year, 1872-'73, there would be a surplus of £250,000. Mr. Duff entered into a variety of details to prove this general result, but which cannot be here described. The progress of the cotton production had been enormous, having been nearly doubled since the commencement of the the American civil war—rising from £52,500,000 to about £102,000,000, as a total of imports and exports of that and other goods. The state of the Indian funds was most satisfactory, and commanded a high price in the money market, both at home and in India. In reference to the political condition of India, Mr. Duff, after referring to the assassination of Earl Mayo, and the outbreak of the Looshai tribes, already alluded to, stated that while to a certain extent India might present, socially a condition analagous to that of an apparently extinct volcano, yet he had no apprehension for the future. He used the following words, which we quote as presenting an almost exact description of the state of India from 1872 to 1879:—"I wish to give the most emphatic and categorical denial possible to the statements that one sometimes hears in society, or reads in the press, to the effect that India is in an exceptionally discontented or unprosperous state. India is usually kept out of the vortex of party here; but party passions in India rage as furiously as they do in this country. Nine hundred and ninety-nine alarmist statements out of a thousand which are repeated amongst us, with regard to Indian affairs, are mere exaggerations or fabrications of persons who are disgusted at not seeing their own particular interests forwarded by the local authorities. The letters and articles of such persons find their way to this country, and are taken *au grand sérieux* by those who do not know the secret sources of their discontent. . . . . That being so, I assert in the most unqualified manner, that if India is in a bad way, it is a fact unknown to the persons in India who are directing her destines, from Simla, or Calcutta, or Madras, or Bombay."

But financially, the Income Tax was the great source of irritation, and even Lord Mayo admitted shortly before his death that both to European and native, the increase of taxation generally might lead to a political danger, the extent of which could hardly be over-estimated. Mr. Fawcett strongly urged this point in the House of Commons, August 6th, 1872, severely condemning the Income Tax, and stating that if other taxes were properly managed, this might be dispensed with. He regarded India as if specially created to increase the profits of English merchants, to afford valuable appointments for English youths, and to give us a bountiful supply of cheap cotton on the present system of dealing with that country. He condemned the general waste and extravagance of the financial administration. But eventually the Government Budget was agreed to.

One of the events of 1873, indirectly connected with Indian affairs, but still of importance in regard to the relation of

Russian intrigues with Persia, was the visit of the Shah of Persia to England. His Imperial Majesty, Nasr-ood-deen, arrived in England, landed at Dover, in the middle of June, and was received by the Duke of Edinburgh and Prince Arthur. His visit was one constant series of fêtes. On the 20th of June he was received by the Queen at Windsor Castle, and on the same evening he was entertained by the Corporation of the City of London at Guildhall. On the 26th the Shah started on a visit to the manufacturing districts, including Manchester, Liverpool, &c. On the 5th July he left England for a visit to France.

At the end of July Mr. Grant Duff gave the annual statement of Indian finance. In the end of the financial year, 1872, there was an apparent surplus of £3,124,177, the largest that had existed since 1834. In the financial year ending 31st March, 1873, there was a surplus of £1,492,000, owing partly to economy in expenditure, a favourable season for agriculture, and extra returns in respect to opium. But Lord Northbrook, the Governor-General, had, for various reasons, determined to abolish the Income Tax, the objections to which, as revived by Earl Mayo, in 1869, have been already stated; and, consequently, for the financial year, 1873-'74, only a nominal surplus was expected. Generally speaking, the future revenue promised increase. Mr. Fawcett took a different view of the future of Indian finance, and complained strongly of the treatment which the people of India had received from the British Government. A long debate ensued on the general condition of India, showing the growing interest that was felt in regard to the finances of the country, resulting, however, in the passing of the usual resolutions. Among the deaths of the year of Indian officials the following may be noticed :—General Sir John Scott, in Afghanistan, &c., aged 76; General Brook R. Parlby, in his 90th year; Mr. John Stuart Mill, who entered the India House in 1823; Major-General W. H. Miller, who retired from the Indian army in 1860; Major-General L. Tyler, of the Punjab and Afghanistan fame; Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Vetch; General Sir P. E. Craigie; and General Sir A. Roberts.

Although our Indian empire was exempt during the course of 1873 from frontier war and political disturbances, considerable uneasiness was felt in regard to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, as threatening to the British dominion in Hindostan by the hostilities which took place between Russia and the Khan of Khiva. It was evident that by the Russian action our northern frontier was threatened, and numerous "explanations" passed between the two cabinets. But it is needless to enter into the details of the Russo-Khivan expedition, as subsequent events, to be hereafter related, removed all danger; Russia soon having her hands too full in Europe to be able to do much mischief in Asia beyond the frontiers of Persia and Turkey.

But the chronic famines of India threatened worse evils towards the close of the year. The failure of the summer rains reduced or destroyed the rice crops in Bengal and Behar, where there was a dense population. On the present occasion timely warning was given of the danger, and steps were taken to arrest, as far as possible, its evils. The Home and Indian Governments joined in efforts to provide for the wants of the destitute population. The Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, sanctioned the purchase of large quantities of rice, relief works on a large scale were commenced, and other attempts made to meet, at least, in part, this calamity.

In the opening of the session of Parliament in 1874, the following passage occurred in her Majesty's speech :—"I deeply regret that the drought of last summer has greatly affected the most populous provinces of my Indian empire, and has produced extreme scarcity, in some parts amounting to actual famine, over an area inhabited by many millions. I have directed the Governor-General of India to spare no cost in striving to mitigate this terrible calamity."

Naturally, much interest was taken in the subject, and early in February a Mansion House subscription list was opened by the Lord Mayor of London. Large sums of money soon flowed in. Lord Lawrence took up the subject with great earnestness, giving the advantages of his advice due to his long career in India. The Marquis of Salisbury, on introducing the question into the House of Lords, asked for power to raise a loan of £10,000,000 to meet the emergency. On both sides of the Houses of Parliament members rose to praise the course that Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy, had pursued. Possibly the famine might have ranged over an area holding 30,000,000 of people, but its severity had, by judicious forethought, limited it to about 8,000,000. The expendi-

ture for relief to the end of February, 1874, had been £2,500,000.

At the close of the session the Queen's speech intimated that (thanks to the energetic measures taken) the number of deaths from actual starvation had been comparatively small. In June the rains appeared, but, after all, the cost of the relief to the population was estimated at not less than £10,000,000.

Some riots took place early in 1874, owing to religious quarrels between the Parsees and their neighbours, but these were speedily quelled. In October, rumours were afloat that Nana Sahib, the notorious head of the mutineers in 1857, and perpetrator of the massacre of Cawnpore, had been found. But the man taken was proved to be an impostor; the affair, however, naturally created great sensation, both at home and in India. The affairs of Afghanistan became exceedingly threatening. The Ameer, Shere Ali, and his son Yakoob Khan, had been for years growing in estrangement. But, for the present, we but briefly notice these complications, because they will be fully detailed in respect to the Afghan war of 1878-'79, and its results, which were the death of Shere Ali, and his defeat by our troops, and the placing of his son, above-named, on the throne of Cabul. Difficulties arose with the Guicowar of Baroda, and the result of a commission of inquiry caused the Viceroy to intimate to that authority that if he did not amend his ways he would be speedily dethroned. He was suspected in November of having instigated the poisoning of Colonel Phayre, the British resident at his court. But, after investigation, nothing definite was arrived at. Of this more will be stated when the events of the year 1875 are chronicled.

On the 8th of July, 1875, Mr. Disraeli brought before the House of Commons the subject of an intended visit by the Prince of Wales to our Indian possessions. He strongly advocated it as a matter of policy, and urged that provision should be made by which his Royal Highness should be enabled to treat the chiefs he met with in a truly generous manner. The vote for this purpose was eventually agreed to, after a little hostile discussion. Before entering into the details of the Indian visit of the Prince of Wales, it may first be premised that, in 1872, the first census of the whole of the population of British India was taken; and, according to the returns then made, the total population numbered 191,307,070, living on an area of 950,919 English square miles. This gives an average of 201 inhabitants to the square mile. Not belonging to British India, but, more or less, under the control of the Indian Government, are a number of native states, covering an extent of 646,147 English square miles, with upwards of 46,000,000 of inhabitants. It was to see this country, and the teeming population which it contains, that the Prince of Wales, in the October of 1875, set out from England with the good wishes of the whole nation, and warmly-expressed hopes for his safe return. As might be expected, various reasons were assigned for this visit. Among them, it was said that it had been designed to silence some murmurs of dissatisfaction which, among the natives in certain quarters, had been noted, and which seemed to threaten, in a more or less remote degree, a breach of those peaceful relations which, since the Sepoy rebellion of 1857, had grown up again between the governed and the governing races. It was, also, hoped that it would, at least, have a tendency to check the encroaching policy of Russia, which had, by many political observers, been supposed for a considerable time to have been menacing the security of India. There were others, however, who thought that there was no substantial ground for fear relative to such designs of Russia; yet the recent acquisition, by that power, of the Khanate of Kokand, already referred to, extending over an area of 4,000 miles, might be deemed sufficient to justify grave suspicions, especially when it was taken into consideration that this territory had been appropriated in the very face of Muscovite assurances that conquest was not their object, though they were quietly annexing it to the already much overgrown dominions of the northern autocrat.

It was on a Monday evening of October, the date being the 11th of that month, in the year 1875, that an open carriage might be seen being rapidly driven into the Charing Cross terminus of the South-Eastern Railway. The occasion was one of no ordinary description, and the carriage contained the Prince and Princess of Wales. The former was mostly engaged in bowing and doffing a deer-stalking hat which he wore, to the ringing hurrahs of the people, whose acclamations were to be accepted as wishing his royal highness "God-speed" on his departure from the English metropolis on

his Indian voyage and tour. An eye-witness says, "A line of people all the way from Marlborough House had sped the departing prince with cordial greetings; but the warmest farewell was reserved for the platform at the station, where many of his numerous personal friends had assembled to to take a final adieu of their prince." Nothing could exceed the heartiness of this demonstration of friendship; and it was not without considerable difficulty that way could be made for the prince and princess to the royal saloon. A score of hands were outstretched at one and the same time, to press the prince's in a farewell grasp—a striking testimony of the cordial feeling with which he was cherished by those who had the honour of his acquaintance in private life. The confusion was great, and the adieus threatened to be long, when the Duke of Cambridge, apparently by main force, almost dragged him into the railway carriage, in which were the princess, the Dukes of Edinburgh and Connaught, and a few others of the royal family. The moment of departure had already arrived. A loud hurrah burst from the general public; the strains of "God save the Queen" vibrated through the air, and the royal train glided out of the station, the prince purposing to leave London for about seven months.

As the particulars of such a departure are not without a certain interest to a people so united and loyal as the British, it may here be chronicled, that the seventy-two miles between London and Dover were traversed in less than one hour and fifty-three minutes, including a stoppage at Ashford, where the Dukes of Edinburgh and Connaught took farewell of their brother, and proceeded to Eastwell Park. At Dover the prince received an address from its Mayor; and then, with the Princess of Wales and suite, went on board the *Castalia*. Three rockets, fired from the harbour-tug *Palmerston*, was the signal for starting. The Trinity House tender *Galatea* was brilliantly lighted, and port-fires burned, till the faces of the assembled multitude on shore glowed blood-red with reflected light. The Duke of Cambridge and other friends now took their leave, when the *Castalia* steamed off for Calais, amid the cheers of the people on the shore. At a little after 12 o'clock at midnight the prince arrived at Calais. The royal party landed in order to catch the mail-train at 1.50, when the Princess of Wales bade "good-bye" to her husband and returned to Dover, whilst he sped on his way to the French capital. He remained in Paris till Wednesday evening, when, recommencing his journey by rail, he went by way of Maçon and Turin to Brindisi, where he embarked on board her Majesty's ship *Serapis* for his voyage to India. On his way, he took Athens, that he might pay his respects to the King and Queen of Greece. Thence he proceeded to Port Said, the Mediterranean entrance to the Suez Canal, by which he continued his route to Ismailia, where he disembarked from the *Serapis* and travelled by railway to Cairo, leaving the ship to pursue its way to Suez. At Cairo he was met by the Khedive of Egypt, with whom he sojourned for three days in the Ghezirah palace. On this occasion he embraced the opportunity of visiting the Great Pyramid, which, as had been the ruins of Athens on his visit, specially illuminated in his honour. He also, in the Queen's name, performed the ceremony of investing the Khedive's son, Tewfik Pasha, with the Order of the Star of India. On the afternoon of Tuesday, the 26th of October, he left Cairo for Suez, and on the evening of the same day embarked on board the *Serapis*, to proceed on his voyage down the Red Sea.

The *Serapis* was an iron steam-vessel of 6,200 tons burden, belonging to the Indian troop-ship service of the royal navy, and was fitted with a screw-propeller and engines possessed of a nominal power of 700-horse. She was expressly prepared for the accommodation of his royal highness, his companions and suite. Her hull was painted white throughout, with a broad band of blue relieved by gold, and the Star of India emblazoned in gold on her bows. The apartments assigned to the prince were on the upper deck, and consisted of a reception-room, a drawing-room, and a dining-room, divided from one another only by curtains, so that they could be thrown into one spacious saloon for state occasions. Besides these, there were two distinct sets of private rooms for sleeping and dressing; and all the arrangements were as complete as they could be made.

On the afternoon of December 23, the *Serapis* and *Osborne* steamed up the river Hooghly, and were soon at Calcutta, capital of the Bengal presidency. As the prince proceeded in a state barge from the *Serapis* to Prinsep's Ghaut, royal salutes were fired,

and the yards of the men-of-war ships *Topaze*, *Doris*, and *Immortalité*, with those of the *Serapis* and *Osborne*, were manned in honour of his royal highness. Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy, and a distinguished assemblage of magnates, received the prince on the landing-stage, when an address was presented, and suitably acknowledged. His royal highness, wearing a field-marshal's uniform, and "looking every inch a king," then passed up the landing-stage to the platform, on which the great native princes and chieftains awaited his coming. It was a glittering throng, in the centre of which the prince presently found himself. The resplendent costumes of the Maharajahs Scindia, of Rewah, Cashmere, Benares, and Jodhpore were shining with priceless jewels. It is needless to enlarge on the frank and hearty manner in which the Prince of Wales returned the courteous greetings of these powerful Indian nobles, as well as those of Lord Napier of Magdala (the commander-in-chief), and the other distinguished Englishmen whom the prince recognised. This reception over, there ensued a procession to Government-house. The streets were lined with curious spectators, and "God bless the Prince of Wales" was sung by a choir of school children. A royal salute was fired from Fort William, and a present-arms made by a guard of honour at Government-house. This building became the residence of his highness during his stay in Calcutta. Herefrom, in the evening, he rode out to view the illuminations; and here, on Friday, December 24, graciously received the homage of the Maharajah Scindia of Gwalior, the Maharajah of Cashmere, the Maharajah of Jodhpore, the Maharajah of Puttiala, the Maharajah of Jeypore, and the Maharajah of Rewah, with the Begum (Princess) of Bhopal, the dazzling brilliancy of whose gem-decked robes and coiffures, may safely be pronounced as more suitable for description in in the pages of romance than in those devoted to history.

After Calcutta, Benares, Lucknow, Cawnpore, Delhi, and others localities were visited, we take up the record of his journey, and find it stated that on March 5th, 1876, he left Nepaul for Bareilly. Thence he proceeded, through Lucknow and Cawnpore, to Allahabad, where the Viceroy and Sir John Strachey received him, and where his royal highness invested a number of officers of his suite as Knights and Companions of the Order of India. Then ensued a visit to Holkar at Indore. On March 10th, the prince left Indore, and returned to Bombay on Saturday morning, the 11th. On Monday, March 13th, after graciously replying to a farewell address, his royal highness, once more on board the *Serapis*, said adieu to India, and, cheered by parting salutes and volleys of British hurrahs, began his homeward voyage. On his way home he visited Malta, Gibraltar, Cadiz, Madrid, and Lisbon. Wherever he went he was received with marked attention and a more than ordinary cordiality. When approaching his native shores, he was met by the Princess of Wales, and the young princes and princesses, off the Isle of Wight, before the arrival of the *Serapis* in port on Thursday, May 11th. The warmth of this family reunion is easier imagined than described. After this, leaving Portsmouth, he arrived in London, where a sumptuous banquet suitably terminated his visit to India.

As regards the financial condition of India at the period here referred to, the following statistics, giving the revenue and expenditure comparatively from 1874-'75 to 1875-'76, will be of interest. A similar table will be round at page 480 *ante*, for the years 1867-'68.

THE FINANCES OF INDIA FOR 1875-'76, COMPARED WITH 1874-'75.

REVENUE AND RECEIPTS.

Land Revenue . .	£21,503,742 +	£206,949
Tributes	726,188 +	1,216
Forest	672,528 +	89,247
Excise	2,493,232 +	147,089
Assessed Taxes . .	510 —	2,237
Customs	2,721,389 +	42,910
Salt	6,244,415 +	17,114
Opium	8,471,425 —	85,204
Stamps	2,835,368 +	77,326
Mint	110,489 —	48,532
Post Office	763,597 +	24,197
Telegraph	309,040 +	22,561
Law and Justice . .	315,992 —	5,806
Marine	227,887 —	70,638
Interest	561,189 +	17,870
In aid of Pensions and Compassionate Allowances . .	749,166 +	50,524
Gain by Exchange .	395,365 +	30
Miscellaneous . . .	281,768 +	3,624
Army	1,045,612 +	56,774
Public Works, ordinary	73,929 —	4,620
Public Works, Irrigation	517,720 +	40,972
State Railways . .	289,512 +	158,526
Total, India . .	£51,310,063	Net increase £739,892

EXPENDITURE.

Refunds and Drawbacks	£336,324 +	£16,408
Land Revenue	2,509,427 +	51,619
Forest	402,520 —	20,747
Excise	82,855 —	4,496
Customs	185,731 +	1,560
Salt	507,410 +	45,242
Opium	2,218,565 —	122,981
Stamps	106,394 —	19,057
Mint	107,626 —	23,467
Post Office	822,079 +	14,483
Telegraph	490,624 +	58,594
Treaty Assignments, &c.	1,713,724 —	24,644
Administration	1,697,365 +	90,830
Minor Departments	309,399 —	11,187
Law and Justice	2,336,447 +	38,297
Marine	627,702 +	37,656
Ecclesiastical	158,058 —	3,666
Medical	181,928 +	349
Political Agencies	429,535 +	25,312
Pensions and Compassionate Allowances	1,939,305 +	159,335
Loss by Exchange	1,429,658 +	531,780
Miscellaneous	186,761 +	65,865
Civil and Furlough Allowances, &c.	229,199 +	12,495
Provincial Services	5,153,652 +	4,908
Army	15,308,460 —	66,699
Public Works, Ordinary	2,907,795 +	348,171
State Railways	214,713 +	30,830
Famine Relief	508,554 +	1,729,306
Interest on Debt	5,178,108 +	145,621
Interest on Service Funds, &c.	385,860 +	6,292
Guaranteed Interest on Railways	975,310 —	269,552
Total Ordinary	49,641,118 —	609,856
Public Works, Extraordinary	4,270,629 +	21,058
Total	£53,911,747	Net Decrease £588,798

PROVINCIAL RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE.

PROVINCES.	Receipts.	Expenditure.
India	£2,732,649	£14,511,783
Bengal	15,496,923	6,300,749
North - West Provinces	5,957,492	2,146,256
Punjab	3,749,552	1,814,684
Oude	1,669,478	545,155
Central Provinces	997,749	674,609
British Burmah	1,746,981	856,721
Assam	561,197	369,314
Madras	8,360,488	5,932,041
Bombay	9,746,601	7,334,756
Total	£51,019,140	£40,486,068

We have only at present named one of the chief incidents of Indian history for 1875 by the Prince of Wales' visit. In the Queen's speech at the opening of the session, it was stated that an ample harvest had restored prosperity to India, and had removed the calamity of the famine.

We have already noticed, at p. 486 *ante*, the attempted poisoning of Colonel A. Phayre, at Baroda, early in 1875. The Guicowar Malharoo being suspected of complicity, a Commission was formed to investigate the question, the Guicowar being defended by the celebrated English barrister, Serjeant Ballantine. The result was that the three English Commissioners considered the guilt of the Guicowar proved; while the three Indian Commissioners held the reverse. But the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, considered the guilt of the Guicowar proved, and, under orders from the Home Government, he issued a proclamation deposing that person from the sovereignty of Baroda, declaring the rights of himself and issue to have been forfeited. But the State was not to be absorbed into the British dominions. Much comment was made on the whole affair, more especially as it appeared that the Viceroy had not deposed the Guicowar because of the supposed attempt at assassinating, but because he thought him a bad ruler.

On the 27th of April of this year the Madras Presidency lost its valued Governor, Lord Hobart. He was at once esteemed by the English, Mussulmans, and Hindoos. All received equal justice at his hands. He did much for education, especially of Mussulman girls. In regard to land and other works, he effected great progress. "When the news of his sudden death came, there was scarcely a dry eye in Madras; and crowds that would have seemed enormous even in London—Hindoo, Mussulman, European, civilian, merchant, and official—all alike lamented a benefactor." He was succeeded by the Duke of Buckingham.

Some difficulties in political affairs arose in respect to Burmah, in 1875. It had been suggested to the King that a road should be constructed through about 250 miles of his country for the purpose of creating a route for our trade between the British and Chinese frontiers. A treaty was agreed on in 1860 to that effect, but the King of Burmah took care that the British should never reap any benefit from it. In 1866 Sir A. Phayre was sent to Burmah by the Indian Government to persuade the King to carry out the stipulations of the treaty, and, if possible, to extend its provisions. But the latter entirely refused to alter his policy in reference to his infringement of the treaty in the matter of monopolies. In 1867, Lord Lawrence, then Viceroy, strongly remonstrated with the King, and eventually the

latter agreed to make a second and improved treaty. Things went on unsatisfactorily until 1874, in December of which year a mission was sent to Mandalay, the capital. One part, under Mr. Margary, proceeded from Shanghai to meet the other, under Colonel Browne, at Bhamo. Near here Mr. Margary was barbarously murdered, with all his Chinese servants. Colonel Browne was also attacked, and, after a brave defence, escaped. Strong suspicion rested on the Burmese Governor of having instigated this outrage on the part of the local Chinese authorities. Another mission was shortly after sent to Mandalay under Sir Douglas Forsyth.

Meanwhile, as the murder of Mr. Margary had been committed by Chinese, our Government insisted on reparation from that nation. Mr. Wade, the British Minister at Pekin, accordingly entered into negotiations for that purpose. But he was met with evasion, yet he remained firm, and at last forced the Chinese Government to agree to publish the text of the foreign treaty (for the protection of Europeans, &c.), and to investigate the causes which led to the death of Mr. Margary.

According to the usual plan of Eastern diplomacy, the Chinese Government delayed to carry out its promises. On the 12th of October, however, the *Pekin Gazette* published an edict enjoining the proper treatment of foreigners in China; and, still later, the Chinese Government instituted an inquiry into the causes of Mr. Margary's assassination. Thus, towards the end of the year, a Chinese war, which had been considered inevitable, was averted, chiefly through the firmness and sagacity of Mr. Wade, who, as a reward for his exertions, was created a Knight of the Bath.

Difficulties broke out in the Straits Settlements towards the close of the year, owing to the action of the Malays, resulting in the murder of Mr. Birch, our Resident. But energetic measures were taken; our troops were called out, and eventually, for the time, difficulties were repressed.

An important step as regards the future of India was undertaken at the end of November by the British Government. The announcement was made that, subject to the approval of Parliament, England should buy £4,000,000 of the shares held by the Khedive of Egypt, in his own right, in the Suez Canal. His finances, as usual, were in an embarrassed state, and the shares had been offered to several banking and other firms. The early history of this canal has already been given at page 484 *ante*. The whole affair was a clever stroke of financial and political diplomacy, under the guidance of Mr. Disraeli and Earl Derby, and the popular sentiment in England backed up a stroke of policy which was at least bold, if not prudent.

In the Indian obituary of 1875, the following may be briefly noticed:—Major-General Harding; Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm; Sir James Hope Grant, eminent for his services during the mutiny of 1857; Lord Hobart, already mentioned; Major-General Riddell; General Henry Hall; Sir Edward Ryan; Colonel F. Cunningham; and Sir H. W. Stisted, who was highly distinguished in his career in India.

The year 1876 was productive of matters of great interest in our Indian Empire. After some discussion the Suez Canal Shares Purchase Bill was agreed to. On the 17th of February Mr. Disraeli brought into the House of Commons a Bill to enable the Queen to assume the title of "Empress" in India. This step had already been foreshadowed by the Queen's speech on the 8th of February, in which the following words occurred:—"I am deeply thankful for the uninterrupted health which my dear son, the Prince of Wales, has enjoyed during his journey through India. (See *ante* p. 488). The hearty affection with which he has been received by my Indian subjects of all classes and races, assures me that they are happy under my rule, and loyal to my throne. At the time that the direct government of my Indian Empire was transferred to the Crown (in the year 1858), no formal addition was made to the style and titles of the Sovereign. I have deemed the present a fitting opportunity for supplying this omission, and a Bill upon the subject will be presented to you."

As might have been expected, a long debate occurred on the subject. Mr. Lowe especially objected to the Bill on constitutional grounds. The second reading was carried by a large majority. It was read a third time on March 23rd, and readily passed through the House of Lords. After receiving the royal assent the proclamation of the new title was made on May 1st, in London, Edinburgh, &c. The following is a copy of the original:—

Victoria R.—Whereas an Act has been passed in the present session of parliament, intituled

"An act to enable her most gracious Majesty to make an addition to the royal style and titles appertaining to the imperial crown of the United Kingdom and its dependencies;" which Act recites that, by the Act for the union of Great Britain and Ireland, it was provided that after such union the royal style and titles appertaining to the imperial crown of the United Kingdom and its dependencies, should be such as his majesty by his royal proclamation under the great seal of the United Kingdom should be pleased to appoint: and which Act also recites that, by virtue of the said Act, and of a royal proclamation under the great seal, dated the 1st day of January, 1801, our present style and titles are "Victoria, by the grace of, God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, defender of the faith:" and which Act also recites that, by the Act for the better government of India, it was enacted that the government of India, theretofore vested in the East India Company in trust for us, should become vested in us, and that India should thenceforth be governed by us and in our name, and that it is expedient that there should be a recognition of the transfer of government so made by means of an addition to be made to our style and titles: and which Act, after the said recitals, enacts that it shall be lawful for us, with a view to such recognition as aforesaid, of the transfer of the government of India, by our royal proclamation under the great seal of the United Kingdom, to make such addition to the style and titles at present appertaining to the imperial crown of the United Kingdom and its dependencies as to us may seem meet:

We have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to appoint and declare, and we do hereby, by and with the said advice, appoint and declare that henceforth, so far as conveniently may be, on all occasions and in all instruments wherein our style and titles are used, save and except all charters, commissions, letters patent, grants, writs, appointments, and other like instruments, not extending in their operation beyond the United Kingdom, the following addition shall be made to the style and titles at present appertaining to the imperial crown of the United Kingdom and its dependencies—that is to say, in the Latin tongue in these words, "Indiæ Imperatrix;" and in the English tongue in these words, "Empress of India."

And our will and pleasure further is, that the said addition shall not be made in the commissions, charters, letters patent, grants, writs, appointments, and other like instruments, hereinbefore specially excepted.

And our will and pleasure further is, that all gold, silver, and copper moneys now current, and lawful moneys of the United Kingdom, and all gold, silver, and copper moneys which shall, on or after this day, be coined by our authority with the like impressions, shall, notwithstanding such addition to our styles and titles, be deemed and taken to be current and lawful moneys of the said United Kingdom; and, further that all moneys coined for and issued in any of the dependencies of the said United Kingdom, and declared by our proclamation to be current and lawful moneys of such dependencies, respectively bearing our style or titles, or any part or parts thereof, and all moneys which shall hereafter be coined and issued according to such proclamation, shall, notwithstanding such addition, continue to be lawful and current money of such depenpendencies respectively, until our pleasure shall be further declared thereupon.

Given at our Court at Windsor, this twenty-eighth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, in the thirty-ninth year of our reign.

God Save the Queen.

The welcome given by all classes in Bengal to the Prince of Wales was an assuring evidence of the loyalty of the people towards the British Government. The wealthier natives in different places raised large subscriptions to commemorate the event by founding educational institutions, and by promoting other works of public usefulness.

Two appointments ordinarily reserved for Civil Servants were conferred on natives of good position, character, and experience. Sir R. Temple was a strong advocate of this policy, and proposed carrying it out in the future, with due regard to the claims of British officers now in the service. In the Uncovenanted Service the higher classes of native officers maintained their character for integrity.

It was determined that, in future, only natives who are graduates of the university should, as a rule, be appointed to the superior posts in either the judicial or the executive branch. Sir R. Temple anticipated much advantage to the service as the effect of this measure.

The decision, to offer for competition annually a fixed number of places in the Subordinate Executive Service was acted on in the year under report. Five successful candidates were immediately provided with appointments. These subordinate establishments were stated to be exceedingly useful, and to supply a want which had long been felt in the Lower Provinces.

The system of concentrating in the magistrate and collector all powers and functions within the limits of his district continued in force. The importance of this concen-

tration outweighed, in Sir R. Temple's opinion, the objections expressed in some quarters, while, at the same time, the magistrates were reminded that they must be careful to evince forbearance and consideration in the exercise of their greatly extended authority. The subdivisional system was completed throughout the province, and its merits appeared to be universally acknowledged.

The financial position of India at this period (1875-'76) has already been noticed (see *ante* p. 488), but the condition of Indian trade will be best understood by the extracts from a Blue-book, which give the following results:—

The total foreign trade of British India (exclusive of Government stores and treasure) during 1875-'76 was as shown below:—

—	Imports.		Exports.	
	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Merchandise.	Treasure.
	£	£	£	£
Bengal	17,767,175	1,080,545	23,747,060	745,943
Madras	3,891,939	562,352	7,205,840	272,512
Bombay	13,481,086	3,599,057	21,664,437	1,078,912
Sind	343,067	2,593	1,706,718	13,170
British Burmah	1,629,401	56,175	3,734,070	4,607
£	37,112,668	5,300,722	58,058,125	2,115,144
	£42,413,390		£60,173,269	
	£102,586,659			

Compared with the two preceding years, the results are as follows:—

—	1873-'74.	1874-'75.	1875-'76.
IMPORTS:	£	£	£
Merchandise	31,628,497	34,645,262	37,112,668
Treasure	5,792,534	8,141,047	5,300,722
TOTAL IMPORTS £	37,421,031	42,786,309	42,413,390
EXPORTS:			
Merchandise	54,960,786	56,312,260	58,058,125
Treasure	1,879,071	1,592,721	2,115,144
TOTAL EXPORTS £	56,839,857	57,904,982	60,173,269
TOTAL TRADE £	94,260,888	100,691,291	102,586,659

The total trade exceeded by 1·88 per cent. that of the preceding year, which, in its turn, had exceeded the trade of 1873-'74 by 6·82 per cent. The value of the trade of 1872-'73, however, was not reached, the circumstances of that year having been abnormal, and having left a depressing effect on the transactions of the years immediately succeeding it. The imports of merchandise increased considerably on those of the preceding year, while in the imports of treasure there was a large diminution. Under exports both merchandise and treasure showed a great advance.

The trade was divided as follows among the different Continents :—

——	Imports.	Exports.	Total.
	£	£	£
Europe	34,154,980	36,736,726	70,891,706
Asia	6 550,904	19,255,215	25,806,119
America	207,406	2,059,489	2,266,895
Africa (including Mauritius and Réunion) . .	1,156,240	1,798,229	2,954,469
Australia (including New Zealand and Tasmania)	343,860	323,610	667,470
Total . . £	42,413,390	60,173,269	102,586,659

The total of the trade with the United Kingdom was £61,146,616. Exports thither increased by £409,383; while under imports merchandise showed an advance of £1,102,544, and treasure a falling off to the extent of £2,584,707, making a net decline of £1,482,163. Trade with France increased considerably in both imports and exports. The proportion of imports to exports was only as 1 to 6·79; the figures under this head, however, exclude all the trade which is carried on through England. The trade with Italy and with Austria again showed a large increase; it has made very great strides since the opening of the Suez Canal. The total value of the trade which took the canal route during the year was 50·16 per cent. of the whole trade.

Amidst the universal felicity which had prevailed in India during the visit of the Prince of Wales, some difficulties had arisen between the Home Government and the Viceroy of India. The subject of dispute was the Tariff Act of 1875, passed by the Viceroy in Council, at Simla. Lord Salisbury, on the part of the Home Government, had previously advised the repeal of the import duty on manufactured cottons, at as early a date as the condition of Indian finance would permit. But before his despatch reached India, an Act, dated August 5th, 1876, had passed there, the principal features of which were the abolition of export duties, the reduction of import duties generally from 7½ to 5 per cent., the retention of import duties on manufactured cottons, and the imposition of import duties on long-stapled cottons. Here it may be remarked that the whole of the cotton produced in India has a short staple. Lord Salisbury, on the part of the Home Government, objected and complained that the Act had been passed in direct contravention to a rule he had imposed on the Indian Government, under which all Bills, not being measures of slight importance, or measures requiring speedy enactment, were to be submitted to the Home Secretary within a sufficient time for him to form his own judgment, and to address his remarks to the Governor-General before they passed the Indian Legislative Council.

Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy, sent his explanations in August, stating that for some time the revision of duties had been anxiously waited for in India. It was a matter of urgency. The Viceroy also stated that Lord Salisbury's "rule" was not only inapplicable to the case, but was a return to obsolete precedents. In November, Lord Salisbury replied, censuring the Viceroy's proceedings. The result was, from this or other causes, that Lord Northbrook resigned the Viceroyship.

Lord Lytton succeeded to that office. He had long been known in Europe as a literary man, and also as a diplomatist. But he had not long entered into the duties of his position, when he came under the disfavour of the Anglo-Indian communities. The circumstances which gave rise to this were as follows :—An English pleader at Agra was about to drive to church one Sunday morning, but when his carriage was brought to the door the groom was not in attendance. Mr. Fuller, the person in question, on the subsequent appearance of the groom, assaulted him, and for this he was subsequently fined for "voluntarily causing what distinctly amounts to hurt," by Mr. Leeds, the joint-magistrate of Agra. The groom eventually died from this treatment, and the fine, some 50s., was handed over to his widow. An inquiry was opened by the Local Government of the North-West Provinces, which resulted in the statement, that

while the penalty should have been heavier —50s. for killing a man!—it was "not specially open to objection." Lord Lytton very justly promulgated a severe minute on the subject, in which he censured the Local Government for its apathy, the High Court for the inadequate fulfilment of its duties and responsibilities in the matter, and the joint-magistrate who tried the case, for his error in judgment, in presuming to deal personally and summarily with so grave a charge, and for setting a very bad example, by allowing such an offence to escape with such practical impunity. The Home Government took up the question. Lord Salisbury, in addressing the students at Cooper's Hill, warned the young engineers proceeding to India in regard to their treatment of the natives, and stated that the Prince of Wales, during his recent tour in India, had frequently been pained by the arrogant manner he had seen adopted against the natives. It was stated that the letters of H. R. H. to the Queen, while on his Indian tour, urged frequent complaints of the demeanour of the Indian officials towards the native princes and common people, and it was hinted that the Queen, before Lord Lytton departed from England to become Viceroy, urged on him special efforts to correct such abuses.

In 1875-'76 attempts were made to commence the manufacture of cotton fabrics in Bengal by aid of English machinery. It seems remarkable that, up to this period, we could import Indian cotton into England, manufacture it into yarn and cloth, and sell these as exports to India, at a lower price than that produced by the natives. Of this we shall have to speak more fully hereafter. Remarks and statistics in respect to financial matters have already been given.

A curious meteorological incident occurred as a cyclone, on 31st October, 1876, of which a special account was given by Sir R. Temple, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Immense waves floated to the land for about two hours. People were borne by the water to the tops of adjacent trees, with the wrecks of their houses. Sir R. Temple estimated that in an area of 3,000 square miles, out of over one million persons suddenly thrown into more or less danger 215,000 must have perished. In some villages the loss ranged from 30 to 70 per cent. of the inhabitants.

The events of Indian affairs in 1877 were of a very important character. On the 1st of January an assemblage of the principal chiefs and nobles of India was held by the Viceroy at Delhi. Here her Majesty's new title of "Empress of India" was proclaimed amid great rejoicings, and great evidences of loyalty. On the same day durbars for the reading of the proclamation were held in each district or division throughout British India. The number of Indian and European personages of *altesse* much exceeded the most sanguine expectations. The Viceroy arrived at the place of assemblage a little after noon, and took his seat on the throne with the usual formalities. The Queen's proclamation was then read in English by the chief herald, and afterwards in Urdu by the Foreign Secretary. The usual salutes, &c., were fired. After a pause the Viceroy delivered an address, in which he expressed her Majesty's wishes in respect to the future progress of her Indian dominions. He acknowledged the loyalty of the Native chiefs, princes, &c.; and, in reply, many of them spoke in the most loyal manner. For several days the rejoicings were kept up, and a review of the troops on the 5th of January concluded the pageant.

The most signal act of grace, to which the natives of India attached much importance, was the release of nearly 16,000 prisoners in the various provinces of India. Under the careful supervision of Sir Edward Bayley, no evil resulted from this apparently perilous course. An amusing part of this programme was the release of prisoners for petty debts. A rich money-lender in the Central Provinces, at whose suit several debtors were in gaol, as soon as he heard that all of them who owed him under 100 rupees, had their debts paid by the Government, at once sent releases to all the rest. In fact, generally throughout India, the recognition of her Majesty as Empress, was not only loyal, but evinced an amount of good-heartedness which was shown as much by the heart as by the sense of the native population.

But this happy rejoicing was followed by a terrible event. Famine again broke out. The summer rain of June and July partially, or wholly failed over many districts of Southern India. Over these tracts, containing a population of at least 26,000,000, the inhabitants depended entirely on irrigation to obtain their crops. They stored the water in tanks in cases of emergency. In Madras the rainfall usually comes in October, and in 1877 this was deficient.

With the famine of the previous year, already described, it is needless to add that the prospects of 1877 were very bad. During the spring and summer of 1877 hopes were entertained that the season might be favourable. But up to August such hopes were disappointed. Providentially the autumn rains came to the rescue. But at the period of maximum distress (August), there were 2,500,000 persons on gratuitous relief. Between January, 1877, and September of the same year, the births numbered 362,719, while the deaths amounted to 1,111,980, showing an increased mortality due to famine, of about 700,000 persons in one district only.

It is almost needless to add that British sympathy was again evoked. At the end of the year the Mansion House Fund of the City of London amounted to about half a million sterling, of which £475,000 had been sent to India for distribution in the famine districts. Of course, the question became one of discussion in the British Parliament, and many suggestions were made. Every endeavour was made to alleviate the distress. But famines in India have become periodic, and as such they must not be met by special or spasmodic efforts, but by a provision for these constantly recurring circumstances. Simple discussion between the policy of partisans will certainly not feed a starving people, nor can any knowledge that science affords us, at least, for the present, do more than alleviate such periodic distresses. Man is all but powerless in most cases when nature presents certain obstacles to his efforts, and our Indian empire, in many districts, presents these apparently insuperable difficulties.

It will, perhaps, be most convenient, although not in exactly chronological order, to give consecutively an account of the Afghan War of 1878-'79, and subsequently to deal with purely Indian affairs for the same period. Of course, as regards recent events, the history of Shere Ali is of the most interest.

We have already stated the earlier events that led to this war. Shere Ali attempted to avert it by casting all the blame on the Indian Government. In a letter dated the 6th of October, 1878, sent by him to the Viceroy of India, are the following remarks:—

"Be it known to your Excellency (Janáb) that your Excellency's friendly letter, which was sent by the hands of the highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, and which contained the news of the deputation of a friendly Mission, namely a Mission from the British Government, has been perused by me; and on perusal I have fully informed myself of its contents. But the above-named Nawab had not yet been honoured with an interview, and your Excellency's friendly letter had not yet been seen by me, when a letter addressed by Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, to Mirza Habibulla Khan, an official of this God-granted Government, having arrived here, was perused by this supplicant before the throne of God. And great surprise and astonishment was caused by the writing of the officer above mentioned—that is, the Commissioner. What can be the result, meaning, and advantage of such a vehement communication to an ally and friend, and of advancing by force a friendly mission in this manner. Subsequently three more letters from the same officer, in the same tone and style, to the address of the officials of this God-granted Government, were seen. Moreover, in the course of a few days, several other letters, which were received from that direction, were seen. These were not free from harsh and rough words and expressions, which are inconsistent with the forms of courtesy and civility, and contrary to the mode of friendship and sympathy. In consequence of the attack of grief and affliction which has befallen me by the decree of God, great distraction has seized the mind of this supplicant at God's threshold. The trusted officers of the British Government, therefore, ought to have observed patience, and to have stayed, at such a time; and this would have been the most commendable and appropriate course. Your Excellency should be pleased to have regard to (mulahaza farmáyand) this harsh (style of) address and provocation, as well as to the altercation with such anger with my officials. How inconsistent is this with the sublime way of friendship and alliance! In any case the officials of this God-granted Government, notwithstanding the threatening communications of the officials of the British Government, which communications are still in the possession of the officers of this Government, will not evince any hostility or opposition to the British Government. Moreover, they do not entertain any hostile or antagonistic feelings towards any Government whatever. But should any Government entertain without cause any hostile and inimical feelings towards this God-granted Government, I commit all my affairs to the merciful God, upon whose will and intention all matters depend. He alone suffices for us, and He is the best to be trusted. The highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, who is the bearer of this friendly letter, has, in accordance with the instructions received from the officers of the British Government, asked leave to return, and the requisite permission has been granted."

It has been well remarked that much of the history of a country depends on that of its rulers. In the preceding pages this has been abundantly shown in respect to India generally. In Eastern countries the statement may be taken as a historical maxim. In Europe we may trace the same idea. England has had its Alfred the Great; France its Charlemagne; Russia its Peter the Great. Germany and other countries may also be instanced for a similar purpose; and in the New World the name of Washington is revered as the father of the United States of America. In a minor degree, Shere Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan, who died in 1879, both in himself and in his ancestors makes a mark in the history of Afghanistan. Consequently it may be desirable to give a detailed account of his life before entering on a full description of the war between that country and ourselves, which, from causes that will be subsequently explained, broke out in 1878. In Asia the death of a man is the knell, frequently, of a state. The year in which Shere Ali first saw the light of day is not known, but he was probably born about the year 1820. Neither is it clearly ascertained where he came in order of seniority among the twenty-two sons who claimed Dost Mahomed as their father. Of the best known of these he was, however, the fifth. Akbar Khan, the murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, died in 1848, and his children, Futteh Mahomed and Jellaluddin, were completely ignored in the subsequent disputes in the succession to the throne. They played no inconsiderable parts in the civil war, and one of them was among the stanchest of the supporters of his uncle, Shere Ali. Then came Hyder Gholam, heir-apparent for a few years, who died in 1859. Afzul and Azim, children of the same mother, a woman of low degree, were the oldest of all, but their claims were never recognized by their father. Both of these were distinguished for their military capacity—more especially the latter—and had afforded their father no excuse for passing them over by any act of incapacity. Shere Ali, whose mother was of noble rank, and the mother also of Akbar and Hyder Gholam, was the next, and he had also two other full brothers, Ameen Khan and Shereef Khan. When Dost Mahomed died in 1863, a few days after he had accomplished the chief object of his heart in the acquisition of Herat, Shere Ali, as had been arranged, succeeded instead of either of his elder brothers or the children of Akbar Khan. Those brothers recognized him as *de facto* ruler, and did homage to him accordingly. They were appointed to various governments in the realm, and for a brief space all went satisfactorily. Several reasons were alleged in explanation of Dost Mahomed's predilection for Shere Ali apart from his claims as Hyder's next brother, but the most obvious cause of all does not appear to have been recorded. Shere Ali accompanied his father during the latter's exile from Cabul after the first Afghan war, when he resided as a State prisoner at Calcutta. In those years of adversity, Shere Ali was the constant companion of the unhappy ruler of Cabul, and to that time may be clearly traced back all the partiality of which Dost Mahomed long afterwards gave such clear proof. The death of Akbar Khan in 1848, and of Hyder Gholam in 1859, removed the only real rivals Shere Ali ever had. In fact, so far as it is possible to compare things that are totally dissimilar, both Afzul and Azim were regarded in the light only of natural sons, and certainly not on the same footing as either Akbar or Shere Ali. The latter ascending the throne as the second prince of the Barukzai faction, received the reins of power at a period of great national prosperity. The genius of his father had regained the lost provinces of Afghan Turkestan. Balkh had been occupied in 1850; seven years later on Kundus shared the same fate, and in 1859, the warlike people of remote Badakshan acknowledged their dependence to Cabul. Herat, as already mentioned, was permanently seized in 1863, and thus Shere Ali found himself in possession of a country united for the first time since Dost Mahomed and his eleven brothers, more than forty years previously, divided between themselves the empire of the Sudosye Shah. Dost Mahomed, who originally held but the district of Ghazni, gradually in his long career expelled his brothers, from, or succeeded them, in their respective governments, and in 1850 he ousted Bokhara from Balkh, just as fifteen years before he had striven gallantly, although in vain, to do the same by the Sikhs in the Peshawur Valley. But whatever brilliant achievements Dost Mahomed wrought, and however prudently he conciliated this country during his later years, he left behind him for his own State and people a curse in the

shape of a disputed succession. Neither Afzul nor Azim was satisfied with his subordinate position, nor was Shere Ali's own brother, Ameen Khan, better contented. In half-settled countries, such as Afghanistan, when a man has a grievance he soon makes an opportunity for proclaiming it. So it was with these Royal brothers, and early in the second year of Shere Ali's tenure of power he discovered that his authority would not be unchallenged. From the commencement of 1864 until 1869 a civil war was carried on between these four rivals with scarcely an intermission. Until Shere Ali had suffered defeat his three rivals used to unite their forces, but when his star had apparently waned irretrievably, then these disputed among themselves, and discord prevailed, until death swept the stage clear of the disputants. During the first campaign the fortune of war was propitious to Shere Ali, and it almost seemed that his promptitude had crushed the danger once and for all. But fresh plots broke out, and several armies took the field against him from different directions at the same time. The war then went on with varying success, Shere Ali now being victorious and then his brothers. In June, 1865, a most desperate battle was fought at Kujhbaz between Shere Ali and his full brother Ameen Khan. For a time the result seemed dubious, and at one moment the army of the Ameer was wavering in its advance. It was then that Shere Ali approached his eldest son and accused him of faint-heartedness. Enraged at the taunt, the gallant youth led a charge into the heart of the enemy's line which turned the scale of battle in favour of his father. But it had been dearly purchased, for Ameen Khan encountered his nephew in the field, and, after a desperate combat, slew him. Ameen Khan himself was killed immediately afterwards, and the uncle and the nephew were found side by side in the thickest quarter of the battle. Impelled, perhaps, by remorse at the accusation he had made against his son, whom he had loved only too well, Shere Ali was smitten by a grief from which he never recovered. In his own words, "Grief clouded all the joy of victory." During the following campaign, Shere Ali remained inactive at Candahar, while his next son, Ibrahim Khan, was left in command at Cabul, with instructions to prevent the advance of Abderrahman south of Bamian. Of all the family, Ibrahim was the least capable, and he suffered himself to be out-manœuvred by his able antagonist. Cabul fell into the possession of Abderrahman, who was now joined by Azim. To Shere Ali lamenting at Candahar came the tidings of the triumphs of his rivals, and, like Achilles on hearing of the death of Patroclus, he roused himself from his apathy and bent all his energies to the restoration of his power. In Herat his third son, Yakoob Khan, was supreme, and with a considerable army raised there and at Candahar he advanced to the relief of Ghazni, then closely besieged by Azim. On his approach Azim retreated, but turned to bay at Shaikhabad, several miles to the north of Ghazni Through the treachery of his followers Shere Ali was routed when victory seemed to be within his grasp, and had to seek safety in flight. Afzul, who had been a prisoner in his hands, was released; and the conquerors returned to Cabul to celebrate their victory. Later on, in 1866, Shere Ali was expelled from Candahar mainly by the influence of Ismail Khan, a son of Ameen Khan. In 1867 Afzul died, and Azim and his nephew, Abderrahman, were left to divide the reward of victory between them. In 1867 the aspect of affairs assumed a more hopeful appearance for Shere Ali; but it was not until the following year that his triumph was assured. At one time so hopeless had Shere Ali's cause become in the eyes of the world that our Government formally recognized his brothers' possession of Cabul and Candahar. The final battle of the war was fought on the 3rd of January, 1869, at Tina Khan, when both Azim and Abderrahman were completely defeated. Azim Khan died shortly afterwards in Persia on his way to Teheran. Abderrahman was thus the only survivor.

With the close of the civil war in Cabul it became necessary for this country to define its relations afresh with a Sovereign who, acknowledged in 1863 as such, had been partially repudiated in 1867, and who in 1869 was once more supreme. Lord Lawrence, just before the victory of Tinah Khan, had entered into direct negotiations with the Ameer, and had sent him a present of £20,000 with a promise of £100,000 more. This gift arrived most opportunely after the exhaustion of the struggle, and undoubtedly did smooth to some extent the irritability our vacillating support had raised within him. Shere Ali then com-

menced the reorganization of his dominions, and he appointed Ibrahim Khan, who had not distinguished himself very much, to the governorship of Herat. Yakoob Khan, to whose abilities Shere Ali was so greatly indebted, was placed over the eastern portion of Cabul. Having thus set his house in order, Shere Ali made the preparations necessary for a brief absence from his country. From Cabul he proceeded through the Khyber Pass to Jamrud and Peshawur, and thence to Rawul Pindee; and at Umballa the Earl of Mayo was encamped to receive him. The Durbar held there was a most gorgeous ceremonial, and Shere Ali, impressed by many things during his journey through the Punjab, was certainly surprised and flattered by the reception he found awaiting him at Umballa. To an ordinary Oriental the pomp and glitter of that show would have atoned for much that was unreal, and for the fictitious expression of friendship and alliance; but Shere Ali was not an ordinary Oriental. The wonders of Western science, and the imposing majesty of our strength, were indeed strange things to the ruler of an ignorant people and an impoverished State; but Shere Ali came not to be astonished or even to be fêted, so much as to be assisted, to be subsidized, to be guaranteed. Now, to do any one of these things in the way in which the Afghan ruler desired we were not prepared. We had flattered him sufficiently, so we thought, in treating him as an independent prince, on a footing apart either from Scindiah or the Nizam, and we aided him with a further present of money and a fresh supply of arms. But we did not in any single particular comply with the precise demands which he addressed to us. During his brief sojourn with us the continual whirl of amusement and display prevented anything more than an occasional manifestation of secret disappointment at the barrenness of the result, but to his mountain home he carried back the conviction, to be brooded over in secret, that nothing valuable could be extracted from this country without the performance of some service on his part, or the surrender of some dearly-prized privilege. In the years following 1869 the impression seems more and more to have forced itself upon him that in relying on us he would be trusting to a broken reed. Yet from our point of view we had acted well towards him. We had been consistent with all our declarations. We had recognized with each turn of fortune that son of Dost Mahomed who chanced to be successful, and it was only when we learnt that both Afzul and Azim were sympathisers with Tashkend rather than with Calcutta that we made up our minds that Shere Ali was the most eligible candidate. What wonder, then, that Shere Ali should be far from enthusiastic in support of our views, and rather sceptical of the value to him of that friendship with which we were so condescending as to honour him? We had trimmed throughout all those years of anarchical misrule, and even at the Umballa Durbar we were still aiming at a double goal. Until we concluded a treaty with him, bestowing some unequivocal mark of our support, and from which it would not be possible for us to go back, what guarantee had he that we should not show ourselves indifferent to his fate once more? The Umballa Durbar demonstrated the power of England, and it also showed that we recognized Shere Ali in that year of grace to be *de facto* Prince of Cabul. That was all; Shere Ali was in no wise strengthened against either Abderrahman or any other rival. What he wanted would have made him safe in all quarters—a further supply of arms, a regular allowance, and, above all, some proof of British support against external foes to flaunt in the face of intriguers against him in the bazaars of Persia and the Khanates. We failed to secure his hearty goodwill by a non-compliance with these demands. The meagre aid he did receive from us in money enabled him to commence improvements in his civil and military systems, as to some of which it is doubtful if they ever went further than the initial proceedings. Keen in observation, and shrewd in judging the practical value of things, he recognized that one of his surest safeguards against popular disturbance would be to adopt the same preventive means as he had seen were adopted by us. He accordingly issued an edict forbidding any arms to be carried between the hours of 10 p.m. and 4 a.m.; and he appointed watchmen in Cabul, and some of the other large cities, for the preservation of life and property at all hours. He also sought to curb the power of his Sirdars by enabling the people to enter into direct communication with himself, and with this view he instituted the right of personal petition. He also created a postal service

throughout his state, and this is reported to have been the most successful of all his improvements. In another way he attempted a great reform, but this was doomed to speedy failure. That was the substitution of cash payments for payments in land or kind. The cause of this failure was, undoubtedly, the arbitrary manner in which the mony value was assessed. He also alleviated the punishments previously in force, and sought to strengthen his rule by exhibiting general moderation, and by conciliating more especially the mass of the people whom all previous rulers had entirely neglected. In two respects he attempted changes in the native customs that are of a less important, but eminently characteristic, kind. He set the fashion himself by wearing English-made clothes, and sought to induce his Court to adopt the same apparel. But he absolutely commanded all the shoemakers of Cabul to get rid of their old goods, and in the future to make nothing else than boots *à l' Anglaise.* In dealing with his army he was not less influenced by his experience of English customs than in those civil matters some of which we have here detailed. He divided his troops into regiments, which numbered fifty-seven of infantry and sixteen of cavalry. Of the former, fifty were said to be properly armed, and each was computed to muster about 650 bayonets. In a cavalry regiment there were 400 men. The Afghan regular army created by Shere Ali numbered, therefore, 32,500 foot and 6,400 horse. In addition to these, there were about 8,000 irregular cavalry, 3,500 jezailchi, or irregular infantry, and a local militia whose numbers were not known. The artillery comprised some 100 pieces in service and another 100 in store. There were gun factories and powder magazines in the chief cities. Such was the army which Shere Ali had created in the years subsequent to the Umballa Durbar.

Shere Ali was accompanied in his visit to India, already mentioned, by his youngest son, Abdulla Jan, at that time a child of eight or nine. It was clear that he was his favourite, and some efforts were made to secure English approval for the scheme that was already seething in his brain of declaring him his heir. It is strange to find that Shere Ali was bent on repeating the mistake made by his own father; but as Dost Mahomed consoled himself for the loss of his eldest son in selecting one of his youngest for his heir, so did Shere Ali for the loss of his in the same way. But in this design he received no encouragement from Lord Mayo, and, shortly after the meeting at Umballa, Yakoob Khan was declared heir to the throne. Some said that this was a mock ceremony, and that no formal announcement was ever made. So, apparently, thought Yakoob Khan, for he left Cabul in 1870 and broke out in open revolt. During that and the following year he appears to have lead an adventurous life in Seistan; but in May, 1871, he had raised a sufficient force to besiege and capture Herat. Then a brief period of reconciliation ensued between father and son, and Yakoob was made Governor of Herat. In November, 1873, Abdulla Jan was publicly proclaimed heir, and thereupon Yakoob Khan seems to have formed the intention of retaining possession of Herat as an independent State. But he considered that his rights to the supreme place could not be set aside even by Shere Ali's acquiescence in his occupation of Herat, and he accordingly continued his preparations for any contingency in the future. He summoned round him all his adherents out of Afghanistan, and at last, in 1874, went himself to Cabul to raise money for the improvement of his district. Shere Ali gave him a safe-conduct, but once in his power it would have argued singular disbelief in his son's abilities for him to have permitted Yakoob Khan to have returned. Yakoob Khan was placed in honourable confinement, and Herat, which he had left in the charge of his younger brother, Ayoob Khan, surrendered to Shere Ali. For a long time it was not clear what had become of the useful Sirdar, who by his military skill was chiefly instrumental in saving Afghanistan from becoming a state split up into numerous and hostile factions. It is strange to find what an unpretending part Shere Ali's eldest son, Ibrahim Khan, according to our lights the heir to the throne, has played in these later scenes. It would almost seem as if he had given up any hopes he might have entertained of succeeding to the throne. His name has not appeared in the annals of his country since he entered Balkh in 1869. The death of Abdulla Jan left Shere Ali no choice but to become reconciled with Yakoob Khan. The descendants of Dost Mahomed were, it must be admitted, not unworthy of the rep-

utation of their head. Akbar Khan Afzul, Azim, Ameen, and even Shereef, among his sons, were all prominent among their warlike and crafty subjects, either by reason of their personal valour or administrative capacity. Nor in the next generation was there any deterioration in these respects. Abderrahman, despite his youth, was held to be no unequal rival of his able uncle Azim. Yakoob Khan was certainly not one whit inferior to any of his family, and another of his cousins, Iskender Khan, shone in another sphere of activity. But if his brothers, children, and nephews were so able, what must we consider the praise due to Shere Ali himself, the principal figure in the drama round whom all the others revolved? As a Sovereign he had experienced depths of misfortune equal to those sounded by the great Frederick. With not less determination and fortitude than was exhibited by that great monarch, he made defeat and disaster the stepping stones to victory and prosperity. Even after the rout at Shaikhabad, when everything seemed utterly lost, he assembled his remaining followers round him, and bade such as despaired of his cause withdraw to his enemies. For himself he was Ameer of Afghanistan, and so long as life remained to him he would fight for the recovery of his rightful inheritance. The military skill of Yakoob Khan, and the gallantry of the levies of Herat, were the visible causes of the turn in the fortune of the war; but behind them, moulding them into shape to produce great results, was the indomitable courage and energy of the never-despairing King. When final victory came he appears to have used it with moderation. The long path which he had trodden through adversity and misfortune had taught him the necessity for controlling that ungovernable temper which had been among the chief causes of the hostility of his subjects towards him. One of the most trustworthy authorities on the subject, the late Mr. John Wyllie, describes his appearance at this time when it was uncertain whether peace had settled down over Afghanistan, or whether only an armed truce had produced a lull, in the following words:—

"In his air there is all the dignity which Royal birth, coupled with a long experience of misfortune, seldom fails to confer; and the habitual melancholy of his passion-ravaged countenance is eloquent with the tale of that domestic grief which four years ago shook his reason with an almost irreparable throe. But the dominant feature is the eye, and its expression sternness—the practised sternness of one never known to spare any adversary that might be wisely struck."

Other authorities affirm that the chief characteristic of the face was cruelty more than sternness, and that in the eyes there was an expression of low cunning mixed with fear. Mr. Wyllie's version rests on a sounder and more probable basis in itself, and tallies more closely with the natural view to be taken of Shere Ali. His career proves him to have been neither a monster of iniquity nor a paragon of virtue. In the first year of his reign he indulged in the impulses of his violent will, and in the next five he paid the penalty for that indulgence. During the last eight he was keen and calculating rather than high-minded and impulsive. He was not at all in doubt in believing that the best way to force our hand was to simulate a *rapprochement* towards Russia, and he acted accordingly. In endeavouring to steer clear of any definite arrangement with either this country or with Russia, he compromised his good name among us, and it is just possible that he went further than he was really disposed to do in his negotiations with Russian agents. During these later years he strove to effect some plan of common action with the hill tribes on our own frontier, and it would almost seem as if, finding all other means abortive, he had instigated them to acts of hostility against this country. The vague promises of aid which he certainly gave some of the clans in 1877 were magnified by the voice of rumour into a distinct engagement, and may have been instrumental in bringing about British troubles with the Jowakis. But whatever Shere Ali's inconsistences were he seems to have believed that the true interests, both of his own country and his particular dynasty, were to maintain friendly relations with the English. Our occupation of Quetta, which he was known to covet as a former possession of Cabul, though acquiesced in at the time, incensed him against us. It came at a moment when the friendly feeling between the two governments was clouded from other causes, and Shere Ali construed the advance into Beloochistan as a menace to Candahar and Cabul. Nor can we wonder at his perturbation. He knew that our only concern in Afghanistan was to pre-

serve it as a barrier against Russia, and he believed that whenever apprehension at Russian movements on the Oxus or dissatisfaction with himself urged us, we should not hesitate to act as our necessities might dictate.

Shere Ali expiated his mistaken policy towards this country by an unhappy end. He died an exile from his country at Mazar-i-Sharif, in Persia, on February 21st, 1879. He left to his successor a difficult task; but the lesson of his own career is the best that an able ruler could desire.

The histories of India and Afghanistan, from a perusal of the earlier pages of this work, will have been seen as constantly interwoven. But perhaps it was not until the outbreak of a war between us and the Afghans, in 1838, a description of which is afforded at page 433, *et seq*, that we knew much of modern Afghanistan, and what we then learned seemed not to have been of much practical benefit when our war with Shere Ali commenced in 1878. It may be therefore desirable, before entering into the details of the latter, that a brief past history of the people should be given, together with a general view of their character, &c., in 1879.

The Afghans may be divided into the various races from which they trace their supposed origin, whether it be primitive Aryan, or Jewish, Persian or Hindoo, and the ethnologist may derive pleasure and satisfaction from so scientific a method of distribution; but for ordinary purposes—those of history and statecraft included—it will be more useful and more interesting to take the Afghan nation as a whole, and to describe it as we find it, subdivided into geographical and historical divisions that admit of clear and unhesitating treatment. The Afghan nation in ancient days was represented by two great clans alone, the Abdali and the Ghiljie, and between these, as everyone will at once surmise who knows anything of the vindictiveness of the Afghan nature, there has been in the past, and there still is in the present, a deadly feud that no truce can completely allay. There can be no question, however, which is the more powerful. The Abdali clan in all its branches has played the foremost part in Afghan history for more than a century and a-half, and has produced those great men who, whether they were Sudosye or Barucksye, have given a lustre to the name of Afghan that no disaster can effectually dispel.

In pre-historic days the clan of Abdal held the mountain range of Ghor, and the country wherein rose the river Murghab. From that secluded region they descended in the ninth century, according to Hanway, upon the fertile province of Khorasan. In this more promising abode they erected an independent Government, which for long continued round the strong position of Herat, and although on several occasions obliged to submit to the superior resources of the Persian State, they appear to have been able always to secure fair terms even from their conquerors, and in the east they repelled all pretensions on the part of the Ghiljies, or of the Hindoo lords of Cabul, to rule across the Helmund. This great people, which held the country from Meshed to Girishk, and from Ferrah to Maimenè, was divided into two principal branches—those of Zeeruk and Punjpaw. But those names have now died out, and it is not by them that the Abdalis are distinguished from one another. The Zeeruk branch was always held to be the more renowned, and it was of that branch that the celebrated clans, the Populsye the Barucksye, the Allekkosye, and the Atchiksye formed part. There were five subdivisions of the Punjpaw—the Noorsye, the Alisye, the Ishauksye, the Khougaunee, and the Maukoo. The Populsye clan was far in a way the most distinguished of the Abdali tribe, and the family of Sudo was the acknowledged head of that tribe. That family enjoyed special rights that no other could claim, and these were based upon some peculiar veneration that it held in the eyes of the rest of the Populsyes. This family soon became known as the Sudosye, and when Ahmed Khan, a Sudosye, established himself as King of Cabul, and his son and grandchildren continued to rule in the State during more than fifty years, then it became usual to speak of the Sudosyes as if they were a special clan, and not a mere offshoot of the Populsye. A story is told that Sudo and Ahmed, of the Barucksye clan, were raised to the rank of Reish Suffeed, or Kut-Khodah, by Shah Abbas the Great of Persia, and that it was to that circumstance that their descendants owed all their peculiar authority. This is not probable, and it is more natural to suppose that the Sudosye family did not receive from Persian patronage that general hold over the affections of the whole Abdali clan which made them the natural leaders of the

Afghan people. But there is no reason for supposing that there was any jealousy or ill-will between the various clans of the Abdalis. There is, on the contrary, proof that they were united among themselves. It was this union, added to their martial qualities, that made them for long the rulers of Khorasan and Zemindewar, at a time when even the Ghiljie chiefs of Candahar were founding dynasties in Isfahan and Yezd. But in 1730 they came to terms with Nadir, and until their young chief Ahmed set up an independent rule in Candahar, upon Nadir's death, they were content to fight the battles of the Persian Shah, and to share in the rewards of his triumphs. But when Ahmed Khan asserted his independence of the new ruler of Teheran he changed the name of the Abdalis to Duranis, in consequence of a dream of the famous saint at Chumkunee, which advised him to take the title of Duri-i-Duran. Strictly speaking, the Populsyes, the Barucksyes, and the rest all became merged in the new tribe, which was to be designated by the royal title Durani. The Duranis were granted either the lands they held or fresh ones, as the case might be, on military tenure, and the province they held became known as Zemindewar. But although Ahmed Khan had ordained that the Abdalis should be one clan, and, in order to bring about that change, had given them the new and attractive title of Duranis, many years elapsed before the various branches of the Abdalis forgot their old divisions, and it is even doubtful whether Populsyes and Barucksyes do not still retain those sentiments which were active in the days when Sudosyes were kings and Barucksyes their viziers.

The Populsyes form a large proportion of the inhabitants of Candahar. They also inhabit the mountainous country north of that city and the valley of the Turnuk. They are good agriculturists, and have always been considered the most polished and civilised of the Duranis. They furnished Ahmed Khan and his immediate successors with some of their best generals and statesmen, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk for long found in them the staunchest supports of his cause. When that unfortunate Prince returned with the English army, in 1839, he found the Populsyes either apathetic or crushed under the repressive legislation of the Barucksyes. The Barucksyes are less devoted to agriculture. They hold the country south of Candahar along the Urgund and Helmund Rivers, and were principally shepherds until the ability of their chiefs made them the foremost people in Afghanistan. Numerically the Barucksyes were superior to the Populsyes. The Atchiksyes are a branch of the Barucksyes, and occupy the country south of Candahar along the Amran range. They are said to be the wildest of all the Duranis, and are averse to any settled occupation whatever. Their numbers are, however, very small. The Alekkosyes are more numerous, and dwell in the northern portion of Zemindewar, on the banks of the Helmund.

Of the Punjab branch the Noorsye tribe is the most numerous. They possess Khash and Ferrah, and are of a martial disposition. The Alisyes, Ishauksyes, Maukoos, and Khougannees are tribes of far less importance, and are scattered throughout Zemindewar and Candahar. But many of the divisions here specified exist now only in name, and the people of Zemindewar and Candahar are Duranis in the first place and above all. The old feud between Populsye, or rather Sudosye, and Barucksye may still slumber beneath the surface; but on that point it would be rash to make any confident assertion. Dost Mahomed and Shere Ali did everything in their power to make the Abdali clan forget its old divisions, and to continue to be, as the Durani, the backbone of the Afghan State. The population of Zemindewar is probably about three-quarters of a million; but the inhabitants of Candahar and Herat should be added to it to give the full number of the Duranis. From Candahar and the Helmund to the borders of Persia, and from Ferrah and Beloochistan to the mountains of Ghor, extends the country of the Duranis, who in all must number one million and a quarter of people.

The Duranis, although an agricultural people, have always refused to perform menial work. They employ for all the rough operations of farming either Buzgurs, hired labourers, or slaves. It is generally the two last who are hired, and these are as a rule of Tajik race, or the Afghan Hamsayahs. The Buzgurs are often poor Duranis, but then they only consent to act as assistants. The Duranis are essentially the Normans of Cabul. They form the best fighting element in the country, and it is because they have held aloof from and been to a certain extent exempt from service in

Shere Ali's regular army, which was mainly composed of Ghiljies and Wardaks, that some doubt may be entertained as to its superiority over old Afghan armies. The Durani villages are always constructed outside the walls of the Sirdar's castle, and locally the Sirdar, except when he is a very great lord, is spoken of as the Khan. These castles vary in size and strength, in proportion as their owners may be powerful or insignificant; but the strongest of them is not very formidable. As a rule, a Durani castle is simply a wall of no great thickness, surrounding a court-yard, off which the dwelling-rooms and offices lead. Sometimes there are turrets on the wall, which contain a few swivels, but this is rare. At the gate of every castle is a mehmaunkhaneh, or house for the reception of guests, and the Durani gentry are notorious for their hospitality to all wayfarers. Although they are strictly orthodox Sunnis they are tolerant to all religions, even to Shiahs. They are proud to a degree in their consciousness of superiority over the rest of the Afghans, and they look upon the whole country as theirs by right of their past deeds in its liberation and preservation. Candahar is in their eyes specially sacred, for it contains the bones of their great men. Durani Sirdars who die in far distant quarters of the state are brought thither to be placed in the family resting-place. The Barucksyes owed their pre-eminence among the Duranis to their numbers, the strength of their castles, and the ability of their two chiefs, Poyndah and Futteh Khans, the father and brother of Dost Mahomed. It is *apropos* here to mention that Candahar remained the capital of Afghanistan until the death of Ahmed Khan. It was his son and successor, Timour, who, in a weak moment, changed it to Cabul.

The Ghiljies, the historical rivals of the Duranis, may be said to predominate in the strip of territory from Jellalabad and Cabul on the north, to Khelat-i-Ghiljie, the vicinity of Candahar, on the south. It was they who at first laid the seeds of Afghan independence when their chief, Mir Vais, rose up against the Persian conqueror and expelled him from Candahar. The Ghiljies then formed an independent State from Ghizni to Candahar, which continued down to the appearance of Nadir Shah. Mahmoud, the son of Mir Vais, invaded and conquered Persia. He was crowned Shah at Ispahan, and was succeeded by his cousin Ashraff, who was at last expelled by Tamasp and Nadir Shah. During those years the Abdalis were independent in Herat and Khorasan, but it is impossible to deny the fact that the Ghiljies were at this period playing a larger part in the struggle for independence and for fame. Until Nadir Shah appeared before the walls of Candahar in 1737, the Ghiljies still continued the chief representatives of Afghan unity. We have a clear token of this in the fact that at that moment the young Sudosye chief, Ahmed Khan, was a hostage from the Abdali clan in Candahar. The Ghiljies acknowledged Ahmed Khan as Sovereign, and were faithful to him and his son Timour. But in the troubles that broke out between Mahmoud and Shuja-ul-Mulk, the Ghiljie chiefs formed a plot for the recovery of their ancient power. This was in the year 1801, and while Mahmoud and his supporter, the Barucksye Sirdar, Futteh Khan, were away from the capital fighting Shuja, the Ghiljies set their chief, Abdurrahim, up as King. The Ghiljies overran the whole country from Candahar to Cabul, but they failed to take Ghizni. Several desperate battles ensued, in which the discipline and artillery of the Duranis always prevailed; but the rising was not completely repressed until May, 1802. Since then the Ghiljies have never refused to obey the commands of the Durani rulers of the country, and they appear to have given up those aspirations for supremacy which once were so keen, and which broke forth about eighty years ago, after they had slumbered for more than fifty years. They have so far acquiesced in the existing state of things that they now form a majority in the Afghan army, and, as a consequence, Ghiljies have risen to higher rank under Shere Ali than under any previous Durani ruler. The Ghiljies are remarkably fine men, and between the western Ghiljies and the Duranis it is not easy to distinguish at a glance. They are generally considered to be less civilised and more treacherous than the Duranis; and if we may believe native authorities they acknowledge their own inferiority to their rivals.

It would be uninteresting to enumerate the numerous clans into which the Ghiljies are divided, but it may be stated that they are all connected with each other by bonds of friendship. Their principal weakness is that they have lost their old aristocratical

form of government, and have not been able to replace it with some satisfactory substitute. Their Khans still survive the revolution, but their power and influence have departed. In this fact may be found the true cause of Ghiljie discomfiture and Durani triumph. Yet the Ghiljies are in no sense inferior as warriors to the Duranis. They have no organisation comparable to the trained levy of the Durani zemindars, but their individual valour must be allowed to rank as high as that of the proudest Barucksye or Populsye Sirdar. The professed champions, who alone permit their hair to go unshorn, always, when approaching an enemy, throw down their cap, and it is the point of honour with them to surrender life sooner than retreat behind that spot. The Ghiljies probably number three-quarters of a million. These are the two principal tribes, or rather divisions, of the Afghans. The Wardaks inhabit a strip of territory west of Ghizni, which is thrust down from the Ghor mountains into the Ghiljie country. Their numbers are not exactly known, but they are devoted to agriculture. They are perfectly obedient to the King, pay their revenue regularly, and contribute a large contingent to the regular army. The Caukers are another division of the Afghans. They hold Siwistan and the Zhobe valley; but we know literally nothing about them. The Powindahs, the warrior merchants of Cabul, should not be omitted from the list. Much has been told of their desperate encounters with the Waziris, through whose country they fight their way down the Gomul Pass to Dera Ismail Khan. These extraordinary people are to be found, during their annual visit, in Calcutta, and some have asserted that they have been met with in Rangoon. They are divided into the two clans, Nasirs and Mean-Khel, of which the former is the more powerful. Of the Eimaks and Hazaras we know very little, but that little points to the supposition that they are of different stock to the other Afghans. It has been suggested that they are Mongols, but this is only a suggestion, and nothing more. The Eimaks are Sunnis, the Hazaras Shiahs. The Kizzelbashes are Persian settlers in Cabul. According to the accepted version, they accompanied Nadir Shah, but there are grounds for supposing that some of them have been settled for a longer period in the state. They reside principally in Cabul, and they form there a busy, active community of great commercial and political importance. Their position is inferior either to the Duranis, or the Ghiljies, or the Wardaks, and the fact that Dost Mahomed was the son of a Kizzelbash woman is a solitary instance of their acquiring, in an indirect manner, political power. It is very necessary that in our dealings with the Afghans we should remember their recognised divisions, which are for all practical purposes the Duranis and Ghiljies alone. The Kizzelbashes must be taken into account in the city of Cabul, but their importance begins and ends there. Afghan life centres round the aspirations and the action of the two historic clans, as it did two centuries ago, when Ghiljie power was at its zenith, and as it has during the last century and a-half, while the Duranis have been supreme.

Having thus briefly sketched the history of the Afghans, and that of some of their leaders, an analysis of the causes of our war with them in 1878-'79, and a description of its chief events, will necessarily follow.

After much fruitless diplomacy, it was resolved to take decided steps against the Ameer of Afghanistan, and for that purpose the following proclamation was issued, in the English, Persian, and Urdu languages, dated 21st November, 1878.

"The Viceroy of India to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, of Kabul, to his Sirdars and subjects, and to all the people of Afghanistan, It is now ten years since the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, after a prolonged struggle, had at last succeeded in placing himself upon the throne of Kabul; at that time his dominion still needed consolidation, and the extent of it was still undefined. In these circumstances the Ameer, who had already been assisted by the British Government with money and with arms, expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India; his wish was cordially complied with; he was courteously received and honourably entertained by the Viceroy at Umballa; the countenance and support he had come to seek were then assured to him; he at the same time obtained further unconditional assistance in arms and money. These tokens of the good-will of the British Government, which he gratefully acknowledged, materially aided the Ameer after his return to his own country in their securing his position and extending his authority; since then the Ameer Shere Ali Khan has received from the British Government, in confirmation of its good-will, large additional gifts of arms; the powerful influence of the British Government has secured for him formal recognition by the Emperor of Russia of a fixed boundary between the Kingdom of Kabuland

the Khanates of Bokhara and Kokand; the Ameer's sovereignty over Wakhan and Badakshan was thereby admitted and made sure, a sovereignty which had till then been disputed by the Russian Government; his subjects have have been allowed to pass freely throughout the Indian Empire, to carry on trade, and to enjoy all the protection afforded by the British Government to its own subjects; in no single instance have they been unjustly or inhospitably treated within British jurisdiction; for all these gracious acts the Ameer Shere Ali Khan has rendered no return, on the contrary he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that province to a British officer of rank returning from a mission to a neighbouring state; he has closed, against free passage to British subjects and their commerce, the roads between India and Afghanistan; he has maltreated British subjects, and permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress; he has used cruelly, and put to death, subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government; he has openly and assiduously endeavoured by words and deeds to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India. Having previously excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, and refused to receive a British mission; having left unanswered friendly communications addressed to him by the Viceroy, and repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the British Government and himself, he has, nevertheless, received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul an embassy from Russia; this he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation thereto. Furthermore, he has done it well knowing that the Russian Government stands pledged by engagements with England to regard his territories as completely beyond the sphere of Russian influence. Finally, while this Russian embassy is still at his capital, the Ameer has forcibly repulsed at his outpost an English envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy, attesting the importance and urgency of the envoy's mission. Even then the British Government, still anxious to avert the calamities of war, deferred hostile action, and proffered to the Ameer a last opportunity of escaping the punishment merited by his acts. Of this opportunity the Ameer has refused to avail himself. It has been the wish of the British Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a state whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a prince whose throne it has helped to support. Animated by this wish, the British Government has made repeated efforts to establish with the Ameer Shere Ali Khan those close and cordial relations which are necessary to the interest of the two neighbouring countries, but its efforts, after being persistently repulsed, have now been met with open indignity and defiance. The Ameer Shere Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government, has thus deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility from the recent acts of the Ameer, and as they have given no offence, so the British Government, wishing to respect their independencies, will not willingly injure or interfere with them, nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Upon the Ameer Shere Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India."

No reply having been received to a previous letter of the Viceroy to the Ameer, immediately after the issue of this proclamation the British troops crossed the Afghan frontier, from Thal and Quetta, and seized two small forts, no opposition being made. This occurred on 21st November, 1878. On the following day the British force, under Sir R. Browne, after shelling Ali-Masjid, occupied the fort, the garrison having retired during the night. On the 26th two of our brigades united at Kurum fort, which had been evacuated by the enemy, and it was occupied by General Roberts, who reached the Peiwar Pass on the 29th, and found the enemy in occupation of the heights. On December 3rd news arrived of the evacuation of Jellalabad by the Afghans. Their troops were removed from Candahar to Cabul, but a showy force was still left by them at Peiwar. The celebrated Khyber Pass was re-opened for the passage of British convoys. Early in December General Roberts captured the Peiwar Pass, and completely routed the Afghan troops, capturing eighteen guns, and large stores of ammunition. He then advanced towards Ali Khel, leaving the Peiwar Pass fortified. On December 9th the Ameer's reply to the Viceroy's ultimatum was published. He complained of the threatening character of the Viceroy's letter, suspected that it was the purpose of the British Government to destroy his independence, but yet offered to receive a small British mission at Cabul. News arrived in England that General

Roberts had advanced to Ali Khel and Rokian without opposition, and that General Biddulph was about to occupy the Khojak Pass, which he succeeded in doing on 14th December. On the 18th, General Browne began his march towards Jellalabad. Rumours were current on the 18th that Shere Ali had quitted Cabul for Turkistan, and that the remaining members of the Russian Mission, whose influence had been so obnoxious to us, had also left. Shere Ali's son, Yakoob Khan, had been released, and was exercising authority. On the following day Shere Ali's departure was officially confirmed. News was received that General Browne had occupied Jellalabad, without opposition, General Roberts had returned to Kurum, and a force was despatched to chastise the hill tribe who had cut the telegraph wires and committed other outrages. Here it may be parenthetically remarked that the Russians, warned by our success in Afghanistan assumed a more friendly tone in respect to the St. Petersburg press towards England.

Towards the close of 1878, the Pathan tribes gave the British troops much trouble by their treachery. They were partly Afghan in their origin, although belonging to our Indian 29th Native Infantry. *Pour encourager les autres*, one man was hanged and twenty were sentenced to various penalties for desertion, &c. At the end of the year the course through the Kyber Pass was interrupted by marauding parties. At the same period General Roberts announced the annexation of the Kurum Valley to our dominions. The great body of the Afghan hill tribes professed friendship to us, and supplies were freely sent into the British Camp.

Early in Janurary, 1879, General Roberts had reached Yakabi. There the Afghan governor of Matoon meet him to pay his respects. General Cavagnari reported that Yakoob Khan was preparing to follow Shere Ali, his father, to Turkestan. On the 7th General Roberts attacked the Afghans in force, killing over 300 of them, while many prisoners, cattle, grain &c, were captured. News came that Shere Ali was trying to get to St. Petersburg to lay his case before the Czar, and to ask his intervention. On the 15th we were proceeding onwards towards Cabul, and General Stewart reported that he had entered Khelat-i-Ghilzai on the 21st without opposition. At that period the whole of the British operations were generally attended with success. Early in February news came that the internal state of Afghanistan was in a most disturbed condition, and, in fact, in anarchy.

During the month of February better progress was made by our troops; rumours came in announcing the illness and death of Shere Ali, which occurred on the 21st. A memoir of him has already been given at a previous page.

Negotiations were set on foot in March between the Indian Government and Yakoob Khan, but the unsettled state of the country rendered progress difficult. It was generally thought desirable that our troops should advance on Cabul, to put full pressure on the Afghan authorities. Early in April intelligence arrived that much annoyance had been given by tribes near Jellalabad. In crossing the Cabul river Lieutenant Harford, and about fifty of the 10th Hussars were drowned through upsetting of their rafts. Reports were at this period very conflicting. It appeared that Yakoob Khan was directing a considerable force on Jellalabad when he was continuing negotiations with the Indian Government, so that practically no progress was being made towards the termination of the war. The general impression in India was that if our expedition passed on to Cabul Yakoob Khan would speedly yield to our demands, and it was proposed to send Major Cavagnari on a special mission, with a small escort, to persuade the new Ameer to submit to the British. This state of things existed until the commencement of May. On the 8th of that month, Yakoob Khan, the new Ameer, met Major Cavagnari at Gandamak, where the former was received with due military honours. Eventually, a treaty, of which the following is the text, was arranged:—

"His Highness Muhammad Yakoob Khan, Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies, having proceeded in person to Gandamak to confer with the British authorities for the cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan, and having there signed a treaty of peace with the British Government, the treaty, as ratified this day by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, is hereby published for general information, together with the telegrams subjoined:—

"Treaty between the British Government and his Highness Muhammad Yakoob Khan, Ameer of Afghanstian and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th of May, 1879 by his

Highness the Ameer Muhammad Yakoob Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., Political Officer on Special Duty, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Hon. Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empire, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

"The following articles of a treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and his Highness Muhammad Yakoob Khan, Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies :—

"Article 1.—From the day of the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and his Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies and his successors on the other.

"Article 2.—His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

"Article 3.—His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Ameer will enter into no engagements with foreign States, and will not take up arms against any foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Ameer against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

"Article 4.—With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relation now established between the British Government and his Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of his Highness's dominions, it is agreed that the British representative shall reside at Cabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government, in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan may on his part depute an agent to reside at the Court of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

"Article 5.—His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British agents within its jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of his Highness's dominions.

"Article 6.—His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

"Article 7.—In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of his Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, his Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to insure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of his Highness, will be stated in the separate commerical treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

"Article 8.—With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments, and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurum to Cabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government; and the Ameer of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

"Article 9. In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States, which has been attested and secured by the foregoing articles, the British Government restores

to his Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Candahar and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurum, Peshin, and Sibi. His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurum and Peshin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government—that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenue of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to his Highness the Ameer.

"The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Kyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawur and Jellalabad districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

"ARTICLE 10.—For the further support of his Highness the Ameer in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing articles, the British Government agrees to pay to his Highness the Ameer and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of rupees.

"Done at Gandamak this 26th day of May, 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-ussani, 1296, A. H.

"AMEER MUHAMMAD YAKOOB KHAN,

"N. CAVAGNARI, Major, Political Officer on Special Duty.

"LYTTON.

"This treaty was ratified by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla, on Friday, this 30th day of May, 1879.

"A. C. LYALL, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department."

The treaty having been ratified, Major Cavagnari left Simla on July the 6th, 1879. He was the bearer of a letter from the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, to the new Ameer announcing his (Major Cavagnari's) appointment as Envoy and Plenipotentiary to Cabul. The following extract from the London *Times* explains the situation of affairs in July, 1879, in regard to India and Afghanistan.

"No time has been wasted between the ratification and the carrying into effect of the Anglo-Afghan treaty. Scarcely more than a month has passed since the treaty was signed by the Indian Viceroy; and we have news that Major Cavagnari has already started on his mission, and that he is expected to reach Cabul towards the end of the present month. His presence there will be something more than a sign of the new and satisfactory relations that have been established between India and Afghanistan. It will greatly help to strengthen them and render them lasting. No one could have been chosen better fitted for the difficult duty of representing England and India at the Afghan capital. In negotiating the Anglo-Afghan Treaty, Major Cavagnari has given abundant proof of skill and firmness and sound judgment. Nor is it a point of least importance that he is liked and trusted by the Sovereign at whose Court he is to reside. With the conclusion of the treaty we may hope for an end to all differences of aims between the contracting parties. The engagement that there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and the Ameer and his successors need be no empty form. The promise is one which it will be for the common advantage of both sides to observe faithfully, and we may find in this the best security that it will be so observed. The events that have brought us up to the point at which we now stand have been rapid in their course. It is not yet a year since the first English Mission was turned back at Ali Masjid; but the change wrought during so brief an interval of time has been complete in every way. In looking back, it is not easy to realise the whole work which a few months have begun and ended. A neighbouring state under alien and hostile influence has been first forced to submission, and has now, we trust, been converted into a friend. A war has been carried on with no break to the uninterrupted success of the English arms. The result, however, is not to be measured by the military work done. The actual fighting has not been much, but it has brought after it an entire reversal of the positions of England and Russia in Afghanistan. England is now supreme where Russia was supreme a year ago, and the effect of the stroke has been wider than even this shows. It has been felt throughout all India, and in Eastern Asia beyond Indian limits. There is no question now as to which star is in the ascendant, or on which side the reality of strength is to be found. England, in fact, has obtained all she was in search of, and various incidental gains along with it. Major Cavagnari's presence at Cabul with the goodwill of the

new Ameer will be a last seal to the work that has been thus happily performed. This, at least, is the expectation we may form in the light of recent events. There is no sign that the relations between the two countries are in any danger of being disturbed, nor does there appear any quarter from which disturbance is likely to come. With the prospect thus clear we may look confidently to what the future will bring with it. That so much has been done, and with so easy a success, is no bad guarantee that whatever is not yet done will follow in due course, and on terms of no great difficulty.

"The position of Yakoob Khan is, in the main, fairly assured. Its strong and its weak points have been long visible. It was expected that the new Ameer would have no great difficulty in establishing his authority at Cabul, and over the greater part of central and southern Afghanistan. It was with the provinces to the north that it was thought likely he would have most trouble. The anticipation, it would seem, has been confirmed thus far by the event. The state of things at Cabul is described as satisfactory. The Ameer has had no difficulty with the people there, or, indeed, anywhere in Afghanistan proper. The news from Herat is still doubtful. Some disaffection is reported on the part of the Governor, an own brother of the Ameer, but it is not thought likely that it will be a source of lasting trouble. The Ameer is to visit that part of his dominions in company with the British Envoy, and it is hoped that under the two-fold influence thus brought to bear upon Mahmoud Ayub Khan all signs of disaffection will vanish. Badakshan, far to the north-east, may not thus easily be reduced. We hear there of Russian diplomacy doing all it can to fan the flame of discontent, and to tear away at least one province from the newly-gained ally of England. It is by no means certain that the report is well-founded. True or untrue, it would be almost equally likely to be set afloat. Nor is it of any great importance to England what the event in Badakshan may prove to be. Rebellion in some quarter or another may be almost said to be the normal state of Afghanistan. If it must come anywhere, we had rather see it to the north than to the south of the Hindoo Koosh. But it is not in Badakshan alone that Russia is reported to be busy. We hear once again of the movements of Russian troops in the direction of Merv. It will be some time yet before we shall come to the end of stories such as these. Whatever Russia does or threatens to do in Central Asia will be looked at with jealous eyes in India. But one main object which we believe to have been attained by the Afghan war and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty is the power of disregarding with safety the threats or the movements of any Power outside the region we have made our own. If this has not been done, nothing has been done at all. The Russian scare was reasonable enough a year ago, when Russia had pretty well succeeded in ousting us from Afghanistan, and seemed likely to be a nearer neighbour than we wished to find her to India proper. But since that date the tables have been turned. We can now afford to look with comparative indifference on the operations of Russia against the barbarous tribes she has not yet subdued. The area of civilisation, or, at least, of good order, will be enlarged by her advance, and India, we may assume, will not be endangered. The Russian spectre may not be laid at once. It is enough that Russia has been rendered powerless for mischief in the only quarter in which her influence was really to be feared.

"Our Calcutta and Simla correspondents send us news all pointing towards reduction of expenditure on the part of the Indian Government. The Indian army system, it would seem, is to be attacked in good earnest. The Committee of Reorganization is prepared to recommend radical reforms, and is assured of cordial support from the Viceroy and the Indian Government. There is some doubt whether the abolition of the Commander-in-Chiefships of Madras and Bombay will be held to fall within the scope of the Committee's inquiry; but it is not unlikely that the whole complex question thus involved will be at least mooted, and so brought, as it deserves to be, before public attention. We have long looked with most hope to a relief of the Indian Exchequer by a lightening of the army charges. It is these which have weighed most heavily upon the resources of India, and the reduction in them might, we believe, be very considerable. The cost of the annual migration of the Government from Calcutta to Simla and back again is a question. It may possibly not bear the close scrutiny with which it is now threatened. The offence of the migration is, however, in

some degree sentimental. Those who have no choice but to stay in Calcutta during the whole year are not pleased at the thought of their more fortunate neighbours, who can move off to Simla when the temperature is over-warm, and can stay there in comfortable quarters until Calcutta is once more habitable. But there is plenty of business to be done in the way of reduction of expenditure more promising, more certainly useful, and less likely to be resisted in high quarters. When this has been done, or some good part of it, the Simla migration may fairly be brought into discussion, and may not impossibly be given up, or at least curtailed in the manner our correspondent suggests. But while questions about the army and public works of all kinds are not yet settled finally, we shall not be surprised if no leisure can be found for other and less important matters, in which, moreover, the case for a change is by no means equally clear."

In regard to the financial accounts of India for 1877-'78, the following is a synopsis as compared with the Regular and Original Estimates of the year, and with the Accounts of the preceding year (1876–'77):—

	Accounts, 1876-'77.	1877-'78.			Accounts of 1877-'78, compared with					
		Original Estimates.	Regular Estimates.	Accounts.	Regular Estimates.		Original Estimates. 1877–'78.		Accounts, 1876-'77.	
					Better.	Worse.	Better.	Worse.	Better.	Worse.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Expenditure	58,178,563	56,932,600	62,039,000	62,512,388	—	473,388	—	5,579,788	—	4,333,825
Revenue	55,995,785	56,310,900	58,608,000	58,969,301	361,301	—	2,658,401	—	2,973,516	—
Excess Ordinary Expenditure	2,182,778	621,700	3,431,000	3,543,087	—	112,087	—	2,921,387	—	1,360,309
Capital Expenditure on Productive Public Works .	3,809,284	3,628,000	4,877,000	4,791,052	85,948	—	—	1,163,052	—	981,768
Total Excess Expenditure £	5,992,062	4,249,700	8,308,000	8,334,139	—	26,139	—	4,084,439	—	2,342,077
Receipts other than Revenue	64,001,348	56,588,200	71,216,000	72,851,859	1,635,859	—	16,263,659	—	8,850,511	—
Disbursements other than Expenditure	60,417,014	51,515,100	62 372,665	64,407,426	—	2,034,761	—	12,892,326	—	3,990,412
Excess Receipts other than Revenue . . . £	3,584,334	5,073,100	8,843,335	8,444,433	—	398,902	3,371,333	—	4,860,099	—
Public Balances Reduced .	2,407,728	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Public Balances Increased .	—	823,400	535,335	110,294	425,041	—	713,106	—	2,518,022	—
Closing Balances . £	15,464,665	13,511,200	16,000,000	15,574,959	—	425,041	2,063,759	—	110,294	—

In the statement of the finances of India as published in a return ordered by the House of Commons on 2nd May, 1879, it is stated that if the famine (1877-'78), costing £6,500,000, and the expenditure on Productive Public Works, amounting to £4,968,123, be eliminated, there remains a surplus of £2,201,944. But for the measures to which reference has been made, this surplus would have been smaller by £461,276, or in all £1,740,668. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that a portion of the Productive Public Works, costing £1,670,930, is expected (however useful the works may otherwise be) to yield, for a long time to come, only small interest.

During the session of 1879, the question of Indian finance became one of great interest, especially in the British House of Commons. The policy of the Government was severely criticised. The price of the rupee between 1870-'79 was greatly depreciated; in 1879 its value was but 1s. 7¼d., compared with its former value of 2s. Hence those who had to draw their income from direct Indian sources sustained great loss. The debate in the House of Commons in June, 1879, showed that Indian finance had become a sub-

ject of deep interest to English politicians. Statistics have been given in this work for nearly every year since the termination of the mutiny in 1858. But the actual position in 1879, so far as competent authorities were capable of dealing with the question, may be best understood from the following quotation of the London *Times*, of June 20th, 1879. Referring to the final debate on the Indian Budget it is remarked :—"That the Home Government has itself become alarmed at the financial situation in the East. Ministers have shown their sense of the imperative necessity of economy by the course they have taken, and they have not spared the susceptibilities of Lord Lytton and his Council in their unqualified rejection of the Indian nostrum for the solution of the silver difficulty.

"There is no way of setting right embarrassed finances, whether of a state or of a private person, except by the practice of economy. The situation in India has reached such a pass that it is absolutely necessary to stop. General Strachey may deprecate the criticism which he holds to be ignorantly passed upon the methods of himself and his brother, but the dimensions of the difficulty have outgrown personal considerations. Mr. Gladstone did not exaggerate the character of the problem when he insisted upon ten per cent. as the proper scale of reduction to be accomplished. Less than this will give us no surety of an equilibrium that can be maintained. At the same time there are forms of reduction that must be condemned as wasteful. The Public Works Department affords, next to the Army, the greatest scope for saving; but Mr. Cross was well justified in protesting in advance against the kind of retrenchment that can be effected by stopping the works of the department while maintaining its staff in full force. The first promise of economy would not be realised by this method, for we may be certain that an army of engineers will always find work to justify its existence. Putting aside, however, the main question of reductions of expenditure, there were other points connected with the financial administration of India that were elucidated, and deserve to be carefully noted. Mr. Cross did excellent work in exposing the fallacy, apparently cherished at the India Office, of the benefits of borrowing in India instead of in England. If, indeed, borrowing in India meant borrowing from native lenders, there might be adduced political arguments in its favour; but the notorious fact is that loans thus contracted are almost exclusively supplied on English account, or by corporations of English origin, and supported by English capital. The funds raised by them are applied to meet the drafts for home charges, and we have thus the singular fact that a loan is raised in India supplied by money from home to meet in India drafts drawn from home. It is obvious that at least two commissions would be saved by raising such loans here. This is not all, nor even the greater part, of the economy that would be effected. The rate of interest at which a loan can be raised in England is about a-half per cent. less than the rate in India, and this gain is gratuitously thrown away. The single argument on the other side is that the interest on an Indian loan is payable in silver, and the Indian Government is secured against the risk of having to pay interest in gold becoming relatively dearer. The notion that a saving can be effected by borrowing in a dearer market has its origin in that sphere of partial enlightenment out of which so many delusions arise. Upon this question of the future depreciation of silver, Mr. Goschen gave excellent reasons for believing that the limit of depreciation had been probably reached; and he expressed the general sense of the House of Commons in putting aside all proposals for recasting the currency of India. Mr. Lowe found no one to utter a word in favour of his bold suggestion for the establishment of a paper currency in India redeemable in gold to be hereafter provided. Mr. Cross forcibly exposed the mistake of supposing that the depreciation of silver was an injury to the people of India. It is an embarrassment to the Administration, because so much of the revenue is derived from payments fixed either permanently or for long periods; but even this is in a large measure counterbalanced by the increased price realised by the opium sales to the benefit of the Indian Treasury. Mr. Cross appeared to be the first to point out this compensating advantage; and when Mr. Stanhope turned to statistics, in order to prove that it was not realised in fact, the Under-Secretary was a little disconcerted to find that figures supported Mr. Cross's view. Mr. Goschen rightly dissented from this opinion; and, indeed, it is clear, that as long as open mints are maintained at Calcutta and Bombay, any quantity of silver

could be poured into the East. There might be, and there would be, a continuous depreciation of the metal, shown by an enhanced price of commodities; but the progress in this direction has hitherto been so slight, that many observers have denied that it has happened at all. They have forgotten that two opposing causes may neutralise one another, just as at home the fall of prices which preceded the gold discoveries was then arrested and subsequently turned; but causes are not ceasing to act because when working in contrary directions they produce rest.

"It is beyond question that the people of India will be economically benefited by the abolition of the cotton duties; and the objections that can be urged with so much power against the course taken by Lord Lytton, already referred to, are consistent with the confession of this truth. They are three-fold. In the first place, the financial position of India is so unsatisfactory that a source of revenue, tainted with many defects, ought not to be abandoned unless some adequate substitute is found for it, and the Indian Government were reckless in disregarding this truth. The second objection is, that even if the Finance Minister had possessed a surplus revenue, he should have applied it, in the first place, to the removal of the export duties on rice, which are indefinitely more injurious to the Indian people than the import duties on cotton. The third objection, on which great stress ought to be laid, is political. Every wise Governor of India will take into account Indian opinions and ideas. He will not always defer to them, but he will be careful not to run counter to them without adequate cause. Lord Lytton has injured the belief that ought to be most carefully guarded, that we govern India for the good of its inhabitants; and he will certainly have injured the reception of economic truth in the East by the prejudice attaching to forcible proselytism such as he has employed."

As regards the financial position for 1879-'80, the Budget as afforded to the House of Commons in May, 1879, is given in the following table, compared with the Regular Estimates for 1878-'79, and with the Accounts for 1877-'78.

SYNOPSIS.

	Accounts 1877-'78.	1878-'79. Regular Estimates.	1879-'80. First Estimates.	First Estimates of 1879-'80, compared with Regular Estimates, 1878-'79. Better.	Worse.	Accounts, 1877-'78. Better.	Worse.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Revenue	58,969,301	64.680,000	64,562,000	—	118,000	5,592,699	—
Expenditure	62,512,388	63,380,000	65,957,000	—	2,577,000	—	3,444,612
Excess Revenue	—	1,300,000	—	—	—	—	—
Excess Expenditure	3,543,087	—	1,395,000	—	2,695,000	2,148,087	—
Capital Expenditure on Productive Public Works	4,791,052	4,599,000	3,500,000	1,099,000	—	1,291,052	—
Net Excess Expenditure £	8,334,139	3,299,000	4,895,000	—	1,596,000	3,439,139	—
Receipts other than Revenue	72,851,859	76,560,000	67,335,500	—	9,224,500	—	5,516,359
Disbursements other than Expenditure	64,407,426	74,635,959	63,140,500	11,495,459	—	1,266,926	—
Excess Receipts other than Revenue £	8,444,433	1,924,041	4,195,500	2,270,959	—	—	4,249,433
Public Balances Reduced	—	1,374,959	700,000	674,959	—	—	810,294
Public Balances Increased	110,294	—	—	—	—	—	—
Closing Balances £	15,574,959	14,200,000	13,500,000	—	700,000	—	2,074,959

"The Government of India* has repeatedly declared that an annual surplus of £2,000,000 is necessary, in ordinary times, to provide the means of protecting, so far as may be possible, the country against famine, and leave a margin such as every solvent state ought to maintain to meet unforeseen contingencies. It has been necessary, as has been shown, to abandon all hope of obtaining such a surplus in the coming year. The ultimate burden caused by the war will not, it may be reasonably anticipated, prove serious, and the assistance which will, it is hoped, be given from the British Treasury removes all present anxiety on this head. The deficit caused by the war, and shown in the estimates of the coming year, is therefore rather apparent than real. The reduction in the revenues caused by the depression of trade and the diminished receipts from the guaranteed railways will, it cannot be doubted, be temporary only; and the guaranteed and state railways are certain to prove growing sources of revenue. The loss caused by the further and great fall which has taken place in the value of silver in relation to gold is a far more real and serious cause of financial embarrassment. The loss by exchange on the estimated amount of the home remittances in the coming year is £3,947,368; it would have been £4,142,000 if provision were made for remittances to cover the whole of the current home charges. The latter sum is more by £3,324,000 than would have been required for the remittance of the same amount in 1872-'73, the last year before the long standing equilibrium between gold and silver was violently disturbed. So far as these remittances are required to meet fixed payments, such as interest, pensions, and the like—and such fixed payments constitute the bulk of the home charges—it may be said that this great sum of £3,324,000 represents the yearly taxation now required in addition to what would have been necessary if the old rate of exchange had been maintained. The rate of exchange fixed by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Lords of the Treasury for the adjustment of public financial transactions between Great Britain and India during 1879-'80, is 1 rupee = 1*s.* 7½*d.* In the financial statement published at the beginning of the present year, it was shown that the Government believed that a *bonâ fide* surplus of nearly £2,000,000 of income over expenditure had been secured; and of this sum, £1,500,000 was to be annually set aside as a special provision against famine. This apparently very satisfactory result was brought about partly by administrative improvements, but mainly by the imposition of new taxation, estimated to yield, eventually, about £1,100,000 a year. The Government then hoped that it saw its way to giving to the country the most complete protection which could be devised against the terrible calamities of famine to which it is periodically exposed. It was also sanguine that many reforms were within its reach which would be in the highest degree beneficial. Although the condition of the finances continues in other respects to be favourable, the fresh fall in the value of silver in relation to gold has, as has been shown, virtually swept away the financial improvement arrived at with so much difficulty. It may be considered that the whole of the new taxation has been swallowed up in the additional charges on account of loss by exchange. The net amount yielded by this taxation in the present year was, as has been already stated, about £971,400, and it is estimated at £1,077,400 for 1879-'80. To remit the whole of the amount required to meet the home charges in the coming year, it has just been shown that the sum of £1,364,362 would be required in excess of the estimate of last year. The insurance provided against future famine has virtually ceased to exist; and the difficulties in the way of fiscal and commercial and administrative reform have been greatly aggravated. Nor can it be any way assumed that the evil will not continue and go on increasing. Under such circumstances it is extremely difficult to follow any settled financial policy; for the Government cannot even approximately tell what income will be required to meet the necessary expenditure of the state. It is hardly necessary to add that this most grave question has long been a cause of anxious deliberation to the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council has submitted his views to the Secretary of State, and they are now under the consideration of her Majesty's Government. It would plainly be undesirable to say more on the subject until her Majesty's Government

* The above is quoted from Blue-Book 165, of 2nd May, 1879, ordered by the House of Commons. The expectations as regards the re-imbursement of, or an advance on account of, the expenses of the Afghan war, will be subsequently dealt with.

has had time to mature its decision in regard to the measures which ought to be taken. Although, for the present at least, the surplus which the Government hoped that it had secured, has almost disappeared, the Governor-General in Council will in no degree abandon the imperative duty of making, to the utmost of his ability, provision for protecting the country against famine. He still believes that a surplus of £1,500,000 a year, in ordinary times, is necessary to cover this liability alone. So far as the coming year is concerned, the help which it is hoped will be afforded by the British Treasury for meeting the expenses of the war relieves the Government from financial anxiety on this account. For the present, the Governor-General in Council thinks it wise to abstain from imposing any fresh burdens on the country, and to accept the temporary loss of the surplus by which it was hoped that an insurance against famine had been provided. The propriety of the course followed by the Government last year in refusing to constitute any separate fund in connection with the famine arrangements has thus, it may be added, been justified by the event. Foreseeing the possibilty of such a contingency as that which has actually occurred, Sir John Strachey spoke in the Legislative Council on the 9th February, 1878 as follows. Any other decision might, he said, 'lead to results probably not contemplated by those who have suggested the establishment of a separate fund; I mean that this might involve the necessity for imposing fresh taxation. Suppose, for instance, that the produce of the new taxes were, by law, strictly set apart from the general revenues, and paid into a separate fund only] to be applied to specified purposes; if then, any sudden change of circumstances arose, calling for seriously increased expenditure, or causing a considerable falling off in the revenue, we should have to choose between the imposition of fresh taxes and the abrogation of the law constituting the fund; for I set aside the idea of meeting ordinary charges by borrowing, as a course financially inadmissible. This dilemma might arise, though the pressure was likely to be only temporary; nor can any one say that such a contingency would be at all improbable, or that it might not occur at any moment. With all my desire to see the pledges maintained that we have given, as to the application of a sum not less than £1,500,000 as an insurance against famine, I think it would be irrational, under many circumstances that I can conceive, to object to the temporary diversion of any necessary part of the revenue from this purpose, with the view of obtaining relief which might be no less urgently required than that which experience has taught us to be requisite in meeting famine. . . . . Without thinking of a future far removed from us, events might, of course, happen which would make it impossible even for us who have designed these measures to maintain our present resolution.'"

For the sake of not interfering with a running account of the Afghan war of 1878-'79 the domestic events of India and their relation to England and other countries have not been hitherto dealt with. In the British Parliament the policy of the Home Government was severely criticised. Our relations with Russia were of the most delicate character, owing to the war between that power and Turkey. Of course our Indian possessions were supposed to be endangered by Russia, although, in the event, as we have already stated, that power had quite enough in hand in Europe to trouble itself in Asia beyond the frontier of Asiatic Turkey. A sketch of the causes that led to the Afghan war has already been given at page 504 *ante*, preceded also with a history of the Afghan people, and at page 506 was given the text of the treaty, signed in May. At page 508 the opinion of the "situation" between England and Afghanistan, as expressed by the London *Times*, was quoted, and the general prospects of India criticised. But in August, 1879, the Home Government published a despatch which Lord Cranbrook had addressed to Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, the following extracts from which promulgate the views of the British Cabinet for the future relation between India and Cabul.

"I have already conveyed to you by telegraph the approval of her Majesty's Government of the conditions of the treaty by which the negotiations were closed, and it is, therefore, only requisite for me now to make a few general remarks on some of its more important articles. The second article, which guarantees an amnesty on the part of the Ameer in favour of those of his subjects who may have aided the British forces during recent operations, was essential to guard against the occurrence of reprisals such as followed the close of the last Afghan War. Her Majesty's Government learn with particular satisfaction that the Ameer has indicated in a

practical way his desire to give effect to its stipulations, and they are confident that his Highness will take care that this desire is not contravened by any act or negligence on the part of subordinate officials. Her Majesty's Government attach special importance to this matter, which materially affects the honour of the British name. The third article of the treaty, which defines the future political relations of the two Governments, appears to her Majesty's advisers to secure to each of the parties to it everything that is essential to their respective interests. On the one hand, the Ameer undertakes to conduct his relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; on the other hand, he receives a guarantee against any consequences which may ensue to him from the due observance of this undertaking, and against unprovoked foreign aggression. At the same time, the concluding passage of the article indicates the strick adherence of the British Government to its oft-declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which is again plainly affirmed in the fifth article. It being obvious that, so long as his Highness conforms strictly to his treaty obligations, foreign aggression must necessarily be unprovoked by any spontaneous act on his part, her Majesty's Government see every reason to believe that the unambiguous stipulations which have now been recorded in a solemn instrument will be conducive to the material prosperity of Afghanistan, to the tranquillity of India, and to the peace of Central Asia. The conditions embodied in the fourth article in regard to the establishment of British agencies in Afghanistan are likely to secure the objects which her Majesty's Government have in view. It is satisfactory that one of the first acts of the Ameer after opening negotiations should have been to express his desire to receive a permanent British Resident at his capital. Although her Majesty's Government always abstained from pressing this measure on the late Ameer, in deference to his objections, they have never ceased to consider it in itself expedient; they believe that even the occasional presence at Cabul of an officer of sound judgment might have obviated many of the misunderstandings of recent years; they are satisfied that the objections expressed by Shere Ali will be shown to have been without substantial foundation; and they anticipate with confidence that the effect of the presence of a British officer at Cabul will be to consolidate that unity of policy between the Governments of India and Afghanistan which it is the first object of the treaty to establish. Her Majesty's Government are glad to observe that you have accorded to the Ameer the privilege of deputing his own agents similarly to India. They believe that many advantages will accrue to both Governments by the presence of an Afghan envoy of good sense and ability at your Excellency's Court. The right has properly been reserved to the British Government to send subordinate agents to the Afghan frontier, when such a measure may be considered necessary. With a competent Resident at Cabul, the permanent location of English officers at Herat, Candahar, and other points on the frontier will, no doubt, be less essential than up to the present time her Majesty's Government have considered it to be. It is clear, however, that the British Government cannot insure the integrity of the Ameer's dominions against foreign aggression unless they have every reasonable facility for acquiring trustworthy information of events beyond the border through the channel of officers deputed from time to time to the frontier. The territorial arrangements specified in Article 9, secure to the British Government that control over the western passes and the tribes inhabiting them which the course of events has rendered essential. The strategic defects of the Indian frontier in the direction of Afghanistan, as that frontier has existed since the acquisition of the Punjab, are very clearly stated in your letter of July 7. As is therein observed, it was not compatible with the policy and principles of the British Government to have recourse to the sword for the purpose of strengthening its position; but the successful conclusion of a war, which every effort was made to avert, has been legitimately used to remedy defects of which the gravity could no longer be overlooked. Her Majesty's Government are gratified that it has been found possible to secure an object so important without actual annexation of Afghan territory, and, in particular, without a permanent occupation of the cities of Candahar and Jellalabad. They agree in the opinion of your Excellency in Council that the loss of those places, and especially of Candahar, would have been extremely detrimental to the strength and credit of the Afghan Government, while they see no reason to question the judgment of your competent professional advisers that it was not necessary, on strategic grounds, to incur so grave a political disadvantage. Her Majesty's Government do not underrate the difficulties which may for some time be experienced in dealing with the tribes now first brought under the control of the Indian Government; but they are persuaded that the energy and judgment which has been attended with such admirable results on the existing Punjab and Sindh frontiers will be equally successful in the new and more extended sphere in which those qualities will now be exercised. The engagement in regard to the construction of a line of telegraph to Cabul through the Kurram Valley, and the improvement of the present imperfect facilities for commercial intercourse between India and Afghanistan, which are embodied in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Treaty, are cordially approved

by her Majesty's Government. Although the promises made by Shere Ali to the late Lord Mayo on this subject were never fulfilled, he lived to see the benefit which accrued to his country by the measures agreed upon by your Excellency's Government, and the Khan and sirdars of Khelat, affecting the lower trade routes between Afghanistan and Beloochistan. The Ameer Yakoob Khan has only to observe the improvement in those regions, in the way both of extended trade and of increased civilisation, to appreciate the solid advantages which commercial facilities and improved communications bring in their train. The subsidy accorded to the Ameer, under Article 10 of the Treaty, appears to her Majesty's Government to be moderate in amount, and necessary to the support of his Highness's legitimate authority. Experience has shown that it is difficult for the ruler of so poor a country as Afghanistan to dispense with material aid of this kind: but its continuance has properly been made dependent on the efficient fulfilment by the Ameer of the engagements which he has now contracted. Her Majesty's Government have observed with great pleasure the loyalty manifested by the native chiefs and princes of India, both individually and collectively, in the recent crisis. Their anxiety to take an active part in the war, and the unreserved manner in which they placed their resources at the disposal of your Excellency's Government, are gratifying evidences of unity of interests and mutual good-feeling and confidence between the British Government and the great feudatories of the Empire. Equally satisfactory has been the conduct of the Khan of Khelat, whose friendly and loyal attitude, no doubt, greatly facilitated the military operations in Southern Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to give the most favourable consideration to any measures which your Excellency in Council may propose for the purpose of marking their recognition of his Highness's services. As I propose to address you separately in the military department on the purely military aspect of the operations now happily terminated, I confine myself at present to recording her Majesty's complete satisfaction with the conduct of officers and men, European and native, under circumstances trying to their endurance and discipline. The various political officers attached to the columns and detachment in the field have had delicate and onerous duties to perform, and have discharged them in such a manner as to add materially to their reputations. The services of Major Cavagnari and Major Sandman in particular have been of special importance to your Government. The value of Major Sandman's personal influence over the Khan of Khelat and the Belooch sirdars can scarcely be overrated; while Major Cavagnari's conduct of the various duties which fell to him during the campaign, and of the negotiations which have led to the restoration of peace with Afghanistan, was marked by tact and ability of high order. I have only, in conclusion to express the deep interest with which her Majesty's Government have perused the clear and able exposition of the policy of the Government of India in connection with recent Afghan affairs, which is contained in your letter of July 7th, and their cordial approval of the proceedings of your Excellency in Council throughout the critical period which is now closed. In carrying out, from time to time, their wishes and instructions, your Excellency and your colleagues have displayed uniform discretion and judgment, and an accurate appreciation of the objects essential to be attained. Her Majesty's Government confidently believe that the policy embodied in the Treaty of Gundamak, to which your Excellency personally has so eminently contributed, will, if pursued consistently, secure both British and Afghan interests, and promote the stability and peace of the Empire."

Fortunately, towards the close of 1877 the famine in Southern India had nearly ceased, but their future prevention became the subject of debate in the British Parliament at the instance of Mr. Fawcett and Mr. John Bright. In anticipation of difficulties with Russia, the British Government resolved to bring several thousand Indian troops to Malta, a resolution which was carried into effect despite the legal difficulties which stood in the way. It is needless to add that the policy of the act was severely criticised in Parliament. But the criticism came too late when the act had been accomplished. India had comparatively little thought bestowed on it, as the state of Europe, owing to the war between Russia and Turkey, determined by the treaty of Berlin, absorbed universal interest here and abroad. An exception however occurred in respect to what was called the "Indian Vernacular Press Act," which had been introduced to suppress the violent, if not treasonable, expressions of the native press in India. Mr. Gladstone brought the subject before the House of Commons on July 23, 1878, severely condemning the conduct of the Home Government and of the Viceroy in India, at thus attempting to stop the free expression of opinion on the part of the natives. He moved that all proceedings taken under the Act by the authorities should be reported to the Secretary of State, and be laid before Parliament from time to time. A long debate resulted, but eventually the policy of the Government was approved by the House of Commons.

In support of the course which had been followed by Lord Lytton and the Home Government, Mr. Gathorne Hardy entered into details. He denied that there had been either haste or secrecy in carrying the Act. It was a matter of great urgency. During the Viceroyship of Lord Northbrook the question had been taken up. So long ago as 1873, Sir George Campbell had sent home a special despatch on the subject. At a Durbar held on 12th August, 1877, at Calcutta, Mr. Eden remarked to the following effect:—"I do not believe that any country in the world would have stood such writing as we have allowed for the last ten years. Lord Northbrook took it up, and we all minuted on the subject; but there seemed to be a disinclination to move in the matter, and since then the editors of the most seditious papers have been praised and flattered—by the Bengal Government—till they have become actually reckless." Mr. Hardy stated that both the Indian and Home Government regretted the necessity of the step, but this had even been justified by the opinion of the natives themselves.

On the 1st January, 1878, a statue of the Queen was unveiled at Calcutta, and on the 4th the institution of a new decoration, the "Imperial Order of the Crown of India," for ladies, was promulgated, including the nomination of the English princesses, of eight Indian princesses, and eighteen English ladies. This may be considered as supplementary to the Order of the "Star of India," instituted February 23rd, 1861, for eminent Indian princes, and others, both English and Native, distinguished by their services in Hindostan.

In March there was a large meeting of natives in Calcutta, to oppose an increase of taxation which had become burdensome. Petitions were prepared for presentation to the British House of Commons. This subject will come under more special review in dealing with the events of 1879. In the same month a Commission was appointed to inquire into the causes of the famines in India; and the new Indian Press law, already referred to, was extended by its operation to nearly the whole of the British Empire in India. Early in April, 1878, Mr. Fawcett challenged the items in the Indian Budget, in the House of Commons, disapproving of the increase of the salt duty, &c., but he was defeated by a large majority. About this time the loyalty of the native troops in India displayed great loyalty in volunteering to proceed to Europe to meet the contingencies that might possibly have arisen in connection with the relations between Russia, Turkey, and England, during the Russo-Turkish war, already alluded to. On the 29th April, the first detachment of native troops embarked at Bombay for Malta, leaving whole regiments behind who had petitioned to go on European service, a course which was approved of by the majority of the native press. A fear of, and, indeed, a partial famine had occurred in some parts of India, but in July the accounts of both the weather and crops announced improvement. To meet the emergency, the arrears of revenue in the Bombay Presidency for the year 1877, had been allowed to stand over. But the mortality caused by the famine in 1878, in that and the Madras Presidencies, was very great. It was stated to exceed 6,000,000, but of these large numbers were accounted for by emigration to other districts. The subject was brought before the House of Lords by Lord Napier and Ettrick, on July 22, 1878, who drew attention also to the recurrence of famines in India. In 1877 it was estimated that the total diminution over all the districts of India affected by famine in 1877-'78 would not amount to less than 3,000,000 persons. Viscount Cranbrook admitted that the sufferings in Madras and Mysore had been very great, but there was every prospect of speedy amendment. The officials had done their best, and both in England and India large sums were subscribed to meet the terrible emergency.

In 1879, Indian affairs occupied a large amount of attention at home. The Budget for 1879-'80 has already been given at page 512 *ante*, with supplementary remarks thereon. In the previous December, Parliament was called together to vote the expenses that would be required to carry on the Afghan war, the details of which have already been given. A long and angry debate occurred in both Houses of Parliament, but the policy of the Government was affirmed, and the necessary supplies were voted; but, as will be seen in the sequel, the expenses fell on the Indian Government. On February 28th, 1879, Mr. Fawcett moved for a select committee to inquire into the revenue and expenditure of our Indian Empire, entering into long details of their history. It would be useless to enter into details of all the speeches that were made on the subject, but perhaps it is

best illustrated by the following quotation, in which the general state of India is described by a very competent authority in the *Times* of August 1, 1879 :—

"The question of the reduction of the military expenditure of India is one which at last the Government of that country has determined on facing. A long experience has taught us that the revenue of the Indian Empire is non-elastic, but the disbursements on account of military charges show a steady increase. Two courses only are open—either to increase the revenue by additional taxation, or to reduce the expenses by strict economy and vigorous retrenchment. Already the people of India are taxed to the uttermost; not only do direct imposts fall heavily on the poorer classes, but indirectly they suffer still more. In maintaining that India is taxed to the uttermost, we allude to the ryot, or poor classes. As yet the wealthy escape ; no means have been found of taxing the pockets of the more prosperous natives in India. The revenues derived from salt and land assessments are virtually poll taxes affecting the poor far more than the rich. It cannot be denied that a tax on the owner of one beegah of land falls far heavier than on the proprietor of 10,000 beegahs; yet the income of almost the poorest of the poor in India is derivable from the small patch of land which they have held for generations. The Income-Tax has been steadily discouraged by all finance ministers acquainted with the people of India. It is asserted, in the first place, that an inquisition into the rent rolls of the wealthier classes would excite discontent; secondly, that it would be impossible to obtain an accurate return; and, thirdly, that for every rupee paid to Government, two would be extracted from the pockets of the people. There is no doubt whatever that the cost of the maintenance of the standing army which we at present keep up is, when we consider its numbers, excessive, and is, moreover, wholly disproportionate to the revenue of the country. Whether such a vast force is necessary, either for the protection of, or for the preservation of, peace in our Indian Empire, is open to doubt. That it could be administered equally effectually and far more economically is a question few can dispute. As we have before pointed out, the present system sprang into growth when we were in continual danger of war. Enemies within as well as without the limits of our possessions were constantly threatening us. Many of these from time to time received substantial aid from our then enemies, the French; others fought with a grand tenacity, feeling it was the death struggle of their own supremacy. We, however, with armies that in these days would scarcely be designated brigades, bore down all opposition, and it was not until we found ourselves conterminous with that great military kingdom ruled over by the Lion of the Punjab, that we deemed it advisable to mass 25,000 men for the subjugation of our gallant foes. In 1849, after a succession of brilliant actions second to none in the history of India, we subdued the Sikhs and incorporated the Punjab with our own Empire. Our borders now stretched from the Bay of Bengal to the Suliman Mountains, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. India was, in fact, an island with a practicable landing-place only on her north-west frontier. So convinced were we of our ability to hold that Empire, that, raising the majority of our force from the natives of the country, we were content to canton about 30,000 British soldiers chiefly in the most salient points for attack from without, and slumbered on in peaceful security. We even felt strong enough to undertake wars beyond our frontier, and troops from India were despatched first to Burmah and then to Persia, for the purpose of coercing the refractory monarchs of these Oriental kingdoms. A few brief years sufficed to show us our error. While watching for foes from without we paid no attention to enemies within, and while endeavouring to consolidate our Empire, we paid no attention to the mutterings of discontent such steps aroused. In 1857 the storm burst (see *ante* p. 463); the Bengal army, which had done its duty nobly side by side with its English brethren in all the hard-won fights of Cabul, Gwalior, the Sutlej, and the Punjab, broke into rebellion, and for a time the safety of our Indian dominions hung on a thread. The reason for this disaffection is not far to seek. In 1856 we annexed the kingdom of Oude (see *ante* p. 456). A very large proportion of our native soldiers were inhabitants of this province. The ex-King was virtually banished to Calcutta, and, brooding over the apparent injustice of the treatment accorded him, took means to disseminate among his ex-subjects seeds of rebellion. The tale of those days needs no repetition. The suppression of the mutiny saw us with 70,000 British troops on the plains of Hindostan,

and a strong native army modelled on what is called the regular system.

"The events of 1857 naturally engendered a feeling of distrust of these native troops in the minds of many of our Indian administrators. They deemed it necessary to keep up a large native army for the purpose of acting, as it were, as a police over the more warlike of the population, and at the same time insisted on retaining 60,000 English soldiers in India to overawe the native forces. It may be objected that this does not represent a faithful view of the case. We maintain that it does. If 30,000 British troops were sufficient to guard India prior to 1857, surely that number is enough now? The physical features of our boundaries have not changed, and those few spots on the coasts open to attack have been protected by fortifications of modern construction. Torpedo corps have been organised, ironclads purchased for harbour defence, and two sides of our triangular island rendered virtually impregnable. The operations in Afghanistan are practically at an end, inasmuch as the line necessary for the rectification of the frontier has been obtained. Why, then, when all source of danger is removed from without, are we unable to reduce our forces to a strength and our military expenditure to a sum compatible with the resources of the country?

"The cause is obvious. We have within our border a vast conglomeration of states in subsidiary alliance with us who are permitted to maintain standing armies, and it is no secret that these forces have engaged the attention of many of the most thoughtful of our Indian statesmen who have cast about for a method of removing the ever-present source of danger in our midst. Lord Napier of Magdala, on entering upon the responsible position of Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies, addressed a confidential memorandum of singular clearness to the late Lord Mayo, not merely pointing out the danger, but suggesting measures for removing it. These hosts, which we know to number considerably over 300,000 men, are fairly drilled, fairly disciplined, and fairly equipped, and, though it is highly improbable they would stand for one moment against our own troops, there is no concealing the fact that, in the event of any general rising, these men would act upon our flanks and interfere with our communications; and, though they might never be arrayed against us in a pitched battle, they would materially affect our operations, and possibly lead to our suffering serious and great loss.

"The accompanying table shows not only the strength of the forces kept up by the various semi-independent princes of India, but the population and revenue of the states furnishing these contingents:—

ARMIES OF NATIVE STATES.

States.	Population.	Revenue.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.
RAJPOOTANA.					
Udipore	1,161,400	£400,000	6,240	15,100	538
Jeypore	1,900,000	360,000	3,539	10,500	312
Jodhpore	1,783,600	175,000	5,600	4,000	220
Bundi	220,000	50,000	200	2,000	68
Kotah	433,000	250,000	700	4,600	119
Tonk	182,000	80,000	430	2,288	53
Jhalawar	220,000	145,000	400	3,500	90
Karauli	188.000	30.000	400	3,200	40
Kishngarth	70,000	60,000	150	2,000	35
Dholpore	500.000	60,000	610	3,650	32
Bharatpore	650,000	210,000	1,460	8,500	38
Alwar	1,000.000	160,000	2,280	5,633	351
Bikaneer	530,000	60.000	670	940	53
Jaisalmir	73,700	50,000	500	400	12
Sirobi	55,000	80.900	375	350	0
Dongarpore	100,000	75,000	57	632	4
Banswara	150,000	300,000	60	500	3
Partabgarh	150,000	28,240	275	950	12
WESTERN INDIA.					
Barodah	1,710,400	600,000	3,093	11,000	30
Kolapore	546,156	100,000	154	1,502	253
Kachh	409,522	150,000	300	600	33
Kattiawar	1,475,685	1,000,000	3,033	15,306	508
CENTRAL INDIA.	Population.	Revenue.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.
Gwalior	2,500,000	£931,000	6,058	16,050	210
Indore	576,000	300,000	3,000	5,500	102
Bhopal	663,656	137,625	1,194	4,766	39
Dhar	125,000	43 700	370	790	4
Dewar	25,000	42 500	—	—	—
Rewar	1,280,000	225,000	905	2,000	35
Minor States	435,000	265,000	2,677	22,163	421
SOUTHERN INDIA.					
Hyderabad	10,666,800	2,000,000	8,202	36,890	725
Mysore	5,055,412	1,082,000	35	1,000	6
Travancore	1,262.647	423 500	60	1.211	6
Cochin	400,000	105,749	—	300	3
CIS-SUTLEJ STATES.					
Pattiala	1,586,000	300.000			
Jhind	311,003	400,000			
Nabha	276.000	400,000			
Kalsia	62.000	13,000	3,191	7,185	141
Malair Kotla	462.000	10,000			
Faridkot	51,000	7,500			
Cashmere	1,500,000	65,000	1.393	18,436	96
Bhawalpore	365.000	30,000	360	2,484	80
Kapurthala	212,721	57,700			
Mandi	139,259	30,000			
Chamba	120,000	12,000	300	3,275	27
Sakit	44.552	8.000			
Minor Chiefs	2,445,492	857,200	4.000	18,000	302
Total	44,082,002	12,173,614	64,172	241,063	5,252

"The net revenue of British India amounts to £37,417,569; that of the Native States, as far as it is possible to ascertain, to about £12,173,614; given a total for the Empire, of £49,591,183. Our own military expenditure amounts to close on £18,500,000. We may safely assume that the forces belonging to the Native States cost the country in one way or another at least three millions sterling, so that three-sevenths of the net revenue of the country is swallowed up in army charges. So far from any attempt being made to reduce this enormous expenditure, we find that Sir John Strachey, the present Finance Minister, has

increased it by upwards of four millions since he assumed office, and the recent measures adopted at the outbreak of the Afghan war, by which our native forces were increased by 15,000 men, adds, according to Mr. Fawcett, a full million to the ordinary expenditure. This, then, increases the proportion expended on military affairs to 40 per cent. of the revenue—an alarming and extravagant burden.

"In order to substantiate our assertion that the native troops are primarily kept up for the purpose of holding in check the force of our feudatories, it is only necessary to glance at a map of India and then refer to an Army List as to the towns and districts held in strength by our troops. For instance, Hyderabad, with its 45,000 men and 725 guns, necessitates a corps of observation of close upon 12,000 British and native troops. Can it be denied that if these 45,000 men ceased to exist the occupation of the garrison of Secunderabad would be virtually gone, and that other cantonments might be done away with? The Hyderabad contingent, numbering 7,000 men, whose sole duty is to keep order in the Nizam's dominions, might then be partially disbanded and the revenue of the state materially improved. Turn once more to Gwalior, with a revenue of less than a million sterling. This Prince keeps up an army of 22,000 men, with 210 guns, although by treaty he is only empowered to maintain a regular force of 5,000 men and 36 guns. Surrounding the territories of the Maharajah we find the British cantonments of Morar and Jhansi, both avowedly held in strength to check the war-like instincts of the Maharajah Scindia, who never scruples to deplore the loss of his national fortress of Gwalior, who deems it a bitter degradation to witness the British sentries mounting guard over the stronghold of his ancestors, and who ostentatiously manœuvres his little army under our very guns.

"With the consolidation of our Empire in Hindostan all danger to these potentates of invasion from without ceased. Their differences were perforce settled. The strong arm of England stepped in, not only to compel them to keep the peace to each other, but also to guarantee them from those periodical waves of aggression which, ever and anon bursting upon India through the passes of the Suliman Mountains, swept the continent from shore to shore. Being thus secure from war, it is obvious that the necessity for the retention of their standing armies ceased. A small personal guard for state purposes would have answered all their requirements, and this is all that should, in justice to the people of the country, have been allowed them. It is idle to cast vain regrets over the past; at the same time it is clear that at the close of the mutinies, when we stood triumphant on the neck of India, with close on 80,000 seasoned campaigners in the field, we had an admirable opportunity for laying down a hard-and-fast rule that the only standing army in the country should be the British, and that the forfeiture of his rights would be the penalty of any Prince endeavouring to evade the rule.

"There were many instances in the Sepoy war when the armies of native princes, in spite of the exertions of their rulers, joined in the mad cry of rebellion: Holkar's army at Indore, the hard fight for the bridge at Cawnpore, testify to the stuff which then was found and now exists in the armies of Indore and Gwalior. Although an opportunity was then lost, justice to the people of India demands that one should now be made, and that the standing menace of an army of 300,000 men in our midst, yet not of us, should cease to exist. It is true there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a salutary, though sweeping reform. It is true that many of these princes, notably those in the Punjab, can point to the fact that they and their troops have done good and gallant service for us; that Cashmere, Kapurthala, Jhind, and Nabha sent down detachments which did yeomen's work before Delhi, and during the war their troops were actively employed in the Kuram Valley. Substantial recompense must necessarily be given to these men. Thus by one vigorous and judicious step we should release 300,000 men from military servitude, permit them to resume their ordinary agricultural pursuits (for in India 95 per cent. of the Sepoys are tillers of the soil), and divert three millions of revenue to its legitimate purposes. It is true this sum will not affect our finances directly, but that it will eventually have a permanently beneficial effect there is no reason to doubt.

"Having thus cleared the country of what must ever be considered a slumbering volcano, it would be an easy matter to decide how far our own forces might be reduced. That the native troops would then

be capable of sensible reduction we fully believe; the necessity for the Hyderabad Contingent, for many of the local corps in Central India, for the strong garrisons of Agra, Gwalior, Umballa, and Jullunder would, in a great measure, have passed away.

"A general disarmament of the whole population of India, similar to that of the Punjab in 1849, only more carefully executed, would remove another danger. A more stringently drawn up Arms Act than the one recently promulgated, containing few if any exceptions, would place it beyond the power of the disaffected to work mischief, however diligently they might endeavour to stir it up. The throwing open the native army to men of good family, permitting those qualified by birth and education to obtain higher positions than the command of a troop or company, would enable native gentlemen with an inclination for military life to find scope for their tastes, and would do much to destroy that barrier of race which now hedges us in so completely.

"There are, however, many matters of detail in the present administration of the Indian army which savour much of extravagance, and are easy of remedy; but, inasmuch as they affect the imaginary interests of the English in India, they have been either passed over or else not thought of by successive Governments. In the first place, commands are very unequally distributed. We have one brigadier-general commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, with an extent of territory bordering close on 600 miles, garrisoned by 12,000 men; and we have in juxtaposition to one of his stations an officer of similar rank holding sway over 2,000 men in the ring fence of Mooltan. Thus it is all over India. The commands are apportioned, not with reference to territorial requirements, not with a regard to the strength of the various garrisons, but rather, it would seem, with a view of providing a sufficiency of comfortable posts for the senior officers of the army.

"The question of the abolition of the Commanders-in-Chief at Madras and Bombay has been often mooted, but never until now seriously entertained; yet all reason for these posts has long since passed away. In the days when the only communication in India was by means of postal runners, when troops were compelled to march everywhere on foot, when railways were not, and telegraph wires unheard of, it was wise and politic that the Governors of these dependencies should be aided by military men holding positions of independent command. Now, when a reference from either Presidency can be made to army head-quarters and an answer received from the fountain-head in the course of a few hours, when the Commander-in-Chief can and does periodically inspect the troops of all three governments, there appears to be no cause why the costly, cumbersome, and expensive machinery of three Commanders-in-Chief in India should be continued. The whole country might well be subdivided into a number of lieutenant-generals' commands, all reporting direct to the chief of the army. These, again, might be subdivided, into divisions and brigades of equal strength, whereby a vast saving might be effected in money, a uniform military system introduced, and an improved state of efficiency obtained."

Such is the view of an eminent authority on Indian affairs, as expressed in 1879, in regard to our expenditure on the army and taxation generally in that country. It was evident to all politicians that something must be done for India. So strong was the feeling of the natives, that they sent over a deputation to England. On July 23, 1879, a meeting was held in London to receive Mr. Lai Mohun Ghose, a barrister from Calcutta, who had been deputed by the Indian associations to bring certain questions before the British public. Mr. John Bright, M.P., presided. Mr. Ghose stated at the outset that it was not possible for the English public to understand the change through which India had been passing in the few years last past. Questions concerning education and taxation had alike been decided in such a way as that the Indian subjects of the Queen had had no voice in their consideration, although they had to pay the taxes which were necessary to defray the expenses. The people of India, also, protested against the war in Afghanistan—a war in which politics had been divorced from morals—and contended that in the circumstances they ought not to be called upon to pay any part of the cost, or that, if any payment was to be made, England should bear an adequate part of the cost. The main grievance which the natives felt was that they had no voice in the government of their country, and this they thought ought to be remedied.

It would appear from what has already been stated, that our Indian Government requires reform in almost every direction. But, as will be seen from preceding remarks, the question of taxation is of the highest importance. For the guidance of the Governors-General in future, the following rules were made incumbent on them by a Minute of 1878-'79 and 1879-'80. It is quoted from Blue-Book 165, Session of British Parliament, 1879 :—

"The principles on which the Customs legislation of the United Kingdom has been based are now admitted axioms by all who recognise the theoretic advantages of free trade. They must be regarded as a part of the national policy which Great Britain has finally adopted, and which the Secretary of State for India, with the deliberate approval of the House of Commons, has required the Government of India in this country to carry out.

These principles are, as regards imports,—

1. That no duty should exist which affords protection to native industry, and, as corollary, that no duty should be applied to any article which can be produced at home, without an equivalent duty of excise on the home production; also, that no duty should be levied except for purely fiscal purposes;

2. That, as far as possible, the raw materials of industry and articles contributing to production should be exempt from Customs taxation;

3. That duties should be applied only to articles which yield a revenue of sufficient importance to justify the interference with trade involved by the machinery of collection.

As regards exports: that duties should be levied on those commodities only in which the exporting country has practically a monopoly of production.

These principles are of general application, but in the case of India they possess a peculiar significance. India is a country of unbounded material resources, but her people are a poor people. Its characteristics are great power of production, but almost total absence of accumulated capital. On this account alone the prosperity of the country essentially depends on its being able to secure a large and favourable outlet for its surplus produce. But there is a special feature in the economic conditions of India which renders this a matter of yet more pressing, and even of vital, importance; this is the fact that her connection with England, and the financial results of that connection, compel her to send to Europe every year about twenty millions sterling worth of her products without receiving in return any direct commercial equivalent. It is this excess of exports over imports which, in the language of the economists, is described as tribute. It is really the return for the foreign capital, in its broadest sense, which is invested in India, including under capital not only money, but all advantages which have to be paid for, such as the intelligence, strength, and energy, on which good administration and commercial prosperity depend. From these causes, the trade of India is in an abnormal position, preventing her receiving, in the shape of imported merchandise and treasure, the full commercial benefit which otherwise would spring from her vast material resources.

The comparatively undeveloped condition of the trade of India may be illustrated by the following figures. The value of the imports and exports taken together per head of the population is in the United Kingdom about £20. In British India it is about 10*s*. The Customs revenue on the few articles now retained in the import tariff of the United Kingdom is about 12*s*. per head, while that of India, on all the articles of its lengthy tariff, is about 3*d*., showing that small as is the proportion of the foreign trade of India to that of England, the proportion of Customs revenue derived from it is smaller still.

Here then is a country which, both from its poverty, the primitive and monotonous condition of its industrial life, and the peculiar character of its political condition, seems to require from its Government, before all things, the most economical treatment of its resources, and, therefore, the greatest possible freedom in its foreign exchanges."

One of the largest, and perhaps one of the most important engagements which any government has entered into during the present century, was the proposal to purchase the East Indian Railway by our Indian Government. The purchase of £4,000,000 value in shares of the Suez Canal, already referred to, was a bold stroke of policy in reference to our Indian Empire, but this railway purchase was a matter of greater importance. Practically all the trade of India has for ages depended on water communication, the roads usually being very bad. On the introduction of canals, avail-

able alike for carriage and irrigation, the native produce became more available for Europeans. But the introduction of railways gave an additional and most necessary stimulus to Indian products and their export. The purchase of the East Indian Railway, in its various conditions, will be best understood from the following quotation from a Parliamentary Paper, 165, of May, 1879:—

"By its contract with the East Indian Railway Company, the Government of India provided, free of charge to the company, all the land on which the railway is laid, and guaranteed from the revenues of India five per cent. interest on the capital of the company, payable in sterling in London.

"All the earnings, and all the working expenses of the company, pass through the Public Treasury and accounts; if the net traffic earnings of the company exceed the sum in rupees which, at 1*s.* 10*d.* the rupee, suffices to provide the guaranteed sterling interest, half the excess is appropriated to the refund of the interest advanced by the Government during the many years for which the railway did not earn a profit. The net cost to the state of all these concessions is estimated to have amounted to not less than twelve crores of rupees, at the end of 1876-'77, since when it has somewhat diminished.

"The company may, at any time, surrender their property to the state and claim back its whole capital cost; and, as, if not transferred earlier, the railway would become the property of the state by lapse of time after ninety-nine years, it is certain that the surrender clause would not be a dead letter.

"On the other hand, the Government may purchase the railway at two successive intervals of twenty-five years, paying, in that case, a price intended to represent the fair market value of the railway, as evidenced by the quotations of the shares of the company. Such payment may be made either in cash or in the form of a terminable annuity, calculated at the market rate of interest in London on Indian Government sterling obligations.

"The Government must declare whether it will exercise its first option of purchase within six months after the 15th February, 1879. The question whether this declaration should be made has long been anxiously debated, both by the Government in India and by the Secretary of State in Council in London. Last year, Lieutenant-General Richard Strachey, R.E., C.S.I., was deputed by the Secretary of State to assist the Government of India in coming to a final conclusion, with an intimation that General Strachey enjoyed his confidence in relation to the matter in hand.

"The Government of India considered this important measure, both financially and administratively. The share capital of the company is £26,200,000, and they have issued debentures for £4,220,000, the interest on which is £188,000. The purchase of a property of this magnitude is a large transaction; but the Government of India had no difficulty in concluding, not only that the purchase was financially expedient, but that the state would not be justified in foregoing the purchase upon any conditions that could be acceptable to the company. Subject to the approval of Parliament, the East Indian Railway will on the 31st December, 1879, become the property of the state.*

"The price to be paid is £125 for every £100 of capital stock, or £32,750,000, for the whole stock of £26,200,000. Payment of that amount is to be made by an annuity terminating on the 14th February, 1953, in the calculation of which the rate of interest used is £4 6*s.* per cent. Both the price of £125, assumed as the market price of the shares, and the rate, £4 6*s.*, assumed as the market rate of interest upon the Indian Government's London sterling obligations, are liberal, and have apparently been so accepted by the shareholders with general unanimity. But, although by the letter of the bond, even better terms might possibly have been exacted, there is good reason for the belief that, on the whole, the intention of the original parties to the contract has been substantially fulfilled; and it is a cause of much satisfaction to the Government of India that this important transaction has been concluded without any breach of the friendly relations between the Government and the company, or injury to the interests of the shareholders, who will receive an annuity at the rate of £5 12*s.* 6*d.* per cent. upon their capital, equal to simple interest, at the rate of £5 7*s.* 6*d.*"

The following table gives a statement of financial results to the revenues of India of the Guarantee of Interest upon capital of the Guaranteed Railway Companies beside that already mentioned.

* This was agreed to during the Session of 1879 of the British Parliament.

STATEMENT showing the true Financial Results to the REVENUES of INDIA of the GUARANTEE of INTEREST upon the CAPITAL of the GUARANTEED RAILWAY COMPANIES.

	1873-74.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.		1879-80.
						Original Estimates.	Regular Estimates.	Estimates.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Gross earnings	8,315,226	8,924,009	8,959,235	10,874,775	13,294,397	11,200,000	11,380,000	11,175,000
Working expenses	4,691,180	4,736,034	4,678,551	5,760.642	6,632,743	5,827,500	6,100,000	5,895,000
Per-centage of working expenses on earnings.	56·41	53·07	52·22	52·97	49·89	52·3	53·60	52·75
Net traffic earnings	3,624,046	4,187,975	4,280,684	5,114,133	6,661,654	5,372,500	5,280,000	5,280,400
Net gain by the remittance to England of Capital Receipts and Disbursements in India at the contract rates of exchange instead of at the average yearly rate obtained for the Secretary of State's Bills	39,249	67,906	17,426	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL REVENUE . . . £	3,663,295	4,255,881	4,298,110	5,114,133	6,661,654	5,372,500	5,280,000	5,280,000
Gross Guaranteed Interest:								
Paid in India	39,191	36,799	33,414	23,736	21,354	19,600	17,400	16,400
Paid in London*	4,581,548	4,609,772	4,606,903	4,636,768	4,635,491	4,699,000	4,689,000	4,745,000
TOTAL GUARANTEED INTEREST (sterling Payments converted at the Average Exchange of the Year) . . .	4,959,704	5,015,537	5,141,518	5,454,814	5,374,115	5,546,500	5,711,000	6,011,300
Surplus paid to railway companies . .	91,501	427,561	227,251	296,028	799,609	642,000	936,200	768,500
Land and supervision	152,438	55,394	83,313	51,633	66,420	81,000	71,800	75,700
Interest on revenue balances . . .	26,934	35,643	34,970	34,936	11,687	2,000	1,500	1,600
Net loss on Receipts and Disbursements of Capital in India calculated in the same way as the Gain . . .	—	—	—	29,161	5,967	7,450	49,900	14,500
TOTAL EXPENDITURE . . £	5,230,577	5,534,135	5,487,052	5,866,572	6,267,798	6,278,950	6,770,400	6,871,600
NET EXPENDITURE from the Public Treasury.	1,567,282	1,278,254	1,188,942	752,439	—	906,450	1,490,400	1,591,600
NET REVENUE . . . . . £	—	—	—	—	393,856	—	—	—

* With the exception of the figures in this line, which are true sterling figures, all the amounts in this table are in rupees converted into the conventional sterling of the accounts by the removal of one digit to the right.

Having thus fully dealt with the chief events of 1879 in regard to Indian History, some minor matters may be noticed. Early in March rumours arrived in England that disturbances had occurred in Burmah. In reply to Earl Granville, in the House of Lords, Viscount Cranbrook stated that owing to the unfriendly acts of the King, as a precautionary matter three regiments of British troops had been despatched to reinforce the garrison of British Burmah. Complications seemed to arise, but up to the end of August, 1879, nothing of importance occurred, and matters seemed to have been, for the present, quietly smoothed over.

The treaty with Yakoob Khan of Afghanistan has already been given. Towards the close of July, 1879, Major Cavagnari arrived at Cabul, and was ostentatiously received by the new Ameer. In the British Houses of Parliament thanks were voted to all who had undertaken part in the Afghan War, and both nominal and substantial honours were conferred on some of the most eminent officers, and civilians. The expenses of the Afghan War were at last cast on India; but the Home Government obtained a loan, which was granted to the East Indian Government, *without interest*, repayable in a period of years.

On August 14th, 1879, the day previous to the prorogation of the British Parliament, a violent attack was made on the Beaconsfield Government on account of its Indian policy, especially in regard to the Afghan Treaty, commenced by Mr. Grant Duff, whose name, as connected with Indian matters, has already frequently appeared in this volume in the history of recent years. The question was as to how far the future friendly relations of the Ameer, under all circumstances, was likely to be maintained. It will not be necessary to enter into the details of this debate; it will be sufficient for our purpose to quote a portion of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, in reply to criticisms on the past policy of the Government: "The general policy we have laid down to support is this—we decide to maintain the same relations with Afghanistan which we have always desired to maintain—we desire to maintain relations with her as a friendly country so far strong and independent as circumstances will permit; and we will at the same time maintain our own clear attitude, which is one of strength, but also an attitude which shows that we are determined, if necessary, to use our strength. We believe by maintaining that attitude we shall gain confidence with the people of Afghanistan, and they will see that they are dealing with a power which is not disposed to trifle with them, which has announced its objects simply and clearly, and is prepared to maintain those objects—which, when it says it does not desire to interfere in their domestic affairs, is sincere in saying so, and when it says that in return for submitting its foreign policy to England's guidance it will guarantee certain things, will actually do so. My belief is that one of the great causes of all the difficulties which we have had of late years in Afghanistan has arisen from the impression that we were not sincere It has arisen from the uncertain language which has been used, and the endeavour to limit or revise undertakings which were not intended to have the full effect which the Afghans were prepared to give to them. When they found that we were not prepared to support them, and were explaining away engagements which were entered into, they said, 'This is a Power which we cannot rely upon; we must turn to some other Power to support us.' Now, whatever you say, you yourselves admit that our policy is one that cannot be reversed. If you do not tell us how it can be reversed, then I say the success of it depends on the success which ought to be impressed on the minds of the Afghans and the people of India, that this is a policy which is adopted, not by one party alone, but by the Government of this country as whole, and in whatever hands the power may rest, and if you succeed in impressing on the Afghans the idea that your policy is one that has been adopted deliberately, and will be continued steadily, then you may derive the advantages which will not be derived in any other way. I say in answer to the questions of the noble lord that I would rather reply to them by another question—Are we to understand, or are we not, that the Liberals, if they come into power, will reverse the policy which we have adopted; and, if not, what earthly object do they expect to gain by endeavouring to suggest difficulties, by putting into our minds, and into the minds of others at a distance, suggestions that our policy means something different to what we say it means, that which we know it means, and from that which, I believe, the country is determined it shall mean."

The following statement of the internal

condition of India, and the general feeling of the native population given by Mr. Ghose, a native Indian barrister, at the end of August, 1879, in London, will be of interest. It is the substance of a lecture given by that gentleman, some of whose remarks on the same subject have been already quoted at a previous page. Mr. Ghose commenced his observations by remarking that it must be confessed that until quite lately very little interest had been shown in this country—whether in or out of Parliament—in the discussions on Indian affairs. No doubt England had been ready to defend India against all comers, visionary dangers, and imaginary enemies; but in Parliament discussions on Indian matters had taken place before empty benches. Happily, however, a change had taken place in the temper of the nation—a change owing, to no small extent, to the persistent efforts of a few high-minded Englishmen who had succeeded in drawing attention to the grave financial embarrassments of the Government of India. There seemed now to be a general opinion that unless prompt measures were taken the Government of India must become, before long, absolutely bankrupt. The revenues of India were mainly derived from six sources, all of which, except opium, were inelastic, whilst the expenditure had been increasing year after year. The taxes were derived from land, opium, salt, excise customs, and stamps. The revenue from opium was nearly eight millions per annum; but this source of income was dependent entirely upon the Chinese, and he had been informed that the Chinese Government had contemplated a measure which would put an end to that source of income. The land tax had been settled in perpetuity in some parts of India, while in other parts, where it had not been so fixed, nothing had tended so much to impoverish the agricultural population of India—nothing had been more prejudicial to the true interests of the country than the system which now prevailed of periodically enhancing the land tax. Mr. Ghose then gave figures showing the disastrous effects which had followed the increase in this tax in Bombay since the year 1868, and said that wherever this system had prevailed it had led to the abandonment of land, to the neglected cultivation of land, and had been of little or no advantage to the Government, and the sooner this system was modified the better. In Bengal, where this system did not prevail, the people were, to use the Lieutenant-Governor's own words, as prosperous and comfortable as any peasantry in the world. A measure was loudly called for to fix the land tax where it was not fixed, if not in perpetuity, for a sufficient number of years, in order that the people might feel free to enjoy the benefit of their own labour. With regard to the other sources of revenue, none of them were capable of yielding any increased income. With regard to the remission of the cotton duties, Mr. Ghose explained that the opposition to that measure did not arise from any hankering after protection, but when the country was suffering from the effect of the blustering policy of the Government, surely it was not the time when a wise Government would have thought of sacrificing such a source of income. The legitimate sources of the Indian revenue being of a stationary character, and unable to meet the growing extravagance of the Indian Government, fresh taxes had been imposed, which fell with the greatest severity on those least able to bear such burdens. What would be thought in this country if the poor-rates were levied exclusively on the class from which paupers came? And yet this was the principle which underlies the new taxes imposed by the Indian Government. The new system of taxation was not without an element of danger, even when dealing with such docile and law-abiding people as the natives of India, and this was proved by the disturbances which had undoubtedly occurred. The new taxes had become odious in the eyes of the people by the wholesale exemption of the official class—perhaps the only class in India most able to bear these increased burdens—and the natives could not help feeling indignant that officials with large salaries should be exempt because the power of taxation rested in their own hands. In the legislative policy of the Government of India they would find a spirit of Imperialism and an utter absence of generosity. The Government seemed to be half conscious that their policy of blunder at home and bluster abroad could not but stir opposition. Up to March 14, 1878, they had one important privilege, which was all the dearer by being the only one—the privilege of unreservedly vindicating their grievances by means of a free Press. (See *ante* p. 516). Up to that time they were enabled to say to their governors, "Strike, but fear;" but the Government resolved to put that down, and they hastily passed a law, suppressing

the freedom of the Vernacular Press. In spite of hysterical utterances, the Government had been so conscious of the weakness of their case that they had never ventured to appeal to the law. If the Government were so anxious to preserve the prestige of the Empire in the East, as to embark in a most unjustifiable war at an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure, they should also have the wisdom to discern that, by their breach of solemn promises, such as that involved in the misappropriation of the Famine Insurance Fund, and by their ungenerous and repressive policy, they were doing that which was calculated to lower the character of the British Government in the eyes of the people of India. Many of the existing evils were directly attributable to the constitution of the Government of India. The members of the Council were a mutual admiration society, who delighted in decorating each other with stars and stripes, and singing pæans of praise, until, he supposed, they actually deluded each other with the idea that they were great wonders. He believed the remedy for this was the introduction into the Council of the Viceroy and the local councils of independent members. This was not a proposition of a revolutionary character—it was only the extension of a system of which the germ already existed. They had municipalities in many of the cities, which had worked well, and the people had learned to cherish the privilege. After alluding in terms of praise to Sir Richard Temple, Mr. Ghose referred to the question of the employment of natives in higher offices. He thought all classes in India would have preferred a system of open competition, of fair play and no favour, to the system of nomination which had been actually adopted. It had been objected, as one reason why natives should not be admitted to the higher offices of the state, that their standard of morality was so low, and that they were so amenable to bribery and corruption, that if they were admitted into those offices the purity of the administration of justice would be affected. He warmly challenged those who had uttered calumnies against the people of a country in which they had enriched themselves, and from which they were now enjoying a liberal pension, to prove the truth of these assertions on this subject. After an indignant protest against such accusations, Mr. Ghose said he should be sorry if the people of England did not think that the people of India saw nothing good in the policy of England in India. He spoke from the bottom of his heart when he said that they felt deeply and profoundly grateful for the many and incalculable blessings England had conferred upon India. They would never forget that it was England who had made them what they were at the present day—that it was England who had made such a spectacle as they saw that night possible—that of a native telling them his fellow-countrymen's wants, and asking them to redress grievances under which they laboured. The people of India were firmly persuaded that the cause of justice could never be pleaded in vain, and they had the satisfaction of knowing that there were great men in this country who were ever ready to take up the cause of the oppressed and the weak in every clime of the habitable globe; men whose integrity of purpose, and the unspotted purity of whose lives, were such as to be their pattern and model. They had the happiness of knowing that if their cause be founded on reason and justice it would be advocated by such men; and knowing also the high tribunal with which the decision rested, they would never despair of the future of India.

Vegetable Productions of India.—The chief productions of a vegetable kind, as opium, cotton, jute, hemp, &c., have already been frequently referred to in the preceding pages. But an important addition has, of recent years, been attempted, in the cultivation of wheat for export to other countries. Of course, the greater the export of products of any country the less will be its necessity to export coin or bullion. Consequently, it is a very important question in Indian finance to diminish, as far as possible, its cash payments, by the extension of its exports. A Blue-Book, issued by order of both Houses of Parliament, appeared in August, 1879. It was a report from Dr. Forbes Watson, on the production of wheat in India, from which the following abstracts are quoted. He remarks as follows :—

"In submitting the subjoined report on the samples of Indian wheat forwarded to the India Office, in accordance with the resolution of the Government of India of the 14th March, 1877, I would take the opportunity of pointing out a few of the principal results of the examination, together with their bearing upon the question of the supply of Indian wheat for the European market. The subject derives, at the

present time, an unusual importance from the obvious consideration that the depreciation of silver, which affects so injuriously the finances of India, can be best counteracted by a development of the Indian export trade. Until, however, the information now in course of collection has been received, the question of the production and export of wheat from India cannot be treated with the amount of statistical detail which it deserves, as the materials available in the usual administration reports are of a fragmentary and incomplete description. At the same time it will be found that the examination of the large collection of samples under report has of itself led to some conclusions which may have an important bearing on the future of the Indian wheat trade.

"The number of samples amounted to more than 1,000, and together they form by far the most complete collection of Indian wheat ever brought to England. By arranging all the samples, according to price, in classes corresponding to the useful classification of soft white wheats, the following result was obtained :—

	Number of Samples.				
	Soft white.	Hard white.	Soft red.	Hard red.	Total.
Superior samples, 44s. to 48s. per quarter, of 496 lbs.	101	—	—	—	101
Grade No. 1, 41s. 6d. to 43s. 6d. ,,	123	13	10	—	146
Grade No. 2, 39s. 6d. to 41s. ,,	73	83	56	—	212
Ordinary, 37s. to 39s. ,,	51	61	74	68	254
Inferior, below 37s. ,,	9	10	20	75	114
Total No. of samples	357	167	160	143	827
Average price per quarter	s. d. 41 9	s. d. 39 5	s. d. 38 5	s. d. 36 1	s. d. 39 8

"It will be seen that wheats equal or superior in value to grades numbers 1 and 2 of white wheat form the greater portion of the collection, numbering, in fact, 459 samples, against 368 ordinary and inferior samples; moreover, out of a total of 827 samples, 101 must be described as being of a very superior quality, whilst only 114 samples are decidedly inferior. The surprisingly favourable character of these results will be clearly perceived on comparing the prices assigned to the Indian samples with the quotations current at the time of valuation for the different kinds of wheat in the London market of 1879, viz. :—

	Per quarter of 496 lbs.	
Danzig		42s. to 46s.
Australian	,,	47s. to 48s.
Californian and Oregon	,,	44s. to 45s.
White American and Canadian	,,	42s. to 46s.
No. 1 Milwaukee	,,	42s. to 43s.
No. 2 ,,	,,	40s. to 41s.
No. 2 Spring	,,	38s. to 40s.
No. 3 ,,	,,	36s. to 37s.

"The above facts conclusively show that India is well adapted for the growth of wheat of the finest quality. It must be, however, kept in mind that a considerable number of the samples sent from India were far superior to any Indian wheat usually seen in the London market, and that without more local information than we now possess it is not possible to decide whether these fine varieties could at present be forthcoming in quantities sufficient for the development of an important trade. In fact, Messrs. Finlay, Scott, and Co., state, in a letter printed among the enclosures to the despatch from the Government of India on the subject, that on the Bombay side the supply of the best qualities is very limited, as compared with the common qualities, and that the prices of the fine wheats are so well kept up in India itself, that more profit is to be obtained on the shipment of inferior than of fine wheat. Be this, however, as it may, one result is clearly apparent from the mere inspection of the samples, and that is, that the cultivation of the finest wheat cannot be considered as anything exceptional, but that it is spread over a considerable portion of the country.

"With regard to the prices assigned to the Indian samples, it is necessary to remark that although they compare very favourably with the quotations of the various English and foreign wheats in the market, yet they afford a much smaller margin, as compared with the prices current in India, than has been the case in former years. It must be observed, however, that the exceedingly low range of prices for wheat and other grains now ruling in European markets seems quite exceptional, whilst the

prices in India are unusually high. As pointed out in the *Economist* of the 1st of March, 1879, the price of wheat in England has only twice within the last 100 years fallen to the then level, viz., in 1835 and in 1851.

"The prospect as regards India appears even more encouraging when viewed in connection with the results already mentioned of the examination of the samples under report. Whilst as regards cotton and some other produce the soil and climate of India are rather at a disadvantage with those of other competing countries, as regards wheat India is proved to be admirably adapted for the production of the finest qualities of both soft and hard wheat. This is a circumstance of great importance, because the supply of the fine varieties is much more restricted than that of the commoner kinds. In considering the competition in the market of the world, France, although producing as much as Russia, may be left out of account, as its production, large though it be, barely suffices for its own consumption. Thus, practically, Russia and the United States are the chief competing countries to be considered. But in both countries the area for the production of fine full grown winter wheat is comparatively restricted. The true policy for India, therefore, appears to consist in taking advantage of her climatic position, and cultivating for export only the finest varieties, in which the competition of Russia and the Far West in America is not likely to be as severe as in the case of the common varieties. Such a policy receives additional recommendation from the fact that the price of the finer varieties is always better kept up, and suffers less in a falling market than that of the common wheat. The higher priced wheat will likewise support better the necessarily high charges of transport and freight.

"Fortunately no serious difficulties seem to stand in the way of effecting a great and rapid change in the character of the wheat exported from India. The quality of the grain itself depends mainly upon the care exercised in the selection of seed. The collection of samples here reported on proves, however, that in almost every district excellent qualities of wheat may be already found. There is therefore no question of acclimatising seed imported from England or other countries, but simply of extending the area of the fine varieties already cultivated, and if a regular demand for the better qualities should spring up, there is every probability that the mere extension of the cultivation already existing would be able to meet it. As regards the condition of the wheat, the considerable quantities of chaff and dirt of all kinds, the presence of which depreciates the Indian wheat on the average by at least 2*s.* 6*d.* per quarter, could be easily removed by the introduction of comparatively simple screening and winnowing machinery.

"There is another point which has an important bearing on the demand for Indian wheat. Its consumption in this country depends mainly upon its adaptability for the purposes of the miller. It must be kept in mind that the recent remarkable development of the export trade in Indian wheat was to a considerable extent influenced by the improvements effected in this country in the mode of grinding it. This development was of course favoured by the opening of the Suez Canal, and by other circumstances; but the principal cause was the discovery that, by previous wetting, Indian wheat is rendered perfectly suitable for grinding in the usual way, and also that an admixture of the dry Indian wheat with the English grain is very advantageous, especially after a wet harvest.

"There is every reason to suppose that just as in the past changes or improvements in the milling process have affected the demand for Indian wheat, so in the future further improvements may result in increasing the demand. The improvements which have been effected during the last few years in milling machinery are very considerable. In addition to the usual system of grinding the grain by means of millstones, two new methods have been prominently brought into notice. The one consists in crushing the wheat by passing it repeatedly between chilled iron rollers. This is the method now universally used in Hungary, and it produces the finest flour in the market. The superiority of the flour prepared in this way to that produced by the ordinary method is shown by the quotations, which, for instance, on the 10th of February, 1879, ranged between 41*s.* and 55*s.* per sack of 280 lbs. of Hungarian flour, whilst the highest price for town-made flour was only 40*s.* The third and most recent system consists in a combination of the grindstones with crushing cylinders. The grain is first broken up between grindstones so as to con-

vert it into a kind of semolina or soojee, which is subsequently crushed between smooth porcelain cylinders."

In conclusion, it appears from the preceeding abstract of Dr. Forbes Watson's report of 1879, that there is nothing to prevent certain districts in India from becoming wheat-exporting countries. If by future attempts this result could be carried out profitably, the solution of the Indian finance question would not be far distant.

Mr. Juland Danvers' report to the Indian Secretary on the railways in India, for 1878-'9, was issued at the end of August, 1879. The following is a summary of its contents:—

An additional length of 995¼ miles has been opened during the year 1878, making a total distance of 8,215 miles on which traffic is now being conducted. Of the total length open, 6,459¾ miles are on the 5ft. 6in. gauge, 1,708 miles are on the metre gauge, and 47¼ miles on other gauges. Besides lines under survey there are 1,021¾ miles, of which 231 are on the broad gauge, still under construction. The most important line which has been completed is that along the Indus Valley, which connects the Port of Kurrachee, in Sind, with the Punjab Railway at Moultan, and thus, with the exception of the crossing of the Indus at Sukkur, a continuous communication by railway *viâ* Lahore, Delhi, Agra, and Benares, to Calcutta, about 2,120 miles in length, is established. A bridge over the Ganges, at Benares, has been determined on. It will form a part of the Oude and Rohilkund Railway system, and will be a very important work both from a commercial and strategical point of view. Some of the native chiefs are showing an interest in railway operations within their territories, and have made arrangements for constructing lines in connection with those existing in their neighbourhood.

The railways in Upper India proved of essential service during the late Afghan campaign. Four thousand men of all arms, in properly arranged proportions, were conveyed from Delhi to Lahore in 24 hours for many days together. By this means 146,000 troops and followers, 15,197 horses, ponies, and mules, 6,227 bullocks, 218 camels, 138 guns, and 83,780 tons of commissariat and other stores were transported in 184 special trains during the operations.

The first term of the lease with the East Indian Railway Company being on the eve of expiration, negotiations were officially commenced in July of last year for purchasing both the main and the Jabalpur lines. Arrangements have been concluded for effecting the purchase by means of an annuity, and for retaining, for 20 years at least, the agency of the company to work the lines as contractors. For the performance of this duty they will receive one-fifth of the profits, after all charges for the annuity, interest, &c., have been paid out of the net revenue. The annuity of £5 12*s*. 6*d*. per cent. expires in the year 1953, when the state will be freed from all charge on account of the undertaking. Railway materials to the amount of 215,043 tons, at a cost of £2,336,599, were shipped to India during the year; and besides this, 125,899 tons of coal, 1,326 tons of coke, and 6,874 tons of patent fuel, at a cost of £221,553, including freight. Since the commencement of railway operations in India, 6,286,146 tons of goods, which, exclusive of freight, have cost £39,363,164, have been sent from this country.

The total number of holders of Indian railway investments in England and India on December 31, 1878, was 64,321. In this country 25,053 held stock to the amount of £1,000 and upwards, 34,960 held stock of less amount, 771 held debenture bonds, and 3,000 debenture stock, while 220 Europeans and 317 natives were registered shareholders in India.

The number of persons employed on the open lines was 142,199, of which 95·15 per cent. were natives of the country, 2·40 were East Indians, and 2·45 Europeans. One European and one East Indian is on an average employed in about every 2¼ miles, and to each mile there are 17 natives. The Government of India have given their serious consideration to the subject of educating, in as suitable a climate as can be found in India, the children of the European *employés*, and the railway companies are endeavouring to come to some arrangement for the purpose.

With regard to expenditure, the capital outlay during the year ended March 31, 1879, was £1,294,816 on the guaranteed lines, and a sum of £3,629,476 had during the year ending October 31, 1878, been expended on the state lines. The total amount of capital which had been expended on the former was £96,725,679, and on the latter £21,291,076. The cost per mile of

the broad-gauge lines in the hands of the companies (of which about one-seventh have a double track) varies from £20,000 to £10,470, averaging £17,000. The seven metre gauge lines now working, and aggregating 1,600 miles in length, have cost on the average £7,366 per mile, varying in the case of the Holkar line, with the passage of the Nerbudda and the ascent of the Vindyhas in a length of 86 miles, from £15,000 per mile to the Hathras and Muttra line, laid on an existing road, and 29 miles in length only, £3,620 per mile.

The net revenue derived from the railways during the year 1878 was £5,197,815, compared with £6,248,469 of the previous year, and £4,564,823 of 1876. The guaranteed lines earned £5,002,028, compared with £6,117,226. The amount paid for guaranteed interest in respect of the year 1878 was £4,708,134, so that there is a surplus profit of £293,894.

There was a falling off in the goods traffic compared with the previous year, but the passenger traffic improved. The movement of grain in 1877 for famine purposes, produced an exceptional amount of traffic. The export trade in wheat was also large in that year, but last year India was unable to compete with America, from whence wheat was brought to England at 30*s*. a quarter. Indian wheat could not be supplied at under 40*s*. The reductions were chiefly in grain and rice, which, on the guaranteed lines, fell from 3,433,953 tons in 1877 to 2,188,000 tons in 1878. The aggregate quantity of merchandise carried was 7,296,335 tons, compared with 8,309,943 in 1877, and 5,794,949 in 1876. The amount received for conveying the same was £6,734,059 in 1878, £7,669,314 in 1877, and £5,651,357 in 1876.

The number of passengers in 1878 were 38,495,743, compared with 34,156,791 in 1877 ; the gross earnings being £3,143,860 and £2,852,973 respectively. The proportion per cent of first class was 651, of second 2·472, of the lower classes 96·877. The lower classes increased from 33,181,971 to 37,326,358; the second from 763,647 to 951,717 ; the first from 211,173 to 217,668.

Upon the whole the results of the year's working are not discouraging. They have shown that fluctuations in the traffic must be expected according to the state of foreign trade and the internal condition of the country, but that a steady impulse is being given to its staple productions. At the same time, the advance in the passenger traffic, notwithstanding adverse circumstances, shows that the people will use the railway freely and largely if it is brought within their means. It is also satisfactory to find that, while the earnings of some lines have fallen short of the guaranteed interest and others exceeded it, the aggregate receipts have for the second time covered the amount advanced by the Government.

The two following Tables give interesting Statistics in regard to East Indian Railways, including particulars of Revenue and Expenditure, and other details. The subsequent eight pages of Tables refer to the Population of British India, Native States, and Territories under the protection of the British Government, with which are included Tables of Imports and Exports. The last Table gives the Gross Amount of the Public Revenue, and of the Expenditure in each Presidency and Province in British India and England for ten official years.

Actual Capital Expenditure on Productive Public Works (Railways) in 1877-'78, and Estimated Expenditure on such Railways in 1878-'79, 1879-'80, and to the end of 1879-'80.

	1877-'78, Accounts.	1878-'79, Estimates.	1879-'80, Estimates.	To end of 1879-'80.	Sanctioned Estimates.	Balance remaining to be spent.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
Punjab Northern	301,852	298,000	407,000	3,404,000	3,664,378	260,378
Indus Valley	1,282,691	883,000	273,000	6,126,000	7,180,000	1,054,000
Northern Bengal (*a*)	433,736	361,000	65,000	1,987,000	1,906,811	—
Tirhoot	89,568	23,000	25,000	488,000	600,149	112,149
Rajputana (*b*)	150,302	212,000	90,000	3,058,000	3,053,692	—
Western Rajputana	180,430	646,000	386,000	1,209,000	1,830,000	621,000
Nimach	208,405	239,000	300,000	1,482,000	2,750,000	1,268,000
Sindia	174,048	244,000	141,000	689,000	874,529	185,529
Wardha Valley	19,380	24,000	15,000	516,000	540,912	24,912
Nagpur and Chattisghar	3,434	120,000	200,000	331,000	746,800	415,800
Rangoon and Irrawaddy	245,178	132,000	35,000	1,250,000	1,261,292	11,292
Dhond and Manmad	543,525	370,000	166,000	1,083,000	1,350,000	267,000
Patna and Gya	1,878	257,000	35,000	293,000	307,467	14,467
Holkar	71,920	−52,000	34,000	1,262,000	1,410,440	148,440
Cawnpore and Farakhabad	. .	95,000	150,000	245,000	322,302	77 302
Nalhati	. .	8,000	. .	35,000	30,000	—
Fluctuations in Store Balances	+278,621	−408,000	+60,000	301,000	. .	—
Reserve	. .	. .	43,000	43,000	. .	—
Total . . £	3,984,968	3,452,000	2,425,000	23,802,000	27,828,772	4,460,269

(*a*) The outlay in excess of sanction will only take place if a Supplemental Estimate is sanctioned.
(*b*) Additional Estimates will be submitted for the purchase of extra Rolling Stock required.

Gross Earnings, Working Expenses, and Net Traffic Earnings of State Railways to end of 1877-'78, with Regular Estimates for 1878-'79, and Budget Estimates for 1879-'80. (Amounts marked thus * are deficits.)

RAILWAYS.	ACTUALS.					Regular Estimates, 1878-79	Budget Estimates, 1879-80
	1873-74.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.		
Gross Earnings:	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Rajputana	20,936	93,818	203,102	239,349	261,434	325,000	338,500
Holkar and Nimach	790	16,702	38,349	39 273	62,666	100,000	112,500
Punjab Northern	—	—	22,657	50,154	76,412	115,000	111,000
Indus Valley	—	—	—	—	—	95,000	206,000
Wardah Coal	—	2,112	2,936	3,686	10,639	13,000	53,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley	—	—	—	—	62,876	106,000	135,000
Dhond and Manmad	—	—	—	—	—	23,000	47,400
Sindia	—	—	—	—	1,319	10,000	20,000
Patna and Gya	—	—	—	—	—	—	12,500
Calcutta and South-Eastern	9,833	9,861	10,486	9,775	12,616	13,000	11,700
Nalhatti	8,355	8,492	7,178	8,098	9,130	8,900	8,400
Tirhoot	—	—	4,805	21,358	34,324	44,000	45,500
Northern Bengal	—	—	—	—	17,111	107,500	123,000
Hattras-Mathura	—	—	—	8,977	9,364	10,000	10,300
£	39,914	130,985	289,513	380,670	557,891	970,400	1,234,800
Working Expenses:							
Rajputana	20,795	57,836	119,639	159,081	184,830	200,000	218,500
Holkar and Nimach	490	11,078	35,715	39,047	39,319	70,000	80,000
Punjab Northern	—	—	13,738	45,958	70,499	108,000	90,000
Indus Valley	—	—	—	—	—	110,000	173,000
Wardah Coal	—	2,403	3,149	3,658	7,044	12,000	33,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley	—	—	—	—	59,994	95,000	90,000
Dhond and Manmad	—	—	—	—	—	28,000	47,400
Sindia	—	—	—	—	2,137	11,500	18,000
Patna and Gya	—	—	—	—	—	—	10,000
Calcutta and South-Eastern	20,030	7,320	9,303	12,821	8,226	11,000	10,900
Nalhatti	5,073	7,367	7,936	8,315	8,732	7,700	8,300
Tirhoot	—	—	4,006	14,190	23,571	35,000	26,500
Northern Bengal	—	—	—	—	16,402	90,000	95,000
Hattras-Mathura	—	—	—	4,919	5,252	5,000	5,500
£	46,388	86,004	193,486	287,989	426,006	783,200	906,100
Net Traffic Earnings:							
Rajputana	141	35,983	83,463	80,267	76,604	125,000	120,000
Holkar and Nimach	300	5,624	2,634	226	23,347	30,000	32,500
Punjab Northern	—	—	8,920	4,195	5,913	7,000	21,000
Indus Valley	—	—	—	—	—	*15,000	33,000
Wardah Coal	—	*291	*213	28	3,595	1,000	20,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley	—	—	—	—	2,882	11,000	45,000
Dhond and Manmad	—	—	—	—	—	*5,000	—
Sindia	—	—	—	—	*818	*1,500	2,000
Patna and Gya	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,500
Calcutta and South-Eastern	*10,197	2,541	1,183	*3,046	4,390	2,000	800
Nalhatti	3,282	1,125	*758	*217	398	1,200	100
Tirhoot	—	—	799	7,168	10,752	9,000	19,000
Northern Bengal	—	—	—	—	710	17,500	28,000
Hattras-Mathura	—	—	—	4,058	4,112	5,000	4,800
£	*6,474	44,982	96,028	92,679	131,883	187,200	328,700

STATISTICS RELATING TO INDIA.

AREA AND POPULATION.

AREA and POPULATION of BRITISH INDIA, exclusive of NATIVE STATES.

Presidencies and Provinces under the Administration of	Area in Square Miles.*	Divisions.	Districts.	Inhabited Houses.	Population.	Density of Population to Square Mile.*	Date of last Census.
The Governor-General of India:							
Ajmere †	2,711	—	1	93,464	396,889	146	1 Apr. 1866
Berar ‡	17,728	—	6	495,760	2,226,496	126	7 Nov. 1867
Mysore ‡	29,325	3	8	1,012,738	5,055,412	172	14 Nov. 1871
Coorg	2,000	—	6	22,900	168,312	84	14 Nov. 1871
Governors:							
Madras	138,856	—	21	5,857,994	31,672,613	228	15 Nov. 1871
Bombay (including Sind)	123,142	4	24	3,277,679	16,302,173	132	21 Feb. 1872
Lieutenant-Governors:							
Bengal	156,200	9	44	10,481,132	60,502,897	383§	Nov. 1871 to Apr. 1872
North-Western Provinces	81,403	7	35	6,359,092	30,781,204	378	18 Jan. 1872
Punjab	104,975	10	32	4,124,857	17,611,498	168	10 Jan. 1868
Chief Commissioners:							
Oudh ‖	23,992	4	12	2,438,006	11,220,232	468	1 Feb. 1869
Central Provinces	84,078	4	19	1,674,291	8,201,519	97	25 Jan. 1872
British Burma	88,556	3	17	535,533	2,747,148¶	31	15 Aug. 1872
Assam	55,384	—	13	670,078	4,132,019**	99§	Nov. 1871 to Feb. 1872
Total under British Administration	908,350	—	238	37,043,524	191,018,412	210	

* Since the Census was taken, the area of several of the provinces has been found to differ from what was then supposed; revised figures are here given of both the area and the density of population.

† The area of Ajmere has been ascertained by a topographical survey to be 2,170·68 square miles. The native population was found by the Census of 1876 to be 396,331, to which must be added 558 Europeans enumerated in 1872.

‡ Temporarily under British Administration.

§ The area of the wild country in which the population is not reckoned has been excluded in calculating these averages.

‖ Amalgamated with the North-Western Provinces, 17 Jan., 1877.

¶ According to a Census taken for revenue purposes in 1876, the population of British Burma was computed to be 2,942,605.

** Excluding the population of the Cachar and Lakhimpur Hills.

AREA and POPULATION of BRITISH INDIA, with estimate for the NATIVE STATES and FOREIGN POSSESSIONS.

Provinces.	UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.		NATIVE STATES.		TOTAL.	
	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.
Government of India:						
Ajmere	2,711	396,889	—	—	2,711	396,889
Berar*	17,728	2,226,496	—	—	17,728	2,226,496
Mysore*	29,325	5,055,412	—	—	29,325	5,055,412
Coorg	2,000	168,312	—	—	2,000	168,312
Central India and Bundelkhand†	—	—	89,098	8,360,571	89,098	8,360,571
Rajputana	—	—	127,596	9,261,607	127,596	9,261,607
Hyderabad	—	—	80,000	9,000,000	80,000	9,000,000
Baroda	—	—	4,399	2,000,225	4,399	2,000,225
Munnipoor	—	—	7,584	126,000	7,584	126,000
Bengal	156,200	60,502,897	38,953	2,312,473	195,153	62,815,370
Assam	55,384	4,132,019‡	—	—	55,384	4,132,019‡
North-Western Provinces	81,403	30,781,204	5,125	657,013	87,528	31,438,217
Oudh§	23,992	11,220,232	—	—	23,992	11,220,232
Punjab	104,975	17,611,498	114,739	5,410,389	219,714	23,021,887
Central Provinces	84,078	8,201,519	28,834	1,049,710	112,912	9,251,229
British Burma	88,556	2,747,148‖	—	—	88,556	2,747,148‖
Madras	138,856	31,672,613	9,818	3,289,392	148,674	34,262,005
Bombay	123,142	16,302,173	67,370	6,831,515	190,512	23,133,688
Total for British India	908,350	191,018,412	573,516	48,298,895	1,481,866	239,317,307
French Possessions	. .	. .	. .	. .	178	271,460
Portuguese Possessions	. .	. .	. .	. .	1,086	407,712
Total of all India	. .	. .	. .	. .	1,483,130	239,996,479

* Temporarily under British administration.
† Excluding minor States, for which there is no information.
‡ Excluding the population of the Cachar and Lakhimpur Hills.
§ Amalgamated with the North-Western Provinces, 17 Jan. 1877.
‖ According to a Census taken for revenue purposes in 1876, the population of British Burma was computed to be 2,942,605.

AREA and POPULATION of TERRITORY under the direct Administration of the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

UNDER DIRECT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.

Provinces.	Divisons.	Districts.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.
				(Census of 1876.)
Ajmere*		Ajmere and Mhairwarra	2,711	396,889
				(Census of 1867.)
Berar†		Amráoti	2,767	501,331
		Akola	2,654	460,615
		Ellichpur	2,623	278,576
		Buldana.	2,807+	365,779
		Wún	3,919+	323,689
		Básim	2,958	276,408
			17,728+	2,206,398
		Unaccounted for	—	20,098
		Total Berar	17,728 +	2,226,496
				(Census of 1871.)
Mysore‡	Nundydroog	Bangalore	2,914	828,354
		Kolar	2,577	618,954
		Túmkûr	3,606	632,239
	Ashtagram	Mysore (with Yelanduru)	4,127	943,187
		Hassan	3,291	669,961
	Nagar	Shimoga	3,797	498,976
		Kadur	2,294	332,381
		Chitaldroog	4,471	531,360
			27,077	5,055,412
		Unaccounted for	2,248	—
		Total Mysore	29,325	5,055,412
				(Census of 1871.)
Coorg		Mercara	265	32,132
		Padinalknad	472	32,350
		Yedenalknad	313	31,104
		Kiggatnad	504	27,738
		Nanjarajpatna	331	26,159
		Yelsavirshime	115	18,829
		Total Coorg	2,000	168,312
		Total under direct British Administration	51,764	7,847,109

NATIVE STATES.

Provinces.	Districts.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.
	Brought forward	51,764	7,847,109
Central India and Bundelkhand.§	Gwalior	33,119	2,500,000
	Indore	8,435‖	635,450
	Bhopal	8,200	769,200
	Rewah	13,000	2,035,000
	Dhár	2,500	150,000
	Dewás	2,576	121,809
	Western Malwa Agency	2,922	241,900
	Bhopal Agency	2,009	236,578
	Bundelkhand Agency	10,567	1,278,000
	Baghelkhand Agency	1,250	235,000
	Bhopawur or Bheel Agency; Goona Agency; Deputy Bheel Agency; Guaranteed Grassia Chiefs ¶	4,250	157,634
	Total Central India	89,098	8,360,571
Rajputana	Oodeypoor or Meywar	11,614	1,161,400
	Jeypoor	15,250	1,995,000
	Jodhpoor or Marwar	35,670	2,000,000
	Kotah	5,000	450,000
	Bikaneer	23,500	300,000
	Boondee	2,300	224,000
	Kerowlee	1,870	124,060
	Bhurtpoor	1,974	743,710
	Tonk	2,700	320,000
	Kishenghur	724	105,000
	Ulwur	3,024	778,596
	Dholepoor	1,660	192,841
	Jeysulmere	12,250	75,000
	Jhallawar	2,500	226,000
	Pertabghur	1,460	150,000
	Banswarra	1,500	150,000
	Serohi	3,200	55,000
	Doongerpoor	1,000	175,000
	Shahpoora	400	36,000
	Total Rajpootana	127,596	9,261,607
Hyderabad (excluding Berar)		80,000	9,000.000
Baroda		4,399	2,000,225
Munnipoor		7,584	126,000
	Total Native States	308.677	28,748.403
	Grand Total	360,441	36,595,512

* The area of Ajmere has been ascertained by a topographical survey to be 2,710·68 square miles. The Native population was found by the Census of 1876 to be 396,331, to which must be added 558 Europeans, enumerated in 1872.

† Temporarily under British Administration. The alteration of area in Berar is due to more accurate survey. The last return from the Government of India gives the total population as 2,226,496, but does not specify the details. The population given for each district is taken from the Administration Report for 1875-6.

‡ Temporarily under British Administration. According to the latest information from India, the total area of Mysore is 29,325 square miles; but the detailed statement shows a total of only 27,077 square miles. Since the Census, a population of 1,544 has been transferred from Kadur to Hassan.

§ Excluding minor states for which there is no information.

‖ An area of 360 square miles has been transferred in 1878 from Khandesh to Indore; the population so transferred is not known.

¶ The figures are incomplete, but are given so far as particulars have been received.

AREA and POPULATION of TERRITORIES under the LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR of BENGAL.

Divisions.	Districts.	Area in Square Miles.*	Population. (Census of 1872.)
UNDER DIRECT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.			
Burdwan	Burdwan	3,455	2,034,745
	Bankoora	1,422	526,772
	Beerbhoom	1,344	695,921
	Midnapore	5,082	2,540,963
	Hooghly (with Howrah)	1,467	1,488,556
Presidency	24 Pergunnahs (with Calcutta)	2,796	2,657,648
	Nuddea	3,421	1,812,795
	Jessore	3,658	2,075,021
	Sunderbuns	5,341	+
	Moorshedabad	2,462	1,353,626
Rajshahye and Cooch Behar	Dinagepore	4,126	1,501,924
	Rajshahye	2,234	1,310,729
	Rungpore	3,476	2,149,972
	Bogra	1,501	689,467
	Pubna	1,978	1,211,594
	Darjeeling	1,234	94,712
	Jalpâiguri	2,906	418,665
Dacca	Dacca	2,796	1,852,993
	Furreedpore ‡	2,249	1,511,878
	Backergunge ‡	3,648	1,878,144
	Mymensingh	6,299	2,349,917
	Tipperah ‡	2,460	1,419,229
Chittagong	Chittagong ‡	2,322	1,006,422
	Noakholly ‡	1,852	949,616
	Hill Tracts	5,561	69,607
Patna	Patna	2,101	1,559,638
	Gya	4,716	1,949,750
	Shahabad	4,385	1,723,974
	Durbhunga	3,004	2,196,324
	Mozufferpore	3,335	2,188,382
	Sarun	2,654	2,063,860
	Chumparun	3,531	1,440,815
Bhâgalpur	Monghyr	3,922	1,812,986
	Bhâgalpur	4,268	1,826,290
	Purneah	4,957	1,714,795
	Maldah	1,813	676,426
	Sonthal Pergunnahs	5,488	1,259,287
Orissa	Cuttack §	4,513	1,622,584
	Pooree	2,472	769,674
	Balasore	2,068	770,232
Chota Nagpore	Hazâribâgh	7,021	771,875
	Lohardugga	12,044	1,237,123
	Singhbhoom ¶	3,897	322,396
	Manbhoom	4,921	996,570
Total under direct British Administration		156,200 *	60,502,897
NATIVE STATES.			
Sikkim		2,567	50,000
Cooch Behar		1,307	532,565
Hill Tipperah		3,867	75,792‖
Chota Nagpore Mehals		16,025	498,607
Cuttack Mehals		15,187	1,155,509
Total Native States		38,953	2,312,473
Grand Total		195,153*	62,815,370

* Excluding the area of rivers and lakes. Corrections have been made in the area of many districts, in accordance with the last Administration Report received for Bengal; but no explanation is therein given of the reason for the changes. The district of Maldah has been transferred from the Rajshahye to the Bhâgalpur division.

+ Unsurveyed and almost uninhabited.

‡ The alterations made since the Census, in the statement of the area and population of these districts, are due to the transfer of part of the subdivision of Mâdâripur from Backergunge to Furreedpore; and of the thanas of Chagulnaya and Mirkeserai, respectively, from Tipperah and Chittagong to Noakholly.

§ Including the two lapsed estates of Angul and Banki.

¶ The alteration made since the Census in the area and population of Singhbhoom is due to the exclusion of Saraikela and Kharsowan, which had been already reckoned in the Chota Nagpore Mehals.

‖ From returns partly based on a Census taken in 1876-'7.

List of the 139 towns in BRITISH INDIA, of which the POPULATION, according to the latest CENSUS, exceeds 20,000.

Towns.	Presidencies and Provinces.	Population.	Towns.	Presidencies and Provinces.	Population.	Towns.	Presidencies and Provinces.	Population.
Calcutta	Bengal	794,645*	Moulmein	B. Burmah	46,472	Kishnagurh	Bengal	26,750
Bombay	Bombay	644,405*	Chupra	Bengal	46,287	Batala	Punjab	26,680
Madras	Madras	397,552*	Moorshedabad	Do.	46,182	Umballa Cantonment	Do.	26,659
Lucknow	Oude	284,779	Saugor	Cent. Provinces	45,655	Ajmere	Ajmere	26,569
Benares	N.W.P.	175,188	Mooltan	Punjab	45,602†	Kurnool	Madras	25,579
Patna	Bengal	158,900	Combaconum	Madras	44,444	Ellore	Do.	25,487
Delhi	Punjab	154,417†	Behar	Bengal	44,295	Sealkote (town)	Punjab	25,337¶
Agra	N.W.P.	149,008	Saháranpur	N.W.P.	43,844	Panipat	Do.	25,276
Allahabad	Do.	143,693	Hyderabad	Bombay	41,152	Dera Ismail Khan	Do.	24,906
Bangalore	Mysore‡	142,513	Cuddalore	Madras	40,290	Nariad	Bombay	24,551
Amritsar	Punjab	133,925	Loodiana	Punjab	39,983	Rewari	Punjab	24,503
Cawnpore	N.W.P.	122,770	Arrah	Bengal	39,386	Satara	Bombay	24,484
Poonah	Bombay	118,886	Ghazipur	N.W.P.	38,853	Serampore	Bengal	24,440
Ahmedabad	Do.	116,873	Mozufferpore	Bengal	38,223	Umballa (town)	Punjab	24,037¶
Surat	Do.	107,149	Shikarpur	Bombay	38,107	Nyhatty	Bengal	23,730
Bareilly	N.W.P.	102,982	Vellore	Madras	38,022	Chandausi	N.W.P.	23,686
Lahore	Punjab	98,924†	Hubli	Bombay	37,961	Háthras	Do.	23,589
Rangoon	B. Burmah	98,745§	Fyzabad	Oude	37,804	Amráoti	Berar‡	23,410
Howrah	Bengal	97,784	Conjeveram	Madras	37,327	Jaunpur	N.W.P.	23,327
Nagpur	Cent. Provinces	84,441	Broach	Bombay	36,932	Adoni	Madras	22,723
Meerut	N.W.P.	81,386	Ahmednagar	Do.	36,824	Peshâwur Cantonment	Punjab	22,709
Farukhabad	Do.	79,204	Masulipatam	Madras	36,188	Pooree	Bengal	22,695
Trichinopoly	Madras	76,530	Coimbatore	Do.	35,310	Násik	Bombay	22,436
Sháhjahánpur	N.W.P.	72,136	Amrohah	N.W.P.	34,904	Hajeepore	Bengal	22,306
Bhágalpur	Bengal	69,678	Hooghly and Chinsura	Bengal	34,761	Annámalai	Madras	22,293
Dacca	Do.	69,212	Budaun	N.W.P.	33,322	Rampore Bauleah	Bengal	22,291
Mirzapore	N.W.P.	67,274	Burdwan	Bengal	32,321	Berhampore	Madras	21,670
Gya	Bengal	66,843	Belgaum	Bombay	82,277‖	Chandrakona	Bengal	21,311
Moradabad	N.W.P.	62,417	Bhiwani	Punjab	32,254	Manipuri	N.W.P.	21,177
Monghyr	Bengal	59,698	Vizagapatam	Madras	32,191	Máyaveram	Madras	21,165
Muttra	N.W.P.	59,281	Midnapore	Bengal	31,491	Tinnevelly	Do.	21,044
Peshâwur	Punjab	58,555†¶	Prome	B. Burmah	31,157	Sasseram	Bengal	21,023
Aligarh	N.W.P.	58,539	Cannanore	Madras	31,070	Jehanabad	Do.	21,022
Mysore	Mysore‡	57,815	Palghat	Do.	30,752	Dholka	Bombay	20,854
Jubbulpore	Cent. Provinces	55,188	Etáwah	N.W.P.	30,549	Bassein	B. Burmah	20,688
Kurrachee	Bombay	53,526‖	Nellore	Madras	29,922	Chittagong	Bengal	20,604
Sholapur	Do.	53,403	Pilibhit	N.W.P.	29,840	Ferozepore	Punjab	20,592¶
Tanjore	Madras	52,175	Mangalore	Madras	29,712	Tellicherry	Madras	20,504
Madura	Do.	51,987	Burhanpur	Cent. Provinces	29,3 3	Brindában	N.W.P.	20,350
Bellary	Do.	51,766	Santipore	Bengal	28,635	Vizianagram	Madras	20,169
Gorakhpur	N.W.P.	51,117	Dinapore	Do.	27,914	Dera Ghâzi Khan	Punjab	20,123
Cuttack	Bengal	50,878	Ellichpore	Berar‡	27,782			
Jullundur	Punjab	50,067	Banda	N.W.P.	27,746	Population of 44 towns above 50,000		5,586,266
Salem	Madras	50,012	Culna	Bengal	27,336	" 95 towns between 20,000 and 50,000		2,897,800
Kamthi	Cent. Provinces	48,831	Dharwar	Bombay	27,136‖			
Nágapatam	Madras	48,525	Berhampore	Bengal	27,110			
Calicut	Do.	47,962	Karnál	Punjab	27,022	Total Population of 139 largest towns		8,484,066
Durbhunga	Bengal	47,450	Khurja	N.W.P.	26,858			
Sanbhall	N.W.P.	46,974	Agurpara	Bengal	26,801			

* In this statement the cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, are each reckoned with their suburbs as one town. By the Census of 1876 the population of Calcutta, within municipal limits, was 429,535 (instead of 447,601); adding the population of the suburbs in 1872, 347,044, the total population would be only 776,579.

† By a Census of the Punjab Municipalities in 1876, the following returns were given: Delhi and suburbs, 160,553; Amritsar and suburbs, 142,381; Lahore and suburbs, 128,441; Peshâwur, 58,430; Mooltan and suburbs, 50,878.

‡ Temporarily under British administration.

§ An estimate in June, 1876, gave 108,000 as the population of Rangoon.

‖ Including civil population in cantonments.

¶ Besides cantonment population:—Peshâwur, 22,709 (see above); Sealkote, 10,546; Umballa, 26,659 (see above); Ferozepore, 15,837.

VALUE of MERCHANDISE and TREASURE respectively IMPORTED into each PRESIDENCY or PROVINCE of BRITISH INDIA, by SEA, from FOREIGN COUNTRIES, on PRIVATE ACCOUNT, excluding GOVERNMENT STORES and TREASURE, in each of the Ten under-mentioned Official Years.

Official Years ended 31 March.	Bengal.			British Burmah.			Madras.		
	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1868 . .	17,507,802	4,313,622	21,821,424	1,029,415	64,476	1,093,891	2,937,207	709,578	3,646,785
1869 . .	16,934,771	4,390,829	21,325,600	1,321,290	38,509	1,359,799	2,970,791	1,098,744	4,069,535
1870 . .	14,833,429	4,662,653	19,496,082	1,025,831	33,656	1,059,487	2,992,446	1,054,059	4,046,505
1871 . .	17,055,258	1,533,448	18,588,706	1,064,557	48,034	1,112,591	3,435,880	546,954	3,982,834
1872 . .	15,698,907	4,001,605	19,700,512	1,382,416	48,439	1,430,855	2,910,392	662,654	3,573,046
1873 . .	15,318,229	1,096,552	16,414,781	1,680,202	72,920	1,753,122	2,932,197	597,657	3,529,854
1874 . .	14,992,196	1,943,506	16,935,702	1,783,054	56,041	1,839,095	3,240,870	397,247	3,638,117
1875 . .	17,369,447	2,887,728	20,257,175	2,160,352	54,906	2,215,258	3,311,570	501,304	3,812,874
1876 . .	17,767,175	1,080,545	18,847,720	1,629,401	56,175	1,685,576	3,891,939	562,352	4,454,291
1877 . .	16,693,813	2,625,466	19,319,279	2,170,025	68,272	2,238,297	3,436,072	443,361	3,879,433
Total for the 10 Years .	164,171,027	28,535,954	192,706,981	15,246,543	541,428	15,787,971	32,059,364	6,573,910	38,633,274

Official Years ended 31 March.	Bombay.			Sind.			Total for India.		
	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1868 . .	13,471,119	6,682,198	20,153,317	718,777	5,500	724,277	35,664,320	11,775,374	47,439,694
1869 . .	14,017,625	8,831,614	22,849,269	686,897	6,862	693,759	35,931,374	14,366,588	50,297,962
1870 . .	13,415,309	8,198,855	21,614,164	612,628	5,584	618,212	32,879,643	13,954,807	46,834,450
1871 . .	11,368,137	3,309,701	14,677,838	424,414	6,686	431,100	33,348,246	5,444,823	38,793,069
1872 . .	10,427,982	6,843,049	17,271,031	391,079	18,066	409,145	30,810,776	11,573,813	42,384,589
1873 . .	10,225,684	2,780,474	13,006,158	316,757	8,982	325,739	30,473,069	4,556,585	35,029,654
1874 . .	11,334,111	3,390,856	14,724,967	278,266	4,884	283,150	31,628,497	5,792,534	37,421,031
1875 . .	11,514,053	4,695,465	16,209,518	289,840	1,644	291,484	34,645,262	8,141,047	42,786,309
1876 . .	13,481,086	3,599,057	17,080,143	343,067	2,593	345,660	37,112,668	5,300,722	42,413,390
1877 . .	12,746,805	8,296,158	21,042,963	320,462	2,861	323,323	35,367,177	11,436,118	46,803,295
Total for the 10 Years .	122,001,911	56,627,457	178,629,368	4,382,187	63,662	4,445,849	337,861,032	92,342,411	430,203,443

VALUE OF INDIAN PRODUCE and MANUFACTURES, of FOREIGN MERCHANDISE, and of TREASURE, EXPORTED from each PRESIDENCY and PROVINCE of BRITISH INDIA, by SEA, to FOREIGN COUNTRIES, on PRIVATE ACCOUNT, excluding GOVERNMENT STORES and TREASURES, in each of the Ten under-mentioned Official Years.

OFFICIAL YEARS ended 31st March	BENGAL.			BRITISH BURMAH.			MADRAS.		
	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1868 .	19,873,661	332,803	20,206,464	1,572,456	22,906	1,595,362	4,237,505	74,050	4,311,555
1869 .	20,826,949	439 375	21,266,324	2,450,169	8,208	2,458,377	5,996,141	117,900	6,114,041
1870 .	20,814,448	156,673	20,971,121	1,770,076	9,336	1,779,412	5,781,770	290,606	6,072,376
1871 .	22,936,479	304,130	23,240,609	2,436,608	16,052	2,452,660	4,867,527	283,199	5,150,726
1872 .	27,627,732	216,098	27,843,030	2,790,752	16,384	2,807,136	7,006,227	291,097	7,297,324
1873 .	24,618,538	75,981	24,694,519	3,785,780	18,600	3,804,380	6,244,668	215,978	6,460,646
1874 .	22,778,737	423,091	23,201,828	3,465,599	14,808	3,480,407	6,618,393	639,754	7,258,147
1875 .	22,014,059	758,170	22,772,229	3,037,496	5,327	3,042,823	6,536,638	258,300	6,794,938
1876 .	23,747,060	745,943	24,493,003	3,734,070	4,607	3,738,677	7,193,120	272,512	7,465,632
1877 .	26,596,018	103,831	26,699,849	3,848,863	15,681	3,864,544	6,454,277	553,597	7,007,874
Total for the 10 Years.	231,833,681	3,556,095	235,389,776	28,891,869	131,909	29,023,778	60,936,266	2,996,993	63,933,259

OFFICIAL YEARS ended 31st March	BOMBAY.			SIND.			TOTAL FOR INDIA.		
	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Grand Total.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1868 .	24,402,485	594,151	24,996,636	787,894	1,426	789,320	50,874,001	1,025,336	51,899,337
1869 .	22,911,892	204,939	23,116,831	877,014	5,660	882,674	53,062,165	776,082	53,838 247
1870 .	23,171,221	559,318	23,730,539	933,861	9,453	943,314	52,471,376	1,025,386	53,496,762
1871 .	24,126,699	975,885	25,102,584	964,512	7,914	972,426	55,331,825	1,587,180	56,919,005
1872 .	24,954,791	895,028	25,849 819	806,346	2,566	808,912	63,185,848	1,421,173	64,607,021
1873 .	19,929,315	959,561	20,888,876	657,994	3,859	661,853	55,236,295	1,273,979	56,510,274
1874 .	20,871,314	792,257	21,663,571	1,226,743	9,161	1,235,904	54,960,786	1,879,071	56,839,857
1875 .	23,647,221	566,086	24,213,307	1,076,847	4,838	1,081,685	56,312,261	1,592,721	57,904,982
1876 .	21,664,437	1,078,912	22,743,349	1,706,718	13,170	1,719,888	58,045,405	2,115,144	60,160,549
1877 .	22,416,395	3,250,676	25,667,071	1,646,079	18,795	1,664,874	60,961,632	3,942,580	64,904,212
Total for the 10 Years.	228,095,770	9,876,813	237,972,583	10,684,008	76,842	10,760,850	560,441,594	16,638,652	577,080,246

GROSS AMOUNT of the PUBLIC REVENUE, and of the EXPENDITURE (excluding outlay of Capital on Productive Public Works), in each PRESIDENCY and PROVINCE in BRITISH INDIA and in ENGLAND, for each of the 10 under-mentioned Official Years.

Presidencies and Provinces.	Official Years ended 31st March.										
	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.†	Total for the 10 Years.
	REVENUE.										
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
India* . .	1,974,857	2,538,362	3,318,343	2,595,646	2,779,337	2,732,273	2,406,014	2,568,299	2,732,649	7,458,478	31,104,258
Bengal . Assam .	16,767,980	16,533,385	15,769,214	16,323,744	16,740,427	15,943,456	15,337,129	15,087,394 552,001	15,496,923 561,197	16,006,392 568,405	161,687,647
N. W. Provs.	5,881,715	5,817,449	6,056,137	6,200,236	5,769,706	5,849,714	5,833,963	5,879,317	5,957,492	6,186,952	59,432,681
Oude . .	1,426,502	1,476,183	1,550,701	1,617,023	1,553,309	1,656,602	1,549,873	1,587,004	1,669,478	1,695,850	15,782,525
Punjab . .	3,459,675	3,434,015	3,792,211	3,852,650	3,634,067	3,604,923	3,782,032	3,747,682	3,749,582	3,837,599	36,894,436
Central Provs.	965,362	1,074,515	1,043,954	1,130,401	1,039,326	1,029,813	1,058,515	956,212	997,749	1,104,138	10,399,985
B. Burmah .	1,156,685	1,266,493	1,197,131	1,210,658	1,218,102	1,392,834	1,502,382	1,488,148	1,746,981	1,771,743	13,951,157
Madras. .	7,512,877	7,507,081	8,079,632	8,207,300	8,092,427	8,199,110	8,210,547	8,373,826	8,360,488	7,051,137	79,594,425
Bombay‡ .	9,283,991	9,437,772	9,899,281	10,097,831	9,061,851	9,589,529	9,679,687	9,986,805	9,746,601	10,076,974	96,860,322
Total India .	48,429,644	49,085,255	50,706,604	51,235,489	49,888,552	49,9[illegible]8,254	49,360,142	50,226,688	51,019,140	55,757,668	505,707,436
England .	104,768	177,436	194,477	178,197	221,663	221,235	238,111	343,483	290,923	238,117	2,208,410
TOTAL .	48,534,412	49,262,691	50,901,081	51,413,686	50,110,215	50,219,489	49,598,253	50,570,171	51,310,063	55,995,785	507,915,846
	EXPENDITURE.										
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
India* . .	12,861,109	13,458,414	13,283,624	12,917,046	13,028,032	13,781,556	13,537,367	13,447,250	14,511,783	14,960,285	135,786,466
Bengal . Assam .	6,206,145	6,301,826	6,502,174	6,081,335	5,331,112	5,422,192	9,441,316	8,057,769 361,290	6,300,749 369,314	6,819,361 380,510	67,575,093
N. W. Provs.	2,504 634	2,844,694	2,784,349	2,567,963	2,305,772	2,083,562	2,162,567	2,202,025	2,146,256	2,239,594	23,841,416
Oude . .	740,921	766,170	717,041	660,979	596,736	626,519	577,825	575,648	545,155	576,784	6,383,778
Punjab . .	2,099,843	2,320,585	2,123,407	1,957,911	1,749,680	1,586,926	1,787,186	1,747,472	1,814,684	1,945,858	19,133,552
Central Provs	1,014,175	1,185,656	987,105	865,228	746,369	689,760	714,917	693,883	674,609	769,568	8,341,270
B. Burmah .	895,936	895,855	724,844	639,499	655,560	696,626	716,709	771,218	856,721	896,508	7,749,476
Madras. .	6,649,989	6,475,294	6,483,226	6,090,504	5,750,352	6,024,095	6,125,317	5,897,554	5,932,041	7,975,787	63,404,159
Bombay‡ .	8,071,733	7,959,135	7,757,251	8,118,970	7,119,190	7,293,976	7,031,791	7,006,474	7,334,756	8,146,545	75,839,821
Total India .	41,044,485	42,207,629	41,363,021	39,899,435	37,282,803	38,205,212	42,094,995	40,760,583	40,486,068	44,710,800	408,055,031
England† .	8,497,622	9,829,092	9,419,391	10,031,261	9,703,235	10,248,605	9,310,926	9,490,391	9,155,050	13,467,763	99,153,336
TOTAL .	49,542,107	52,036,721	50,782,412	49,930,696	46,986,038	48,453,817	51,405,921	50,250,974	49,641,118	58,178,563	507,208,367

* Including Territories and Departments under the Government of India, together with the Military Receipts and Charges for the whole of India, except those relating to the Armies of Madras and Bombay.

† Other particulars of these have already been given; and further will be afforded in subsequent tables.

‡ Including Sind.

CHAPTER II.

TOPOGRAPHY—MOUNTAINS AND PASSES—RIVERS—PLATEAUX—PROVINCES AND CHIEF TOWNS—CLIMATE AND DISEASES—GEOLOGY—SOIL—MINERALOGY.

ASIA, — the largest and most diversified quarter of the globe, has for its central southern extremity a region of unsurpassed grandeur, comprising lofty mountains, large rivers, extensive plateaux, and wide-spread valleys, such as are not to be found within a like area in any other section of the earth. This magnificent territory, known under the general designation of India,* is in the form of an irregular pentagon, with an extreme length, from north to south of 2,000 miles, and extreme breath of 1,200 miles; an area of 1,500,000 sq. miles; and a well-defined boundary of about 10,000 English miles.†

The geographical position of India possesses several advantages. On the north, it is separated from China, Tibet, and Independent Tartary, for a distance of 1,800 miles, by the Himalayan chain and prolongations termed the Hindoo-Koosh, whose altitude varies from 16,000 to 27,000 feet (three to five miles), through which there is only one pass accessible to wheeled carriages (Bamian.) This gigantic wall has at its base an equally extended buttress, the sub-Himalaya and Sewalik hills, with, in one part, an intervening irregular plateau (Tibet) of 90 to 150 miles wide: on the *West*, the Hindoo-Koosh is connected by the low Khyber ranges with the lofty Sufied-Koh, and its conjoint the Suliman mountains, which rise 10,000 feet, like a mural front, above the Indus valley, and have a southerly course of 400 miles; the Suliman are connected by a transverse chain with the Bolan mountains, which proceed nearly due south for 250 miles, and become blended with the Keertar, Jutteel, and Lukkee hills; the latter terminating in the promontory of Cape Monze, a few miles to the north-west of the Indus mouth. This *western* boundary of 900 miles, supports the table-lands which constitute a large part of Afghanistan and Beloochistan: to these there are four principal ascents—the Khyber, Gomul, Bolan, and Gundava passes, readily defensible against the strategetic movements of any formidable enemy. On the *East*, an irregular series of mountains, hills, and highlands, extend from the source of the Brahmapootra, along the wild and unexplored regions of Naga, Munneepoor, and Tipperah, through Chittagong and Arracan to Cape Negrais (the extremity of the Youmadoung range), at the mouth of the Irawaddy river; to the southward and eastward of Pegu and Martaban, the Tenasserim ridge commences about one hundred miles distant from the coast, and prolongs the boundary to the Straits of Malacca, along the narrow strip of British territory which fronts the Bay of Bengal. The length of this *eastern* frontier is 1,500 miles, and it forms an effectual barrier against aggression from the Burmese, Siamese, or Malays, with whose states it is conterminous. On the *South*, the shores of the above-described territory are washed by the Bay of Bengal, the Straits of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea, for 4,500 miles. The natural frontiers of this extensive region may be thus summarily noted :—north, along the Himalaya, 1,800; west, along Afghanistan, &c., 900; east, along Burmah, Siam, &c., 1,800: total by land, 4,500; by sea, 4,500 = 9,000 English miles.

No pen-and-ink description can convey an adequate idea of India as a whole; the mind may comprehend separate features, but must fail to realise at one view a complete portraiture, especially if devoid of unity of configuration: in several countries a mountain ridge and a main conduit form an outline, around which the chief topographical peculiarities may be grouped; but the region before us contains several lines of great length and elevation, with diverse axis of perturbation, and declinations to three of the cardinal points, causing numerous rivers, flowing S.W. (Indus); S.E. (Ganges); S. (Brahmapootra and Irawaddy); W. (Nerbudda, Taptee, and Loonee); E. (Godavery, Kistnah, Cauvery, and Mahanuddy); and in

* *See* p. 13 for origin of word: old geographers designate the country as India *within* (S.W. of), and *beyond* (S.E. of) the Ganges.

† The reader is requested to bear in mind throughout this work, that round numbers are used to convey a general idea, easy to be remembered; they must be viewed as approximative, and not arithmetically precise. Indian statistics are still very imperfect.

other directions according to the course of the mountain-ranges and the dip of the land towards the ocean, by which the river system is created and defined.

Irrespective of the circumscribing barriers, and of the bones and arteries (hills and streams) which constitute the skeleton of Hindoostan, three features, distinctively delineated, deserve brief notice. The snowy ranges on the north give origin to two noble rivers, which, as they issue from the lesser Himalaya, are separated by a slightly elevated water-shed, and roll through widely diverging plains—the one in a south-easterly direction to the Bay of Bengal, the other south-westerly to the Arabian sea; each swollen by numerous confluents which, altogether, drain or irrigate an area equal to about half the superficies of India Proper. The Gangetic plain is 1,000, that of the Indus (including the Punjab), 800 miles in length; the average breadth of either, 300 miles; the greater part of both not 500 feet above the sea; the height nowhere exceeding 1,000 feet. Intermediate, and bifurcating the valleys of the main arteries, there is an irregular plateau, extending from north to south for 1,000, with a breadth varying from 300 to 500 miles, and a height ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 feet above the sea-level. Midway between Cape Comorin and Cashmere, this table-land is bisected from west to east, for 600 miles, by the narrow Nerbudda valley: the *northern* section, of an oblong shape, comprising Malwa, East Rajpootana, and Bundelcund, has for its south-eastern and north-western buttresses the Vindhya and Arravulli ranges, and a declination towards the Jumna and Dooab on the north-east, and to the Guzerat plain on the south-west: the *southern* section, constituting what is erroneously* termed the Peninsula, contains the Deccan, Myscre, Berar, and adjoining districts; forms a right-angled triangle,† supported on the north by the Sautpoora mountains, and on either side by the Western and Eastern Ghauts and their prolongations; the declination is from the westward to the eastward, as shown by the courses of the Godavery and Kistnah.

These prominent physical characteristics may be thus recapitulated. 1st. The extensive mountain circumvallation, east to west, from the Irawaddy to the Indus. 2nd. The two great and nearly level plains of the Ganges and Indus. 3rd. The immense undulating plateau, of 1,000 miles long, in a straight line from the Jumna to the Cauvery. To these may be added a low coast-line of 4,500 miles, skirted on either side of the Bay of Bengal, and on the Malabar shore of the Indian Ocean, by receding *Ghauts* and other lofty ranges, backed by inland ridges of hills, and mountains traversing the land in diverse directions, such as the Vindhya, Sautpoora, and Arravulli. These salient features comprise many varieties of scenery; but for the most part wide-spread landscapes extend on the east,—teeming with animal and vegetable life; sandy wastes on the west, where the wild ass obtains scanty provender; on the north, an arctic region, whose snowy solitudes are relieved from perpetual stillness by volcanic fires bursting from ice-capt peaks; on the south, luxuriant valleys, verdant with perpetual summer; a rocky coast at Kattywar, swampy sunderbunds at Bengal, jungly ravines in Berar, and fertile plains in Tanjore;—*here* Nature in sternest aspect,—*there* in loveliest form,—*everywhere* some distinctive beauty or peculiar grandeur: while throughout the whole are scattered numerous cities and fortresses on river-bank or ocean-shore, adorned with Hindoo and Moslem architecture, cave temples of wondrous workmanship, idolatrous shrines, and Mohammedan mausoleums, wrought with untiring industry and singular artistic skill; cyclopean walls, tanks, and ruins of extraordinary extent, and of unknown origin and date; but whose rare beauty even the ruthless destroyer, Time, has not wholly obliterated. These and many other peculiarities contribute to render India a land of romantic interest, which it is quite beyond the assigned limits of this work to depict: all within its scope‡ being a brief exposition of the various mountain-ranges and passes, the plateaux, the river system, coast-line, islands, &c., with an enumeration of the principal cities and towns, which are more numerous and populous than many of continental Europe.§

* There is no partial insulation—no isthmus.

† The northern and western sides are about 900 miles in length; the eastern 1,100.

‡ A full description of the geography of India would require a volume to itself; but the tabular views which are given, with details already afforded, will, with the aid of the maps, enable the reader to trace out the topography of the country.

§ Autumnal tourists, in search of health, pleasure, or excitement, and weary of the beaten paths of the Seine and Rhine, might readily perform, in six months (September to March), the present route to and from India,—examine the leading features of this ancient and far-famed land, judge for themselves of its gorgeous beauty, and form some idea of the manners and customs of its vast and varied population.

Mountain Chains of India, their Extent, Position, Elevation, &c. *(For reference notes, see p. 548.)*

Name.	Extent and Position of Extremities.	Elevation above the Sea.	Remarks.
HIMALAYA, *or "abode of Snow."*	This stupendous mass extends in an irregular curve over 22° of lon., from the defile above Cashmere, where the Indus penetrates into the plains of the Punjab, lon. 73° 23′, to the S. bend of the Sanpoo, lon. 95° 23′. It is 1,500 m. long, with an avg. breadth of 150 m.	1. Dairmal, 19,000 ft.; 2. Bal Tal, 19,650; 3. Ser and Mer, 20,000; 4. Hanle, 20,000; 5. Gya, 24,764; 6. Porgyal, 22,600; 7. Raldang, 20,103; 8. St. Patrick, 22,798; 9. St. George, 22,654; 10. The Pyramid, 21,579; 11. Gangoutri, 22,906; 12. Jumnoutri, 21,155; 13. Kedarnath, 23,062; 14. Badrinath, 22,954; 15. Kamet, 25,550; 16. Nanda Devi, 25,749; 17. Gurla, 23,900; 18. Dhawalagiri, 27,600; 19. Gonsainthan, 24,740; 20. Junnoo, 25,311; 21. Kinchinjunga, 28,176; 22. Chomiomo, 19,000; 23. Kanchan Jhow, 22,000; 24. Chumalari, 23,929; 25. Three peaks on lower bank of Deemree, 21,000; 26. Kailas, 22,000. Average elevation, 18,000 to 20,000 ft.	Limit of perpetual snow, or congelation, on S. slope, 15,000 to 18,000 ft. Deep narrow valleys, separated by ranges running either parallel or at right angles with the main ridge, contain the numerous sources of the rivers flowing into the Ganges, the Indus, and the Brahmapootra.* The steep face is towards the plain, and to the N. the chain supports the lofty table-land of Tibet. The greater part of the giant peaks, which rise to an elevation of 25,000 or 28,000 ft., are situate not on the central axis, but to the south of it. Viewed from Patna, at a distance of about 150 miles, these mountains present a long line of snow-white pinnacles, which, on a nearer approach, are seen towering above the dark line of lower but still lofty mountains.† With the exception of a strip of land at the foot of the mountains, the whole of Bootan presents a succession of the most lofty and rugged mountains on the surface of the globe. It is a series of ridges, separated only by the narrow beds of roaring torrents.
HINDOO-KOOSH,‡ *Kouenlun, or Mooz Taugh.*	About 850 m. long. From Kara-korum, lat. 35°, lon. 77°; to Bamian,‖ lat. 34° 50′, lon. 67° 48′.¶	1. Hindoo-Koosh, 35° 40′, 68° 50′, 21,000 ft.; §2. Summit N. of Jelalabad, 20,248; 3. Koushan Pass, 15,200; 4. Khawak Pass, 13,200; 5. Akrobat, 10,200 feet. Laram Mountains, 35° 20′, 62° 54′: about 60 m. from N.E. to S.W., dividing the valley of Suwat from that of Panjkora; and Laspissor Mountains, S. of, and subordinate to, Hindoo-Koosh, about 50 m. from E. to W., 36°, 70°—little known.	Limit of perpetual snow on S. slope (lat. 37°), 17,000 ft. The most remarkable feature of Hindoo-Koosh is, that to the S. it supports the plains of Caubul and Koh-Damaun, 6,000 to 7,000 ft.; while to the N. lies the low tract of Turkestan. Koondooz town, distant in a direct line 80 m. N. of Hindoo-Koosh, only 900 ft. above the sea. The Hindoo-Koosh is a distinct mountain system, its parallelism being from S.W. to N.E., while that of the Himalaya is from S.E. to N.W. **
KOH-I-BABA	About 60 m.,—along lat. 34° 30′, between lon. 67° 30′, and 68° 30′. At the S.W. extremity of Hindoo-Koosh, with which it is connected by the transverse ridges of Kalloo and Hajeguk.	Variously estimated. According to Burnes and Lady Sale, 18,000 ft.; Outram, 20,000 ft.; Humboldt, 2,800 toises, or 17,640 ft.; the most probable is 16,000 ft. Highest accessible point, 34° 40′, 67° 30′; 13,200 ft. Hajeguk Pass, 11,700 ft.	It is a vast rounded mass, the culminating ridge ascending in lofty peaks, covered with perpetual snow, stretching as far as the eye can reach—further to the W. it sinks into the mazy mountains forming the Huzareh highlands. Supposed to be the Parapamissus of the Greeks.
SUFIED-KOH, *Snowy or White Mountains.*	Near Attock, lon. 72° 16′ W. to lon. 69° 36′, proceeding nearly along the parallel of lat. 33° 50′; then sinking into a maze of hills stretching to the Kohistan of Kabool.	There are three ranges, running nearly parallel to the S. of the Caubul River; they rise in height as they recede from the river, the highest between 69° 40′, and 70° 30′, attaining an altitude of 14,000 ft.	Covered with perpetual snow. Generally of primary formation, consisting of granite, quartz, gneiss, mica-slate, and primary limestone. The Soorkh Rood, the Kara Su, and many other shallow but impetuous streams rush down its northern face, and are discharged into the Caubul river, which conveys their water to the Indus. The two lowest ranges are covered with pine forests; the highest and most distant has a very irregular outline, is steep and rocky, yet furrowed by many beautiful vales.††
PUGHMAN, *or Pamghan Range.*	Subordinate to Hindoo-Koosh, running along its S. base, generally from N.E. to S.W.	Estimated at 13,000 ft. Oona Pass, 34° 23′, 68° 15′; 11,320 ft. Erak Summit, 34° 40′, 68° 48′; 12,480 ft.	Always covered with snow. Its south-eastern brow overhangs the delightful region of Koh-Damaun and Caubul; its northern face forms the southern boundary of the Ghorbund valley.

Kurkutcha Mountains . .	Separate valley of Caubul from plain of Jelalabad; and connect Hindoo-Koosh with Sufied-Koh.	From 1,000 to 2,000 ft. above Caubul, and the highest part, 34° 25′, 69° 30′; 8,000 ft. above the sea.	Four routes over this range; practicable only for a man and horse at Lattabund Pass, 4,000 British troops were destroyed in their retreat, in 1842. Cold intense in winter, the frost splitting the rocks into huge shattered fragments.
Khyber Mountains . .	Length, about 50 m.; breadth, about 20 m. Between 33° 30′ and 34° 20′, and 71° 10′ and 71° 30′. They connect Hindoo-Koosh with Sufied-Koh.	Tatara summit, highest point, 4,800 ft. Summit of Khyber Pass, 3,373 ft. Passed easily by British troops during the Afghan War of 1878-'79.	Appear at first irregularly grouped, but the distinct arrangement of a chain is afterwards observable. Four passes through this range. The hills generally consist of slate and primary limestone, with overlying sandstone.
Goolkoo Mountains . . .	Lat. 33° 22′, lon. 67° 50′; 30 m. S.W. from Ghuznee.	Estimated at 13,000 ft.	
Amran Mountains . .	Lat. 30° 50′, lon. 66° 30′.	General elevation, about 8,000 ft. Highest part, 30° 50′, 66° 30′; about 9,000 ft. Kojuck Pass, 7,457 ft.	Bounds the table-lands of Shawl and Pisheen on the W., as the Hala range does to the E.
Toba Mountains	Length, 150m. Between 30° 40′ & 32° 40′, and 66° 40′ and 68° 20′; extending N.E. from the N. side of Pisheen valley.	General elevation, 9,000; above Pisheen, 3,500 ft. Tukatoo Hill, 30° 20′, 66° 55′; 11,500 ft.	Country, though generally rugged, fertile.
Pubb Mountains	Length, about 90 m. From C. Monze to lat. 26°.	Supposed to equal those of W. Scinde, viz., 2,000 ft. Highest part, about 25° 30′.	In 25° 3′, 66° 50′, they are crossed by the Guncloba Pass, described as stony, and of easy ascent and descent.
Scinde Ranges, viz.— I. Jutteel.	60 to 70 m. S.W. from Sehwan to Dooba. Between 25° 32′, 26° 20′, and 67° 48′, 68° 8′.	Steep—in few places less than 2,000 ft.	The road from Sehwan to Kurrachee lies between them, and Keertar more to the W.
II. Keertar	Parallel with the Jutteel, more to the W., between 25° 50′, 26° 40′, and about 67° 40′.	Average height, probably below 2,000 ft. . . .	Imperfectly explored.
III. Lukkee	Length, about 50 m. From Jutteel, S.E. towards Hydrabad. Centre of range, 26°, 67° 50′.	Highest part, 1,500 to 2,000 ft. Between Lukkee and Sehwan, the mountains have a nearly perpendicular face, towards the Indus, above 600 ft. high.	They are of recent formation, containing a vast profusion of marine exuviæ. Huge fissures traverse this range, and hot springs and sulphureous exhalations are of frequent occurrence.
Hala, *Brahooick, or Bolan Range.*	Length, about 400 m. From Tukatoo to Arabian Gulf, forming the E. wall of Beloochistan table-land.	Average height, 5,000 to 6,000 ft. Kurklekee Mountains, that part which borders on the Bolan Pass, from 29° 20′ to 30° 10′, 67° to 67° 30′, where the crest of Bolan Pass intersects them, 5,793 ft.	The range is crossed by the Bolan Pass, through which the route lies from Shikarpoor to Kandahar and Ghuznee, which though very important in a military point of view, is inferior in commercial interest to the Goolairee, farther N.
Suliman Range	Length, about 350 m. From 33° 40′, they run nearly S. in the 70th merid. of lon., to the mountains about Hurrund and Kahun, in lat. 29°.	Highest elevation, Takht-i-Suliman, called also Khaissa-Ghar, lat. 31° 35′; 11,000 ft.	E. face dips rather steeply to the Indus, but the W. declivity much more gradual, to the table-land of Sewestan. Sides of mountains clothed nearly to the summits with dense forests; valleys overgrown with a variety of indigenous trees, shrubs, and flowers.
Kala, *or Salt Range* . . .	Stretch from the E. base of Suliman Mountains to Jhelum River, N.E. to S.W., in lon. 32° 30′, to 33° 30′.	Highest elevation, 2,500 ft.	Vegetation scanty, and the bold and bare precipices present a forbidding aspect. About 32° 50′, 71° 40′, the Indus makes its way down a narrow rocky channel, 350 yards broad; and the mountains have an abrupt descent to the river.
Sewalik Range . . .	Length, 155 m., greatest breadth, 10 m. From Hurdwar to Roopur, S.E. to N.W.	From 3,000 to 3,500 ft.; highest part, 30° 17′, 77° 50′, between the Timli and Lal Derwaza Passes.	In many places each hill might be represented by a right-angled triangle, the base resting on the pass, perpendicular facing towards the plains; hypothenuse sloping towards the Dhoons, in the opposite direction.
Nepaul Mountains, and Table-land.	500 m., breadth from 90 to 150 m. From Kumaon to Sikhim.	Diversified by several inhabited valleys, from 3,000 to 6,000 ft. above the plains of Bengal. The hills rise towards the culminating ridge of the Himalayas. Katmandoo, 4,628 ft. above sea, in a valley surrounded by stupendous mountains.‡‡ Bynturee, 29° 35′, 79° 20′; 5,615 ft.	Hills consist of limestone, hornstone, and conglomerate. Notwithstanding its low latitude, Nepaul, from its elevation, enjoys a climate resembling that of S. Europe. Snow lies on the mountain-chain which surrounds the capital, in winter, and occasionally falls in the valley. The whole is well-watered.

Name.	Extent and Position of Extremities.	Elevation above the Sea.	Remarks.
ARRAVULLI RANGE	Length, 200 m.; average breadth, 10 to 15 m. Extend from 22° 40′, to 26° 50′, and from lon. 74° to 75°.	Average 3,000 ft. Highest elevation, Mt. Aboo, 5,000 ft. Crest of Koulmair Pass, 3,353 ft. Twelve m. from Beawr; country one mass of hills, intersected by small vales.	Forms the western buttress of the plateau of Central India. The mountains at Pokur are of a rose-coloured quartz, displaying bold pinnaces and abrupt rocky sides. The geological formation of Mt. Aboo is granitic.
KATTYWAR MOUNTAINS .	The peninsula lies between 20° 42′, 23° 10′, 69° 5′, 72° 14′; area 19,850 sq. m.	The Gir, a succession of ridges and hills, some 1,000 ft.; elevation diminishing towards N. Girnar, a granitic peak, 3,500 ft. Palithana Mt., 1,500 ft. Group near Poorbunder, 2,000 ft. Low ridge running from Choteyla to Gir, 400 ft. The centre of peninsula is the highest, and here all the rivers take their rise.	Caverns, deep ravines, and other fastnesses, very numerous in the Gir. The base of Girnar Mt. is clothed with jungle, diversified with black rocks, which appear through the vegetation. After this, the mount rises an immense bare and isolated granite rock, the face being quite black, with white streaks; and the N. and S. sides nearly perpendicular scarps.§§
VINDHYA CHAIN.	From Guzerat on the W. to the basin of the Ganges on the E.; and comprised between the 22nd and 25th parallels of latitude.	Avg. height 1,500 to 2,000 ft. Chumpaneer, 22° 31′, 73° 41′; 2,500 ft. Crest of Jam Ghaut, 2,300 ft.‖‖ Mountain in Bhopal, 2,500 ft. Mahadeo Mountains, between 21° 30′ 22° 40′, 78° 80′: Doulagheree, said to be the highest; Ambarmarph, estimated at 2,500 ft. Chindwarra, 2,100 ft.; and Patchmaree, vaguely stated to be 5,000 ft.; but this is probably an exaggeration; Dokgur, stated to be 4,800 ft.; Putta Sunka, and Choura Doo, the highest, conjectured at 5,000 ft. Amarkantak, a jungly table-land, computed to be 3,463 ft. Leela, a summit in Lanjhee hills, 21° 55′, 80° 25′, 2,300 ft.; another of the same hills, in 21° 40′, 80° 35′, 2,400 ft.	The chain forms the southern buttress of the plateau of Malwa, Bhopal, &c. In the Sangor and Nerbudda territories, its crest is but the brow of this table-land; but in the western part, it rises a few hundred feet above the high land on its northern side. The passes that have been made over this range, are, for the most part, bad. The geological formations are the granitic and the sandstone, overlaid by trap rock.
BUNDELCUND RANGES, THREE, VIZ.— I. BINDYACHAL.	Commence near Seundah, lat. 26° 14′, lon. 78° 50′; proceeds S.W. to Narwar, 25° 39′, 77° 52′; S.E. to 24° 12′; N.E. to Ajegarh, 24° 53′, 80° 20′; and Kalleenjur, in the same vicinity, and E. to Barghar, 25° 10′, 81° 36′.	None more than 2,000 ft. Average between the Tara and Kuttra passes, about 520 ft. The Tons falls over the brow by a cascade of 200 ft.; Bilohi, 398 ft.; and Bouti, 400 ft.	The lower parts are primary, overlaid by sandstone, in many places trap, or other formations of volcanic origin. The plateau, which surmounts the range, is from 10 to 12 m. wide.
II. PANNA	Rises S. of the Bindyachal plateau.	Average elevation between Kuttra Pass and Lohargaon, 1,050 ft. Elevation between Lohargaon and the foot of the hills near Patteriya, about 1,200 ft.	Summit an undulating platform, about ten miles wide. Where deep ravines allow examination, an enormously thick bed of sandstone is found with primary rock superincumbent, itself overlaid by volcanic rocks.
III. BANDAIR	Separated from the Panna range by the valley of Lohargaon, rising from a platform from 10 to 20 m. wide.	Average elevation, 1,700; on some of its undulations, amounting to 2,000 ft.	Generally of sandstone, intermixed with ferruginous gravel. The basin of Lohargaon is of lias limestone. The outer limit of this hilly tract is marked by abrupt isolated hills.
RAJMAHAL HILLS	Rise about 20 m. S. of the Ganges; stretch S. and S.W. to the Vindhya range and the highlands of the Deccan. They terminate at the pass of Sikrigali.	Of moderate elevation. Cluster on the W. of the Phalgu, one on the E. of that river, a third near Shukpoora; 700 ft. Hills towards the S. probably twice that elevation. Railway sweeps round the eastern extremity of the range.	In the E. the rock is of trap; in one place there is a conical hill, having at the top a cavity resembling the crater of an extinct volcano. A neighbouring hill sends forth smoke, luminous at night. In the W. and S.W. the rock is of quartz, or coarse jasper and flint, containing ore of iron and lead.
SIRGOOJAH MOUNTAINS . .	Length, 90 m.; breadth, 85 m. Lie between 22° 34′, 23° 54′, 82° 40′, 84° 6′.	Rugged and mountainous, from 500 to 600 ft. above adjoining table-land of Chota Nagpore.	Drained by the rivers Kunher and Rhern, with its feeder the Mohan, flowing in a direction generally northerly. These rivers are mostly shallow, except during the rains, when they become rapid torrents.

PACHETE HILLS	Length, 105 m.; breadth, 95 m. Lie between 22° 56′, 23° 54′, 85° 46′, 87° 10′.	Imperfectly known. N. part described as marked by hills from 400 to 600 ft. About 23° 35′, 85° 50′, a mountain conjectured at from 2,500 to 3,000 ft. Near the centre of dist. some hills about 900 ft.	Formation generally primitive, of either granite, gneiss, or sienite. Coal has been found near Jeria, 23° 44′, 86° 25′; and iron-ore exists at a short distance. The chain unites the N. extremities of the W. and E. Ghauts, and forms the base of the triangle on which rests the table-land of S. India. By the Moguls the country to the N. was called Hindoostan, and that to the S. the Deccan.
SAUTPOORA MOUNTAINS .	Divides the Nerbudda from the Taptee valleys, extending from 21° and 22°, and 73° 40′, to 78°, when it becomes confounded with the Vindhya.	Avg. elevation, supposed, 2,500 ft. Asseerghur hill-fort, 1,200 ft. They form the northern base of the Deccanie table-land.	S. declivity towards Taptee abrupt; N. towards Nerbudda, gentle. They rise into peaks, or swell into forms denoting a volcanic origin.
WESTERN GHAUTS, called by the natives *Syadree* in its N. part; and *Sukheit* in its S. part.—MALABAR COAST.	Length, about 800 m. From about 21° 15′, to 73° 45′, 74° 40′, where they terminate almost precipitously, forming the N. side of the Gap of Palgatcheri.	Avg. height, 4,000 ft. About 21°; 2,000 ft. Mahabulishwur, 18°, 73° 40′; 4,700 ft. Poorundher, 4,472 ft. Singhur, 4,162 ft. Hurreechundurghur, 3,894 ft. About 15°; 1,000 ft. Towards Coorg: Bonasson Hill, 7,000 ft. Tandianmole, 5,781 ft. Papagiri, 5,682 ft.	Seaward face though abrupt, not precipitous, but consists of a series of terraces or steps. Chasms or breaks in the range, give access to the highlands, and are denominated *ghauts* or passes, a name which has become generally applied to the range itself. The core is primary, inclosed by alternating strata of more recent origin. Scenery delightful and grand, displaying stupendous scarps, fearful chasms, numerous waterfalls, dense forests, and perennial verdure.
NEILGHERRY GROUP . . .	Length, about 50 m.; breadth, about 20 m.; area from 600 to 700 sq. m. Between 11° 10′ and 11° 35′, and 76° 30′ and 77° 10′.	Elevation from 5,000 to 8,000 ft. Dodabetta, 8,760 ft. Kudiakad, 8,502 ft. Kundah, 8,353 ft. Duvursolabeta, 8,380 ft. Beroyabeta, 8,488 ft. Murkurti, 8,402 ft. Ootacamund, lat. 10° 50′; 7,361 ft. General surface, an undulating table-land.	The foundation rocks are primary. Principal mineral,—iron-ore. Neither calcareous nor stratified rocks, nor organic remains are found. So steep are the precipices, that in many parts, a stone dropped from the edge, will fall several thousand feet without striking anything. Neilgherries, from "neil," blue, and "gherries," hills; blue hills.
PALGHAT GHAUTS . . .	Length, about 200 m. From the Gap of Palgatcheri nearly to C. Comorin.	Elevation from 4,000 to 7,000 ft. A spacious table-land, 4,740 ft. A peaked summit, 6,000 ft. Another, 7,000 ft. Vurragherry ms., 5,000 to 6,000 ft. Near C. Comorin, in the extreme S., 2,000 ft. Several, not measured.	The W. brow is, with little exception, abrupt; on the E. side the declivity is gradual. Such a conformation would seem to indicate a volcanic disturbance along the W. precipitous face.
EASTERN GHAUTS, along COROMANDEL COAST.	Length, about 1,000 m. From Balasore, S.W. to Ganjam; thence to Naggery, near Madras; where it joins the range which crosses the country in a north-easterly direction, from the W. Ghauts, N. of the Gap of Palgatcheri.	Average elevation, about 1,500 ft. Cauvery Chain, 4,000 ft. Condapilly, 1,700 ft. W. of Madras, estimated, 3,000 ft. Hills seen from the Moghalbundi, between Pt. Palmyras and Chilka Lake, appearing in irregular scattered groups, 300 to 1,200 ft.	Granite constitutes the basis of the range; and clay, hornblende, flinty and primitive slate, or crystalline limestone, forms the sides of the mountains; and the level country, as far N. as the Pennar, appears to consist of the debris, when the laterite formation covers a large surface. From the Kistnah, northward, the granite is often penetrated by trap and greenstone. To Vizagapatam and Ganjam sienite and gneiss predominate, occasionally covered by laterite.
ASSAM MOUNTAINS, VIZ.— I. NAGA HILLS.	Length, about 250 m. On the S.E. border of Assam, stretches to the mountain-range forming the N.W. boundary of Burmah. Centre, about 26° 30′, lon. 95°.	In the Khaibund range, supposed 4,000 ft. Some peaks are almost inaccessible.	The country is a wild unexplored tract. The measures adopted by the British government to restrain the outrages committed by the Nagas within British territory, have led to their submission.
II. DUPHALA, AND ABOR HILLS.	Mountains N. of Assam, inhabited by Bhooteans, Duphala, and Abor tribes.	From 5,000 to 6,000 ft. above the surrounding level. . .	The face of Assam presents an immense plain, studded with clumps of hills, rising abruptly from the general level. The mountains on the N. are composed generally of primitive rocks. Those to the S., of tertiary and metamorphic.
III GARROW HILLS .	On the N.E. frontier of Bengal	A confused assemblage, from 1,000 to 6,000 ft. Estimated area, 4,347 sq. m.	Character of country, wild. The rock formation is supposed to be chiefly of gneiss, or stratified granite.
IV. COSSYAH HILLS . .	Estimated area, 7,280 sq. m. Between 25° & 26°, and 91° & 92°.	Chirra Poonjee, 4,100 ft.	

Name.	Extent and Position of Extremities.	Elevation above the Sea.	Remarks.
V. JYNTEAH HILLS . .	80 m. in length from N. to S., and 40 in breadth. Extends from lat. 24° 55′, to 26° 7′, and from lon. 91° 35′, to 92° 48′.	About 16 m. on the Silhet side, and about the same on that of Assam, consists of low land interspersed with small hills. In the interior, about 50 m. in extent, is an undulating hilly table-land, from 1,500 to 2,500 feet high.	Coal is said to abound in the hills of Jynteah.
YOUMADOUNG, *or Arracan Mountains.*	Length, about 600 m. From Munneepoor, lat. 22° 20′, to C. Negrais. lat. 16°.	Average height, 3,000 to 5,000 ft. Blue Mountain, 22° 37′, 93° 11′, 8,000 ft. Pyramid Hill, 3,000 ft. Crest of Aeng Pass, 4,517 ft. Pass from Podangmew to Ramree, 4,000 ft. From Blue Mountain there is a gradual slope to C. Negrais, where it is only about 300 ft.	It is a continuation of the great mountain chain commencing at the S. of Assam, in 26° 30′; and extends S., running parallel with the river Irawaddy, and forms a natural barrier between Arracan and Ava.
BURMAH MOUNTAINS . . .	Little known. . . .	From Prome to Ava, characterised by unevenness and general elevation. Northerly, it is decidedly mountainous. Mountains 4 m. N. of Ava, 4,000 ft. Zyngait Mts., forming a kind of elevated dooab between the Saluen and Sittang rivers.	Gold, silver, iron, tin, lead, antimony, and other metals, are met with. Quarries of marble are worked near Ummerapoora. Coal has been discovered on the Irawaddy.
TENASSERIM MOUNTAINS. .	Length, about 500 m., breadth nowhere exceeds 80 m. Area, 30,000 sq. m.	Siamese Mts., running N. to S. along Tenasserim provinces, 3,000 to 5,000 ft. Mountains in Ye province, three parallel ridges, from 3,000 to 4,500 ft., gradually diminishing towards the coast, about 500 ft. Buffalo Mts., about 70 m. from Moulmein, 1,543 ft.	Coal of excellent quality has been discovered. Iron, tin, and gold are frequently met with.

* The two sections of the Himalaya furnish points of resemblance, in presenting almost insurmountable obstacles to communication between the countries which they divide, thereby separating the Botis or people of Tibet from the Hindoo family of India. Major Cunningham considers the distinction of climate not less positively marked, both ranges forming the lines of demarcation between the cold and dry climate of Tibet, with its dearth of trees, and the warm and humid climate of India, with its luxuriance of vegetable productions. Some analogy, moreover, may be traced between the drainage systems of the two sections; the one separating the waters of the Sanpoo from those of the Ganges and its affluents; and the other intervening between the Indus, flowing at its northern base, and the subsequent tributaries of that river rising on its southern slope.

† Any view of the Himalaya, especially at a sufficient distance for the snowy peaks to be seen overtopping the outer ridges, is very rare, from the constant deposition of vapours over the forest-clad ranges during a greater part of the year, and the haziness of the dry atmosphere of the plains in the winter months. At the end of the rains, when the south-east monsoon has ceased to blow with constancy, views are obtained, sometimes from a distance of nearly 200 miles.

‡ It has often been observed, the Koh Kosh, or mountain of Kosh, offers a plausible etymology for the Caucasus of the classical writers. It is supposed by Ritter and Wilford to be that mentioned by Pliny, under the name of *Graucasas*, but slightly deviating from the Sanscrit *Gravakasus* (shining rock.)

§ Remarkable for its mass and elevation. Viewed from the Koushan Pass, distant ten miles south, its appearance is very sublime. The outline is serrated, it being crowned by a succession of lofty peaks, with sides often perpendicular, and it is wrapped in a perpetual covering of snow, in all parts not too steep to admit its lying.

‖ All the series appear to diverge from the apex of the plain, expanding "like the sticks of a fan."

¶ Humboldt regards it as the "most striking phenomenon amongst all the mountain-ranges of the old world." He considers that it may be traced from Taurus, in Asia Minor, across Persia, then, in the Huzareh mountains, to Hindoo-Koosh, and to the frontier of China; and that it is distinct from the Himalaya. The two ranges are physically discriminated by the depression down which the Indus flows, which, with its numerous irregularities, it is not easy to believe could have been hollowed out by the water's force even of that great river

** "The elevated expanse of Pameer," to the north of Hindoo-Koosh, observes Humboldt, "is not only a radiating point in the hydrographical system of Central Asia, but is the focus from which originate its principal mountain chains, being common to India, China, and Turkestan; and from it, as from a central point, their several streams diverge."

†† The country between Sufied-Koh and Hindoo-Koosh is hilly; breadth about twenty m. It is divided into a series of plains by cross ranges (Khyber, Kurkutcha, &c.), which pass between Sufied-Koh and the outer ranges of Hindoo-Koosh. These plains are generally barren and stony, and have a slope from E. to W. The Caubul, which flows through them, has to make its way by narrow passages

‡‡ Valley of Catmandoo, nearly of oval shape: length, N. to S., 12 m.; E. to W. about 10 m. Bounded on the N. and S. by stupendous mountains. To the E. and W. by others less lofty, the western end defined principally by a low steep ridge, called Naga-Arjoon, which passes close behind Sumbhoo-Nath, and is backed by a more considerable one named Dhoahouk. To the eastward, the most remarkable hills are those of Ranichouk and Mahabut, but they do not reach the elevation of Phalchouk (the highest on the south), or of Sheopoori, which is by far the highest mountain. The bottom of the valley is uneven, intersected by deep ravines, and dotted throughout with little hills.

§§ The number of peaks which crown this mountain is variously stated. According to Tod, there are six, the most elevated of which is that of Gorucknath, having on its summit an area of only ten feet in diameter, and surrounded by a shrine dedicated to Gorucknath; each of the other peaks has its shrine. On a small table-land on the mountain, about 600 feet below its summit is the ancient palace of Khengar, and numerous Jain temples.

‖‖ Ascent from Indore (1,998 feet), gradual; descent, to the Nerbudda, steep and abrupt.

4 B

Mountain Passes on the Indian Frontiers, from the Indus to the Irawaddy—so far as known.

Name and Position.	Lat. and Lon. of Extremities; Length and Breadth.	Heights, in Feet.	Remarks.
Moola or Gundava—Cutch Gundava.	Lat. 28° 10′, lon. 66° 12′; lat. 28° 24′, lon. 67° 27′.—About 100 m. Open spaces, connected by defiles.	Bapow, 5,250 ft.; Peesee Bhent, 4,600; Nurd, 2,850; Bent-i-Jah, 1,850; Kullar, 750 ft.	Descent, 4,650 ft., average 46 ft. per m. Water abundant. Practicable for artillery.*
Bolan—Beloochistan	Lat. 29° 30′, lon. 67° 40′; lat. 29° 52′, lon. 67° 4′.—55 m.; ½ m. wide at entrance.	Entrance, 800 ft.; Ab-i-goom, 2,540; crest, 5,793 ft.	Average ascent, 90 ft. per m.† Ditto.
Gomul or Goolairee—Derajat.	Lat. 32°, lon. 70° 30′.—About 100 m.	20 m. from entrance road N.W., then 80 m. S.W., then N.W. to Ghuznee.	Winding course.‡
Khyber—Peshawur	Lat. 33° 58′, lon. 71° 30′.—About 33 m.	Crest, 3,373 ft. Ali-Musjid, 2,433 ft.	Rises gradually from the E., but has a steep declivity westward.§
Bamian—Afghanistan	Lat. 34° 50′, lon. 67° 48′.—About 1 m. wide, bounded by nearly perpendicular steeps.	Bamian, 8,496 ft., over a succession of ridges from 8,000 to 15,000 ft.	Only known route over Hindoo-Koosh for artillery or wheeled carriages.‖
Koushan—Hindoo-Koosh	Lat. 35° 37′, lon. 68° 55′: over principal shoulder of Hindoo-Koosh peak.—About 40 m.; narrow.	Crest, 15,000 ft.	Road rocky and uneven; descent, 200 ft. per m. Three entrances.¶
Khawak—Hindoo-Koosh	Lat. 35° 38′, lon. 70°.—About 15 m.	Crest, 13,200 ft.	Ascent on N. side, an uniformly inclined plane.**
Bul Tul or Shur-ji-La—Cashmere.	Lat. 34° 10′, lon. 75° 15′	Crest, 10,500 ft.	
Baramula—Cashmere	Lat. 34° 10′, lon. 74° 30′	. . . .	Only pass into Cashmere practicable for an army.
Bara Lacha—Tibet	Lat. 32° 44′, lon. 77° 31′.		
Rotang—Himalaya	Lat. 32° 25′, lon. 77° 12′.		
Manerung—Himalaya	Lat. 31° 56′, lon. 78° 24′	Crest, 18,612; source of Darbung, 15,000 ft.	Very difficult.
Charung—Himalaya	Lat. 31° 24′, lon. 78° 35′	Crest, 17,348 ft.	Extremely difficult.
Burenda—Himalaya	Lat. 31° 23′, lon. 78° 12′.—Length of crest, 50 paces	Crest, 15,095 ft.	Most elevated part a narrow glen, very steep.††
Bulcha—Kumaon	Lat. 30° 28′, lon. 80° 14′	. . . .	Over a high ridge extending E. and W.
Niti—Kumaon	Lat. 30° 57′, lon. 79° 54′	Crest, 16,814; village of Niti, 11,464 ft.	Open from the end of June to October.‡‡
Kambachen—Nepaul	Lat. 27° 38′ lon. 88°	Crest, 15,770 ft.	Broad shelf of snow, bet^{n}. rocky eminences.§§
Choonjerma—Nepaul	Lat. 27° 33′, lon. 88° 1′	Crest, 16,000 ft.	Temperature, 24° at 5 P.M.
Wallanchoon—Nepaul	Lat. 27° 52′ lon. 87° 14′	Crest, 16,755 ft.	Path leading up the pass for eight miles, a narrow, stony, and steep gorge. Top, a low saddle, between two ridges of rock.
Tunkra—Sikhim	Lat. 27° 38′, lon. 88° 56′	Crest, 16,100 ft.	Ascent, on N.W. side, gradual, over a snow-bed and glacier; descent, on S.E., steep, but grassy.
Donkia—Sikhim	Lat. 27° 56′, lon. 88° 48′	Crest, 18,600 ft.	View of Tibet from summit.
Aeng—Arracan	Lat. 19° 49′, lon. 94° 9′.—34 miles	Crest, 4,517; Khen-Kyomig, 3,777; Aeng, 147 ft.	Avrg. rise, 250 ft., avrg. descent, 472 ft. per m.‖‖
Myhee—Arracan	Lat. 19° 14′, lon. 94° 30′	. . . .	Myhee village, a police-station.

* In 1839, the Anglo-Indian detachment marched through it It is preferable to the Bolan Pass in a military point of view.

† A continuous succession of ravines and gorges. The air in the lower part of the pass is in summer oppressively hot and unhealthy.

‡ Of great commercial importance. Every spring, large caravans traverse it from Hindoostan to Afghanistan.

§ Called the Key of Afghanistan. At Ali-Musjid, merely the bed of a rivulet, with precipices rising on each side at an angle of 70°. Near Lamdee Khana, a gallery 12 ft. wide; on one side a perpendicular wall, and on the other a deep precipice. It was last forced by the British in 1878-'79 during the Afghan War.

‖ The great commercial route from Kabool to Turkestan; the several passes to the eastward are less frequented on account of their difficulty and their elevation.

¶ Most frequented east of Bamian; impassable for wheeled carriages.

** Scarcely frequented, yet may be considered the most practicable. Tamerlane crossed it on his march into Hindoostan.

†† Passes over the Outer Himalaya range:—Sugla, 31° 13′ lat., 78° 29′ lon.—elevation, 16,000 ft.; Kimlia, 31° 15′, 78° 25′, 17,000; Siaga, 31° 16′, 78° 20′, 16,000; Marga, 31° 16′, 78° 21′, 16,000; Lumbia, 31° 16′, 78° 20′, 16,000; Barga, 31° 16′, 78° 19′, 15,000; Nulgun, 31° 19′, 78° 13′, 14,891; Rupin, 31° 2′, 78° 10′, 15,480; Ghusul, 31° 21′, 78° 8′, 15,851; Nibrung, 31° 22′, 78° 10′, 16,035; Gunas, 31° 21′, 78° 8′, 16,026; Yusu, 31° 24′, 78° 4′, 15,877; Sundru, 31° 24′, 78° 2′, 16,000; Shatul, 31° 25′ lat., 77° 58′ lon., 15,555 ft. In Koonawur there are several passes, at elevations varying from 15,000 to 17,000 ft.

‡‡ Considered the best pass between Kumaon and Tibet, and is one of the principal channels of trade between Chinese Tartary and Hindoostan.

§§ Ascended by Dr. Hooker, December, 1848. The distance to which the voice was carried was very remarkable: he could hear distinctly every word spoken at from 300 to 400 yards off.

‖‖ Considerable trade carried on over this pass between Ava and Arracan.

Rivers of British India—their Source, Course, Discharge, and Length; Tributaries or Confluents; and estimated area, in sq. m., drained; Forty-nine Main Streams, having their outlet in the Sea; and large Tributaries, having their outlet in other Rivers.

Name.	Source, Course, Discharge, and Length.	Tributaries, and their Length in British Miles; and Area drained.	Remarks.
1. GANGES.—BHAGEERUTTEE at its source, and PODDA near the sea.	Gangoutri, Himalaya, 1,400 ft. above the level of the sea. N.W. to Johnioi; W. and S.W., 13 m.; S.W., 36 m.; S., 15 m.; S.E., 39 m.; S., 8 m.; W., 24 m.; S.W., 15 m.; S., 130 m.; S.E. to Allahabad, E., 270 m.; E. to Sikrigalee; S.E. remainder of course into Bay of Bengal, by numerous mouths. The Ganges gives off some of its waters to form the Hooghly, and also anastomoses with the Megna.—Length, 1,514 m.	Jumna, 860; Ghogra, 606; Gunduck, 450; Goomtee, 482; Sone, 465; Coosy, 325; Ramgunga, 373; Mahananda, 240; Karumnassa, 140; Koniae or Jamuna, 130; Aluknunda, 80; Bhillung, 50 m.—398,000 sq. m. drained, exclusive of Hooghly.	Navigable for river craft as far as Hurdwar, 1,100 m.; steamers ply as far as Gurmukteesur, 393 miles above Allahabad, distant from Calcutta *via* Delhi, 930 miles; at Cawnpoor, 140 m. above Allahabad, the navigation is plied with great activity. The breadth of the Ganges at Benares varies from 1,500 to 3,000 ft. Mean discharge of water there, throughout the year, 250,000 cub. ft. per second.
2. HOOGHLY . . .	Formed by junction of Bhageeruttee and Tellinghee, two branches of Ganges. S. to Calcutta; S.W. to Diamond Harbour; E. and S.W. into the sea at Saugor roadstead, by an estuary 15 m. wide.—Length, 160 m., by winding of stream.	Dammoodah, 350; Dalkissore, 170; Coossy, 240; Mor, 130.—About 49,000 sq. m. drained.	Formerly navigable for a line-of-battle ship to Chandernagore; now, vessels drawing more than 17 ft., not safe in passing from Calcutta to the sea, by reason of shoals.
3. INDUS, or NILAB ("*blue-river.*")	Tibet, behind Kailas range, to the N. of Kailas peak, 22,000 ft. above the sea. N.W. to Dras R.; more northerly to Shy-yok; W.N.W., 115 m. to Makpon-i-Shagaron; S.S.W. and S. to Attock; a little W. of S. to confluence with Punjnud; S.W. to Khyrpoor; S. to Sehwan; S.E. to Hydrabad; W. of S. to Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean.—Length, 1,800 m.	Eekung-Choo, 110; Hanle, 70; Zanskar, 150; Dras, 75; Shy-yok, 300; Shy-ghur, 70; Ghilgit; Cabool, 320; Sutlej, 850; Chenab, 765; Jhelum, 490; Ravee, 450; Punjnud, 60 m.—About 390,000 sq. m. drained.	Navigable to Attock, 942 m. from sea, there from 500 to 800 ft. wide; depth, 60 ft. Breadth and depth varies much after junction with Punjnud; breadth, 1 to 30 m.; depth, 12 to 186 ft.
4. BRAHMAPOOTRA—MEGNA, near the sea.	N.E. extremity of Himalaya range; lat. 28° 30′, lon. 97° 20′. S.W., 63 m.; W.—S.W.—S.E.—S.W., and E. to Bay of Bengal, through three mouths, Hattia, Ganges, and Shebazpoor.—Length, 933 m.	Sanpoo, 1,000; Dibong, 140; Noh-Dihong, 100; Boree Dehing, 150; Soobu-Sheeree, 180; Monas, 189; Bagnee, 150; Guddala, 160; Durlah, 148; Teesta, 313; Barak, 200; Goomtee, 140 m. In lat. 25° 10′, lon. 89° 43′, it gives off the Koniae. — 305,000 sq. m. drained.	The branches of the Brahmapootra, together with those of the Ganges, intersect the territory of Bengal in such a variety of directions, as to form a complete system of inland navigation.
5. IRAWADDY	E. extremity of Himalaya, lat. 28° 5′, lon. 97° 58′. Nearly N. to S. through Burmah, and the British territory of Pegu; into the Bay of Bengal, by numerous mouths.—Length, 1,060 m.	Khyendwen, 470; Shwely, 180; Moo, 125 m.—164,000 sq. m. drained.	The Bassein branch affords a passage for the largest ships for 60 miles from its mouth. No river of similar magnitude, it is stated, presents so few obstructions.
6. GODAVERY	E. declivity of W. Ghauts, near Nassik, 3,000 ft. above the sea. S.E., 200 m.; E., 100 m.; S.E., 85 m.; E., 170 m.; S.E., 200 m.; into Bay of Bengal, by three mouths.—Length, 898 m.	Wein-Gunga, 439; Manjera, 330; Poorna, 160; Paira, 105; Inderaotee, 140 m.—130,000 sq. m. drained.	In 1846, the sanction of the Court of Directors of E. I. C. was given to the construction, at an expense of £47,500, of a dam of sufficient height to command the delta, and to supply the rich alluvial soil of which that tract is composed, with the means of constant irrigation. The experiment of navigating the Godavery by steam, had been entertained by the Madras government, and means for carrying it into effect have been adopted.

N.B.—Where no tributaries or area drained are mentioned, it is because, as regards the former, there are none of note; and the other is small, and imperfectly defined.

7. Kistnah, or Krishna	Mahabulishwar table-land, Deccan, lat. 18° 1′, lon. 73° 41′; 4,500 ft. above the sea. S.E., 145 m.; N.E., 60 m.; S.E., 105 m.; N.E., 180 m.; S.E. to Chentapilly; S.E. 70 m. further; then, parting into two arms, one flowing S.E. 30 m., the other S. 25 m., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 800 m.	Beemah, 510; Toongabudra, 325; Gutpurba, 160; Mulpurba, 160; Warna, 80; Dindee, 110; Peedda Wag, 70 m.—110,000 sq. m. drained.	The Kistnah, in consequence of the rapid declivity of its waterway and rockiness of its channel, cannot be navigated by small craft, even for short distances. An extensive system of irrigation, in connection with this river, has been constructed, and has been of great value to the district.
Western side of India:			
8. Nerbudda	Amarkantak, a jungly table-land, lat. 22° 39′, lon. 81° 49′; from 3,500 to 5,000 ft. above the sea. Nearly due W., with occasional windings, to Gulf of Cambay, by a wide estuary.—Length, 801 m.	Herrun; Samarsee, 60; Suktha, 70 m.—About 60,000 sq. m. drained.	The river, notwithstanding the great width of its bed in some parts of its upper course, appears to be scarcely anywhere continuously navigable for any considerable distance, in consequence of the innumerable basaltic rocks scattered over its channel.
9. Loonee	Arravulli Mts., near Pokur, lat. 26° 37′, lon. 74° 46′. S.W., nearly parallel with Arravulli range, into Runn of Cutch, by two mouths, principal in lat. 24° 42′, lon. 71° 11′.—Length, 320 m.	Rairee, 88; Sokree, 130 m.—About 19,000 sq. m. drained.	Bed full of micaceous quartoze rock; banks low, and little above the surrounding level.
10 Bunnas	In a cluster of summits in the Arravulli range, lat. 24° 47′, lon. 73° 28′. S.W., into Runn of Cutch, by several small channels.—Length, 180 m.	About 17,000 sq. m drained.	
11. Bhader	Kattywar, lat. 22° 10′, lon. 71° 18′. S.W., into Indian Ocean, near Poorbunder, lat. 21° 38′, lon. 69° 46′.—Length, 135 m.	Area of peninsula, 18,950 m. (11–16)	The surface of Kattywar peninsula is generally undulating, with low ridges of hills, running in irregular directions The land in the middlemost part is the highest, and here all the rivers take their rise, disembouging themselves respectively into the Runn and Gulf of Cutch, and Gulf of Cambay. (11–16)
12. Oojal	Kattywar, lat. 21° 31′, lon. 70° 50′. Circuitous, but generally W., into backwater, behind Poorbunder.—Length, 75 m.		
13. Ajee	Kattywar, lat 22° 10′, lon. 76° 31′. N.W., into Gulf of Cutch.—Length, 60 m.		
14. Setroonjee	Kattywar, lat. 21° 15′, lon. 70° 25′. E., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 60 m.		
15. Geyla	Kattywar, lat. 22°, lon. 71° 20′. E., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 60 m.		
16. Gooma	Kattywar, lat. 22° 18′, lon. 71° 30′. E., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 88 m.		
17. Taptee	Sautpoora Mts., near Mooltae, lat. 21° 46′, lon. 78° 21′. Generally W., to Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 441 m.	Poorna, 160; Girna, 160; Boree, 90; Panjar, 92 m.—About 25,000 sq. m. drained.	It can scarcely be deemed a navigable stream, as at Surat, 17 m. from its mouth, it is fordable when the tide is out. It is, however, navigable in the dry season for boats of light draught, through Candeish. The mouth is obstructed by numerous sands and a bar.
18 Myhe, or Mahe	Vindhya Mts., lat. 22° 32′, lon. 75° 5′; 1,850 ft. above the sea. N.W., 145 m.; W. 25 m.; S.W., 180 m., into Gulf of Cambay.—Length, 350 m.	Amass, 90; Manchun, 55 m.	Navigable for 15 m. from its mouth. At 50 m. up, 100 yds. wide; bed, 400 yds.; depth, 1 ft.
19. Washishtee	W. Ghauts, lat. 17° 50′, lon. 73° 36′. S.—W.—S.E.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length 55 m.	No tributaries of note; area drained small, and imperfectly defined. (19–24)	Though rugged, the Concans have many fertile valleys, each of which, for the most part, affords a passage for a small river or torrent, holding a westerly course from the Ghauts to Indian Ocean. The most fertile spots are on the banks of streams. The rivers abound with fish, but are also frequented by alligators. The Savitree is navigable as far as Mhar, 3C m. from its mouth. (19–24)
20. Savitree	W. Ghauts, lat. 18° 17′, lon. 73° 27′. S.E.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 70 m.		
21. Taunsa	W. Ghauts, lat. 19° 41′, lon. 73° 29′. S.W.—W.—W.S.W.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 58 m.		
22. Soorla	W. Ghauts, lat. 19° 54′, lon. 73° 24′. W.—S., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 68 m.		
23. Damgunga	W. Ghauts, lat. 20° 11′, lon. 73° 42′. W.—N.—W.N.W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 58 m.		
24. Par	W. Ghauts, lat 20° 30′, lon. 73° 43′. W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 50 m.		

Name.		Source, Course, Discharge, and Length.	Tributaries, and their Length in British Miles; and Area drained.	Remarks.
25. Eeb	Western India.	W. Ghauts, lat 20° 50′, lon. 73° 42′. W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 70 m.	No tributaries of any extent; and area drained imperfectly.	Nothing worthy note.
26. Poorna		W. Ghauts, lat. 20° 59′, lon. 73° 44′. W., into the Indian Ocean.—Length, 60 m.		
27. Gungavully . .		Plain of Dharwar, lat. 15° 45′, lon. 75° 10′. S.—S.W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 100 m.		
28. Cauly Nuddee .		Plain of Dharwar, lat. 15° 33′, lon. 74° 47′. S., 61 m.; W., 30 m., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 91 m.	. . . .	Navigated by the largest patimars for 20 m. From Mullapoor to Shedashegur, rendered easy by uniformity of channel.
29. Ponany . . .		Coimbatoor, lat. 10° 19′, lon. 77° 6′. N.W.—W., into Indian Ocean.—Length, 128 m.		Navigable for canoes as far as Palghat, 63 m. from the sea.
30. Vygah	Eastern side of India.	Madura, lat. 10° 17′, lon. 77° 37′. S.E., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 130 m.		The large anicuts upon it are Conoor, diverting a stream of same name, Parea Anai, &Chittanaik.
31. Vellaur		Base of E. Ghauts, lat. 10° 28′, lon. 78° 21′. E., into Gulf of Manaar.—Length, 80 m.		
32. Goondah		Vellanuddhee hills, Madura. S.E., into Gulf of Manaar.—Length, 95 m.		
33. Cauvery		Coorg, lat 12° 25′, lon. 75° 34′. E., 33 m.; N.E., 28 m.; S.E., 95 m.; N.E.—E.—S.E., 47 m.; S., 47 m.; S.E.—E.—N.E., into Bay of Bengal. Length, 472 m.	Magunmurchy, 40; Bhovani, 120; Noyel, 95 m.; Hennavutty; Leechman-Teert; Cubbany; Shimska; Arkavati; Ambrawutty.—About 36,000 sq. m. drained.	Navigable for craft through the low country during the inundation. Gungan Zooka fall, 370 ft. Burr Zooka, 460 ft.
34. Vellaur		Base of E. Ghauts. E., into Bay of Bengal, near Porto Novo.		The river is small at its mouth, and admits only coasting craft.
35. Palar		Mysore table-land, lat. 13° 20′, lon. 78° 2′. S.E., 55 m.; E., 87 m.; S.E., 48 m., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, about 220 m.	Pony, 40; Sheyaroo, 90 m.	The entrance of the Palar, near Sadras, is contracted by a bar or narrow ridge of sand, inside of which the river becomes of considerable width.
36. Soornamooky . .		Mysore table-land, lat. 13° 26′, lon. 79° 11′. N.E., to Bay of Bengal.—Length, 99 m.		
37. Pennar.—(N.) . .		Nundidroog table-land, lat. 13° 23′, lon. 77° 43′. N.W., 30 m.; N., 95 m.; E., 230 m., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 355 m.	Chittravutti, 107; Paupugnee, 130; Chittair, 75 m.	
38. Pennar.—(S.) . .		N. of Nundidroog table-land, lat. 13° 32′, lon. 77° 45′. S. to Mootanhalli, 55 m.; S.E., 190 m., into Bay of Bengal, a mile N. of Ft. St. David.—Length, 245 m.		Gold is found in its sands, in its passage through the Carnatic.
39. Gundlacama . .		Lat. 15° 40′, lon. 78° 49′. Very circuitous; E.—N.E.—S.S.E.—S.E., into Bay of Nizampatnam.—Length, 155 m.		
40. Bondsdora . . .		Table-land of Orissa, lat. 19° 39′, lon. 83° 27′. S., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 130 m.		
41. Lalglah . . .		Table-land of Orissa, near source of Bondsdora. S., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 133 m.		
42. Mahanuddy . . .		Native state of Nowagudda, lat. 20° 20′, lon. 82°. W., 30 m.; N.E., 110 m.; S.E., 300 m., to Bay of Bengal by numerous mouths.—Length, 520 m.	Hutsoo, 130; Aurag, 117; Tell, 130; Bang Nuddee, 60 m.—About 46,000 sq. m. drained.	From July to February, navigable for boats for 460 m.
43. Brahminy . . .		Palamow table-land, lat. 23° 25′, lon. 84° 13′. S.—E.—S.E., into Bay of Bengal, near Pt. Palmyras.—Length, 410 m.		
44. Byturnee . .		Near Lohardugga, lat. 23° 29′, lon. 84° 55′. N.—E.—S.—S.W.—S.E.—E., into Bay of Bengal, by Dhumrah river.—Length, 345 m	Sunk, 95 m.—About 26,000 sq. m. are drained by Brahminy and Byturnee.	Sacred in the Hindoo mythology, more especially at its source.

River	Source, course, and length	Tributaries and area drained	Navigation
45. SOOBUNREEKA (En. India)	Chota Nagpoor table-land. N.E.—E.—S.E.—S.—S.E. —E.—S.E.—S., into Bay of Bengal.—Length, 280 m.	Karow, 80 m.—About 12,000 sq. m. drained.	
46. ARRACAN, or COLADYNE. (East side Bengal Bay.)	Near Blue Mountain, Youmadoung range, lat. 22° 27′, lon. 92° 51′. S., into Combermere Bay.—Length, 160 m.	Myoo; Lemyo.	Navigable within a few miles of Arracan town, for ships of 250 tons burden. 90 m. above Akyab, the stream is narrow, and navigable only for canoes. 10 m. broad at its mouth.
47. SITTANG . . . . . (East side Bengal Bay.)	Burmah, lat. 21° 40′, lon. 96° 50′. S., into Gulf of Martaban.—Length, 420 m.	Yennan, 115; Saar, 120 m.	It is a navigable river. For about 190 m. forms the boundary between the Tenasserim provinces and Pegu.
48. SALUEN, or SALWEEN (East side Bengal Bay.)	N. of Yunnan province, China; about lat. 27° 10′, lon. 98° 57′. S., into Gulf of Martaban, by two mouths, formed by Pelewgewen Island.—Length, 430 m.	Attaran or Weingo, 110; Thoung-yin Myit, 225; Meloun, 90 m.	It enters the British dominions about lat. 18° 40′.
49. TENASSERIM . . . (East side Bengal Bay.)	Supposed to lie in the mountains to the N.E. of Tavoy, between the 14th and 15th parallel of latitude. S to Metamio, lat. 14° 13′; S.E. and S. to Tenasserim town; N.W. into Bay of Bengal, by two mouths.—Length, 270 m.	Baing-Khiaung; Little Tenasserim; Kamaun Khiaung.	Upper part of course through a wild and uncultivated tract, sometimes between high and perpendicular banks. It afterwards opens on extensive plains. On many parts of its banks exist forests of fine teak, and the valuable sappan wood.
TRIBUTARIES.			
JUMNA, tributary to GANGES	Jumnoutri, Himalaya, lat. 31°, lon. 78° 32′; 10,849 ft. above the sea. S.W.—S.E., to Ganges, at Allahabad. —Length, 860 m.	Tonse or Supin, about 100; Hindan, about 160; Hansoutee, 99; Bangunga, 220; Chumbul, 570; Sinde, 260; Betwa, 360; Cane, 230; Baghin Nuddee, 90; Seyngur, 210; Urrund Nuddee, 245 m.—About 105,000 sq. m. drained.	In consequence of its bed being obstructed by shoals and rocks, navigation is not practicable for craft above Delhi, except by means of the canal. Its banks are lofty and precipitous, and ridges of rock in many places advance into the stream, combining with its general shallowness and strong current to render navigation extremely difficult and dangerous.
GHOGRA, tributary to GANGES	N. of Kumaon, lat. 30° 28′, lon. 80° 40′, probably between 17,000 and 18,000 ft. S.E., 33 m.; S.W., 70 m.; S.E., 12 m.; S., 30 m.; S., 23 m. further; S.E., to Ganges, near Chupra.—Length, 606 m.	Raptee, 134; Kurnalli, 225; Bhyrvee, 70; Dhauli, 45; Goringunga, 60 m.—About 49,000 sq. m. drained.	Butter describes it as navigable for the largest class of boats in all seasons.
GOOMTEE, tributary to GANGES	In a small lake or morass, 19 m. E. of the town of Pillebheet. Lat. 28° 35′, lon. 80° 10′; 520 ft. above the sea. S.—S.E., into Ganges, 30 m. below Benares.—Length, 482 m.	. . .	In the rainy season, boats of 1,000 or 1,200 maunds (40 tons) burthen, are sometimes seen proceeding to Lucknow.
SONE, tributary to GANGES .	Amarkantak table-land, lat. 22° 41′, lon. 82° 7′; from 3,500 to 5,000 ft. above the sea. N., 30 m.; N.W., 80 m.; N., 40 m.; N.E., 125 m.; E., 47 m.; N.E., into the Ganges, 10 m. above Dinapore.—Length, 465 m.	Koel, 140; Kunher, 130; Johila, 100 m.—Including the Phalgu and other rivers falling into the Ganges above Rajmahal, about 42,000 sq. m. drained.	The navigation of the river is not considered available for purposes of important utility higher than Daudnagur, 60 m. from the confluence with the Ganges.
GUNDUCK, tributary to GANGES	Near Dhawalagiri peak, Himalaya. S.—S.E.—S.W. —S.E., into Ganges, near Patna.—Length, 407 m.	Trisula-gunga, 100; Marachangdi, 100; Naling, 110 m.—About 40,000 sq. m. drained.	Though navigable continuously through its whole course downwards from Bhelaunji, there are in the part of its channel nearer that place many rapids and passes, where, the course being obstructed by rocks, navigation becomes difficult and dangerous.
CHUMBUL, tributary to JUMNA	Malwa, lat. 22° 26′, lon. 75° 45′, 8 or 9 m. S.W. from Mhow, which is 2,019 ft. above the sea. It rises in the cluster called Janapava. N., 105 m.; N.W., 6 m.; S.E., 10 m.; N.E., 23 m.; N.W., 25 m.; N. to junction with Kalee Sind; N.E., 145 m.; S.E., 78 m., to Jumna.—Length, 570 m., described in a form nearly semicircular, the diameter being only 330 m.	Chumbela, 70; Seepra, 120; Parbutty, 220; Kallee Sind, 225; Banas, 320; Chota Kallee Sind, 104 m.—About 56,000 sq. m. drained.	It does not appear to be used for navigation, which is probably incompatible with the average declivity of its bed (2 ft. 5 in. per m.), and still more so with the general rugged and rocky character of its channel. Its average volume of water is so considerable, that on its junction it has been known to raise the united stream 7 or 8 ft. in 12 hours.

Name.	Source, Course, Discharge, and Length.	Tributaries, and their Length in British Miles; and Area drained.	Remarks.
RAMGUNGA, tributary to GANGES.	Kumaon, lat. 30° 6′, lon. 79° 20′; about 7,144 ft. above the sea. S.E., 20 m.; S.W., 70 m.; S. to Moradabad—S.E.—S., into Ganges.—Length, 373 m.	Kosee, 150; Gurra, 240 m.	Fordable at Moradabad, at 15 m. below confluence with Kosee; but not usually fordable below Jellalabad.
COOSY, tributary to GANGES.	Himalaya Mountains, lat. 28° 25′, lon. 86° 11′. S.W.—S.E.—S.—E.—S.E.—S., into Ganges.—Length, 325 m.	Arun, 310; Tambur, 95; Gogaree, 235; Dud Coosy, 50; Tiljuga, 40 m.—46,000 sq. m. dr.	Where narrowest, and when lowest, stream 1,200 ft. wide and 15 ft. deep. It is larger than the Jumna or the Ghogra.
MAHANANDA, tributary to GANGES.	Near Darjeeling, in the Sikhim hills, lat. 26° 57′, lon. 88° 20′. S., 40 m.; S.W., 60 m.; S.E., 50 m.; S., 20 m.; S.E., 40 m.; S., 30 m.—Length, 240 m.	. . . .	Navigable during the dry season for craft of 8 tons as far as Kishengunge; for those of much larger burthen during the rains.
KARUMNASSA, tributary to GANGES.	In the Kymore range, lat. 24° 38′, lon. 83° 11′. N.—N.W., into the Ganges, near Ghazeepoor.—Length, 140 m.		
TONS, tributary to GANGES.	Lat. 24°, lon. 80° 30′. N.W.—E.N.E.—N., into the Ganges, a few miles below Allahabad.—Length, 165 m.	Satni, Beher, Mahana, Belun, and Seoti.—Including small streams, 13,000 sq. m. drained.	
ALUKNUNDA, tributary to GANGES.	Lat. 30° 33′, lon. 79° 38′. N.W.—S.W.—W.—S.W., into the Bhageerutte, at Deoprayag.—Length, 80 m.	Doulee, 35; Vishnuganga, 25; Mundakni, 32; Pindur, 60 m.	At confluence with Bhageeruttee, 142 ft. broad; rises 46 ft. during the melting of the snow.
BHILLUNG, tributary to GANGES.	Lat. 30° 46′, lon. 78° 55′. S.W., into the Bhageeruttee.—Length, 50 m.		Between 60 and 70 ft. wide in the beginning of May, 5 m. from its mouth.
DAMMOODAH, tributary to HOOGHLY.	Ramghur district, lat. 23° 55′, lon. 84° 53′. E. and S.E., to Burdwan; S., to Diamond Harbour.—Length, 350 m.	Barrachur, 155 m.	Crossed by a ferry, 50 m. above its mouth. At Raneegunj, 135 m. from mouth, 500 yds. wide, fordable, with a rapid current about 1 ft. deep in December.
COOSSY, tributary to HOOGHLY	Ramghur district, lat. 23° 35′, lon. 85° 58′. Circuitous, but generally S.E., into Hooghly.—Length, 240 m.	Comaree.	It is crossed at Ameenugur, 80 m. from source, & at Koilaghat, 40 m. from mouth, by fords during the dry season, and ferries during the rains.
DALKISSORE, tributary to HOOGHLY.	Pachete district, lat. 23° 30′, lon. 86° 34′. S.E.—S.—S.E., into Hooghly at Diamond Harbour.—Length, 170 m.		Crossed at Bancoora, 50 m. from source, and at Jahanabad, by means of fords.
SHY-YOK, tributary to INDUS	Near Kara-korum Pass. S.E.—N.W., into Indus, near Iskardo.—Length, 300 m.	Chang-Chenmo, 58; Nubra, 66 m.	
CAUBUL, tributary to INDUS.	Lat. 34° 15′, lon. 68° 10′, near Sir-i-Chusma, in Afghanistan; elevation 8,400 ft. Generally E., through the valley of Caubul, and plains of Jellalabad and Peshawur, into the Indus.—Length, about 320 m.	Punchshir, 120; Tagao, 80; Alishang, 120, Soorkh-Rood, 70; Kooner, 230; Suwat, 150 m.—About 42,000 sq. m. drained.	Not navigable along the N. base of Khyber Mts. except on rafts and hides. Navigable for boats of 40 or 50 tons to Dobundee.
ZANSKAR, tributary to INDUS	N. declivity of Bara-Lacha Pass, lat. 32° 47′, lon. 77° 33′. N.W.—W.—N.W.—N.E.—N.W.—N.E., into the Indus, a few miles below Le.—Length, 150 m.	Trarap, 42; Zingchan-Tokpo, 22 m.	
SUTLEJ, tributary to INDUS.	Remote sources, Lakes Manasarowar and Rahwan Hrad, lat. 30° 8′, lon. 81° 53′; 15,200 ft. above the sea. N.W., 180 m.; S.W., through Bussahir; W. to junction with Beas; S.W. to Punjnud.—Length, 550 m., to junction with Beas; 300 m. farther to Punjnud: total, 850 m.	Spiti, 120; Buspa, 52; Beas, 290 m.—About 29,000 sq. m., or, including Ghara and Beas, about 65,000 sq. m. drained.	At Roopur, 30 ft. deep, and more than 500 yds. wide. Navigable as far as Filoor in all seasons, for vessels of 10 or 12 tons burthen.
BEAS, tributary to SUTLEJ.	On S. verge of Rotang Pass, lat. 32° 24′, lon. 77° 11′; 13,200 ft. above the sea. S., 80 m.; W., 50 m.; then a wide sweep to N.W. for 80 m.; S., 80 m., to Sutlej, at Endreesa.—Length, 290 m.	Parbati; Sainj, 38; Gomati, 55 m.; Ul; Gaj.—About 10,000 sq. m. drained.	
CHENAB, tributary to INDUS	Near Bara-Lacha Pass, lat. 32° 48′, lon. 77° 27′. N.W. to Murumurdwun; S.W. to confluence with Jhelum, thence S.W. to Ghara, or continuation of Sutlej.—Length, 605 m. to Jhelum, 765 m. to Ghara.	Suruj-Bhagur, 44; Murumurdwun, 86; Dharh, 56 m.—About 21,000; including Jhelum, 50,000; and with Ravee, 72,000 sq. m. drained.	Becomes navigable for timber-rafts at Aknur. Descends at the average rate of 40 ft. per m. for the first 200 m. Estimated elevation at Kishtewar, 5,000 ft.

JHELUM, tributary to CHENAB.	The Lidur, in N.E. mountains of Cashmere, near Shesha Nag. Through valley of Cashmere, and into Punjab by Baramula gorge; S. to Chenab confluence, in lat. 30° 10′, lon. 79° 9′.—Length, 409 m.	Lidur, 50; Vishnau, 44; Sinde, 72; Lolab, 44; Kishengunga, 140; Kunihar, 100; Pirpanjal, 115 m.—About 280,000 sq. m. drained.	Navigable for 70 m. through Cashmere. Navigable from the Indus to the town of Ohind.
RAVEE, tributary to CHENAB,	Lat. 32° 26′, lon. 77°, in the Pirpanjal or Mid-Himalaya range, to the W. of Rotang Pass. S.W., about 40 m.; W. to Lahore; S.W. to junction with Chenab.—Length, 450 m.	Nye, 20; Sana, 36; Chakki, 50 m.—About 22,000 sq. m. drained.	Tortuous course: fordable in most places for eight months of the year.
SANPOO, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	N. face of Himalayas, lat. 30° 25′, lon. 82° 5′. E., winding its way through Tibet, and washing the borders of the territory of Lassa. It then turns suddenly S., and falls into the Brahmapootra, under the name of Dihong.—Length, about 1,000 m.	Sanki-Sanpoo, Niamtsion, Zzangtsiou, Lalee Nuddee.	
TEESTA, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	About lat. 27° 59′, lon. 88° 50′. S.—S.E., into Brahmapootra.—Length, 333 m.	Lachoong, 23; Rungbo, 22; Rungeet, 23 m.	Navigable for craft of 6 or 7 tons as far up as Puharpoor, 15 m. beyond the divergence of the Attree.
BARAK, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	It is an offset from the Jeree, which leaves in lat. 24° 43′, lon. 93° 13′. W. through Cachar and Silhet; S.W., into Megna.—Length, 200 m.		Banks low and marshy along the valley of Cachar.
MONAS, tributary to BRAHMAPOOTRA.	Himalaya range, lat. 28° 20′, lon. 91° 18′. S., 40 m.; S.W., 110 m.; S.W., into Brahmapootra.—Length, 189 m.	Deemree, of greater length than itself.	
KHYENDWEN, tributary to IRAWADDY.	Burmah, lat. 26° 28′, lon. 96° 54′. Generally S., into Irawaddy, near the town of Amyenmyo.—Length, 470 m.	Myitia Khyoung, 170 m.	
WEIN-GUNGA, or PRENHETA, tributary to GODAVERY.	Mahadeo Mountains, lat. 22° 25′, lon. 79° 8′. E., 80 m.; S., 34 m.; S., 25 m.; S.W., 80 m.; S., 100 m.; into Godavery.—Length, 439 m.	Pench Nuddee, 150; Kanhan Nuddee, 130 m. —About 21,000 sq. m. drained, exclusive of Payne-Gunga and Wurda.	Elevation at Bundara, lat. 21° 12′; 872 ft. above the sea.
WURDA, tributary to WEIN-GUNGA.	Sautpoora Mountains, lat. 21° 44′, lon. 78° 25′. Generally N.W. to S.E.—Length, about 250 m.	Payne-Gunga, 320 m.—About 8,000 sq. m. drained.	Fordable, except at the height of the rains; then navigable for 100 m. above its mouth.
PAYNE-GUNGA, tributary to WEIN-GUNGA.	Lat 20° 32′, lon. 76° 4′, in Candeish. Very circuitous, but generally E., into Wurda.—Length, 320 m.	Araun, 105; Koony, 65 m.—About 8,000 sq. m. drained.	
MANJERA, tributary to GODAVERY	Lat. 18° 44′, lon. 75° 30′. S.E.—S.W., into Godavery. —Length, 330 m.	Thairnya, 95; Narinja, 75; Munnada, 100 m. —About 11,000 sq. m. drained.	
BEEMAH, tributary to KISTNAH.	Lat. 19° 5′, lon. 73° 33′, in the table-land of the district of Poona; 3,090 ft. above the sea. S.E., into Kistnah. —Length, 510 m.	Goor, 100; Neera, 120; Seena, 170; Tandoor, 85 m.—About 29,000 sq. m. drained.	
TOONGABUDRA, tributary to KISTNAH	Lat. 14°, lon. 75° 43′, junction of Toonga and Budra rivers. N.—N.E., into Kistnah.—Length, 325 m.	Chinna Hugry; Hundry, 225 m.; Wurda. —About 28,000 sq. m. drained	Rocky obstacles to navigation in upper part of course. Fine teak forests on banks.
POORNAH, tributary to TAPTEE.	Lat. 21° 35′, lon. 77° 41′. S., 65 m.; W., 95 m.; into the Taptee.—Length, 160 m.		
GIRNA, tributary to TAPTEE	E. slope of W. Ghauts, lat. 20° 37′, lon. 73° 25′. E., 120 m.; N., 50 m.; into the Taptee.—Length, 160 m.		
BHOVANI, tributary to CAUVERY.	Among the Kundah group, lat. 11° 15′, lon. 76° 4′. E., into Cauvery.—Length, 120 m.		
NOYEL, tributary to CAUVERY	E. slope of W. Ghauts, lat. 10° 59′, lon. 76° 44′. E., into Cauvery.—Length, 95 m.		
HUTSOO, tributary to MAHANUDDY.	Lat. 23° 18′, lon. 82° 32′ S., into Mahanuddy.—Length, 130 m.		
TELL, tributary to MAHANUDDY.	Lat. 19° 54′, lon. 82° 41′. N.W., into Mahanuddy.—Length, 130 m.		

NOTE—*Of the above-named rivers, forty-nine main streams flow to the sea: the chief tributaries to these number* 210, *of which thirty flow for* 200 *m. and upwards; sixty-three have a course of* 100 *to* 200 *m.; and the remainder under* 100 *m*

Rivers in Afghanistan, and in the Countries adjacent to India on the North-west—so far as known.

Name and Length.	Source, Course, and Discharge.	Tributaries or Confluents; and their Length in English Miles.	Remarks.
HELMUND.—650 miles .	Pughman range, lat. 34° 40′, lon. 68° 2′; at an elevation of 10,076 ft. above the sea. Westerly; south-westerly to Pullaluk; north-westerly; in the Hamoon marshy lake, and that of Duk-i-Teer, by numerous channels.	At 25 m. below Girishk receives the Urgundab, 250 m.; Turnak.	At Girishk, 350 m from source; banks, about 1,000 yards apart; in spring, spreads beyond these limits,—depth, 10 or 12 ft.,—with a rapid current. At Pullaluk it was crossed by Christie, who found it, at the end of March, 400 yards wide, and very deep.
LORAH.—About 80 miles . .	Shawl table-land, lat. 39° 49′, lon. 67° 20′. South-westerly, until lost in the sands of the desert of Khorasan.		In April the water (which is briny) is 7 or 8 yards wide, and 2 ft. deep. It is crossed on the route from Shawl to Kandahar.
KOONDOOZ.—About 300 miles	Valley of Bamian, about lat. 34° 52′, lon. 67° 40′. Easterly; northerly; north-easterly; northerly; and north-westerly; into the Amoo or Jinoon River.	Inderaub, 65; and Khanah-i-bad, 90 m.	
HERI ROOD, or HURY.—About 600 miles.	Huzareh Mountains, lat. 34° 50′, lon. 66° 20′; 9,500 ft. above the sea. Generally westerly to Herat, where it turns north-westerly, forming a junction with the Moorghaub; the united stream is ultimately lost in the desert of Khorasan.	Sir-i-Jungle, 90 m.	At Herat, it was formerly crossed by a brick bridge, but three out of thirty-three arches being swept away, communication was intercepted in time of inundation. It is remarkable for the purity of its water.
POORALLEE.—100 miles	Jhalawan province, about lat. 27° 23′, lon. 66° 21′. Southerly, through Lus province into the Indian Ocean, in lat. 25° 23′, lon. 66° 20′; near Sonmeanee.	N.B.—*The tributaries of these rivers, in the countries adjacent to India, are as yet very imperfectly known,—as indeed are also the origin and courses of the rivers themselves, or the countries through which they flow.*	From the bund N. of Lyaree, the river has no bed; as it fills, during the rains, the bund is swept away, and the water inundates the plain, which is here about 5 m. broad.
GHUZNEE.—About 60 miles .	Huzareh Mountains, about lat. 33° 50′, lon. 68° 20′. Generally southerly, as far as lat. 33°; afterwards south-westerly; into Lake Abistada, in lat. 32° 42′, lon. 68° 3′.		
BOLAN.—About 70 miles . .	Sir-i-Bolan, Bolan Pass, lat. 29° 51′, lon. 67° 8′; 4,494 ft. above sea. Remarkably sinuous, but generally south-easterly; forms a junction with the Nari River.		Liable to inundations; and as its bed, in some parts, occupies the whole breadth of the ravine, travellers are frequently overtaken by the torrent. Falls 3,751 ft. in 50 m., from source to Dadur.
MOOLA.—About 150 miles .	A few miles S. of Kelat, in Beloochistan. South-easterly, about 80 miles; north-easterly; and easterly; ultimately absorbed in the desert of Shikarpoor.		The Moola or Gundava Pass winds along its course.
URGUNDAB.—250 miles .	Huzareh Mountains, about lat. 33°, lon. 67°. South-westerly to 25 m. past Kandahar; westerly remainder of course,—falls into the Helmund River.	Turnak	Where crossed 12 m. from Candahar, it is, ordinarily, about 40 yards wide, from 2 to 3 ft. deep, and fordable; but in inundations, becomes much increased. Greater part of its water drawn off to fertilise the country.
GOMUL.—About 160 miles .	Afghanistan, about lat. 33°, lon. 69° 6′, at the foot of an offshoot from Sufied-Koh. S.; W.; and a little E. of S. to Goolkuts; thence E., N.E., and S.E., until absorbed by the sands of the Daman.	Zhobe, about 170 m.	Its bed for a great distance forms the Goolairee Pass, or great middle route from Hindoostan to Khorasan, by Dera Ismael Khan and Ghuznee: crosses the Suliman range lat. 32°.

Name.	Locality.	Elevation, in Feet.	Remarks.
CENTRAL INDIA, including OODEYPOOR, MALWA, BHOPAL, BUNDELCUND, and SHAHABAD.	Extends by the Arravulli, Dongurpoor, Vindhya, Bindyachal, Panna, and Bandair ranges,—73° to 84°; about 700 m. long; breadth, very various,—greatest from Amjherra to Ajmeer, 250 m.; from Mhow to Mokundurra, 150 m.; at Saugor and Dumoh, 75 m.; afterwards very narrow.	Highest towards S. and W.; average of Oodeypoor, 2,000 ft. Malwa, 1,500 to 2,000. Bhopal, 2,000. Bundelcund, about 1,000. Shahabad, 700. Plain of Ajmere, 2,000. Oodeypoor town, 24° 37′, 73° 49′; 2,064 ft.—slope to N.E., Banas River flowing in that direction; gradual fall also to valley of Chumbul River, where it rises to Malwa; Mhow, 2,019. Dectaun, 1,881. Dhar, 1,908. Indore, 1,998. Crest of Jaum Ghaut, 2,328. Oojein, 1,698. Adjygurh, 1,340. Amjherra, 1,890. Saugor, 1,940. Rhotasgurh, 700. Sonar River, source, 1,900 ft. From the Vindhya range the surface has a generally gradual, but in some places abrupt, descent; as at Mokundurra, and the Bindyachal hills, where rivers occasionally fall over the brow in cascades. Shahabad district very rocky and uneven.	Tin and copper are found in Oodeypoor. In Bhopal the prevailing geological formation appears to be trap overlying sandstone. Minerals are few and unimportant. Water is very plentiful. The mineral resources of Bundelcund appear to be considerable.
SOUTHERN INDIA, including DECCAN, MYSORE, &c.	Supported as it were by a triangle formed by the Sautpoora or sub-Vindhya on the N., W. Ghauts on the W., and E. Ghauts on the E.; the Sautpoora range constituting the base. Length, from Sautpoora River to Salem, about 700 m.; breadth from Mahabulishwar to Sirgoojah, about 700 m. If Chota-Nagpoor be considered as part of this great table-land, it may be said to extend nearly 250 m. farther in a north-easterly direction.	Highest parts, those nearest W. Ghauts, and in centre of Mysore, Mahabulishwar 18°, 73° 45′; 4,700 ft. Source of Kistnah, 4,500. Source of Godavery, 3,000 Poona, 2,823. Source of Manjera, 3,019 ft. Rivers rising in ravines between spurs of W. Ghauts, wind their way through E. Ghauts across the Deccan, the slope being in that direction. Plains of Nagpoor, 1,000 ft.—slope to S E.; drained by Wein-Gunga, which falls into Godavery. Hydrabad, 1,800 ft. Secunderabad, 17° 26′, 78° 33′; 1,837 ft. Beder, 17° 53′, 77° 36′; 2,359 ft. From the Wein-Gunga the surface rises towards N.E., where Rypoor, 21° 12′, 81° 40′, is 1,747 ft. Source of Mahanuddy, 2,111; and Konkeir, 20° 16′, 81° 33′, 1,953 ft. Nundy-droog, highest in Mysore, 4,856 ft.; slope from hence on all sides:—S. to Bangalore, 3,000; E. to plains of Carnatic—Chittoor, 1,100; N. to plains of Gooty, 1,182; and those of Bellary, 1,600 ft. Colar, 13° 8′, 78° 10′; 2,800 ft. Mysore town, 12° 18′, 76° 42′; 2,450 ft. Seringapatam, 12° 25′, 76° 45′, 2,412;—from hence, there is a gradual rise to Coorg, where Verajenderpetta is 3,399, and Merkara, 4,506 ft. From Bangalore, descent to S. by rather abrupt steppes to plains of Salem, 1,400, and Coimbatoor, 1,483 ft. From Belgaum, 15° 50′, 74° 36′, 2,500 ft., there is a gradual fall to the E. Bellary plains, 1,600 ft. Gooty plains, 1,182; Cuddapah town, 507; and E. part of Cuddapah dist., 450 ft.	Hypogene schists, penetrated and broken up by prodigious outbursts of plutonic and trappean rocks, occupy by far the greater portion of the superficies of Southern India. The central part of the Deccan is composed of waving downs, which, at one time, present for miles a sheet of green harvests, but in the hot season, bear the appearance of a desert, without a tree or shrub to relieve its gloomy sameness. The seaward face of the table-land towards the W., though abrupt, is not precipitous, but consists of a succession of terraces or steps. On the Coromandel side the slope to the sea is gentle, exhibiting the alluvial deposits borne down from the higher portions of the table-land.
SOUTH-WEST FRONTIER OF BENGAL, including CHOTA-NAGPOOR, SIRGOOJAH, PALAMOW, RAMGURH, HAZAREEBAGH, MYNPAT and AMARKANTAK.	Between 22° 30′ and 24° 30′; and easterly, from about 85° to 82′.	Chota-Nagpoor, 3,000 ft.; hills running E. and W., but of little elevation; Sirgoojah, mountainous, rising 600 to 700 ft. above level of Chota-Nagpoor. Mynpat table-land, about 30 m. S.E. from Sirgoojah town; area not ascertained—about 3,000 or 3,500 ft. Palamow dist., very mountainous—little known. Hazareebagh town, 24°, 85° 24′; 1,750 ft. Slope of country to S., towards Sumbulpoor—N. and E. parts of dist. very mountainous, but level, and even depressed towards Mahanuddy. Sumbulpoor town, only 400 ft. Orissa table-land then rises on the other side of Mahanuddy, in some places to 1,700 ft., backed by the chain of E. Ghauts. Amarkantak, jungly table-land, 22° 40′, 81° 50′; 3,500 ft.	The soil in the plains is generally fertile, producing abundant crops of wheat, barley, rice, pulse, excellent vegetables, cotton and sugar-cane. The uncultivated parts are overrun with a coarse grass. A great part of the region is quite unknown.
NEPAUL	At the foot of the Himalaya range, between Himalaya and the Tarai; 500 m. long; E. to W., 160 m. broad; area, 54,500 sq. m.	The surface generally consists of valleys varying from 4,000 to 6,000 ft. above Bengal plains. Khatmandoo (in an oval-shaped valley 12 m. long), 27° 42′, 85° 18′; 4,628. Bhynturee, 29° 34′, 80° 30′; 5,615 ft. Slope to S. drained by Ghogra, Gunduck, and Coosy.	The geological formation of the hilly tract—limestone, hornstone, and conglomerate. Vegetable productions of most remarkable stateliness, beauty, and variety. Climate resembles that of southern Europe.

Table-lands of Afghanistan and the Countries adjacent to India, on the North-west.

Name.	Locality.	Elevation, in Feet.	Remarks.
Western Afghanistan.	From about Ghuznee or Sufied-Koh, to Amran Mountains, N. to S.; and from near Kandahar to the Suliman range.	Crest of highland of Ghuznee, lat. 30° 43′, lon. 68° 20′; 9,000 ft. Ghuznee, 33° 34′, 68° 18′; 7,726. Yerghuttoo, 33° 20′, 68° 10′; 7,502. Mookur, principal source of Turnak River, 32° 50′, 67° 37′; 7,091. Abistada Lake, 32° 35′, 68°; 7,000. Punguk, 32° 36′, 67° 21′; 6,810. Shuftul, 32° 28′, 67° 12′; 6,514. Sir-i-Asp, 32° 15′, 66° 54′; 5,973. Kelat-i-Giljie, 32° 8′, 66° 45′; 5,773. Julduk, 32°, 66° 28′; 5,396. Hydurzie, 30° 23′, 66° 51′; 5,259. Hykulzie, 30° 32′, 66° 50′; 5,063. Teer-Andaz, 31° 55′, 66° 17′; 4.829. Kandahar, 32° 37′, 65° 28′; 3,484 ft.	Afghanistan, for four-fifths of its extent, is a region of rocks and mountains, interspersed with valleys of great fertility, and in many places containing table-lands, cold, bleak, and barren. It has a surface as rugged as that of Switzerland, with summits of much greater height. General slope of country, from N.E. to S.W.
Northern Afghanistan.	Between Hindoo-Koosh on the N., and Sufied-Koh on the S.; and Huzareh country on the W., and Khyber hills on the E.	Kurzar, near source of Helmund, 34° 30′, 67° 54′; 10,939 ft. Kalloo, 34° 30′, 67° 56′; 10,883. Youart or Oord, 34° 22′, 68° 11′; 10,618. Gooljatooe, 34° 31′, 68° 5′; 10,500. Shibbertoo, 34° 50′, 67° 20′; 10,500. Siah Sung, 34° 34′, 68° 8′; 10,488. Gurdan Dewar, 34° 25′, 68° 8′; 10,076. Soktah, 34° 40′, 67° 50′; 9,839. Khawak Fort, 35° 38′, 70° 5′; 9,300. Topchee, 34° 45′, 67° 44′; 9,085. Chasgo, 33° 43′, 68° 22′; 8,697. Bamian, 34° 50′, 67° 45′; 8,496. Huftasaya, 33° 49′, 68° 15′; 8,420. Sir-i-Chusma, 34° 21′, 68° 20′; 8,400. Zohak's Fort, 34° 50′, 67° 55′; 8,186. Killa Sher Mahomed, 34° 16′, 68° 45′; 8,051. Kot-i-Asruf, 34° 28′, 68° 35′; 7,749. Maidan, 34° 22′, 68° 43′; 7,747. Urghundee 34° 30′, 68° 50′; 7,628. Khoord Kabool, 34° 21′, 69° 18′; 7,466. Caubul, 34° 28′, 69°; 6,396. Boothauk, 34° 30′, 69° 15′; 6,247. Jugdulluk, 34° 25′, 69° 46′; 5,370. Gundamak, 34° 17′, 70° 5′; 4,616. Crest of Khyber Pass, 34° 8′, 71° 15′; 3,373. Ali-Musjid, 34° 3′, 71° 22′; 2,435. Jellalabad, 34° 25′, 70° 28′; 1,964 ft.	Slope from W. to E.; Kabool River flowing in that direction: lofty mountains enclosing valley of Jellalabad on N. and S. sides. Course of river obstructed, and bed contracted by ridges of rock connecting them. City of Kabool surrounded by hills on three sides. Jellalabad, on a small plain.
Shawl and Pisheen	Between Hala and Amran ranges, on the N. frontier of Beloochistan.	Khojuck Pass, Amran Mts., 30° 45′, 66° 30′; 7,449 ft. Pisheen, from 5,000 to 6,000. Shawl exceeds 5,000. Town of Shawl, 5,563. Dasht-i-Bedowlat, 30° 57′; about 5,000. Siriab, 30° 3′, 66° 53′; 5,793 ft.	Wildest parts of enclosing mountains,—haunts of wild sheep and goats: more accessible tracts yield pasture to herds and flocks. Orchards numerous. Dasht-i-Bedowlat (*wretched plain*), destitute of water.
Beloochistan . .	S. of Afghanistan	Kelat, 28° 53′, 66° 27′; 6,000 ft. Sohrab, 28° 22′, 66° 9′; 5,800. Munzilgah, 29° 53′, 67°; 5,793. Angeera, 28° 10′, 66° 12′; 5,250. Bapow, 28° 16′, 66° 20′; 5,000. Peesee-Bhent, 28° 10′, 66° 35′; 4,600. Sir-i-Bolan, 29° 50′, 67° 14′; 4,494. Putkee, 28° 5′, 66° 40′; 4,250. Paeesht-Khana, 27° 59′, 66° 47′; 3,500. Nurd, 27° 52′, 66° 54′; 2,850. Ab-i-goom, 29° 46′, 67° 23′; 2,540. Jungikoosht, 27° 55′, 67° 2′; 2,150. Bent-i-Jah, 28° 4′, 67° 10′; 1,850. Beebee Nanee, 29° 39′, 67° 28′; 1,695. Kohow, 28° 20′, 67° 12′; 1,250 Gurmab, 29° 36′, 67° 32′; 1,081. Kullar, 28° 18′, 67° 15′; 750 ft.	Coast craggy, but not elevated; in some places a sandy shore; inland surface becomes higher. Most remarkable features of Beloochistan, rugged and elevated surface, barrenness, and deficiency of water. It may be described as a maze of mountains, except on the N.W., in which direction the surface descends to the Great Desert on the S., where a low tract stretches along the sea-shore.
Cashmere and Bultistan, or Little Tibet	Western Himalaya	Average of Cashmere valley, between 5,000 and 6,000 ft. Huramuk Mt. 13,000. Pir-panjal, 15,000. Small elevations in valley, 250 to 500 ft. Average of valley of Indus (N. of Cashmere vale), 6,000 to 7,000 ft. Slope from S.E. to N.W. Mountains on each side rising from 6,000 to 8,000 ft. higher.	Mountains enclosing Cashmere vale, basaltic. Ranges on each side of Bultistan valley rugged, bare, and nearly inaccessible; formation generally of gneiss; that of the valley, shingle and sand

CLIMATE.—A country extending through six-and-twenty degrees of latitude, and with elevations from the coast-level to the height of three or four miles above the sea, must necessarily possess great variety of temperature. About one-half of India is intertropical, comprising within its limits the three principal stations of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay; in fact, all the country south of a line drawn from Burdwan on the east, through Bhopal, to the gulf of Cutch on the west—a distance from Cape Comorin of about 1,000 miles. All the region north of this line, and extending 800 miles from Cutch to Peshawur, is outside the tropic of Cancer: the area of the inter and extra-tropical territory is nearly alike. Mere distance from the equator will not convey an adequate idea of the climate of any district: other circumstances must be taken into account; such as elevation above the sea,—aspect in reference to the sun and the prevailing winds,—more or less vegetation,—radiation of terrestrial heat,—quantity of rain falling,* or dryness of atmosphere,—proximity to snow-covered mountains or great lakes,—drainage, ventilation, &c.;†—all these, varying in collateral existence or in degree of operation, cause a variety of climate and thermometrical range, which latitude will not indicate. Regions contiguous to the equator, at or near the sea-level, possess a high but equable temperature: the mercury, on Fahrenheit's scale, exhibits in the shade at Singapore, a flat island in 1° 17′ N., a heat of 73° to 87° throughout the year. As we recede from the equator north or south, a wider caloric range is experienced, not only throughout the year, but within the limits of a single day. In the N. W. Provinces of India, and in the S.E. settlements of Australia, the mercury not unfrequently rises in the summer season to 90° and even 100° Fahr., and shows a fluctuation, in twenty-four hours, of 24°: but this extreme torridity —when the circumambient fluid seems to be aeriform fire—is but of brief duration. Animal and vegetable life are reinvigorated, for a large part of the year, by a considerably cooler atmosphere. Indeed, at New York and Montreal, the heat of June and July is found as more intolerable than that of Jamaica or Ceylon; but then snow lies on the ground, at the former places, for several weeks in winter. Again, moisture with heat has a powerful and injurious effect on the human frame, though favourable to vegetation and to many species of animal life. Speaking from personal knowledge, we have lain exhausted on a couch with the mercury at 80° Fahr., during the rainy season, in Calcutta, Bombay, and Hong Kong; and ridden through the burning forests of Australia, on the sandy Arabian plains, and over the sugar-cane plantations of Cuba, with the mercury at 100° Fahr. So, also, with reference to elevation: in the East and West Indies, at a height of several thousand feet above the sea, we have enjoyed a fire at night in June; and yet, in April and September, been scorched at mid-day in Egypt, Northern China, and Eastern Europe. These observations are made with a view of answering the oft-recurring inane question, without referring to any locality, "What sort of a climate has India?" In order, however, to

* The quantity of rain in the tropical or temperate zones is affected by the elevation of the land above the sea. In India the maximum fall is at 4,500 feet altitude; beyond this height it diminishes. This is shown by the former scientific chairman of the E. I. Cy., Colonel Sykes, in his valuable *Meteorological Observations:* thus, on the western coast of India the fall is at sea-level (mean of seven levels)—inches, 81; at 150 ft. altitude (Rutnagherry in the Concan), 114; at 900 ft., Dapoolee (S. Concan), 134; at 1,700 ft. (Kundala Pass, from Bombay to Poona), 141; at 4,500 ft. (Mahabulishwar—mean of 15 years, 254; at 6,200 ft. (Augusta Peak, Uttray Mullay range), 194; at 6,100 ft. (Kotagherry, in the Neilgherries, one year), 81; at 8,640 ft. (Dodabetta, highest point of Western India, one year), 101 inches. The same principle is observable in the arid lofty table-land of Thibet, and in the contiguous elevated regions where rain seldom falls. So also in Chili and other parts of the Andes. The distinguished meteorologist, Dr. John Fletcher Miller, of Whitehaven, adduces evidence, in his interesting account of the Cumberland Lake District, to demonstrate the existence of a similar law in England, where he considers the maximum fall of rain to be at the height of 2,000 feet.

† In 1829, Mr. M. Martin published in Calcutta, a small *brochure*, entitled *The Effects of Climate, Food, and Drink on Man.* The essay was prepared in the hope of inducing the government to adopt sanitary measures for the drainage and ventilation of Calcutta, where cholera had become long located. It was predicted that unless the *nidus* of this fearful malady were destroyed in the Indian cities by the purification of their respective atmospheres, the disease would be extensively generated and wafted with the periodical winds from Asia to Europe. The prognostication was ridiculed: sad experience might perhaps induce corporations and citizens of large towns to adopt timely-effective sanitary measures. By so doing a healthy climate may everywhere be obtained; but no altitude or position will avail for the prevention of endemic diseases, or for lengthening the duration of life, wherever large masses of human beings are congregated, unless complete drainage, free circulation of air, and the removal of all putrescent animal and vegetable matter be made an urgent and daily duty.

convey some idea of the thermometrical range, and the quantity of rain falling at different stations, the following table has been collated from different sources:—

Meteorological Monthly Observations for different parts of India; showing the Latitude, number of feet above the level of the sea, average Thermometer, and Rain in inches.

Places, Latitude, and Elevation above sea.	THERMOMETER.												
	Jan	Feb.	March	April.	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Mean of Year.
Calcutta, 22° 34′, 18 ft. . .	69	73	78	87	88	83	82	82	82	82	71	67	79*
Madras, 13° 5′, sea-level .	78	78	82	88	92	87	88	86	86	84	82	78	83
Bombay, 18° 57′, sea-level†	77	77	80	82	85	85	81	84	79	84	84	80	84
Tirhoot, 25° 26′, 26° 42′, little elevated . . .	60	66	76	85	89	86	84	85	81	73	—	61	78
Goorgaon, 28° 28′, 817 ft. .	70	72	80	94	104	98	85	84	89	87	75	66	—
Delhi, 28° 41′, 800 ft. . .	53	62	70	79	82	82	82	80	80	73	62	56	72
Rajpootana, ‡ about 500 ft.	70	73	82	82	74	90	85	—	—	—	90	66	—
Nagpoor, 21° 10′, 930 ft. .	68	75	83	89	90	84	79	79	79	79	73	72	79
Hyderabad, 17° 22′, 1,800 ft.	74½	76¼	84	91½	93	88	81	80¼	79	80	76½	74½	81½
Bangalore, 12° 58′, 3,000 ft.	71	73	79	78	79	75	74	74	74	71	71	70	74
Hawilbagh, 29° 38′, 3,887 ft.	47	55	61	60	73	76	78	79	75	69	60	52	—
Kotagherry, 11° 27′, 6,100 ft.	59	60	61	62	62	64	64	65	64	62	60	59	61
Ootacamund, 11° 24′, 7,300 ft.	54	56	60	64	64	59	56	56	56	56	55	53	57
Mussoorie, 30° 27′, 6,282 ft.	—	—	—	—	77	70	68	68	67	61	56	—	—
Landour, 30° 27′, 7,579 ft. .	41	46	55	65	68	66	68	66	64	57	46	47	—
Darjeeling, 27° 2′, 8,000 ft.	40	42	50	55	57	61	61	61	59	58	50	43	53
	RAIN IN INCHES.												Total
Calcutta	0·05	0·48	1·77	3·52	12·86	3·04	12·44	8·15	8·19	3·68	0·06	2·57	56·61
Nagpoor	0 40	0 50	3·84	1·01	0.21	6·25	14·93	7·51	16·32	—	2·89	0·13	53·99§
Bangalore	—	—	35	4·16	5·89	3·24	5·88	4·13	13·97	5·10	1·30	—	—
Kotagherry	2	3	6	10	2	2	4	2	2	10	2	5	50
Ootacamund	1	1	2	5	6	8	7	6	7	9	5	3	60
Darjeeling	1	—	1	2	9	26	25	29	15	8	—	—	122

The monsoons or prevailing winds within the tropics, as on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, are denominated the *South-west* and the *North-east;* but owing to modifying circumstances, the direction is in several places changed: at Arracan, the S.W. blows more frequently from the S., and the N.E. more to the W. of N. Lower Bengal, including the country around Calcutta, has a climate more trying than that of any other part of India. November, December, and January are tolerably cool, and Europeans may walk out during the day. In February, March, April, and May, the heat daily increases, until, during the last month especially, it becomes almost intolerable; not a cloud appears in the heavens to mitigate the burning rays of the sun, which seem to penetrate into the very marrow of an European. We have known men and beasts to drop dead in the streets of Calcutta. When the monsoon is on the eve of changing, before the *chota bursaut* (little rain) set in, the nights as well as the days are oppressive; respiration becomes laborious, and all animated nature languishes: the horizon assumes a lurid glare, deepening to a fiery red; the death-like stillness of the

* Abstract of the mean annual summaries of a meteorological register kept at Calcutta, for ten years:—

Years.	Sunrise.	2·40 P.M.	Sunset.
1841 . . .	72°7	89°0	82°4
1842 . . .	73·3	88·0	82·1
1843 . . .	73·3	87·6	82 5
1844 . . .	72·7	87·6	82·3
1845 . . .	73·7	86·9	82·3
1846 . . .	74·3	86·3	81·9
1847 . . .	73·2	86·1	81·1
1848 . . .	74·1	87·4	82·5
1849 . . .	73·6	86·7	81·8
1850 . . .	73·1	86·1	81·4
Mean .	73·4	87·2	82·0

The annual fall of rain at Calcutta, during six years, commencing with 1830, averaged 64 inches. In the wet season evaporation is very slight.

† Amount of rain at Bombay for six years:—

	Inches.		Inches.
1845	54·73	1848 .	73·42
1846	87·48	1849 . .	118·88
1847 . . .	67·31	1850 . . .	47·78

Average annual fall during thirty years, 76·08 inches. At Madras, average for eight years, 66·59 inches.

‡ Between lat. 26° 54′, and lat. 29° 23′.—(Boileau's *Tour in Rajwara*, pp. 304—317.)

§ Situation, about 350 m. from nearest part of Bay of Bengal, and 420 m. from Indian Ocean. In 1826, and in 1831, the fall of rain slightly exceeded 65 inches; the greatest registered fall was 72 inches, and that was in 1809. Average fall of rain for eight years, 48·10 inches. Proceeding westward towards the Ghauts and Indian Ocean, the rains become heavier until reaching Mahabulishwar, where the fall is probably unexampled in amount; in 1849 it was 294 inches. The mean annual quantity is 239 inches, of which 227 fell in the four monsoon months. The greatest annual fall was in 1834, when it amounted to 297 inches. Another report gives the mean annual fall, as deduced from the observation of ten years, at 229 inches; and the number of days on which rain falls, at 127.

air is occasionally broken by a low murmuring, which is responded to by the moaning of cattle: dense, dark masses of clouds roll along the Bay of Bengal, accompanied with occasional gusts of wind; streaks of lightning, after sunset, glimmer through the magazines where the electric fluid is engendered and pent up; the sky becomes obscured with mist, and lowring; next, broad sheets of lambent flame illumine each pitchy mass, until the entire heavens seem to be in a blaze; while peal after peal of thunder reverberate from cloud to cloud, like discharges of heavy artillery booming through cavernous hills, or along an amphitheatre of mountains; thin spray is scattered over the coast by the violence of the increasing gale,—the rain commences in large drops, augments to sheeted masses, and sweeps like a torrent from the sky; the surf roars along the beach,—the wind howls furiously, screaming or groaning piteously; and every element seems convulsed with the furious conflict: at length the S.W. monsoon gains the victory, and the atmosphere becomes purified and tranquil. The monsoon is felt with varying degrees of intensity at different parts of the coast; but at Madras and at Bombay the scene is one of awful grandeur. During the rains the air is saturated with moisture; and the effect on the whole surface of the human frame causes extreme lassitude and mental depression: along the sea-shore the pernicious effects are mitigated by a sea-breeze, called the "Doctor," which sets in about ten, A.M., and lasts until sunset. As the country is ascended above the ocean-level, varieties of climate are experienced; but on the plains of the Ganges and of the Indus, and in some parts of Central India, hot winds blow nearly equal in intensity to those which are felt in Australia. In few words, some idea may be conveyed of the climate of several districts:—

Bengal Proper,—hot, moist, or muggy for eight months—April to November; remainder cool, clear, and bracing.

Bahar,—cool in winter months; hot in summer; rain variable.

Oude,—fluctuating temperature and moisture; therm. range 28 to 112°; rain, 30 to 80 inches.

Benares,—mean temperature, 77°; winter cool and frosty sometimes; therm. at night, 45°, but in the day, 100°; rain variable—30 to 80 inches.

Agra,—has a wide range of temperature; in mid-winter night-frosts and hail-storms sometimes cut off the cotton crop and cover the tanks with ice; yet at noon in April, therm. reaches the height of 106° in the shade.

Ghazeepoor,—range in coldest months, 58 to 71°—April, 86 to 96°; May, 86 to 95°; June, 85 to 98°; July, 86 to 96°. In the *Dehra Doon*—range 37 to 101°. In the year 1841, December mean heat, 60°; June, 88°; whole year, 74°. In 1839, total fall of rain, 67 inches; of which in July, 15; August, 26.

Cuttack and opposite coast of Bay of Bengal,—refreshed by a sea-breeze blowing continuously from March to July.

Berar,—moderate climate, according to elevation.

Madras,—cold season of short duration in the Carnatic. Mercury in therm. higher than in Bengal, sometimes 100° Fahr. Heat tempered by the sea.

Arcot,—high temperature, 110° in the shade, sometimes 130° Fahr. Few sudden vicissitudes; storms infrequent.

Salem,—fluctuating climate—in January, 58 to 82°; March, 66 to 95°; May, 75 to 96°.

Trichinopoly,—has a steady high temperature, a cloudless sky, dry and close atmosphere, with much glare and intense reflection of heat.

Vizagapatam,—on the coast is hot, moist, and relaxing; inland equally sultry, but drier.

Bellary is characterised by great aridity; rain, 12 to 26 inches; therm. falls in January to 55 or 50°; thunder-storms frequent in summer months.

Cuddapah,—average max. temperature for several years (in the shade), 98°; minn., 65°; mean, 81°: mean temperature during monsoon, 77°; max., 89°.

Madura,—on the hills mild and genial in summer; therm. seldom below 50° or above 75°; in the plains, reaching 115° and even 130°.

Travancore,—owing to proximity of mountains, humid but not oppressive.

Mysore,—table-land cool, dry, and healthy; at Bangalore (3,000 ft. high), therm. range from 56 to 82°. The monsoons which deluge the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, have their force broken by the Ghauts on either side, and genial showers preserve the Mysorean verdure throughout the year.

Neilgherries,—the climate resembles that of the intertropical plateaux of America; at Ootacamund (height 7,300 ft.), mean temperature rather above that of London, but ann. range very small; not sufficient sunshine to bring the finer European fruits to perfection, but corn and vegetables thrive. Lower down the vales enjoy an Italian clime; at Coimbatoor (height 4,483 ft.), during the cold season, max., 59°; minn., 31°; in April, average 65°; May, 64° Fahr.; there are no sultry nights, a blanket being acceptable as bed-covering in all seasons. In the higher regions, the air beyond the zone of clouds and mists is clear and dry, as evidenced by the great distance within which sound is heard, and by the buoyancy of the human frame.

Coorg is a bracing mountain region. Daily range, 2 to 6°; ann., 50 to 80° Fahr.; annual rain, at Mercara (4,500 ft.), 119 inches; in June, about 40 inches.

Malabar coast,—warm but agreeable; therm. 68 to 88° Fahr.; ann. rain, 120 to 130 inches.

Canara and the Concans,—beneath the Ghauts are not, tropically speaking, unhealthy, except where marsh and jungle prevail, when malaria is produced.

Bombay,—tropical heat diminished by sea-breezes.

Broach,—December to March, cool; average rain, 33 inches.

In *Guzerat*, which is the hottest part of W. India, the westerly winds are burning in May, June, and July; temperature high for nine months; average fall of rain, 30 inches.

Mahratta country,—near the Ghauts the clouds are attracted from the Indian Ocean, and a profusion of rain falls for three or four weeks without intermission, but often not extending 30 m. to the E. or S.

The *Deccan* table-land is salubrious; at Sattara, mean ann. temperature, 66°. Even in September I enjoyed the air of Poona, as a great relief from the sultry heat of Southern China. Ann. range of therm., 37 to 94°; fall of rain, light and uncertain—22 to 30 inches; among the Ghauts, 300 inches. Proceeding westward towards the Ganges, and northward through *Central India* plateau, there is a modified temperature (at Meerut, therm. falls to 32° Fahr.), with occasional hot winds, which prevail as far as Sinde and the Punjab. Sinde is dry and sultry; at Kurachee, 6 or 8 inches rain; at Hydrabad, 2 inches; at Larkhana, farther north, there was no rain for three years. Mean max. temperature of six hottest months, 98° in the shade.

Punjab,—more temperate than Upper Gangetic plain; from November to April, climate fine; summer heat, intense; hot winds blow with great violence, and frequent dust-storms in May and June render the air almost unbreathable. Rains commence in July; August and September, sickly months. The Great Desert to the S. of the Punjab has a comparatively low temperature; at Bickaneer, in winter, ponds are frozen over in February; but in summer the heat is very great; therm. 110 to 120° in the shade.

Candeish has a luxurious climate like that of Malwa.

Upper Assam has a delightful temperature; the heat bearable, and the cold never intolerable. Mean temperature of four hottest months, about 80°; of winter, 57°; mean ann., 67°; heavy rains, which commence in March and continue to October. The quantity which falls is unequal; at Gowhatty, it is about 80; at Chirra Poonjee, 200; and in the Cossya country, 500 to 600 inches = 50 ft. At this latter place there fell in 1850, no less than 502 inches = 42 ft.; in August, 1841, there were 264 inches = 22 ft., in five successive days—30 inches every 24 hours. [Let it be remembered that the *annual* fall in London is 27; in Edinburgh, 24; in Glasgow, 32 inches.] The eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, to the Straits of Malacca, is more genial and agreeable than that of the Coromandel coast: the greatest heat is in April; therm., at Mergui, 100°; the monsoon is mild, but violent to the northward.

Lower Assam and Arracan are similar to Bengal.

This rapid sketch will indicate the variety of climates in India; but it is in the loftier adjoining regions that the greatest extremes exist.

The Himalaya and Hindoo-Koosh slopes and valleys exhibit a very varied temperature, and corresponding diversity of products, from the loftiest forest trees to the stunted lichens and mosses, when the last trace of vegetable life disappears as effectually as it does at the Arctic or Antarctic Poles, snow being equally perpetual at an elevation of four to five miles (20,840 to 25,000 ft.) above the sea, as at the extreme northern and southern parts of our globe. On the southern, or Indo-Gangetic side of the Himalaya, which rises like a wall from the sub-Himalaya, the snow-line commences at 12,000 to 13,000 ft. on some of the spurs or buttresses; on the northern side of the same range,—table-land of Tibet 10,000 ft. above the sea; the snow-line commences at 16,000 ft., but in some places is not found at 20,000 ft. On the southern slope cultivation ceases at 10,000 ft.; but on the northern side, cultivation extends to 14,000 ft., where birch-trees flourish; the limit of furze-bushes is at 17,000 ft. Vegetation, to some extent, indicates the more or less severity of this mounta' inclime: the *Deodar* has its favourite abode at 1,000 to 12,000 ft.—attains a circumference of 30 ft., and of great stature, and the wood will last, exposed to the weather, for 400 years. Various species of magnificent pines have a range of 5,000 to 12,000 ft.; the arboraceous rhododendron, every branchlet terminated by a gorgeous bunch of crimson flowers, spreads at 5,000 to 8,000 ft.; the horse-chesnut and yew commence at 6,000 ft., and end at 10,000 ft.; the oak flourishes at 7,000 to 8,000 ft.; maple, at 10,000 to 11,000 ft.; ash, poplar, willow, rose, cytisus, at 12,000; elm, at 7,000 to 10,000; birch commences at 10,000, ceases on S. slope at 13,000 ft; on N. side fine forests of this tree at 14,000 ft. Juniper met with occasionally at latter-named height; the grape attains great excellence at Koonawur, 8,000 ft., but does not ripen beyond 9,000 ft.; the currant thrives at 8,000 and 9,000 ft.; apricot, at 11,000 ft.; gooseberry and raspberry, at 10,000 to 12,000 ft.

The decrement of heat in proportion to latitude and elevation is, as yet, imperfectly ascertained. Dr. Hooker* allows one degree of Fahrenheit's thermometer for every degree of latitude and every 300 ft. of ascent above the sea; at Calcutta, in 22° 34′, the mean ann. temperature is about 79°; that of Darjeeling, in Sikhim, 27° 2′; 7,450 ft. above Calcutta, is 53°, about 26° *below* the heat of Calcutta. The decrease of temperature with elevation is much less in summer than in winter: in January, 1° = 250 ft., between 7,000 and 13,000 ft.; in July, 1° = 400 ft.; the decrement also less by day than by night. The decremental proportions of heat to height is roughly indicated by this skilful naturalist.

1° = 300 ft.	at elevation	1,000 to 8,000 ft.
1° = 320 ft.	„	8,000 to 10,000 ft.
1° = 350 ft.	„	10,000 to 14,000 ft.
1° = 400 ft.	„	14,000 to 18,000 ft.

This must be effected by aspect and slope of elevation; by quantity of rain falling, and permeability of soil to moisture; by amount of cloud and sunshine, exposure of surface, absence of trees, undulation of the land, terrestrial radiation, and other local influences.

Within the tropics, in the northern hemisphere, the limits of perpetual congetation is 16,000 to 17,000 ft. above the sea; in lat. 30°, 14,000 ft.; in 40°, 10,000 ft.; in 50°, 6,000 ft.; in 60°, 5,000 ft.; in 70°, 1,000 ft.; and in 80° and further north, at the sea-level. In the southern hemisphere, the land, which is in lat. 56°, exhibits perpetual frost.

At Kumaon, winter rigour is moderated by great solar radiation, and somewhat tempered by contiguous snow-capped mountains, whence a diurnal current of air sets in as regularly as a sea-breeze on a tropical shore, and with a nearly equally invigorating effect. Snow commences to fall at the end of September, and continues until the beginning of April. During the absence of snow for five months, the mercury ranges at sunrise, 40 to 55°; at mid-day, 65 to 75° in the shade—90 to 110° Fahr. in the sun. The heat of course diminishes as height increases, except during the cold season. At Almora town, in 29° 30′, 5,400 ft. elevation, the therm. before

* In his valuable work. *Himalayan Journals* ii., 404.

sunrise is always lowest in the valleys, and the frost more intense than on the hills of 7,000 ft. elevation, while at noon the sun is more powerful; extreme range in 24 hours, sometimes from 18 to 51° Fahr. Snow does not fall equally in every season; the natives say the greatest fall is every third year. On the Ghagor range, between Almora and the plains, snow remains so late as the month of May. At Mussoorie, 6,000 to 7,000 ft. high, the mean ann. heat is only 57° Fahr.; indeed, at 4,000 ft. hot winds cease, and vegetation assumes an European character. Annual fall of rain at Almora, 40 to 50 inches.

The northernmost part of Nepaul valley, between 27 and 28°, and elevation of 4,000 ft., has a climate somewhat similar to that of the southern parts of Europe. In winter a hoar-frost commonly covers the ground, occasionally for three or four months, freezing the standing pools and tanks, but not severe enough to arrest the flow of rivers. In summer noon, the mercury stands at 80 to 87° Fahr. The seasons are very nearly like those of Upper Hindoostan; the rains set in earlier, and from the S.E. are usually very copious, and break up about October, causing excessive inundations in some places from the mountain torrents. In a few hours, the inhabitants, by ascending the sides of the enclosing mountains, may exchange a Bengal heat for a Siberian winter.

At Darjeeling the atmosphere is relatively more humid than at Calcutta; the belt of sandy and grassy land, at the foot of the Himalaya, only 300 ft. higher than in Calcutta, and 3½° N. of that city, is, during the spring months, March and April, 6 or 7° colder; and though there is absolutely less moisture in the air, it is relatively more humid; this is reversed after the rains commence. The south wind, which brings all the moisture from the Bay of Bengal, discharges annually 60 to 80 inches of rain in traversing 200 m. of land; but the temperature is higher in advancing north-west from the Bay of Bengal: which may be caused from the absence of any great elevation in the Gangetic valley and plain, and its being walled in to the northward by the Himalaya mountains.

Elevation causes in Afghanistan a corresponding diversity of climate: at Caubul, which is considered to be very salubrious, and 6,396 ft. above the sea, the air is warmer in summer and colder in winter than that of England; and the diurnal therm. range is great, amounting to 40°. June, July, and August are the hottest; December, January, and February the coldest months,—the mercury falling several degrees below zero Fahr.; but the sun possesses sufficient power at mid-day to melt the surface of the snow, which, however, is again frozen at night. The seasons are very regular; the sky is unclouded, the air bright and clear, with scarcely any rain; in November a few showers are followed by snow; and from the middle of March till the 1st of May, there is incessant rain, which melts the snow rapidly, and causes a sudden transition from winter to summer (with but little spring), when thunder and hail-storms occur; earthquakes are not unfrequent during winter in the immediate vicinity of the lofty ranges, but are said to be unknown at Candahar. Prevailing winds, N.N.W. and W.; E. seldom; winter, calm; variable at breaking up of the season.*

Cashmere valley, by its elevation (5,000 ft.), has a cool climate; in winter the celebrated lake is slightly frozen over, and the ground covered with snow to the depth of 2 ft.; hottest months, July and August, therm. 80 to 85° at noon, when the air is sometimes oppressive from want of circulation.

But it is in the loftier regions that the peculiarities caused by altitude are most observable: at—

Bussahir,—the climate varies from that of the intertropical at Rampoor, 3,260 ft.† above the sea, to that of the region of perpetual congelation: in parts bordering on the table-land of Tartary the air is at one season characterised by aridity greater than that of the most scorching parts of the torrid zone. In October, and later in the year, when the winds blow with the greatest violence, woodwork shrinks and warps, and leather and paper curl up as if held to a fire; the human body exposed to those arid winds in a few minutes show the surface collapsed, and if long left in this condition life becomes extinct. Vegetation with difficulty struggles against their effects. Gerard found tracts exposed to them to have a most desolate and dreary aspect; not a single tree, or blade of green grass, was distinguishable for near 30 m., the ground being covered with a very prickly plant, which greatly resembled furze in its withered state. This shrub was almost black, seeming as if burnt; and the leaves were so much parched from the arid winds of Tartary, that they might be ground to powder by rubbing them between the hands. Those winds are generally as violent as hurricanes, rendering it difficult for the traveller to keep his feet. The uniform reports of the inhabitants represent the year as continual sunshine, except during March and April, when there are some showers, and a few clouds hang about the highest mountains; but a heavy fall of rain or snow is almost unknown. The excessive cold and aridity on the most elevated summits cause the snow to be there so light, loose, and powdery, that it is continually swept like smoke through the air by the tempestuous winds. The limit of perpetual congelation in Bussahir ascends to the northward.

The direct rays of the sun are extremely hot at great elevations: insomuch, that Jacquemont found the stones on the ground on the table-land of Tartary, at an elevation of 15,000 or 16,000 ft., become so hot in sunshine, as to be nearly unbearable by the hand; at an elevation of 18,000 ft., Gerard found the rays of the sun so oppressive that he was obliged to wrap his face in a blanket.

At *Bulti* or *Little Tibet* the atmosphere is very clear and dry. But though rain is almost unknown, snow falls, and lies from the depth of 1 to 2 ft. The cold in the elevated parts is intense in winter; on the high and unsheltered table-land of Deotsuh, it at that season totally precludes the existence of animal life. The heat in the lower parts in summer is considerable, the therm.‡ ranging from 70 to 90° in the shade at noon.

At *Ladakh* the climate is characterised by cold and excessive aridity. The snow-line is so usually high in Spiti and Ruphsu, at the south-eastern extremity of Ladakh, as to show the utter futility of attempting to theorise respecting the so-called isosthermal lines, in the present scanty and imperfect state of our information as to the data from

* Notes of observations, 1st April, 1838, to 31st March, 1840, in Afghanistan.—(*Calcutta Jour. Nat. Hist.*)

† The Choora district (valley of the Pabur, 4,800 feet) is a beautiful and fertile tract, with a delightful climate.

‡ Thornton's *Gazetteer: Afghanistan, &c.*, vol. i., p. 120.

which they should be determined. Gerard says, respecting Spiti, in lat. 32°, that the marginal limit of the snow, which, upon the sides of Chimborazo, occurs at 15,700 ft., is scarcely permanent in Thibet at 19,000, and upon the southward aspect has no well-defined boundary at 21,000 ft.; and one summit, 22,000 ft. high, was seen by him to be free of snow on the last day in August. This absence of snow probably results, in part, from the very small quantity of moisture kept suspended in the highly rarefied atmosphere, in part from the intense heat of the direct rays of the sun, the latter cause being in some degree dependent on the former. "Wherever we go," observes Gerard, "we find the sun's rays oppressive." In one instance, in the beginning of September, at an elevation of 15,500 ft., a thermometer, resting upon the rocks, marked 158°; in another, at 14,500 ft., the instrument, placed on sand, marked 130°; and in a small tent, at an elevation of 13,000 ft., it indicated 110°. These phenomena he attributed to the rarefaction and tenuity of the atmosphere, from elevation and the absence of moisture,—circumstances which allow of such immediate radiation of heat, that at the same moment there will be a difference of more than 100° between places only a few hundred yards asunder, occasioned by the one receiving, and the other being excluded, from the direct rays of the sun. At Ruphsu, at the elevation of 16,000 ft., it freezes every night, even at Midsummer; but the heat of the day so far countervails the cold of night, that the Lake Chamorereil is free from ice during the summer months. At Le, having an elevation of about 10,000 ft., frosts, with snow and sleet, commence early in September and continue until May; the therm. from the middle of December to February, ranges from 10 to 20°; even in June, the rivulets are often, at night, coated with ice. Moorcroft, during his Himalayan travels, found the therm., when exposed to the sun's rays at mid-day in July, to range from 134 to 144°. The atmosphere is in general dry in all parts of the country.

In the works of Gerard, Lloyd, Moorcroft, Vigue, Jacquemont, and Hooker, useful details are given on the meteorology of these lofty regions.

The climate of India is not inimical to the European constitution: that of Bengal and other low districts is very trying, especially to those who do not follow a strictly temperate course in all things; but there are many instances of Englishmen living for a quarter of a century at Calcutta, and on returning to England, enjoying another quarter of a century of existence, preserving, to old age, a vigorous mental and bodily frame.* In the hot and moist parts of India, abdominal diseases,—in the warm and dry, hepatic action or congestion prevail. Exposure at night, especially to malaria or the effluvia arising from intense heat and decomposing vegetable and animal matter, causes a bilious remittent (popularly called jungle fever), which operates as a poison on the human system, and becomes rapidly fatal if not counteracted by mercury or some other medicine, or unless the morbific matter be expelled, and the patient have strength of frame to survive the fever.

The direct rays of a nearly vertical sun, and even those also of the moon, cause affections of the brain which are frequently fatal; and when not so, require removal to the temperate zone for their relief. The establishment of sanataria at elevated and healthy positions, has proved a great benefit to Anglo-Indians, who at Darjeeling, Simla, Landour, Mussoorie, Mount Aboo, the Neilgherries, and other places, are enabled to enjoy a European temperature and exercise,—to check the drain on the system from the cutaneous pores being always open,—to brace the fibres and tone the nerves, which become gradually relaxed by the long continuance of a high temperature. As India becomes more clear and cultivated, and facilities for locomotion by railroads and steam-boats are augmented, the health of Europeans will improve, and their progeny will derive a proportionate benefit: but it is doubtful whether there is any part of the country where a European colony would *permanently* thrive, so as to preserve for successive generations the stamina and energy of the northern races.

The diseases that prevail among the Indians vary with locality: low, continued fever is most prevalent in flat, and rheumatism in moist regions. Leprosy and other skin disorders are numerous among the poorest classes. *Elephantiasis*, or swelling of the legs; *berri-berri*, or enlargement of the spleen; torpidity of the liver, weakness of the lungs, and ophthalmia, are common to all ranks and places: goitre is found among the hill tribes; cholera and influenza sometimes decimate large masses of the people. Numerous maladies, engendered by early and excessive sensuality, exist among rich and poor, and medical or chirurgical skill are consequently everywhere in great request. The inhabitants of India, generally speaking, except in the more elevated districts, have not the robust frames or well-wearing constitutions which result from an improved social state, or from the barbarism which is as yet free from the vices and defects of an imperfect civilisation: the inhabitants of the torrid zone do not enjoy a longevity equal to those who dwell in the temperate climates of the earth.

* Mr. W. C. Blaquiere, for a long period police magistrate at Calcutta, died there in 1854, æt. 95: he arrived at Bengal in 1774.

Geology.—It will require many more years of scientific research before an accurate geological map can be laid down for India.* Immense tracts covered with impenetrable forests,—the few Europeans in the country occupied with military and civil governmental duties,—the lassitude of mind and body which, sooner or later, oppresses the most energetic,—and the malaria which inevitably destroys those who attempt to investigate the crust of the earth, overrun with jungle, or immersed in swamp;—these, and other obstacles render the prosecution of this science a matter of extreme difficulty. All that can be attempted in a work of this nature is to collate the best known data, and arrange them in outline, for reference and future systematic exposition.†

Rerepresentatives of all the series found in Europe and other parts of the world, are traceable in India. Mr. Carter has industriously noted the observations of various investigators; and the following summary is partly abstracted from his compilation:—

Older Metamorphic Strata.—*Gneiss, Mica Schiste, Chlorite Schiste, Hornblende Schiste, Quartz Rock, Micaceous Slate, Talcose Slate, Clay Slate, Granular Limestone.*

Gneiss.—Most general and abundant,—occurring in different parts of the Himalaya; Oodeypoor; near Baroda; Zillah Bahar; Rajmahal hills; Phoonda Ghaut; Northern Circars; and more or less throughout "peninsula" (? Deccan) to the Palghaut, and probably to Cape Comorin: it is frequently veined by granite, contains in most places specular iron ore: beds of garnets common everywhere; corundum in southern India, and beryl in Mysore. Composition varied in texture, compactness, and with more or less mica; colour—speckled, black, brown, reddish gray to white; sometimes tinted green where chlorite replaces mica: when very fine-grained and decomposing, gneiss bears a close resemblance to fine-grained sandstone.

Mica Schiste.—Southern Mahratta country, and western extremities of Vindhya range, passes into micaceous slate at the Phoonda Ghaut: veined with quartz, but no granite: being associated with gneiss and hornblende schistes, they pass into each other.

Chlorite Schiste.—Southern Mahratta country: it also contains garnets.

Hornblende Schiste, forms the sides of the Neilgherries, where it is from five to seven miles in breadth: garnets found in it. Southern Mahratta country, Salem; and often passes into mica schiste on the Malabar coast.

Quartz Rock.—Hills between Delhi and Alwur, and between Ajmere and Oodeypoor; mountains around Deybur Lake, Chittoor, and at the western part of the Vindhya range, with mica slate; southern Mahratta country; more or less in the granitic plains of Hydrabad, and in the *droogs* of Mysore. The rock is compact and granular in the Ajmere mountains; and of a red, violet, gray, or brown colour; brilliantly white in the Mahratta country. Mica is frequently disseminated throughout the rock in large masses; talc and chlorite, occasionally.

Micaceous Slate and Chlorite Slate.—Both at the Phoonda Ghaut; and the latter in the Mahratta country. The micaceous occurs in the Indo-Gangetic chain, Koonawur; and in the Soolumbur range, Oodeypoor.

Clay Slate, appears to be of great thickness, and considerable extent, viz., from the Arravulli range, the lower part of which is composed of this formation; thence to Oodeypoor, *viâ* the Soolumbur range, across the Durgawud valley to Malwa, on the Kistnah; southern Mahratta country, Nellore; and in the Eastern Ghauts at Jungamanipenta, a ferruginous clay-slate overlies the trap at Mahabulishwar. In the Arravulli it is massive, compact, and of a dark blue colour. The Soolumbur range is almost entirely composed of this and chlorite slates. Micaceous passes into clay-slate at the Phoonda, and, farther south, the Saltoor passes (Western Ghauts.) This also occurs at the Carrackpoor hills (Bahar), where the clay-slate is about twenty miles wide, and extends in the direction of the strata.‡

Plutonic Rocks.—*Granite, Diorite or Greenstone.*

Granite.—Himalaya; Ajmere and around Jeypoor, traversing the mountains in veins and dykes; the Arravulli range consists chiefly of granite, resting on slate; Mount Aboo; from Balmeer across the sands to Nuggur Parkur; the Gir; Girnar; between Oodeypoor and Malwa, are all varieties: it extends more or less southward to the Nerbudda; on that river between Mundela and Amarkantak, Jubbulpoor, Kalleenjur, Zillah Bahar, Carrackpoor hills; in Bhagulpore and Monghyr districts; near Baitool; Nagpore territory; Cuttack; Orissa; Northern Circars; Hydrabad; between the Kistnah and Godavery; Gooty; Neilgherries; Malabar coast at Vingorla; Coromandel; between Madras and Pondicherry; ending at Cape Comorin. The granitic rocks vary in structure and composition, as they do in colour: thus there are *syenitic, pegmatitic,* and *protogenic.* It is gray at Ramteak in Nagpoor, red generally in

* The late eminent geologist, J. B. Greenough, made an excellent beginning by his large map on this subject, which has since been followed up.

† See a valuable *Summary of the Geology of India, between the Ganges, the Indus, and Cape Comorin;* by H. J. Carter, Asst. Surg. Bombay Establishment, Aug., 1853: reprinted from Journal of Bombay British Asiatic Society, p. 156.

‡ In the neighbourhood of Calcutta a series of boring experiments to find water, were carried on at intervals between 1804 and 1833; the results were—artificial soil at surface; next, as follows: a light blue or gray-coloured sandy clay, becoming gradually darker from decayed vegetable matter, until it passes at 30 ft. deep into a 2 ft. stratum of black peat, apparently formed by the *debris* of Sunderbund vegetation, which was once the delta of the Ganges; below the peat a black clay, and in this and the gray clay immediately above the peat, logs and branches of yellow and red wood, found in a more or less decayed state. In one instance only bones were discovered, at 28 ft. deep. Under blue clays, at 50 to 70 ft. deep, *kunkur* and *bagiri* (apparently small land shells, as seen in Upper India.) At 70 ft. a seam of loose reddish sand,—75 to 125 ft. beds of yellow clay predominate, frequently stiff and pure like potter's clay, but generally mixed with sand and mica: horizontal strata of kunkur pass through it, resembling exactly those found at Midnapoor. Below 128 ft. a more sandy yellow clay prevails, which gradually changes to a gray, loose sand, becoming coarser in quality to the lowest depth yet reached (176 ft.), where it contains angular fragments, as large as peas, of quartz and felspar.

the Deccan, but at Vencatigherry (Mysore), and at Vingorla, gray: in the Neilgherries it is syenitic.

Greenstone.—Hazareebagh, Mahratta country, Mysore, Nellore, Chingleput, Madras, Trichinopoly, Salem, in the granitic plains of Hydrabad; and extensively throughout Southern India. In the Deccan the dykes may be traced continuously for twenty miles; about Hydrabad they are from 100 to 300 feet broad; about four miles from Dhonee, between Gooty and Kurnool, there is one 150 feet high, and 200 feet broad, passing through a range of sandstone and limestone mountains.

SILURIAN ROCKS.—*Greywacke.*—Ghiddore, Rajmahal hills; Kumaon. It is a quartzoze sandstone; yellow colour, resinous lustre, and compact splintery fracture.

Transition or Cambrian Gneiss, is of great extent in Bhagulpore district, composing two-thirds of the country between the Curruckpore and Rajmahal hills, and the greater portion of the southern ridges of the latter group. It consists of quartz, more or less, hornblende, felspar, mica, and garnet pebbles.

OOLITIC.—*Limestone.*—Cutch; near Neemuch, Malwa; Bundelcund; on the river Sone; Firozabad, on the Bheema; Kuladgee, in the southern Mahratta country; on the Kistnah; and as far south as Cuddapah. Though its principal characters are its uniform lithographic texture, solidity, conchoidal smooth fracture, and hardness,—dendritic surface, smoky gray colour, passing into dark smoky blue; and parallel thin stratification,—it differs when departing from its general composition, just as the shales differ which interlaminate it, the coal strata, and the sandstone, as being more or less argillaceous, bituminous, or quartziferous; of different degrees of hardness, coarseness, and friability of structure; and of all kinds of colours, streaked and variegated. It is occasionally veined, and interlined with jasper and light-coloured cherts, which, near Cuddapah, give it a rough appearance; also contains drusy cavities, calcedonies, and cornelian, north of Nagpoor: in the bed of the Nerbudda between Lamaita and Beragurh, near Jubbulpoor, of a snow-white colour, and traversed by chlorite schiste. It is frequently denuded of its overlying sandstone and shales in Southern India, and in this state is not uncommonly covered by trap, as near Ferozabad on the Bheema.

Thickness, 310 feet near Kurnool; 10 to 30 feet on the Bheema, with strata from 2 inches to 2 feet thick. In the part of the Himalaya examined by Captain Strachey, the secondary limestones and shales were several thousand feet in thickness, the upper portion being in some places almost made up of fragments of shells.

If the white crystalline marble generally of India is allowed to be metamorphic strata, this limestone exists in the Girnar rock of Kattywar; the lithographic form in Cutch, and between Neemuch and Chittore; the white marble about Oodeypoor, and northwards in the neighbourhood of Nusseerabad, Jeypoor, Bessona, and Alwar; a narrow strip about 150 m. long in Bundelcund; again about Bidjyghur and Rhotasghur on the Sone; white marble in the bed of the Nerbudda, near Jubbulpoor; in the hills north-east of Nagpoor: near the junction of the Godavery and Prenheta rivers; thence along the Godavery more or less to Rajahmundry; Sholapoor district; on the Bheema; of every variety of colour, and greatly disturbed and broken up about Kaludgee, in the southern Mahratta country; along the Kistnah, from Kurnool to Amarawattee; and more or less over the triangular area formed by the latter place, Gooty, and the Tripetty hills. Chunam, an argillaceous limestone, used for building in Bengal, Bahar, Benares, &c.;* occurs in nodules in the alluvium, which, at Calcutta, is 500 to 600 feet thick. Near Benares, it contains fragments of fresh-water shells. South of Madras, a dark clay abounds in marine shells, used in preference for lime-burning to those on the beach, as beeing freer from salt.

Sandstone,—appears to be composed of very fine grains of quartz, and more or less mica, united together by an argillaceous material. It exists in Cutch; in the Panna range, Bundelcund; the Kymore hills; Ceded Districts; in lat 18°, 15 m. west of the Godavery; on the banks of the Kistnah; plains of the Carnatic, and the districts watered by the Pennar river. It is present in the sub-Himalaya range, and in the Rajmahal hills. All the towns on the Jumna, from Delhi to Allahabad, appear to be built of this sandstone. The plains of Beekaneer, Joudpore, and Jessulmere, are covered with the loose sand of this formation. It borders on the northern and western sides of the great trappean tract of Malwa, and forms the north-eastern boundary of the Western India volcanic district.

Its thickness varies, either from original inequality, or subsequent denudation. Its greatest depth, at present known, is in the eastern part of the Kymore range, where it is 700 feet at Bidjighur; and 1,300 feet at Rhotasghur; at the scarps of the waterfalls over the Panna range, it does not exceed 360 or 400 feet; from 300 to 400 feet is its thickness near Ryelcherroo and Sundrogam, in the Ceded Districts. Its greatest height above the sea is on the banks of the Kistnah, 3,000 feet. Organic remains are very abundant in this formation. It has been ascertained that the great trap deposit of the Western Ghauts, rests on a sandstone containing vegetable remains, chiefly ferns.

VOLCANIC ROCKS.†—*Trap.*—The largest tract is on the western side of India, and extends continuously from the basin of the Malpurba to Neemuch in Malwa; and from Balsar, about 20 m. south of the mouth of the Taptee, to Nagpoor. This is probably the most remarkable trap-formation existing on

* The British Residency at Hydrabad (Deccan) is a specimen; the Corinthian columns, &c., being executed in white chunam.

† Volcanic fires were said by the natives to exist among the loftier peaks of the Hindoo-Koosh and the Himalayan ranges, but earthquakes are of rare occurrence. A severe one was, however, experienced throughout a large extent of country on 26th August, 1833,—vibration from N.E. to S.W., with three principal shocks: first at 6·30 P.M.; second, 11·30 P.M.; and third, at five minutes to midnight. It was most severely felt at and near Katmandoo, where about 320 persons perished: the trembling of the earth commenced gradually, and then travelled with the rapidity of lightning towards the westward; it increased in violence until the houses seemed shaken from their foundations,—large-sized trees bent in all directions; the earth heaved fearfully; and while the air was perfectly calm, an awful noise burst forth as if from an hundred cannon. Probably in India, as in Australia, subterranean igneous action, which was formerly very violent, is now almost quiescent, or finds its vent through mighty chimneys at a height of four or five miles above the sea. The Lunar Lake, 40 m. from Saulna, is a vast crater 500 ft. deep, and nearly 5 m. round the margin; its waters are green and bitter, supersaturated with alkaline carbonate, and containing silex and some iron in solution: the mud is black, and abounds with sulphuretted hydrogen; the water is, nevertheless, pure and void of smell.

the surface of the globe; its breadth is about 335 m. N. to S.; length, about 350 m. E. to W.; and covers an area of from 200,000 to 250,000 sq. m.* Another portion extends from Jubbulpoor to Amarkantak, thence south-westerly towards Nagpoor. It constitutes the core of the Western Ghauts, and predominates in the Mahadeo and Sautpoora mountains.

Its two grand geological features along the Ghauts, where it has attained the highest elevation, are flat summits and regular stratification. Fourteen beds have been numbered in Malwa, the lowest and largest of which is 300 feet thick. These are equally numerous, if not more so, along the Ghauts, but the scarps are of much greater magnitude. Besides its stratification, it is in many places columnar; as in the beds of the Nerbudda and Chumbul; and the hill-fort of Singhur presents a surface of pentagonal divisions.

Wherever the effusions exist to any great extent, they appear to be composed of *laterite* above, then *basalt*, and afterwards *trappite* and *amygdaloid*.

Basalt.—There are two kinds of this rock; a dark blue-black, and a brown-black. Both are semi-crystalline. Their structure is massive, stratified, columnar, or prismoidal. Dark blue is the basalt of Bombay Island, brown-black that of the Deccan.

To this general description, may be added what has been gleaned in a general manner of the specific structure of some of the principal positions.

Himalayas.—Formations primary: the first strata, which is towards the plain, consists of limestone, lying on clay-slate, and crowned by slate, greywacke, or sandstone. Beyond the limestone tract, gneiss, clay-slate, and other schistose rocks occur; granite arises in the mountains near the snowy ranges. The peaks are generally composed of schistose rocks, but veined by granite to a great elevation. Kamet, however, is an exception, appearing to consist of granite alone. Greenstone dykes rise through and intersect the regular rocks. Strata fractured in all directions; slate, as if crushed, and the limestone broken into masses. The soil is principally accumulated on the northern side.

The formation of the Indo-Gangetic chain, in Koonawur, is mostly gneiss and mica-slate; in some places, pure mica. On the left bank of the Sutlej, granite prevails, forming the Raldang peaks. Further north, it becomes largely intermixed with mica-slate; to the north-east changes into secondary limestone, and schistose rocks, abounding in marine exuviæ.† In Kumaon, the Himalayas are composed of crystalline gneiss, veined by granite; the range forming the north-eastern boundary, is believed to be of recent formation. The mountainous tract south of the principal chain in Nepaul consists of limestone, hornstone, and conglomerate. The Sewalik (the most southerly and lowest range of the Himalayan system) is of alluvial formation, consisting of beds of clay, sandstone with mica, conglomerate cemented by calcareous matter, gravel, and rolled stones of various rocks. The supposition is, that it is the *debris* of the Himalaya, subsequently upheaved by an earthquake. The geology of the Sewalik is characterised by the occurrence of quantities of fossil remains.

Punjab.—Near the north-east frontier, in the vicinity of the Himalaya, is an extensive tract of rocks and deposits of recent formation; limestone, sandstone, gypsum, argillaceous slate; occasionally veins of quartz.

The Salt-range.—Greywacke, limestone, sandstone, and red tenaceous clay, with deposits of chloride of sodium, or common salt.

The Sufied-Koh is *primary*, consisting of granite, quartz, mica, gneiss, slate, and primary limestone.

The Suliman mountains are of *recent* formations, principally sandstone and secondary limestone, abounding in marine exuviæ.

Central India.—Arravulli range, generally primitive, consisting of granite, quartz, and gneiss. Formation along banks of upper course of Nerbudda, trappean; lower down, at Jubbulpoor, granitic; at Bhera Ghur, channel contracted between *white* cliffs of magnesian limestone; at the junction of the Towah, there is a ledge of *black* limestone: at, and near Kal Bhyru, slate of various sorts; basaltic rocks scattered over channel. Ranges enclosing Nemaur, banks of rivers, and eminences in the valley, basaltic. Saugor and Nerbudda territory; eastern part, towards Amarkantak, generally sandstone; from here it extends westward, forming the table-land bounding Nerbudda valley on the north, and is intermixed with marl, slate, and limestone. The volcanic tract commences about lon. 79°, and extends to about the town of Saugor, which is situate on its highest part. This (trap), with that of sandstone, further east, may be considered to belong to the Vindhya; and the former to the Mahadeo and Sautpoora ranges. In some places, primitive rocks appear through the overlying bed. The Bindyachal hills are of horizontally-stratified sandstone; Panna hills, sandstone, intermixed with schiste and quartz; and, to the west, overlaid by limestone.

Western Ghauts.—The great core is of primary formation, inclosed by alternating strata of more recent origin. These have been broken up by prodigious outbursts of volcanic rocks; and from Mahabulishwar northward, the overlying rock is exclusively of the trap formation; behind Malabar they are of primitive trap, in many places overlaid by immense masses of laterite, or iron-clay. The Vurragherry or Pulnai hills (Madura) are gneiss, stratified with quartz; in some places precipices of granite.

Nagpoor.—North-western and western part, vol-

* The rock in which the Ellora caves are excavated is said to be a basaltic trap, which, from its green tinge and its different stages from hardness to disintegration, is supposed by the natives to be full of vegetable matter, in a greater or less advance to putrefaction: the crumbling rock affords a natural green colour, which is ground up and employed in painting on wet chunam (lime plaster.)

† Dr. Gerard found some extensive tracts of shell formation 15,000 ft. above the sea. The principal shells comprised cockles, mussels, and pearl-fish; nummulites and long cylindrical productions. These shells, of which many were converted into carb. of lime, some crystallised like marble, were lying upon the high land in a bed of granite, and pulverised state: the adjacent rocks composed of shell limestone, the large blocks composed of a multitude of shells of different sizes, imbedded in a mass of calcareous tufa. Four classes of shell formation were distinguished; one in particular, a freshwater bivalve, resembling the *unio*, which exists in great abundance at the foot of the lower hills and throughout the Dooab. In the Neermal hills, N. of the Godavery, on the road from Hydrabad to Nagpoor, many very perfect fossil shells, mostly bivalves, and evidently marine, have been discovered imbedded in a volcanic rock, together with the head and vertebræ of a fish: the formations around rest everywhere on granite; and there are several hot-springs holding lime in solution. Univalves and bivalves, particularly buccinum, ammonites, and mussels, abound in Malwa.

canic, principally basalt and trap. This terminates at the city of Nagpoor, and the primitive, mostly granite and gneiss, rises to the surface.

Mysore.—The *droogs*, huge isolated rocks, scattered over the surface; vary in elevation from 1,000 to 1,500 feet; bases seldom exceeding 2 m. in circumference; generally composed of granite, gneiss, quartz, and hornblende; in many places overlaid by laterite.

SOIL,—mainly determined by the geological character of each district, except in the deltas, or on the banks of rivers, as in the Punjab, where an alluvium is accumulated. The land in Lower Bengal is of inexhaustible fertility, owing partly to the various salts and earthy limestone with which the deposits from the numerous rivers are continually impregnated: it is generally of a light sandy appearance. The alluvium of Scinde is a stiff clay; also that of Tanjore, Sumbulpore, and Cuttack, by the disintegration of granitic rocks. A nitrous (saltpetre) soil is general in Bahar; in the vicinity of Mirzapoor town, it is strongly impregnated with saline particles; and at many places in Vizagapatam. The *regur*, or cotton ground, which extends over a large part of Central India, and of the Deccan, is supposed to be formed by a disintegration of trap rocks; it slowly absorbs,* and long retains moisture; and it has produced, in yearly succession, for centuries, the most exhausting crops. It spreads over the tablelands of the Ceded Districts and Mysore, flanks the Neilgherry and Salem hills, and pervades the Deccan, but has not been observed in the Concans. It is a fine, black, argillaceous mould, containing, in its lower parts, nodules, and pebbly alluvium. *Kunkur* (a calcareous conglomerate)† fills up the cavities and fissures of the beds beneath it; and angular fragments of the neighbouring rocks are scattered over its surface. It contains no fossils. In some parts it is from 20 to 40 feet thick. *Kunkur* is common in the north-western provinces, the rocks often advancing into the channel of the Jumna, and obstructing the navigation. In the western part of Muttra district, it is mixed with sand: in Oude, some patches of this rock, which undergo abrasion very slowly, stand 70 or 80 feet above the neighbouring country, which, consisting of softer materials, has been washed away by the agency of water. Its depth, in the eastern part of Meerut district, is from one to 20 feet. In the Dooab, between the Ganges and Jumna, and in many parts of the N.W. provinces, there is a light rich loam, which produces excellent wheat; at Ghazeepore, a light clay, with more or less sand, is favourable for sugar and for roses. As the Ganges is ascended before reaching Ghazeepore, the soil becomes more granitic, and is then succeeded by a gravel of burnt clay, argite, and cinders, resembling what is seen in basaltic countries. Assam, which has been found so well adapted for the culture of tea, has for the most part a black loam reposing on a gray, sandy clay; in some places the surface is of a light yellow clayey texture. The soil usually found in the vicinity of basaltic mountains is of a black colour, mixed with sand. Disintegrated granite, where felspar predominates, yields much clay.

A sandy soil exists in the centres of the *Dooabs*, of the Punjab; more or less in Paniput, Rhotuck, and Hurriana districts: Jeypoor, Machery, and Rajpootana; and in some parts of Scinde; in Mysore, a brown and rather sandy earth prevails; Trichinopoly is arid and sandy; and near Tavoy town, on the E. side of the Bay of Bengal, there is a large plain, covered with sand.

The soil of Nagpoor, in some tracts, is a black, heavy loam, loaded with vegetable matter; red loam is found in Salem and in Mergui.

Tinnevelly has been found well suited for the cotton plant, and the substance in which it delights looks like a mixture of lime, rubbish, and yellowish brickdust, intermixed with nodules of *Kunkur*.‡ A chymical analysis of three of the best cotton soils in these districts, gave the following results :§—

Cotton Soils.	Vegetable matter.	Saline and Extractive.	Iron. Protox.	Iron. Deutox.	Iron. Tritox.	Carb. lime.	Magnesia.	Alumina.	Silex.	Water and loss.	Remarks.
Bundelcund	2·00	0·33	—	7·75	—	11·90	trace	3·10	74·0	1·00	No peat or lignite; nothing soluble in cold water; silex in fine powder; kunkur in the gravel.
Coimbatore	2·30	traces	4·00	—	—	7·50	trace	2·80	82·80	0·60	Gravel, mostly silex, with some felspar, but no kunkur.
Tinnevelly .	0·15	0·20	—	—	2·88	19·50	0·15	2·00	74·00	1·12	Gravel, almost wholly kunkur; some carb. iron; half the soil of gravel.

Guzerat is generally termed the Garden of Western India. With the exception of Kattywar, and to the eastward of Broach, it is one extensive plain, comprising many different soils; the chief varieties being the black or cotton soil, and the *gorat*, or light grain-producing soil.‖ The former is chiefly confined to Broach and part of Surat N. of the Taptee; the latter prevails throughout Baroda, Kaira, and part

* All the soils of India have, in general, a powerful absorbing quality; hence their fertile properties.

† *Kunkur.*—A calcareous concretion, stratified and in mammillated masses of all sizes, which contains 50 to 80 per cent. of carbonate of lime, some magnesia, iron, and alumina: these nodules are interspersed in lage quranties throughout extensive tracts of the alluvial and secondary formations, and are ascribed to the action of calcareous springs, which are of frequent occurrence.

‡ It is curious to note, in different countries, how plants seem to vary in their feeding: thus, at Singapore, the best cotton soil *apparently* consists of large coarse grains of white sand, mixed with something like rough charcoal-dust, and with fragments of vegetables and mosses of all sorts. A somewhat similar substance, mingled with shells and decayed vegetable matter, is the favourite *habitat* of the Sea Island cotton of Georgia, U. S.

§ See an interesting *Essay on the Agriculture of Hindoostan*, by G. W. Johnston.

‖ *See* Mackay's valuable *Report on Western India*, p. 41.

of Ahmedabad, becoming more mixed with sand to the northward; black soil abounds to the westward of the Gulf, and in many of the Kattywar valleys. The numerous vegetable products of India attest the variety of soils which exist there.

MINERALS.—Various metals have been produced and wrought in India from the earliest ages: the geological character of the different districts indicates their presence. So far as we have yet ascertained, their distribution is as follows:—

Iron.—Ladakh.—Mines in the north-eastern part of the Punjab,* and in almost every part of Kumaon, where the requisite smelting processes are performed; though on a small scale, and in a rude and inefficient manner. Mairwarra; in veins, and of good quality, believed to be inexhaustible. Rajmahal; in gneiss. Lalgang, 16 miles south-west of Mirzapoor city. Kuppudgode hills; in schistes, quartz, and gneiss: on the north-east side, one stratum of iron, 60 feet thick. Ramghur—hills abounding in iron, though not of the best quality. Hazareebagh, in gneiss—flinty brown colour, pitchy lustre, and splintery fracture; 20 feet thick. Various parts of Palamow district; at Singra in inexhaustible quantities. Eastern part of Nagpoor territory. Mine of good quality at Tendukhera, near Jubbulpoor (were the navigation of the Nerbudda available, this would prove a most useful article of export for railways.) Western extremity of Vindhya; in gneiss. Southern Mahratta country; in quartz: micaceous and magnetic iron-ore occur in the same district; in clay-slate. In all the mountains of the Western Ghauts; in Malabar; in veins, beds, or masses, in the laterite (here extensively smelted.) Salem, southern part (yields 60 per cent. of the metal fit for castings.) Nellore district. In many places in Masulipatam. Rajahmundry; in sandstone hills. Vizagapatam. Abundant in many parts of Orissa. Tenasserim provinces; occurs in beds, veins, and in rocks. Between the Saluen and Gyne rivers, it is found in sandstone hills. Most abundant between Ye and Tavoy, approximating the sea-coast; the best is at a short distance north of Tavoy town: it is there in two forms—common magnetic iron-ore; and massive, in granular concretions, crystallized, splendent, metallic, highly magnetic, and with polarity. The ore would furnish from 74 to 80 per cent. raw iron. In various places the process of smelting is rudely performed by the natives, but they produce a metal which will bear comparison with the best Swedish or British iron.†

Tin.—Oodeypoor,—mines productive. On the banks of the Barakur, near Palamow; in gneiss. Tenasserim provinces. Tavoy, rich in tin-ore; generally found at the foot of mountains, or in hills: Pakshan river; soil in which the grains are buried, yields 8 or 10 feet of metal; at Tavoy, 7 feet: of superior quality in the vicinity of Mergui town.

Lead.—Ladakh. Koonawur. Ajmere; in quartz rocks. Mairwarra. Eastern part of Nagpoor. In the vicinity of Hazareebagh. Eastern Ghauts at Jungamanipenta; in clay-slate—mines here. Amherst province. Fine granular galena obtained in clay-slate, and clay limestone on the Touser, near the Dehra-Doon.

Copper.—Ladakh. Koonawur, in the valley of the Pabur. Kumaon, near Pokree; but these mines are almost inaccessible, and the vicinity affords no adequate supply of fuel for smelting: others at Dohnpur,‡ Dhobri, Gangoli, Sira, Khori, and Shor Gurang. Mairwarra. Oodeypoor; abundant,—it supplies the currency. Southern Mahratta country, in quartz; also in a talcose form. Vencatigherry, North Arcot. Nellore district.§ Sullivan's and Callagkiank Islands, in the Mergui Archipelago. This metal is most probably extensively distributed, and of a rich quality.

Silver.—In the tin mines of Oodeypoor. In the lead mine, near Hazareebagh, and other places.

Gold.—Sands of Shy-yok, Tibet. Ditto Chenab, Huroo, and Swan rivers, Punjab. Ditto Aluknunda, Kumaon. Throughout the tract of country W. of the Neilgherries, amid the rivers and watercourses, draining 2,000 sq. m., this coveted metal abounds; even the river stones, when pounded, yield a rich product: it is usually obtained in small nuggets. In the iron sand of the streams running from the Kuppudgode hills, and from the adjoining Saltoor range. Sumbulpoor; in the detrius of rocks. In moderate quantities in several places in the eastern part of Nagpoor. Many of the streams descending from the Ghauts into Malabar; and in Wynaad. Gold-dust in Mysore.|| In the Assam rivers it is plentiful: near Gowhatty 1,000 men used to be employed in collecting ore for the state. Various parts of Tenasserim provinces, but in small quantities. The geological structure of India indicates an abundance of the precious metals.

Coal.—The carboniferous deposits of the *oolitic series* in Bengal, west of the Ganges and Hooghly, consist of coal, shale, and sandstone, but no limestone, and they appear chiefly to occupy the depressions of the granitic and metamorphic rocks which form this part of India, becoming exposed in the banks or beds of watercourses or rivers which have passed through them, or in escarpments which have

* Colonel Steinbach says that the mineral wealth of the Punjab is considerable; that mines of gold, copper, iron, plumbago, and lead abound, and that "properly worked they would yield an enormous revenue."

† The natives of Cutch make steel chain-armour, sabres, and various sharp edge tools from their iron; the horse-shoes are excellent—the metal being more malleable, and not so likely to break as the English iron.

‡ The gray ore found in Dohnpur affords 30 to 50 per cent. of copper; it is associated with malachite, and contained in a compact red-coloured dolomite: hence mining operations can be carried on without timbering or masonry.

§ Mines discovered by Dr. Heyne, near Wangapadu. "A footpath, paved with stones, led up the hill to the place which was shown me as one of the mines. It is situated two-thirds up the hill, and might be about 400 ft. above the village (Wangapadu.) An open gallery cut into the rock, demonstrated that it had been formerly worked; and as the stones, which lay in abundance near it, were all tinged or overlaid with mountain green, there could be no doubt that the ore extracted had been copper."—(Heyne, *Tracts on India*, p. 112.)

|| In excavating the disintegrating granite in the vicinity of Bangalore, to ascertain the extent to which the decomposing influence of the atmosphere will affect the solid rock (viz., 30 to 35 ft.), the contents of soil were frequently auriferous. In blasting sienite at Chinapatam, 40 m. from Bangalore, on the road to Seringapatam, Lieutenant Baird Smith, B.E., observed considerable quantities of gold disseminated in small particles over the fractured surfaces. At Wynaad this metal was obtained from rich yellow earth in sufficient quantity to employ a number of labourers and to yield some return.

been produced by upheaval of the rocks on which they were deposited. The coal occurs in strata from an inch or less to 9 or 10 feet thickness, interstratified with shale and sandstone; the whole possessing a dark black or blue colour, of a greater or less intensity. At Burdwan its character is slaty: the genera of plants are partly English, some Australian, some peculiar. The depth at the Curhurbalee field, situated 60 miles south of the Ganges, near Surajgurrah, is from 50 to 100 feet. Proceeding westerly, towards Palamow district, which contains many valuable and extensive fields, and where several shafts have been sunk, it has been seen about 16 m. from Chergerh, in Singrowla; at the confluence of the Sone and Tipan, about 30 m. E. from Sohajpoor. Near Jeria, in Pachete district. Hills in Ramghur, abounding in coal. Jubbulpoor, 30 m. S. from Hoosungabad; in Shahpoor in the same neighbourhood; and abundantly along the valley of the Nerbudda. Traces of it are said to exist in the diamond sandstone north-west of Nagpoor, and it has been found in the Mahadeo mountains. In the Punjab, at Mukkud, on the left bank of the Indus, and in the localities of Joa, Meealee, and Nummul. The extremes of this coal formation, so far as have yet been discovered in India, are:—the confluence of the Godavery and Prenheta in the south, in lat. 19°, and the Salt range in about 33° N.; Cutch in the west, and Burdwan in the east; and detached in Silhet, Pegu (recently found of excellent quality), and the Tenasserim provinces (plentiful, and possessing good properties.) There are many other places, no doubt, in the country between Bengal and Berar, where this valuable mineral exists; traces of it have been observed in Orissa, but it has not yet been found abundant for use; it is not improbable that it extends across the delta of the Ganges to Silhet, distant 300 miles. It also occurs extensively in the grits bounding the southern slope of the Himalaya: it has been questioned whether this is the older coal, or only lignite associated with nagelflue,—where the Teesta issues from the plain, its strata is highly inclined, and it bears all the other characters of the older formation. Analysis of Indian coal found in different parts, and near the surface, gave the following results:—Chirra Poonjee, slaty kind: specific gravity, 1·497; containing volatile matter, 36; carbon, 41; and a copious white ash, 23 = 100. Nerbudda (near Fatehpoor), near the surface,—volatile matter, 10·5; water, 3·5; charcoal, 20; earthy residue (red), 64 = 100. Cossyah hills: specific gravity, 1·275; volatile matter or gas, 38·5; carbon or coke, 60·7; earthy impurities, 0·8 = 100 —(ash very small.) Hurdwar: specific gravity, 1·968; volatile matter, 35·4; carbon, 50; ferruginous ash, 14·6 = 100. Arracan: specific gravity, 1·308; volatile matter, 66·4; carbon, 33; ash, 0·6 = 100. Cutch: charcoal, 70; bitumen, 20; sulphur, 5; iron, 3; calcareous earths, 2.

Sulphur.—Mouths of Godavery, and at Condapilly, on the Kistnah. Sulphate of alumina obtained from the aluminous rocks of Nepaul; used by the natives to cure fresh wounds or bruises: yields on analysis—sulphate of alumina, 95; peroxyde of iron 3; silex, 1: loss, 1. Sulphate of iron is procured in the Behar hills, and used by the Patna dyers: it yields sulphate of iron, 39; peroxyde of iron, 36; magnesia, 23: loss, 2 = 100.

Diamonds.—Sumbulpoor has been celebrated for the finest diamonds in the world; they are found in the bed of the Mahanuddy. Mines were formerly worked at Wyraghur, Nagpoor; Malavilly, in Masulipatam (near Ellore); and at Panna, in Bundlecund. Mr. H. W. Voysey described, in 1824, the diamond mines of the *Nulla Mulla* mountains, north of the Kistnah,* which were formerly extensively worked.†

Rubies.—Sumbulpoor; in the detritus of rocks.

Pearls.—Gulf of Manaar, near Cape Comorin, and on the coast of many of the islands in the Mergui Archipelago.

Sodic chloride (common salt) is found in rock and liquid form at various places. A salt lake, 20 m. long by 1½ broad, is situated in lat. 20° 53′, long. 74° 57′; it supplies a great portion of the neighbouring country with salt after the drains are dried up. A salt lake in Berar contains in 100 parts:—Sodic chloride, 20; Calcic chloride, 10; chloride of magnesia, 6. Towards the sources of the Indus, salt lakes exist at 16,000 feet above the sea. There are extensive salt mines in the *Salt range* of the Punjab. Natron and soda lakes are said to exist in the Himalaya.

Cornelian is found and worked in different places: the principal mines are situated at the foot of the western extremity of the Rajpeepla hills, close to the town of Ruttunpoor; the soil in which the cornelians are imbedded consists chiefly of quartz sand—reddened by iron, and a little clay. Agates abound in Western India: at one part of Cutch the sides of the hills (of amygdaloid)) are covered with heaps of rock crystal, as if cart loads had been purposely thrown there, and in many parts of the great trappean district the surface is strewed with a profusion of agatoid flints, onyx, hollow spheroids of quartz, crystals, and zoolitic minerals. There are evidences of several extinct volcanoes in Cutch.

This is but an imperfect sketch of the minerals of India: doubtless, there are many more places where metals exist; but during the anarchy and warfare which prevailed prior to British supremacy, the very knowledge of their locality has been lost. At no distant day this subterranean wealth will be developed; and probably, when the gold-fields of Australia are exhausted, those of India may be profitably worked.

* These mountains are bounded on all sides by granite, that everywhere appears to pass under it, and to form its basis: some detached portions have only the upper third of their summits of sandstone and quartz, the basis or remaining two-thirds being of granite. Deep ravines are not infrequent. The diamond is procured only in the sandstone breccia, which is found under a compact rock, composed of a beautiful mixture of red and yellow jasper, quartz, chalcedony, and hornstone, of various colours, cemented together by a quartz paste: it passes into a pudding-stone of rounded pebbles of quartz, hornstone, &c., cemented by an argillo-calcareous earth of a loose friable texture, in which the diamonds are most frequently found. The breccia is seen at depths varying from 5 to 50 feet, and is about 2 feet in thickness; immediately *above* it lies a stratum of pudding-stone, composed of quartz and hornstone pebbles, cemented by calcareous clay and grains of sand. The miners are of opinion that the diamond is always growing, and that the chips and small pieces rejected ultimately increase to large diamonds.—*Trans. A. S. Bengal*, vol. xiv., p. 120.

† The diamonds of Golconda have obtained great celebrity throughout the world, but they were merely cut and polished there, having been generally found at Parteall, in a detached portion of the Nizam's dominions, near the southern frontier, in lat. 16° 40′, long. 80° 28′.

Investigations made in Orissa with a view to the discovery of coal in places accessible by a water route resulted in disappointment, and the Talchere coalfields were in 1875-'76 abandoned.

In the Pachamba subdivision of the Hazareebagh district there were five coal-mines at work. In one, worked by the Kurharbari Coal Company, operations were commenced in November 1875, and 600 tons of coal were raised before the close of the year. The northern portion of the Manbhoom district is believed to be rich in coal, but only two mines were in operation.

Coal-mining at Wurrora was prosecuted with vigour in 1875. A regular output of coal had commenced, averaging daily fifty tons gross, with every prospect of a steady increase. Two serious difficulties stood in the way of the development of this industry. One was the difficulty of procuring labour. The irksomeness of working below ground is aggravated to the native workman by the groundless fear of danger, and his habits are also against any constant work. The coolies at Wurrora, as soon as they have saved up a little money, and precisely at the moment when they are becoming really useful, go off to spend their gains at their own homes, and, as they have no stock in trade, it would be useless to enter into engagements with them for a term of service. The other drawback is the large amount of small coal and slack extracted with the larger coal. This coal is practically useless; labour has been vainly employed in getting it, and, when got, there is the difficulty of getting rid of it. Two methods present themselves of dealing with this matter. It is proposed that, if coal-cutting machinery has been found to be successful in England in increasing the proportion of large to small coal extracted, it should be introduced at Wurrora. Another proposal is to utilise the small coal by attempting to convert it into patent fuel, but how this can be done could only be decided by a series of experiments. Exploration in the Satpura region of the Nerbudda Valley was continued, but so far without success. The Mhowpani mine was steadily worked, and during 1875 supplied the Great Indian Peninsula Railway with nearly 20,000 tons of coal, a larger amount than in any previous year.

The experiments in Chanda in iron manufacture had not as yet fulfilled the expectations formed regarding them, but this was owing, not to any defect in the ores, but to the quality of the Wurrora coal. It is hoped, if this unfavourable condition cannot be remedied, that the coal will be found suitable for reducing the ore by the "direct" process.

Metalliferous minerals in British Burmah are chiefly found in the Tenasserim division; tin in Mergui and Tavoy; lead in Maingay Island, Amherst, and Toungoo; iron in Amherst and Shwe-gyeen; copper and antimony in the hill confines of Toungoo. Gold exists in the Shwe-gyeen river, a limpid stream which flows from the western hills. A special report on the minerals in the north of this division was submitted by the late Mining Geologist in 1875. After prolonged local inquiries he came to the conclusion that the minute quantities of gold which appear to be found do not come from quartz reefs, nor are they brought down the rivers from their sources; but are sparsely disseminated throughout the granite of the country, where they are found in the disintegrated *débris*.

Tin is the only metal which is worked scientifically and well. The mines to the south of the Mergui district, in the townships of Lenyah and Malewoon, have always attracted considerable attention, and the ore is said to become more plentiful the further south it is followed. A European firm three years ago took a lease of the Malewoon mines, and have opened out roads and imported machinery with a view to their thorough exploitation. Several large and valuable lodes have been struck, pronounced to be equal in yield to some of the best Cornish mines; but the output of metal has hitherto been inconsiderable, owing to the time which has intervened in obtaining machiney and the milling furnaces. Large quantities of crushed ore have, however, been collected, and are available for smelting. Elsewhere, the mines are worked by Chinamen, who use no machinery, but excavate cuttings from fifteen to twenty feet below the surface, and sift the earth in artificial channels. The metalliferous deposit is then melted in a rude kind of furnace.

Locality and Physical Aspect of Districts, Provinces, and States of India.

PUNJAB, or region of the "five rivers;" adjoining Afghanistan on the E.,—A plain, sloping from N.E. to S.W.; north part, near Himalayas, hilly and mountainous. Pasturage and grazing-grounds.

CIS-SUTLEJ TERRITORY,—Between Sutlej and Jumna, and a strip of land between the Ghara river and Rajpootana. Bhawulpoor and Sirhind, a plain; hill-slates on Himalaya ridges, mountainous and richly wooded.

CASHMERE,—Western Himalaya. Cashmere Proper, a fertile valley, enclosed by mountains. Elevation of bottom, 5,500 to 6,000 ft.: lofty snow-clad ranges, N.W. to S.E., constitute the general configuration.

BUSSAHIR,—Wonderful maze of some of the highest mountains in the world; general rise from S. to N.

GURHWAL,—Ranges of enormous height, with several valleys; the whole drained by the Ganges. Slope from N. and N.E.

SINDE,—Lower course and delta of Indus; between Beloochistan mountains and Great Desert. Low and flat. Some short ridges of hills in the W. part; towards the E. a desert. Mouths of Indus continually changing.

CUTCH,—S.E. of Sinde. Two parallel hilly ranges nearly intersect province.

WESTERN RAJPOOTANA,—Between Sinde and Bhawulpoor and Arravulli range. Mostly a plain, interspersed with sand-hills: rocky ridges extend in various directions.

EASTERN RAJPOOTANA,—Between Arravulli mountains and Malwa. Near the Arravulli a table-land, declining to N.E.: continuous parallel hilly ranges extend N.E. to the vicinity of Delhi.

GUZERAT,—S. of Cutch and Rajpootana. Very rugged, especially in Kattywar: hills connected with Vindhya, and part of W. Ghauts.

MALWA (Central India),—Between Guzerat and Bundelcund. A plateau, supported by Vindhya range; elevation diminishing towards Northern Gangetic valley.

BHOPAL, MALWA,—Greater part a table-land, resting on N. side of Vindhya; declivity to N. A few streams find their way, through gorges in the chain, into Nerbudda, which flows along the S. frontier.

GWALIOR, or SCINDIAH,—Central India. N.E. part level, bare, and much cut up by ravines; S., the country becomes hilly; middle part, a plateau; slope to the N.; S. part crossed by Nerbudda valley.

AHMEDABAD and KAIRA,—Head of the Gulf of Cambay. Almost a perfect level; appearing as if the sea had abandoned it at no very remote period.

KANDEISH,—Both banks of Taptee river. Valley of Taptee, enclosed by hills 1,000 to 1,800 ft. high. Tracts formerly cultivated; now covered with jungle and infested with tigers.

NORTHERN and SOUTHERN CONCANS,—Along the sea from lat. 16° to lat. 20°, including Bombay. Valleys enclosed by spurs from W. Ghauts, through which a clear stream flows, until influenced by the tides. Ravines and gorges filled with jungle, harbouring beasts of prey, especially tigers.

POONA,—Deccan. High table-land; slope from N.W. to S.E. Intersected by numerous spurs from W. Ghauts: elevation diminishing towards S.E.

SATTARA,—Deccan. High table-land; slope from N.W. to S.E. Gradual but rugged declivity from W. Ghauts to S.E.

DHARWAR, BELGAUM, and SHOLAPOOR,—Deccan. Undulating plains, elevated from about 2,000 to 2,500 ft.; slope to the E. and N.E.

HYDERABAD, or NIZAM'S DOMINIONS,—Deccan. For the most part an undulating plain; declivity from W. to E.: many isolated hills and ranges, of moderate elevation.

WESTERN DIVISION: MADRAS PRESIDENCY,—Malabar coast. Low sea-coast, rising towards culminating ridge of W. Ghauts. Numerous narrow shallow rivers flowing E. to W. from Ghauts. Country hilly.

TRAVANCORE,—Malabar coast. Low sandy sea-coast; behind the W. Ghauts; attaining in some places an altitude of 7,000 ft.

SOUTHERN DIVISION: MADRAS PRESIDENCY,—Between Mysoor and Travancore, and Coromandel coast. E. parts level; towards the W. rising into mountains: Neilgherries and E. Ghauts supporting table-land of Mysore.

MYSORE,—S. of Deccan. High table-land; here and there huge masses of rock, apparently thrown tumultuously together.

CENTRAL DIVISION: MADRAS PRESIDENCY,—Between Mysore and Coromandel coast. Bellary and Cuddapah district; a table-land, resting on stupendous wall of mountains. Coast districts low, interspersed with hills.

NORTHERN DIVISION: MADRAS PRESIDENCY,—W. side of Bay of Bengal. Low sea-coast (except a ridge extending along sea-shore in Vizagapatam district), hilly and mountainous to W. delta of Godavery and Kistna rivers.

CUTTACK,—Orissa coast. Low sandy shore; delta of Mahanuddy; inland, the Moghalbandi, a dry tract; then rises the hill country, closing down to the sea near Chilka lake, and near Balasore.

CUTTACK MEHALS,—Inland of Cuttack province. Very hilly. Forests of fine timber.

SOUTH-WEST FRONTIER OF BENGAL. Table-lands of Chota-Nagpoor, Sirgooja, and Mynpat; and mountains of Palamow, &c.

ORISSA,—Inland of Northern Circars. Table-land, supported by E. Ghauts: slope to W., to Godavery; to S., to Bay of Bengal, the rivers flowing through *ghats*, or passes; and to N. and N.E., to Mahanuddy.

NAGPOOR, or BERAR,—Between Saugor and Nerbudda, and the Circars; and the Godavery and Wein-Gunga, and upper course of Mahanuddy. In general of considerable elevation; slope from N.W. to S.E. Lanjhee range divides the territory into two basins—one into Mahanuddy, and the other into Godavery. N. part rugged and mountainous; S.E. part hilly and woody.

SAUGOR and NERBUDDA TERRITORY,—On each bank of upper course of Nerbudda river. Considerably elevated tract: E. part a table-land, declining to W., to valley of Nerbudda; to the S. are the Sautpoora and Mahadeo mountains; to the N. the Vindhya, which is but the brow of a rugged plateau; elevation diminishing towards the N.

REWAH,—Adjoining Nerbudda territories on the N.E. W. and N.W. mountainous, rising in three successive plateaux: intersected by valley of Sone from W. to E. S. of this a table-land, contiguous to that of Sirgooja.

BUNDELCUND STATES,—Between Nerbudda territory and N. W. Provinces. Plain, little elevated above valley of Jumna; on the W. and S. a continuous range of hills; to the E. they close down upon the Ganges. Some of the rivers flow through the plain, or are precipitated in cascades over the brow of the high land.

ALLAHABAD,—N. W. Provinces. Plain, sloping from N.W. to S.E. Banks of Jumna high in some parts of Banda district.

AGRA,—N. W. Provinces. Plain, sloping from N.W. to S.E. A slightly elevated ridge extends along the Dooab, about midway between the Ganges and Jumna.

BHURTPOOR,—Gangetic plain. Level; slope to E. Small detached hills in N. part.

MEERUT,—N. W. Provinces. Plain; slope in Suharunpoor, Mozuffurnuggur and Meerut districts, from N. to S.; in Boolundshuhur and Allyghur, N.W. to S.E.

DELHI,—N. W. Provinces. Mostly level. Ridges in Goorgaon district 400 to 600 ft. above surrounding country.

KUMAON,—N. W. Provinces. Well defined mountain system. S. limit, Ghagur mountain; successive ranges rise higher and higher, until ultimately crowned by the culminating ridge of the stupendous Himalaya.

ROHILCUND,—N. W. Provinces. Level; slope from N.W. to S.E., and from N. to S.

OUR
INDIAN EMPIRE.

HISTORY OF

THE MUTINY OF THE SEPOY TROOPS,

IN 1857.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

ALLEGED CAUSES OF DISCONTENT—OPPRESSIVE AND PAUPERISING TENURE OF LAND—INEFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—EXCLUSION OF NATIVES FROM ALL SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT—IGNORANCE OF THE LANGUAGES, AND AVERSION EVINCED TOWARDS THE NATIVES—EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND MISSIONARY OPERATIONS—CASTE—FREE PRESS—DEFECTIVE CURRENCY—OPIUM MONOPOLY—NEGLECT OF PUBLIC WORKS—REPRESSION OF BRITISH ENTERPRISE—RECENT ANNEXATIONS—INFRACTION OF THE HINDOO LAW OF INHERITANCE—EXTINCTION OF NATIVE STATES—SATTARA, NAGPOOR, CARNATIC, TANJORE, JHANSI, OUDE, ETC.—STATE OF THE BENGAL ARMY; RELAXED DISCIPLINE; REMOVAL OF REGIMENTAL OFFICERS TO STAFF AND CIVIL EMPLOYMENTS; PAUCITY OF EUROPEAN TROOPS; SEPOY GRIEVANCES; GREASED CARTRIDGES—MOHAMMEDAN CONSPIRACY—FOREIGN INTRIGUES; PERSIAN AND RUSSIAN.

NEVER, perhaps, was the condition of British India deemed more fair and promising than at the conclusion of 1856. The new governor-general, Lord Canning, who arrived in the spring of that year, had seen no reason to question the parting declaration of his predecessor, Lord Dalhousie—that India was "in peace without and within," and that there appeared to be "no quarter from which formidable war could reasonably be expected at present."*

The British and Anglo-Indian press, adopting the same tone, declared "the whole of India" to be "profoundly tranquil."† The conviction seems to have been general amid all ranks and classes, from the viceregal palace at Calcutta, to the smallest and most distant English post; and thus it happened that the vessel of the state pursued her course with all sail set, in the full tide of prosperity, till a series of shocks, slight at first, but rapidly increasing in strength and frequency, taught a terrible lesson of the necessity for careful steering amid the sunken rocks, the shoals, and quicksands, heretofore so feebly and faintly traced in those famous charts and log-books—the voluminous minutes and correspondence of the East India Company.

The sky had been carefully watched for any indication of the storms of foreign invasion; but the calm waters of our "strong internal administration," and the full current of our "unparalleled native army," had so long borne the stately ship in triumph on their bosom, that few attempts were made to sound their depths. Those few excited little attention, and were, for the most part, decidedly discouraged by the authorities both in England and in India. The consequence has been, that at every step of the revolt, we then encountered fresh proofs of our ignorance of the first conditions on which rested the general security of the empire, and the individual safety of every European in India.

Our heaviest calamities, and our greatest advantages, thus came on us by surprise: we were then met by foulest treachery in the very class we deemed bound to us by every tie of gratitude and self-interest, and we only found help and fidelity among those whom we most distrusted. We then failed where we confidently looked for

* Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 28th February, 1856.—Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 16th June, 1856; see p. 459 Vol. I.

† The *Times*, 9th December, 1856.

triumph; we after succeeded where we anticipated failure. Dangers we never dreamed of, had risen suddenly to paralyse our arms; and obstacles which seemed well-nigh insurmountable, had vanished into thin air before us. Our trusted weapons thus proved worthless; or worse—been turned against us; and, at the outset of the struggle, we were like men whose pistols had been stolen from their holsters, and swords from their scabbards, while they lay sleeping; and who, starting up amazed and bewildered, seized the first missiles that came to hand to defend themselves against a foe whose numbers and power, whose objects and character, were alike involved in midnight darkness.

Very marvellous was the presence of mind, the self-reliance, the enduring courage displayed by English men and women, and many native adherents, in their terrible and unlooked-for trial; and very comforting the instances of Christian heroism which adorn this sad and thrilling page of Anglo-Indian history: yet none will venture to deny, that it was the absence of efficient leaders on the part of the mutineers, and not our energy and foresight, which, under Providence, was the means of enabling us to surmount the first overwhelming tide of disaster. Nothing can be more contradictory than the opinions held by public men regarding the immediate object of the mutineers. Some deny that the sepoys acted on any "prearranged plan;" and declare, that "their primary and prevailing motive was a panic-terror for their religion."* Others regard the revolt as the issue of a systematic plot, which must have taken months, if not years, to organise; and compare the outbreak to the springing of a mine, for which the ground must have been hollowed, the barrels filled, the train laid, and the match fired, before the explosion.† A third party assert, that our own impolicy had gathered together masses of combustibles, and that our heedlessness (in the matter of the greased cartridges) set them on fire.

It is quite certain that the people of India labour under many political and social evils, resulting from inefficient administration. Human governments are, at best, fallible and weak instruments. In Christian England, after so many centuries of freedom, kept and strengthened by unceasing effort, we all acknowledge how far the condition of the masses falls short, in reality, of what in theory we might have hoped for. How, then, can we doubt, that there must be in India much greater scope for oppression, much greater need for watchfulness. We have seen, in Ireland, a notable example of the effects of absentee proprietorship; but here was a case of absentee sovereigntyship, in which the whole agency was systematically vested in the foreign delegates of a foreign power, few of whom had ever acquired any satisfactory insight into the habits, customs, or languages of the people they were sent to govern.

It is easier to account for the errors committed by the Company than for the culpable neglect of Parliament. We know that an Indian question continued to be the "dinner-bell" of the House of Commons, notwithstanding the revelations of the Torture Committee at Madras, until the massacres of Meerut and Cawnpore showed that the government of India was a subject which affected not only the welfare of the dark-coloured millions from whom we exacted tribute, but also the lives of Englishmen, and the honour of Englishwomen—the friends or relatives, it might be, of the heretofore ignorant and listless legislators.

A right understanding of the causes of the revolt would materially assist all engaged in framing measures for the restoration of tranquillity, and for a sounder system of administration. The following enumeration of the various causes, distant and proximate, which are asserted by different authorities to have been concerned in bringing about the present state of affairs, is therefore offered, with a view of enabling the reader to judge, in the course of the narrative, how far events then tended to confirm or nullify these allegations.

Land-tenure.—The irregular, oppressive, and generally pauperising tenure of land, has been set forth in the preceding volume: and since every sepoy looks forward to the time when he shall retire on his pension to live in his own cottage, under his own fig-tree, the question is one in which he has a clear and personal interest. Irrespective of this, the manner in which the proprietary rights of the inhabitants of the Ceded and Conquered provinces have been dealt with,

* See Indophilus' (Sir Charles Trevelyan's) Letters to the *Times*. Republished by Longman as a pamphlet: p. 37.

† See Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's speech at the Herts Agricultural Society, October, 1857.

is a matter of history with which the landowners in native independent states are sure to make themselves acquainted; and the talookdars and hereditary chiefs of Oude, could not but have remembered with alarm, the grievous breach of faith committed against the proprietors of the soil in the North-Western Provinces.

A general allusion to this disgraceful procedure has been already made;* but the following detail is given on the authority of various papers drawn up by Mr. Henry St. George Tucker. The views of Mr. Tucker were, it should be premised, utterly opposed to any system "founded on the assumption of the government being the universal landlord;" which sweeping assumption he regarded "as a virtual annihilation of all private rights."

The Ryotwar Settlement made by Munro, in Madras, he thought tended to the impoverishment of the country, the people, and the government itself; and was, in fact, a continuation of the policy of Tippoo Sultan, who drove away and exterminated the proprietors; his object being to engross the rents as well as revenues of the country.

The landowners of the North-Western Provinces—including Delhi, Agra, Bareilly, and the cessions from Oude in 1801—had, however, peculiar and positive grievances to complain of. In 1803, under the administration of the Marquis Wellesley, a regulation was passed, by which the government pledged themselves, "that a permanent settlement of the Ceded provinces would be concluded at the end of ten years;" and proclaimed "the proprietary rights of all zemindars, talookdars, and other descriptions of landholders possessing a right of property in the lands comprising their zemindaries, talooks, or other tenures, to be confirmed and established under the authority of the British government, in conformity to the laws and usages of the country." In 1805, a regulation was passed by the same government, in nearly corresponding terms, declaring that a permanent settlement would be concluded with the zemindars and other landholders in the Conquered provinces, at the expiration of the decennial leases. But, in 1807, the supreme government being anxious to extend to the landowners of our newly-acquired territory those advantages which had been conferred on the zemindars of the Lower Provinces, by fixing the land-tax in perpetuity, a new regulation was enacted, appointing commissioners for superintending the settlement of the Ceded and Conquered provinces; and notifying "to the zemindars, and other actual proprietors of land in those provinces, that the jumma which may be assessed on their estates in the last year of the settlement immediately ensuing the present settlement, shall remain fixed for ever, in case the zemindars shall now be willing to engage for the payment of the public revenue on those terms in perpetuity, and the arrangement shall receive the sanction of the Hon. Court of Directors."† Far from objecting to the pledge given to the landholders in those regulations; far from contending against the principle of a fixed assessment, either on the ground of policy or of justice, the Court expressed their approbation of the measure contemplated, and gave it their unreserved sanction. To as late a period as 1813, not even a doubt was expressed in the way of discouragement; and the government of India had every reason to presume that they were proceeding in this great work with the full concurrence and approbation of the controlling authorities in this country. Mr. Edmonstone, in his able and instructive letters to the Court (of 31st July, 1821), has shown most conclusively, that the plans and proceedings of the government abroad received an ample confirmation. "Unhappily," says Mr. Tucker, "different views were adopted at a subsequent period; and since 1813,‡ the whole tenor of the Court's correspondence with the supreme government, has not only discountenanced the idea of a permanent settlement of the lands in the Ceded and Conquered provinces, but peremptory injunctions have been issued to that government, prohibiting the formation of such settlement at any future period. The pledge so formally given to the landholders in 1803, and 1805, and 1807, had accordingly remained unredeemed to the year 1856-'57; temporary settlements had been concluded, in various ways, with different classes of persons; some of the principal talookdars had been set aside, and deprived of the management of their estates; and the great object seems to have been, to introduce the system of revenue administration§ which ruled in

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i.

† Calcutta Records—Regulation X. of 1807; sec. 5.

‡ See Letter of Court of Directors to Bengal, 16th March, 1813.

§ The Ryotwar: see *Indian Empire*, vol. i.

the territory of Fort St. George. "I (in 1827) was a party to the introduction of leases for thirty years in the Western Provinces, by way of compromise for violating the pledge which had been given to the landholders in 1803 and 1805, to confirm the settlement then made with them in perpetuity. It was hoped that this term would operate as compensation for their disappointment, and that it would, in a degree, answer the ends proposed by a permanent settlement; but, as a principle, it is undoubted that permanency of tenure, and a limitation of the public demand upon the land, were boons bestowed under the dictates of a just and enlightened policy, and that Lord Cornwallis is to be regarded as the greatest benefactor of India."*

The measure referred to by Mr. Tucker, which I had myself the satisfaction of assisting to procure, was, however, partial in its extent, as well as temporary in its operation. It can hardly be called a compromise; it was simply a sop thrown by the stronger party who broke the bargain, to certain members of the weaker party, who had no resource but to accept it. The public pledge of a permanent settlement with the whole Conquered and Ceded, or, as they are now styled, North-Western Provinces, remained unredeemed. Moreover, even supposing the landholders could forget the manner in which that great boon was freely promised and arbitrarily withheld, they would still had reason to complain of the irregular and often oppressive assessments to which they were and are subjected. There is abundant evidence on this head; but none of greater authority than that of Colonel Sleeman, the resident at Lucknow; who, being commissioned by Governor-general Dalhousie to inquire into the state of Oude, became incidentally acquainted with the results of our fifty years' government of the half of Oude, ceded to us by the treaty of 1801.

"The country was then divided into equal shares, according to the rent-roll at the time. The half made over to the British government has been ever since yielding more revenue to us; while that retained by the sovereign of Oude has been yielding less and less to him: and ours now yields, in land revenue, stamp-duty, and the tax on spirits, two crore and twelve lacs [of rupees] a-year; while the reserved half now yields to Oude only about one crore and thirty-three lacs. Under good management, the Oude share might, in a few years, be made equal to ours, and perhaps better; for the greater part of the lands in our share have been a good deal impoverished by over-cropping; while those of the Oude share have been improved by long fallows." Colonel Sleeman would seem to attribute the greater revenue raised from our territories, to that obtained by the native government, simply to our "good management;" for he adds, that "lands of the same natural quality in Oude, under good tillage, now pay a much higher rent than they do in our half of the estate."† Yet, in another portion of his Diary, when describing the decided aversion to British rule entertained by the landed aristocracy of Oude, he dwells on our excessive assessments, as co-operating with the cost and uncertainty of the law in civil cases, in causing the gradual decay of all the ancient families. "A less and less proportion of the annual produce of their lands is left to them in our periodical settlements of the land revenue; while family pride makes them expend the same sums in the marriage of their children, in religious and other festivals, personal servants, and hereditary retainers. They fall into balance, incur heavy debts, and estate after estate is put up to auction, and the proprietors are reduced to poverty. They say, that four times more of these families have gone to decay in the half of the territory made over to us in 1801, than in the half reserved by the Oude sovereign; and this is, I fear, true. They named the families—I cannot remember them."‡

To Mr. Colvin, Lieutenant-governor of the N.W. Provinces, the Colonel writes, that on the division of Oude in 1801, the landed aristocracy were equal in both portions. "Now (28th Dec., 1853) hardly a family of this class remains in our half; while in Oude it remains unimpaired. Everybody in Oude believes those families to have been systematically crushed."§

The correspondence in the public journals, regarding the progress of the mutiny, affords frequent evidence of the heavy rate of assessment in the North-West Provinces. For instance, the special correspondent of the *Times* (Mr. Russell), writing from the

* See *Memorials of Indian Government;* a selection from the papers of H. St. G. Tucker, edited by J. W. Kaye; pp. 106—137.

† *Journey through Oude, in* 1849-'50, by Colonel Sir W. Sleeman; vol. i., p. 169.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 321. § *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 415.

camp at Bareilly, speaks of the "indigent population" of Rohilcund; and asserts, on the authority of Mr. Donalds, a settler and planter there, that the Company's land-tax on certain districts was not less than sixty-six per cent.*

It was needful that a searching and unprejudiced inquiry should be instituted wherever decided and general disaffection had been manifested—wherever such statements are made as that from Allahabad; in which it is asserted, that "one, and only one, of the zemindars has behaved well to us during the disturbances here."†

An exposition of the working of the "model system" in Southern India, is given by Mr. Bourdillon, secretary to the government at Madras, in the revenue department, in a pamphlet published in 1852, in which he showed that, in the year 1848-'9, out of a total of 1,071,588 leases (excluding joint holdings in the fourteen principal ryotwarree districts), no fewer than 589,932 were each under twenty shillings per annum; averaging, in fact, only a small fraction above eight shillings each: 201,065 were for amounts ranging from twenty to forty shillings; averaging less than 28*s.* 6*d.* each: and 97,891 ranged between forty and sixty shillings; averaging 49*s.* 6*d.* each. Thus, out of 1,100,000 leases, 900,000 were for amounts under sixty shillings each, the average being less than 19*s.* 6*d.* each per annum. Mr. Bourdillon thus describes the condition of several million‡ of people subject to the Crown of England, and under its complete jurisdiction in some parts for more than half a century:—"Now it may certainly be said of almost the whole of the ryots paying even the highest of these sums, and even of many holding to a much larger amount, that they are always in poverty, and generally in debt. Perhaps one of this class obtains a small amount out of the government advances for cultivation; but even if he does, the trouble he has to take, and the time he loses in getting it, as well as the deduction to which he is liable, render this a questionable gain. For the rest of his wants he is dependent on the bazaar-man. To him his crops are generally hypothecated before they are reaped; and it is he who redeems them from the possession of the village watcher, by pledging himself for the payment of the kist (rent claimed by government.) These transactions pass without any written engagements or memoranda between the parties; and the only evidence is the chetty's (bazaar-man) own accounts. In general, there is an adjustment of the accounts once a year; but sometimes not for several years. In all these accounts interest is charged on the advances made to the ryot, on the balance against him. The rate of interest varies with the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the borrower: it is probably seldom, or never, less than twelve per cent. per annum, and not often above twenty-four per cent. Of course the poorest and most necessitous ryots have to pay the highest. A ryot of this class of course lives from hand to mouth; he rarely sees money, except that obtained from the chetty to pay his kist: the exchanges in the out-villages are very few, and they are usually conducted by barter. His ploughing cattle are wretched animals, not worth more than seven to twelve shillings each; and all the rest of his few agricultural implements are equally primitive and inefficient. His dwelling is a hut of mud walls and thatched roof, far ruder, smaller, and more dilapidated than those of the better classes of ryots above spoken of, and still more destitute, if possible, of anything that can be called furniture. His food, and that of his family, is partly thin porridge, made of the meal of grain boiled in water, and partly boiled rice with a little condiment; and generally, the only vessels for cooking and eating from, are of the coarsest earthenware, much inferior in grain to a good tile or brick in England, and unglazed. Brass vessels, though not wholly unknown among this class, are rare. As to anything like education or mental culture, they are wholly destitute of it."

Mr. Mead, who resided several years at Madras, and who visited other parts of India, declares, that by the system which the British government have pursued, "the native aristocracy have been extinguished, and their revenues lost equally to the rulers and the multitude. The native manufacturers are ruined; and no corresponding increase has taken place in the consumption of foreign goods. Not a fourth of the land is taken up for tillage; and yet 200,000 men annually leave these shores, to seek employment on a foreign soil. The taxation of all kinds, and the landlord's rent,

* The *Times*, July 6th, 1858.

† Parl. Papers, 4th February, 1858.

‡ According to Mr. Mead, "18,000,000 souls, in Madras, had only a penny a-week each to subsist on."—(p. 3.)

amount to but 5*s*. per head; and yet the surplus production of 23,000,000 is but 2*s*. 7*d*., and the imports but 1*s*. 6*d*., each person."*

The people of the North-West Provinces were being rapidly reduced to the condition of those of Southern India; and it is asserted, that they would rejoice at any change which promised relief from a "system" calculated to weigh down, with unceasing pressure, the energies of every man who derives his subsistence from the cultivation of the soil.

The Inefficient Administration of Justice was an admitted evil; the costliness, the procrastination, above all, the perjury and corruption for which our civil and criminal, our Sudder and Adawlut courts, were notorious. Shortly before the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Halliday, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, urged, in the strongest language, the necessity for measures of police reform, which should extend to "our criminal judicatories as well as to the magistracy and constabulary organisation." He adds, after referring to the evidence brought forward in Mr. Dampier's elaborate reports—"I have myself made much personal inquiry into this matter during my tours. Whether right or wrong, the general native opinion is certainly that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery, in which, however, the best chances are with the criminals; and I think this, also, is very much the opinion of the European mofussil [country] community. * * * Often have I heard natives express, on this point, their inability to understand the principles on which the courts are so constituted, or so conducted, as to make it appear in their eyes as if the object were rather to favour the acquittal, than to insure the conviction and punishment of offenders; and often have I been assured by them, that their anxious desire to avoid appearing as prosecutors, arose in a great measure from their belief that prosecution was very likely to end in acquittal, even, as they imagined, in the teeth of the best evidence; while the acquittal of a revengeful and unscrupulous ruffian, was known by experience to have repeatedly ended in the most unhappy consequences to his ill-advised and imprudent prosecutor. That this very general opinion is not ill-founded, may, I think, be proved from our own records."†

The youth and inexperience of the magistrates, which contributed so largely to the inefficiency of the courts over which they presided, arose out of the numerical inadequacy of the covenanted service to supply the number of officers required by the system in 1856. The Hon. A. Kinnaird stated, in the House of Commons, June 11th, 1857, that in Bengal, there were but seventy covenanted and uncovenanted magistrates, or one to 460,000 persons; and that there were three or four cases of a single magistrate to more than a million souls. It is terrible to think of the power such a state of things must throw into the hands of the native police, and this in a country where experience has taught us, that power, thus delegated, has invariably been employed as a means of extorting money. No wonder, then, that "from one end of Bengal to the other," the earnest desire and aim of those who had suffered from thieves or dacoits, would be, "to keep the matter secret from the police, whose corruption and extortion is so great, as to cause it to be popularly said, that dacoity is bad enough, but the subsequent police inquiry very much worse."

The frequent change, from place to place, and office to office, was urged as another reason for the inefficiency of our system. In the district of Dacca, for instance, the average time of continuance in the magistrate's office, had been, for about twenty years, not ten months. The extent of the evil may be understood by looking over the register of civil servants, and their appointments. The *Friend of India* quotes the case of a well-known name among Indian officials—Henry Lushington—who arrived in India on the 14th of October, 1821, and, by the 9th of May, 1842, had filled no less than twenty-one offices—a change every year. But during this time he returned to Europe twice, and was absent from India four years and a quarter: his occupancy of each office, therefore, averages scarcely nine months. The journalist adds—"Thousands of miles of country, inhabited by millions of people, would have neither justice nor protection, were it not for the illegally assumed power of the planter and zemindar. There are districts in which the magistrate's court is sixty miles away; and in one case, I know of a judge having to go 140 miles to try a case of murder—so wide does his jurisdiction extend. This very district contains upwards of two millions of people; yet to

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt;* p. 313. (Routledge, 1858.)

† Minute to Council of India, 30th April, 1856.

govern it there are just two Europeans; and one of these spends a considerable portion of his time in sporting, shooting wild animals, and hunting deer."*

The diminished numbers and impaired efficiency of the rural police, or village chowkeedars, up to about the year 1857, was another reason why "our magistracy is losing credit and character, and our administration growing perceptibly weaker." They are, says lieutenant-governor Halliday, so inadequately and uncertainly paid, as to be kept in a permanent state of starvation; and though, in former days, magistrates battled for them with unwilling zemindars and villagers, and were encouraged by government to do so, they are now declared to have no legal right to remuneration for service, and have themselves become too often the colleagues of thieves and robbers. The measures suggested by Mr. Halliday as indispensable to the effectual improvement of the Bengal police, were—the improvement of the character and position of the village chowkeedars, or watchmen; the payment of adequate salaries, and the holding forth of fair prospects of advancement to the stipendiary police; the appointment of more experienced officers as covenanted zillah magistrates; a considerable increase in the number of the uncovenanted or deputy magistrates; an improvement in our criminal courts of justice; and, lastly, the establishment of sufficient means of communication with the interior of districts: because no system could work well while the police-stations and the large towns and marts in the interior continued to be cut off from the chief zillah stations, and from one another, by the almost entire absence of roads, or even (during a large part of the year) of the smallest bridle-roads or footpaths.

The proposer of the above reforms added, that they would involve an increased expenditure of £100,000 a-year on the magistracy and police of Bengal; and this statement, perhaps, furnishes an explanation of the little attention excited by a document full of important but most unpalatable assertions. The onus cannot, however, be allowed to rest solely on the local authorities. The consideration of the House of Commons had been urgently solicited, by one of its own members,† to the report of the lieutenant-governor; and the fact of such flagrant evils being alleged, by a leading functionary, to exist in the districts under the immediate eye of the supreme government, was surely a sufficient warning, not merely of the necessity of promptly redressing the wrongs under which the Bengalees laboured, but also of investigating the internal administration of the distant provinces. It is unaccountable that the judicial part of the subject should have been so long neglected, after the unreserved condemnation of the system, pronounced by Lord Campbell in the House of Lords in 1853. In reply to the complaint of the Duke of Argyll regarding the strong expressions used in a petition for relief, presented on behalf of the people of Madras, his lordship adverted to the mode in which "ingenuous youths" were dispatched from the college at Haileybury, with, at best, a very imperfect acquaintance with the languages of India, and were made at once judges. Even the advantage of only acting in that capacity was withheld, the same youth being one day a judge of civil cases, the next a collector of revenue, and the next a police magistrate. Speaking from experience derived from the appeals which had come before him as a member of the judicial committee of the Privy Council, he thought, "as far as regarded the administration of justice in the inferior courts, no language could be too extravagant in describing its enormities."‡

The testimony borne by Mr. Halliday, in Bengal, entirely accords with that given by other witnesses regarding the administration of justice in the North-Western Provinces. Colonel Sleeman, writing in 1853, declared—"There is really nothing in our system which calls so much for remedy." He says, that during his recent tour through Oude, he had had much conversation with the people generally, and with many who had sojourned in our territory in seasons of disturbance. They were all glad to return, rather than remain in our districts and endure the evils occasioned by "the uncertainties of our law, the multiplicity and formality of our courts, the pride and negligence of those who preside over

* Quoted by Mr. Kinnaird, in *Bengal, its Landed Tenure and Police System.* (Ridgway, 1857; p. 14.) The series of measures provided by Lord Cornwallis, to protect the cultivator under the Permanent Settlement from oppression on the part of the proprietors, had been disregarded; and the consequence of this neglect tended to leave too great power in the hands of the zemindars.—(*Ibid*, p. 6.)

† By the Hon. A. Kinnaird, June 11th, 1856.

‡ *Hansard's Debates*, vol. cxxiv., p. 647.

them, and the corruption and insolence of those who must be employed to prosecute or defend a cause in them, and enforce the fulfilment of a decree when passed." Colonel Sleeman cites the statements made to him by the Brahmin communities of two villages, invited back by the native authorities from the Shahjehanpoor district, and resettled on their lands; "a mild, sensible, and most respectable body, whom a sensible ruler would do all in his power to protect and encourage; but these are the class of landholders and cultivators whom the reckless governors of districts under the Oude government most grievously oppress. They told me:—

"'Your courts of justice are the things we most dread, sir; and we are glad to escape from them as soon as we can, in spite of all the evils we are exposed to on our return to the place of our birth. * * * The truth, sir, is seldom told in these courts. There they think of nothing but the number of witnesses, as if all were alike; here, sir, we look to the quality. When a man suffers wrong, the wrongdoer is summoned before the elders, or most respectable men of his village or clan; and if he denies the charge and refuses redress, he is told to bathe, put his hand upon the peepul-tree, and declare aloud his innocence. If he refuses, he is commanded to restore what he has taken, or make suitable reparation for the injury he has done; and if he refuses to do this, he is punished by the odium of all, and his life becomes miserable. A man dare not put his hand upon that sacred tree and deny the truth—the gods sit in it, and know all things; and the offender dreads their vengeance. In your Adawluts, sir, men do not tell the truth so often as they do among their own tribes or village communities: they perjure themselves in all manner of ways, without shame or dread; and there are so many men about these courts, who understand the 'rules and regulations' (aen and kanoon), and are so much interested in making truth appear to be falsehood, and falsehood truth, that no man feels sure that right will prevail in them in any case. The guilty think they have just as good a chance of escape as the innocent. Our relations and friends told us, that all this confusion of right and wrong, which bewildered them, arose from the multiplicity of the 'rules and regulations,' which threw all the power into the hands of bad men, and left the European gentlemen helpless!'"*

The comment made on the above assertions, tends to establish their accuracy. Colonel Sleeman says—"The quality of testimony, no doubt, like that of every other commodity, deteriorates under a system which renders the good of no more value, in exchange, than the bad. The formality of our courts here, as everywhere else, tends to impair, more or less, the quality of what they receive. The simplicity of courts composed of little village communities and elders, tends, on the contrary, to improve the quality of the testimony they get; and, in India, it is found to be best in the isolated hamlets and forests, where men may be made to do almost anything rather than tell a lie. A Mahratta pundit, in the valley of the Nerbudda, once told me, that it was almost impossible to teach a wild Gond of the hills and jungles the occasional value of a lie. It is the same with the Tharoos and Booksas, who are almost exclusively the cultivators of the Oude Turaee forest, and with the peasantry of the Himalaya chain of mountains, before they have come much in contact with people of the plains, and become subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. These courts are, everywhere, our weak points in the estimation of our subjects; and they should be everywhere simplified, to meet the wants and wishes of so simple a people."†

The Exclusion of the Natives from all Share in the Government, had been acted on as necessary to our retention of India. Yet many leading authorities agree in viewing the degraded state in which they have been held as a great defect in our system. "We exclude them," said Sir Thomas Munro, "from every situation of trust and emolument. We confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence. * * * We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men who, under a native government, might have held the first dignities of the state; who, but for us, might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants, and are often not better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence."

Lord Metcalfe, Lord William Bentinck, and others, have taken the same tone; and the opinions of the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Glenelg, are sufficiently evidenced in the 87th clause of the Charter Act of 1833, which declares the natives eligible to all situations under government, with certain exceptions. This clause,‡ so generously intended, only

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 68.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 168; vol. ii., p. 415.

‡ The clause runs as follows:—"That no natives of said territories, nor any natural born subject of her majesty resident therein, shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company." Mr. Cameron, a gentleman long and intimately acquainted with India, writing in 1853, says—"During the

proved a cruel mockery, by exciting expectations which were often frustrated by the conditions attached to it, and the determined opposition of the Court of Directors, even when those conditions, including the voyage to England had been fulfilled.

The monopoly of commerce was the worst feature of the E. I. Company, as regarded the British nation; the monopoly of patronage was its worst feature as regards the Indian population, and not its best as regards that of England. Lord William Bentinck stated the case very ably in his evidence before the select committee on steam communication with India in 1837. "The bane of our system is not solely that the civil administration is entirely in the hands of foreigners, but that the holders of this monopoly, the patrons of these foreign agents, are those who exercise the directing power at home; that this directing power is exclusively paid by the patronage; that the value of this patronage depends exactly upon the degree in which all the honours and emoluments of the state are engrossed by their clients, to the exclusion of the natives. There exists, in consequence, on the part of the home authorities, an interest in respect to the administration precisely similar to what formerly prevailed as to commerce, directly opposed to the welfare of India; and, consequently, it will be remarked without surprise, that in the two renewals of the charter that have taken place within the last twenty-five years, in the first, nothing was done to break down this administrative monopoly; and in the second, though a very important principle was declared, that no disability from holding office in respect to any subjects of the Crown, by reason of birth, religion, descent, or colour, should any longer continue, still no provision was made for working it out; and, as far as is known, the enactment has remained till this day a dead letter."*

The number of natives employed in the administration, notwithstanding the large accessions of territory between the years 1851 and 1857 (inclusive), had actually decreased from 2,910 to 2,846. Of the latter number, 856 received less than £120 *per annum*; 1,377 from £120 to £240 per annum; and only eleven received above £840.† These figures, when compared with the increased numbers and high salaries of the European covenanted and uncovenanted servants, can hardly fail to suggest a reason why the Hindoos—who frequently filled the chief positions in Indo-Mohammedan states, and almost invariably that of Dewan (or chancellor of the exchequer)—may think the rule of power-loving, money-getting Englishmen, worse for them than that of the indolent Moslem, who, though he sometimes forcibly destroyed the caste of thousands, yet never withheld from their race the honours and emoluments of high office. Rajpoots led the forces of Delhi; Rajpootnies (though that they affected to consider a degradation) sat within its palaces in imperial state—the wives and mothers of emperors: Brahmins filled every revenue office, from that of the treasurer-in-chief to the lowest clerk; all the financial business being transacted by them. The Great Moguls, the minor Mohammedan sovereigns, and their chief retainers, were spendthrifts rather than hoarders: they won kingdoms with their swords; and, like all conquerors, looked to reap where they had not sown; but avarice, or the love of money for its own sake, was very rare among them. They sat on their silver howdahs, on the backs of their elephants, and threw rupees, by bagsful, among the people, who always benefited, at least indirectly, by the lavish expenditure for which they furnished the means.

The modern Brahmins (whatever their ancestors may have done) certainly evince more acquaintance with, and predilection for, the practice of the rules of Cocker, than for the abstract study of the Vedas, and the geographical and astronomical absurdities of the Shastras. They are born diplomatists, as well as financialists. Our greatest statesmen have acknowledged their remarkable ability. The despatches, especially the supplementary ones, of the late Duke of Wellington, abound with evidence of this: and when describing the character of Talleyrand, the duke could find no better comparison than that he was "like Eitel Punt (the

twenty years that have [since] elapsed, not one of the natives has been appointed to any office except such as they were eligible to before the statute." Mr. Henry Richard, commenting on this policy, remarks—"In adopting this course, and treating the natives as a conquered and inferior race, on no account to be admitted to political and social equality with ourselves, we are not only violating the dictates of justice and of Christian morality, but we are disregarding all that the experience of the past has taught us to be wise policy with a view to permanent success."—(*Present and Future of India under British Rule*, p. 37.)

* Parl. Papers, 26th April, 1858; p. 201.

† Parl. Paper (House of Commons), 16th April, 1858.

Brahmin minister of Sindia); only not so clever."* Such men as these can hardly be expected to endure, without resentment, treatment which keeps the promise to the ear, yet breaks it to the sense.

In England we have grown used to the assertion, that there is no such thing as public opinion or discussion among the natives: but this is a mistake, and only proves that we have overlooked its rise and progress. The public meetings held in every presidency, the numerous journals, and, still more, the political pamphlets published by natives, attest the contrary. Of the latter class one now lies before me, written in English—fluent, grammatical English—with just a sufficient tinge of Orientalism to give internal evidence of the veritable authorship. The writer, after admitting the protection afforded by British rule from external violence and internal commotion, adds —"But it has failed to foster the growth of an upper class, which would have served as a connecting link between the government and the mass of the people. The higher order of the natives have, ever since its commencement, been shut out of all avenues to official distinction. They may acquire colossal fortunes in commercial and other pursuits, or obtain diplomas and honours in colleges and universities, but they cannot be admitted into the civil service, or the higher grades in the military service, without undertaking a voyage to England, and complying with other equally impracticable conditions. The highest situations to which they can aspire, are deputy-magistrateships and Sudder ameenships."†

Ignorance of the Languages, and the Aversion evinced towards the Natives, were the causes alleged by Baboo Shew Purshad (inspector of schools in the Benares division), for the "unpopularity of the government, and, consequently, of all the miseries under which the country labours." The reluctance of the English functionaries to mix with the natives, had prevented their acquiring that thorough knowledge of their sentiments and capabilities, social and moral condition, internal economy, wants, and prejudices, which are essential to successful government. "In England," says the writer just quoted, "you have only to pass good acts, and draw good rules, and people will take upon themselves to see that they are worked in the right way, and for their benefit, by the local authorities; but here the case is otherwise: the best regulations can be turned into a source of the worst oppression by an unscrupulous and exacting magistrate; and if you give us a good magistrate, he can keep us happy without any regulation at all. The Punjab owes its happiness more to Sir John Lawrence and Messrs. Montgomery and Macleod, than to any system or regulation. * * * It is owing to these few officers, who come now and then to the lot of some districts, that people have not yet despaired and risen in a body. * * * The government will feel, no doubt, stronger after the suppression of the mutiny than they ever were. If the hatred of their countrymen towards the natives increases in ratio to the increase of power, as hitherto, the disaffection of the people, and the unpopularity of the government, will increase also proportionally. The consequences are obvious: and, be assured, the country will be desolated and ruined."‡

Englishmen, generally, have no gift for languages; and this has been always one of their weak points as rulers of India, where it is of the first importance that all functionaries, whether civil or military, should be—not first-rate Grecians, or versed in black-letter lore—but able to converse, in the vernacular dialect, with the men over whom they bear rule. Had such knowledge been at all general, warnings would, in all human probability, have been received of the combinations (such as they were) which preceded the massacres of Meerut, Cawnpore, and Jhansi. It was a serious defect in the system (springing, no doubt, from the monopoly of patronage), that so little trouble had been taken to promote the efficiency of the servants of the Company, as administrators of a delegated despotism. Lord Wellesley strove earnestly for this end; but his efforts were coldly received, and we subsequently reaped the results.

So far as the natives were concerned, sending out "incapables" to bear rule over them, manifested a shameful indifference to

* Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, vol. i., p. 241.

† *The Mutinies, the Government, and the People*; by A Hindoo; p. 36. (Printed at Calcutta, 1858.)

‡ *Thoughts of a Native of Northern India on the Rebellion, its Causes and Remedies* (Dalton, Cockspur-street, 1858): with a Preface, written at Calcutta, and signed "M. W."—initials which suggest the name of a well-known member of the Bengal (uncovenanted) service. The Dedication to H. C. T., Esq., is similarly suggestive.

their interests, and inflicted a wrong, of which we cannot hope to escape the penalty. "It is suicidal to allow India to be a refuge, as it is at present to a great extent, for those of our youth who are least qualified to make their way in their own country; and it is such an insult to the natives, who are full of intelligence, and are making great progress in European knowledge of all kinds, that if anything could excuse them for rebelling, it would be this."

This is plain speaking from an authority like Indophilus; and what he adds with regard to young officers was equally applicable to civilians:—"It should not be left, as it is at present, to the decision of a young man whether he will pass in the native languages or not. The power of understanding his men, and of rendering himself intelligible to them, should be considered an indispensable qualification; and those who cannot, or will not, acquire this necessary accomplishment, should be removed from the service. Every officer should be presumed to understand the language of his soldiers."*

The change which had taken place in Anglo-Indian society, had, without doubt, been a painful one for the natives. The very large increase in the proportion of Englishwomen who accompanied their husbands, fathers, and brothers to India, had tended to decrease the association with the native gentry; and these are becoming yearly less able to vie with the Europeans. One branch of the intercourse of former days had greatly diminished; the conventionalities had become more stringent; the temptations had decreased; the shameless profligacy described by Clive† no longer existed; and a dark-coloured "bee-bee" (lady), the mother of a large family of Eurasians, would not now be considered a fit head for the household of a distinguished military or civil servant. How far any radical reform has taken place, or whether the great "social evil" has only changed its hue, it is hard to say; but several trustworthy witnesses assert as an evident fact, that the Europeans and natives of all classes associated far less than they used to do, and that many of the former had adopted a supercilious tone towards the latter, which was equally impolitic, unjust, and inconsistent with the usual refining and softening effect of legitimate domestic intercourse.

The repeated use of the word "niggers" in many books of Indian memoirs, and in the correspondence published in the public journal,‡ was itself a painful and significant symptom. An American traveller asked how we can reconcile our denunciation of the social inequality of the negro and white races in America with our own conduct to the East Indians? "I allude," he says, "to the contemptuous manner in which the natives, even those of the best and most intelligent classes, are almost invariably spoken of and treated. The tone adopted towards the lower classes is one of lordly arrogance; towards the rich and enlightened, one of condescension and patronage. I have heard the term 'niggers' applied to the whole race by those high in office; with the lower order of the English it is the designation in general use."§

Sir Charles Napier considered, that nothing could be worse than the manners of Englishmen in India towards natives of all ranks. Therefore, when endeavouring to bring into operation the resources of Sinde, he refused British officers a passage on board his merchant steamers, knowing that "if granted, they would go on board, occupy all the room, treat my rich merchants and supercargoes with insolence, and very probably drink and thrash the people."||

Religion and Education.—Missionary operations are alleged to have had their share in jeopardising the permanence of our power; while, on the contrary, the advocates of religious enterprise assert, that had the messengers of the glad tidings of universal peace and good-will been suffered to have free way in India, as in every other dependency or colony of the British empire, such an exposition of the tenets of Protestant Christianity would long since have been afforded to the intelligent and argumentative Hindoos, as would have rendered it impossible for the most artfully-concocted rumours, founded on the most unfortunate combination of circumstances, to persuade them (in the teeth of a hundred years' experience to the contrary), that force and fraud would ever be used to compel the

* Letter to the *Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 307.

‡ A writer in the *Times*, "who has passed his life in India," asserts, that "the white and the dark man are no more equal, and no more to be governed by the same rules, than the man and the ape."—("H." Nov. 23rd, 1857.) It is much to be regretted, that such mischievous and exceptional opinions as these should find unqualified expression in a journal which circulates largely throughout India.

§ Taylor's *Visit to India, &c., in* 1853; p. 273.

|| *Life*, by Sir William Napier; vol. iii., p. 473.

adoption of a creed which appeals to the reason, and requires the habitual exercise of the free-will of every disciple.

With some few and partial exceptions, the policy of the home and local government had been steadily and even sternly repressive of all attempts for the extension of Christianity; and every concession made had been wrung from them by the zeal of influential individuals, supported by public opinion. It needs not to establish this fact on evidence, or to remind the reader that English missionaries were not even tolerated in India until the year 1813; that Marshman and Carey were compelled to take up their residence without the British frontier, in the Danish settlement of Serampoor; that Judson and his companions were actually deported; and that Robert Haldane's munificent and self-sacrificing intention of expending £40,000 on the formation of an effective mission for Benares, was frustrated by the positive prohibition of government, despite the efforts of Wilberforce and others.

An Indian director is said to have declared, that "he would rather a band of devils landed in India than a band of missionaries;"* and his colleagues acted very much as if they shared his conviction.

Secular education was long viewed by the East India Company as a question in which they had no concern; and the efforts made by the Marquis Wellesley and others, were treated with an indifference amounting to aversion. At length public opinion became decided on the subject; and, in 1813, the sum of £10,000 was, by the determination of parliament, decreed to be annually appropriated, out of the revenues of India, for the cultivation of exclusively Hindoo and Mohammedan lore.

In 1824, Mr. Mill (the historian, who entered the service of the Company after writing his famous exposition of the worst features of their rule) was ordered to prepare a despatch on the subject of education. He did so, and in it boldly laid down the principle of inculcating sound truth, in opposition to the absurd fictions of the Shastras. The directors accepted his *dictum,* and founded English schools and colleges for exclusively secular instruction. Lord W. Bentinck, in 1834, pursued a similar course; and a few thousand youths (including Nana Sahib) learned to talk English fluently, to quote Shakespeare, Pope, Addison, and Byron, instead of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, Hafiz or Sadi; and to jeer with the flippancy of superficial scepticism at the ignorance of their parents and countrymen, in asserting that the earth rests on eight elephants, a serpent, a turtle, and such like;† and at the Mussulmans, for believing in Mohammed's journey to the moon. After all, such instruction was a direct and tangible interference with the religious views of the people. No greater would have been committed, had we placed before them a frank and full exposition of our own creed, choosing Moses rather than Milton to narrate the origin and fall of the whole human race, and trusting to the equally inspired record of the evangelists, to impart, with resistless power, the divinely revealed mystery of man's redemption.

We have taught the whole truth as regards material things—that the earth is round, for instance, and that the ocean is everywhere the same; in opposition to the Brahminical doctrine, that the earth consists of seven continents, divided by seas composed respectively of salt-water, wine, sugar-cane juice, clarified butter, curds, milk, and fresh-water. Spiritual truth we did not venture to set forth; and the conquerors who represent a nation which applauds itself for the maintenance in strict union of church and state, thus became the voluntary exponents of a neutral system which closely resembles practical infidelity. And practical infidelity was the cause to which alone our conduct was attributed by the more intelligent class of the natives. They knew that the government is firm even to obstinacy in the maintenance of its convictions, and they utterly discredited the reality of a belief which can co-exist with the temporising and cowardly half measures employed by those who are in all other things habitually positive and outspoken.

The Anglo-Indian authorities were not, however, all blind or indifferent to the workings of the "Godless colleges." In Madras, a strong feeling grew up in favour of the teaching of the Bible in government schools. The Marquis of Tweeddale, then governor, shared and ably expressed this opinion, declaring, that "it required a more solid foundation than is to be found in the Hindoo or Mohammedan faith, to bear the change which learning operates on the mind of those who emerge out of a state of ignorance, and attain those mental

* Quoted by the Hon. A. Kinnaird—Exeter Hall, Jan. 5th, 1858.

† Arthur's *Mysore,* p. 91.

acquirements which enlarged education gives. * * * Nor do I see how native society itself can safely and permanently advance except upon this basis. I would therefore adopt the rule proposed by the council, which recognises the Bible as a class-book in the government schools, but at the same time leaves it free to the native student to read it or not, as his conscience may dictate, or his parent may desire."*

The Court of Directors refused to comply with Lord Tweeddale's recommendation, and persevered in their previous resolve, despite the remonstrances of the Madras council, and their clear exposition of the mistaken view on which that determination was founded. An able pen wrote a denunciation of the system, which now reads like a prophecy:—"The government does not know what it is doing. No doubt it is breaking down those superstitions, and dispersing those mists, which, by creating weakness and disunion, facilitated the conquest of the country; but, instead of substituting any useful truth, or salutary principles, for the ignorance and false principles which they remove, they are only facilitating the dissemination of the most pernicious errors, and the most demoralising and revolutionary principles. I have been appalled by discovering the extent to which atheistical and deistical writings, together with disaffection to the British government and hatred to the British name, have spread, and are spreading, among those who have been educated in government schools, or are now in the service of government. The direction of the government system of education is rapidly falling into the hands of astute Brahmins, who know how to take advantage of such a state of things, and at the same time to strengthem themselves by an alliance with Parsee and Mussulman prejudices; while the European gentlemen who still remain nominally at the head of the system, know nothing of the under-currents which pervade the whole, or consider themselves as bound, either by principle or policy, not to make any exertions in favour of Christian truth; while the professed object of the government is to give secular instruction only."†

In April, 1847, an order was issued by the Court of Directors to the governor-general, requiring, that the principle which had been "uniformly maintained, of abstaining from all interference with the religion of the natives of India," should be rigidly enforced. A paragraph in a previous despatch (to Madras, 21st May, 1845), declared it to be "the duty of government, and not less of its officers, to stand aloof from all missionary labours, either as promoting or as opposing them." At this time, it was well-known that many of the most esteemed officials, civil and military, were, and had been for years past, members of committees of Bible and Missionary societies. A public demand for "specific instructions" regarding the meaning of the directors, was made by their servants; and this, together with the privately expressed opinions which reached the governor-general (Lord Hardinge), induced him to withhold the despatch and recommend its suppression; in which the directors concurred, because its publication "might give rise to discussion on a subject on which it is particularly desired that the public mind should not be excited."‡

In the year 1849, a native of high-caste, occupying a responsible position in the Calcutta college, publicly embraced Christianity, and was immediately dismissed by the English authorities.§

The government pursued the system of excluding the Bible from its schools, while the missionaries persisted in making it the foundation of theirs; and the opinion of the natives was evidenced in the large voluntary contributions made by them to the latter. The statistics of 1853 gave the following result:—Government schools, 404; scholars, 25,362: Christian Mission schools, 1,668; scholars, 96,177. The returns showed some singular facts: among others, that the only school at Bangalore in which Brahmin youths were found, was a missionary one.

In 1854, the duty of adopting measures for the extension of education, was avowed in a despatch by Sir Charles Wood; and the doctrine of grants in aid for the support of all schools, without reference to the religious doctrine taught therein, was plainly set forth.

* See Lord Tweeddale's Minute, August 24th, 1846, and reply thereto.—Sixth Report of House of Lords, 1853; pp. 189; 152.

† Testimony of Professor Henderson, of the Bombay Government Schools, dated 31st October, 1803; published in a Discourse upon his death, by Dr. Wilson president of the Bombay Literary Society.

‡ Parl. Papers (House of Commons), 12th February, 1858; pp. 3, 5, 11.—*Letter from a Layman in India;* pamphlet, published by Dalton, Cockspur-street, 1858; pp. 11, 12.—Speech of Rev. W. Chalmers, Exeter Hall, January 5th, 1858.

§ *Christian Education for India in the Mother-Tongue*, p. 15.

A minister of public instruction for India was appointed, with a salary of £3,000 a-year; four inspectors, with salaries varying from £1,500 down to £750; and a large number of sub-inspectors: but no single vernacular school* was established, neither was any attempt made to frame and circulate tracts on agriculture and mechanics, or to convey, in the native languages, the more elementary and practical portions of the knowledge generally availed of in Europe for the furtherance of various branches of trade and manufacture.†

The extensive scale on which preparations were made surprised the natives, and the unauthorised and improper statement of some of the officials, that "it was the order of government that people should now educate their children,"‡ created much anxiety. Yet proselytising was neither contemplated nor desired. The Calcutta Bible Society requested permission of the Council of Education to place a copy of the Bible, in English and the vernacular, in the library of each government school and college. It was notorious that the Koran and the Shastras were there; yet the council declined to give the Bible a place beside them, because it would be a breach of "neutrality."§

In England, and even in India, the authorities generally seem to have had no misgivings as to the result of purely secular teaching. Some few, however, deprecated education of any kind to any extent; and this party included a late governor-general, Lord Ellenborough, who declared his belief of its incompatibility with the maintenance of British dominion in India—a conviction, the ground of which is explained by a subsequent statement made by his lordship in his place in parliament (in 1852), that "no intelligent people would submit to our government."‖

With such views, it is not surprising that Lord Ellenborough, when addressing the House of Lords on the 9th of June, 1857, on the recent tidings of the mutiny of the Bengal army, should have adverted with extreme astonishment to a statement which he could "scarcely believe to be true," though he had seen it "distinctly stated in the papers, that the governor-general himself, Lord Canning, subscribed largely to a missionary society, which has for its object the conversion of the natives." The reply of Lord Lansdowne was, that if "Lord Canning had so acted as to give countenance to such belief as the noble earl inferred, he would no longer deserve to be continued in his office." These, and similar expressions of opinion, did much good by affording unmistakable evidence of the feelings entertained by men of high talent and position. A cry arose for "Christian emancipation," and several public meetings took place. On one of these, held at Exeter Hall on the 5th of January, 1858, the *Times* commented in the following terms:—"We have made a great mistake in India. The religious policy pursued by the government of that country, has made us, as one of its own servants declared, 'cowards in the eyes of men, and traitors in the eyes of God.' * * * A stranger to the question, after reading the noble chairman's speech on that occasion, might well imagine that the Hindoos were the conquerors, and we the subjects; that we had been tyrannically debarred, for more than a century, from the free exercise of our religion; and that we were at length seizing a favourable moment to demand relief from these unjust disabilities. All that his lordship, and those who followed him, asked for, was Christian emancipation; * * * and that, under a government acknowledging faith in Christ Jesus, the profession of the Gospel should no longer be visited with penalties of civil disqualification. These are literally the conditions to which our policy has driven us. * * * We were never really neutral; we made ourselves partisans; but, unfortunately, in our anxiety to escape the charge of favouring Christianity, we actually favoured heathenism. * * * All this must now end, if not for truth's sake, for the sake of government itself. Our policy has broken down utterly, and proved destructive to its own objects. There is no mistaking the results of the experiment. Where, asked Lord Shaftesbury, did the insurrection break out? Was it in Madras, where Christians are most numerous, and where Christianity has been best treated? Was it in Bombay, where caste was scouted,

* A Vernacular Society was subsequently organised in London. It was much needed; for, as its chief promoter, Mr. Tucker, truly says, no people have ever been Christianised through a foreign language.

† Report of Public Meeting for the Formation of a Christian Vernacular Education Society, 20th May, 1858; p. 8.

‡ Parl. Papers, 13th April, 1858; p. 2.

§ *Letter from a Layman*, p. 13.

‖ Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, p. 117.

and Hindoos taught that government could pay no heed to such pretensions? No; it was in Bengal, where idolatry and caste received the greatest reverence; and in the Bengal army, which represented the most pampered class of the whole population."

Another incident, illustrative of the anti-Christian policy of the Indian government, remains to be quoted. The Sonthals—a wild tribe, resembling our gipsies—were driven into rebellion in 1856, by the misconduct of some railway contractors, the exactions of native bankers, and the outrages committed by the native police. The missionaries materially aided in restoring tranquillity, and succeeded in obtaining the confidence of these poor savages, who were without the pale of Hindoo caste; and the Calcutta authorities entered into arrangements with the Church Missionary Society for the establishment of schools of religious and industrial instruction among them, and specially among the females.* When the measure became known in England, the home government refused its sanction, and ordered the establishment of schools on its own plan, the teachers of which were to be "most strictly enjoined to abstain from any attempt to introduce religious subjects in any form."†

It is interesting to learn, from one of the Hindoos themselves, the view taken by them of our so-called neutrality. Shew Purshad says—"It is absurd to think that the English are hated by the Hindoos on account of their religion. * * * It is not religion, but the want of religion, which has brought so much evil to this country. The people know that the government is a Christian one. Let it act openly as a true Christian: the people will never feel themselves disappointed; they will only admire it. * * * Education must be carried on upon a sounder principle, and religion must be fostered. Don't turn India from idolatry to atheism. * * * Who can detest 'religion?' It is the order of their own Shastras‡ that every man is to revere his own religion. You may have a thousand missionaries to preach, and another thousand as masters of the schools, at the expense of the government, or distribute a thousand Bibles at the hands of the governor-general. The people will not murmur out a single syllable, though they may laugh and jeer; but take care that you do not interfere with their caste—you do not force them to eat the food cooked by another in the gaols,§ or thrust grease down their throats with the cartridges made by Europeans. * * * Difference of caste must vanish, with many other offsprings of folly and ignorance, when its proper time comes. To try to exterminate it now must end in bloodshed."||

Mr. Henry Carre Tucker, the son of a once chairman of the East India Company (and himself no mean authority¶), confirms the statement, from long personal experience—that so long as we scrupulously abstain from any direct interference with the ceremonial observances of caste, we may teach Christianity as much as we please, adding—"This view is strengthened by the fact, that during the late mutiny, those large military stations have escaped the best where the governors were most zealous for Christianity." He proceeds to instance Peshawur, under Herbert Edwardes; and Lahore, under "those brave Christian men, John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery:" but here we cannot follow him without anticipating the subsequent narrative. His conclusions, however, are too important to be omitted: they are—"That we ought to assume a bolder position as a Christian gov-

* See Mr. J. M. Strachan's *Letter to Captain Eastwick*. (Seeley, 1858.)

† Parl. Papers (Commons), 24th Aug., 1857; p. 2.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 46.

§ "Active resistance to the recently introduced messing system in the gaols of Bengal and the N.W. Provinces, has produced bloodshed."—Col. Sykes' Letter to the *Times*, October 8th, 1857.

|| *Thoughts of a Native, &c.*, pp. 18—34.

¶ Mr. Tucker was connected with the Benares district for twenty-five years: during this period he avowed and acted up to his own high standard of Christian duty, at the risk of being deemed a dangerous fanatic; the more so because the "Holy City" of Benares is the stronghold of the Brahmins, and holds a somewhat similar position, in the estimation of the Hindoos, to what Mecca does in that of the Moslems. Yet, on his departure for Europe in March, 1858, a valedictory address was presented to him, signed by all the principal inhabitants—expressing sorrow at the termination of their official connection, a "deep sense of admiration of his enlarged spirit of philanthropy and almost boundless benevolence," and "gratitude for his zealous exertions in extending the benefits of education." In token of their sense of the manner in which he had employed his few leisure hours in furthering "the welfare, here and hereafter, of those committed to his charge," the subscribers to the address collected among themselves 6,000 rupees, for the obtainment of a full-length portrait of their friend, to be placed in the Benares college; and with the balance, after defraying the cost of the picture, they proposed to found a scholarship to commemorate his name. Certainly the Hindoos know how to appreciate Christian disinterestedness when they meet with it.

ernment; that it is quite feasible to Christianise our education; and that, instead of causing alarm and disaffection, those dangerous points have, through God's blessing, been the most quiet where Christian exertion has been the greatest. Oude, destitute of all missionary effort, and the sepoys, to whom Christian instruction was closed, were the worst of all."*

The ignorance displayed by the sepoys, and that large part of the Indian population connected with the army, regarding Christianity, was remarkable, even after making every possible allowance for the rigid exclusion of missionary teaching, and the absolute prohibition of proselytism among their ranks.† The cause is obvious—not simply to the minds of earnest Christians, but to the class who have least sympathy with anything approaching religious enthusiasm.

The *Times*,‡ in one of its leading articles, was constrained to admit, that it was because the superior beneficence and purity of our religion have not been vividly and transparently exhibited in practice, that we "have not converted the people who have witnessed the every-day life of British gentlemen and ladies—we will not say to an acceptance of our religion, but even to any high regard for it. * * * We ought to have stood high in that land of many religions, as a consistent, believing, just, kind, and holy people. That we have not even done this, and that we are regarded simply as unbelievers, with little religion except a few negative tenets, which we find convenient for political purposes, must be deemed a shortcoming in our practice. It must be our fault that we Christians stand so much lower in the religious scale of India than we did in the scale of ancient paganism."

While (according to the above impartial testimony) we did not teach Christianity either by precept or example, and while among the sepoys the Bible had remained a sealed book, no such embargo has ever been laid on the Koran. The Mohammedans, themselves essentially propagandists, have remained masters of the situation. Wrapped in a complacent belief of their own superiority, as believers in a revelation more recent and complete than that of their conquerors, the followers of the False Prophet adopted their own classification of "Jews, English, infidels, and heretics;" and really viewing us, (in a certain sense) as we do the Jews, took constant pains to communicate this impression to the Hindoos.

Indeed, who will venture to defend from the charge of practical atheism, a government that causes such sentences as "God is a Spirit," to be expunged from its school-books;§ being apparently ignorant that this fundamental truth is the very essence of all that is sound in Mohammedanism, and is acknowledged, at least in theory, by every Brahmin and Buddhist in India.

Caste, and the panic-terror which the idea of its violation may have occasioned, constitute a social and political, even more than a religious question.‖ Sir Charles Napier well defined the difference when he said, that what the natives dreaded, was "not conversion, but contamination." Caste is no universal, immutable law: it is a pure convention; but one which, by the nature of our position, we are bound to respect to a certain reasonable extent.

The traditional four castes¶ have merged into innumerable others. Human passions have proved too strong for the strongest fetters ever forged by a wily priesthood. Intermarriages have taken place between every variety of caste; and the result is, the general division of the Hindoo population into high-caste (consisting of Brahmins who compose the priest and scholar class, and the Rajpoots, who are hereditary soldiers), low-caste (in which all the Mahrattas, and

* It would seem as if the government had feared the influence of Christianity among the English soldiery; for it is only in 1857-'58 that chaplains had been appointed to accompany expeditions. No provision of the kind was made in the Cabool war; and Sir Charles Napier loudly complained of a similar deficiency among his force in Sinde.

† Witness the case of Purrub-deen Pandeh, a high-caste Brahmin (a naik in the 25th regiment), who, though "previously much esteemed in the corps," was summarily removed for having received Christian baptism. This occurred at Meerut in 1819.—(Parl. Papers, 8th February, 1858.)

‡ October 6th, 1857.

§ See *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1857: article on the "Sepoy Rebellion;" by the Rev. W. Arthur; p. 259.

‖ No European can form, though they ought to form, a correct idea of the difference between the prejudices of caste and those of religion. Give a couple of gold mohurs to a pundit, and he will cheerfully compose a book in refutation of his own religion; but give him a glass of water openly touched by you, even through the medium of a stick a hundred feet long, and he will not drink it, though you offer him a thousand gold mohurs. Secretly, perhaps, he may not have objection to do anything either to please you or satiate his own passions.—(*Thoughts of a Native, &c.;* p. 18.)

¶ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 14.

most of the remaining native princes, are included), and, thirdly, out-caste—a section diffused all over India, and forming a large proportion of the entire population. The Abbé Dubois maintained, that they were, in his time, one in five; but an able writer of our own day suggests one in ten as nearer the truth: adding—"Even in this proportion the Indian out-castes would be twenty millions of human beings, or more than the population of all England."*

This class includes the aborigines, or at least the predecessors of the Hindoos, the Gonds, Bheels, Sonthals, &c., who have never accepted caste; and, indeed, could not by Brahminical law find place in it. The barrier is equally impassable for the Mussulmans, whose observance of certain caste rules is worthless in the sight of the Hindoos. No man can venture to foretel how much longer the system may endure, or how soon it may be thrown to the winds. The Jains have caste; the Buddhists (who still linger in India) have none. Then there are the Siks, originally a peaceable, religious sect, founded by a Hindoo, whose creed was derived from the Vedas and the Koran. Caste was suddenly abolished among them by Govind, their tenth "Guru," or spiritual chief; converts were gladly welcomed from all quarters, and admitted to a perfect equality.†

A similar change may come over the mass of the Hindoos; and as the teaching of St. Paul produced the simultaneous conversion of two thousand persons, so here, whole communities may be led at once to renounce the error which has so long enthralled them. Or, the work may be more gradual—individual enlightenment may be the thin edge of the wedge: but in either case, Christian civilisation is the instrument which alone can prosper in our hands—the only one that affords any rational prospect of leading to the voluntary renunciation of caste. This renunciation does not necessarily accompany conversion to Christianity; though it would seem to be an inevitable consequence.

Some of the Hindoo pamphleteers, however, declare that caste can hardly be deemed incompatible with Christianity, when it exists so evidently, although under peculiar forms, among the English. They ask, whether we do not treat all men whose skins are darker than our own, as if of quite another caste or *breed?* Whether half-caste is not our contemptuous term for an Eurasian? They point to the whole framework of Anglo-Indian society, to its "covenanted" service, to the rigid exclusiveness produced by patronage alike in the military and civil service, in confirmation of their assertion. High-caste, low-caste, and out-caste, with their various subdivisions, are, they say, pretty clearly defined in our practice, however forcibly we may repudiate such distinctions in theory.

To return: the Indo-Mohammedans have, to a certain extent, imitated Brahminical practices as conventional distinctions, and are interested in inciting the Hindoo sepoys to maintain a system which enables them to dictate to their officers the what, when, how, and where, in a service in which unhesitating and unquestioning obedience is otherwise exacted. The natives are perfectly aware that caste is a great inconvenience to the Europeans, and that it materially impedes their efficiency as soldiers and servants. It is this which rendered them so watchful of every measure of government that might infringe on the caste monopoly of privileges and immunities, which we had unwisely made their "Magna Charta," and which we, strangely enough, took no pains to investigate or define. The consequence of our ignorance of its theory and regulations has been, that we have been perpetually falling into opposite errors—vacillating between absurd deference to pretended scruples, and real infraction of the first and most invariable observances. Persecution on the one hand, undue concessions on the other, have been our Scylla and Charybdis; but it is our ignorance that has made them so.

In considering the operation of caste in India, we must bear in mind that it is a thing hard to preserve intact, and easily destroyed, either by force or fraud. Many comparatively recent instances of both are on record; and Tippoo Sultan especially delighted in compelling Brahmins to forfeit their privileges by destroying kine. The natives know us too well to fear any such ebullitions of insane barbarity or fierce zeal; but it is quite possible they may anticipate our desiring the annihilation of caste on the score of policy, and dread our attempting it by a *coup d'état*. It is alleged that articles in the public journals, regarding the need of soldiers experienced by England in carrying out the Russian, Persian, and Chi-

* *Sepoy Rebellion in India;* by the Rev. W. Arthur.—*London Quarterly Review*, October, 1857.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 154.

nese wars, gave rise to rumours which were circulated among the sepoys, of the anxiety of government to get rid, at once and for ever, of the shackles which prevented the Indian troops from being sent across the Cala-pani, or Black water, to fight our battles in foreign climes.* A Hindoo would naturally cling to the system which was at both his reason and excuse for avoiding expatriation, which he fears worse than death; and his suspicions would easily be roused on the subject.

The readiest way of destroying caste, is by forcing or tempting the party concerned to taste anything prepared by unclean hands —that is, by persons of an inferior, or of no caste; or which contains the smallest particle of the flesh of kine. The Mohammedans abstain as rigidly from tasting the flesh of the impure hog, as the Hindoos from that of the sacred cow. The motive differs, but the result is the same. In both cases, the abstinence respectively practised is one of the first and most generally recognised of their rules. The Indian government could scarcely have been ignorant, when issuing a new description of fire-arms to the sepoys, that to bite a cartridge greased with cows' or pigs' fat, was more to Hindoos and Indo-Mohammedans, than "eating pork to a Jew, spitting on the Host to a Roman Catholic, or trampling on the Cross to a Protestant."† To the Hindoos it was indeed much more, so far as temporal welfare was concerned; for it involved practical outlawry, with some of the pains and penalties specially attached to conversion to Christianity. It is clear, that if it had been necessary to distribute greased cartridges, to be bitten by the troops, not only the greatest care ought to have been taken that no contaminating material should be used in the manufacture, but also that an explicit assurance should have been given to this effect. Yet, the inspector-general of ordnance has stated, that "no extraordinary care appears to have been taken to ensure the absence of any objectionable fat."‡ So that, so far from endeavouring to remove all suspicion from the minds of the sepoys, of any intention to inflict on them the calamity they most dreaded, we did not even guard against its perpetration.

The issue of the greased cartridges, under such circumstances, was unquestionably a gross blunder, and is viewed by many as the exciting cause of the mutiny.

The *Free Press*, and the so-called *Gagging Act* of Lord Canning, have given rise to discussions which bring to mind Dr. Johnson's remark, that opinions formed on the efficacy of a certain branch of scholastic discipline, are apt to be materially influenced by the fact, "of which end of the rod falls to one's share." The evils alleged to have been produced by unrestricted publication, are too circumstantially stated by official authorities to be omitted in the present category; and it becomes necessary to show, if possible, the two sides of the question—that is, the case of those who wield, and those who wince under, the rod of censorship. It is now little more than forty years since complete freedom of the press was bestowed by Sir Charles Metcalfe.§ The measure was sudden and startling: it was scarcely in accordance with his own previous views; and it was in decided opposition to the opinions which the Court of Directors had from time to time enunciated.

A recapitulation of the restrictive measures adopted in the three presidencies, from 1799 to 1819, is given in an important communication made by "the Chairs"‖ to the president of the India Board, on the 17th of January, 1823. Among other evidence in support of the necessity for a rigid censorship, they quoted the following Minute, written in 1807, by Lord William Bentinck (then governor of Madras), regarding a charge delivered by one of the judges of the Supreme Court (Sir Henry Gwillim) to the grand jury:—

"It is necessary, in my opinion, for the public safety, that the press in India should be kept under the most rigid control. It matters not from what pen the dangerous matter may issue; the higher the authority the greater the mischief. We cannot prevent the judges of the Supreme Court from uttering, in open court, opinions, however mischievous; but it is in our power, and it is our duty, to prohibit them from being circulated through the country by means of the press. Entertaining strongly this sentiment, I would recommend that the order of government may be given to all proprietors of printing-presses, forbidding them, upon pain of the utmost displeasure of the governor in council, to print any paper whatever without the previous sanction of the governor in council, communicated by the chief secretary."¶

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 37. (Routledge and Co.: London, 1858.)

† *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 33.

‡ Parl. Papers (by command), 1857; p. 7.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 431.

‖ The chairman and deputy-chairman of the E. I. Company (J. Pattison and W. Wigram.)

¶ Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858.

The opinion pronounced by Sir Thomas Munro, regarding the revolution which a free press would produce throughout the native army, is next quoted; and the writers proceed to express similar and very decided views on the subject:—

"A free press is a fit associate and necessary appendage of a representative constitution; but in no sense of the terms can the government of India be called a free, a representative, or a popular government; the people had no voice in its establishment, nor have they any control over its acts. * * * Can it be doubted that the respect of the natives for our authority would be greatly diminished, and the energy of the government impaired, by a free press? * * * It is impossible to suppose that a foreign government, however strong and beneficent its character, should not be obnoxious in some degree to those who live under it. It is humbling to the pride of the people; and where they differ, as in India, in religion, in language, in manners, in colour, and in customs from those who administer the government, there cannot be much sympathy or attachment between them. Though the situation of the large body of the people may now be greatly better, on the whole, than it was under their native governments, there are not a few, particularly among the Mohammedans, who have suffered from the change. These, we may be sure, will always be ready to avail themselves of any opportunity of retrieving their fortunes, and we know not that they could desire a more efficient auxiliary than a licentious press, labouring daily to extinguish all respect for our character and government in the minds of their countrymen. The tendency and effect of our system, too, has been to beget in the minds of the people at large a respect for themselves, and notions of their own importance, which makes the task of governing them a more difficult one than it was when they first came under our rule. But the delicacy of our situation in India cannot be well understood without special advertence to the circumstance of the government being dependent in a great degree for its security on a native army, which, though better paid, with reference to the wages of labour, than any other army in the world, contains in its organisation some elements of discontent. The exclusion of the natives from its higher ranks must necessarily be a source of heart-burning to men of family and ambition; and when a sense of mortification is united with a spirit of enterprise, their joint workings are not easily daunted or repressed. It may be difficult to retain the fidelity of men of this description, with all the care and caution that can be exercised; but it would appear to be either a lamentable infatuation, or unpardonable rashness, to allow them to be goaded on to revolt, by means over which we possess or may obtain control. Whatever English newspapers are published at the presidencies will naturally find their way to the principal military stations. Many of the native officers can read and understand English; and by means of the native servants of the European officers, it will not be difficult for them to obtain the perusal of those papers, containing a perhaps exaggerated representation of their grievances or an inflammatory incentive to rebellion, which, from their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments, they have better means of concerting than any other portion of the population."*

* Parl. Papers, 4th May, 1858; pp. 20—23.

The degree of severity with which the restrictions enacted to control the press were enforced, depended of course materially on the character of those by whom the supreme authority was wielded. Lord Amherst used his power as governor-general in such wise as entirely to stifle all public discussion; and Lord William Bentinck, his successor (in 1828), was so impressed by the mischievous effect of this policy, that though, as has been shown, very ready to repress, in the most summary fashion, any real or imagined excess on the part of journalists, he, nevertheless, deemed it necessary to issue a notice inviting suggestions from any quarter for the improvement of public measures, and the development of the resources of the country; and the result was the publication of letters from various quarters, written with much ability and freedom; among which, the first and most important were those afterwards embodied by the Hon. Frederick Shore, in his *Notes on Indian Affairs*.

Lord William Bentinck quitted India in 1835; Lord Auckland came out as his successor in the same year; and it was during the brief provisional sway of Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, that the important measure was adopted of giving complete freedom to the press. In explaining the difference between his own opinions and those of his predecessor, Sir Charles says—

"His lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes. I see so much danger in the ignorance, fanaticism, and barbarism of our subjects, that I rest on the spread of knowledge some hope of greater strength and security. * * * The time is past when the operations of the press could be effectually restrained. Even if that course would be any source of safety (which must be very doubtful), nothing so precarious could in prudence be trusted to. If, therefore, increase of danger is really to be apprehended from increase of knowledge, it is what we must cheerfully submit to. We must not try to avert it; and, if we did, we should fail."†

Lord Elphinstone (formerly the governor of Bombay), in commenting on this passage, truly says, that Lord Metcalfe "considers the freedom of the press, and the diffusion of knowledge, as convertible terms;" and expresses his surprise that a statesman who entertained such alarming notions of the insecurity and unpopularity of our rule, should have been the man to abolish the

† *Selections from the Metcalfe Papers*, p. 197.

few remaining restrictions deemed indispensable by his predecessor.*

In 1841, Lord Auckland revoked an order passed in 1826, prohibiting public servants from being connected with newspapers as editors or proprietors. Next came Lord Ellenborough; who found his tranquillity so disturbed by the "abuse" of the press, that after three months' residence in India, he ceased "to read a word that appeared in the newspapers."† The commander-in-chief, Lord Gough, is alleged to have avowed with yet more stoical philosophy, that "for his part, he never read any paper but the *Tipperary Journal.*" The governor-general deemed it the most judicious course to treat all attacks on his administration with silent contempt; and, in 1843, he issued an order of opposite tenor to that of Lord Auckland; which, by enforcing strict secrecy regarding all information officially obtained, neutralised the power which had been freely exercised under the express sanction of the three previous rulers.

"Lord Ellenborough's general order," says Indophilus, "and the disposition which was shown to place a strict interpretation upon it, effectually restrained the pens of the Company's servants; and no government could stand such pounding and kicking, and bedaubing and besmearing, as ensued." Statements, however false, put forth in ignorance or from malice prepense, were left to be copied into the native papers; and no denial, no antidote in any shape, was offered. For instance, a paragraph went the round of the newspapers, that it was intended to annex the Rajpoot states; and although great disquiet was thereby occasioned throughout Rajpootana, no contradiction was ever published.‡

The Afghan war, and the annexation of Sinde, were subjects on which the authorities were perhaps wise in preferring to submit to comments which they might treat as calumnious, rather than engage in controversy; but sometimes leading officials, more sensitive or less discreet than their superiors, broke all bounds, and declaimed against the press in terms of unmeasured invective. The brave, testy, inconsistent general, Sir Charles Napier, who came to India at sixty years of age with five pounds in his pocket, for the sake of providing for his family,§ and who did provide for them magnificently, by what he termed that "very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality," the seizure of Sinde;||—this man (who was as ready with his pen as with his sword, and, in either case, fought ever without a shield) fairly flung himself into a hornet's-nest by his reckless and indiscriminate abuse of those "ruffians,"¶ whom he boasted of taking every public opportunity of calling "the infamous press of India."** One of them excited his special displeasure by taking part against him in the Outram controversy—Dr. Buist, of the *Bombay Times*, whom Sir Charles alternately threatened with a law-suit and a horsewhipping, and of whom he spoke at a public dinner as that "blatant beast;"†† a *mot* which he duly records, and which Sir William did not think it derogatory to his brother's fame to publish.

With such personal feelings as these, it is not to be wondered that Sir Charles should regard the public statements of the journalists with jealous aversion, and should accuse them of desiring to excite mutiny among the troops; of inciting the hostile tribes to rise against them; of glorying in the sufferings of their countrymen; and many similar accusations in which the fiery old warrior gave vent to his irrepressible belligerence. His is not fair testimony concerning the operation of a free press; and it is necessary to turn to more impartial witnesses. Sir Charles Trevelyan

* Minute of 24th June, 1858. Parl. Papers (House of Commons), 4th May, 1858; pp. 52, 53.

† Debate, 27th Dec., 1857.—*Times* report.

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 48.

§ *Life*, vol. iii., p. 194. || *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 218.

¶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 305. Dr. Buist (editor of the *Bombay Times*, and sheriff of Bombay), in a pamphlet entitled, "Corrections of a Few of the Errors contained in Sir William Napier's Life of his Brother, in so far as they affect the Press of India," gives some valuable statements regarding the Indian newspapers; of which he says there were, in 1843, about thirty; costing close on £100,000 a-year for their maintenance—deriving their chief support, and nearly all their intelligence from officers of the British army. The *Englishman* (Calcutta) was conducted by Captain McNaughten (Bengal Army) and Mr. (after' Sir Ronald McDonald) Stevenson, projector and engineer of the great Bengal railway: *Hurkaru*—Mr. John Kaye, Bengal artillery, now of the India House (author of the *History of the Afghan War*): *Calcutta Star and Morning Star*—Mr. James Hume, barrister, after' police magistrate of Calcutta: *Friend of India*—the well-known Mr. John Marshman: *Bombay Courier*, by Mr. W. Crawford, barrister, after'senior magistrate of police: and *Bombay Gentleman's Gazette*, by Mr. P. J. McKenna.—(p. 15.)

** *Life*, by Sir William Napier, vol. iii., p. 124.

†† *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 294.

asserts, that it has been, "on the whole, highly beneficial:" and that—

"There cannot be a greater evil than that public officers should be exempted from the control of public opinion. In Lord William Bentinck's, Lord Metcalfe's, and Lord Auckland's time, the press was held in wholesome respect by the public functionaries at the most remote stations, and it acted as a sort of moral preventive police. * * * We used to call it the Parliament of the Press. It may safely be said, that there was not a single good public measure which was not powerfully aided by it. As regards the native press, some newspapers were conducted in a creditable manner in the English language, by and for the natives, who had received an English education; others were published in the native language by the missionaries: and it must not be supposed that the remainder, which were written by natives in the native languages, did nothing but preach sedition. Their standard, both of intelligence and morality, was, no doubt, below that of the English newspapers; but they opened the minds of the natives to an interest in general topics, *and taught them to think, from which every thing else might be expected.*"*

Sanscrit literature proves that the Hindoos were a thoughtful people before the English set foot in India; but the spread of European and "non-religious" theories, has been certainly likely to teach them to reason in an entirely different fashion. We know that Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and Condorcet gave currency to ideas which took a very practical form in the French Revolution. These writers, with the English infidel, Tom Paine, have found imitators and admirers in India, and their doctrines are flung abroad like firebrands by the native press. A blind, unreasoning distrust of all governments—a fierce disaffection towards all constituted authorities—thirst for license under the name of freedom; such are the fruits of the tree of knowledge, apart and contra-distinguished from the tree of life. A saying, attributed to the Duke of Wellington, is often cited against the danger attendant on promoting education without religion—that of making men "clever devils." No better illustration of this need be adduced than the terrible scenes enacted by the Bengal sepoys, among whom native newspapers of the worst class were freely circulated. The utter indifference so long evinced by government, regarding the number, tone, and character of the native journals, was almost incredible;† indeed, that complete freedom should have been accorded, even to the European press, was strangely at variance with the general policy of the Company.

In 1857, the adult male European population scattered throughout India, not in the service, was estimated at only 4,000.‡ The journals must, therefore, to a great extent, have been maintained by officials. Some of them, especially the *Madras Athenæum,* uniformly deprecated annexation; and thus its supporters contributed with their purses, and sometimes with their pens, to oppose the very acts which, in their official capacity, they were bound to enforce.§ It was impossible that the natives should not take a lively interest in discussions which immediately affected them. Even a child, hearing its own name often repeated, would listen; and the natives have done so to some purpose.

Some years ago, one of the ablest and most disinterested advocates for the necessity of Indian reform, as the sole means of averting the blow which has since fallen, wrote:—

"The free press is doing its work in India: the Parsee merchants, the zemindars, the native heads of castes, are beginning to feel their power, to combine, and to ask for redress of grievances; some of them are violent, and these do not alarm me; but some are remarkably temperate; and I confess, that knowing the strength of their case, I fear the men who begin so temperately, and have reason on their side."||

Sir Charles Metcalfe, in establishing, and Lord Auckland in confirming, the freedom of the press, especially insisted that the boon thus granted might be withdrawn, in the event of its proving injurious in operation. "Should the safety of the state ever demand such a course, in a single hour a law may be passed to stop or to control every press in India: nothing has been lost of useful power."¶

In the middle of June, 1857, when the mutiny was at its height, the supreme government deemed it necessary to pass an act, which, for the space of the succeeding twelvemonth, was intended to replace the press in the position it occupied

* *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 45.

† On application to the East India House for some additional details to those given in the *Indian Empire* (in the first volume), the writer was informed that the directors had no information on the subject.

‡ Dr. Buist's *Corrections of Sir W. Napier*, p. 40.

§ The *Edinburgh Review* speaks of the Anglo-Indian press as exclusively representing "the opinions of European settlers in the country, or half-castes not in the Company's service," whom it describes as a class bitterly hostile to government. (October, 1847.) Mr. Mead, on the contrary, affirms, that "six out of seven of the whole body of subscribers are in the Company's service."—*Sepoy Revolt*, p. 183.

|| Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, p. 20.

¶ Minute, by Lord Auckland, 8th August, 1836.

in 1835, before the removal of all restrictions by Sir Charles Metcalfe. The authorities were unanimous regarding the necessity of the measure, which involved the re-institution of the licensing system, together with a rigid censorship. The act was passed by the governor-general in council in a sitting; and Lords Harris and Elphinstone, the governors of Madras and Bombay, expressed their entire acquiescence. No distinction was made between the English and the native press, the government being desirous to avoid drawing invidious distinctions between European and native subjects. They add, moreover—

"We do not clearly see how any distinction of the sort could be really carried into effect, for there are now more than one newspaper in the English language written, owned and published by natives, almost exclusively for circulation amongst native readers; and although we have no reason to fear that treasonable matter would be designedly published in any English newspaper, we have to guard in these times against errors, indiscretion, and temper, as well as against international sedition. * * * To show that the necessity of controlling the English as well as the native press, is not merely imaginary, it will be enough to state, that the treasonable proclamation of the king and mutineers of Delhi—cunningly framed so as to influence the Mohammedan population as much as possible against the British government, and ending with the assurance, that the multiplication and circulation of that document would be an act equal in religious merit to drawing the sword against us, was published by a respectable English newspaper of this town without comment. For doing the very same thing, with comments having the outward form of loyalty, the publishers of three native Mohammedan papers in Calcutta, have been committed to the Supreme Court, to take their trial for a seditious libel."*

Lord Harris went further than this, and declared "the larger portion of the British press throughout the country," and particularly in the Madras presidency, to be "disloyal in tone, un-English in spirit, wanting in principle, and utterly regardless of correctness in statement."† He complained especially of the seditious matter circulated among the sepoys by a newspaper entitled the *Examiner*, "the mouth-piece of the Roman Catholic priests."‡ Lord Elphinstone considered the unrestricted liberty of the press incompatible with the continuance of British rule. "Systematic abuse of the government," he writes, "misrepresentation of its acts, and all attempts to create ill-feeling between the different classes of the community, especially between the European officers and the native soldiery, must be prevented."§ The home authorities confirmed the act, declaring that they felt no doubt of its necessity.||

The first English paper threatened with the revoke of its licence, was the well-known *Friend of India*, which, in an article entitled "The Centenary of Plassy," censured the mammon-worship of the East India Company, and declared that "only the intense greediness of traders could have won for us the sovereignty of the country." Mohammedan princes and Hindoo rajahs were spoken of as a class that would speedily die out; and in conclusion, the writer held forth a hope that the second centenary of Plassy might be "celebrated in Bengal by a respected government and a Christian people."

The secretary to government (Mr. Beadon) officially informed the publisher, that the circulation of such remarks, in the existing state of affairs, was dangerous "not only to the government, but to the lives of all Europeans in the provinces not living under the close protection of British bayonets." This communication was published in the *Friend of India*, with satirical comments, which the authorities considered so offensive, that the licence would have been withdrawn but for the resignation of Mr. Mead, who was acting as provisional editor during the absence of the proprietor, Mr. Marshman.¶

The *Bengal Hurkaru* (Messenger) was warned for its exaggerated echo of the vengeance-cry of the London *Times*; a writer, styling himself "Militaire," denouncing the just and wise recommendation of government not needlessly to "embitter the feelings of the natives," and urging that, "for every Christian church destroyed, fifty mosques should be destroyed, beginning with the Jumma Musjid at Delhi; and for every Christian man, woman, and child murdered, a thousand rebels should bleed."**

Ten days later, another article appeared, which contained the following passage:—

* Despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 4th July, 1857. Signed—Canning, Dorin, Low, Grant, and Peacock. Parl. Papers (Commons), 28th August, 1857; pp. 4, 5.

† Minute, by Lord Harris, dated "Fort St. George, 2nd May, 1857"—*Ibid.*, p. 11.

‡ Minute, 22nd June, 1857—*Ibid.*, p. 13.

§ Minute, 24th June, 1857. Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858; p. 53.

|| Letter of Court of Directors, 26th August, 1857—*Ibid.*, p. 30.

¶ Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, pp. 42—46. Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, pp. 359—376.

** *Bengal Hurkaru*, 5th September, 1857.

"There are many good, honest, simple people in Calcutta, who are both surprised and disappointed that popular indignation has not boiled up to a higher pitch. They are astounded at finding that Lord Canning has not been already ordered home in irons, and that Mr. Beadon has not been sentenced to be tarred and feathered, and ridden upon a rail, previously to being placed in some extremely uncovenanted situation under a native superior. We are very far from saying that these proceedings would not be appropriate in the cases in question; but we would say to our enthusiastic friends, 'My dear sirs, you are too impatient. All in good time.'"*

The licence of the *Hurkaru* was revoked; but the editor (Mr. Blanchard) having resigned, a new licence was issued to the proprietor. Other English papers were also warned for transgressing the conditions of their licences; but the native editors generally did not appear to have incurred censure.

The chief difficulty seemed to be, the course to be adopted with regard to the republication of articles from English papers. The following, for instance, is styled by Mr. Frere (commissioner of Sinde), "a very mischievous perversion of an Indian debate, which, in quieter times, might be amusing." A summary of grievances could hardly be deemed amusing at any moment. At the coming crisis, it was not only humiliating, but alarming, to find such statements circulating in Hindoostan on the authority of British parliamentary debates; for the so-called perversion was really a summary of the leading arguments advanced by members of both houses against the East India Company, more especially by the Marquis of Clanricarde, whose speech, it was predicted at the time, would occasion great excitement among the natives of India.

"The *Jam-i-Jamsibid* of Meerut relates, that in durbar of ——, the Marquis of Clanricarde complained much of the Indian government; that a vast amount of rupees was expended among the home authorities in the way of pay, they knowing little of the circumstances of the country; that the nobles and great men of Hindoostan were becoming extinct; and the middle classes gradually suffering damage, and poor people being ruined. It would be proper that the country should be so governed, that the people do not suffer. Some zillahs require a decrease of taxation, and the salt-tax is very wrong. In whatever countries there was fitting management, the latter impost had been abolished. Beside this, in Hindoostan, the system of justice was defective. Moreover, on this account, the English name suffered; and, in Hindoostan, amid ten judges, nine are Hindoostanees, but their pay and position was unimportant and inconsistent with their duties. And the heads of the E. I. Company say, that amid fourteen crore (million) of Hindoostanees, not one is worthy of rank or trust; a very sad and distressing statement, enough to break the hearts of the people of Hindoostan, and cow their spirits. Besides which, he said many more things; in answer to which, the Duke of Argyle was unable to advance any clear argument."†

It would be difficult to know on what ground an editor could be warned for the republication of the above statements, unless it were on the strength of the now repudiated axiom, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel!"

In another case—that of a Persian newspaper, edited in Calcutta by one Hafiz Abdul Kadir—the insurrectionary views of the writer were undisguised. The licence was, of course, revoked; and the press and printing materials seized. It would have been madness to suffer such effusions as the following to go forth:—

"Now, when the drum of the power of the English is sounding so loudly, it is in every one's mouth that the state of Travancore also is to be annexed to the British dominions upon the ground of maladministration. It is also said that the principality of Ulwar will be *confiscated*‡ by government. But at present the progress of *confiscation* is *arrested* by the government of the Almighty Ruler.

"The government should first *arrest* the progress of the disturbances and disorders which are raging in all parts of the country, and then address itself to these confiscations again. I formed a design of going to Worms. But the "worms"§ unexpectedly eat off my head. He (God) is Almighty. He does what he will. He makes a world desert in a breath.

"Everybody knows, and now perhaps it has become quite clear to the *lords of annexation*, what kind of mischief the confiscation of Lucknow has done, causing ruin to thousands of their own friends. * * * Come what may, in these degenerate days, the men of Delhi must be celebrated as sons of Rustum, and very Alexanders in strength. Oh! God destroy our enemies utterly, and assist and aid our sovereign (Sultan)."

With the above characteristic extract this section may fitly conclude, without any attempt to hazard conclusions on so difficult a subject as the degree of control necessary to be exercised for the maintenance of a despotic government, in a crisis so arduous and unprecedented as that of 1857-'58.

* *Bengal Hurkaru*, 14th September, 1857.

† Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858. p. 48.

‡ All the *italicised* words are exactly rendered from the Persian by their English synonymes.

§ Kirman, the name of a town and province in Persia, also signifies "worms." The conceit can thus be rendered into English. The whole tone of the article, in the original, is highly sarcastic.—*Goolshun Nowbahar*, 27th June, 1857. Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858; pp. 46, 47.

*Currency.**—An ill-regulated and insufficient currency had long pressed heavily on the people, and had exercised a singular influence in the crisis of 1857-'58. Until then there was only one public bank (that of Bengal) in all India; with much difficulty two others, also under the control of government, were established at Bombay and Madras; but the amount of notes issued by them was insufficient for the requirements of even these cities. Three or four joint-stock banks were subsequently formed; but the government had continued, up to the year 1858, to rely on a bulky and indivisible coin, the silver rupee (worth about two shillings), for its standard circulating medium. The exclusive use, by the state, of metallic money, had occasioned the accumulation of treasure, amounting sometimes, to fourteen millions sterling, in thirty or forty treasuries, scattered all over the country. Forty to fifty thousand sepoys had been annually employed in escorting money from one district to another, an employment properly belonging to a police force; which had occasioned much discontent, and tended to the relaxation of discipline, and general demoralisation of the soldiery. A paper currency would have answered every purpose of local taxation and payments to the troops; it would have been far more easily transmissible, and it would not have offered so tempting a bribe to native cupidity. In several instances, it was evident that the sepoys were stimulated to the commission of crime by the hope of plundering the local treasuries of much larger sums than were ever allowed to remain in them.

The *Times*† at the period published the following forcible remarks on the subject:—

"Regiments that held Company's paper were faithful until they had exchanged it for gold; regiments that had pay in arrear were faithful until the arrears were paid up. The Company's gold has never received credit for the part it played in the mutiny. Yet it had often been presssd upon the authorities at Calcutta, that a paper currency would be a boon to India. Those who wished for this, probably thought little of the danger of carrying bullion in bullock-trunks or palkies through the jungle, or storing it in exposed places; their object was, in all probability, the extension of commerce and the development of the resources of the country. The policy of the Company was, is, and ever must be, to discourage all independent enterprise within their territories, and they were consistent in refusing to listen to any such suggestions. Now, however, when we are commencing a new era—if, indeed, we are commencing, or are about to commence a new era—this subject must be reconsidered. There can be no good reason why India should not in monetary facilities be placed upon a level with England. There is excellent reason why the troops should be paid in paper money. The absence of the gold is the absence of a powerful temptation, and the bank-note is a guardian of the fidelity of the man in whose pocket it lies."

The *Opium Monopoly*, with its concomitant grievances—the forced cultivation of the poppy, and the domiciliary right of search—ranked among the causes of popular disaffection. The Company obtained opium from the ryots at a very low price, by a system of advances, and sold it for the contraband China trade, at a very high one.‡ An official authority declares, that the peasants in the opium districts of Patna and Benares, are compelled to give up fixed portions of their lands for the production of the poppy. The forced cultivation of this poisonous drug brings on the wretched cultivators the persecuting surveillance of the police; the probability that they may be retaining some portion for private sale, exposing them to every sort of ingenuity which spies, authorised and unauthorised, can imagine, as the means of inflicting fines and extorting bribes.§ The deteriorating influence on the consumer cannot be doubted. In China we have notoriously returned evil for good; exporting ship-loads of their refreshing herb to combat our own spirit-craving propensities; and importing, in defiance of the laws of God and man, millions of pounds' worth of a stimulant which we know to be, when once resorted to, almost invariably persevered in, to the destruction of the body, and, it would seem, of the soul even, of its miserable victim. In India we found the debasing indulgence general among certain classes. Baber and his successors, with the exception of Aurungzebe, were all its habitual consumers; and the able historian of Rajast'han, Colonel Tod, attributes the loss of independence by the Rajpoots, their general deterioration, and the diminished productiveness of the country, chiefly to the same suicidal practice.

* The cash balances in the different Indian treasuries, varied from twelve to fourteen millions sterling. In 1856, the amount was £12,043,334: of this sum, there was in Bengal, £5,117,553; in the N. W. Provinces, £2,251,904 = £7,369,457. The Madras presidency had £2,311,365; and the Bombay, £2,362,510.—(Parliamentary Papers, April 20th, 1858.)

† June, 1858.

‡ J. Passmore Edwards' *Evils of the Opium Trade*, p. 18.

§ See *Iniquities of the Opium Trade;* by Rev. A. A. Thelwell.

But though the East India Company did not originate the use or cultivation of opium in all their vast dominions, they did so in several. It was argued, that the very taxation was itself a discouragement to the cultivation; and this would be the case in a free country; but was it not true in India, where there were so many means of compelling the peasant to toil like a serf at any labour for a bare subsistence? That the Company had been voluntarily instrumental in increasing the production, stands on the face of their own records.

On the cession of Malwa by the Mahrattas, measures were taken to raise from that province a revenue similar to that obtained in the Bengal presidency. A powerful impulse was given to the growth of the poppy; but the cost of cultivation was found so far to exceed that of Bahar or Benares, and the transport was likewise so much more difficult, that the excessive production obtained in Central India, scarcely afforded sufficient nett profit to atone for the injury done to the Bengal monopoly. The utmost efforts were made to remedy this, and to prevent diminished cultivation in the old provinces. "Premiums and rewards," says a chairman of the old East India Company, "have been held out; new offices and establishments have been created; the revenue officers have been enlisted in the service; and the influence of that department has been brought into action to promote the production. * * * The supreme government of India, too, have condescended to supply the retail shops with opium, and have thus added a new feature to our fiscal policy. I believe that no one act of our government has appeared, in the eyes of respectable natives, both Mohammedan and Hindoo, more questionable than the establishment of the Abkarry, or tax on the sale of spirituous liquors and drugs. Nothing, I suspect, has tended so much to lower us in their regard. They see us derive a revenue from what they deem an impure source; and when they find the pollution of public-houses spreading around them, they cannot understand that our real object is to check the use of the noxious article which is sold, or to regulate those haunts of the vicious with a view to objects of police. And have we succeeded in promoting these objects? Will any man be so hardy as to maintain, that the use of spirituous liquors and drugs has been diminished by the operation of the tax, or that it has not been everywhere extended? * * * But even if we admit that these objects have been kept in view, or that it is becoming, in the present state of the country, to regulate the vend of spirits and drugs, was it becoming in a great government to exhibit itself as the purveyor of opium to publicans, or—in the words of the Regulation—'to establish shops, on the part of government, for the retail sale of the drug?' Is it desirable that we should bring it to the very door of the lower orders, who might never otherwise have found the article within their reach, and who are now tempted to adopt a habit alike injurious to health and to good morals?"*

Not content with stimulating to the utmost the production of opium in our own territories, we voluntarily extended the curse in the Mahratta districts of Central India, in the Afghan state of Bhopal, in Oodipoor, Kotah, Boondi, and other Rajpoot principalities, by negotiations and treaties, "such as are not, I believe (says Mr. Tucker), to be paralleled in the whole history of diplomacy;" whereby we have bound ourselves to the payment of large annual sums on account of opium. "We make it the interest of the chiefs to increase the growth of the poppy, to the exclusion, in some instances, of sugar-cane, cotton, and other products which constitute the riches of a country, and which ought to minister to the comforts of the people."

These statements are very important, coming from one whose official position, Indian experience, and personal character, give his opinions threefold weight. He adds a brief warning, which, read by the blaze of the incendiary fires of 1857, is pregnant with meaning. "The Rajpoot, with all his heroic bravery and other good qualities, requires very skilful management. The same may be said of the Afghan of Rohilcund, who is still more restless and impatient of control; and if there were not other and better reasons, I should say that it is not safe, with either race—Rajpoot or Afghan—to supply the means of habitual excitement, which must render them more turbulent and ungovernable."†

Sir Stamford Raffles, another acknowledged authority, indignantly denounced the conduct of the European government in

* *Memorials of Indian Government;* a selection from the papers of H. St. George Tucker; edited by Mr. Kaye: pp. 152—134.

† *Ibid.*, p. 156.

overlooking every consideration of policy and humanity, and allowing a paltry addition to their finances to outweigh all regard to the ultimate prosperity of the country. Unfortunately, the financial addition* is paltry only when viewed in connection with the amount of evil which it represents, and which has increased in proportion to the extended cultivation. An experienced authority† states, that wherever opium is grown it is eaten; and considers that "one-half of the crimes in the opium districts, murders, rapes, and affrays, have their origin in opium-eating." Major-general Alexander uses the most forcible language regarding the progressive and destructive course of intoxication by opium and ardent spirits throughout India, appealing to the returns of courts-martial and defaulters' books for testimony of the consequent deterioration of the sepoys; and to the returns of the courts and offices of judges, magistrates, and collectors, for that of the mass of the natives. Under this view of the case, and remembering also the example set by the notorious tendency to drunkenness which disgraces the British troops, there is something terribly significant in the fact, that the fiercest onslaughts and worst brutalities which our countrymen and countrywomen have endured, were committed under the influence of the hateful drugs by which we have gained so much gold, and inflicted so much misery.

The *Neglect of Public Works* must take its place among the indirect causes of revolt; for it had materially impeded the development of the resources of the country, and furnished the people with only too palpable reason for discontent. It was a subject which ought always to have had the special attention of the Anglo-Indian authorities. They should have remembered, that the people over whom they ruled were literally as children in their hands; and should have taken care to exercise a far-seeing, providential, and paternal despotism. Under Mohammedan and Hindoo governments, the princes and nobles have ever delighted in associating their names with some stately edifice, some great road or canal, some public work of more or less utility. It was a fashion which those who made for themselves a fortune and a name, especially delighted in following; and the fact is so well known that it needs no illustration. Every book of travel affords fresh instances. Foreign adventurers have adopted the same beneficent custom: witness the Martinière college at Lucknow. Very few Englishmen, however, have thought of spending on, or in India, any considerable portion of the wealth they made there; the noble Sir Henry Lawrence and others, whose names are easily reckoned, forming the exceptions.

It would occupy too much space to offer anything like an enumeration of our shortcomings in this respect: able pens have already performed the ungracious task; and it needs but a few hours' attentive study of the admirably condensed exposition given by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton (chief engineer of Madras), and of the pamphlets published by Mr. Dickinson and other members of the Indian Reform Society, to be convinced how unjust and impolitic have been our omissions in this important branch of government.

Sir Charles Napier says, that "in India, economy means, laying out as little for the country and for noble and useful purposes as you can; and giving as large salaries as you can possibly squeeze out of the public to individuals, adding large 'establishments.'"‡ The force of this remark is painfully apparent, when the immense number of "collectors," and the extent and enormous expense of the revenue establishment, are compared with the number of engineers, and the cost of the department for public works. The contrast between what is taken from, and what is spent upon India, becomes still more glaring when the items of expenditure are examined, and a division made between the works undertaken on behalf of the government—such as court-houses, gaols, &c.—and those immediately intended for the benefit of the people, such as roads, canals, and tanks.

The injustice of this procedure is surpassed by its impolicy. Colonel Cotton says—

"Certainly, without any exaggeration, the most astonishing thing in the history of our rule in India is, that such innumerable volumes should have been written by thousands of the ablest men in the service on the mode of collecting the land revenue, while the question, of a thousand times more importance, how to enable the people to pay it, was literally never touched upon; and yet, even the

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i.

† Mr. Andrew Sym, who had charge of the Company's opium agency at Goruckpoor. See pamphlets on the *Opium Trade* by Major-general Alexander and Mr. W. S. Fry.

‡ *Life*, vol. ii., p. 428.

question of the amount of taxation was utterly insignificant in comparison with that. While we have been labouring for a hundred years to discover how to get twenty lacs out of a district which is not able to pay it, not the least thought has been bestowed on the hundreds of lacs it was losing from the enormous cost of transit, which swallowed up all the value of the ryot produce, if they raised it.* * * * If we take the whole loss to India, from want of communication, at only twenty-five million sterling, it is twelve times as great a burthen as the interest of the [Indian] debt. * * * Public works have been almost entirely neglected in India. The motto hitherto has been—'do nothing, have nothing done, let nobody do anything.' Bear any loss, let the people die of famine, let hundreds of lacs be lost in revenue for want of water, rather than *do* anything. * * * Who would believe, that without half-a-dozen miles of real turnpike-road, with communications generally in the state that they were in England two centuries ago—with periodical famines and a stagnant revenue—the stereotyped answer to any one who urges improvement is, 'He is too much in a hurry—he is too sanguine—we must go on by degrees;' and this, too, in the face of the fact that, almost without exception, money laid out upon public works in India, has yielded money returns of one hundred, two hundred, and three hundred per cent., besides innumerable other advantages to the community. * * * We have already all but lost one century, to the great damage of our finances and the greater injury of the people."†

It is terrible to think of the amount of suffering occasioned by the ignorant apathy of the nation to whom it has pleased Providence to entrust the government of India. "The neglect of public works" is a vague, unmeaning sound in British ears: no nation blessed with free institutions can appreciate its full intent; and no people under the despotism of a single tyrant, but would rise, and cut off the Pharaoh who demanded the tale of bricks, yet withheld the straw. Nothing but the complicated system of our absentee sovereigntyship, can account for such strange persistence in errors which have repeatedly brought the Company to the verge of bankruptcy, and inflicted on the mass of the people chronic poverty and periodical famine.

In England, we are occasionally horror-struck by some case of death from actual destitution; and we know, alas! that large portions of our working population, with difficulty obtain the necessaries of life; but we are also aware that public and individual benevolence is incessantly at work to diminish the sufferings inseparable, at least to some extent, from an over-populated and money-worshipping country. When Ireland was scourged with famine, the whole British empire, even to its farthest colony, poured forth, unsolicited, its contributions in money or in food with eager haste. Is, then, human sympathy dependent on race or colour? No; or the West Indies would still be peopled with slaves and slave-drivers. The same springs of action which, once set in motion, worked incessantly for the accomplishment of negro emancipation, would, if now touched on behalf of the Hindoos, act as a lever to raise them from the deep wretchedness in which they are sunk. The manufacturers of Manchester and of Glasgow are surely blind to their own interests, or long ere this they would have taken up the subject of roads, canals, and tanks for India, if only to encourage the growth of cotton in the country in which it is an indigenous product, and to diminish their dangerous dependence on America. Had they done so, they would have had their reward. But the active and enterprising philanthropical class, which includes many "successful merchants" in its ranks, perhaps requires to be told, that the subject of public works for India is at once a great call for national justice and individual charity; that there is no conceivable means of fulfilling on so large a scale the unquestionable duty of giving bread to the hungry, as by initiating measures to rescue hundreds of thousands of British subjects from probable starvation.

The frightful massacres of Meerut and Cawnpoor have not banished from our minds the recollection of that terrible "Black Hole," where 123 persons perished, some from suffocation, and others in the maddening agonies of thirst; and this not from any purpose of fiend-like cruelty, but simply because the young Nawab, Surajah Dowlah, did not know the size of the prison-chamber of the English garrison in which he had directed his prisoners to be secured; and none of his officers cared to disturb his sleep, to procure a change of orders. When he awoke the door was opened, and the few weak, worn survivors, on whose frames some hours of agony had done the work of years, tottered forth, or were dragged out from amid the already putrefying corpses of their companions.‡

Surajah Dowlah paid, with his throne and life, the forfeit of his apathetic ignorance; and his people were happily delivered from that crowning curse—despotic inca-

* *Public Works in India;* by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton, 1854; p. 8. † *Ibid.*, pp. 294, 295.
‡ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 273.

pacity. His fate ought to have served as a warning of the effects of mere neglect. Has it done so; or has the evil been multiplied a thousand-fold under a Christian government? Can it, or can it not, be proved by public records, that, for every single Englishman who perished while the Indian nawab lay sleeping, many thousand natives had fallen victims to an apathy no less criminal, manifested by the representatives of the E. I. Company? This is the meaning, or at least a part of the meaning, of the "neglect of public works in India;" and the only excuse offered for it is the poverty of the government. It is asserted, that the drain consequent on perpetual wars, which directly enriched and often indirectly ennobled the individuals concerned, occasioned so wide a destruction of native property, created such an unceasing drain on the state revenues, and so increased and complicated the labours of the collectors, that the one-engrossing anxiety of the authorities, how to meet current expenses, unavoidably superseded every other consideration.

The peculiar system of the Company had likewise contributed to induce a selfish and short-sighted policy. The brief period of administration allotted to each governor-general, whatever its advantages, has had the great drawback of rarely sufficing for the initiation, organisation, and carrying through of any large measure of general benefit; and it is, of course, seldom that a new-comer, fresh from England, has the ability or the generosity to appreciate and cordially work out the plan of his predecessor. The consequence has been a lamentable want of any consistent policy for the development of the resources of India. Lord Dalhousie, it is true, exerted himself zealously and successfully in the furtherance of certain great undertakings, in connection with which his name may well be gratefully remembered. The Ganges canal, the various railways, the electric telegraph, are works of undoubted utility; and the good service they have rendered to the supreme government in its hour of need, must be calculated in lives rather than in money. But a few great and costly achievements cannot excuse the general neglect manifested by the non-appropriation of a certain portion of the revenue of every district to meet its own peculiar and urgent requirements. From the absence of any adequate provision, the vast reservoirs, sometimes many miles square, constructed by native princes centuries ago, have been allowed, to a considerable extent, to go to decay, and are now sources of disease instead of fertility, being covered with rank weeds.*

The East India Company had added the tax levied by their Mohammedan or Hindoo predecessors for annual repairs, to their general assessments, but yet suffered many of the tanks to go to ruin; while, according to good authority, "in many cases they still exact (1858) the same money-revenue from the cultivators, amounting, at the present day, to fifty, sixty, and seventy per cent. of the gross produce of the soil, as if the tanks were kept in perfect repair, and the cultivators received the quantity of water required to grow a full crop of produce."†

Water, water! is the primary want of the Indian farmer; yet, according to Colonel Cotton, it is undoubted that, in the worst year that ever occurred, enough has been allowed to flow into the sea to have irrigated ten times as much grain as would have supplied the whole population.‡ The case is put in the clearest light in an extract from a private letter, hastily written, and not meant for publication, addressed by "one of the most distinguished men in India," to Mr. Dickinson, and published by him, under the idea that it was better calculated than any laboured statement, to carry conviction to an unprejudiced mind. The writer, after declaring that the perpetual involvements of the Company had originated in their having omitted not only to initiate improvements, but even to keep in repair the old works upon which the revenue depended; adds—"But this is not the strongest point of the case. *They did not take the least pains to prevent famine.* To say nothing of the death of a quarter of a million of people in Guntoor, the public works' committee, in their report, calculate that the loss in money by the Guntoor famine, was more than two millions sterling. If they could find money to supply these losses, they could have found a hundredth part of the sum to prevent them.

"Lord —— thinks it would be better not to blame the government; how can we possibly point out how improvement can be made without proving that there has been neglect before? * * * Lord —— won-

* Macleod Wylie's *Bengal a Field of Missions*, p. 241.

† *Lectures on British India;* by John Malcolm Ludlow; vol. ii., p. 317.

‡ Quoted in the Madras Petition of 1852.

ders at my vehemence about public works: is he really so humble a man as to think no better of himself, than to suppose he could stand unmoved in a district where 250,000 people had perished miserably of famine through the neglect of our government, and see it exposed every year to a similar occurrence? If his lordship had been living in the midst of the district at the time, like one of our civilians, and had had every morning to clear the neighbourhood of his house of hundreds of dead bodies of poor creatures who had struggled to get near the European, in hopes that there perhaps they might find food, he would have realised things beyond what he has seen in his ——shire park."*

What excuse, even of ignorance, can be offered for a government that turned a deaf ear to statements so appalling as these, made by their own servants? Such impenetrable apathy affords a confirmation of the often-repeated assertion, that nothing but the continual pressure of public opinion in England, will ensure anything being effected in India. Would that this power might be at once exerted! Even when, in the midst of battles, we ought to be doing something to avert the consequences of past neglect, or the scourge of war will be followed by the constant visitations of famine, and its twin-sister, pestilence.

We were not able to do much, or anything, in some of the most disturbed districts; but in the great majority, where comparative quiet prevails, a vigorous effort ought at once to be made for the introduction of a better system; that is, one designed to benefit the mass of the people, instead of being exclusively framed to suit the convenience of the European officials. Had this been earlier attempted, we might have had fewer great works to talk about in parliament or at the India House (though that is hardly possible, considering that we are Anglo-Saxons of the nineteenth century): but certainly India would not now be so generally destitute of the means of cheap carriage; neither would it be necessary to urge "the clearing-out of this poisonous old tank; the repairing of that embankment; the metalling of this mud-track through the jungle; the piercing, by a cheap canal of irrigation, of that tongue of land, of a few miles, between two rivers;"† the preservation of bridges; and such-like cheap, homely, obscure labours, as are now urgently needed throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula.

* Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, pp. 37—90.

† Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 320.

Cheap transit by land and water is a point only secondary in importance to irrigation, as a means of preventing famine, by enabling one part of the country to help another in the event of the failure of local rains. Major-general Tremenheere, in his general evidence before parliament (May, 1858), when adverting to the brief intervals which have elapsed between the years of scarcity in the present century, forcibly states the necessity for affording the greatest facilities for the transport of produce, as the true remedy for these oft-recurring famines.‡ The evidence of subsequent witnesses before the same committee, shows that, in a country where easy transit is essential to the preservation of life during periodical visitations of dearth, there exists the most remarkable deficiency of means of intercommunication ever heard of under a civilised government.

"There are no roads to connect even Calcutta with any of the great cities of the interior. No road to Moorshedabad; no road to Dacca; none to Patna; no such roads as parish roads in England, to connect villages and market-towns in the interior. Consequently, in the rainy season, every town is isolated from its neighbours, and from all the rest of the country. Besides roads, bridges are wanted: there are hardly any bridges at all in the country; their place is partially supplied by ferries. The grand trunk-road, within the Lower Provinces, is only partially bridged; and half the bridges, I believe, have been washed away from defects of construction."§

In Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, the maintenance of good roads is a duty to which the government are alleged to be specially pledged; for, in making the decennial settlement (on which the permanent one was subsequently grounded), a separate tax for the purpose was inserted in the rent-roll, but was afterwards merged in the general assessment, and not applied to the roads. The native land-owners have remembered this breach of faith; and when urged, some years ago, to make fresh provision for the maintenance of highways, they objected, on the ground of the misappropriation of their actual yearly payments. Happily for them, their interests are closely allied with those of the British settlers. Both classes are equally without the pale of privilege and patronage, dignities and immunities,

‡ First Report of the Select Committee on the Colonization and Settlement of India, p. 6.

§ *Ibid.* Evidence of W. Theobald, Esq., p. 74.

with which the East India Company had fenced round its covenanted service; but the storm which had disturbed the immigrant planters in their peaceable avocations, had contributed to procure for them the opportunity of laying before a parliamentary committee, and consequently before the nation at large, the obstructions which impede all attempts to earn an honourable livelihood by developing the resources of India.

Several witnesses declared the want of internal communication to be peculiar to the administration of the East India Company, who had attempted nothing except for military or governmental purposes, and even then very imperfectly; while, under Hindoo and Mohammedan dynasties, the peninsula was intersected with roads, the remains of which are still traceable.* The planters, to some extent, make roads in their immediate vicinity, suitable to their own necessities; but these do not answer for purposes of general traffic, which requires continuous lines. The native land-owners understand road-making, but want the means, not the will, to carry it on extensively. Mr. Dalrymple, an indigo and sugar planter, and silk manufacturer, resident in India upwards of thirty years, adduced, as an instance of the feeling of the natives on this subject, that he has known one of them make a road for a hundred miles from a religious motive.†

For the neglect of many duties, and especially of this one, we are paying a severe penalty; and the hardships so long suffered by the natives, in having to carry their articles of produce or merchandise on their heads, along paths impassable for beasts of burden, since fell with tenfold weight on our heavily-laden soldiery. Individual suffering, great as that had been (including the long list of victims to "solar apoplexy," on marches which, by even good common roads or by canals, would have been short and comparatively innocuous), formed but the inevitable counterpart of the public distress occasioned by the frequent insurmountable impediments to the rapid concentration of military force on a given point. Facilities for the movement of troops are important in every seat of war; but particularly so in India, where the extent of country to be maintained exceeds beyond all proportion the number of European troops which can at any sacrifice be spared to garrison it.

The upholders of "a purely military despotism" were certainly not wise even in their generation, or they would have promoted, instead of opposing, the construction of railways between the chief cities, as a measure of absolute necessity. If only the few already projected had been completed, Delhi could hardly have fallen as it did—a rich, defenceless prize—into the hands of the mutineers, nor afforded them the means of establishing a rallying-point for the disaffected, and doing incalculable damage to European *prestige*, by setting an example of temporarily successful defiance. As it was, the contrast was most painful between the lightning-flash that brought the cry for help from stations surrounded by a seething mass of revolt, and the slow, tedious process by which alone the means of rescue could be afforded. Thus, the appeal of Sir Henry Lawrence for reinforcements for Cawnpoor, received the gloomy response, that it was "impossible to place a wing of Europeans there in less time than twenty-five days." The bullock-train could take a hundred men a-day, at the rate of thirty miles a-day:‡ this was all that could be done; and, with every effort, at an enormous cost of life and treasure, the troops arrived only to be maddened by the horrible evidences of the massacre they were too late to avert.

"Indophilus" views the railroad system as the basis of our military power in India; and considers it "so certain that railways are better than regiments, that it would be for the interest of England, even in a strictly economical point of view, to diminish the drain upon her working population, by lending her credit to raise money for the completion of Indian railways."§ The urgency of the requirement has become so evident as a measure of expediency, for the maintenance of our sovereignty, that it scarcely needs advocating: on the contrary, it seems necessary to deprecate the too exclusive appropriation of Indian revenue to railroads (especially costly ones, in which speed is apt to be made a primary requisite),|| to the neglect of the far cheaper means of transit which might be opened by single

* Second Report—Evidence of Mr. J. T. Mackenzie, p. 88.

† Second Report, p. 67.

‡ Telegram of the governor-general to Sir Henry Lawrence, May 24th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on the Mutiny; Appendix, p. 315.

§ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 12.

|| See Colonel Cotton's *Public Works*, p. 184.

rail, by tram-roads, by the formation of canals for steam navigation, and by the opening and improving of rivers. Measures of this kind must be taken, if we would enable the people to bear the expenses attendant on our system of government.* Labour thus wisely employed and directed, would produce capital; the now insuperable difficulty of raising a sufficient revenue without oppressing the masses, would be removed; and their rulers, relieved from pecuniary pressure, might dare to be just by renouncing opium smuggling, and to be humane by abandoning the less criminal but still obnoxious salt† monopoly, which, as usually conducted, acts as an irregular poll-tax—falling heaviest on those who have farthest to fetch it from the government depôts.

The *Repression of British Enterprise* is closely connected with the neglect of public works; for had European planters been allowed to settle in any considerable numbers, and to give free expression to their opinions, they would certainly have agitated the subject in a manner which no government could have wholly withstood.

The Company, from their earliest days, strove with unremitting care to guard their chartered privileges against the encroachments of their countrymen, and adopted a tone of lofty superiority which was scarcely consistent with their own position as "merchant adventurers." Had there not been in America, the West Indies, and other colonies and dependencies of the British crown, abundant outlet for capital and enterprise, the Indian monopoly would probably have been soon broken through: as it was, the "interlopers" were comparatively few, and easily put down, if they proved in the least refractory, by the strong measure of deportation. Gradually the exclusive system was greatly modified by the effects of the parliamentary discussions which accompanied each renewal of the Company's charter, together with the disclosures of mismanagement involved in the perpetually recurring pecuniary embarrassments, from which they sought relief in the creation and augmentation of an Indian national debt. In 1813 their trade with India ceased entirely: it had long been carried on at an actual loss; the traffic with China, and the Indian territorial revenues, supplying the *deficit*. Yet, notwithstanding the opening up of the Indian trade to all British subjects (followed by a similar procedure with that of China in 1833), the Company were slow in abating their jealous hostility towards "adventurers," and did their utmost to prevent European enterprise from gaining a footing in India. They did not seem to have recognised the change of policy incumbent on them when, ceasing to be traders, they became sovereigns of a vast empire, and were thereby bound to renounce class interests and prejudices, and merge all meaner considerations in the paramount obligation of promoting the general good.

Of course, colonization, in the ordinary sense of the term, is neither practicable nor desirable in a country already well and generally densely peopled, and where land is the most dearly prized of all possessions. Even in certain favoured localities, where outdoor employment can be best undertaken by Europeans, there is no product which they could cultivate on the spot, in which they would not be undersold by the natives. Indeed, it would be manifestly absurd to attempt to compete, as labourers, with men who can support themselves on wages ranging from 1½*d.* to 4½*d.* a-day.‡ It is as the pio-

* The salaries of Englishmen in India are all on a very high scale. The average annual salary received by civilians is estimated at £1,750.—(See article on "British India"—*Quarterly Review*, August, 1858; p. 237.) A Queen's officer, directly he embarks for India, has double pay. The fees of the lawyers and solicitors at Calcutta, are more than double what they are in English courts. No tradesman in Calcutta would be satisfied with the English rate of profit; and, in fact, all European labour is much more highly remunerated in India than elsewhere.—(First Report of Colonization Committee. Evidence of Major-general Tremenheere; p. 36.) It was found necessary to raise the scale of salaries of English functionaries, as a means of preserving them from corruption; and, to a great extent, the measure has succeeded. Even-handed justice requires, that the same experiment should be tried with the natives of the country from which the funds are levied, and it will then be seen whether improved efficiency and integrity may not equally be the result. "A native judge, who has any prospect of promotion, hardly ever is known to be corrupt."—Raikes.

† The difference in the price of salt, between Calcutta and Benares, amounted to 100 per cent. Rice, which sold at a seaport at 2*s.* a bushel, was quoted at an average of 5*s.* 1*d.* per bushel in the Punjab, the Trans-Indus, and the Cis-Sutlej territories; the distance of these states from a seaport being from 800 to 1,200 miles.—Third Report of Colonization Committee, dated July 12th, 1858. Evidence of W. Balston, Esq.; p. 65.

‡ Evidence of R. Baikie, Esq.—First Report of Colonization Committee, 6th May, 1858; p. 52.

neers of skill and capital that Europeans must look to find remuneration and useful employment in India. In that sense the field is wide enough, and the need great indeed; for the native products and manufactures have, in many instances, actually diminished in extent and in value under the sway of the old East India Company. Every child knows that calico takes its name from Calicut, whence it was first brought to England; yet domestic manufacture has been overwhelmed by the cheap, coarse fabrics of the Manchester steam-power looms; nor has the encouragement been given which might have opened for them a lucrative market in luxurious England for their own more delicate and durable productions. The Dacca muslin—the famous "woven wind," which, when wet, lay on the grass like the night-dew—this, also, has become almost a thing of the past. Yet, if only a market were assured, the cotton could be grown as before, and the same exquisite manipulation would be as cheaply obtainable.

Much important information regarding the present state of affairs, had been laid before the select committee appointed in 1858 to inquire into questions affecting the settlement of India. Well-informed persons declare, that labour is cheap and abundant almost everywhere throughout India;* that the natives are very tractable; and yet, despite their readiness to learn, and long intercourse with Europeans, the knowledge of agriculture is in about the same position as at the time of Alexander's invasion.† This is in itself a discreditable fact, considering the effects produced by the application of science to agriculture in Europe: and the apathy manifested in India is especially blamable and impolitic, on the part of a government which had virtually usurped the position of landlord over a large portion of the country, more than one-half of the revenues of which was derived by rents from the land; while four-fifths of the annual exports, were the direct produce of the soil.‡ These remarks are, of course, made in regard to the policy of the East India Company, previous to its dissolution in 1858.

While the system pursued had not improved under the rule of the Company, the cultivators themselves have absolutely deteriorated; the better class of farmers are alleged to have become generally impoverished, and to live in less comfort than they used to do under the Hindoo and Mohammedan dynasties; while very many of the ryots are hopelessly in debt.§ Impaired fertility is the natural consequence of over-cropping, and the native tenant has no means of counteracting this; his poverty being so great, that he cannot afford to keep up a farming establishment of sufficient strength, especially as regards cattle, to admit of the due production of manure, or of those requirements which are considered indispensable, in England, to the cultivation of the commonest arable land.‖ The native agriculturist, if he borrow from a native banker and capitalist, pays, it is alleged, from fifty to seventy-five per cent. interest.¶ Usury thrives by sucking the life-blood, already scanty, of tillage and manufacture, and rivets the fetters of that system of advances which is truly described as the curse of India.**

The existence of the prevailing wretchedness above indicated, goes far to prove that the Company, in opposing the settlement of their fellow-countrymen, had not been actuated by a disinterested solicitude for the welfare of the natives. In fact, the fear of an influx of Europeans was almost a monomania with the Court of Directors; and every measure which could in any manner, however indirectly, facilitate the anticipated irruption, met with opposition avowedly on that account. Thus, the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company, when advocating the enforcement of rigid restrictions on the press in 1823, adverted especially to the possibility of its "affording amusement or occupation to a class of adventurers proceeding clandestinely to India, to encourage whom would be a departure from the policy hitherto observed."††

Lord William Bentinck granted to Englishmen the privilege of holding lands in the interior of India, contrary to the in-

* Second Report of Select Committee on Colonization and Settlement of India, 10th June, 1858.—Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise; p. 40.

† First Report, 6th May, 1858.—Evidence of Major-general Tremenheere; p. 29.

‡ Second Report.—Evidence of Major-general Tremenheere; pp. 28, 29.

§ *Ibid.*—Evidence of Mr. J. T. Mackenzie; p. 83.

‖ Evidence of Captain J. Ouchterlony.—Third Report, 12th July, 1858; p. 4. Another witness says, the charge for money advances is from fifty to a hundred per cent.; "but when the lenders advance in grain, they generally charge from one to two hundred per cent., because they have to be repaid in kind."—Mr. Mackenzie. Second Report, p. 83.

¶ Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise.—*Ibid.*, p. 41.

** Evidence of Mr. Fowler.—Third Report, p. 54.

†† Parl. Papers, 4th May, 1858; p. 19.

structions of the Company; and his reasons for so doing are recorded in the minutes in council, of the years 1829 and 1830. At this period the question of settlement in India excited a good deal of interest in England; and a clause was inserted in the East India Charter Act of 1833, giving permission to all British subjects by birth, to purchase land and reside in India; and an enactment, in conformity with this clause, was passed by the local legislature in 1837.

Sir Charles Metcalfe was one of the leading advocates for a change of policy, as indispensable to the continuance of the Anglo-Indian empire; but he held that this change could never be effected until the government of the Crown should be formally substituted for that of the Company. The opinion is remarkable as coming from one of the most distinguished servants of the latter body—one who, trained in the close preserve of the covenanted civil service, rose, under the fostering care of Lord Wellesley, from occupying a clerk's desk, through intermediate grades of office, to the highest place in the council-chamber, and exercised, in a most independent fashion, the supreme authority provisionally entrusted to his care in 1835. His views would lose much of their force if conveyed in terms less full and unequivocal than his own; but, in reading the following extracts, it is necessary to remember that the word colonization has here a very limited application, and that the immigration required is not general; but must, to be beneficial to either of the parties concerned—the natives or the immigrants—consist of the capitalist class; in fact, of precisely those who find in overstocked Europe no field for the development of their resources, and who are deterred from the colonies by the high rate of wages, which constitute their chief attraction to the labouring masses.

"It is impracticable, perhaps [he writes as early as 1814], to suggest a remedy for the general disaffection of our Indian subjects. Colonization seems to be the only system which could give us a chance of having any part of the population attached to our government from a sense of common interests. Colonization may have its attendant evils; but with reference to the consideration above-stated, it would promise to give us a hold in the country which we do not at present possess. We might now be swept away in a single whirlwind. We are without root. The best-affected natives could think of a change of government with indifference; and in the N.W. Provinces there is hardly a man who would not hope for benefit from a change. This disaffection, however, will most probably not break out in any general manner as long as we possess a predominant power." In 1820, he declares—"As to a general reform of our rule, that question has always appeared to me as hopeless. Our rulers at home, and councillors abroad, are so bigoted as to precedent, that I never dream of any change unless it be a gradual declension from worse to worse. Colonization, without being forced or injudiciously encouraged, should be admitted without restraint. * * * I would never agree to the present laws of exclusion with respect to Europeans, which are unnatural and horrible." In 1836, he says—"The Europeans settled in India, and not in the Company's service, and to these might be added, generally, the East Indians of mixed breed, will never be satisfied with the Company's government: well or ill-founded, they will always attach to it the notion of monopoly and exclusion; they will consider themselves comparatively discountenanced and unfavoured, and will always look with a desire to the substitution of a King's government. For the contentment of this class, which for the benefit of India and the security of our Indian empire ought greatly to increase in numbers and importance, the introduction of a King's government is undoubtedly desirable.* * * It must be doubted whether even the civil service will be able to retain its exclusive privileges after the extensive establishment of European settlers. * * * The necessity of employing unfit men in highly important offices, is peculiar to this service, and demands correction."*

The evidence laid before parliament, after an interval of twenty-five years, formed a singular counterpart to the above statements. The persons examined spoke from long and intimate experience; and their testimony, though varying in detail, coincided for the most part in its general bearing. They denounced the obstructive policy pursued towards them; and the majority distinctly declared that permission to settle had not been availed of, because the protection of life and property, common to every other part of the British Empire, was not afforded in India to any but the actual servants of government; the interests of all other subjects, European and native, being habitually disregarded. One witness alleged, that, "at this present time" (May, 1858), there are fewer Englishmen settled in the interior of India than there were twenty years ago, government servants excepted.†

* *Metcalfe Papers*, pp. 144; 150; 164; 171. It is, however, only fair to remind the reader, that Lord Metcalfe is declared by his biographer, Mr. Kaye, to have subsequently greatly modified his opinions. Seeing that government by the Crown would be, in fact, government by a parliamentary majority; he said, if that were applied to India, our tenure would not be worth ten years' purchase.—*Papers*, p. 165.

† Mr. G. Macnair.—Second Report, p. 2.

Another gentleman gave a clear exposition of similar convictions; stating, that—

"The real serious impediment to the settlement of Englishmen in India, is to be found in the policy of the system under which our Indian possessions have been hitherto, and, unfortunately, up to the present day, are still governed;—that policy which, giving certain extensive and exclusive privileges to a corporation established for trading purposes, and gradually formed into a governing power, originally shut out the spirit of enterprise, by excluding from the country Englishmen not servants of the Company. Although the extreme severity of this original policy has been somewhat modified and gradually relaxed, its spirit has remained but little changed; and its effects have been to keep the people of this country very ignorant of the resources and great value of India, and of the character, condition, and wants of the natives. Moreover, it is a matter of notoriety, that there has been, and is at the present time, a constant antagonism between the official and non-official Anglo-Indian communities; and that exactly as the adventuresome Englishman, who is called an interloper, with difficulty obtained his admission in the country, so even now he maintains his position in a continuous but unequal struggle with the local government, which he, in turn, regards as an obstacle between himself and the Crown and constitution to which he owns allegiance, and looks for protection in his own country. Then again, the departments of administration, police, the judicial system, both civil and criminal, are notoriously so wretchedly inefficient, oppressive, and corrupt, that they deter the peaceful and industrious from living within their influence, or risking their lives and property under their operations. I believe that even the comparatively few gentlemen settled in the interior of the country, would willingly withdraw, if they could do so without a ruinous sacrifice of property; for little or no heed has been given to their complaints, nor indeed of the natives; while the evils which have been pointed out for many years past are greatly on the increase. The present constitution of the legislative council has made matters worse than they were before; and that body has certainly not the confidence either of Europeans or natives. With the exception of two judges taken from the Supreme Court of Calcutta, it is composed of salaried and government officials, who have been such from the age of twenty, who have really nothing at stake in the country, and who are not likely to live under the operation and influence of the laws which they pass; while those who are directly interested in the well-being of the country, both Europeans and natives, are entirely excluded from any voice in the laws by which they are to be ruled and governed. * * * At present, you have in India a series of antagonisms which works most injuriously for all classes, and completely prevents that union amongst the governing people which appears to me to be essential to the well-being, not only of ourselves, but of the millions of people our subjects, taken under our care and protection avowedly for their own good, and enlightenment, and advancement in civilisation. At present there is an antagonism in the army, by the distinction of two services; and a worse antagonism between the Queen's courts and the Company's courts; between the laws administered in the presidency towns and in the interior; between the covenanted service, who have a monopoly of the well-paid appointments, and the upper, or educated portion of the uncovenanted service, who think themselves most unjustly excluded from advancement: and, finally, between almost every Englishman (I speak of these as facts, not as matters of opinion) not in the service of the Company, and the local government and covenanted service, who not only represent but carry out the policy of the East India Company, so as to shut out the direct authority of the Crown, the intervention of parliament, and the salutary and most necessary influence of public opinion in England. You cannot disconnect the European and the native. If you legislate simply with the idea of what is suitable to the English, without referring to the native and redressing the grievances of the native, there will be that unhappy antagonism between them that will effectually bar Europeans from going out to India."*

The exorbitant rate of interest (from fifteen to eighteen per cent.) charged on advances of money made to an indigo-planter, silk producer, or any settler occupied in developing the resources of the country (though not to be compared with that exacted from the native borrower), was urged by "an English zemindar"† resident some twenty-five years in Bengal, as another proof of the insecurity of property in the mofussil, or country districts, compared with that situated within the Calcutta jurisdiction, where large sums can be readily raised at from six to seven per cent. interest.‡ He enumerated the grievances already set forth in preceding sections, and pointed to the successful cultivation extensively carried on by European settlers in Ceylon, as a consequence of the perfect security and encouragement to capitalists, afforded by the administration and regulations of that island. §

Another witness declared that, in some parts of India, the land-revenue system actually excluded European capitalists. He instanced the Madras presidency, and some portions of that of Bombay, where the Ryotwarree settlement was in force, where the government was the immediate landlord, and was represented in its transactions with its wretched tenants by the revenue police, an ill-paid and rapacious army of some 60,000 men, whose character was pretty well exposed in the Madras Torture Report. The settlement made no provision for the

* Evidence of Mr. J. G. Waller.—Second Report, pp. 169, 170.

† Evidence of Mr. John Freeman.—First Report, pp. 112; 119; 139.

‡ The fixed legal maximum of interest in Bengal was twelve per cent.; other commissions brought it up to eighteen per cent.—Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise. Second Report, p. 54.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

introduction of an intermediate class of landlords; and the pauperised labourers emigrated in tens of thousands, to the Mauritius and elsewhere, leaving their own waste lands, to obtain subsistence in better governed countries.

In Bengal, both European and native capital and skill found employment under the permanent settlement, the value of which the natives generally perfectly understood, and called the "Great Charter of Bengal." The same witness adds—"It is invaluable to them and to us too; for it has saved Bengal from insurrection."*

This one great advantage possessed by Bengal, did not, however, compensate for its other drawbacks; among which, the British settlers especially dwelt on the lamentable deficiency of commercial roads, and the contrast thereby offered to the beautiful pleasure-drives for civilians and their ladies, which surround the chief stations. A settler engaged in growing rice, sugar, tobacco, and vegetables, for the Calcutta market, on an estate situated only forty miles from the great English metropolis, described the difficulty of transit as so great, that the men who came to take the sugar away were obliged to do so upon bullocks' backs, each animal carrying about two maunds (about 1½ cwt. English), and treading warily along the lines separating one rice-field from another, which are generally about a foot in breadth, somewhat elevated above the field, acting also as ledges to keep the water in the fields: but, adds this witness, "some distance from there, where there is a little bit of road, they will take twenty or twenty-five maunds of produce with a cart and a couple of bullocks."†

Despite all discouragements, the British settlers claimed to have done good service to their country and to India; and they affirmed "that wherever Europeans have been settled during the late convulsion, those parts have been less disturbed."‡ Their enterprise has been imitated by the native merchants; and many in Calcutta have, during the last forty years, become large shippers of produce, and send orders for manufactured goods direct to England.§

Articles of great importance have been principally discovered and worked by the "interlopers." The coal-beds found by them after years of research, now give beneficial employment to several associations, including the Bengal Company, which alone pays a large sum per month to the railway, for the transit of coal from Raneegunge to Calcutta. The supply furnished by them proved invaluable to the government during the mutiny; and the fleets of inland steamers belonging to the General Steam Navigation and Ganges Companies, then rendered vital service in the conveyance of the British troops, the naval brigade, and military ammunition and stores. Their efficiency would have been much greater had the authorities heeded the arguments previously addressed to them regarding the want of a canal to Rajmahal, or kept open one of the Nuddea rivers from Nuddea to the Ganges.||

The British settlers were the first to establish direct steam communication between Calcutta and Suez: through their instrumentality the transit through Egypt was carried out, and the first steamer placed on the Nile: they introduced the river steam-tugs, used to facilitate the intricate and dangerous navigation between Calcutta and the pilot station; and they established the horse-carriages, by which Sir Colin Campbell and hundreds of officers and soldiers hastened to the seat of war. Silk, and other valuable and easily-transportable products, such as indigo, the hateful drug opium, together with jute, hemp, tobacco and linseed, have considerably increased in quantity, and improved in quality, under the influence of British capital and energy. The settlers succeeded in growing good tea before it was discovered to be indigenous in so many places

* Evidence of Mr. Theobald.—First Report, pp. 61, 62; 85.

† Evidence of Mr. J. Freeman.—First Report, p. 119. (See further testimony to the same effect—First Report, pp. 114; 157. Second Report, pp. 31; 40; 52; 108. Third Report, pp. 64, 65.)

‡ Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise.—Second Report, p. 36.

§ Evidence of Mr. Freeman.—First Report, p. 114.

|| The "Nuddea Rivers" is the name given to the network of channels which traverse the country between the Ganges and the Hooghly. These channels are supplied partly from the Ganges and partly from the drainage of the country, and are sometimes all but dry. The general opinion was that one of them might be kept open for the country-boats and for steamers all the year round, instead of five months, if proper engineering skill were applied to the task; by which means a circuitous and even dangerous route of five hundred miles would be avoided.—First Report. Evidence of Mr. W. Theobald, p. 75.

in the Himalayas; and were beginning the cultivation so successfully in Assam and Kumaon, that, in 1856, 700,000lbs. were exported to England. The Neilgherry coffee is alleged to have obtained an excellent name in the London market, as that of Tellicherry has done long ago. Beer has been brewed on the Neilgherries, and sold at 9*d.* per gallon, which the soldiers preferred to the ordinary description, retailed there at 1*s.* and 1*s.* 2*d.* per quart bottle.*

During the Russian war, there was an export of grains and oil seeds (forming, in 1856, a large item) from the interior of India to England; but it ended on the conclusion of peace, because war prices, or canal irrigation and carriage, were essential conditions of remuneration. The same thing occurred with wheat. At the commencement of the war there was a first export of twenty quarters, which rose to 90,963 quarters in 1856, and fell with declining prices to 30,429 quarters in 1857. Rice is exported largely under any circumstances, because it is produced in great abundance on the coast, and is not subject to the cost of inland carriage.† This, and much similar testimony, tends to corroborate the unqualified declaration previously made by Colonel Cotton, that "India can supply England fully, abundantly, cheaply with its two essentials, flour and cotton; and nothing whatever prevents its doing so but the want of public works."‡

The evidence of British settlers was very satisfactory regarding the possibility of cultivating cotton of good quality to an almost unlimited extent. One witness predicted that the first three or four large canals (for irrigation as well as transit) made in India, would drive the American cotton entirely out of the market, from the much lower cost of production in India. American cotton costs 6*d.* per pound at the English ports; Indian, of equal quality, might, it was alleged, be delivered there from any part of India at a cost of 1½*d.* per pound.§

Even supposing this representation to be somewhat sanguine and highly-coloured, it was most desirable that a vigorous effort should be made to restore the ancient staple product of India, by making one grand experiment—whether slave labour may not be beaten out of the market by the cheapest and most abundant supply of free labour which could possibly be desired. In the cultivation and manufacture of cotton, all the requirements of England and of India (national and individual) are combined: capital, skill, and careful superintendence, would find remunerative exercise on the one side; and, on the other, large masses of people, now half-starved, would be employed; and men, women, and even children could work together in families—an arrangement always much desired in India.

Neither is there any reason why the manufacture of the finer fabrics—of gold-wrought and embroidered muslins—should not be resumed as an article of export. They are quite peculiar to India, and must remain so. The temperature of the country; the delicate touch of the small supple native fingers; the exquisite, artistic tact in managing the gorgeous colouring: all these points combine in producing effects which have been strangely undervalued in England. The barbaric pearl and gold, the diamonds of Golconda, the emeralds and pearls, have led us to overlook the incomparable delicacy of Indian manufactures.

Shawls are almost the only exceptional article amid general neglect. The French, always discriminating in such matters, have shown more appreciation of the value of native manipulation. Several factories, called "filatures," have been for many years established in their settlement at Pondicherry, and where, properly organised and superintended by practical men, the profit yielded is stated at no less than thirty per cent. per annum on the capital invested. A parliamentary witness says, if three times the amount could have been spun, it would have found ready purchasers.‖ It was however, asserted, that the assessments were not half as high in Pondicherry as in the neighbouring British territory.

The point long doubtful, whether the English constitution could ever bear permanent residence and active occupation in India, appears to be solved by the concurrent testimony of the planters, whose evidence before a committee of the House of Commons, has been so largely quoted. Their stalwart frames and healthy appearance, after twenty, and even thirty years' experience, went far to confirm their statements, that

* Evidence of Captain Ouchterlony.—Third Report, p. 4.

† Third Report.—Evidence of Mr. W. Balston, See also vol. 1. p. 527. ‡ *Public Works*, p. 29.

§ Evidence of Mr. W. Balston.—Third Report, p. 98.

‖ Evidence of Captain Ouchterlony.—Third Report, pp. 13; 37.

out-door employment in the more temperate localities, was, even in India, favourable rather than detrimental to health. It is still an open question, how far their children or grandchildren may thrive there; and to what extent early transplantation to schools in the sanitaria afforded by the Neilgherries and other hilly tracts, may operate in preventing physical deterioration.

The chief attractions to "merchant adventurers" in India, are as prominent now as in the days when good Queen Bess granted the first charter to her subjects; the field for capital and enterprise is quite as wide, and even more promising. Merchants, money-lenders, and government stipendiaries, are the only wealthy natives at present in India; and many of these—some by fair and highly creditable means, others by intrigue and usury—have become possessed of fortunes which would enable them to take rank with a London millionaire.

India is, in truth, a mine of wealth; and if we are permitted to see the sword of war permanently sheathed, it may be hoped that we shall take a new view of things; especially, that the leaders of our large manufacturing towns — Birmingham and Manchester, Glasgow and Belfast — will take up the question of good government for India, and convince themselves, by diligently comparing and sifting the evidence poured forth from many different sources, of the necessity for developing the resources and elevating the condition of their fellow-subjects in Hindoostan. Poverty, sheer poverty, is the reason why the consumption of our manufactures is so small; and its concomitants—the fear of extortion, and personal insecurity, induce that tendency to hoarding, which is alleged to operate in causing the annual disappearance of a considerable portion of the already insufficient silver currency.

This, and other minor evils, are effects, not causes; they are like the ailments which inherent weakness produces: strengthen the general frame, and they will disappear. The temptation of profitable and secure investments, such as urgently-required public works may be always made to offer by a wise government, would speedily bring forth the hoarded wealth (if there be such) of India, and would assuredly attract both European and native capital, which, thus employed, might be as seed sown. The British settlers, and some public-spirited native merchants (such as the well-known Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeeboy, of Bombay, with others in each presidency), have shown what individual effort can accomplish. It is now for the government to follow their example, and prepare for a rich harvest of material and moral progress.

Annexation, and Infraction of the Indian Laws of Inheritance.—The system of subsidiary alliances, established by Lord Wellesley, in the teeth of many and varied difficulties, has, without doubt, been the means of quietly and effectively establishing the supremacy of England over the chief part of the Indian peninsula. It has likewise greatly conduced to the general tranquillity, by compelling the native governments to keep peace with one another. It might have done much more than this, had subsequent governors-general entered into the large and generous policy of its promoter, and viewed it as a protective measure calculated to prolong the existence of native states, and regulate the balance of power. Lord Wellesley had no passion for annexation; he did not even say with Clive, "to stop is dangerous, to recede is ruin:"* on the contrary, he believed that the time had arrived for building up a barrier against further extension; and for this very purpose he bent every energy of his mind to frame the system which has been perverted by his successors, and warped by circumstances, into a preliminary to absorption and extinction.

He desired to preserve the independence of the Rajpoot principalities; and thus, rather than by exterminating wars, to keep in check the then alarmingly turbulent and aggressive Mahratta powers. His plans were perfected, and fairly in operation when he quitted India. Unhappily, his whole policy was, for a little while, misrepresented and misunderstood. Its reversal was decreed, and unswerving "non-intervention" was to be substituted for protective and defensive alliances. In theory, this principle seemed just and practicable; in action, it involved positive breach of contract with the weaker states, with whom, in our hour of peril, we had formed treaties, and whom we were pledged to protect against their hereditary foes.

Mistaken notions of economy actuated the authorities in England; and, unfortunately, Sir George Barlow, on whom the

* *Metcalfe Papers*, p. 5.

charge of the supreme government devolved by the sudden death of Lord Cornwallis, was incapable of realising, much less of forcibly deprecating, the evil of the measures he was called upon to take. Lord Lake, the commander-in-chief, felt his honour so compromised by the public breach of faith involved in the repudiation of treaties which he had been mainly instrumental in obtaining, that he resigned, in disgust, the diplomatic powers entrusted to him.*

No less indignation was evinced by the band of rising statesmen, whose minds had been enlarged and strengthened by participation in the views of the "great little man," who, "from the fire of patriotism which blazed in his own breast, emitted sparks which animated the breasts of all who came within the reach of his notice."† One of these (Charles Metcalfe) drew up a paper on the policy of Sir George Barlow, of remarkable interest and ability. He says—

"The native powers of India understand the law of nations on a broad scale, though they may not adhere to it; but they are not acquainted with the nice quirks upon which our finished casuists would draw up a paper to establish political rights. Our name is high, but these acts must lower it; and a natural consequence is, that we shall not again be trusted with confidence.

"Sir George Barlow, in some of his despatches, distinctly states, that he contemplates, in the discord of the native powers, an additional source of strength; and, if I am not mistaken, some of his plans go directly, and are designed, to foment discord among those states. * * * Lord Wellesley's desire was to unite the tranquillity of all the powers of India with our own. How fair, how beautiful, how virtuous does this system seem; how tenfold fair, beautiful, and virtuous, when compared with the other ugly, nasty, abominable one."‡

All the members of the Wellesley school imbibed the same tone; and though they differed widely on many points, and subsequently became themselves distinctive leaders, yet Elphinstone and Malcolm, Adams and Jenkins, Tucker and Edmonstone, consistently maintained the rights of native states, and regarded any disposition to take advantage of their weakness or promote strife, as "ugly, nasty, and abominable."

When the non-intervention system proved absolutely impracticable, the authorities fell back on that of subsidiary alliances; but instead of proceeding on the broad basis laid down by Lord Wellesley, and organising such relations of mutual protection and subordination between the greater and the minor states, as might be necessary for the preservation of general tranquillity, a system of minute and harassing interference was introduced into the affairs of every petty state. "We established," writes Sir Charles Metcalfe in 1830, when a member of the supreme council, "a military police throughout Central India, with a view to maintain order in countries belonging to foreign potentates."§ The arrangements made were costly, clumsy, and inefficient; and, in the end, have worked badly for all parties.

The British contingents which joined the rebel Bengal army in 1857, were, for the most part, forced on the native princes, and their general tendency has been to foster the inherent weakness, corruption, and extortion of the states in which they have been established. The benefit of exemption from external strife, had been dearly purchased by increased internal oppression; the arm of the despot being strengthened against his subjects by the same cause which paralysed it for foreign aggression. Then had arisen the difficult question—how far we, as the undoubted supreme power, were justified in upholding notoriously incapable and profligate dynasties, even while the cruel wrongs of the people were unceasingly reported by the British residents at the native courts? As is too frequently the case, the same question has been viewed from different points of view at different times, and, at each period, the decision arrived at has run the risk of being partial and prejudiced.

In the time of Warren Hastings, Sir John Shore, and Lord Wellesley, the increase of territory was deprecated by the East India Company and the British nation in general, as equally unjust in principle and mistaken in policy. The fact that many of the Hindoo, and nearly all the Mohammedan, rulers were usurpers of recent date, ruling over newly-founded states, was utterly ignored; and their treacherous and hostile proceedings against us, and each other, were treated as fictitious, or at least exaggerated. At length a powerful reaction took place; people grew accustomed to the rapid augmentation of our Anglo-Indian empire, and ceased to scrutinise the means by which it was accomplished. The rights of native princes, from being over-estimated, became as unduly disregarded.

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 406.
† *Metcalfe Papers*, p. 10.
‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

The system of annexation afterwards pursued, which set at nought the ancient Hindoo law regarding the succession of adopted sons and female representatives, was alleged to have been a special cause of the revolt.* From time immemorial, the adoption of heirs in default of natural and legitimate issue, has been the common custom of the Hindoos. If a man have no son, it is an imperative article in his religious belief that he should adopt one; because it is only through the ceremonies and offerings of a son, that the soul of the father can be released from *Put*—which seems to be the Brahminical term for purgatory. The adopted child succeeds to every hereditary right, and is treated in every respect as if lawfully begotten. Lord Metcalfe has expressed a very decided opinion on the subject. After pointing out the difference between sovereign princes and jagheerdars—between those in possession of hereditary sovereignties in their own right, and those who hold grants of land, or public revenue, by gift from a sovereign or paramount power—he adds, that Hindoo sovereign princes have a right to adopt a successor, to the exclusion of collateral heirs; and that the British government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of Hindoo law. "The supposed reversionary right of the paramount power," Lord Metcalfe describes "as having no real existence, except in the case of the absolute want of heirs; and even then the right is only assumed in virtue of power; for it would probably be more consistent with right, that the people of the state so situated should elect a sovereign for themselves."†

Many of our leading statesmen have concurred not only in deprecating the use of any measures of annexation which could possibly be construed as harsh or unjust, but also in viewing the end itself, namely, the absorption of native states, as a positive evil. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had probably had more political intercourse with the highest class of natives than any other individual now living, had always continued to entertain the same views which he set forth as interpreter to Major-general Wellesley, in the memorable conferences held to negotiate the treaties of Surjee Anjengaum and Deogaum, in 1803, with Sindia and the rajah of Berar;‡ when he described the British government as uniformly anxious to promote the prosperity of its adherents, the interests of such persons being regarded as identified with its own.

Many years later, Mr. Elphinstone wrote—"It appears to me to be our interest as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments: it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers: their territories afford a refuge to all whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours; and the contrast of our government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered."

Colonel Wellesley, in 1800, declared, that the extension of our territory and influence had been greater than our means. "Wherever we spread ourselves," he said, "we increase this evil. We throw out of employment and means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded, or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionately decreased."§

Marquis Wellesley, in 1842, wrote—"No further extension of our territory is ever desirable in India, even in the event of war for conquest, if that could be justified or were legal, as the law now wisely stands."||

Lord Ellenborough (despite the annexation of Sinde) advised, that even "what are called rightful occasions of appropriating the territories of native states," should be avoided; because he considered, that the maintenance of those states, and "the conviction that they were considered permanent parts of the general government of India, would materially strengthen our authority. I feel satisfied, that I never stood so strong with my own army as when I was surrounded by native princes; they like to see respect shown to their native princes. These princes are sovereigns of one-third of the population of Hindoostan;

* *Vide Rebellion in India;* by John Bruce Norton.

† *Metcalfe Papers* (written in 1837); p. 318.

‡ *Supplementary Despatches of F. M. the Duke of Wellington;* edited by the present Duke: vol. iii.

§ *Wellington Despatches.* Letter to Major Munro, dated 20th August, 1800.

|| Letter from the Marquis Wellesley to Lord Ellenborough, 4th July, 1842.

and with reference to the future condition of the country, it becomes more important to give them confidence that no systematic attempt will be made to take advantage of the failures of heirs to confiscate their property, or to injure, in any respect, those sovereigns in the position they at present occupy."

Sir John Malcolm went further still, and declared, that "the tranquillity, not to say the security, of our vast Oriental dominions, was involved in the preservation of the native principalities, which are dependent upon us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from these alliances, their co-existence with our rule is, of itself, a source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost. * * * I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule."

Henry St. George Tucker likewise lifted up his voice in warning, declaring, that the annexation of a principality to our gigantic empire, might become the source of weakness, by impairing our moral influence over our native subjects.*

These opinions so far prevailed, that down to the viceroyalty of Lord Dalhousie, the Hindoo custom of adoption was not only sanctioned, but urged by the supreme government on native princes in the absence of natural heirs. The majority of Indian dynasties have been maintained in this manner. The famous Mahratta leaders, Dowlut Rao Sindia of Gwalior, and Mulhar Rao Holcar of Indore, both died childless: the latter adopted a son; the former left the choice of a successor to his favourite wife, who exercised the right, and herself filled the position of regent.†

On the death of the adopted prince, in 1843, his nearest relative, a boy of eight years of age, was proclaimed maharajah. The war which took place in the same year, and which terminated in the capture of the fortress of Gwalior by the British troops, on the 4th of January, 1844, did not lead to the extinction of the principality, as it would unquestionably have done under the course of policy which subsequently prevailed. The young maharajah was confirmed in the position, for which, as he advanced in age, he showed himself well qualified; and his name, like that of his cotemporary the rajah of Indore, since took high rank amid the faithful allies of England.

Lord Ellenborough's opinions regarding the maintenance of native states, were not, however, shared by his zealous champion, Sir Charles Napier, who expressed himself on this point, as on most others, in very strong terms. "Were I emperor of India," he said, when his views were most matured, "no Indian prince should exist." He would dethrone the Nizam, he would seize Nepaul: in fact, he considered, that without the abolition of the native sovereignties no great good could be effected, and the Company's revenues must be always in difficulty.‡

Sir Charles was probably singular in his desire to extend the British frontier indefinitely, and "make Moscowa and Pekin shake;" but many persons, including Mr. Thoby Prinsep and other leading India House authorities, looked forward to the extinction of the subsidiary and protected states within our boundary as desirable, both in a political and financial point of view, especially in the latter.§

In India, the majority of the governing "caste," as Colonel Sykes called the civilians,‖ were naturally disposed to favour extensions of territory which directly conduced to the benefit of their body, and for the indirect consequences of which they were in no manner held responsible. To them, the lapse of a native state was the opening of a new source of promotion, as it was to the directors in England of "patronage"—an advantage vague in sound, but very palpable and lucrative in operation. No wonder that the death of the "sick man" should have been often anticipated by his impatient heirs as a happy release, which it was excusable and decidedly expedient to hasten. It was but to place the sufferer or victim within reach of the devouring waves of the Ganges,

* Several of the above opinions, with others of similar tendency, will be found collected in a pamphlet entitled *The Native States of India;* published by Saunders and Stanford, 6, Charing-cross: 1853.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 427.

‡ See review in the *Times*, May 25th, 1857, of Sir W. Napier's *Life of Sir C. Napier*.

§ See Mr. Prinsep's pamphlet on the *Indian Question in* 1853.

‖ Third Report of Colonization Committee, 1858; p. 88.

and the result, according to Hindoo notions, is paradise to one party, and pecuniary advantage, or at least relief, to the other. The whirlpool of annexation has been hit upon as offering advantages of a similar kind; namely, complete regeneration to the native state subjected to its engulphing influence, and increased revenue to the paramount power. Bengal civilians began to study "annexation made easy," with the zeal of our American cousins, and it was soon deemed indispensable to hasten the process by refusing to sanction further adoptions. The opinions quoted in preceding pages were treated as out of date, and the policy founded on them was reversed. The experience of the past showed, that from the days of Clive, all calculations founded on increase of territorial revenue, had been vitiated by more than proportionate increase of expenditure. It might have also taught, that the decay of native states needed no stimulating, and that even if their eventual extinction should be deemed desirable, it would at least be well to take care that the inclined plane by which we were hastening their descent, should not be placed at so sharp an angle as to bring them down, like an avalanche, on our own heads. These considerations were lost sight of in the general desire felt "to extinguish the native states which consume so large a portion of the revenue of the country;"* and few paused to consider the peculiar rights of native administrators, as such, or remembered that, in many cases, the profit derived from the subsidy paid for military contingents, was greater than any we were likely to obtain from the entire revenue. In fact, the entire revenue had repeatedly proved insufficient to cover the cost of our enormous governmental establishments, civil and military.

The expenditure consequent on the war with, and annexation of, Sinde,† was the subject of much parliamentary discussion, the immense booty obtained by the army being contrasted with the burden imposed upon the public treasury and highly-taxed people of India. Still the lesson prominently set forth therein was unheeded, or treated as applicable only to projects of foreign aggrandisement, and having no relation to questions of domestic policy.

The Marquis of Dalhousie expressed the general sentiments of the Court of Directors, as well as his own, in the following full and clear exposition of the principles which prompted the series of annexations made under his administration:—"There may be a conflict of opinion as to the advantage, or to the propriety, of extending our already vast possessions beyond their present limits. No man can more sincerely deprecate than I do any extension of the frontiers of our territories, which can be avoided, or which may not become indispensably necessary from considerations of our own safety, and of the maintenance of the tranquillity of our provinces. But I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength; for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests, we believe, will be promoted thereby."

Lord Dalhousie differed from Lord Metcalfe and others above quoted, not less with regard to the nature of the end in view, than as to the means by which that end might be lawfully obtained; and he has recorded his "strong and deliberate opinion," that "the British government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue, as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural, when the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindoo law."

It is not surprising that the process

* *Modern India;* by Mr. Campbell, a civilian of the Bengal service.

† Mr. St. George Tucker asserted, that the proceedings connected with the annexation of Sinde were reprobated by every member of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, "as characterised by acts of the grossest injustice, highly injurious to the national reputation:" and that the acquisition of that country was "more iniquitous than any which has ever stained the annals of our Indian administration."—*Memorials of Indian Government*, pp. 351, 352.

of absorption should have been rapid, when the viceroy, who held the above opinions, was essentially a practical man, gifted with an "aptitude for business, unflagging powers of labour, and clearness of intellect;" which even the most decided opponents of his policy have applauded. In reviewing the result of his eight years' administration, Lord Dalhousie dwelt, apparently without the slightest misgiving, on the large increase of the British territories in the East during that period; four kingdoms, and various chiefships and separate tracts, having been brought under the sway of the Queen of England. Of these, *the Punjab* was the fruit of conquest.* *Pegu and Martaban* were likewise won by the sword in 1852; and a population of 570,180 souls, spread over an area of 32,250 square miles, was thereby brought under the dominion of the British Crown.†

The *Raj or Principality of Sattara*, was the first state annexed by Lord Dalhousie, to the exclusion of the claims of an adopted son. There was only one precedent—and that a partial one—for this measure: it occurred under the administration of Lord Auckland, in 1840, in the case of the little *state of Colaba*, founded by the pirate Angria, whose chief fort, Gheria, was taken by Watson and Clive in 1756.‡ Colaba was dependent on the government of the Peishwa at Poona; and, on the extinction of his power, the British entered into a treaty with Ragojee Angria, the existing chief, guaranteeing the transmission of his territories in their integrity to his "successors." With the sanction of the Bombay government, Ragojee adopted a boy, who died soon after him. Permission was asked for a fresh adoption, but refused; and the territory was treated as having escheated for want of heirs male, although, it is alleged, there were many members of the Angria family still in existence, legally capable of succeeding to the government.

Sattara was altogether a more important case, both on account of the extent and excellent government of the kingdom, and because its extinction involved a distinct repudiation of the practice of adoption previously sanctioned by the British authorities, and held by the Hindoos as invariably conferring on the adopted child every privilege of natural and legitimate issue.§ The fact was so generally recognised, that there seems no reason to doubt that the native princes, in signing subsidiary or other treaties, considered that children by adoption were included, as a matter of course, under the head of legitimate heirs and successors. The exception, if intended, was sufficiently important to demand mention. But the conduct of the government, in repeated instances (such as those of the Gwalior and Indore principalities, of Kotah in 1828, Dutteah in 1840, Oorcha, Banswarra, and Oodipoor, in 1842, and, several years later, in Kerowlee),|| was calculated to remove all doubt by evidencing its liberal construction of the Hindoo law of succession.

Lord Auckland declared, in the case of Oorcha, that he could not for a moment admit the doctrine, that because the view of policy upon which we might have formed engagements with the native princes might have been by circumstances materially altered, we were therefore not to act scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those engagements; and again, when discussing the question of the right of the widow of the rajah of Kishenghur to adopt a son without authority from her deceased husband, his lordship rejected any reference to the "supposed rights" which were suggested as devolving on the British government as the paramount power, declaring that such questions must be decided exclusively with reference to the terms and spirit of the treaties or engagements formed with the different states; and that no demand ought to be brought forward than such as, in regard to those engagements, should be scrupulously consistent with good faith.

By this declaration Lord Auckland publicly evinced his resolve to adhere to the principle laid down by high authority forty years before, under very critical circumstances. It was not an obedient dependency, but the fortified border-land of a warlike principality, that was at stake, when Arthur Wellesley urged the governor-general to abide by the strict rules of justice, however inconvenient and seemingly inexpedient. On other points of the question the brothers might take different views; on this they were sure to agree; for they

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, p. 65.
† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 456.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 458. Parl. Papers, 16th April, 1858.]
§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 271.

|| The social grounds on which the practice of adoption is based, are well set forth by General Briggs. See Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 226; and *Native States*, pp. 21; 23.

were equally ready to "sacrifice Gwalior or every other frontier in India ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith."*

The mode of dealing with Sattara did not contribute to raise the British name either for generosity or unflinching integrity. The deposition of that most able ruler, Pertab Sing, on a charge of conspiracy against the supreme government,† was earnestly deprecated in England by many eminent men, and excited great indignation among his subjects. The secret and hurried manner in which his seizure and trial were conducted, increased the apparent hardship of his sentence; and an able writer asserts his conviction that when it occurred, not a native in India, nor five persons in the world, believed in his guilt.‡ He died in 1847, leaving an adopted son, around whom the affections of the people long clung.§ The remembrance of his misfortunes did not pass away; and one of the mutineers, hung at Sattara in 1857, addressed the surrounding natives while he was being pinioned, to the effect that, as the English had hurled the rajah from his throne, so they ought to be driven out of the country.‖ The deposition of Pertab Sing was not, however, accompanied by any attempt at annexation of territory; the government, on the contrary, "having no views of advantage and aggrandisement," resolved, in the words of the new treaty (5th September, 1839), to invest the brother and next in succession to the rajah with the sovereignty. This brother (Appa Sahib) died in 1848. He, also, in default of natural issue, had adopted a son, whose recognition as rajah was strongly urged by Sir George Clerk, the governor of Bombay, on the ground that the terms of the treaty, "seemed to mean a sovereignty which should not lapse for want of heirs, so long as there was any one who could succeed, according to the usages of the people." "In a matter such as this question of resumption of territory, recovered by us, and restored to an ancient dynasty,"¶ he observes, "we are morally bound to give some consideration to the sense in which we induced or permitted the other party to understand the terms of a mutual agreement. Whatever we intend in favour of an ally in perpetuity, when executing a treaty with him on that basis, by that we ought to abide in our relations with his successors, until he proves himself unworthy."

Sir G. Clerk further advocated the continuance of the independence of Sattara, on account of its happy and prosperous state. Mr. Frere, the British resident, said that no claimant would venture to put forward his own claim against the adopted sons of either of the late rajahs; but that there were many who might have asserted their claim but for the adoption, and who would "be able to establish a very good *primâ facie* claim in any court of justice in India." These arguments did not deter Lord Dalhousie from making Sattara the first example of his consolidation policy. "The territories," he said, "lie in the very heart of our own possessions. They are interposed between the two military stations in the presidency of Bombay, and are at least calculated, in the hands of an independent sovereign, to form an obstacle to safe communication and combined military movement. The district is fertile, and the revenues productive. The population, accustomed for some time to regular and peaceful government, are tranquil themselves, and are prepared for the regular government our possession of the territory would give." With regard to the terms of the treaty, he held that the words "heirs and successors" must be read in their ordinary sense, and could not be construed to secure to the rajahs of Sattara any other than the succession of heirs natural: and the prosperity of the state, he did not consider a reason for its continued independence, unless this prosperity could be shown to arise from fixed institutions, by which the disposition of the sovereign would always be guarded, or compelled into an observance of the rules of good government. (This, of course, could not be shown, such security being peculiar to countries blessed with free institutions, and utterly incompatible with any form of despotism.) In conclusion, the governor-general argued, that "we ought to regard the territory of Sattara as lapse, and should incorporate it at once with the British dominions in India."**

The Court of Directors were divided in opinion on the subject: nine of them agreed

* *Wellington Despatches*, 17th March, 1804.
† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 432.
‡ Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 171.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 171.
‖ *Bombay Telegraph*, 19th June, 1857.
¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 419.
** Minute by Lord Dalhousie, 30th August, 1848.

with, and five differed from, Lord Dalhousie.* The dissentients were Messrs. Tucker, Shepherd, Melville, Major Oliphant, and General Caulfield. Regarding the precedent established in the case of Colaba, Mr. Tucker said—

"I remonstrated against the annexation (I am disposed to call it the confiscation) of Colaba, the ancient seat of the Angria family, to which the allusion has been made in the Bombay minutes; and far from having seen reason to modify or recall the opinion recorded by me on that proceeding, I have availed myself of every suitable occasion to enforce my conviction, that a more mischievous policy could not be pursued than that which would engross the whole territory of India, and annihilate the small remnant of the native aristocracy. There are persons who fancy that landed possessions in India cannot be successfully administered by native agency. In disproof of this notion I would point to the Rampoor jaghire in Rohilcund, which was a perfect garden when I saw it long ago, and which still remains, I believe, in a state of the highest agricultural prosperity. Nay, I would point to the principality of Sattara, which appears to have been most successfully administered both by the ex-rajah, Pertab Sing, and his brother and successor, Appa Sahib, who have done more for the improvement of the country than our government can pretend to have done in any part of its territory."†

This, and other energetic protests, are said to have produced so strong an impression, that a vote seemed likely to pass in the Court of Proprietors, repudiating the annexation of Sattara. The majority of the directors perceiving this, called for a ballot, and so procured the confirmation of the measure by the votes of some hundreds of ladies and gentlemen, for the most part utterly ignorant of the merits of the case.‡

The provision made by the supreme government for the widows and adopted son,§ was censured by the directors; and Lord Dalhousie writes, that although the Hon. Court had declared "their desire to provide liberally for the family, and their wish that the ladies should retain jewels, furniture, and other personal property suitable to their rank, they still objected that the grant of so much property, which was fairly at the disposal of the government, was greatly in excess of what was required."‖

The Kingdom of Nagpoor "became British territory by simple lapse, in the absence of all legal heirs;" for the government, says Lord Dalhousie, "refused to bestow the territory, in free gift, upon a stranger,¶ and wisely incorporated it with its own dominions."**

Absorption was becoming a very familiar process to the British functionaries, and the addition of a population of about 4,650,000, and an area of 76,432 square miles,†† appeared to excite little attention or interest. Parliamentary returns prove, however, that the kingdom was not extinguished without palpable signs of dissatisfaction, and even some attempt at resistance on the part of the native government. The ranees, or queens, on the death of the rajah in December, 1853, requested leave to take advantage of the Hindoo law, which vested in them, or at least in the chief of them—the right of adopting a son, and of exercising the powers of the regency. They offered to adopt, according to the pleasure of the supreme government, any one of the rightful heirs, who, they alleged, existed, and were entitled to succeed to the sovereignty; "both according to the customs of the family and the Hindoo law, and also agreeably to the practice in such cases pursued under the treaties." The reply was a formal intimation, that the orders issued by the government of India having been confirmed by the Hon. Court of Directors, the prayer of the ranees for the restitution of the raj to the family could not be granted. The maharanee, called the Banka Bye (a

* The question of the right of adoption, says Mr. Sullivan, was treated by all the authorities at home and abroad as if it had been an entirely new one, and was decided in the negative; whereas, it appeared, by records which were dragged forth after judgment was passed in the Sattara case, that the question had been formally raised, and as formally decided in favour of the right, twenty years before; and that this decision had been acted upon in no less than fifteen instances in the interval.—Pamphlet on the *Double Government*, published by India Reform Society; p. 24.

† Lieutenant-general Briggs, in his evidence before the Cotton Committee appointed in 1848, mentioned having superintended the construction of a road made entirely by natives for the rajah of Sattara, thirty-six miles long, and eighteen feet wide, with drains and small bridges for the whole distance.

‡ Sullivan's *Double Government*, p. 26.

§ They were allowed to retain jewels, &c., to the value of sixteen lacs, and landed property worth 20,000 rupees a-year. Pensions were also granted (from the revenue) to the three ranees, of £45,000, £30,000, and £25,000 respectively.—Parl. Papers (Commons), 5th March, 1856; p. 10.

‖ Parl. Papers, &c., p. 10.

¶ Lord Dalhousie, in a minute dated 10th June, 1854, admits that lineal members of the Bhonslay family existed; but adds, "they are all the progeny of daughters."—Parl. Papers (Commons), 16th June, 1856.

** Minute, dated 28th February, 1856; p. 8.

†† Parl. Papers (Commons), 16th April, 1858.

very aged woman, of remarkable ability, who had exercised the authority of regent during the minority of her grandson, the late rajah), and the younger ranees, were not entirely unsupported in their endeavours for the continuance of the state, or at least for the obtainment of some concessions from the paramount power. The commissioner, and former resident, Mr. Mansel, represented the disastrous effect which the annexation of Nagpoor was calculated to produce upon certain influential classes. The dependent chiefs, the agriculturists, and the small shopkeepers would, he considered, "if not harshly agitated by new measures," be easily reconciled to British rule; but—

"The officers of the army, the courtiers, the priesthood, the chief merchants and bankers who had dealings with the rajah's treasury and household—all the aristocracy, in fact, of the country, see in the operation of the system that British rule involves, the gradual diminution of their exclusive consequence, and the final extinction of their order."*

The extinction of the aristocracy was calculated to affect the mass of the population more directly than would at first seem probable. Mr. Mansel truly says—

"The Indian native looks up to a monarchical and aristocratic form of life; all his ideas and feelings are pervaded with respect for it. Its ceremonies and state are an object of amusement and interest to all, old and young; and all that part of the happiness of the world which is produced by the gratification of the senses, is largely maintained by the existence of a court, its pageantry, its expenditure, and communication with the people. Without such a source of patronage of merit, literary and personal, the action of life in native society as it is and must long be, would be tame and depressing. * * * It is the bitter cry on all sides, that our rule exhibits no sympathy, especially for the native of rank, and not even for other classes of natives. It is a just, but an ungenerous, unloveable system that we administer, and this tone is peculiarly felt in a newly-acquired country. It may be that we cannot re-create, but we may pause ere we destroy a form of society already existing, and not necessarily barren of many advantages. * * * The main energies of the public service in India are directed to, or absorbed in, the collection of revenue and the repressing of rural crime; and the measures applied to the education of the native people are of little influence; while many of our own measures—as in the absorption of a native state (if we sweep clean the family of the native prince and the nobility gradually from the land)—are deeply depressing on the national character and social system."†

He therefore recommended, with a view of reconciling the past with the future, in a change of government from Oriental to European hands, that the Nagpoor royal family should be permitted to exercise the right of adoption; to enjoy the privileges of titular chieftainship; and to retain possession of the palace in the city of Nagpoor, with a fixed income and a landed estate.

The reply to these recommendations was, that the governor-general in council could not conceal his surprise and dissatisfaction at the advocacy of a policy diametrically opposed to the declared views of the supreme authority. The grounds on which the British commissioner advocated the creation of a titular principality, were pronounced to be weak and untenable; while all experience was alleged to be opposed to the measure which he had "most inopportunely forced" on the consideration of government. The king of Delhi, the nawab of Bengal, and the nawab-nizam of the Carnatic, were cited as so many examples of its impolicy: but "in all these cases, however, some purpose of great temporary expediency was served, or believed to be served, when the arrangement was originally made; some actual difficulty was got over by the arrangement; and, above all, the chiefs in question were existing things [?] before the arrangement." In the present instance, however, the official despatch declares there was no object of even temporary expediency to serve; no actual difficulty of any sort to be got over; no one purpose, political or other, to be promoted by the proposed measure.‡

The provision suggested by Mr. Mansel as suitable for the ranees in the event of his proposition being rejected, was condemned as extravagantly high; the hereditary treasure of the rajah, the governor-general considered, in accordance with the decision of the Hon. Court in an analogous case (Sattara), was "fairly at the disposal of the government, and ought not to be given up to be appropriated and squandered by the ranees."§

The money hoarded, having been accumulated, it was alleged, out of the public funds, was available to defray the arrears of the palace establishments—a reasonable

* Parl. Papers (Commons)—Annexation of Berar: No. 82; March 5th, 1856; p. 4.

† *Ibid.*, p. 6.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.

§ The mode of appropriating the personal and hereditary treasure of the late rajah, suggested by the commissioner as likely to be approved by the ranees, was the building a bridge over the Kumaon river; and thus, in accordance with Hindoo custom, linking the family name to a great and useful work.

plea, which could not be urged in defence of the same seizure of personal savings in the case of Sattara.

This unqualified censure of the commissioner was followed by his removal, a proceeding directly calculated to inculcate the suppression not only of opinions, but even of facts, of an unpalatable kind. The half-measure which he had suggested might possibly have worked badly, as most half-measures do; but it was avowedly proposed as a compromise, and as a means of meeting difficulties, which the Calcutta authorities saw fit to ignore. No notice whatever was taken of Mr. Mansel's statement, that in arguing with the people at Nagpoor on the practice of putting the members of the family of a deceased chief on individual life pensions, upon the absorption of a state, they immediately (though not before unsubservient to the execution of orders from Calcutta for the extinction of sovereign powers) fell back upon the law and rights of the case, and contended that the treaty gave what was now being arbitrarily taken away.*

Nothing, indeed, could be more arbitrary than the whole proceeding. A military officer, Captain Elliot, was made officiating commissioner, and a large body of troops was placed at his disposal to overawe opposition, in the event of the royal family or their late subjects evincing any disposition to resist the fulfilment of the orders of the governor-general for the seizure of the treasure, hereditary jewels, and even the personal property and household effects of the deceased rajah, which were advertised to be sold by public auction, to provide a fund for the support of his family.

The ranees sent a vakeel, or ambassador, to Calcutta, to intreat that a stop should be put to the sale of effects held as private property for a century and a-half; "and, further, for the cessation of the unjust, oppressive, and humiliating treatment shown by the commissioner, under the alleged orders of government, towards the maharanees and the other heirs and members of the family of the late rajah, whose lives are embittered and rendered burdensome by the cruel conduct and indignities to which they have been obliged to submit."

Repeated memorials were sent in by the ranees, concerning "the disrespect and contumely" with which they were treated by the acting commissioner, and also regarding the manner in which the sales by auction were conducted, and property sacrificed; particularly cattle and horses: a pair of bullocks, for instance, estimated to be worth 200 rupees, being sold for twenty.

The official return of the proceeds of the rajah's live stock, tends to corroborate the statement of the ranees. A hundred camels only realised 3,138 rupees, and 182 bullocks only 2,018; elephants, horses, and ponies in large numbers, sold at equally low prices. The remonstrances of the ranees were treated with contemptuous indifference. The government refused to recognise their envoys, and would receive no communications except through the official whose refusal to forward their appeals was the express reason of their having endeavoured to reach the ear of the governor-general by some other channel.

The removal of the property from the palace was attended by considerable excitement. The native officer employed by the English government, was "hustled and beaten" in the outer courtyard of the palace. The sepoys on duty inside the square, are described by Captain Elliot in his rather singular account of the matter, "as not affording that protection and assistance they were bound to do; for, setting aside Jumal-oo-deen's [the native officer's] rank, position, and employment, he was married, and somewhat lame." There was great excitement in the city, as well as in and about the palace, and great crowds had assembled and were assembling. It was doubtful to what extent opposition might have been organised, for the aged maharanee was asserted to have sent a message to the British officer in command, that if the removal of property were attempted, she would set the palace on fire. This threat, if made, was never executed: reinforcements of troops were introduced into the city, and the orders of the government were quietly carried through. The governor-general considered that the "scandalous conduct" of the sepoys and rifle guards on duty, ought to have been punished by dismissal from the service; but it had been already passed over in silence, and so no martyrs were made to the cause, and the affair passed over as an ebullition of that "floating feeling of national regret," which Mr. Mansel had previously described as ready to discharge itself in dangerous force upon any objects within its range.

* Parl. Papers on Berar, p. 7.

The maharanee denied having incited or approved the resistance offered by her people; but the Calcutta authorities persisted in considering that a plan of resistance had been organised by her during the night preceding the disturbances which took place in the morning of the 11th of October, 1854, and threatened to hold the ranees generally responsible, in the event of any repetition of such scenes as those which had already brought down upon them the displeasure of government.

The ladies were, no doubt, extremely alarmed by this intimation, which the officiating commissioner conveyed to them, he writes, in "most unmistakable language." The sale of the chief part of the jewels and heirlooms (estimated at from £500,000 to £750,000 in value)* was carried on unopposed in the public bazaars; a proceeding which the then free press did not fail to communicate to the general public, and to comment on severely.† Of the money hidden within the sacred precincts of the zenana, 136 bags of silver rupees had been surrendered; but there was a further store of gold mohurs, with the existence of which the Banka Bye had herself acquainted the British functionaries immediately after the death of her grandson, as a proof of her desire to conceal nothing from them. When urged, she expressed her readiness to surrender the treasure; but pleaded as a reason for delay, the extreme, and as it speedily proved, mortal sickness of Unpoora Bye, the chief widow, in whose apartments the treasure was hidden, and her great unwillingness to permit its removal. The commissioner appears to have treated this plea as a continuation of "the old system of delay and passive resistance to all one's instructions and wishes." Nevertheless, he deemed it objectionable "to use force;" and "was unwilling that Captain Crichton [the officer in command] should go upstairs on this occasion, or take any active part in this matter," it being "better to avoid a scene:" and, as an alternative, he advised "writing off the amount known to be buried, to the debit of the ranees, deducting the same from their annual allowance, and telling them the same was at their disposal and in their own possession."‡

The princesses would have been badly off had this arrangement been carried out, for the amount of hoarded treasure had been exaggerated, as it almost invariably is in such cases; and although no doubt is expressed that the formal surrender of 10,000 gold mohurs (made immediately after the delivery of the governor-general's threatening message) included the entire hoard, yet double that sum was expected; the other half having, it is alleged, been previously expended.

The maharanee excited the angry suspicions of the Calcutta government by a despairing effort for the maintenance of the state, with which she felt the honour of her house indissolubly allied. It appeared, that Major Ramsay, then resident at Nepaul, had, when occupying the same position at the court of Nagpoor, been on very bad terms with the deceased rajah. The Banka Bye attributed the extinction of the raj to his representations, and sent a vakeel to him, in the hope of deprecating his opposition, and obtaining his favourable intervention. The errand of the vakeel was misunderstood, and attributed to a desire to communicate with the Nepaulese sovereign on the subject of the annexation of Nagpoor. Under this impression, the governor-general in council declared, that the ranees had no right whatever to communicate with native courts; that it was impossible to put any other than an unfavourable construction on their attempt to do so: and the acting commissioner was officially desired to acquaint them, that the repetition of such an act would "certainly lead to substantial proof of the displeasure of government being manifested to them."

On the mistake being discovered, the following minute was recorded by the governor-general, and concurred in by the four members of council whose names have become lately familiar to the British public. Its curt tone contrasts forcibly with that adopted by the Marquis Wellesley, and his great brother, in their arrangements for the royal family of Mysore: yet the dynasty of Hyder Ali had been founded on recent usurpation, and overthrown in open fight; while that of Berar represented a native power of 150 years' duration, and long in peaceful alliance with the Company as a protected state. The age and reputation of the Banka Bye, her former position as regent, the remarkable influence exercised by her during the late reign, and her

* Parl. Papers (Annexation of Berar), p. 9.

† *Indian News*, 2nd April, 1855.

‡ Letter from officiating commissioner, Capt. Elliot, to government, 13th Dec., 1854.—Parl. Papers, p. 44.

uniform adhesion to the British government,—these, together with the dying state of Unpoora Bye, the eldest of the rajah's widows, and the bereaved condition of them all, might well have dictated a more respectful consideration of their complaints and misapprehensions, than is apparent in the brief but comprehensive account given by the supreme government, of the groundless charge which had been brought against the princesses:—

"It now appears that the vakeel sent by the ranees of Nagpoor to Nepaul, was intended, not for the durbar, but for Major Ramsay, the resident there. Major Ramsay, when officiating resident at Nagpoor, was compelled to bring the late rajah to order. The rajah complained of him to me, in 1848. The officiating resident was in the right, and, of course, was supported. It seems that these ladies now imagine that Major Ramsay's supposed hostility has influenced me, and that his intercession, if obtained, might personally move me. The folly of these notions need not to be noticed. The vakeel not having been sent to the durbar, nothing more need be said about the matter."*

The means used by Major Ramsay "to bring the rajah to order," had been previously called in question, owing to certain passages in the despatch which had occasioned the supersession of Mr. Mansel. These passages are given at length, in evidence of the entirely opposite manner in which successive British residents at Nagpoor exercised the extraordinary powers entrusted to them; interfering in everything, or being absolutely nonentities (except as a drain upon the finances of the state they were, barnacle-like, attached to), according to their temper of mind and habit of body.

"In my arguments," says Mr. Mansel, "with natives upon the subject of the expediency and propriety of the British government dealing with the Nagpoor case as a question of pure policy, I have put to them the position, that we had all of us at Nagpoor, for the last two years, found it impracticable to carry on the government decently. I remarked that Major Wilkinson, after a long struggle, succeeded in getting the rajah within his own influence, and, by his fine sagacity and perfect experience, had controlled him whenever he chose. Colonel Speirs, from decaying health, was latterly unable to put much check upon the rajah, though his perfect knowledge of affairs of the day here, and of Oriental courts in general, would otherwise have been most valuable. Major Ramsay† pursued a course of uncompromising interference, and, in a state of almost chronic disease, attempted a perfect restoration to health. Mr. Davidson, as his health grew worse, left the rajah to do as he liked; and under the argument, that it was better to work by personal influence than by fear, he left the rajah to do as he pleased, with something like the pretence of an invalid physician—that his patient would die with too much care, and required gentle treatment. During my incumbency, I found the rajah so much spoiled by the absolute indulgence of my predecessor, that I was gradually driven to adopt the radical reform of Major Ramsay, or the extreme conservatism of Mr. Davidson; and in the struggle which latterly ensued between myself and the rajah, his end was undoubtedly hastened by vexation at my insisting on his carrying out the reform in spirit as well as to the letter. * * * The argument of the natives, with whom I have frequently conferred on this subject, is, that the British residents at Nagpoor should participate in the blame charged to the rajah by myself; for if the same system of advice and check which was contemplated by the last treaty, had been carried out from first to last, the rajah would never have been tempted into the habits of indolence and avarice that latterly made him make his own court and the halls of justice a broker's shop, for the disposal of official favours and the sale of justice. The answer to this is, that the British government does its best; that it sends its highest servants to a residency; and if the principles or abilities of the different incumbents vary, it is only natural and incidental to any colonial system in the world. The result, however, is, that the management of the country gets into all kinds of embarrassment, of death, judicial corruption, and irresponsibility of ministers, when the readiest course is to resume those sovereign powers that were delegated on trust."‡

Surely the foregoing statements of the last "incumbent" of the Nagpoor residency, afford a clear exposition of the mischievous effects of establishing, at the courts of native princes, a powerful functionary, whose office combines the duties of a foreign ambassador with those of a domestic counsellor, or rather dictator. If the

* Minute, dated November, 1854. Parl. Papers (Annexation of Berar), p. 41. Signed—Dalhousie, J. Dorin, J. Low, J. P. Grant, B. Peacock.

† Major Ramsay denies this; and, while bearing testimony to the "high character" of Mr. Mansel, says, that the policy adopted by the latter was radically opposed to his own, for that he had pursued the most rigid system of non-interference with any of the details of the local government; whereas Mr. Mansel appointed, or caused the appointment of, several individuals to responsible offices in the Nagpoor government, and set apart particular days in the week on which the heads of departments waited upon him at the residency, and submitted their reports and proceedings.—Letter of Major Ramsay to government, 5th February, 1855—Parl. Papers, pp. 46; 53.

‡ Letter of Commissioner Mansel, 29th April, 1854—Parl. Papers, p. 7. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 420, for an account of the circumstances under which the so-called delegation of sovereign powers was made in the case alluded to.

resident be an upright man, he can scarcely fail to be distracted by the conflicting interests of the paramount and dependent states—the two masters whom he is bound to serve; and if of a sensitive disposition, he cannot but feel the anomalous character of his situation at the elbow of a dependent sovereign, who must naturally regard him as something between a schoolmaster and a spy. No doubt there have been British residents whose influence has been markedly beneficial to native states; not only formerly, when their position was better defined, and, from circumstances, involved less temptation to, or necessity for, interference in the internal affairs of the state, but even of late years. The general effect, however, has been the deterioration and depression painted with half unconscious satire by Mr. Mansel, in the case of Nagpoor.

The circumstances attending the annexation of this state, have been dwelt on more on account of the incidental revelations which they involve of the practical working of a pernicious system, than from any special interest which attaches to the particular question so summarily decided by Lord Dalhousie. No connected statement of the case had been made public on behalf of the princesses, notwithstanding the spirited attempts made by the Banka Bye to obtain a fair hearing. When the governor-general refused to receive any communication through her envoys, she sent them to England, in the hope of obtaining a reversal of the decision pronounced at Calcutta. The vakeels complained of the treatment which the ranees had met with, especially of the strict surveillance under which they were placed: their statements were published in the newspapers, and the new commissioner for Nagpoor (Mr. Plowden) took up the matter in resentment. Meantime, Unpoora Bye died (14th Nov., 1855), her end being embittered, and probably accelerated, by the same mental distress which is acknowledged to have hastened that of her husband. The aged maharanee abandoned further opposition, and wrote to London to dismiss her vakeels (2nd Dec., 1855), on the ground that, instead of obeying her orders, and laying her case before the authorities in a supplicating way, so that her "honour and humble dignity might be upheld," they had displayed a great deal of imprudence, and used calumnious expressions against the British officers. She informed them, with significant brevity, of the death of Unpoora Bye; adding—"Well, what has happened, has happened." This letter, which is alike indicative of the character of the writer and of the dictation (direct or indirect) under which it was written, closed the series of papers, published by order of parliament, regarding the annexation of Berar.

The territory resumed from Ali Morad, one of the Ameers of Sinde, in 1852, comprised an area of 5,412 square miles. The reason of the resumption has been already stated.*

Odeipore is mentioned, in a Return (called for by the House of Commons in April, 1858) "of the Territories and Tributaries in India acquired since the 1st of May, 1851," as having been annexed in 1853. The area comprised 2,306 square miles, with a population of 133,748 persons. This place must not be confounded with the two Oodipoors (great and small) in Rajast'han, the absorption of which even Lord Dalhousie would scarcely have ventured on attempting.

The territory resumed from Toola Ram Senaputtee, in Cachar, in 1853, comprised 2,160 acres of land; but, unlike Odeipore, had only the disproportionate population of 5,015.†

Hyderabad.—In 1853, the Nizam concluded a new treaty with the Company, by which he transferred to them one-third of his country, to meet the expenses of the contingent maintained by him, but disciplined and commanded by British officers. The resident, Major-general Fraser, when the proposition for the cession of territory first came under consideration in 1851, recommended nothing less than the deposition of the Nizam, and the assumption of sovereign power by the Company for a definite number of years—a measure which he considered justified by the weak character of the Nizam, and the disorganised state of his administration. This proposition was at once rejected by Lord Dalhousie, who ably argued, that the transfer of the administration to the British government would never be consented to by the Nizam; that to impose it upon him without his consent, would be a violation of treaties; that the Nizam was neither cruel, nor ambitious, nor tyrannical; that his maladministration of his own kingdom did not materially affect the security of British territory, or the interests of British subjects; and that the

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 452.

† Parl. Paper (Commons), 16th April, 1858.

British authorities were neither called on, nor at liberty, to set aside an independent native government because, in their opinion, that government exercised its authority in a manner injurious to its subjects.* "The debt," Lord Dalhousie says, "which burdens the Nizam has been produced by the contingent. The monthly subsidy for which the resident at Hyderabad maintains a perpetual wrestle with the dewan [native chancellor of the exchequer], and which transforms the representative of the British government, by turns, into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in execution, is the pay of the contingent." The governor-general proceeds to expose the misinterpretation of the article of the treaty of 1800; which provided that the British army should, in time of war, be reinforced by a body of 15,000 of the Nizam's troops; but which had "been made to justify our requiring the Nizam to uphold a force of about 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, and four field batteries, officered by British officers, controlled by the British resident, trained on the British system, not in war only, but permanently, at a very costly rate, and so as to be available for the use of the Nizam only when the representative of the British government has given his consent."†

The scale of expenditure on which the contingent was maintained, was inordinate. Lord Dalhousie, in a minute of the 25th of September, 1848, declared—"I agree with Colonel Low in thinking that we cause the contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be. The staff, in my humble judgment, is preposterously large. The pay and allowances, and charges of various kinds, are far higher than they ought to be." Still, nothing was done to reduce this ruinous waste of public funds; for in March, 1853, another minute, by the same ready pen, described the contingent as having no less than five brigadiers, with brigade-majors, attached to it, and a military secretary, who drew the same salary as the adjutant-general of the Bengal army. By the rules of the force, the officers were promoted to superior grades, and to higher pay, earlier than they would have been in their own service; and, altogether, the expenses were "unusually and unnecessarily heavy."‡

The plan devised for compelling the payment, by the Nizam, of expenditure thus recklessly incurred in the maintenance of a contingent which no treaty bound him to support, and which had existed on sufferance from the time of the Mahratta war, without any formal sanction on the part of either government, was vaunted as extremely liberal, apparently because it fell short of total annexation.

The sum claimed was about seventy-five lacs,§ or £750,000 (including interest at six per cent.); to provide for the payment of which, the supreme government demanded the transfer of "districts to the value of not less than thirty-five lacs per annum, so as to provide for the payment of the principal of the debt within three years, and further to afford a margin, which should in each year be applicable to meet any partial deficiencies which might still occur in the supply of monthly pay for the troops of the contingent."‖ The resident pointed out, as the districts of which the British government might most fitly and advantageously demand possession, the Berar Payeen Ghaut, the border districts from thence down to Shorapoor,¶ and the territory of the dooab, between the Kistnah and the Toombuddra; which, together, comprised the whole frontier of the Nizam's kingdom along its northern and western boundaries, and along its southern boundary, as far as the junction of the above-named rivers.

"The Berar Payeen Ghaut (he adds) is, without exception, the richest and most fertile part of the Nizam's country, and the Raichore dooab is the next to it in this respect. These two districts hold out great prospect of improvement in regard to revenue and commerce, from an extended culture of the two articles of cotton and opium. * * * The quantity of opium now cultivated in Berar Payeen Ghaut,

* Parl. Papers, 26th July, 1854; p. 3.

† Minute by the governor-general, June, 1851.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 100.

‡ Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, pp. 4; 103.

§ Minute by governor-general, 27th May, 1851.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 32.

‖ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¶ The resident, Major-general Fraser, adds a remark on Shorapoor, which illustrates the systematic encroachment, manifested in so many ways, and excused by such various pretexts. The rajah of Shorapoor, he says, "is near his majority; but, I presume, that when that district is given over to his charge, measures will be taken by the supreme government for keeping it, for some years at least, subject to the control of a British officer. It is at present in a favourable and improving state; but if given up to the young rajah's exclusive and uncontrolled authority, it will quickly revert to the same state of barbarism in which it was before."—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 14. Shorapoor is inhabited by the Bedars, a warlike aboriginal tribe, whose chief claims a descent of more than thirty centuries.

as well as of cotton, might be greatly increased, and the duty upon them would form, in itself, a very productive source of revenue."

Captain Meadows Taylor likewise gave an extremely tempting account of the same districts; he referred to the reported existence of very valuable anicuts, and described the Raichore district as well supplied with tanks.

Temporary occupation, for the liquidation of the outstanding debt, was all that was to be immediately demanded; but Lord Dalhousie avowedly anticipated the probability of being compelled to retain these districts permanently, for the regular payment of the contingent. Major-general Fraser entered more fully into the subject; and his statements show, in the clearest manner, the irremediable disorder into which the proposed step was calculated to plunge the finances of Hyderabad. He writes (4th February, 1851):—

"We are about to assume, in pursuance of a just right to do so, which cannot be denied, the temporary management of a tract of country yielding from thirty to forty lacs of rupees; and the Nizam, therefore, will have so much income less to meet those demands, to which his whole and undivided revenue has long been proved to be quite unequal. He has been unable, for the last five years, to pay the contingent, except by partial instalments only, although he considers this the first and most important payment incumbent on his government to make; and it cannot, therefore, be expected that he should be able to meet this essential claim upon him with his financial means diminished to the extent above mentioned. It is all but certain that he will not be able to pay the contingent [*brigadiers, brigade-majors, military secretaries, and all*] for any further period than perhaps the next two months, and this, probably, but in small proportion only. The ultimate consequence, then, must be (and I see no reason why this argument should not be set before him in a plain and distinct light), that we should be under the necessity of retaining, permanently, in our possession the territory of which we are now about to assume the temporary charge."

The Nizam felt the iron pale which surrounded his kingdom closing in, and made an attempt at resistance which astonished the supreme authorities, and disconcerted, or at least delayed, the execution of their arrangements. Open resistance the governor-general was prepared to overwhelm by taking military possession of the specified districts. The Nizam was too prudent, or too powerless, to offer any. Suraj-ool-Moolk, the chief minister, appointed in compliance with Lord Dalhousie's suggestion, and pronounced by him to be the only man who seemed to possess the capacity to grapple with the difficulties of the state, pointed out the certain ruin which the proposed cession would involve. The districts demanded, he said, afforded one-third of the entire revenue; another third would be required for the regular monthly payment of the contingent, &c.: and only one-third being left to carry on the entire administration, both the Nizam and his subjects would be reduced to distress for the means of existence.

Arguments of this nature had been anticipated, and would probably have made little impression, had they not been followed up by a distinct offer for the immediate liquidation of arrears. The resident had received no instructions how to act in so unexpected a case, and he therefore wrote word to Calcutta, that pending further orders, he had judged it his duty to consent to leave the question of the transfer of the districts in temporary abeyance, the Nizam having found means to take upon himself the entire and immediate payment of his debt, and to give "the best security that could be offered for the future regular payment of the contingent, short of the actual transfer, to us, of part of his country for this purpose."*

The first half of the debt was paid at once; the second proved more difficult to be raised in the precise manner required, although the Nizam contributed thirty lacs of rupees (£30,000) from his private funds. Suraj-ool-Moolk requested that a favourable rate of exchange might be allowed for the Nizam's bills, in consideration of the interest paid by him direct to the British government, of that exacted by usurers on sums borrowed on the same account, and especially because of the notorious embarrassments of the state. He asked that the existing average rate of exchange on the Company's bills should be applied to the Nizam's, and that these latter should be credited according to their dates. In support of his first request, he urged that it was the universal practice to pay a debt at the current rate of exchange, and not at the rate which prevailed when the loan was made; adding, that it ought to be borne in mind, that the present debt had accumulated, in the course of seven years, by comparatively small sums; and the whole of it was now required to be paid within four months. With regard to the

* Letter of Resident Fraser, 16th July, 1851.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 52.

second point, he said—"If instead of hoondees [bills], the Circar [state] paid the amount of the debt to you in cash, and you found it expedient to remit the money to the residencies, you would have to pay ready money to the soucars [bankers] for the hoondees you procured for this purpose; and as I send you hoondees so purchased, instead of the coin, I do not think I am unreasonable in requesting that credit may be given to this Circar [state] on the dates the hoondees are delivered to you."*

But the resident would hear of no allowance; no deductions in any way. The financial difficulties of the Nizam were a subject of regret; but it was not "equitable, that the loss of which Suraj-ool-Moolk complained, should be lessened at the expense of the British government."

The 31st of October—the time specified for the payment of the second and final instalment—arrived. The Nizam, though unable to raise the entire sum required, yet managed to furnish a considerable portion of it, and acted in such a manner as to convince the resident that he was really "exerting himself, in good faith, to liquidate the whole." The governor-general records this, in a minute dated 3rd January, 1852; yet, at the same time, he was occupied in framing a treaty which was to deprive the Nizam of the territory he had made so strenuous an effort to retain. Colonel Low was dispatched to Hyderabad to conduct the negotiations; "his judgment, firmness, and conciliatory demeanour" being relied on to bring about the issue desired by the supreme government. The task was neither an easy nor a pleasant one.

The proposals now made were, that the Nizam should cede the frontier districts in perpetuity, and receive, in return, a receipt in full for the portion of the instalment he had failed to pay in October, and likewise for the future subsistence of the contingent, which the Company proposed to reorganise in their own name, on a reduced scale, transforming it from the Nizam's force into one to be maintained for him by the government. There was, moreover, a subsidiary force, which the Company were bound to maintain in perpetuity by the treaty of 1800, within the state of Hyderabad; the funds being provided by the cession of the Nizam's share of the territory acquired from Mysore.† The government had need of these troops, and desired to obtain, by a new treaty, the right of employing the chief part of them elsewhere, on the plea of there being no necessity for them in Hyderabad; the danger of external foes which existed when the arrangement was first made, and when the Mahrattas were in the height of their power and turbulence, having long since passed away.

It was true that, by this particular part of the proposed arrangement, the Nizam would be no loser; because the contingent, and the large number of troops in his immediate service, alone exceeded the ordinary requirements of the state. Only, as Lord Dalhousie wanted the services of the subsidiary force elsewhere, and as the contingent force, to a great extent, performed its duties and supplied its place, it is evident that there could be no excuse for appropriating the services of the former body without contributing to the expenses of the latter, which amounted to £30,000 a month.‡

This was never even contemplated; and the state of Hyderabad having been made to furnish funds in perpetuity for a subsidiary force, was now to be compelled to cede territory for the support of another distinct but very similar body of troops, and to place the former at the service of the British government without receiving any compensation whatever.

It is true the Nizam was to be given the option of disbanding the contingent; but then the immediate ruin of the country was anticipated by the resident as so palpable and certain a consequence of such a measure, that the idea was viewed as one of the last the Nizam would entertain. Even in the event of his choosing this hazardous alternative, in a desperate endeavour to relieve his finances from the incubus with which they had been so long burdened, the transfer of territory was still to be insisted on, at least temporarily, for the payment of arrears, "and for covering the future expenses of the force during the time necessary for its absorption, in the gradual manner required by good faith to existing personal interests."§

* Letter from Sooraj-ool-Moolk, 14th August, 1851.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 70.

† For the origin and establishment of the subsidiary force, see *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 373; 378.

‡ Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), 26th July, 1854; p. 94.

§ Despatch from directors, 2nd November, 1853.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 8.

"Beneficial as these proposals are, especially to the Nizam," writes Lord Dalhousie, "it is anticipated that his highness will be reluctant to assent to them:" and, in the event of his reluctance amounting to a positive refusal to sign the new treaty, military possession was ordered to be taken of the coveted districts.

The Nizam was, as had been anticipated, incapable of appreciating the advantages offered him: he saw no occasion for any new treaty at all; earnestly craved for time to pay off the debt; and promised to meet the expenses of the contingent with regularity for the future—a promise which, however, there is reason to fear he lacked the means of performing. At first, he seems to have been inclined to stand at bay; and in the opening conference with Colonel Low, he took up the strong point of his case, and put it very clearly.

"In the time of my father," said the Nizam, "the Peishwa of Poona became hostile both to the Company's government and to this government, and Sir Henry Russell (the resident) organised this contingent, and sent it in different directions, along with the Company's troops, to fight the Mahratta people; and this was all very proper, and according to the treaty; for those Mahrattas were enemies of both states; and the Company's army and my father's army conquered the ruler of Poona, and you sent him off a prisoner to Hindoostan, and took the country of Poona.* After that, there was no longer any war; so why was the contingent kept up any longer than the war?"

Colonel Low was not prepared to meet an argument which went at once to the gist of the question; and he made, as an honest man could not help doing, a very lame reply, excusing himself on the plea, that thirty-six years had elapsed since the occurrence of the events alluded to by the Nizam; that he (the colonel) was not in Hyderabad at the time; but that he supposed the reigning prince had considered the maintenance of the contingent a good arrangement, and therefore consented to it. He proceeded to represent the necessity of retaining this force to overawe the Arabs, Rohillas, Seiks, and other plunderers, and to enable the Nizam to collect his revenues: adding, that the governor-general was so much disposed to act liberally in the matter, that he would probably aid in reducing the expenses of the contingent, if that were desired. The Nizam here abruptly terminated the conference.

A draft treaty was sent in, providing for the required cession; and the Nizam was reminded, that he would thereby gain relief, in future, from the heavy interest he had been compelled to pay on money borrowed for the maintenance of the contingent. His reiterated reply was—"A change in a treaty, be it what it may, can never be an advantage to a sovereign who prefers, as I do, that there should not be any change at all." He reluctantly consented to discuss the subject again with the resident, and received him at the second interview with a flushed face and excited manner, which, at first sight, resembled the effects of wine or opium. This was not the case; for the Nizam had never shown himself more acute in argument, nor more fluent in conversation; but he was very angry, and had been sitting up nearly all night examining the treaty with his chief nobles. "Two acts," he said, "on the part of a sovereign prince are always reckoned disgraceful: one is, to give away, unnecessarily, any portion of his hereditary territories; and the other is, to disband troops who have been brave and faithful in his service. * * * Did I ever make war against the English government, or intrigue against it? or do anything but co-operate with it, and be obedient to its wishes, that I should be so disgraced?"† Again and again he asked to be allowed to pay the forty-six lacs of rupees then owing, and provide security for future regularity; but the resident reminded him that similar pledges had been repeatedly violated, and urged him to accept the governor-general's proposition, and apply the sum he spoke of in lessening the heavy arrears of his own troops and servants. The Nizam, in reply, made what impartial readers may consider a natural and sensible speech; but which the resident reported as illustrative of "his highness's peculiar and strange character."

"Gentlemen like you," he said, "who are sometimes in Europe, and at other times in India; sometimes employed in government business, at other times soldiers; sometimes sailors, and at other times even engaged in commerce (at least I have heard that some great men of your tribe have been merchants), you cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign prince, born to live and

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 419.

† Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 119.

die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations. You think that I could be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your government in perpetuity: it is totally impossible that I could be happy; I should feel that I was disgraced. I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the same footing as Mohammed Ghouse Khan [the Nawab of Arcot]; to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat and sleep and say my prayers. Wah!"*

Other remarks followed; the Nizam went over all the most disputed portions of former negotiations, and said that the Company ought to give him territory instead of taking any away. He complained bitterly of the discreditable transactions connected with the firm of Palmer & Co., by which his father had sustained both territorial and pecuniary loss;† and adverted sarcastically to the high value the British power placed on money. The second interview terminated as unsatisfactorily as the first. A third followed, at which the Nizam received the resident with "something of sadness in his expression of countenance," yet "with due courtesy and politeness." But he soon grew excited, and said angrily, "Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the contingent at all?" In that case, he was told, some years might elapse before the men could be otherwise provided for, and the specified districts would still be required to provide for them in the interim.

The conversation came to a standstill, and the resident broke silence by asking a decided answer to the question—whether the Nizam would consent to form a new treaty? "I could answer in a moment," was the retort; "but what is the use of answering? If you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new treaty, or giving any answer at all."

Once more the discussion was adjourned. The government had resolved, in case of necessity, "to take possession of the districts by physical force;"‡ but a difficulty arose as to the troops to be employed. There were, indeed, more than sufficient for the purpose already stationed within the limits of Hyderabad; but the employment of troops ostensibly organised for the Nizam's service, in direct opposition to his will, would, one of the members of government observed, be a measure of doubtful propriety in the case of the subsidiary force, but, beyond all doubt, wrong in the case of the contingent. The same minute shows how completely native contingents were viewed as identified with British interests, and how little anticipation was then entertained that a time was coming when the majority would mutiny, murder their officers, and fight to the death against the united power of their own princes and the British government: it also illustrates the anomalous condition of contingent troops in general, on whom such divided allegiance as is here described, must necessarily have sat lightly; and who were counted upon by the supreme government, as being ready, at any moment, to march against the person and the capital of their ostensible master, to whom they had sworn allegiance, and whose salt they ate.

"I am quite satisfied," writes Sir Frederick Currie, "that the troops of the contingent would, at the command of the resident and their officers, march against the other troops of the state, against Hyderabad, and against the person of the Nizam himself, if so ordered, as readily as against any other parties, so entirely have they been taught to consider themselves our soldiers; but we must not, on that account, lose sight of the fact, that they are *bonâ fide* the Nizam's troops, enlisted (by British officers, it is true, but by British officers in the pay and service of the Nizam) in his name, sworn to allegiance to him, and obedience to his orders. It would be, to my mind, the very height of anarchy to order these troops to coerce their master in any way; but more especially so, to use them for the purpose of taking violent possession of a part of that master's territories in order to provide for their own pay."§

The government had therefore a special reason for desiring to procure the consent of the Nizam to their occupation of the frontier districts; beside which, the use of the subsidiary troops for their own purposes, could only be obtained by an article framed to supersede the rule by which they were "hampered"|| in the treaty of 1800; and further, it was desirable to secure a legal sanction for the continued maintenance of the contingent.

At length a modification of the draft treaty was agreed upon, chiefly through

* An Arabic exclamation, indicative of anger and surprise, and uttered with uncontrollable passion.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 120.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 421.

‡ Resident's Letter.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 129.

§ Minute by Sir F. Currie, 2nd April, 1853.

|| Minute by Mr. Dorin, 1st June, 1853.—Parl. Papers, p. 154.

the mediation of Shums-ool-Omrah, the uncle-in-law of the Nizam; who was described by the resident as having been famed, throughout a long life, for truthfulness and general respectability of character, and who evinced, at a very advanced age, remarkable manliness and good sense. The Nizam positively refused to sign away any of his territory in perpetuity; but he reluctantly consented to the temporary transfer of the districts to British management, on condition of regular accounts being rendered to him, and the surplus revenue being paid into his treasury, after the liquidation of the old debt, and the regular payment of the contingent, with some other items, should have been provided for.

The governor-general had previously declared, that "much consideration" was due to the Nizam on account of the unnecessary expense at which the contingent had been maintained; and had dwelt forcibly on the heavy pecuniary sacrifice the government was willing to make by cancelling the old debt. Why this benevolent intention was not carried out, does not clearly appear. The Nizam would have joyfully accepted the boon, if assured that it involved no latent responsibility; but it never seems to have been placed within his reach. Lord Dalhousie, in his long minute on the subject of the advantages procured by the treaty, says, "that in providing, beyond risk, the means of regularly paying the contingent, and of terminating all pecuniary transactions and consequent causes of dispute with the Nizam, the government of India secured an all-important object; to obtain which, it was prepared not merely to accept an assignment of districts only, but further to cancel the fifty lacs of rupees due to it." His lordship adds—"The government may well be content with a treaty which gives it what it sought without requiring the sacrifice it was ready and willing to make in return."

No doubt the new arrangement was an extremely favourable one for the British government, when viewed in the light of temporary financial expediency. The benefit to be derived by the prince, whom Lord Dalhousie truly called our "old and staunch ally," is by no means equally apparent.* Yet it would seem to have been so to the Calcutta council; for, in sending home to the Court of Directors the documents from which the preceding account has been exclusively framed, and the precise words of which have been, as far as possible, adhered to, entire confidence is expressed in the irrefragable proofs contained therein, "that the conduct of the government of India towards the Nizam, in respect of the contingent and of all his other affairs, has been characterised by unvarying good faith, liberality, and forbearance; and by a sincere desire to maintain the stability of the state of Hyderabad, and to uphold the personal independence of his highness the Nizam."

The directors evidently sympathised with Lord Dalhousie's views of the course prompted by such laudable motives, including "a due regard for our own interests."† They rejoiced to find the Indian government relieved "from the unbecoming position of an importunate creditor;" and presented their "cordial thanks to the governor-general, and the officers employed by him, in negotiating so satisfactory a treaty."

The transfer was effected in 1853. Since then, the annexation of Hyderabad had been openly canvassed, and, probably, would have been quickly completed, only the turn of Oude came first, and then—the mutiny. Fortunately for us, the Nizam died in the interim; otherwise, "the mingled exasperation and humiliation," which Lord Dalhousie himself declares the proceedings of the governor-general *must* have produced in his mind, would perhaps have taken a tangible form; and, to our other difficulties, might have been added that of struggling with "one of the most dangerous and fanatical Mussulman districts in India."‡

* Parl. Papers, p. 40.

† Minute and despatch by gov.-general, pp. 8, 9.

‡ See *Quarterly Review*, August, 1858; article on "British India," pp. 265, 266. The writer (believed to be Mr. Layard) refers to the "garbled" Blue Book from which the statement in the foregoing pages has been framed, as affording some insight into the manner in which Lord Dalhousie bullied the Nizam into a surrender of his three richest districts; and speaks of a letter full of unworthy invective and sarcasm, in which the latter is likened, by the former, "to the dust under his feet." This sentence is not printed in the only letter from the governor-general to the Nizam in the Parl. Papers; which contains, however, the strange assertion, that the efficient maintenance of the contingent force was a duty imposed upon the government of Hyderabad, by the stipulations of existing treaties —a statement refuted by his lordship in repeated minutes. The Nizam is also threatened with the resentment of that great government "whose power can crush you at its will;" and an anticipation is expressed, of the pain and anxiety which must be caused to his highness by "the plain and peremptory

The succeeding Nizam was suffered to ascend his hereditary throne in peace, and would, it was hoped, reap the reward of his allegiance in the restoration of the assigned districts, which a recent authority has declared, "were filched from his father by a series of manœuvres as unjust and discreditable as any that may be found in the history of our administration of British India."*

The principality of Jhansi (a name with which we became subsequently painfully familiar), annexed in 1854, added to our dominions 2,532 square miles of territory, peopled by 200,000 souls. The attendant circumstances were peculiar. In 1804, a treaty was concluded with Sheo Rao Bhao, subahdar or viceroy of Jhansi, by Lord Lake, under what the government truly described as the "nominal" sanction of the Peishwa. The adhesion of this chief was then deemed of much importance, and his influence had effect in inducing many others to follow his example, and thus facilitated our operations in Bundelcund. In 1817, the Peishwa having ceded to us all his rights, feudal, territorial, and pecuniary, in that province, a new treaty was entered into, by which the governor-general, "in consideration of the very respectable character" borne by the lately deceased ruler, Sheo Rao Bhao, "and his uniform and faithful attachment to the British government, and in deference to his wish expressed before his death," consented to confirm the principality of Jhansi, in perpetuity, to his grandson Ram Chandra Rao, his heirs and successors.†

The administration of Ram Chandra was carried on so satisfactorily, that, in 1832, the title of maharajah was publicly conferred on him, in lieu of that of subahdar, by Lord William Bentinck, who was returning by Jhansi to Calcutta, from a tour of inspection in the Upper Provinces. The little state was then well ordered. Its ruler was a sensible, high-spirited young man; his aristocracy and army were composed of two or three thousand persons, chiefly of his own family and tribe; and his villages and people had as good an appearance as any in India. After the ceremony had been performed in the presence of all orders of his subjects, the maharajah approached the governor-general in the attitude of supplication, and craved yet another boon. His subjects watched with deep interest the bearing of their ruler, which, in their view, implied unqualified devotion and allegiance; but they noticed (according to a native writer) the smile of surprise and derision with which the ladies and officials in the viceregal suite regarded the scene. Lord William himself had a juster appreciation of native character, but he naturally feared some embarrassing request, and heard with relief, that the boon desired was simply permission to adopt the English ensign as the flag of Jhansi. A union-jack was at once placed in his hands, and forthwith hoisted, by his order, from the highest tower of his castle under a salute of one hundred guns. The significance of the act thus gracefully carried through, was beyond misapprehension; for the adoption of the flag of the supreme power by a dependent chieftain, was the expressive and well-known symbol of loyalty and identity of interest.‡

Upon the death of Ram Chandra in 1835, without male heirs, the succession was continued in the line of Sheo Rao. Gungadhur Rao, the son of Sheo, while yet a young man, was suddenly carried off by dysentery, on the 21st of November, 1853. The day before his death, the maharajah sent for the political agent of Bundelcund (Mr. Ellis), and the officer in command (Captain Martin), and delivered to them the following *khareeta*, or testament, which he caused to be read to them in his presence, before all his court.

"[After compliments.] The manner in which my ancestors were faithful to the British government, previous to the establishment of its authority [in Bundelcund], has become known even in Europe; and it is well known to the several agents here, that I also have always acted in obedience to the same authority.

"I am now very ill; and it is a source of great grief to me, that notwithstanding all my fidelity, and the favour conferred by

language" addressed to him. Mr. Bright quoted the sentence already given from the *Quarterly Review*, in his place in parliament (June 24th, 1858); adding—"Passages like these are left out of despatches when laid on the table of the House of Commons. It would not do for the parliament, or the Crown, or the people of England, to know that their officer addressed language like this to a native prince." It is further alleged, that when forced to make the transfer in question, the Nizam had a counter pecuniary claim, exceeding in demand that urged against him; which claim, though of old standing and repeatedly advanced, Lord Dalhousie refused to discuss, until the coveted districts should have been surrendered.

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 266.

† Parl. Papers (Jhansi), 27th July, 1855; pp. 1; 17.

‡ Indophilus' *Letters to the Times*, p 11.

such a powerful government, the name of my fathers will end with me; and I have therefore, with reference to the second article of the treaty concluded with the British government, adopted Damoodhur Gungadhur Rao, commonly called Anund Rao, a boy of five years old, my grandson through my grandfather.* I still hope that, by the mercy of God, and the favour of your government, I may recover my health; and, as my age is not great, I may still have children; and should this be the case, I will adopt such steps as may appear necessary. Should I not survive, I trust that, in consideration of the fidelity I have evinced towards government, favour may be shown to this child, and that my widow, during her lifetime, may be considered the regent of the state (Malika) and mother of this child, and that she may not be molested in any way."

Lakshmi Bye addressed the governor-general in favour of the adoption. She argued, that the second article of the treaty was so peculiarly worded, as expressly to state the right of succession in perpetuity, either through *warrisan* (heirs of the body, or collateral heirs) or *joh nasheenan* (successors in general); which the widow interpreted as meaning, "that any party whom the rajah adopted as his son, to perform the funeral rites over his body necessary to ensure beatitude in a future world, would be acknowledged by the British government as his lawful heir, through whom the name and interests of the family might be preserved." She likewise pleaded, that the fidelity evinced by the Jhansi chiefs in past years, ought to be taken into consideration in coming to a final decision on the fate of the principality.†

Major Malcolm, the political agent for Gwalior, Bundelcund, and Rewah, in forwarding the above appeal, speaks of the first point as an open question for the decision of government; but with regard to the latter plea, he says—"The Bye (princess or lady) does not, I believe, in the slightest degree overrate the fidelity and loyalty all along evinced by the state of Jhansi, under circumstances of considerable temptation, before our power had arrived at the commanding position which it has since attained."‡ In a previous communication, the British agent wrote—"The widow of the late Gungadhur Rao, in whose hands he has expressed a wish that the government should be placed during her lifetime, is a woman highly respected and esteemed, and, I believe, fully capable of doing justice to such a charge." Major Ellis, the political assistant for Bundelcund, considered the particular question of the right of adoption in Jhansi as settled by the precedent established in the case of Oorcha; treaties of alliance and friendship existing with both states, and no difference being discernible in the terms, which could justify the withholding the privilege of adoption from the one after having allowed it to the other. Moreover, he considered that the general right of native states to make adoptions, had been clearly acknowledged and recorded by the directors.§

The governor-general, after having "carefully considered" the above statements, decided that Jhansi, having "lapsed to the British government, should be retained by it, in accordance equally with right and with sound policy." Measures were immediately taken for the transfer of the principality to the jurisdiction of the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces. The native institutions were demolished at a blow, all the establishments of the rajah's government were superseded, and the regular troops in the service of the state were immediately paid up and discharged.‖

The Gwalior contingent, and the 12th Bengal native infantry, were the troops chiefly employed by the British government in carrying through these unpopular measures; but reinforcements were held in readiness to overawe opposition. Employment such as this, on repeated occasions, was not calculated to increase the attachment of the sepoys to the foreign masters whom they served as mercenaries, in what many of them considered the confiscation of the rights and property of native royalty. If they had any latent patriotism, or any capacity for feeling it, nothing could have been more calculated to arouse or implant it than this ruthless system of absorption. Their sympathies would naturally be enlisted in favour of Lakshmi Bye, who fierce, relentless tigress as she has since appeared,

* This term is used to denominate cousins in the third and fourth degrees, tracing their descent in the male line to a common ancestor.—Jhansi Papers, p. 8.

† Letters from the Ranee.—Parl. Papers, pp. 14; 24.

‡ Jhansi Papers, pp. 14; 24, 25.

§ Major Ellis referred especially to a despatch from the Court of Directors, dated 27th March, 1839 (No. 9), for an explicit statement of their views on the subject of adoption.—Jhansi Papers, p. 16.

‖ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

was then venerated as a marvel of youth, ability, and discretion. "This lady," said Major Malcolm, "bears a very high character, and is much respected by every one in Jhansi;" and he urged especially (in the event of the annexation of the state), "that in compliance with her husband's last request, all the state jewels and private funds, and any balance remaining in the public treasury, after closing the accounts of the state, should also be considered as her private property."*

The governor-general replied, in general terms, that the property of the rajah would belong by law to his adopted son; because, the adoption, if legally made, was good for the conveyance of private rights, though not for the transfer of the principality. Thus the ranee was not only deprived of the regency, but was held to be cut off from other claims by the very means her dying husband had taken to ensure her future position. The first part of her history ends here. We have no account of the manner in which she bore her disappointment; but we know that she rose at the first signal of the mutiny, and that her name is now inseparably connected with thoughts of massacre and war. Her subsequent career does not, however, belong to this introductory chapter. The supreme council were by no means unanimous regarding the seizure of Jhansi. Messrs. Low and Halliday, while professing themselves convinced by Lord Dalhousie's reasoning on the legality of the annexation, stated, that they would have preferred the pursuance of a similar course towards Jhansi to that already taken with regard to Kerowlee.

Now Kerowlee was a Rajpoot principality, the annexation of which was only prevented by the interference of the home government, on a threatened motion of the House of Commons.†

Indophilus (whose opinion on the subject is especially interesting, on account of his tendency towards the annexation policy in particular, and generally in favour of the Company) says, that Kerowlee had neither been so well governed, nor had entered into such an interesting relation with us, as Jhansi: but its rajah was descended from the Moon (Chandrabunsee); and some thousands of half-civilised relations and retainers were dependent for their social position and subsistence upon the continuance of the little state. He also died without children; but the native institutions of the state were suffered to continue, and the ruling chief has remained faithful to us during the insurrection. The larger Rajpoot states of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Bikaneer, and others, have been also on our side. "The case of their Brother of the Moon was justly regarded by them as a test of our intentions towards them, and they were in some degree reassured by the result. There can be no doubt (adds Indophilus) that these small national states, which must be dependent upon the central government, and cannot, if treated with common fairness, combine against it, are an important element of the Indian system."

The Nawab of the Carnatic died in 1855, leaving no son. The claims of his paternal uncle, Azim Jah (who had been regent), were urged as entitling him, by Mohammedan law, to succeed to the musnud; but the decision was given against him, and the title of nawab placed "in abeyance," on the ground that the treaty by which the musnud of the Carnatic had been conferred on the nawab's predecessor, had been purely a personal one, and that both he and his family had disreputably abused the dignity of their position, and the large share of the public revenue which had been allotted to them.‡

Mr. Norton, an English barrister of the Madras bar, who had been present at the installation of the deceased nawab, and had resided at Madras throughout the whole of his occupation of the musnud, says, he was neither of bad parts nor of bad disposition; and had he been only moderately educated, his presence at Madras might have entailed great benefits upon the people, especially the Mussulman population. The nawab had been under the tutelage of the Company from his earliest infancy; and instead of superintending his moral and intellectual training, they gave him over "to the offices of panders and parasites, and left him to sink, from sheer neglect, into the life of sensuality and extravagance common to Eastern princes." He died suddenly, while still young; and Mr. Norton argues, that

* Letter of political agent (Malcolm), 16th March, 1854.—Parl. Papers on Jhansi, p. 28.

† *Quarterly Review*, July, 1858; article on "British India," p. 269.

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 11. Minute of Governor-general Dalhousie, 28th February, 1856. Return to order of House of Lords; printed 16th June, 1856; pp. 12, 13.

foolish and improvident as his conduct had been, he had committed no offences sufficiently heinous to justify the penalty inflicted on the family; adding, "we might just as reasonably have refused to allow the heirs of George IV. to succeed him, on account of his irregular habits and extravagance."

The same writer states, that Azim Jah, the rejected claimant of the musnud, had been on several occasions officially recognised, in writing, as the lawful heir.*

The titular Raj of Tanjore was abolished by alleged right of lapse on the death of its last rajah, Sevajee, in 1855. The resident, Mr. Forbes, pleaded strongly in behalf of the daughter of the deceased. He urged that Tanjore was not a conquered country; that its acquisition had not cost the life of a single soldier, nor the value of a single rupee; and that during fifty years' possession, a revenue of no less than twenty crores, or as many millions sterling, had been derived from it by the British government. After entreating favourable consideration for the daughter of a line of princes who, when their aid was needed, had always proved our firm allies—he sets forth another and very pertinent view of the case, declaring, that "it is impossible to doubt that the now prosperous condition of the country would be very greatly affected by the sudden withdrawal of a circulation amounting to about eleven lacs a-year. So great a diminution of the expenditure within the province, must certainly lead to a difficulty in realising the revenue: it is a small tract of land from which to raise fifty lacs a-year; and it cannot be a matter of indifference to the producers, whether more than a fifth of the revenue be spent among them or not."

Mr. Norton gives his personal testimony with regard to the unnecessary and impolitic harshness with which the extinction of the titular principality was accomplished. A company of sepoys was marched suddenly into the palace; the whole of the property, real and personal, was seized, and the Company's seals put upon all the jewels and other valuables. The soldiery were disarmed, and in the most offensive way. The private estate of the rajah's mother, of the estimated value of three lacs a-year, was sequestered, and then remained so. The occupier of every piece of land in the district, which had at any time belonged to a former rajah, was turned out of his possession, and ordered to come before the commissioner to establish a title to his satisfaction. The whole of the people dependent upon the expenditure of the raj revenue among them, were panic-struck at the prospect of being thrown out of employ; and, in a week, Tanjore, from the most contented place in our dominions, was converted into a hotbed of sullen disaffection. The people venerated the raj, and were indignant at its suppression: the very sepoys refused to receive their pensions.

According to Mr. Norton, the terms of the treaty promised the succession to "heirs" in general, and not exclusively to heirs male; but he considers the prior claim to be that of the senior widow, in preference to the daughter; and quotes a precedent in the history of the Tanjore dynasty, and many others in Hindoo history, including that of Malcolm's favourite heroine, Ahalya Bye, the exemplary queen of Indore.†

Kamachi Bye, the senior widow, intended contesting her claims to the raj, in England. She first filed a bill in the Supreme Court, for the recovery of the personal private estate of her late husband, and then obtained an injunction against the Company, to restrain them from parting with the property.‡

Passing over some minor absorptions, we arrive at the last and greatest of Lord Dalhousie's annexations—one which, both from its importance and special character, requires to be entered into at some length.

Oude, or *Ayodha*, was famous in ancient Hindoo lore as the kingdom of Dasaratha, the father of Rama, the hero of the famous epic the *Ramayana*. With the details of its fall as a Hindoo kingdom, and its history as a province of the Mogul empire, we are almost entirely unacquainted; but we know that it has retained its institutions to the present day, and that, in all respects, the Hindoo element largely predominates throughout Oude. The question of immediate interest is its connection by treaties with the East India Company, and the proceedings of its Mussulman rulers.

It has already been shown that their independence was founded on simple usurpation, having been obtained by taking advantage of the weakness of their rightful sovereigns, the Moguls of Delhi.§

Sadut Khan, nick-named the "Persian pedlar," the founder of the dynasty, was a

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, pp. 98—107.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 392.

‡ Norton's *Rebellion in India*, pp. 107—118.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 159.

merchant of Khorasan, who, by dint of ability and intrigue, eventually procured for himself the position of governor (or soubah, or nawab) of the province of Oude, together with that of vizier, which he held when Nadir Shah invaded India in 1738-'9.

The reigning emperor, Mohammed Shah, was powerless in the hands of his ambitious servants; their plots and peculations facilitated the progress of the invader; and their private quarrels incited the pillage and massacre which desolated Delhi. Sadut Khan was perpetually intriguing against his wily rival, the Nizam-ool-Moolk (or regulator of the state), "the old Deccani baboon," as the young courtiers called him; from whom the Nizams of the Deccan (Hyderabad) descended.

The death of Sadut Khan is said to have been indirectly caused by the Nizam.* It occurred before Nadir Shah quitted Delhi.† His son and successor, Sufdur Jung, was likewise able and unprincipled. The third of the dynasty was Shuja Dowlah,‡ who succeeded, in 1756, to the nawabship, which the weakness, not the will, of the Moguls of Delhi had suffered to become hereditary. The unfortunate emperor, Shah Alum, had indeed no worse enemy than his nominal servant, but really pitiless and grasping gaoler, the nawab-vizier of Oude.§ It was Shuja Dowlah who was conquered by the British troops in the battle of Buxar, in 1764; and with whom, in 1773, Warren Hastings concluded the infamous treaty of Benares, whereby the districts of Allahabad and Corah were, in defiance of the rights of Shah Alum, sold to the nawab-vizier; and British forces were hired out to the same rebellious subject, for the express purpose of enabling him to "annex" Rohilcund, and "exterminate"|| the Rohilla chiefs, with whom we had no shadow of quarrel.

Immediately after the defeat and massacre of the Rohillas on the bloody field of Bareilly in 1774, Shuja Dowlah was seized with mortal sickness, and died after many months of agony. The cause was said to have been a wound inflicted by the daughter of Hafiz Rehmet, the principal Rohilla chief, who perished, sword in hand, at Bareilly. The unhappy girl had been captured; and when the nawab strove to add to the murder of the father the dishonour of his child, she stabbed him, and was immediately seized, and put to death. The wound inflicted by the unhappy girl was slight; but the dagger's point had been dipped in poison, which slowly and surely did its work.¶

The next nawab, Asuf-ad-Dowlah, was a weak and sensual youth, who had no strength of character to enable him to resist the evil counsels of unworthy favourites. The subsidiary troops at first obtained from the English for purposes of the most direct aggression, became a heavy drain on the resources of the misgoverned country. Warren Hastings saw, in his indolent neighbour, an instrument for increasing the dominions of the Company, and refilling their treasury; and then followed new treaties, new loans, new cementing of eternal friendships, and, lastly, the shameless plunder of the begums of Oude, which inflicted indelible disgrace alike on the nawab and the governor-general.**

The Marquis Cornwallis, in this as in other cases, took a very different view to that acted on by his predecessor. He saw the increasing disorganisation of Oude, and remonstrated forcibly with its ruler; who urged, in extenuation, the exactions of the Company, amounting, within a period of little more than nine years, to £2,300,000 sterling.†† The annual subsidy settled by treaty, had been raised, on one pretext or another, until it averaged eighty-four lacs per annum; and Warren Hastings himself acknowledged the "intolerable burden" which was inflicted upon the revenue and authority of the nawab-vizier, by the number, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions, and emoluments of the Company's service, civil and military; which called forth the envy and resentment of the whole

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 166. † *Ibid.*, p. 173.

‡ A memorandum on the Oude dynasty, drawn up by Fletcher Hayes, assistant-resident at Lucknow, is inserted in the Oude Blue Book of 1856. Shuja Dowlah is there described "as the infamous son of a still more infamous Persian pedlar," and as enjoying "the extensive province of Oude as a reward for a service of uncommon villanies." This and other statements are quoted on the authority of Ferishta, the famous Mohammedan annalist; but Mr. Hayes overlooks the fact, that Ferishta (or Mahomed Kasim) was born about the year 1570 during the reign of the emperor Akber, and was the cotemporary of the French traveller Bernier. It is therefore not the *Annals of Ferishta* which Mr. Hayes quotes from, but the continuation of them, known as Dow's *History of Hindoostan*, a work which, though honestly and ably written, occasionally records rumours of the day as historical facts.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 299.

|| The word used in the treaty of Benares.—*Vide Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 329.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 330. ** *Ibid.*, p 363

†† Despatch of directors, 8th April, 1789.

country, by excluding the native servants and adherents of the vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment.*

Lord Cornwallis reduced the amount of tribute to fifty lacs; checked the interference, and curtailed the salaries and perquisites, of officials; and insisted on the disbandment of the temporary brigade, which had been subsidized by the vizier for so long a time only as he should require its services, but from the costly maintenance of which he had afterwards in vain sought relief.

The measures of the governor-general in favour of the Oude government were, unhappily, not attended by any corresponding internal reforms. Profligacy, incapacity, and corruption at court; tyranny, extortion, and strife among the semi-independent Hindoo chiefs; neglect and abject wretchedness among the mass, continued to prevail up to the death of Asuf-ad-Dowlah in 1797.

The succession was disputed between his brother Sadut Ali, and his son Vizier Ali, a youth of seventeen, of a disposition violent even to madness. The Calcutta government (of which Sir John Shore was then at the head) at first decided in favour of Vizier Ali; but clear proof of his illegitimacy, and consequent unfitness to succeed according to Mussulman law, being adduced, the decision was reversed in favour of Sadut Ali, who entered into a new treaty with the Company; by which he consented to surrender the fortress of Allahabad, to increase the annual subsidy, and to receive into his service the additional troops deemed necessary for the protection of Oude.

The Marquis Wellesley (then Lord Mornington) became governor-general in 1798; and his attention was at once drawn to the notorious misgovernment of Oude. The three brothers—the Marquis, Colonel Wellesley (the future duke), and Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley)—discussed the subject publicly and privately; and the colonel drew up a memorandum on the subject, which, in fact, anticipates all that has since been said on the evils of subsidiary troops.

"By the first treaty with the nabobs of Oude, the Company were bound to assist the nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates the evil. It is usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy was generally the whole, or nearly the whole, disposable resource of the state, it was not easy to produce it at the moments at which it was stipulated. The tributary government was then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from aumildars, to sell the office of aumildar, and to adopt all the measures which it might be supposed distress on the one hand, and avarice and extortion on the other, could invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

"As soon as this alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty, and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realise the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by aumildars, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws, and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government; and the result is, an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

"But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government, and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration, in order to save the resources of the state, and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy."†

Lord Wellesley was ambitious, and certainly desirous of augmenting, by all honourable means, the resources and extent of the dominion committed to his charge. He had, however, no shade of avarice in his composition, for himself or for the Company he served: all his plans were on a large scale—all his tendencies were magnificent and munificent. He saw that the Company, by their ostensible system of non-interference in the internal affairs of the nawab's government, and by the actual and almost inevitable exercise of authority therein for the restraint of intolerable acts of oppression and disorder, had created a double government, which was giving rise to the greatest extortion and confusion.

Successive governors-general had borne testimony to the absence of law, order, and justice throughout Oude, and had endeavoured to introduce remedial measures; which, however, had all produced a directly contrary effect to that for which they were

* Quoted in *Dacoitee in Excelsis; or, the Spoliation of Oude*, p. 28. London: Taylor.

† Memorandum on Oude.—*Wellington Supplementary Despatches;* edited by the present Duke. London: Murray, 1858.

designed, by complicating the involvements of the state, and increasing the extortions practised on the people by the aumildars and licentious native soldiery. These latter had become so perfectly mutinous and ungovernable, that Sadut Ali required the presence of British troops to secure him against the anticipated treachery of his own; and declared that, in the day of battle, he could not tell whether they would fight for or against him.

The consideration of these circumstances induced Lord Wellesley to frame a treaty, concluded in 1801, by which the nawab ceded one-half of his territories to the Company (including the districts now forming part of the North-Western Provinces, under the names of Rohilcund, Allahabad, Furruckabad, Mynpoorie, Etawa, Goruckpoor, Azimghur, Cawnpoor, and Futtehpoor), in return for a release from all arrears of subsidy, and for all expenses to be hereafter incurred in the protection of his country, which the Company bound themselves to defend in future, alike against foreign and domestic foes. They distinctly promised that no demand whatever should be made upon his territory, whether on account of military establishments; in the assembling of forces to repel the attack of a foreign enemy; on account of the detachment attached to the nawab's person; on account of troops which might be occasionally furnished for suppressing rebellions or disorders in his territories; nor on account of failures in the resources of the Ceded Districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, the calamities of war, or any other cause whatever.

The Company guaranteed to Sadut Ali, his heirs and successors, the possession of the reserved territories, together with the exercise of authority therein; and the nawab engaged to establish therein such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and calculated to secure their lives and property. He likewise bound himself to disband the chief part of the native troops; which he immediately did by reducing them from 80,000 to 30,000. The treaty of 1801 gave the nawab a certainty for an uncertainty; and restored to the remaining portion of Oude something of the vigour of an independent state. It would probably have done much more than this, had the Company confirmed the appointment of Henry Wellesley, by the governor-general, to superintend the working of the new arrangements, and assist in initiating and carrying out useful reforms. The ability, tact, and courtesy which he had manifested in the previous negotiations, had won the confidence of Sadut Ali; and, as the brother of the governor-general, Henry Wellesley might have exercised an influence beneficial to both parties, similar to that which contributed so largely to the tranquil settlement of Mysore, under the auspices of Colonel Wellesley. But the directors would not sanction such a breach of the privileges of the covenanted service, and the appointment was cancelled. The papers of the late Lord Cowley, and the Wellesley MSS. in the British Museum, abound with evidence of judicious reformatory measures projected for Oude, but neutralised or set aside by the home government. While Sadut Ali lived the treaty worked well, although the manner in which he availed himself of the stipulated services of British troops, repeatedly made the Calcutta government sensible of the responsibility they had assumed, and the difficulty of reconciling the fulfilment of their engagements to the ruler, with a due regard to the rights and interests of his subjects.

The nawab conducted his affairs with much discretion and economy; and, on his death in 1814, he left fourteen millions sterling in a treasury which was empty when he entered on the government.

The partition of Oude was not, however, accomplished without bloodshed. The Hindoo landowners in the ceded country—who were, for the most part, feudal chieftains of far older standing than any Mussulman in India—resisted the proposed change, and were with difficulty subdued.* The fact was significant; and it would have been well had the subsequent annexators of Oude remembered, that the danger to be apprehended lay with the feudal and semi-independent chiefs, rather than with their sensual and effete suzerain.

Sadut Ali was succeeded by Ghazi-oo-deen, who is described by one authority as "indolent and debauched;"† and, by another, as bearing some resemblance to our James I.‡ He lent the Company two millions of the treasure accumulated by his predecessor, to assist them in carrying on their wars with

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 386.
† Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 192.
‡ Heber's *Journal*.

Burmah and Nepaul, and they gave him, in return, a share of their conquests; namely, the Turaee*—a fertile, richly-wooded, but unhealthy tract, which extends along the foot of the Himalayas; and sanctioned his assumption of regal dignity.

The acceptance of a loan, under the circumstances, was unworthy of a great government; and the confirmation of Ghazi-oo-deen's sovereignty was of doubtful policy. Complaints of misgovernment were rife, and appear to have been supported by forcible evidence. Bishop Heber, who travelled through Oude in 1824-'5, gave a more favourable account than other witnesses of the condition of the country; but his observations were necessarily cursory. He reasoned with Ghazi-oo-deen on the duty of attending to the condition of the people; and "the reply was, that he was powerless, having lent to the British government all the money which would have enabled him to ease his subjects of their burdens." Had the money remained in the Oude treasury, it is highly improbable that it would have benefited the people, except, indeed, indirectly, through the reckless expenditure of an unscrupulous minister, and a most unworthy set of favourites. Still, it is painful to learn that English governors should have exposed themselves to such a reproach, or should have acknowledged a loan from a dependent prince, in such a strain of fulsome and profane flattery as that in which Lord Amherst invokes the blessing of the Almighty on "the Mine of Munificence;" and declares, that "the benefits and fruits of our amity, which have existed from days of yore, are impressed upon the heart of every Englishman, both here and in Europe, as indelibly as if they had been engraven on adamant; nor will lapse of time, or change of circumstance, efface from the British nation so irrefragable a proof, so irresistible an argument, of the fraternal sentiments of your majesty."†

Nevertheless, the internal management of the "Mine of Munificence" was far from satisfactory, and the resident was officially reminded (July 22nd, 1825), that "by the treaty of 1801, the British government is clearly entitled, as well as morally obliged, to satisfy itself by whatever means it may deem necessary; that the aid of its troops is required in support of right and justice, and not to effectuate injustice and oppression." In conformity with these instructions, the resident, and the officers commanding troops employed in the king's service, exercised a scrutiny which became extremely distasteful; and the treaty was violated by the increase of the native force (which was available, unchallenged, for any purpose, and afforded emolument and patronage to the native ministers and favourites), until, within the last few years of the reign of Ghazi-oo-deen, it comprised about sixty thousand men.

Nuseer-oo-deen, the son of Ghazi, succeeded him on the musnud in 1827. This is the "Eastern king" whose private life has been gibbeted to deserved infamy, in a sort of biographical romance‡ written by a European adventurer, for some time member of the royal household (as librarian or portrait-painter.) Recollecting the scandalous scenes revealed by contemporary diaries and memoirs regarding our nominally Christian kings—the Merry Monarch, and Nuseer's contemporary, the Fourth George—we need not be too much surprised by the mad vagaries and drunken cruelties of the Moslem despot, who prided himself on his adoption of certain English habits and customs§—such as wearing broadcloth and a beaver hat under the burning sun of Oude; and usually terminated his daily drinking bouts with his boon companions, under the table, after the most approved English fashion. The favourite, shortly before the death of Nuseer, was a barber from Calcutta, who had come out to India in the capacity of a cabin-boy, and from that became a river trader. Hair-dressing, however, continued to be a lucrative resource to him: the natural curls of the governor-general were widely imitated; and when the barber went on his other affairs to Lucknow, he was employed in his old vocation by the resident. The king, delighted with the change produced in the appearance of this powerful English functionary, tried a similar experiment on his own lank locks, and was so gratified by the result, that he appointed the lucky *coiffeur* to a permanent post in his house-

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 413.

† Letters of Lord Amherst to the King of Oude, October 14th, 1825; and June 23rd, 1826. Quoted in *Dacoitee in Excelsis; or, the Spoliation of Oude*: pp 68—70.

‡ *Private Life of an Eastern King;* by a member of the household of his late majesty, Nuseer-oo-deen, King of Oude. London, 1855.

§ Nuseer substituted a chair of gold and ivory for the musnud, or cushion, of his ancestors.

hold, with the style of Sofraz Khan (the illustrious chief), and gave him a seat at his table. The barber had a fund of low humour: he amused the king by pandering to his vitiated taste; and soon made himself indispensable. The existence of Nuseer-oo-deen was embittered by a well-grounded suspicion of treachery among his own family and household: the fear of poison was continually present with him; and he would touch no wine but that placed before him by his new favourite, who consequently added the office of wine-merchant to his other lucrative monopolies.

The European papers learned something of what was passing at the palace of Lucknow, despite the care which the European adventurers installed there, naturally took to keep things quiet. The *Calcutta Review*, and *Agra Ukbar*, published squibs and pasquinades upon the "low menial" who had ingratiated himself with the King of Oude; but the object of their jeers set them at nought, and continued to accumulate wealth, and to retain his influence at court by ever-new inventions of buffoonery and indecency, until the European members of the household threw up their appointments in uncontrollable disgust; and such scenes of open debauchery disgraced the streets of Lucknow at mid-day, that the resident, Colonel Low, was compelled to interfere, and at length succeeded in procuring the dismissal of the barber.*

These and other statements of the anonymous memoir-writer, are quite compatible, and, indeed, frequently correspond with the entries in the journal of Sir William Sleeman, of accounts furnished by natives of the character and habits of Nuseer-oo-deen.

Both writers dwell much on the repeated declaration of the king that he should be poisoned; and Sir William states, that for some time before his death, Nuseer wore constantly round his neck a chain, to which was attached the key of a small covered well in the palace, whence he drew water. His death was very sudden. It occurred shortly after a glass of sherbet had been administered to him by one of the women of his harem, in the night of the 7th of July, 1837.

The question of succession was stormily contested. The king had had several wives, whose history forms a not very edifying episode in Sir William Sleeman's journal. The most reputable one was a grand-daughter of the King of Delhi—a very beautiful young woman, of exemplary character; who, unable to endure the profligacy of the court, quitted it soon after her marriage, and retired into private life, on a small stipend granted by her profligate husband. Then there was Mokuddera Ouleea, originally a Miss Walters, the illegitimate daughter of a half-pay officer of one of the regiments of British dragoons, by a Mrs. Whearty, a woman of notoriously bad character, although the daughter of one English merchant, and the widow of another. She was married to the king in 1827, and was seen by Mrs. Park, in her visit to the zenana in 1828, sitting silently on the same couch with her successful rival, the beautiful Taj Mahal.†

Mulika Zamanee (Queen of the Age) entered the palace of Lucknow while Nuseer-oo-deen was only heir-apparent, in the capacity of wet-nurse to his infant son, Moonna Jan (by another wife called Afzul-Mahal); and so fascinated the father, that, to the astonishment of the whole court (in whose eyes the new-comer appeared very plain and very vulgar), he never rested until she became his acknowledged wife. Her former husband (a groom in the service of one of the king's troopers, to whom she had previously been faithless) presumed to approach the palace, and was immediately thrown into prison; but was eventually released, and died soon after the accession of Nuseer. Her two children, a boy and girl, were adopted by Nuseer; who, when he became king, declared the boy, Kywan Jah, to be his own son, and publicly treated him as such.

When Viscount Combermere visited Lucknow in 1827, in the course of his tour of inspection as commander-in-chief, Kywan Jah was sent, as heir-apparent, with a large retinue and a military escort, to meet his lordship and attend him from Cawnpoor. The king was, no doubt, desirous to propitiate his guest. He came outside the city to welcome him, invited him to share the royal howdah on the state elephant, and escorted him to the palace in full procession, flinging, meantime, handfuls of coin among the multitude who accompanied the cavalcade.

The Orientals dearly love pageantry; it would seem as if it reconciled them to des-

* The barber carried off £240,000.—*Private Life of an Eastern King*, p. 330.

† Mrs. Park's *Wanderings*, vol. i., p. 87.

potism: and the present occasion must have been an interesting one; for the externals of royalty sat gracefully on the handsome person of the sensual and extravagant Nuseer-oo-deen; and the British general, besides being in the zenith of his fame as the conqueror of Bhurtpoor (which had successfully resisted the British troops under Lord Lake), had a manly bearing, and a rare gift of skilful horsemanship—befitting the soldier pronounced by the great Duke the best cavalry officer in the service—united to an easy, genial courtesy of manner, calculated to gain popularity everywhere, but especially in India.

Lord Combermere occupied the residency for a week, during which time, a succession of hunts, sports, and *fêtes* took place, which formed an era in the annals of Lucknow. Nuseer-oo-deen was, in turn, sumptuously entertained by the commander-in-chief; to whom, on parting, he gave his own portrait, set in magnificent diamonds. The Company appropriated the diamonds; but the picture remained in the possession of Lord Combermere, and was an interesting relic of the fallen dynasty of Oude.

Nuseer-oo-deen subsequently demanded from the resident the formal recognition of Kywan Jah, as his heir-apparent, by the British government. The resident demurred, on the plea that the universal belief at Lucknow was, that Kywan Jah was three years of age when his mother was first introduced to his majesty. But this had no effect: Nuseer-oo-deen persisted in his demand; and, to remove the anticipated obstacle, he repudiated Moonna Jan publicly and repeatedly.* The consequence of his duplicity was, that he was held to have left no legitimate son. According to Sir William Sleeman (who, during his situation as resident, had abundant means of authentic information), the general impression at Lucknow and all over Oude was, that the British government would take upon itself the management of the country on the death of the king, who himself "seemed rather pleased than otherwise" at the thought of being the last of his dynasty. He had repudiated his own son, and was unwilling that any other member of the family should fill his place. The ministers, and the other public officers and court favourites, who had made large fortunes, were favourable to the anticipated measure; as it was understood by some, that thereby they would be secured from all scrutiny into their accounts, and enabled to retain all their accumulations.†

The reader—recollecting the custom in Mussulman kingdoms, of a complete change of officials at every accession, generally accompanied by the spoliation of the old ones—will understand this was likely to prove no inconsiderable advantage. Lord Auckland, the governor-general, had, however, no desire for the absorption of Oude, but only that measures should be taken for its better government. He decided that the eldest uncle of the late king should ascend the musnud, and that a new treaty should be formed with him.

On the death of Nuseer-oo-deen, a British detachment was sent to escort the chosen successor from his private dwelling to the palace. He was an old man, had led a secluded life, and was weakened by recent illness. On arriving at his destination, he was left to repose for a few hours in a small private room, previous to the tedious formalities of enthronement. But the succession was not destined to be carried without opposition. The Padshah Begum (the chief queen of Ghazi-oo-deen, and the adoptive mother of Nuseer, with whom she had been long at variance) asserted the claims of her grandson, the disowned child but rightful heir of the late ruler. She made her way to the palace in the middle of the night, on the plea of desiring to see the dead body of the king—forced the gates with her elephants, and carried in with her the youth Moonna Jan, whom she succeeded in literally seating on the musnud; while she herself took up her position in a covered palanquin at the foot of the throne. Amid the confusion, the sovereign selected by the Company remained unnoticed, and apparently unknown. His sons, grandsons, and attendants were, however, discovered, and very roughly treated; nor did the resident (Colonel Low) escape severe handling. On learning what had occurred, he proceeded to the palace with his assistants, and remonstrated with the begum on the folly of her procedure; but his arguments were stopped by the turbulence of her adherents, who seized him by the neckcloth, dragged him to the throne on which the boy sat, and commanded him to present a complimentary offering on pain of death. This he positively refused; and the begum's vakeel, Mirza Ali, seeing the dangerous excitement of her rabble followers, and dreading the

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 40.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 152.

sure vengeance of the Company if the lives of their servants were thus sacrificed, laid hold of the resident and his companions, and shouted out, that by the command of the begum they were to be conducted from her presence. The resident and his party, with difficulty and danger, made their way to the south garden, where Colonel Monteath had just brought in, and drawn up, five companies in line. The temper of the troops, generally, seemed doubtful. At this crisis Colonel Roberts, who commanded a brigade in the Oude service, went in, and presented to Moonna Jan his offering of gold mohurs; and then absconded, being seen no more until the contest was decided. Captain Magness drew up his men and guns on the left of Colonel Monteath's, and was ordered to prepare for action. He told the resident that he did not feel quite sure of his men; and a line of British sepoys was made to cover his rear.*

Meanwhile the begum began to think the game in her own hands. The palace and *baradurée*, or summer-house, were filled with a motley crowd; nautch-girls danced and sang at one end of the long hall, in front of the throne; and the populace within and without enjoyed the tumult, and shouted acclamation: every man who had a sword or spear, a musket or matchlock, flourished it in the air, amid a thousand torches. Everything portended a popular insurrection. The begum saw this, and desired to gain time, in the hope that the British troops in the garden would be surrounded and overwhelmed by the armed masses which had begun to pour forth from the city. Had this catastrophe occurred, the British authorities would have borne the blame for the deficiency of the subsidized British troops, and for having indiscreetly omitted to watch the proceedings of the Padshah Begum, whose character was well known. The fault, in the latter case, is attributed to the negligence of the native minister.

The resident was anxious to avoid a collision; yet convinced of the necessity for prompt action: therefore, on receiving a message from the begum, desiring him to return to her presence, he refused, and bade her and the boy surrender themselves immediately; promising, in the event of compliance, and of the evacuation of the palace and city by her followers, that the past should be forgiven, and that the pension of 15,000 rupees a-month, accorded by the late king, should be secured to her for life. But in vain: the begum had no thought of surrendering herself; the tumult rapidly increased; the rabble began to plunder the palace; several houses in the city had already been pillaged; and the British officer in command urged the resident to action, lest his men should no longer have room to use their arms.

The native commanders of the state troops manifestly leant towards the begum. One of them declared that "he was the servant of the throne; that the young king was actually seated on it; and that he would support him there:" whereupon he also presented his offering of gold mohurs. The armed crowds grew momentarily more menacing: a ringleader attempted to seize a British sepoy by the whiskers; and an affray was with difficulty prevented. The resident, taking out his watch, declared, that unless the begum consented to his offer within one quarter of an hour, the guns should open on the throne-room. She persisted in her purpose, encouraged by the increasing numbers of her followers. The stated time elapsed; the threat of the resident was fulfilled; and, after a few rounds of grape, a party of the 35th regiment, under Major Marshall, stormed the halls.

As soon as the guns opened, the begum was carried by her attendants into an adjoining room; and Moonna Jan concealed himself in a recess under the throne. They were, however, both captured, and carried off to the residency. None of the British troops were killed; but one officer and two or three sepoys were wounded. Many of the insurgents perished; from forty to fifty men being left killed and wounded, when their companions fled from the palace. The loss would probably have been much greater, had not the soldiers of the 35th, on rushing through the narrow covered passage, and up the steep flight of steps by which they entered the throne-room, seen, on emerging from the dim light, a body of sepoys with fixed bayonets and muskets, drawn up (as they imagined) behind the throne. At these they fired; a smash of glass followed, and proved their first volley to have been spent, on their own reflection, in an immense mirror. This happy mistake saved a needless waste of blood. No further resistance was attempted; order was gradually restored; and the sovereign selected

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 162.

by the Company was publicly crowned in the course of the morning.

Strangely enough, the innocent and ill-used Delhi princess, after years of seclusion, was involved in the tumult, but escaped injury by the zeal and presence of mind of her female attendants. The begum, on her way from her own residence to the palace, had passed that of the princess, whom she summoned to accompany her. Perhaps awed by her imperious mother-in-law—perhaps desirous of looking once again on the face of the man whose conduct had doomed her to long years of widowhood, the princess obeyed, and appears to have been a silent witness of the whole affair. When the firing began, her two female bearers carried her in her litter to a small side-room. One attendant had her arm shattered by grapeshot; but the other tied some clothes together, and let her mistress and her wounded companion safely down, from a height of about twenty-four feet, into a courtyard, where some of the retinue of the princess found and conveyed them all three safely home.

The claim of Moonna Jan appears to have been a rightful one, despite the formal declaration of the late king, that he had ceased to cohabit with the boy's mother for two years before his birth. The decision arrived at by the British government cannot, however, be regretted; for Moonna Jan was said, even by the members of his own family who asserted his legitimacy, to be of ungovernable temper, and the worst possible dispositions.* Both he and the begum† were sent to the fort of Chunar, where they ended their days as state prisoners.

The new king, Mohammed Ali Shah, succeeded to an empty treasury and a disorganised government: he had the infirmities of age to contend with; nevertheless, he displayed an amount of energy and shrewdness very rare in his family.

A new treaty with Oude was alleged to be necessary, because no penalty had been attached, in that of 1801, to the infraction of the stipulation for reforms to be made in the government. Another article had been violated by the increase of the native army greatly beyond the stated limit. Of this latter infraction the British government were well disposed to take advantage, having, in fact, themselves violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty, by keeping Oude very ill supplied with troops. Thus, at the time of the death of Nuseer-oo-deen (previous to the arrival of the five companies under Colonel Monteath), the whole of the British force in charge of Lucknow and its million inhabitants, consisted of two companies and a-half of sepoys under native officers. One of the companies was stationed at the treasury of the resident; another constituted his honorary guard; and the remaining half company were in charge of the gaol. All the sepoys stood nobly to their posts during the long and trying scene; but no attempt was made to concentrate them for the purpose of arresting the tumultuous advance of the begum's forces: collectively, they would have been too few for the purpose; and it was, moreover, deemed unsafe to remove them from their respective posts at such a time.‡

Something more than tacit consent had probably been given to the increase of the native force of Oude; which, in 1837, numbered about 68,000 men. By the new treaty, Mohammed Ali was authorised to increase his military establishment indefinitely; but bound to organise, as a part of it, an auxiliary British force, and to provide a yearly sum of sixteen lacs (£160,000) for the maintenance of the same. The concluding articles stipulated, that the king, in concert with the resident, should take into immediate and earnest consideration the best means of remedying the existing defects in the police, and in the judicial and revenue administration of his dominions; and set forth, that "if gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule should hereafter at any time prevail within the Oude dominions, such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity, the British government reserves to itself the right of appointing its own officers to the management of whatsoever portions of the Oude

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 170.

† The previous history of the begum appears to have been very remarkable. Ghazi-oo-deen had conceived a strong dislike to his son Nuseer, and considered him utterly unfit to mount the throne. The begum stanchly and successfully asserted his rights, as her husband's lawful heir. When he, in turn, conceived a violent aversion to his own child Moonna Jan, she took her grandson under her protection, armed her retainers, and, after a contest in which many lives were lost, succeeded in maintaining her ground until the resident interfered, and satisfied her by guaranteeing the personal safety of the boy, for whose sake she eventually sacrificed the independence of her latter years, and died a prisoner of state.—*Private Life of an Eastern King*, p. 205.

‡ Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 168.

territory—either to a small or to a great extent—in which such misrule as that above alluded to may have occurred, for so long a period as it may deem necessary; the surplus receipts in such case, after defraying all charges, to be paid into the king's treasury, and a true and faithful account rendered to his majesty of the receipts and expenditure of the territory so assumed." In the event of the above measure becoming necessary, a pledge was given for the maintenance, as far as possible, of the native institutions and forms of administration within the assumed territories, so as to facilitate the restoration of those territories to the sovereign of Oude when the proper period for such restoration should arrive.*

The above treaty was executed at Lucknow on the 11th of September, 1837, and was ratified on the 18th of the same month by the governor-general. It is necessary that the manner in which the compliance of Mohammed Shah was ensured, should be clearly understood. The death of Nuseer occurred at midnight, and the resident, as has been stated, instantly sent off one of his assistants to the house of Mohammed Shah, with orders to conduct him to the palace, after having secured his signature to a paper promising consent "to any new treaty that the governor-general might dictate." This was obtained.

Lord Auckland was rather shocked by such undisguised dictation; and declared, "he should have been better pleased if the resident had not, in this moment of exigency, *accepted* the unconditional engagement of submissiveness which the new king had signed. This document may be liable to misconstruction; and it was not warranted by anything contained in the instructions issued to Colonel Low."†

If Lord Auckland was startled by the means taken to ensure the consent of the king to any terms which might be required from him, the resident was not less painfully surprised by the draft treaty framed by the governor-general in council. Colonel Low wrote, that the concessions so unexpectedly demanded, were "of a nature that would be very grating to any native sovereign of respectable character;" especially to the present king, "who, to the best of my belief at least, knows by experience how to manage a country properly, and really wishes to govern with moderation and justice." The resident especially deprecated the requisition for the payment of a very large annual sum for the maintenance of an army, which was not to be under the command of the king, or even at his own disposal—"a heavy payment, in fact, which he must clearly perceive is more for our own purposes and interests than for his, or for the direct advantage of his subjects." Colonel Low requested a reconsideration of the unfavourable opinion which had been expressed regarding the preliminary pledge he had exacted from Mohammed Ali, declaring, that so far from its being superfluous, it was indispensable; otherwise, the "desired objects of the Indian government could never have been gained without some forcible and most unpleasant exercise of our power." In a significant postscript, he asked whether, in the event of the present king's death before the ratification of the treaty, he ought to take any, and, if so, what, agreement from the next heir? adding, that the residency surgeon lately in attendance on Mohammed Shah, was decidedly of opinion, that "any unusual excitement, or vexation of mind, would be likely to bring on apoplexy."‡ All this the resident stated in a public letter; but he wrote another in the secret department, in which he earnestly advised a revision of the treaty; urging, that the formation of the proposed auxiliary force would create great discontent in Oude, and inflict a burden which would necessarily be felt by all classes; and that it would be considered "as distinctly breaking our national faith and recorded stipulations in the former treaty."§

Lord Auckland persisted in his policy: the resident was told that he had "misapprehended" the spirit of the treaty, which the king was compelled to sign, literally at the hazard of his life; for, on being made acquainted with its terms, "the idea of such new rights being ordered in his time, so hurt the old man's feelings, that it had an immediate effect on his disease;" producing an attack of spasms, from which he did not entirely recover for twenty-four hours.||

The authorities in England, to their honour be it spoken, refused to sanction such a shameless breach of faith as this repudiation of the terms on which half Oude had been annexed in 1801. They unanimously de-

* Treaty between E. I. Company and King of Oude: printed in Parl. Papers relating to Oude (Commons), 20th July, 1857; pp. 31—33.

† Parl. Papers, p. 13. ‡ *Ibid.*,—pp. 14, 15.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 17.
|| Letter of Resident, July 30, 1837.—Parl. Papers.

creed the abrogation of the recent treaty, and desired that the king should be exonerated from the obligations to which his assent had been so reluctantly given. Nothing could be more thoroughly straightforward than the view taken by the directors. They declared, that it would have been better to have given the king a fair trial, without any new treaty; and condemned the preliminary engagement as having been "extorted from a prince from whom we had no right to demand any condition on coming to his lawful throne." The proposed auxiliary force was pronounced inadmissible, on the ground that the payment "would constitute a demand upon the resources of Oude that we are not entitled to make; for we are already bound, by the treaty of 1801, to defend at our own expense, that country against internal and external enemies; and a large cession of territory was made to us for that express purpose."

The sentiments expressed on this occasion are directly opposed to those which animated the annexation policy, subsequently adopted. The directors conclude their despatch with the following explicit opinion:—"The preservation of the existing states in India is a duty imposed upon us by the obligations of public faith, as well as the dictates of interest; for we agree in the opinion expressed by Lieutenant-colonel Low, in his letter of the 26th of September, 1836, that the continued existence of such states will afford the means of employment to respectable natives, which they cannot at present obtain in our service; and, until such means could be provided in our own provinces, the downfall of any of the native states under our protection might, by depriving numerous influential natives of their accustomed employment, be attended with consequences most injurious to our interests. Our policy should be to preserve, as long as may be practicable, the existing native dynasties; and should the fall of them, or of any one of them, from circumstances beyond our control, become inevitable, then to introduce such a system of government as may interfere in the least possible way with the institutions of the people, and with the employment of natives of rank under proper superintendence, in the administration of the country."*

The directors left the governor-general in council to choose the manner in which to convey to the King of Oude the welcome tidings of the annulment of a compact which, they truly observed, he regarded as inflicting not only a pecuniary penalty upon his subjects, but a disgrace upon his crown and personal dignity. They advised, however, that it should rather proceed as an act of grace from his lordship in council, "than as the consequence of the receipt of a public and unconditional instruction from England."

Lord Auckland thereupon declared, that the directors, like the resident, had much misunderstood his measure;† and his council agreed with him in the hope that, by a relaxation of the terms of the treaty, the authorities in England might be reconciled to a measure which could not be cancelled without the most serious inconvenience, and even danger:‡ and when they found that the Company were pledged to the British parliament for the annulment of the treaty, they persisted in urging the inexpediency of making any communication to the King of Oude on the subject. On the 15th of April, 1839, the directors reiterated their previous orders, and desired that no delay should take place in announcing, in such manner as the governor-general might think fit, to the King of Oude, the disallowance of the treaty of 11th of September, 1837, and the restoration of our relations with the state of Oude to the footing on which they previously stood.

On the 11th of July, 1839, they simply reverted to their previous instructions, and required their complete fulfilment.§ Yet, on the 8th of the same month, the governor-general acquainted the King of Oude that, after some months' correspondence with the Court of Directors upon the subject of the treaty, he was empowered to relieve his majesty from the payment of the annual sixteen lacs. His lordship expressed his cordial sympathy with the liberal feelings which dictated this renunciation of a sum, the raising of which he had "sometimes feared" might lead to "heavier exactions on the people of Oude than they were well able, in the present state of the country, to bear."

Then followed an exhortation on the lightening of taxation, and the extension of

* Despatch, 10th April, 1838, from Secret Committee; p. 38. Signed by J. R. Carnac and J. L. Lushington.

† Minute by Governor-general Auckland, dated "Umritsir, 13th December, 1838."—Parl. Papers, pp. 43—52.

‡ Minutes by Messrs. Morison and Bird, 28th January, 1839; pp. 52; 57.

§ Parl. Papers, pp. 57—60.

useful public works, which might be effected with the aforesaid sixteen lacs; and a complacent reference to the fresh proof thus afforded, "of the friendship with which your majesty is regarded by me and by the British nation." Not one word, not the most distant hint of the abrogation of the treaty; nay, more—the newly-appointed resident, Colonel Caulfield, was specially desired "to abstain from encouraging discussion as to the treaty of 1837," except as regarded the reasons above quoted from the letter of the governor-general, for releasing the king from the pecuniary obligation of maintaining an auxiliary force.*

The above statements are taken from the returns laid before parliament on the motion of Sir Fitzroy Kelly; but it is confidently alleged that the papers therein published are, as in the case of the Nizam, fragmentary and garbled; especially that the important letter written by Lord Auckland to the King of Oude is not a correct translation of the original, but a version adapted to meet the ideas of the British public.†

No such aggravation is needed to enhance the effect of the duplicity exhibited by the Indian government, in their sifted and carefully prepared records laid before parliament, of the mode in which the king was led to believe that the treaty which the Court of Directors had disavowed, because it was essentially unjust and had been obtained by unfair means, was really in force, the pressure being temporarily mitigated by the generous intervention and paternal solicitude of the governor-general.

This is a painful specimen of Anglo-Indian diplomacy. Still more painful is it to find such a man as Lord Dalhousie characterising the deliberate concealment practised by his predecessor, as "an inadvertence." The treaty was never disallowed in India—never even suppressed. The discussion regarding its public disallowance seems to have fallen to the ground; the directors, engrossed by the cares and excitements of that monstrous compound of injustice, folly, and disaster—the Afghan war—probably taking it for granted that their reiterated injunctions regarding Oude had been obeyed by Lord Auckland and his council.

Mohammed Ali Shah died in 1842, in the full belief that the treaty which so galled and grieved him was in operative existence. His son and successor, Amjud Ali, had no reason for doubt on the subject: the British functionaries around him spoke and wrote of it as an accepted fact; and, in 1845, it was included in a volume of treaties, published in India by the authority of government. No important change, for good or for evil, appears to have taken place during the five years' sway of Amjud Ali, who died in February, 1847, and was succeeded by Wajid Ali, the last of his dynasty. The new king was not deficient in natural ability. He had considerable poetical and musical gifts; but these, precociously developed under the enervating influences of the zenana, had been fostered to the exclusion of the sterner qualities indispensable to the wielder of a despotic sceptre.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged and often sharply-exercised supremacy of the British government, the dynasty of Oude still preserved, by virtue of Lord Wellesley's treaty of 1801 (that is to say, by the portions of it not cancelled by that of 1837), a degree of independence, and of exemption from internal interference; which, rightly used by an upright, humane, and judicious sovereign, might yet have raised fertile, beautiful Oude to a state of prosperity which, by affording incontestable proofs of its efficient government, should leave no plea for its annexation. Public works, efficient courts of justice, reduced rates of assessment—these things can never be wholly misrepresented

* Deputy Secretary of Government to the Resident, 8th July, 1839.—Parl. Papers, p. 61.

† The letter published in the Parl. Papers, and the Persian and English versions sent to the king: all three differed on important points. In *Dacoitee in Excelsis* (written, according to the editor of Sleeman's *Oude*, by Major Bird), a literal translation of the Persian letter actually sent to the King of Oude is given, which differs widely and essentially from that above quoted from the Parl. Papers. In the latter there is no sentence which could fairly be rendered thus:—"From the period you ascended the throne, your majesty has, in comparison with times past, greatly improved the kingdom; and I have, in consequence, been authorised by the Court of Directors to inform you, that, *if I think it advisable, for the present, I may* relieve your majesty from part of the clause of the treaty alluded to, by which clause expense is laid upon your majesty." The writer of *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, says that the italicised words bear a different sense in the autograph English letter, in which they run thus:—*I am directed to relieve you.* The king pointed out the non-agreement of the two documents, and the governor-general forthwith issued an order, directing that the old custom of sending the original English letter as well as the Persian version, should be discontinued.—(p. 92.) See also *Oude, its Princes and its Government Vindicated:* by Moulvee Mussehood-deen Khan Bahadoor; p. 75.

or overlooked; but such reforms were little likely to be effected while Wajid Ali sat at the helm.

In November, 1847, the governor-general, Lord Hardinge, visited Lucknow, held a conference with the king, and caused a memorandum, previously drawn up, to be specially read and explained to him. In this memorandum, Wajid Ali was enjoined "to take timely measures for the reformation of abuses," and for "the rescue of his people from their present miserable condition." Failing this, the governor-general stated, he would have no option but to act in the manner specified by the treaty of 1837; which not only gave the British government a right to interfere, but rendered it obligatory on them to do so whenever such interference should be needful to secure the lives and property of the people of Oude from oppression and flagrant neglect. If the king, within the following two years, should fail in "checking and eradicating the worst abuses," then the governor-general would avail himself of the powers vested in him by the aforesaid treaty.*

Two years and more passed, but the king evinced undiminished aversion for the duties of his position. His time and attention were devoted entirely to the pursuit of personal gratifications, and he associated with none but such as contributed to his pleasures—women, singers, fiddlers, and eunuchs; and could, in fact, submit to the restraints of no other society. He ceased to receive the members of the royal family, or the aristocracy; would read no reports from his local officers, civil or military—from presidents of his fiscal and judicial courts, or functionaries of any kind; and appeared to take no interest whatever in public affairs.

A change was made about this time in the mode of collecting the land revenue (from the *ijara*, or contract system, to the *amanee*, or trust-management system) in many districts; but no favourable result was produced—the same rack-rent being exacted under one as under the other; the same uncertainty continuing to exist in the rate of the government demand; and the same exactions and peculations on the part of the native officials.

Colonel (afterwards Sir William) Sleeman received the appointment of resident in 1849, and was authorised by Lord Dalhousie to make a tour throughout Oude, and report upon the general condition of the people. The letter which communicates the information of the appointment, shows that the governor-general was bent on the assumption of sovereign power over Oude, and the reconstruction of the internal administration of that "great, rich, and oppressed country."† The mission of Colonel Sleeman was evidently designed to collect a mass of evidence which should convince the home authorities of the necessity for the "great changes" which their representative had resolved upon initiating; and in this sense the new resident has been truly called "the emissary of a foregone conclusion."‡ Still, though not unprejudiced, Colonel Sleeman was an honest and earnest man, well calculated by character and long training to extract truth, and experienced in framing a plain, unvarnished statement of facts. Forty years of active Indian service had afforded him opportunities of intercourse with the natives, of which he had taken abundant advantage. Active, methodical, and rigidly abstemious, he had been invaluable in the very departments where his countrymen have usually proved least able to grapple with the enervating influences of climate, routine, and red tape.§ His successful efforts in bringing to justice, and almost eradicating the murderous fraternity of the Thugs, ‖ by dispersing the horrible obscurity in which their midnight deeds of assassination and theft had been so long shrouded, breaking up their gangs, and tracking them out in detail, was altogether most masterly, and conferred an incalculable amount of benefit on the peaceable and industrious, but helpless portion of the population. Colonel Sleeman's character and career, however,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., pp. 201—215.

† Letter from Lord Dalhousie to Colonel Sleeman.—*Journey through the Kingdom of Oude* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xviii.

‡ *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 109.

§ Writing to Mr. Elliot, secretary to government in 1848, regarding the difficulty of getting dacoit prisoners tried, Colonel Sleeman said that political officers had little encouragement to undertake such duties; adding—"It is only a few choice spirits that have entered upon the duty *con amore*. General Nott prided himself upon doing nothing while he was at Lucknow; General Pollock did all he could, but it was not much; and Colonel Richmond does nothing. There the Buduk dacoits, Thugs and poisoners, remain without sentences, and will do so till Richmond goes, unless you give him a fillip. * * * Davidson was prevented from doing any thing by technical difficulties; so that out of four residents we have not got four days' work.—*Journey through the Kingdom of Oude* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xxviii.

‖ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 429; for an account of the Thugs. or Phansi-gars.

naturally tended to render him a severe censor of incapacity, sensuality, and indolence—the besetting sins of the King of Oude. Consequently, his correspondence manifests a contemptuous aversion for the habits and associates of Wajid Ali, scarcely compatible with the diplomatic courtesy expected in the intercourse of a British functionary with a national ally. Personal acquaintance might have mitigated this feeling; but Colonel Sleeman does not seem to have attempted to employ the influence which his age, position, and knowledge of the world might have given him with the king, who was then a young man of about five-and-twenty. "I have not," he says, "urged his majesty to see and converse with me, because I am persuaded that nothing that I could say would induce him to alter his mode of life, or to associate and commune with any others than those who now exclusively form his society."*

The tour of inspection was made during three months of the cold season of 1850, in defiance of the tacit opposition of the native government, on whom the expenses, amounting to £30,000, were charged.† The mode of proceeding adopted to procure evidence against the King of Oude, and the complete setting aside of the authority of the native government therein involved, may be excused by circumstances, but cannot be justified. A similar proceeding in any Anglo-Indian province would unquestionably have revealed a mass of crime and suffering, of neglect and unredressed wrongs, of which no conception could have been previously formed. Under our system, however, the evils from which the people labour, lie deep, and resemble the complicated sufferings which affect the physical frame in a high state of civilisation. Under native despotism, the diseases of the body politic are comparatively few in number, and easily discernible, analogous to those common to man in a more natural state. The employment of torture, for instance, as a means of extorting revenue, is a barbarism which seems general among Asiatic governments; and it has been, if indeed it be not still, practised by our own native underlings, in consequence of imperfect supervision and excessive taxation. In Oude, this favourite engine of despotism and oppression was, as might have been expected, in full operation. It ought, long years before, to have been not simply inveighed against by residents in communications to their own government, but enacted against in treaties; for, clearly, when the British government guaranteed to a despotic ruler the means of crushing domestic rebellion, they became responsible that their troops should not be instrumental in perpetuating the infliction, on the innocent, of cruelties which the laws of England would not suffer to be perpetrated on the person of the vilest criminal.

The supreme government are accused of having contented themselves with inculcating rules of justice and mercy by vague generalities, without any attempt to take advantage of opportunities for initiating reforms. Major Bird, formerly assistant-resident at Lucknow, affirms that he had then in his custody proposals framed by the native government, with the assistance of the resident, Colonel Richmond, in 1848, for the introduction of the British system of administration in the king's dominions, to be tried in the first instance in such portions of them as adjoined the British territories. The scheme was submitted to Mr. Thomason, the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces, for correction, and was then forwarded to the governor-general, by whom it was rejected; the secretary to government stating, that "if his majesty the King of Oude would give up the whole of his dominions, the East India government would think of it; but that it was not worth while to take so much trouble about a portion."‡

Such a rebuff as this is quite indefensible. Although the worthless ministers and favourites by whom the king was surrounded, might have eventually neutralised any good results from the proposed experiment, yet, had the Calcutta authorities really felt the

* Parl. Papers relative to Oude.—Blue Book, 1856; p. 158.

† In the *Reply to the Charges against the King of Oude*, published in the name of Wajid Ali Shah himself, the following passage occurs:—"When Colonel Sleeman had, under pretence of change of air for the benefit of his health, expressed a wish to make a tour through the Oude dominion, although such a tour was quite unusual, I provided him with tents and bullock-trains, and ordered my officers to furnish him with men for clearing the road, provisions and all other necessaries; and although this cost me lacs of rupees, still I never murmured nor raised any objections." In Colonel Sleeman's very first halt, he is described as having received petitions, and written letters thereon to the native government, in defiance alike of treaties, of the express orders of the Court of Directors, and of the rule of neutrality previously observed by successive residents.—(Pp. 8; 13.)

‡ *Dacoitee in Excelsis; or, the Spoliation of Oude*, p. 102. Taylor: London.

earnest solicitude expressed by them for the people of Oude, they would have encouraged any scheme calculated to lessen the disorganisation of which they so loudly complained, instead of waiting, as they appear to have done, to take advantage of their own neglect.

It is not easy to decide how far the British government deserved to share the disgrace which rested on the profligate and indolent dynasty, of which Wajid Ali was the last representative, for the wretched condition of Oude. Of the fact of its misgovernment there seems no doubt; for Colonel Sleeman was a truthful and able man; and the entries in his Diary depict a state of the most barbarous anarchy. The people are described as equally oppressed by the exactions of the king's troops and collectors, and by the gangs of robbers and lawless chieftains who infested the whole territory, rendering tenure so doubtful that no good dwellings could be erected, and preventing more than a very partial cultivation of the land, besides perpetrating individual cruelties, torturings, and murders almost beyond belief.

No immediate result followed the report of the resident; for the Burmese war of 1851–'2 occupied the attention of government, and gave Wajid Ali Shah a respite, of which he was too reckless or too ill-advised to take advantage. Colonel Sleeman, writing to Lord Dalhousie in September, 1852, declared—

"The longer the king reigns the more unfit he becomes to reign, and the more the administration and the country deteriorates. The state must have become bankrupt long ere this; but the king, and the knaves by whom he is governed, have discontinued paying the stipends of all the members of the royal family, save those of his own father's family, for the last three years; and many of them are reduced to extreme distress, without the hope of ever getting their stipends again, unless our government interferes. The females of the palaces of former sovereigns ventured to clamour for their subsistence, and they were, without shame or mercy, driven into the streets to starve, beg, or earn their bread by their labour. * * * The king is surrounded by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters worse than either; and the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. They appropriate at least one-half the revenues of the country to themselves, and employ nothing [sic] but knaves of the very worst kind in all the branches of the administration. * * * The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c; the minister has the land revenue: and all are making large fortunes."*

In the beginning of 1853, the resident writes to Sir James Weir Hogg, that the King of Oude was becoming more and more imbecile and crazy; and had, on several occasions during some recent religious ceremonies, gone along the streets beating a drum tied round his neck, to the great scandal of his family, and the amusement of his people. The minister, Ali Nukkee Khan, is described as one of the cleverest, most intriguing, and most unscrupulous villains in India;† who had obtained influence over his master by entire subservience to his vices and follies, and by praising all he did, however degrading to him as a man and a sovereign.

Notwithstanding the king's utter inattention to public affairs, and devotion to drumming, dancing, and versifying, he believed himself quite fit to reign; and Colonel Sleeman considered that nothing would ever induce Wajid Ali to abdicate, even in favour of his own son, much less consent to make over the conduct of the administration, in perpetuity, to our government. The conclusion at which the resident arrives is important:—

"If, therefore, our government does interfere, it must be in the exercise of a right arising out of the existing relations between the two states, or out of our position as the paramount power in India. These relations, under the treaty of 1837, give our government the right to take upon itself the administration under present circumstances; and, indeed, imposes upon our government the duty of taking it: but, as I have already stated, neither these relations, nor our position as the paramount power, give us any right to annex or to confiscate the territory of Oude. We may have a right to take territory from the Nizam of Hyderabad, in payment for the money he owes us; but Oude owes us no money, and we have no right to take territory from her. We have only the right to secure for the suffering people that better government which their sovereign pledged himself to secure for them, but has failed to secure.‡"

The entire reliance manifested in the above extracts, on the validity of the treaty of 1837, is equally conspicuous in other letters. It is repeatedly mentioned as giving the government ample authority to assume the whole administration; but it is added—"If we do this, we must, in order to stand well with the rest of India, honestly and distinctly disclaim all interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenues for the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude;" for, "were we to take advantage of the occasion to annex or confiscate Oude, or any part of it, our good name in India would inevitably suffer; and

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 369.
† *Ibid.* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xxii.
‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 388.

that good name is more valuable to us than a dozen Oudes."

On the annexation policy in general, the resident commented in terms of severe censure. "There is a school in India," he says, "characterised by impatience at the existence of any native states, and by strong and often insane advocacy of their absorption—by honest means if possible; but still their absorption. There is no pretext, however weak, that is not sufficient, in their estimation, for the purpose; and no war, however cruel, that is not justifiable, if it has only this object in view." Such views he denounced as dangerous to our rule; for the people of India, seeing that annexations and confiscations went on, and that rewards and honorary distinctions were given for them, and for the victories which led to them, and for little else, were too apt to infer that they were systematic, and encouraged and prescribed from home. The native states he compared to breakwaters, which, when swept away, would leave us to the mercy of our native army, which might not always be under our control.*

With such opinions, he watched with deep anxiety the progress of the aggressive and absorbing policy favoured by Lord Dalhousie and his council, which, he considered, was tending to crush all the higher and middle classes connected with the land, and to excite general alarm in the native mind. He began to fear the adoption of some course towards Oude which would involve a breach of faith; but he does not seem to have suspected the possibility of any right of annexation being grounded on the repudiation by the Calcutta government, at the eleventh hour, of the treaty of 1837.

In a private letter (the latest of his correspondence), he writes—"Lord Dalhousie and I, have different views, I fear. If he wishes anything done that I do not think right and honest, I resign, and leave it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn engagements with white faces or black. We have no right to annex or confiscate Oude; but we have a right, under the treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appropriate its revenues to ourselves. To confiscate would be dishonest and dishonourable. To annex would be to give the people a government almost as bad as their own, if we put our screw upon them."†

The last admission is a strange one from the narrator of the *Tour through Oude.* He was not spared to remonstrate, as he certainly would have done, against the adoption of measures he had denounced by anticipation; but he was spared the too probable pain of remonstrating in vain. In the summer of 1854 his health began to fail. He went to the hills in the hope of recruiting his strength and resuming his labours. At last, warned by indications of approaching paralysis, he resigned his office, and embarked for England, but died on his passage, on the 10th of February, 1856, at the age of sixty-seven. Four days before, his services had been recognised by his nomination as a K.C.B., at the express request of Lord Dalhousie, who, despite their difference in opinion, fully appreciated the qualities of his able subordinate. The mark of royal favour came in all respects too late: it would have been better bestowed at the time when it had been richly earned by the measures for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoitee, instead of being connected with the ill-omened *Tour* which preceded the annexation of Oude.

General Outram (Napier's old opponent) was sent as officiating resident to Lucknow, in December, 1854, and desired to furnish a report with a view to determine whether public affairs continued in the state described from time to time by his predecessor. This he did, at considerable length, in February, 1855;‡ and his conclusion was, that matters were as bad, if not worse, than Colonel Sleeman had described them; and that "the very culpable apathy and gross misrule of the sovereign and his durbar," rendered it incumbent on the supreme government to have recourse to the "extreme measures" necessary for the welfare of the five millions of people who were now oppressed by an effete and incapable dynasty.

Major-general Outram added, that in the absence of any personal experience in the country, he was dependent for information on the residency records, and on the channels which supplied his predecessor. It would seem that he (like Colonel Caulfield) had been instructed to refrain from any mention of the treaty of 1837; for his report refers exclusively to that concluded in 1801: but in a paper drawn up by Captain

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 392.

† Written in 1854-'5. Published in the *Times*, November, 1857.

‡ See *Oude Blue Book* for 1856; pp. 12—46.

Fletcher Hayes (assistant-resident), on the "history of our connection with the Oude government," the Calcutta authorities are reminded, that in the absence of any intimation of the annulment of the treaty of 1837, all its articles (except that of maintaining an auxiliary force, from which the king had been relieved as an act of grace) were considered by the court of Lucknow as binding on the contracting powers.*

The supreme authorities had placed themselves in a difficult position: they had pertinaciously stood between the Court of Directors and the government of Oude, and had taken upon themselves the responsibility of maintaining the treaty repudiated by the directors as unjust and extortionate. But in 1855, the rapid march of the annexation policy had left the landmarks of 1837 so far behind, that it had become desirable to set the contract of that date aside, because its exactions and its penalties, once denounced as unfair to the king, would now, if enforced, limit and cripple the plans of the governor-general. The very instrument, obtained and retained for aggressive purposes, in defiance of the orders of the home authorities, was likely to prove a weapon of defence in the hands of the King of Oude, and to be rested upon as the charter of the rights of the dynasty and state. But the Red treaty palmed off on Omichund, with the forged signature of Admiral Watson, was not more easily set aside by Clive† than the treaty with Oude by the governor-general in council. In each case, the right of the stronger prevailed without a struggle, and left the weaker party no power of appeal. Still the authorities, in discussing the affairs of Oude, abstained, as far as possible, from any mention of the treaty of 1837, and evidently thought the less said on the subject the better. Thus, the governor-general, in his minute on the measures to be adopted for the future administration of Oude (extending over forty-three folio pages), adverts to the treaty of 1837, only in one short paragraph, in which he states that the instrument by which the mutual relations of the British and Oude governments were defined, was the treaty of 1801. "A very general impression prevails that a subsequent re-adjustment of those relations was made by the treaty concluded by Lord Auckland in 1837. But that treaty is null and void. It was wholly disallowed by the Hon. Court of Directors as soon as they received it."

In other paragraphs, repeated reference is made to the warnings given by Lord Hardinge to Wajid Ali, in 1847, of the determination of the supreme government, in the event of continued neglect, to interfere for the protection of the people of Oude; but the important fact is suppressed, that the right of interference was explicitly stated to rest, wholly and solely, "on the treaty ratified in the year 1837."‡

"It is to the treaty of 1801," said Lord Dalhousie, "that we must exclusively look:"§ and, accordingly, it was looked to, for the express purpose of proving that it had been violated by the King of Oude, and might, therefore, be likewise declared null and void. Yet Lord Dalhousie hesitated at "resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory, and the abolition of the throne." The rulers of Oude, he admitted, had been unwavering in their adherence to the British power, and had "aided us as best they could in our hour of utmost need:" he therefore recommended that the king should be suffered to retain his title and rank, but should be required to transfer the whole civil and military administration into the hands of the E. I. Company, in perpetuity, by whom the surplus revenues were to be appropriated, a liberal stipend being allowed for the maintenance of the royal family. "The king's consent," he added, "is indispensable to the transfer of the whole, or of any part, of his sovereign power to the government of the East India Company. It would not be expedient or right to extract this consent by means of menace or compulsion." Lord Dalhousie, therefore, advised that the king should be requested to sign a treaty based on the foregoing terms, and warned that, in the event of refusal, the treaty of 1801 would be declared at an end, and the British subsidiary force entirely withdrawn. The proposal appears to have been made under the idea that the very existence of the throne ot Oude depended so entirely on the presence

* *Oude Blue Book*, p. 81.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 276—278.

‡ Minute by Lord Dalhousie, June 18th, 1855.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 149.

§ Any reader who doubts the illegality of Lord Dalhousie's conclusion, would do well to peruse the able opinion of Dr. Travers Twiss, dated 24th February, 1857, on the infraction of the law of nations, committed by setting aside the treaty of 1837: quoted in *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, pp. 192—199

of a British force, that the king would accede to any conditions required from him. But the other members of council unanimously deprecated the offering of the proposed alternative, on the ground of the terrible crisis of anarchy which would be the probable consequence; and it was suggested that, "if there should be in the king's council but one person of courage and genius, though it should be but a dancing-girl (such as Indian annals show many), the king might be led to elect disconnection rather than abdication."*

Mr. Dorin minuted in favour of the entire incorporation of Oude, and objected to continuing "to the most unkingly monarch of Oude any portion of the royal position and dignity which, by nature and inclination, he is incapable of sustaining;" yet he foresaw that the king would never surrender his kingdom except on compulsion. All Mr. Dorin's sympathies were, he declared, with the people of Oude, the "fine, manly race," from whom we drew "almost the flower of the Bengal army."

Mr. Grant agreed generally with Mr. Dorin, but thought that the king might be suffered to retain his title for his lifetime. Mr. Grant took strong views of the rights and responsibilities of the British government, both in its own right, and as having "succeeded to the empire of the Mogul;" and he denied that the Oude rulers had ever stood in the position of sovereign princes. Major-general Low (who had held the position of resident at Lucknow for eleven years) minuted in favour of annexation, but desired to see more liberal provision made for the present king and his successors than the other members of council deemed necessary. He urged that the well-known habits of Mohammedans of rank afforded a guarantee for their income being expended among the people from whom it was levied, and not hoarded up, and sent off to a distant country, according to the practice of most European gentlemen on reaching the highest offices in the Indian service. The character of the last five princes of Oude, all of whom he had known personally, had, he said, been much misrepresented: they had sadly mismanaged their own affairs, but they had constantly proved active and useful allies, having again and again forwarded large supplies of grain and cattle to our armies with an alacrity that could not be exceeded by our own British chiefs of provinces, and having lent us large sums of money when we were extremely in want of it, and could not procure it elsewhere. As individual princes, their intercourse with our public functionaries had been regular, attentive, courteous, and friendly.†

Mr. Peacock minuted in favour of the assumption of sovereign power over Oude, but desired that the surplus revenue might be disposed of entirely for the benefit of the people, and no pecuniary benefit be derived by the East India Company. The suggestion deserved more notice than it appears to have received, seeing that "the benefit of the people" is declared by the directors to have been "the sole motive, as well as the sole justification," of the annexation.‡

Not one of the four members of council (not even Mr. Peacock, though an eminent lawyer) took the slightest notice of the treaty of 1837, or alluded to the frequent references concerning it made by their delegates at the court of Lucknow. They spoke freely enough of treaties in general, discussed the law of nations, and quoted Vattel; but the latest contract was tabooed as dangerous ground. The governor-general, in forwarding to the Court of Directors the minutes and other papers above quoted, alluded to his own approaching departure, but offered to remain and carry out the proposed measures regarding Oude, if the directors considered that the experience of eight years would enable him to do so with greater authority than a newly-appointed governor might probably command. The task, he added, would impose upon him very heavy additional labour and anxiety; the ripened fruit would be gathered only by those who might come after him.§ The simile is an unfortunate one, if the fruit we subsequently gathered in Oude is to be viewed as evidencing the character of the tree which produced it.

The Court of Directors, in announcing their decision on the subject, imitated the reserve of their representatives; and having the fear of Blue Book revelations, and India Reform Society philippics before

* Minute by Mr. Grant.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 218.

† This last portion of Major-general Low's minute certainly does not accord with the account given by Colonel Sleeman of his intercourse with Wajid Ali; but the colonel, though just and honourable in deed, was not conciliatory in manner; and his official communication with the king would be naturally affected by this circumstance.

‡ *Oude Blue Book*, p. 234.

§ Despatch dated July 3rd, 1855.—*Ibid.*, p. 1.

their eyes (but not of mutiny and insurrection), they ignored the chief difficulty, and accepted Lord Dalhousie's offer in the most complimentary terms, leaving him unfettered by any special instructions. They suggested, however, that the officiating resident (Outram) should be instructed to ascertain whether the prospect of declaring our connection with the Oude government at an end, would be so alarming to the king as to render his acceptance of the proposed treaty a matter of virtual necessity. If this could be relied on, the alternative was to be offered; if not, the directors authorised and enjoined the attainment of the "indispensable result," in such manner as the governor-general in council should see fit. Concerning the appropriation of the surplus revenue, they made no remark whatever.*

The idea of offering the king the withdrawal of the subsidiary force as the alternative of abdication, was abandoned, and measures were taken for the assumption of the government of Oude, by issuing orders for the assembling of such a military force at Cawnpoor as, added to the troops cantoned at that station, and to those already in Oude, was considered sufficient to meet every immediate contingency. The additional troops numbered about 13,000 men, and were placed under the divisional command of (the late) Major-general Penny; but constituted a distinct field force under (the late) Colonel Wheeler, as brigadier. In the meantime, the disorganisation of Oude was clearly on the increase, and one of its marked features was a rising spirit of Moslem fanaticism. It happened that a Mohammedan fast fell on the same day as a Hindoo feast; and Ameer Ali, a moolvee, or priest, of high repute, took advantage of the circumstance to incite his co-religionists to a fierce onslaught on the Hindoos. Troops were ordered out to quell the disturbances; but Ameer Ali seized and confined two of the officers, assembled 3,000 men, and declared his intention of destroying a certain Hindoo temple, and erecting a mosque in its stead. At length the British subsidiary force was employed by the king against the moolvee. An affray ensued, in which a body of Patans fought with the recklessness of fanaticism, and were cut down, standing shoulder to shoulder round their guns, by a party of Hindoo zemindars and their retainers. In all, 200 Hindoos and 300 Patans perished. This occurred in November, 1855. About the same time the Oude government became aware that some great change was in agitation. They asked the reason for the assembling of so large a force at Cawnpoor; and were, it is alleged, solemnly assured that it was intended to keep in check the Nepaulese, who were supposed to be meditating a descent towards the district of Nanparah.†

The veil, however, was soon withdrawn. On the 30th of January, 1856, General Outram requested the attendance of Ali Nukki Khan at the residency, and after informing him of the contemplated changes, "mentioned that, in order to prevent the chance of a disturbance on the part of evil-disposed persons, a strong brigade of troops was directed to cross the Ganges, and march on the capital."‡

Having impressed the minister with the futility of resistance, the resident proceeded to seek, or rather to insist upon, an interview with the king. Remembering the discussions which had taken place between the Nizam of Hyderabad and Colonel Low, the governor-general was anxious that General Outram should not be surprised into indiscreet admissions; and warned him, that it was "very probable" that the king would refer to the treaty negotiated with his predecessor in the year 1837, of the entire abrogation of which the court of Lucknow had never been informed. "The effect of this reserve, and want of full communication, is felt to be embarrassing to-day. It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled instrument was still included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845, by the authority of government. There is no better way of encountering this difficulty than by meeting it full in the face." This was to be done by informing the king that the communication had been inadvertently neglected; and the resident was authorised to state the regret felt by the governor-general in council, that "any such neglect should have taken place even inadvertently." Should the king observe, that although the treaty of 1837 was annulled, a similar measure, less stringent than that now proposed, might be adopted, he was to be told, that all subsequent experience had

* Despatch from the Court of Directors, dated November 21st, 1855. Signed—E. Macnaghten, W. H. Sykes, &c., &c., &c.—*Oude Blue Book*, pp. 233—236.

† *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 140.

‡ *Oude Blue Book*, p. 280.

shown that the remedy then provided would be wholly inadequate to remove the evils and abuses which had long marked the condition of Oude.*

Such were the arguments put by the supreme government of India, into the mouth of General Outram. They must have been extremely unpalatable to a man whose friendly feeling towards Indian princes had been strengthened by personal and friendly intercourse, and not frozen by viceregal state, or neutralised by exclusive attention to the immediate interests and absorbing pecuniary anxieties of the East India Company. But the resident had swallowed a more bitter pill than this when negotiating with the unfortunate Ameers of Sinde, whom, in his own words, he had had to warn against resistance to our requisitions, as a measure that would bring down upon them utter and merited destruction; while he firmly believed, that every life lost in consequence of our aggressions, would be chargeable upon us as a murder.†

In the present instance he was spared the task of adding insult to injury. Neither the king nor his minister attempted to stand upon any abstract theory of justice, or fought the ground, inch by inch, as Mahratta diplomatists would have done—throwing away no chance, but, amid defeat and humiliation, making the best possible terms for themselves. Wajid Ali Shah, on the contrary, "unkingly" as he had been described to be, and unfit to reign as he certainly was, did not stoop to discussions which he knew would avail him nothing, but acted on the imperial axiom, "*aut Cæsar aut nullus.*"

When the resident proceeded, as prearranged, to present to the king the draft treaty now proposed, accompanied by a letter from the governor-general urging its acceptance, he found the palace courts nearly deserted, and the guns which protected the inner gates dismounted from their carriages. The guard of honour were drawn up unarmed, and saluted him with their hands only. The mere official report of the interview is very interesting. The king received the treaty with the deepest emotion, and gave it to a confidential servant, Sahib-oo-Dowlah, to read aloud; but the latter, overcome by his feelings, was unable to proceed beyond the first few lines; on which the king took the treaty into his own hands, and silently read the document, in which he was called upon to admit that he and his predecessors had, by continual maladministration, violated the treaty of 1801; and to make over the entire government of Oude to the East India Company in perpetuity, together with the free and exclusive right to "the revenues thereof." In return for signing this humiliating abdication, Wajid Ali was to retain and bequeath "to the heirs male of his body born in lawful wedlock" (not his heirs generally, according to Mohammedan law), the style of a sovereign prince, and a stipend of twelve lacs per annum.

After carefully perusing every article, the king exclaimed, in a passionate burst of grief—"Treaties are necessary between equals only; who am I now, that the British government should enter into treaties with me?" Uncovering himself (the deepest token of humiliation which a Mohammedan can give),‡ he placed his turban in the hands of the resident, declaring that, now his titles, rank, and position were all gone, he would not trouble government for any maintenance, but would seek, in Europe, for that redress which it was vain to look for in India.

General Outram begged the king to reflect, that if he persisted in withholding his signature, "he would have no security whatever for his future maintenance, or for that of his family; that the very liberal provision devised by the British government would inevitably be reconsidered and reduced; that his majesty would have no guarantee for his future provision, and *would have no claim whatever on the generosity of the government.*" The prime minister warmly supported the resident; but the king's brother exclaimed, that there was no occasion for a treaty, as his majesty was no longer in a position to be one of the contracting powers. The king reiterated his unalterable resolve not to sign the treaty: the resident intimated that no further delay than three days could be permitted; and then, with the usual ceremonies and honours, took his leave.

The government, in their anxiety to obtain the king's signature, had empowered

* Letter from secretary of government to Major-general Outram, January 23rd, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 243.

† Outram's *Commentary on Napier's Conquest of Sinde*, p. 439. See also *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 451.

‡ May your father's head be uncovered! is one of the most bitter curses of the Mohammedans.

the resident to increase the proffered stipend of twelve lacs (£120,000) to fifteen, if their object could be thus attained. But the demeanour of Wajid Ali convinced General Outram that the promise of double that sum, or of any amount of money, would have no effect; and he therefore considered it unworthy of the government he represented, to make any offer to raise the proposed allowance by a lac or two per annum.

An attempt was made to gain the king's consent through his mother, a lady remarkable for good sense and intelligence,* who exercised great influence over her son; and a yearly stipend of a lac of rupees was offered her as the reward of success. The reply of the queen-mother is not stated in General Outram's account of the conference, and the circumstance itself is only incidentally mentioned; but it is evident that she rejected it, and ceased not to protest against the proposed treaty, and to beg that a further period might be allowed, during which the king might be enabled to show to the world, by the adoption of vigorous reforms, how anxious and eager he was to follow out the plans of the British government.

The three days allowed for consideration elapsed: the king persisted in his resolve; and the resident carried out his instructions by issuing a proclamation, previously prepared at Calcutta, notifying the assumption of the exclusive and permanent administration of the territories of Oude by the Hon. East India Company.

The king offered no opposition whatever to the measures adopted by the British government; but, in what the resident called "a fit of petulance," he ordered all his troops at the capital to be immediately paid-up and dismissed. General Outram thereupon informed the king, that it was incumbent on him to retain the soldiery until the arrangements of the new administration should be completed; adding, that should any disturbance take place, his majesty would be held responsible, and made answerable for the same. Upon the receipt of this threat, Wajid Ali Shah, having resolved to give no pretext for a quarrel, issued proclamations, desiring all his people, civil and military, to obey the orders issued by the British government; to become its faithful subjects; and on no account to resort to resistance or rebellion.

* "Note of a Conference with the queen-mother, by General Outram."—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 286.

He expressed his determination of proceeding at once to Calcutta, to bring his case to the notice of the governor-general, and thence to England, to intercede with the Queen; but he specially commanded that his subjects should not attempt to follow him. General Outram desired that this last paragraph should be omitted. It originated, he said, in the absurd idea impressed upon the king by his flatterers, that a general exodus of his people would follow his departure; or else was introduced with the intention of exciting sympathy in Europe. "Another manœuvre," he added, "has been had recourse to, with the same object doubtless. For two days past, a written declaration of satisfaction with his majesty's rule has been circulated for signature in the city, where it may probably meet with considerable success. Of course, most classes at Lucknow will suffer, more or less, from the deprivation of the national plunder which is squandered at the capital."†

There is reason to believe that very general dismay was caused at Lucknow by the annexation of the kingdom. The breaking up of a native government is always a terrible crisis to the metropolis. In the present instance, the amount of immediate and individual suffering was unusually large. The suddenness of the king's deposition, and his refusal to sign the treaty, aggravated the distress which the change from native to European hands must have occasioned, even had it happened as a so-called lapse to the paramount power, in the event of the sovereign's death without heirs. As it was, the personal rights of the deposed monarch were dealt with as summarily as the inherited ones of the royal family of Nagpoor had been. No official account has been published of these proceedings; but in the statement of the case of the King of Oude, attributed to Major Bird, the following assertions are made:—

"Since the confiscation of the Oude territory, the royal palaces, parks, gardens, menageries, plate, jewellery, household furniture, stores, wardrobes, carriages, rarities, and articles of *vertu*, together with the royal museum and library, containing 200,000 volumes of rare books, and manuscripts of immense value, have been sequestered. The king's most valuable stud of Arabian, Persian, and English horses, his fighting, riding, and baggage elephants, his camels, dogs and cattle, have all been sold by public auction at nominal prices. His majesty's armoury, including the most rare and beautifully worked arms of every description, has also

† Major-general Outram to secretary of government, February 7th, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 292.

been seized, and its contents disposed of by sale or otherwise. * * * The ladies of the royal household were, on the 23rd of August, 1856, forcibly ejected from the royal palace of the Chuttar Munzul, by officers who neither respected their persons nor their property, and who threw their effects into the street."*

It is to be hoped that the above statement was exaggerated; and if so, it is especially to be regretted that the British public, or their representatives, were not furnished with authentic information on so interesting and important a point as the manner in which the deposition of Wajid Ali Shah was accomplished, and in what respects it was calculated to raise or allay the ferment of the mass of the aristocratic and manufacturing classes, the interests of the latter being closely associated with the former. In the *Reply to the Charges against the King of Oude* (already quoted), Wajid Ali Shah asserts, that the usurpation of his dominion would tend to destroy the trade in embroidered silk and cotton cloths. "It is notorious, that three-fourths of the rich embroidered cloths of Benares are imported to Oude; the remainder, one-fourth, being sent to other countries. In Bengal and other provinces, people very seldom use these costly dresses." The reason implied, rather than declared, by the king is probably the true one; namely, that his subjects could afford to clothe themselves in luxurious apparel, whereas those of the East India Company could not; and he adds—"My territories have not been strictly measured with chains so as to render it impossible for the agriculturist to derive a profit, nor have I resumed the allowances of any class of people."†

The testimony of the king regarding the probable results of his deposition, is, in part, corroborated by that of an eye-witness, who will hardly be accused of exaggerating the case; and who, in speaking of the many innocent sufferers from the change of government, includes in his list, "thousands of citizens who had previously found employ in providing for the ordinary wants of the court and nobility. There were several hundreds of manufacturers of hookah snakes. The embroiderers in gold and silver thread were also reckoned by hundreds. The makers of rich dresses, fine turbans, highly ornamental shoes, and many other subordinate trades, suffered severely from the cessation of the demand for the articles which they manufactured."‡

Oude was taken possession of, very much more as if it had been obtained by force of arms than by diplomacy. Annexation on a large scale, is in either case a hazardous operation, requiring the greatest circumspection. Let any one turn to the Wellesley and Wellington despatches, or to the Indian annals of that eventful period, and see the extreme care which was taken in the settlement of Mysore—the forethought in preparing conciliatory measures, and meeting national prejudices; the liberal consideration for individual interests—and then peruse, in the parliamentary papers, the summary manner in which the native institutions in Oude, without the least consideration or examination, were to be rooted up and superseded by a cut-and-dried system, to be administered in the higher departments exclusively by Europeans. After such a comparison of preliminary measures, the different results, in the case of Oude and Mysore, will be deemed amply accounted for. It has been truly said of Lord Wellesley, in a leading Indian journal, that "whatever he was suffered to carry out to his premeditated conclusion, fell into its place with as few disadvantages to the political and social state of Indian society, as a radical operation could well be attended with." In the settlement of Mysore, it is asserted, "every difficulty was foreseen, and every exigency met; and the dynasty of Tippoo was plucked up, flung aside, and replaced by a new arrangement, which fitted into its place as if it had been there, untouched, from the days of Vishnu." Regarding the occupation of Oude, a very different picture is drawn by the writer, who asserts, that its annexation was carried out in the most reckless manner, and that most important circumstances connected with it were entirely overlooked. "In Lord Dalhousie's opinion, all that was necessary was simply to march a small body of troops to Lucknow, and issue the fiat of annexation. This done, everything, it was supposed, would go on in an easy, plain-sailing manner. The inhabitants might not be satisfied; the zemindars might grumble a little in their forts; the budmashes might frown and swagger in the bazaar; but what of that? The power of the British was invincible."§

* *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 145.

† *Reply to Charges, &c.*, p. 43.

‡ *Mutinies in Oudh;* by Martin Richard Gubbins, of the Bengal civil service, financial commissioner for Oudh. London: Bentley, 1858; p. 70.

§ *Bombay Athenæum.*

The minutes of the supreme council certainly tend to corroborate the foregoing opinion, by showing that the difficulties and dangers attendant on the annexation of Oude were very imperfectly appreciated. The refusal of the king to sign the proffered treaty (though previously deprecated by the governor-general as an insurmountable obstacle to direct absorption), seems to have been welcomed when it actually occurred, as an escape from an onerous engagement; and the submission of all classes—hereditary chiefs, discarded officials, unemployed tradespeople, and disbanded soldiery—was looked for as a matter of course; any concessions made by the annexators being vouchsafed as a matter of free grace, to be received with gratitude, whether it regarded the confirmation of an hereditary chiefdom, or a year's salary on dismissal from office.

The king, Lord Dalhousie considered, by refusing to enter into any new engagement with the British government, had placed himself in entire dependence upon its pleasure; and although it was desirable that "all deference and respect, and every royal honour, should be paid to his majesty Wajid Ali Shah," during his lifetime, together with a stipend of twelve lacs per annum, yet no promise ought now to be given of the continuance of the title, or of the payment of the same amount of money to his heirs. Messrs. Dorin, Grant, and Peacock concurred in this opinion; but Major-general Low minuted against "the salary of the heirs" of Wajid Ali being left to the decision of a future government, the members of which would very probably not sufficiently bear in mind the claims of the Oude family on the British government for comfortable income at least. The minute proceeded to state, that though, for many reasons, it was to be regretted that the king had not signed the treaty, yet, in a pecuniary point of view, his refusal was advantageous. To himself the loss had been great; and, as he had issued all the orders and proclamations that could be desired, and had done his utmost to prevent all risk of strife at the capital, by dismounting his artillery, guns, &c., it would be harsh, and not creditable to a great paramount state, which would "gain immense profit from the possession of the Oude territories," if, in addition to the punishment inflicted on the king, the income intended for his direct male heirs should also be curtailed.

Major-general Low was in a minority of one, as Mr. Peacock had been regarding the appropriation of the surplus revenue; and their opinions, in neither case, appear to have met with any consideration. The claims of the various classes of the population were treated in as summary and arbitrary a manner as those of their sovereign; and, owing to the peculiar constitution of Oude, the experiment was a much more dangerous one in their case than in his. The administration was to be conducted, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the system which the experience of nearly seven years had proved to be eminently successful in the provinces beyond the Sutlej; that is to say, the measures which had been matured, and gradually carried through, in the conquered Punjab, by the co-operation of some of the most earnest and philanthropic men whom India has ever seen, was now to be thrust upon Oude, without any preliminary inquiry into its adaptation. In the Punjab, the Lawrences and their staff acted as a band of pacificators on an errand of love and mercy, rather than in the usual form of a locust-cloud of collectors. Such men, invested with considerable discretionary power, could scarcely fail of success; yet one at least of them shrunk from enforcing the orders of government, and left the Punjab, because he could not bear to see the fallen state of the old officials and nobility.*

In Oude, the newly-created offices, rather than the men who were to fill them, occupy the foreground of the picture. General Outram was appointed chief commissioner, with two special military assistants, a judicial and financial commissioner, four commissioners of divisions, twelve deputy-commissioners of districts, eighteen assistant-commissioners, and eighteen extra assistants, to begin with. An inspector of gaols was to be appointed as soon as the new administration should be fairly established; and a promise was held out for the organisation of a department of public works, to aid in developing the resources of the country.

The pay of the new functionaries was to range from 3,500 rupees to 250 rupees a month (say from £4,200 to £300 a-year.) The number of native officials to be retained was, as usual, miserably small, and their remuneration proportionately low. As a body, they were of course great losers by the revolution.

* Arthur Cocks, chief assistant to the resident.—Raikes' *Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 25.

The king urged, as a special ground of complaint, the manner in which "writers, clerks, and other *attachés*" of departments had been supplanted by strangers. "Is it," he asks, "consistent with justice to deprive people of the soil of situations of this nature, and bestow them on foreigners? Foreigners have no claim to support from the government of Oude, while natives of the soil are left without means of procuring their livelihood."*

Mr. Gubbins, the financial commissioner for Oude, who was sent there at the period of the annexation, speaks of the sufferings of the nobility as having been aggravated by the neglect of the British functionaries. "The nobles had received large pensions from the native government, the payment of which, never regular, ceased with the introduction of our rule. Government had made liberal provision for their support; but before this could be obtained, it was necessary to prepare careful lists of the grantees, and to investigate their claims. It must be admitted, that in effecting this there was undue delay; and that, for want of common means of support, the gentry and nobility of the city were brought to great straits and suffering. We were informed that families which had never before been outside the zunana, used to go out at night and beg their bread."†

When Sir Henry Lawrence came to Lucknow, towards the close of March, 1857, we are told that he applied himself to cause the dispatch of the necessary documents, and gave the sufferers assurance of early payment and kind consideration. But nearly fourteen months had dragged slowly away before his arrival; and a smouldering mass of disaffection had meanwhile accumulated, which no single functionary, however good and gifted, could keep from bursting into a flame.

The discharged soldiery of the native government, amounting to about 60,000 men, naturally regarded the new administration with aversion and hostility. Service was given to about 15,000 of them in newly-formed local regiments, and some found employment in the civil departments. The large proportion, for whom no permanent provision could be made, received small pensions or gratuities: for instance, those who had served from twenty-five to thirty years, received one-fourth of their emoluments as pension; and those who had served from seven to fifteen years, received three months' pay as a gratuity. Under seven years' service, no gratuity whatever appears to have been given to the unfortunates suddenly turned adrift for no fault of their own. It was further decreed, that no person whatever should be recommended for pension or gratuity, who should decline employment offered to him under the British government.‡ Of the late king's servants, civil and military, many remained without any permanent provision; and not a few refused employ—some because they hoped that the native kingdom would be restored; but the majority of the soldiery, on account of the severity of the British discipline.§

By far the greatest difficulties in which the new government became involved, regarded the settlement of titles to land. Considering the long series of years during which at least the temporary assumption of the powers of administration had been contemplated by the British government, it is not a little surprising to find the governor-general in council avowedly unprovided with "any information as to the extent and value of rent-free holdings in Oude, or as to the practice which may have prevailed under the native government in respect of these grants." Without waiting for any enlightenment on the subject, rules are laid down "for the adjudication of claims of the class under consideration;" and, as might have been reasonably expected, these rules worked badly for all parties.

The despatch above quoted is very able, but decidedly bureaucratic throughout: its arbitrary provisions and minute details remind one of the constitutions which the Abbé Sièyes kept in the pigeon-holes of his writing-table, ready for any emergency. No consideration was evinced therein for the peculiar state of society in Oude, or even for the prominent features portrayed by Colonel Sleeman in his honest but cursory investigation. The fact was, that Oude, instead of the exclusively Mohammedan kingdom, or the British dependency, which it was represented to be, was really a Hindoo confederacy, presided over by a foreign dynasty. The most powerful class were Rajpoot chiefs, claiming descent from the sun and the moon; who laughed to scorn the mushroom dynasty of Wajid Ali, and regarded, with especial contempt, his assumption of the kingly title. These men,

* *Reply to Charges*, p. 43.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 70.

‡ *Oude Blue Book* for 1856, p. 278.

§ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 69.

united, might at any moment have compelled the Mohammedan ruler to abdicate or govern on just principles, had not co-operation for such an object been rendered impracticable by their own intestine strife. The state of things among them resembled that which brought and kept the Rajpoot princes under partial subjection: the faggots bound up together could not have been broken; but it was easy to deal with them one by one. Thus the suzerainty of the Mogul emperor was established over Rajast'han; and thus, though somewhat more firmly, because on a smaller scale, the power of the usurping governors was fixed in Oude. But the great jungle barons were overawed rather than subjugated; and, in the time of Colonel Sleeman, the officers of the native government could not examine into their rent-rolls, or measure their lands, or make any inquiry into the value of the estates, except at the risk of open rebellion. They had always a number of armed and brave retainers, ready to support them in any enterprise; and the amount was easily increased; for in India there is seldom any lack of loose characters, ready to fight for the sake of plunder alone.*

The talookdars were mostly the hereditary representatives of Rajpoot clans; but some were the heads of new families (Hindoo or Mohammedan), sprung from government officials, whose local authority had enabled them to acquire a holding of this description. The term "talookdar" means holder of a talook, or collection of villages, and, like that of zemindar (as used in Bengal), implied no right of property in the villages on behalf of which the talookdar engaged to pay the state a certain sum, and from which he realised a somewhat larger one, which constituted his remuneration. In fact, the property in the soil was actually vested in the village communities; who "are," says Mr. Gubbins, "the only proprietors of the soil; and they value this right of property in the land above all earthly treasure."†

Over these talookdars there were government officers (with whom they have often been confounded), and who, under the title of Nazims or Chukladars, annually farmed from government the revenues of large tracts of country for a certain fixed payment; all that they could squeeze out in excess being their own profit. "These men, from the necessities of their position, were," says Carre Tucker, "the greatest tyrants and oppressors imaginable. Backed by artillery, and the armed force of government, it was their business to rack-rent the country, extracting, within the year of their lease, all that they possibly could; whilst landholders resisted their exactions by force of arms. A constant war was thus carried on, and the revenue payments varied according to the relative strength of the nazim and the landowners. To avoid such contests, and obtain the privilege of paying a fixed sum direct into the government treasury, many of the talookdars would bid for the farm of their own part of the country. Such men, while acting as lord-lieutenants, would of course use their delegated authority to consolidate their influence over their own clan and tenantry, and also to usurp rights over independent village communities." This system led to the most cruel oppression; but it was supported by the ministers and courtiers of the king at Lucknow, as leading to an annual repetition of presents and bribes, without which no candidate could hope to obtain investiture as nazim or chukladar.‡

The government, not content with abolishing this manifest evil, attempted to revolutionise, at a stroke, the whole state of society, by sweeping aside the entire class of chiefs and barons, with the incidents of their feudal tenure, and making the revenue settlement with the village communities and smaller holders. Hereditary rights, unquestioned during successive generations, were confounded with those exercised by the revenue farmers *ex officio*, and the settlement officers were desired to deal with the proprietary coparcenaries which were believed to exist in Oude, and not to suffer the interposition of middlemen, such as talookdars, farmers of the revenue, and such like. The claims of these, if they had any tenable ones, might be, it was added, more conveniently considered at a future period.

Nothing could be more disheartening to the great landowners than this indefinite adjournment of any consideration of their claims; which, in effect, acted like a decree of confiscation, with a distant and very slight chance of ultimate restitution. It was quite evident that the motive of the measure was expediency, and that the government had, as stated by the *Times*,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., pp. 1, 2.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 61.

‡ *Letter on Oudh and its Talookdars*, p. 2.

"a natural leaning in favour of the peasant cultivators, to the detriment of the warlike and turbulent chiefs," whom it was thought politic to put down; and the plan of ignoring their ancient possessions had the additional advantage of bringing their manorial dues, averaging from ten to twenty per cent. on the village assessment, into the public exchequer.

The summary settlement in Oude too far resembled that which had been previously carried through, with a high hand, in the North-West Provinces, concerning which much evidence has recently been made public. Mr. H. S. Boulderson, a Bengal civilian, engaged in establishing the revenue settlement of 1844, declares, that whether the talookdars in Oude experienced, or only anticipated, the same dealings from our government which the talookdars in the North-West Provinces received, they must have had a strong motive to dread our rule. "The 'confiscation' which has been proclaimed against them—whether it really means confiscation, or something else—could not be more effectually destructive to whatever rights they possessed, than the disgraceful injustice by which the talookdars of the North-West Provinces were extinguished." He asserts, that the settlement involved an utter inversion of the rights of property; and that the commissioners, in dealing with what they termed "the patent right of talookdaree," and which even they acknowledged to be an hereditary right which had descended for centuries, treated it as a privilege dependent on the pleasure of government, and assumed the authority of distributing at pleasure the profits arising out of the limitation of their own demand.*

The opinion of Sir William Sleeman has been already quoted concerning the treatment which the landed proprietors had received in the half of Oude annexed by the British government in 1801, and now included in the North-West Provinces. By his testimony, the measures, and the men who enforced them, were equally obnoxious to the native chiefs and talookdars; being resolved on favouring the village communities, to the exclusion of every kind of vested interest between them and the state treasury. Sir William states—

"In the matter of discourtesy to the native gentry, I can only say that Robert Martin Bird insulted them whenever he had the opportunity of doing so; and that Mr. Thomason was too apt to imitate him in this, as in other things. Of course their example was followed by too many of their followers and admirers. * * * It has always struck me that Mr. Thomason, in his system, did all he could to discourage the growth of a middle and upper class on the land—the only kind of property on which a good upper and middle class could be sustained in the present state of society in India. His village republics, and the ryotwar system of Sir Thomas Munro at Madras, had precisely the same tendency to subdivide minutely property in land, and reduce all landholders to the common level of impoverishment. * * * Mr. Thomason would have forced his village republics upon any new country or jungle that came under his charge, and thereby rendered improvement impossible. * * * He would have put the whole under our judicial courts, and have thereby created a class of pettifogging attornies, to swallow up all the surplus produce of the land. * * * Mr. Thomason, I am told, systematically set aside all the landed aristocracy of the country as a set of *middlemen*, superfluous and mischievous. The only part of India in which I have seen a middle and higher class maintained upon the land, is the moderately settled districts of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories; and there is no part of India where our government and character are so much beloved and respected."†

Mr. Gubbins makes some very important admissions regarding the revenue system pursued in the North-West Provinces, and that subsequently attempted in Oude. "The pressure of the government demand is, in many districts, greatly too high. It is too high in Alighur, in Mynpoorie, in Boolundshuhur, and throughout the greater part of Rohilcund. The principle on which that settlement was made, was to claim, as the share of government, two-thirds of the nett rental. But the fraud and chicanery opposed to our revenue officers, caused them unwittingly to fix the demand at more than this share. In Oude, after repeated and most careful examination, I came unhesitatingly to the conclusion, that the government collector appropriated, if possible, the entire rent, and never professed to relinquish any part of it."‡ Of course, under a system which grasped at the *entire rent* of the soil, there could be no landlord class: a very short period of time would suffice for their extinction; and any so-called proprietary rights must, in due course, have also been annihilated.

No arguments in favour of the village system (excellent as this was in its place and degree), could justify the suppression of

* Minute on the Talookdaree cases, recorded on 2nd of April, 1844. Printed for private circulation in June, 1858; p. 19.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 413. Letter to Mr. Colvin, dated "Lucknow, 28th December, 1853."

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*. p. 73.

every other co-existing institution. But the projected change, even had it been unexceptionable in its tendency, was altogether too sudden: the village communities were not strong enough to feel safe in occupying the vantage-ground on which they were so unexpectedly placed; and many of them considered the rough-and-ready patriarchal sway of their chiefs but ill-exchanged for our harsh and unbending revenue system, and tedious and expensive law processes. Government erred grievously "in following supposed political and financial expediency, instead of ascertaining and maintaining existing rights in possession; and in supposing, that in the course of a very hurried assessment of revenue by officers, many of whom were inexperienced, it was possible to adjudicate properly difficult claims to former rights.* Lord Dalhousie's successor admits it to be too true, "that unjust decisions were come to by some of our local officers, in investigating and judging the titles of the landholders."† The natural consequence was, as stated by General Outram, that the landholders, having been "most unjustly treated under our settlement operations," and "smarting, as they were, under the loss of their lands," with hardly a dozen exceptions, sided against us, when they saw that "our rule was virtually at an end, the whole country overrun, and the capital in the hands of the rebel soldiery."‡ The yeomanry, whom we had prematurely attempted to raise to independence, followed the lead of their natural chiefs. All this might, it is alleged, have been prevented, had a fair and moderate assessment been made with the talookdar, wherever he had had clear possession for the legal limit of twelve years, together with a sub-settlement for the protection of the village communities and cultivators.§

Very contradictory opinions were entertained regarding the manner in which the British sepoys were affected by the annexation of Oude.

Mr. Gubbins admits, that when the mutinies commenced in the Bengal army, the talookdars in Oude were discontented and aggrieved; numbers of discharged soldiers were brooding over the recollection of their former license; and the inhabitants of the cities generally were impoverished and distressed; but the sepoys, he says, had benefited by the change of government, and were rejoicing in the encouragement given to the village communities at the expense of the talookdars. Thousands of sepoy families laid complaints of usurpation before the revenue officers, and "many hundreds of villages at once passed into their hands from those of the talooqdars! Whatever the talooqdar lost, the sepoy gained. No one had so great cause for gratulation as he."

The sepoys, although an exceptional class, had their own grievance, besides sharing in the general distrust and aversion entertained by the whole people at the idea of being brought under the jurisdiction of our civil courts; as well as at the introduction of the Company's opium monopoly, and the abkaree, or excise, on the retail sale of all spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, the consumption of which was very large throughout Oude, and especially among the soldiery.

Under the native government, the British sepoys enjoyed special and preferential advantages, their complaints being brought to its notice by the intervention of the resident. Each family made a point of having some connection in the British army, and, through him, laid their case before his commanding officer. The sepoy's petition was countersigned by the English colonel, and forwarded to the resident, by whom it was submitted to the king.|| This privilege was not recognised or named in any treaty or other engagement with the sovereign of Oude, nor could its origin be traced in any document recorded in the resident's office;¶ but it was in full operation at the time of our occupation of Oude; and had been, for a long term of years, the subject of continued discussion between successive residents and the native durbar.

Mr. Gubbins considers that the termination of this custom could not have produced disaffection among the sepoys, because but little redress was thereby procured by them. "Some trifling alleviation of the injury complained of, might be obtained; but that was all. That a sepoy plaintiff ever succeeded in wresting his village from the grasp of the oppressor, by aid of the British

* *Letter on Oudh and its Talookdars;* by H. Carre Tucker: p. 5.

† Despatch dated 31st March, 1858.—Parl. Papers on Oude (Commons), 20th May, 1858; p. 4.

‡ Despatch dated 8th March, 1858.—Parl. Papers, p. 1.

§ Carre Tucker's *Letter*, p. 7.

|| Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 64.

¶ Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 289.

resident, I never heard; if it ever occurred, the cases must have been isolated and extraordinary."*

The evidence of Sir W. Sleeman (whose authority is very high on this subject, in his double character of officer and resident) was directly opposed to that above cited. He thought the privilege very important; but desired its abolition because it had been greatly abused, and caused intolerable annoyance to the native government. The military authorities, he said, desired its continuance; for though the honest and hard-working sepoys usually cared nothing about it, a large class of the idle and unscrupulous considered it as a lottery, in which they might sometimes draw a prize, or obtain leave of absence, as the same sepoy has been known to do repeatedly for ten months at a time, on the pretext of having a case pending in Oude. Consequently, they endeavoured to impress their superiors with the idea, "that the fidelity of the whole native army" depended upon the maintenance and extension of this right of appeal. And the privilege was gradually extended, until it included all the regular, irregular, and local corps paid by the British government, with the native officers and sepoys of contingents employed in, and paid by, native states, who were drafted into them from the regular corps of our army up to a certain time—the total number amounting to between 50,000 and 60,000. At one period, the special right of the sepoys to the resident's intervention extended to their most distant relatives; but at the earnest entreaty of the native administration, it was restricted to their wives, fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters. "In consequence, it became a common custom with them to lend or sell their names to more remote relations, or to persons not related to them at all. A great many bad characters have, in this way, deprived men of lands which their ancestors had held in undisputed right of property for many generations or centuries; for the court, to save themselves from the importunity of the residency, has often given orders for the claimant being put in possession of the lands without due inquiry, or any inquiry at all."†

The use or abuse of the privilege depended chiefly on the character of the resident; and that it was occasionally shamefully abused, is a fact established, we are told, by the residency records.

"If the resident happens to be an impatient, overbearing man, he will often frighten the durbar and its courts, or local officers, into a hasty decision, by which the rights of others are sacrificed for the native officers and sepoys; and if he be at the same time an unscrupulous man, he will sometimes direct that the sepoy shall be put in possession of what he claims, in order to relieve himself from his importunity, or from that of his commanding officer, without taking the trouble to inform himself of the grounds on which the claim is founded. Of all such errors there are, unhappily, too many instances recorded in the resident's office."‡

Sir W. Sleeman adduces repeated instances of sepoys being put in possession of landed estates, to which they had no rightful claim, by the British government, at the cost of many lives; and quotes, as an illustration of the notorious partiality with which sepoy claims were treated, the case of a shopkeeper at Lucknow, who purchased a cavalry uniform, and by pretending to be an invalid British trooper, procured the signature of the brigadier commanding the troops in Oude, to numerous petitions, which were sent for adjustment to the durbar through the resident. This procedure he continued for fifteen years; and, to crown all, succeeded in obtaining, by the aid of government, forcible possession of a landed estate, to which he had no manner of right. Soon after, he sent in a petition stating that he had been in turn ejected, and four of his relations killed by the dispossessed proprietor. Thereupon an inquiry took place, and the whole truth came out. The King of Oude truly observed, with regard to this affair:—"If a person known to thousands in the city of Lucknow is able, for fifteen years, to carry on such a trade successfully, how much more easy must it be for people in the country, not known to any in the city, to carry it on!"§

On one occasion, no less than thirty lives were lost in attempting to enforce an award in favour of a British sepoy. On another, a sepoy came to the assistant-resident (Captain Shakespear), clamouring for justice, and complaining that no notice of his petition had been taken by the native government. On being questioned, he admitted that no less than forty persons had been seized, and were in prison, on his requisition.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 65.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., pp. 288—292.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

§ Letter of the King of Oude to the resident; 16th June, 1836.—Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 286.

As to punishing the sepoys for preferring fraudulent claims, that was next to impossible, both on account of the endless trouble which it involved, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of procuring a conviction from a court-martial composed of native officers; the only alternative being, to lay the case before the governor-general. The natural consequence was, that the sepoys became most importunate, untruthful, and unscrupulous in stating the circumstances of their claims, or the grounds of their complaints.*

It is impossible to read the revelations of Colonel Sleeman on this subject, without feeling that the British authorities themselves aggravated the disorganisation in the native administration, which was the sole plea for annexation. At the same time, it is no less clear, that the injustice perpetrated on behalf of the sepoys, was calculated to exercise a most injurious effect on their morals and discipline. The unmerited success often obtained by fraud and collusion, was both a bad example and a cause of disgust to the honest and scrupulous, on whom the burthen of duties fell, while their comrades were enjoying themselves in their homes, on leave of absence, obtained for the purpose of prosecuting unreasonable or false claims. Of the honest petitioners, few obtained what they believed to be full justice; and where one was satisfied, four became discontented. Another cause of disaffection arose when it was found necessary to check the growing evil, by decreeing that the privilege of urging claims through the resident should cease when native officers and sepoys were transferred from active service to the invalid establishment.

Altogether, the result of making the sepoys a privileged class (in this, as in so many other ways), was equally disastrous to their native and European superiors. Colonel Sleeman says, that the British recruits were procured chiefly from the Byswara and Banoda divisions of Oude, whose inhabitants vaunt the quality of the water for *tempering* soldiers, as we talk of the water of Damascus for tempering sword-blades. "The air and water of Malwa," it is popularly said, "may produce as good trees and crops as those of Oude, but cannot produce as good soldiers." They are described as never appearing so happy as when fighting in earnest with swords, spears, and matchlocks, and consequently are not much calculated for peaceful citizens; but the British sepoys who came home on furlough to their families (as they were freely permitted to do in time of peace, not only to petition the native government, but also ostensibly to visit their families, on reduced pay and allowances), were the terror, even in the midst of this warlike population, of their non-privileged neighbours and co-sharers in the land.

The partiality shown them did not prevent "the diminished attachment felt by the sepoys for their European officers" from becoming an established fact; and officers, when passing through Oude in their travels or sporting excursions, have of late years generally complained, that they received less civility from villages in which British invalids or furlough sepoys were located, than from any others; and that if anywhere treated with actual disrespect, such sepoys were generally found to be either the perpetrators or instigators.†

The evidence collected in preceding pages, seems to place beyond dispute, that the annexation of Oude, if it did not help to light the flames of mutiny, has fanned and fed them by furnishing the mutineers with refuge and co-operation in the territories which were ever in close alliance with us when they formed an independent kingdom; but which we, by assuming dominion over them on the sole plea of rescuing the inhabitants from gross misgovernment, really changed into a turbulent and insurrectionary province.

The metamorphosis was not accomplished by the deposition of the dynasty of Wajid Ali Shah. Indian princes generally, might, and naturally would, view with alarm so flagrant a violation of treaties, and of the first principles of the law of nations; but the Hindoos of Oude could have felt little regret for the downfall of a government essentially sectarian and unjust. The kings of Oude, unlike the majority of Mohammedans in India, were Sheiahs;‡ and so bigoted and exclusive, that no Sheiah could be sentenced to death at Lucknow for the murder even of a Sonnite, much less for that of a Hindoo. According to Colonel Sleeman, it was not only the law, but the everyday practice, that if a Hindoo murdered a Hindoo, and consented to become a Mussulman, he could not be executed for

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 292.
† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 289.
‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 62.

the crime, even though convicted and sentenced.*

Under such a condition of things, it is at least highly probable, that a rigidly impartial and tolerant administration would have been a welcome change to the Hindoo population. That it has proved the very reverse, is accounted for by the aggressive measures initiated by the new government, and the inefficient means by which their enforcement was attempted.

The latter evil was, to a certain extent, unavoidable. The Russian war deprived India of the European troops, which Lord Dalhousie deemed needful for the annexation of Oude: but this does not account for the grave mistake made in raising a contingent of 12,000 men, for the maintenance of the newly-annexed country, almost entirely from the disbanded native army. These levies, with half-a-dozen regular corps, formed the whole army of occupation.

Sir Henry Lawrence foresaw the danger; and in September, 1856, seven months before the commencement of the mutiny, he urged, that some portion of the Oude levies should change places with certain of the Punjab regiments then stationed on the Indus. Oude, he said, had long been the Alsatia of India—the resort of the dissipated and disaffected of every other state, and especially of deserters from the British ranks. It had been pronounced hazardous to employ the Seiks in the Punjab in 1849; and the reason assigned for the different policy now pursued in Oude was, that the former kingdom had been conquered, and the latter "fell in peace." Sir Henry pointed out the fallacy of this argument, and the materials for mischief which still remained in Oude, which he described as containing "246 forts, besides innumerable smaller strongholds, many of them sheltered within thick jungles. In these forts are 476 guns. Forts and guns should all be in the hands of government, or the forts should be razed. Many a foolish fellow has been urged on to his own ruin by the possession of a paltry fort, and many a paltry mud fort has repulsed British troops."†

The warning was unheeded. The government, though right in their desire to protect and elevate the village communities, were unjust in the sweeping and indiscriminating measures which they adopted in favour of the villagers, and for the increase in the public revenue, anticipated from the setting aside of the feudal claims of the so-called middlemen. Before attempting to revolutionise the face of society, it would have been only politic to provide unquestionable means of overawing the opposition which might naturally be expected from so warlike, not to say turbulent, a class as the Rajpoot chiefs.

Had men of the Lawrence school been sent to superintend the "absorption" of Oude, it is probable they might have seen the danger, and suggested measures of conciliation; but, on the contrary, it is asserted, that the European officials employed were almost all young and inexperienced men, and that their extreme opinions, and the corruption of their native subordinates, aggravated the unpopularity of the system they came to administer. Personal quarrels arose between the leading officers; and the result was a want of vigour and co-operation in their public proceedings.‡

Meantime, the obtainment of Oude was a matter of high-flown congratulation between the home and Indian authorities. The Company changed their opinion afterwards; § but, at the time, they accepted the measure as lawful, expedient, and very cleverly carried out. Far from being disappointed at the want of enthusiasm evinced by the people in not welcoming their new rulers as deliverers, their passive submission (in accordance with the proclamations of Wajid Ali Shah) called forth, from the Court of Directors, an expression of "lively emotions of thankfulness and pleasure," at the peaceable manner in which "an expanse of territory embracing an area of nearly 25,000 square miles, and containing 5,000,000 inhabitants, has passed from its native prince to the Queen of England, without the expenditure of a drop of blood, and almost without a murmur."‖

Upon the assumption of the government of Oude, a branch electric telegraph was commenced to connect Cawnpoor and Lucknow. In eighteen working days it was completed, including the laying of a cable,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 135.

† Article on "Army Reform;" by Sir H. Lawrence.—*Calcutta Review* for September, 1856.

‡ See Letter signed "Index," dated "Calcutta, December 9th, 1857."—*Times*, January 15th, 1858.

§ See Despatch of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 19th April, 1858.—Parl. Papers, 7th May, 1858; p. 4.

‖ Despatch dated December, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book* for 1856; p. 288.

6,000 feet in length, across the Ganges. On the morning of the 1st of March, Lord Dalhousie (who on that day resigned his office) put to General Outram the significant question—"Is all quiet in Oude?" The reply, "All is quiet in Oude," greeted Lord Canning on his arrival in Calcutta.

On the previous day, a farewell letter had been written to the King of Oude by the retiring governor-general, expressing his satisfaction that the friendship which had so long existed between the Hon. East India Company and the dynasty of Wajid Ali Shah, should have daily become more firmly established. "There is no doubt," he adds, "that Lord Canning will, in the same manner as I have done, strengthening and confirming this friendship, bear in mind and give due consideration to the treaties and engagements which are to exist for ever."*

It is difficult to understand what diplomatic purpose was to be served by this reference to the eternal duration of treaties which had been declared null and void, and engagements proffered by one party, which the other had at all hazards persisted in rejecting; or why Lord Dalhousie, so clear, practical, and upright in his general character, should seem to have acted so unlike himself in all matters connected with what may be termed his foreign policy.

It must not, however, be forgotten, that that policy, in all its circumstances, was sanctioned and approved, accepted and rewarded, by the East India Company. Lord Dalhousie's measures were consistent throughout; and he enjoyed the confidence and support of the directors during the whole eight years of his administration, in a degree to which few, if any, of his predecessors ever attained. It was the unqualified approval of the home authorities that rendered the annexation policy the prominent feature of a system which the people of India, of every creed, clime, and tongue, looked upon as framed for the express purpose of extinguishing all native sovereignty and rank. And, in fact, the measures then pursued are scarcely explicable on any other ground. The democratic element is, no doubt, greatly on the increase in England; yet our institutions and our prejudices are monarchical and aristocratic: and nothing surprised our Eastern fellow-subjects more, than the deference and courtesy paid by all ranks in the United Kingdom, to rajahs and nawabs, who, in their hereditary principalities, had met—as many of them aver—with little civility, and less justice, at the hands of the representatives of the East India Company.

Yet, it was not so much a system as a want of system, which mainly conduced to bring about the subsequent state of things. The constant preponderance of expenditure above income, and an ever-present sense of precariousness, have been probably the chief reasons why the energies of the Anglo-Indian government have been, many years, most mischievously directed to degrading kings, chiefs, nobles, gentry, priests, and landowners of various degrees, to one dead level of poverty—little above pauperism. We have rolled, by sheer brute force, an iron grinder over the face of Hindoo society—crushed every lineament into a disfigured mass—squeezed from it every rupee that even torture could extract; and lavished the money, thus obtained, on a small white oligarchy and an immense army of mercenary troops, who were believed to be ready, at any moment, to spread fire and the sword wherever any opposition should be offered to the will of the paramount power, whose salt they ate.

We thought the sepoys would always keep down the native chiefs, and, when they were destroyed, the people; and we did not anticipate the swift approach of a time when we should cry to the chiefs and people to help us to extinguish the incendiary flames of our own camp, and to wrench the sword from the hands in which we had so vauntingly placed it.

In our moment of peril, the defection of the upper classes of Hindoostan was "almost universal." But surely it is no wonder that they should have shown so little attachment to our rule, when it is admitted, even by the covenanted civil service, that they "have not much to thank us for."

Throughout British India, several native departments were declared to have been "grossly underpaid," particularly the police service, into which it had been found difficult to get natives of good family to enter at all. In revenue offices, they were formerly better paid than subsequently. The general result of our proceedings had been, that at the time of the mutiny, "the native

* Letter, vouched for as a true translation by Robert Wilberforce Bird, and printed in a pamphlet entitled *Case of the King of Oude;* by Mr. John Davenport: August 27th, 1856.

gentry were daily becoming more reduced, were pinched by want of means, and were therefore discontented."*

It is difficult to realise the full hardship of their position. Here were men who would have occupied, or at least have had the chance of occupying, the highest positions of the state under a native government, and who were accustomed to look to the service of the sovereign as the chief source of honourable and lucrative employment, left, frequently with no alternative but starvation or the acceptance of a position and a salary under foreign masters, that their fathers would have thought suitable only for their poorest retainers. Not one of them, however ancient his lineage, however high his attainments, could hope to be admitted within the charmed circle of the covenanted civil service, as the equal of the youngest writer, or even in the army, to take rank with a new-fledged ensign.

The expenses of an Asiatic noble are enormous. Polygamy is costly in its incidentals; and the head of a great family is looked to, not only for the maintenance of his own wives and children, in a style proportionate to their birth, but also of those of his predecessors. The misery which the levelling policy produced, was severely felt by the pensioners and dependents of the fallen aristocracy, by the aged and the sick, by women and children. And this latter fact explains a marked feature in the rebellion of 1857; namely, the number of women who had played a leading part in the insurrection. The Ranee of Jhansi, and her sister, with other Hindoo princesses of less note, had evinced an amount of ability and resolve far beyond that of their countrymen; and the cause of disaffection with almost all of these, had been the setting aside of their hereditary rights of succession and of adoption. They then viewed the sudden refusal of the British government to sanction what they had previously encouraged, as a most faithless and arbitrary procedure; and many chiefs, whose hostility was otherwise unaccountable, would probably, like the chief of Nargoond, have proved to have been incited to join the mutineers chiefly, if not exclusively, by this particular grievance.

A branch of the annexation question, in which the violation of rights of succession was also a prominent feature, yet remains to be noticed—namely, the

Resumption of Rent-free Lands; whereby serious disaffection had been produced in the minds of a large class of dispossessed proprietors. All rightful tenure of this kind is described, in the regulations of the East India Company, as based upon a well-known provision "of the ancient law of India, by which the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the annual produce of every beegah (acre) of land, excepting in cases in which that power shall have made a temporary or permanent alienation of its right to such proportion of the produce, or shall have agreed to receive, instead of that proportion, a specific sum annually, or for a term of years, or in perpetuity."†

Both Hindoo and Mohammedan sovereigns frequently made over part, or the whole, of the public revenue of a village, or even of a district, to one of their officers; they often assigned it in jaghire for the maintenance of a certain number of troops, or gratuitously for life, as a reward for service done; and sometimes in perpetuity. In the latter case, the alienation was more complete than that practised in the United Kingdom;‡ for here titles and estate escheat to the state on the death of the last legal representative of a family; but, among the Hindoos, such lapse never, or most rarely occurs, since all the males marry, in childhood generally, several wives; and their law vests rights of succession and adoption in the widows of the deceased. These rights were acknowledged equally by Hindoo and Moslem rulers—by the Peishwa of Poona, and the Nawab-vizier of Oude; the only difference being, that in the event of adoption, a larger nuzzurana, or tributary offering, was expected on accession, than if the heir had been a son by birth: in other words, the legacy duty was higher in the one case than the other.

"Enam," or "gift," is the term commonly given to all gratuitous grants, whether temporary or in perpetuity—whether to individuals, or for religious, charitable, or educational purposes: but it is more strictly applicable to endowments of the latter description; in which case, the amount of state-tribute transferred was frequently very considerable, and always in perpetuity. "A large proportion of the grants to individuals," Mountstuart Elphinstone writes.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, pp. 56, 57.

† Regulation xxxi., of 1803.

‡ For instance, in the alienation of a part of the revenues of the post-office, and other public departments; enacted in the case of certain noble families.

"are also in perpetuity, and are regarded as among the most secure forms of private property; but the gradual increase of such instances of liberality, combined with the frequency of forged deeds of gift, sometimes induces the ruler to resume the grants of his predecessors, and to burden them with heavy taxes. When these are laid on transfers by sales, or even by succession, they are not thought unjust; but total resumption, or the permanent levy of a fixed rate, is regarded as oppressive."*

During the early years of the Company's rule, the perpetual enam tenures were sedulously respected; but as the supreme government grew richer in sovereignty, and poorer in purse (for the increase of expenditure always distanced that of revenue), the collectors began to look with a covetous eye on the freeholders. They argued, truly enough, that a great many of the titles to land were fraudulent, or had been fraudulently obtained; and in such cases, where grounds of suspicion existed, any government would have been in duty bound to make inquiry into the circumstances of the original acquisition.

But instead of investigating certain cases, a general inquiry was instituted into the whole of them; the principle of which was, to cast on every enamdar the burthen of proving his right—a demand which, of course, many of the ancient holders must have found it impossible to fulfil. The lapse of centuries, war, fire, or negligence might, doubtless, have occasioned the destruction of the deeds. Some of the oldest were, we know, engraven on stone and copper, in long-forgotten characters; and few of the commissioners could question the witnesses in the modern Bengalee or Hindoostani, much less decipher Pali or Sanscrit.

A commission of inquiry was instituted in Bengal in 1836, "to ascertain the grounds on which claims to exemption from the payment of revenue were founded, to confirm those for which valid titles were produced, and to bring under assessment those which were held without authority."† In theory, this sounds moderate, if not just; in practice, it is said to have proved the very reverse, and to have cast a blight over the whole of Lower Bengal. The expense of the commission was, of course, enormous; and even in a pecuniary sense, the profit reaped by government could not compensate for the ruin and distress caused by proceedings which are asserted to have been so notoriously unjust, that "some distinguished civil servants" refused to take any part in them.‡

Mr. Edmonstone, Mr. Tucker, and a few of the ablest directors at the East India House, protested, but in vain, against the resumption laws, which were acted upon for many years. The venerable Marquess Wellesley, a few weeks before his decease (July 30th, 1842), wrote earnestly to the Earl of Ellenborough (then governor-general), as follows:—

"I am concerned to hear that some inquiry has been commenced respecting the validity of some of the tenures under the permanent settlement of the land revenue. This is a most vexatious, and, surely, not a prudent measure. Here the maxim of sound ancient wisdom applies most forcibly—'*Quieta non movere.*' We ancient English settlers in Ireland have felt too severely the hand of Strafford, in a similar act of oppression, not to dread any similar proceeding."

Strafford, however, never attempted anything in Ireland that could be compared with the sweeping confiscation which is described as having been carried on in Bengal, where "little respect was paid to the principles of law, either as recognised in England or in India;" and where, "it is said, one commissioner dispossessed, in a single morning, no less than two hundred proprietors."§

In the Chittagong district, an insurrection was nearly caused by "the wholesale sweeping away of the rights of the whole population;" and in the Dacca district, the commission likewise operated very injuriously.||

The general alarm and disaffection excited by these proceedings, so materially affected the public tranquillity, that the Court of Directors was at length compelled to interfere, and the labours of the Bengal commission were fortunately brought to a close some years before the mutiny.¶

The enam commission appointed for the Deccan, was no less harsh and summary in

* Quoted in evidence before Colonization Committee of House of Commons, of 1858.—Fourth Report, published 28th July, 1858; p. 36.

† Statement of the East India Company.

‡ Fourth Report of Colonization Committee, p. 47.

§ *Quarterly Review*, 1858.—Article on "British India;" attributed to Mr. Layard: p. 257.

|| See Second Report of Colonization Committee of 1858; p. 60.

¶ *Quarterly Review*, 1858; p. 257.

its proceedings, the results of which have been stated to afford the people their "first and gravest cause of complaint against the government."*

Due investigation ought to have been made in 1818, when the dominions of the Peishwa first became British territory, into the nature of the grants, whether hereditary or for life; and also to discover whether, as was highly probable, many fraudulent claims might not have been established under the weak and corrupt administration of the last native ruler, Bajee Rao. All this might have been done in perfect conformity with the assurance given by the tranquilliser of the Deccan (Mountstuart Elphinstone), that "all wuttuns and enams (birthrights and rent-free lands), annual stipends, religious and charitable establishments, would be protected. The proprietors were, however, warned that they would be called upon to show their sunnuds (deeds of grant), or otherwise prove their title."†

Instead of doing this, the government suffered thirty years to elapse—thus giving the proprietors something of a prescriptive right to their holdings, however acquired; and the Court of Directors, as late as September, 1846, expressly declared, that the principle on which they acted, was to allow enams (or perpetual alienations of public revenue, as contradistinguished from surinjams, or temporary ones) to pass to heirs, as of right, without need of the assent of the paramount power, provided the adoption were regular according to Hindoo law.‡

The rights of widows were likewise distinctly recognised, until the "absorption" policy came into operation; and then investigations into certain tenures were instituted, which paved the way for a general enam commission for the whole Bombay presidency; by which all enamdars were compelled to prove possession for a hundred years, as an indispensable preliminary to being confirmed in the right to transmit their estates to lineal descendants—the future claims of widows and adopted sons being quietly ignored.

The commission was composed, not of judicial officers, but of youths of the civil service, and of captains and subalterns taken from their regiments, and selected principally on account of their knowledge of the Mahratta languages; while, at the head of the commission, was placed a captain of native infantry, thirty-five years of age.§

These inexperienced youths were, besides, naturally prejudiced in deciding upon cases in which they represented at once the plaintiff and the judge. The greater the ingenuity they displayed in upsetting claims, the greater their chance of future advancement. Every title disallowed, was so much revenue gained. Powers of search, such as were exercised by the French revolutionary committees, and by few others, were entrusted to them; and their agents, accompanied by the police, might at any time of the night or day, enter the houses of persons in the receipt of alienated revenue, or examine and seize documents, without giving either a receipt or list of those taken. The decisions of previous authorities were freely reversed; and titles admitted by Mr. Brown in 1847, were re-inquired into, and disallowed by Captain Cowper in 1855.‖

An appeal against a resumptive decree might be laid before the privy council in London; and the rajah of Burdwan succeeded in obtaining the restoration of his lands by this means.¶ But to the poorer class of ousted proprietors, a revised verdict was unattainable. Few could afford to risk from five to ten thousand pounds in litigation against the East India Company. But, whatever their resources, it was making the evils of absentee sovereigntyship most severely and unwisely felt, to require persons, whose families had occupied Indian estates fifty to a hundred years and upwards, to produce their title-deeds in England; and to make little or no allowance for the various kinds of proof, which, duly weighed, were really more trustworthy, because less easily counterfeited, than any written documents.

The commissioners on whom so onerous a duty as the inquiry into rent-free tenures was imposed, ought at least to have been tried and approved men of high public character, who would neither hurry over cases by the score, nor suffer them to linger on in needless and most harassing delays; as the actual functionaries are accused of

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 259.

† Proclamation of Mr. Elphinstone; and instructions issued to collectors in 1818.

‡ Fourth Report of Colonization Committee, p. 35.

§ *Ibid*

‖ *Quarterly Review*, p. 258. Stated on the authority of "Correspondence relating to the Scrutiny of the revised Surinjam and Pension Lists." Printed for government. Bombay, 1856.

¶ Second Report of Colonization Committee, p. 9.

having done, according to their peculiar propensities. Perhaps it would have been better to have acted on altogether a different system, and acknowledged the claim established by many years of that undisturbed possession which is everywhere popularly looked upon as nine-tenths of the law; and, while recognising all in the positions in which we found them on the assumption of sovereignty, to have claimed from all, either a yearly subsidy or (in pursuance of the practice of native sovereigns) a succession duty. At least, we should thereby have avoided the expense and odium incurred by the institution of a tribunal, to which Lieutenant-governor Halliday's description of our criminal jurisdiction would seem to apply—viz., that it was "a lottery, in which, however, the best chances were with the criminal." On the outbreak of the rebellion, the resumption commission was brought suddenly to a close; its introduction into Guzerat (which had been previously contemplated) was entirely abandoned, and some of the confiscated estates were restored. But the distrust inspired by past proceedings could not easily be removed, especially as the feeling of ill-usage was aggravated by the fact, that in border villages belonging jointly to the Company and to Indian princes, the rent-free lands, on the side belonging to the former, had been resumed, while those of the latter remained intact.*

In the North-West Provinces, the government avoided incurring the stigma of allowing a prescriptive right of possession and transmission to take root through their neglect, by immediately making a very summary settlement. The writings of Sleeman, Raikes, Gubbins and others, together with the evidence brought before the colonization committee, tend to prove the now scarcely disputed fact, that the attempted revenue settlement of the North-West Provinces, and the sweeping away of the proprietary class as middlemen, had proved a failure. With few exceptions, the ancient proprietors, dispossessed of their estates by the revenue collectors, or by sales under decrees of civil courts, had taken advantage of the troubles of 1858 to return, and have been suffered, and even encouraged, to do so by the ryots and small tenants, to whom their dispossession would have appeared most advantageous.†

A number of cases of alleged individual injustice towards the rajahs and talookdars, were collected, and stated, in circumstantial detail, in a minute laid before Mr. Thomason (the lieutenant-governor of Agra in 1844), by Mr. Boulderson, a member of the Board of Revenue; who eventually resigned his position, sooner than be associated in proceedings which he believed to be essentially unjust. His chief ground of complaint was, that the board, instead of instituting a preliminary inquiry into what the rights of talookdars and other proprietors really were, acted upon *à priori* arguments of what they must be; and never, in any one of the many hundred resumptions made at their recommendation, deemed the proofs on which the proceedings rested, worthy of a moment's inquiry.

After reciting numerous instances of dispossession of proprietors who had held estates for many years, and laid out a large amount of capital in their improvement, the writer adds:—

> "I have in vain endeavoured, hitherto, to rouse the attention of my colleague and government to this virtual abolition of all law. * * * The respect of the native public I know to have been shaken to an inexpressible degree: they can see facts; and are not blinded by the fallacious reasonings and misrepresentations with which the board have clothed these subjects; and they wonder with amazement at the motives which can prompt the British government to allow their own laws—all laws which give security to property—to be thus belied and set aside. All confidence in property or its rights is shaken; and the villany which has been taught the people they will execute, and reward the government tenfold into their own bosom."‡

In a Preface, dated "London, 8th June, 1858," Mr. Boulderson states, that his minute "produced no effect in modifying or staying the proceedings" of the revenue board; and if "forwarded to England, as in due official course it should have been, it must have had as little effect upon the Hon. Court of Directors."

Even in the Punjab, the system pursued was a levelling one. Notwithstanding all that Henry Lawrence and his disciples did to mitigate its severity, and especially to conciliate the more powerful and aggrieved chiefs, the result is asserted to have been, to a great extent, the same there as in the Deccan: "the aristocracy and landed gentry who have escaped destruction by the settlement, have been ruined by the resumption of alienated land."§

Thus annexation and resumption, confiscation and absorption, had gone hand-in-

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 259. † *Ibid.*, p. 251.
‡ Minute on Talookdaree cases; by Mr. Boulderson.
§ *Quarterly Review* (July, 1858), p. 260.

hand, with a rapidity which would have been dangerous even had the end in view and the means of attainment been both unexceptionable. However justly acquired, the entire reorganisation of extensive, widely scattered, and, above all, densely populated territories, must always present difficulties which abstract rules arbitrarily enforced can never satisfactorily overcome.

The fifteen million inhabitants brought by Lord Dalhousie under the immediate government of the British Crown, were to be, from the moment of annexation, ruled on a totally different system: native institutions and native administrators were expected to give place, without a murmur, to the British commissioner and his subordinates; and the newly absorbed territory, whatever its history, the character of its population, its languages and customs, was to be "settled," without any references to these important antecedents, on the theory which found favour with the Calcutta council for the time being.

Many able officials, with much ready money, and a thoroughly efficient army to support them, were indispensable to carry through such a system. In the Punjab, these requisites were obtained at the expense of other provinces; and the picked men sent there, were even then so few in number and so overworked, that they scarcely had time for sleep or food. Their private purse often supplied a public want. Thus, James Abbott was sent by Sir Henry Lawrence to settle the Huzara district, which he did most effectually; going from valley to valley, gaining the confidence of all the tribes, and administering justice in the open air under the trees—looking, with his long grey beard on his breast, and his grey locks far down his shoulders, much more like an ancient patriarch than a deputy-commissioner. "Kâkâ," or "Uncle" Abbott, as the children called him (in return for the sweetmeats which he carried in readiness for them), took leave of the people in a very characteristic fashion, by inviting the entire population to a feast on the Nara hill, which lasted three nights and days; and he left Huzara with only a month's pay in his pocket, "having literally spent all his substance on the people." His successor, John Becher, ably filled his place, "living in a house with twelve doors, and all open to the people. * * * The result is, that the Huzara district, once famous for turbulence, is now about the quietest, happiest, and most loyal in the Punjab."* Of course, Kâkâ Abbott and his successor, much less their lamented head (Sir Henry Lawrence), cannot be taken as average specimens of their class. Such self-devotion is the exception, not the rule: it would be asking too much of human nature, to expect the entire civil service to adopt what Colonel Herbert Edwardes calls the Bahaduree (summer-house) system of administration, and keep their cutcherries open, not "from ten till four" by the regulation clock, but all day, and at any hour of the night that anybody chooses.† Neither can chief commissioners be expected, or even wished, to sacrifice their health as Sir Henry Lawrence did in the Punjab, where, amid all his anxieties for the welfare of the mass, he preserved his peculiar character of being pre-eminently the friend of the man that was down; battling with government for better terms for the deposed officials and depressed aristocracy, and caring even for thieves and convicts. He originated gaol reform; abolished the "night-chain," and other abominations; introduced in-door labour; and himself superintended the new measures—going from gaol to gaol, and rising even at midnight to visit the prisoners' barracks.‡

The manner in which the Punjab was settled is altogether exceptional: the men employed certainly were; so also was the large discretionary power entrusted to them. Elsewhere matters went on very differently. The civil service could not furnish an efficient magistracy for the old provinces, much less for the new; the public treasury could not satisfy the urgent and long reiterated demand for public works, canals to irrigate the land, roads to convey produce, and avert the scourge of famine, even from Bengal: how, then, could it spare ready money to build court-houses and gaols in its new possessions?

Like Aurungzebe, in the Deccan, we swept away existing institutions without being prepared to replace them, and thereby became the occasion of sufferings which we had assumed the responsibility of preventing. Thus, in territories under British government, the want of proper places of

* See the graphic description given by Colonel Herbert Edwardes, of Sir Henry Lawrence's old staff in the Punjab, previous to annexation.—Quoted in Raikes' *Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

confinement is alleged to be so great, that "prisoners of all classes are crammed together into a dungeon so small, that, when the sun goes down, they fight for the little space upon which only a few can lie during the weary night. Within one month, forty die of disease, produced by neglect, want of air, and filth. The rest, driven to despair, attempt an escape; twenty are shot down dead. Such is a picture—and not an imaginary picture—of the results of one of the most recent cases of annexation!"*

Even supposing the above to be an extreme, and, in its degree, an isolated case, yet one such narrative, circulated among the rebel ranks, would serve as a reason for a general breaking open of gaols, and as an incitement and excuse for any excesses on the part of the convicts, to whom, it will be remembered, some of the worst atrocities committed during the rebellion were generally attributed.

In fact, the increase of territory, of late years, has been (as the Duke of Wellington predicted it would be) greatly in excess of our resources. Annex we might, govern we could not; for, in the words of Prince Metternich, we had not "the material."† That is, we had not the material on which alone we choose to rely. Native agency we cannot indeed dispense with: we could not hold India, or even Calcutta, a week without it; but we keep it down on the lowest steps of the ladder so effectually, that men of birth, talent, or susceptibility, will serve us only when constrained by absolute poverty. They shun the hopeless dead-level which the service of their country is now made to offer them.

Our predecessors in power acted upon a totally different principle. Their title was avowedly that of the sword; yet they delegated authority to the conquered race, with a generosity which puts to shame our exclusiveness and distrust; the more so because it does not appear that their confidence was ever betrayed.

Many of the ablest and most faithful servants of the Great Moguls were Hindoos. The Moslem knew the *prestige* of ancient lineage, and the value of native ability and acquaintance with the resources of the country too well, to let even bigotry stand in the way of their employment.

* *Quarterly Review* (July, 1858), p. 273.

† Quoted by Mr. Layard, in a Lecture delivered at St. James's Hall, Piccadilly, on his return from India, May 11th, 1858.

The command of the imperial armies was repeatedly intrusted to Rajpoot generals; and the dewans (chancellors of the exchequer) were usually Brahmins: the famous territorial arrangements of Akber are inseparably associated with the name of Rajah Todar Mul; and probably, if we had availed ourselves of the aid of native financiers, and made it worth their while to serve us well, our revenue settlements might have been ere now satisfactorily arranged. If Hindoos were found faithful to a Moslem government, why should they not be so to a Christian one, which has the peculiar advantage of being able to balance the two great antagonistic races, by employing each, so as to keep the other in check? Of late, we seem to have been trying to unite them, by giving them a common cause of complaint, and by marking the subordinate position of native officials more offensively than ever. They are accused of corruption—so were the Europeans: let the remedy employed in the latter case be tried in the former, and the result will be probably the same. The need of increased salary is much greater in the case of the native official. Let the government give him the means of supporting himself and his family, and add a prospect of promotion: it will then be well served.

By the present system we proscribe the higher class, and miserably underpay the lower. The result is unsatisfactory to all parties, even to the government; which, though it has become aware of the necessity of paying Europeans with liberality, still withholds from the native "the fair day's wage for the fair day's work." Latterly, the Europeans may have been in some cases overpaid; but the general error seems to have lain, in expecting too much from them; the amount of writing required by the Company's system, being a heavy addition to their labours, especially in the newly annexed territories. The natural consequence has been, that while a certain portion of the civilians, with the late governor-general at their head, lived most laboriously, and devoted themselves wholly to the duties before them; others, less zealous, or less capable, shrunk back in alarm at the prospect before them, and, yielding to the influences of climate and of luxury, fell into the hands of interested subordinates—signed the papers presented by their clerks, and, in the words of their severest censor, "amused

themselves, and kept a servant to wash each separate toe."*

Under cover of their names, corruption and extortion has been practised to an almost incredible extent. Witness the exposure of the proceedings of provincial courts, published in 1849, by a Bengal civilian, of twenty-one years' standing, under the title of *Revelations of an Orderly.*

An attempt had been made to remedy the insufficient number of civilians, by taking military men from their regiments, and employing them in diplomatic and administrative positions; that is to say, the Indian authorities had tried the Irishman's plan of lengthening the blanket, by cutting off one end and adding it to the other.

The injurious effect which this practice was said to have exercised on the army, is noticed in the succeeding section.

The State of the Indian Army, and the alleged Causes of the Disorganisation and Disaffection of the Bengal Sepoys, remain to be considered. The origin of the native army, and the various phases of its progress, have been described in the earlier chapters of this work. We have seen how the restless Frenchman, Dupleix, raised native levies, and disciplined them in the European fashion at Pondicherry;† and how these were called sepoys (from *sipahi,* Portuguese for soldier), in contradistinction to the *topasses* (or hat-wearers); that is to say, to the natives of Portuguese descent, and the Eurasians, or half-castes, of whom small numbers, disciplined and dressed in the European style, were entertained by the East India Company, to guard their factories. Up to this period, the policy of the Merchant Adventurers had been essentially commercial and defensive; but the French early manifested a political and aggressive spirit. Dupleix read with remarkable accuracy the signs of the times, and understood the opportunity for the aggrandisement of his nation, offered by the rapidly increasing disorganisation of the Mogul empire, and the intestine strife which attended the assertion of independence by usurping governors and tributary princes. He began to take part in the quarrels of neighbouring potentates; and the English levied a native soldiery, and followed his example.

The first engagement of note in which the British sepoys took part, was at the capture of Devicotta, in 1748, when they made an orderly advance with a platoon of Europeans, as a storming party, under Robert Clive. Three years later, under the same leader, a force of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys, marched on, regardless of the superstitions of their countrymen, amid thunder and lightning, to besiege Arcot; and having succeeded in taking the place, they gallantly and successfully defended it against an almost overwhelming native force, supported by French auxiliaries.

The augmentation in the number of the sepoys became very rapid in proportion to that of the European troops. The expedition with which Clive and Watson sailed from Madras in 1756, to recapture Calcutta from Surajah Dowlah, consisted of 900 Europeans and 1,500 natives.

The total military force maintained by the English and French on the Madras coast was at this time nearly equal, each comprising about 2,000 Europeans and 10,000 natives. The British European force was composed of H. M.'s 39th foot, with a small detail of Royal Artillery attached to serve the regimental field-pieces; the Madras European regiment, and a strong company of artillery. The sepoys were supplied with arms and ammunition from the public stores, but were clothed in the native fashion, commanded by native officers, and very rudely disciplined.

At the commencement of the year 1757, Clive organised a battalion of sepoys, consisting of some three or four hundred men, carefully selected; and he not only furnished them with arms and ammunition, but clothed, drilled, and disciplined them like the Europeans, appointing a European officer to command, and non-commissioned officers to instruct them. Such was the origin of the first regiment of Bengal native infantry, called, from its equipment, the "Lall Pultun," or "Red regiment" (pultun being a corruption of the English term "platoon," which latter is derived from the French word "peloton.") It was placed under the direction of Lieutenant Knox, who proved a most admirable sepoy leader. There was no difficulty in raising men for this and other corps; for during the perpetually-recurring warfare which marked the Mussulman occupation of Bengal, adventurers had been accustomed to flock thither from Bahar, Oude, the Dooab, Rohilcund, and even from beyond the Indus;

* Sir Charles Napier.—*Life and Opinions.*

† See *Indian Empire,* vol. i., pp. 114; 258; 304; 533.

engaging themselves for particular services, and being dismissed when these were performed. It was from such men and their immediate descendants that the British ranks were filled. The majority were Mussulmans; but Patans, Rohillas, a few Jats, some Rajpoots, and even Brahmins were to be found in the early corps raised in and about Calcutta.*

The Madras sepoys, and the newly-raised Bengal battalion, amounting together to 2,100, formed two-thirds of the force with which Clive took the field against Surajah Dowlah at Plassy, in June, 1757. Of these, six Europeans and sixteen Natives perished in the so-called battle, against an army estimated by the lowest calculation at 58,000 men.† Of course, not even Clive, "the daring in war," would have been so mad as to risk an engagement which he might have safely avoided, with such an overwhelming force; but he acted in reliance on the contract previously made with the nawab's ambitious relative and commander-in-chief, Meer Jaffier, who had promised to desert to the British with all the troops under his orders at the commencement of the action, on condition of being recognised as Nawab of Bengal. The compact was fulfilled; and Meer Jaffier's treachery was rewarded by his elevation to the musnud, which the East India Company allowed him to occupy for some years. Meanwhile, the cessions obtained through him having greatly increased their territorial and pecuniary resources, they began to form a standing army for each of the three presidencies, organising the natives into a regular force, on the plan introduced by Clive.

The first instance on record of a Native court-martial occurred in July, 1757. A sepoy was accused of having connived at the attempted escape of a Swiss who had deserted the British ranks, and acted as a spy in the service of the French. The Swiss was hanged. The sepoy was tried by a court composed of the subahdars and jemadars (Native captains and lieutenants) of his detachment, found guilty, and sentenced to receive 500 lashes, and be dismissed from the service—which was accordingly done.

The hostilities carried on against the French, subjected the East India Company's troops to great hardships. The Europeans had been much injured in health and discipline by repeated accessions of prize-money, and by the habits of drinking and debauchery into which they had fallen. Numbers died; and the remainder had neither ability nor inclination to endure long marches and exposure to the climate. During an expedition in pursuit of a detachment under M. Law, they positively refused to proceed beyond Patna: Major Eyre Coote declared that he would advance with the sepoys alone; which, they rejoined, was "the most desirable event that could happen to them." Major Coote marched on with the sepoys only; but the French succeeded in effecting their escape. The recreants got drunk, and behaved in a very disorderly manner; whereupon thirty of the worst of them were brought before a court-martial, and, by its decree, publicly flogged for mutiny and insubordination.

The sentence was pronounced and executed on the 28th of July, 1757. On the following day, the sepoys, undeterred by the penalty exacted from their European comrades, laid down their arms in a body, and refused to proceed farther. The Madrassees especially complained, that although they had embarked only for service in Calcutta, they had been taken on to Chandernagore, Moorshedabad, and Patna; and that now they were again required to advance, to remove still farther from their families, and endure additional fatigues and privations. They alleged that their pay was in arrears, and that they had not received the amount to which they were entitled. Major Coote warned them of the danger which would accrue from the want of unanimity and discipline among a small force surrounded with enemies, and the hazard to which, by laying down their arms, they exposed the savings they had already accumulated, and the large amount of prize-money then due to them. These considerations prevailed; the men resumed their arms, and marched at once with the artillery to Bankipoor, the European infantry proceeding thither by water.

When Clive first left India, in 1760, the Bengal force consisted of one European battalion of infantry and two companies of artillery (1,000 men in all), and five Native battalions (1,000 men in each.) The number of European officers was at the same time increased: one captain as commandant, one lieutenant and one ensign as staff, with four sergeants, being allowed to each Native

* *Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army;* by Captain Arthur Broome, Bengal Artillery; 1850: vol. i., p. 93.

† See *Indian Empire*, in which a general account of Indian battles is given.

battalion. There was likewise a Native commandant, who took post in front with the captain, and a Native adjutant, who remained in the rear with the subalterns.

In 1764, very general disaffection was manifested throughout the army, in consequence of the non-payment of a gratuity promised by the nawab, Meer Jaffier. The European battalion, which was, unfortunately, chiefly composed of foreigners (Dutch, Germans, Hessians, and French), when assembled under arms for a parade on the 30th of January, refused to obey the word of command, declaring, that until the promised donation should be given, they would not perform any further service. The battalion marched off under the leadership of an Englishman named Straw, declaring their intention of joining their comrades then stationed on the Caramnassa, and with them proceeding to Calcutta, and compelling the governor and council to do them justice. This appears to have been really the design of the English mutineers; but the foreigners, who were double their number, secretly intended to join Shuja Dowlah, the nawab-vizier of Oude; and went off with that intention.

The sepoys were at first inclined to follow the example of the Europeans, whose cause of complaint they shared; but the officers succeeded in keeping them quiet in their lines, until the Mogul horse (two troops of which had been recently raised) spread themselves among the Native battalions, and induced about 600 sepoys to accompany the treacherous foreigners.

The European officers rode after the mutineers, and induced their leader Straw, and the greater part of them, to return. Probaby they would have done so in a body but for the influence exercised over them by a sergeant named Delamarr, who had been distinguished by intelligence and good conduct in the previous campaign, but who had a private grievance to avenge, having, as he alleged, been promised a commission on leaving the King's and entering the Company's service; which promise had been broken to him, though kept to others similarly circumstanced. This man was born in England of French parents, and spoke both languages with equal facility; on which account he was employed by the officers as a medium of communication with the foreign troops. As long as any of the officers remained with the mutineers, he affected fidelity; but when the last officer, Lieutenant Eyre, was compelled to relinquish the hope of reclaiming his men, by their threatening to carry him off by force, Delamarr put himself at the head of the party, and gave out an order that any one who should attempt to turn back, should be hanged on the first tree. The order appears to have had a contrary effect to that which it was intended to produce; for the Germans thought the French were carrying the matter too far; and they, with all but three of the few remaining English, returned on the following day, to the number of seventy, accompanied by several sepoys.

Thus the original deserters were diminished to little more than 250, of whom 157 were of the European battalion (almost all Frenchmen), sixteen were of the European cavalry, and about 100 were Natives, including some of the Mogul horse. They proceeded to join the army of Shuja Dowlah of Oude; and some of them entered his service, and that of other Indian potentates; but the majority enlisted in Sumroo's brigade.*

On the 12th of February (the day following the mutiny), a dividend of the nawab's donation was declared as about to be paid to the army, in the proportion of forty rupees to each European soldier, and six to each sepoy. The sepoys were extremely indignant at the rate of allotment: they unanimously refused to receive the proffered sum, and assembled under arms on the 13th of February, at nine in the forenoon. The Europeans were very much excited; and it became difficult "to restrain their violence, and prevent their falling upon the sepoys, for presuming to follow the example they themselves had afforded."†

Suddenly the sepoys set up a shout, and rushed down, in an irregular body, towards the Europeans, who had been drawn up in separate companies across the parade, with the park of artillery on their left, and two 6-pounders on their right.

Captain Jennings, the officer in command, perceiving that the sepoys were moving with shouldered arms, directed that they should be suffered to pass through the intervals of the battalion, if they would do so quietly. Several officers urged resistance; but Captain Jennings felt that the discharge of a single musket would be the signal for a fearful struggle, which must end either in the extermination of the Europeans, or in the total dissolution of the

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 297.

† Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 420.

Native force, on which the government were deeply dependent. He rode along the ranks, urging the men to be quiet; and arrived at the right of the line just in time to snatch the match out of the hand of a subaltern of artillery, as he was putting it to a 6-pounder, loaded with grape.

The result justified his decision. Two corps (the late 2nd grenadiers and 8th Native infantry) went off towards the Caramnassa river. The other two Native battalions present (the late 1st and 3rd Native infantry), remained behind—the one perfectly steady, the other clamorous and excited. The remaining three detached battalions all exhibited signs of disaffection. Captain Jennings, with the officers of the mutinous corps, followed them, and induced every man of them to return, by consenting to their own stipulation, that their share of the donation should be raised to half that of the corresponding ranks of the European battalion. This concession being made generally known, tranquillity was at once re-established.

The question of the better adaptation of the natives of India to serve as regular or irregular cavalry, was discussed. The council considered that a body of regular Native cavalry might be raised on the European system, under English officers. Major Carnac objected on the following grounds:—"The Moguls," he said, "who are the only good horsemen in the country, can never be brought to submit to the ill-treatment they receive from gentlemen wholly unacquainted with their language and customs. We clearly see the ill effects of this among our sepoys, and it will be much more so among horsemen, who deem themselves of a far superior class; nor have we a sufficiency of officers for the purpose: I am sorry to say, not a single one qualified to afford a prospect of success to such a project." These arguments prevailed. The Mogul horse was increased, during the year (1764), to 1,200 men each risallah (or troop) under Native officers, with a few Europeans to the whole.

The number of the Native infantry was also rapidly on the increase; but their position and rights remained on a very indefinite footing, when Major Hector Munro succeeded to the command of the Bengal army in August, 1764. In the following month a serious outbreak occurred. The oldest corps in the service, then known as the 9th, or Captain Galliez' battalion, but afterwards the 1st Native infantry, while stationed at Manjee (near Chupra), instigated by some of their Native officers, assembled on parade, and declared themselves resolved to serve no longer, as certain promises made to them (apparently regarding the remainder of the donation money) had been broken. They retained their arms, and imprisoned their European officers for a night; but released them on the following morning.

There did not then exist, nor has there since been framed, any law decreeing gradations of punishment in a case which clearly admits of many gradations of crime. It has been left to the discretion of the military authorities for the time being, to punish what Sir Charles Napier called "passive, respectful mutinies," with sweeping severity, or to let attempted desertion to the enemy, and sanguinary treachery, escape almost unpunished.

The subsequent proceeding resembled the outbreak of spoilt children, rather than of concerted mutiny.* No intention to desert was shown, much less to join the enemy. Such conduct had been before met with perhaps undue concessions. Major Munro then resolved to attempt stopping it by measures of extreme severity. Accordingly he held a general court-martial; and on receiving its verdict for the execution of twenty-four of the sepoys, he ordered it to be carried out immediately. The sentence was, "to be blown away from the guns"—the horrible mode of inflicting capital punishment so extensively practised in 1857-'58.

Four grenadiers claimed the privilege of being fastened to the right-hand guns. They had always occupied the post of honour in the field, they said; and Major Munro admitted the force of the argument by granting their request. The whole army were much affected by the bearing of the doomed men. "I am sure," says Captain Williams, who then belonged to the Royal Marines employed in Bengal, and who was an eye-witness of this touching episode, "there was not a dry eye among the Marines, although they had been long accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been on the execution party which shot Admiral Byng, in the year 1757."† Yet Major Munro gave the signal, and the explosion followed. When the loathsome results became apparent—the mangled limbs scattered far and wide, the strange burning

* Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 459.

† Captain Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry* p. 170.

smell, the fragments of human flesh, the trickling streams of blood, constituted a scene almost intolerable to those who witnessed it for the first time. The officers commanding the sepoy battalions came forward, and represented that their men would not suffer any further executions; but Major Munro persevered. The other convicted mutineers attempted no appeal to their comrades, but met their deaths with the utmost composure.

This was the first example, on a large scale, of the infliction of the penalty of death for mutiny. Heretofore there had been no plan, and no bloodshed in the numerous outbreaks. Subsequently they assumed an increasingly systematic and sanguinary character.

On the return of Clive to India in 1765 (as Lord Clive, Baron of Plassy), the Bengal army was reorganised, and divided into three brigades—respectively stationed at Monghyr, Allahabad, and Bankipoor. Each brigade consisted of one company of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, one risallah, or troop, of Native cavalry, and seven battalions of sepoys.

Each regiment of European infantry was constituted of the following strength:—

1 Colonel commanding the whole Brigade.
1 Lieutenant-colonel commanding the Regiment.

1 Major.	36 Sergeants.
6 Captains.	36 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	27 Drummers.
9 Lieutenants.	630 Privates.
18 Ensigns.	

The artillery comprised four companies, each of which contained—

1 Captain.	4 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	2 Drummers.
1 First Lieutenant.	2 Fifers.
1 Second Lieutenant.	10 Bombardiers.
3 Lieut. Fireworkers.	20 Gunners.
4 Sergeants.	60 Matrosses.

Each risallah of Native cavalry consisted of—

1 European Subaltern in command.

1 Sergeant-major.	3 Jemadars.
4 Sergeants.	2 Naggers.
1 Risaldar.	6 Duffadars.
	100 Privates.

A Native battalion consisted of—

1 Captain.	30 Jemadars.
2 Lieutenants.	1 Native Adjutant.
2 Ensigns.	10 Trumpeters.
3 Sergeants.	30 Tom-toms.*
3 Drummers.	80 Havildars.
1 Native Commandant.	50 Naiks.
10 Native Subahdars.	690 Sepoys.

Captain Broome, from whom the above details are derived, remarks, "that the proportion of officers, except to the sepoy battalions, was very much more liberal than in the present day; and it is most important to remember, that every officer on the list was effective—all officers on other than regimental employ, being immediately struck off the roll of the corps; although, as there was but one roster for promotion in the whole infantry, no loss in that respect was sustained thereby. The artillery and engineers rose in a separate body, and were frequently transferred from one to the other."†

The pay of the sepoy was early fixed at seven rupees per month in all stationary situations, and eight rupees and a-half when marching, or in the field; exclusive of half a rupee per month, allotted to the off-reckoning fund, for which they received one coat, and nothing more, annually. From that allowance they not only fed and clothed themselves, but also erected cantonments in all stationary situations, at their own expense, and remitted to their wives and families, often to aged parents and more distant relatives, a considerable proportion of their pay; in fact, so considerable, that the authorities were obliged to interfere to check their extreme self-denial.‡

In 1766, the mass of the British officers of the Bengal army entered into a very formidable confederacy against the government, on account of the withdrawal of certain extra allowances, known as "double batta." The manner in which Lord Clive then used the sepoys to coerce the Europeans, has been already narrated.§

The first epoch in the history of the Bengal army may be said to end with the final departure of Clive (its founder) from India, in 1767. Up to this time, no question of caste appears to have been mooted, as interfering with the requirements of military duty, whether ordinary or incidental; but as the numbers of the sepoys increased, and the proportion of Hindoos began to exceed that of Mussulmans, a gradual change took place. A sea voyage is a forbidden thing to a Brahminist; it is a violation of his religious code, under any circumstances: he must neglect the frequent ablutions which his creed enjoins, and to which he has been accustomed from childhood; and if he do not irrecoverably forfeit his caste, it must be by enduring severe privations in regard to food

* That is, Tom-tom (native drum) players.
† Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 540.
‡ Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 263.
§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 305.

while on board ship. The influence of the officers, however, generally sufficed to overcome the scruples of the men; and, in 1769, three Bengal battalions prepared to return by sea from the Madras presidency to Bengal. Two grenadier companies embarked for the purpose, and are supposed to have perished; for the ship which they entered was never heard of afterwards. This event made a deep impression on the minds of the Hindoos, confirmed their superstitious dread of the sea, and aggravated the mingled fear and loathing, which few Englishmen, except when actually rounding the "Cape of Storms," or becalmed in a crowded vessel in the Red Sea, can understand sufficiently to make allowance for.

In 1782, a mutiny occurred at Barrackpoor, in consequence of the troops stationed there being ordered to prepare for foreign service, which it was rumoured would entail a sea voyage. No violence was attempted; no turbulence was evinced; the men quietly combined, under their Native officers, in refusing to obey the orders, which the government had no means of enforcing. After the lapse of several weeks, a general court-martial was held. Two Native officers, and one or two sepoys, were blown from the guns. The whole of the four corps concerned (then known as the 4th, 15th, 17th, and 31st) were broken up, and the men drafted into other battalions.

In 1787, Lord Cornwallis arrived in India, as governor-general and commander-in-chief. He earnestly desired to dissipate, by gentle means, the prejudices which marred the efficiency of the Native army; and he offered a bounty of ten rupees per man, with other advantages, to such as would volunteer for service on an expedition to Sumatra. The required four companies were obtained; the promised bounty was paid previous to embarkation; every care was taken to ensure abundant supplies of food and water for sustenance and ablution; the detachment was conveyed on board a regular Indiaman at the end of February; and was recalled in the following October. Unfortunately the return voyage was tedious and boisterous: the resolute abstinence of the Hindoos from all nutriment save dry peas and rice, and the exposure consequent on the refusal of the majority to quit the deck night or day, on account of the number of sick below, occasioned many to be afflicted with *nyctalopia*, or night-blindness; and deaths were numerous. Notwithstanding this, the care and tact of the officers, and the praise and gratuities which awaited the volunteers on relanding, appeared to have done much to reconcile them to the past trial, and even to its repetition if need were.

The government thought the difficulty overcome, and were confirmed in their opinion by the offers of proceeding by sea made during the Mysore war. In 1795, it became desirable to send an expedition to Malacca, whereupon a proposition was made to the 15th battalion (a corps of very high character), through its commanding officer, Captain Ludovick Grant, to volunteer for the purpose. The influence of the officers apparently prevailed; the men were reported as willing to embark; but, at the last moment, a determined mutiny broke out, and the 29th battalion was called out, with its field-pieces, to disperse the mutineers. The colours of the 15th were burnt; and the number ordered to be left a blank in the list of Native corps.* Warned by this occurrence, the government proceeded to raise a "Marine battalion,"† consisting of twelve companies of a hundred privates each; and it became generally understood, if not indeed officially stated, that the ordinary Bengal troops were not to be sent on sea voyages.

A corps of Native militia was raised for Calcutta and the adjacent districts, and placed, in the first instance, under the town major. It consisted of eighty companies of ninety privates; but was subsequently augmented to sixteen or more companies of one hundred privates each. Captain Williams, writing in 1816, says—"It is now commanded by an officer of any rank, who may be favoured with the patronage of the governor-general, with one other European officer, who performs the duty of adjutant to the corps."‡ Several local corps were formed about the same time.

Some important changes were made in the constitution of the Bengal army in 1796; one effect of which was to diminish the authority and influence of the Native officers. The staff appointment of Native adjutants was abolished, and a European adjutant was appointed to each battalion. The principle of regimental rank and promotion (to the rank of major, inclusive), was

* A regiment was raised in Bahar, in 1798, and numbered the 15th.

† Formed into the 20th, or Marine regiment, in 1801.

‡ *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 243.

adopted throughout the E. I. Company's forces; and, contrary to the former arrangement, the whole of the staff of the government and of the army, inclusive of a heavy commissariat, with the numerous officers on furlough in Europe, and those employed with local corps, and even in diplomatic situations, were thenceforth borne on the strength as component parts of companies and corps. Thus, even at this early period, the complaint (so frequently reiterated since) is made by Captain Williams, that the charge of companies often devolved on subalterns utterly unqualified, by professional or local acquirements, for a situation of such authority over men to whose character, language, and habits they are strangers.*

The rise, and gradual increase, of the armies of the Madras and Bombay presidencies, did not essentially differ from that of the Bengal troops, excepting that the total number of the former was much smaller, and the proportion of Mohammedans and high-caste Brahmins considerably lower than in the latter. The three armies were kept separate, each under its own commander-in-chief. Many inconveniences attended the division of the forces of one ruling power. It became a barrier to the centralisation which the bureaucratic spirit of the Supreme government of Calcutta had habitually fostered; and attempts were after made, more or less directly, for an amalgamation of the three armies. The Duke of Wellington thoroughly understood the bearing of the question, and his decided opinion probably contributed largely to the maintenance of the chief of the barriers which have prevented the contagion of Bengal mutiny from extending to Bombay and Madras, and hindered the fraternisation which we may reasonably suspect would otherwise have been general, at least among the Hindoos. The more united the British are, the better, no doubt; but the more distinct nationalities are kept up in India, the safer for us: every ancient landmark we remove, renders the danger of combination against us more imminent.

The Madras and Bombay sepoys, throughout their career, often had, like those of Bengal, occasional outbreaks of mutiny, the usual cause being an attempt to send them on expeditions which necessitated a sea voyage. Thus, in 1779, or 1780, a mutiny occurred in the 9th Madras battalion when ordered to embark for Bombay; which, however, was quelled by the presence of mind and decision of the commandant, Captain Kelly. A fatal result followed the issue of a similar order for the embarkation of some companies of a corps in the Northern Circars. The men, on arriving at Vizagapatam (the port where they were to take shipping), rose upon their European officers, and shot all save one or two, who escaped to the ship.†

One motive was strong enough to overcome this rooted dislike to the sea; and that was, affection for the person, and confidence in the skill and fortune, of their commanding officer. Throughout the Native forces, the fact was ever manifest, that their discipline or insubordination, their fidelity or faithlessness, depended materially on the influence exercised by their European leaders. Sir John Malcolm, in his various writings, affords much evidence to this effect. Among many other instances, he cites that of a battalion of the 22nd Madras regiment, then distinguished for the high state of discipline to which they had been brought by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-colonel James Oram. In 1797, he proposed to his corps, on parade, to volunteer for an expedition then preparing against Manilla. "Will he go with us?" was the question which went through the ranks. "Yes!" "Will he stay with us?" Again, "yes!" and the whole corps exclaimed, "To Europe, to Europe!" They were ready to follow Colonel Oram anywhere—to the shores of the Atlantic as cheerfully as to an island of the Eastern Ocean. Such was the contagion of their enthusiasm, that several sepoys, who were missing from one of the battalions in garrison at Madras, were found to have deserted to join the expedition.‡

The personal character of Lord Lake contributed greatly to the good service rendered by the Bengal sepoys (both Hindoo and Mohammedan) in the arduous Mahratta war of 1803-'4. He humoured their prejudices, flattered their pride, and praised their valour; and they repaid him by unbounded attachment to his person, and the zealous fulfilment of their public duty. Victorious or defeated, the sepoys knew their efforts were equally sure of appreciation by the commander-in-chief. His conduct to the shattered corps of Colonel Monson's detachment, after their

* Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 253.

† Parliamentary evidence of Sir J. Malcolm in 1832.

‡ *Ibid.*

gallant but disastrous retreat before Holcar,* was very remarkable. He formed them into a reserve, and promised them every opportunity of signalising themselves. No confidence was ever more merited. Throughout the service that ensued, these corps were uniformly distinguished.

The pay of the forces in the last century was frequently heavily in arrears, and both Europeans and Natives were driven, by actual want, to the verge of mutiny. The Bombay troops, in the early wars with Mysore, suffered greatly from this cause; and yet none ever showed warmer devotion to the English. When, on the capture of Bednore, General Matthews and his whole force surrendered to Tippoo, every inducement was offered to tempt the sepoys to enter the sultan's service; but in vain. During the march, they were carefully separated from the European prisoners at each place of encampment, by a tank or other obstacle, supposed to be insurmountable. It did not prove so, however; for one of the captive officers subsequently declared, that not a night elapsed but some of the sepoys contrived to elude the vigilance of the guards by swimming the tanks (frequently some miles in circumference), or eluding the sentries; bringing with them such small sums as they could save from the pittance allowed by the sultan, for their own support, in return for hard daily labour, to eke out the scanty food of the Europeans. "We can live upon anything," they said; "but you require mutton and beef." At the peace of 1783, 1,500 of the released captives marched 500 miles to Madras, and there embarked on a voyage of six or eight weeks, to rejoin the army to which they belonged at Bombay.†

Similar manifestations of attachment were given by the various Native troops of the three presidencies; their number, and proportion to the Europeans, increasing with the extension of the Anglo-Indian empire. In 1800, the total force comprised 22,832 Europeans, and 115,300 Natives of all denominations; the Europeans being chiefly Royal troops belonging to the regular cavalry and infantry regiments, which were sent to India for periods varying from twelve to twenty years. As the requirements of government augmented with every addition of territory, the restrictions of caste became daily more obnoxious; and attempts, for the most part very ill-judged, were made to break through them. Certain regulations, trivial in themselves, excited the angry suspicions of the sepoys, as to the latent intentions of government; and the sons of Tippoo Sultan (then state-prisoners at Vellore), through their partisans, fomented the disaffection, which issued in the mutiny of 1806, in which thirteen European officers and eighty-two privates were killed, and ninety-two wounded.‡

In 1809, another serious outbreak occurred in the Madras presidency, in which the Native troops played only a secondary part, standing by their officers against the government. The injudicious manner in which Sir George Barlow had suppressed an allowance known as "tent-contract," previously made to Europeans in command of Native regiments, spread disaffection throughout the Madras force. Auber, the annalist of the East India Company, gives very few particulars of this unsatisfactory and discreditable affair; but he mentions the remarkable fidelity displayed by Purneah, the Dewan of Mysore (chosen, and earnestly supported, by Colonel Wellesley, after the conquest of that country.) The field-officer in charge of the fortress of Seringapatam, tried to corrupt Purneah, and even held out a threat regarding his property, and that belonging to the boy-rajah in the fort. The dignified rejoinder was, that the British government was the protector of the rajah and his minister; and that, let what would happen, he (Purneah) would always remain faithful to his engagements.§

A skirmish actually took place between the mutineers and the king's troops. Lord Minto (the governor-general) hastened to Madras, and, by a mixture of firmness and conciliation, restored order, having first obtained the unconditional submission of all concerned in the late proceedings; that is to say, the great majority of the Madras officers in the Company's service.

The refusal of the 47th Bengal regiment to march from Barrackpoor in 1825, on the expedition to Burmah, is fully accounted for by the repugnance of the sepoys to embarkation having been aggravated by the insufficient arrangements made for them by the commissariat department. The authorities punished, in a most sanguinary man-

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 400.

† Sir John Malcolm's *Government of India*. London: John Murray, 1833; p. 210.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 407.

§ Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii., pp. 476, 477.

ner, conduct which their own negligence had provoked.*

An important change was introduced into the Native army, under the administration of Lord William Bentinck (who was appointed commander-in-chief as well as governor-general in 1833), by the abolition of flogging, which had previously been inflicted with extreme frequency and severity. Sir Charles Napier subsequently complained of this measure, on the ground of its leaving no punishment available when the army was before the enemy. The limited authority vested in the officers, increased the difficulty of maintaining discipline, by making expulsion from the service the sole punishment of offenders who deserved perhaps a day's hard labour. Sir Charles adds—"But I have been in situations where I could not turn them out, for they would either starve or have their throats cut; so I did all my work by the provost-marshal." His favourite pupil, "the war-bred Sir Colin Campbell," appears to have been driven to the same alternative to check looting.

The change which has come over the habits of both military men and civilians during the present century, has been already shown. Europeans have gradually ceased to take either wives or concubines from among the natives: they have become, in all points, more exclusive; and as their own number has increased, so also has their regard for conventionalities, which, while yet strangers in the land—few and feeble—they had been content to leave in abeyance. The effect on Indian society, and especially on the army, was evident. The intercourse between the European and Native officers had become yearly less frequent and less cordial. The acquisition of Native languages was neglected; or striven for, not as a means of obtaining the confidence of the sepoys, but simply as a stepping-stone to distinction in the numerous civil positions which the rapid extension of territory, the paucity of the civil service, and the rejection of Native agency, had thrown open to their ambition. There is, inevitably, a great deal of sheer drudgery in the ordinary routine of regimental duty; but it surely was not wise to aggravate the distaste which its performance is calculated to produce, by adopting a system which makes long continuance in a regiment a mark of incapacity.

The military and civil line of promotion is, to a great extent, the same. An Indian military man is always supposed to be fit for anything that offers. He can be "an inspector of schools, an examiner in political economy, an engineer, a surveyor, an architect, an auditor, a commissary, a resident, or a governor."† Political, judicial, and scientific appointments are all open to him; and the result, no doubt, is, that Indian officers, in many instances, show a versatility of talent unknown elsewhere.

But through teaching officers to look to staff appointments and civil employ for advancement, the military profession is described as having fallen into a state of disparagement. Officers who have not acquitted themselves well in the civil service are "remanded to their regiments," as if they were penal corps; and those who remain with their regiments, suffer under a sense of disappointment and wounded self-esteem, which makes it impossible for them to have their heart in the work.‡

The employment of the army to do the civil work, was declared by Napier to be "the great military evil of India;" the officers occupying various diplomatic situations, the sepoys acting as policemen, gaolers, and being incessantly employed in detachments for the escort of treasure from the local treasuries, to the manifest injury of their discipline. "Sir Thomas Munro," he adds, "thought three officers were sufficient for regiments. This is high authority; yet I confess to thinking him wrong; or else, which is very possible, the state of the army and the style of the officer have changed, not altogether better nor altogether worse, but become different."

There is, probably, much truth in this suggestion. The character of the Native officers and sepoys, as well as that of the Europeans, had changed since the days of Munro. The Bengal army had grown, with the Bengal presidency, into an exclusively high-caste institution. The men were chiefly Brahmins and Rajpoots, or Mussulmans—handsome, stately men, higher by the head and shoulders than the Madrassees or Mahrattas; immeasurably higher in caste. Great care was taken to avoid low-caste recruits; still more, outcasts and Christians. In this respect, most exaggerated deference was paid to religious prejudices which, in

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 424. Thornton's *India*, vol. iv., p. 113.

† *Times*, 15th July, 1857. Letter from Bombay correspondent.

‡ Indophilus' *Letters to the Times*, p. 15.

other points, were recklessly infringed. In Bombay and Madras, no such distinctions were made. Recruits were enlisted without regard to caste; and the result was, a mixture much less adapted to combine for the removal of common grievances. A Native army, under foreign rule, can hardly have been without these: but so flattering a description was given of the Indian troops, that, until their rejection of our service, and subsequent deadly hostility, raised suspicions of "a long-continued course of mismanagement,"* little attention was paid to those who suggested the necessity of radical reforms.

Yet Sir John Malcolm pointed out, as early as 1799, the injustice of a system which allowed no Native soldier the most distant prospect of rising to rank, distinction, or affluence; and this "extraordinary fact" he believed to be "a subject of daily comment among the Native troops."†

The evil felt while the Indian army was comparatively small, could not but increase in severity in proportion to the augmentation of the sepoys, who, in 1851, amounted to 240,121, out of 289,529 men; the remainder being Europeans. Meanwhile, the extinction of Indian states and of national armies had been rapidly progressing. The disbanded privates (at least such of them as entered the British ranks) may have benefited by the change; regular pay and a retiring pension compensating them for the possibility of promotion and the certainty of laxer discipline, with license in the way of loot (plunder.) But the officers were heavy losers by the change. In treating of the causes of the mutiny, Mr. Martin Gubbins says, that in the Punjab, "the father may have received 1,000 rupees per mensem, as commandant of cavalry, under Runjeet Sing; the son draws a pay of eighty rupees as sub-commander, in the service of the British government. The difference is probably thought by themselves to be too great." In support of this guarded admission, he proceeds to adduce evidence of the existence of the feeling suggested by him as probable, by citing the reproachful exclamation of a Seik risaldar, conspicuous for good conduct during the insurrection—"My father used to receive 500 rupees a-month in command of a party of Runjeet Sing's horse; I receive but fifty."‡

* Speech of Lord Ellenborough: Indian debate, July 13th, 1857. The Duke of Argyll, and others, said, that "there could be no doubt there had been some mismanagement."—*Ibid.*, July 27th, 1858.

Sir Charles Napier returned to India, as commander-in-chief of the Anglo-Indian armies, on the 6th of May, 1849. He was sent out for the express purpose of carrying on the war in the Punjab; but it had been successfully terminated before his arrival. He made a tour of inspection, and furnished reports to government on the condition of the troops; which contained statements calculated to excite grave anxiety, and prophecies of evil which were subsequently fulfilled.

He pointed out excessive luxury among the officers, and alienation from the Native soldiery, as fostering the disaffection occasioned among the latter by sudden reductions of pay, accompanied by the increased burthen of civil duties, consequent on the rapid extension of territory.

It was, however, not until after positive mutiny had been developed, that he recognised the full extent of the evils, which he then searched out, and found to be sapping the very foundation of the Indian army.

Writing to General Caulfield (one of his few friends in the East India direction) in November, 1849, he calls the sepoy "a glorious soldier, not to be corrupted by gold, or appalled by danger;" and he adds—"I would not be afraid to go into action with Native troops, and without Europeans, provided I had the training of them first."§

In a report addressed to the governor-general in the same month, the following passage occurs:—

"I have heard that Lord Hardinge objected to the assembling of the Indian troops, for fear they should conspire. I confess I cannot see the weight of such an opinion. I have never met with an Indian officer who held it, and I certainly do not hold it myself; and few men have had more opportunities of judging of the armies of all three presidencies than I have. Lord Hardinge saw but the Bengal army, and that only as governor-general, and for a short time; I have studied them for nearly eight years, constantly at the head of Bengal and Bombay sepoys, and I can see nothing to fear from them, *except when ill-used*; and even then they are less dangerous than British troops would be in similar circumstances. I see no danger in their being massed, and very great danger in their being spread over a country as they now are: on the contrary, I believe that, by concentrating the Indian army as I propose, its spirit, its devotion, and its powers will all be increased."‖

The above extract tends to confirm the general belief, that the private opinion of Lord Hardinge, regarding the condition of

† Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, vol i., p. 96.
‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 98.
§ Sir Charles Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., pp. 212, 213.
‖ Parl. Paper (Commons), 30th July, 1857.

the army, was less satisfactory than he chose to avow in public. Lord Melville has given conclusive evidence on the subject by stating, from his personal acquaintance with the ex-commander-in-chief, that—"Entertaining the worst opinion privately, Lord Hardinge never would express it publicly, trying thereby to bolster up a bad system, on the ground of the impolicy of making public the slight thread by which we held our tenure of that empire."* Napier, who never kept back or qualified his views, soon saw reason to declare, that "we were sitting on a mine, and nobody could tell when it might explode."† The circumstances which led him to this unsatisfactory conclusion were these. After the annexation of the Punjab, the extra allowance formerly given to the troops on service there, was summarily withdrawn, on the ground that the country was no longer a foreign one. The 22nd Native infantry stationed at Rawul Pindee refused the reduced pay. The 13th regiment followed the example; and an active correspondence took place between these corps, and doubtless extended through the Bengal army; for there are news-writers in every regiment, who communicate all intelligence to their comrades at head-quarters.‡

Colonel Benson, of the military board, proposed to Lord Dalhousie to disband the two regiments; but the commander-in-chief opposed the measure, as harsh and impolitic. Many other regiments were, he said, certainly involved: the government could not disband an army; it was, therefore, best to treat the cases as isolated ones, while that was possible; for, he added, "if we attempt to bully large bodies, they will do the same by us, and a fight must ensue."§ The governor-general concurred in this opinion. The insubordination at Rawul Pindee was repressed without bloodshed, by the officer in command, Sir Colin Campbell; and the matter was treated as one of accidental restricted criminality, not affecting the mass.

Sir Charles Napier visited Delhi, which he considered the proper place for our great magazines, and well fitted, from its central position, to be the head-quarters of the artillery—the best point from whence to send forth troops and reinforcements. Here, too, the spirit of mutiny manifested itself; the 41st Native infantry refusing to enter the Punjab without additional allowances as heretofore; and twenty-four other regiments, then under orders for the same province, were rumoured to be in league with the 41st. The latter regiment was, however, tranquillised, and induced to march, by what Sir William Napier terms "dexterous management, and the obtaining of furloughs, which had been unfairly and recklessly withheld."

At Vizierabad the sepoys were very sullen, and were heard to say they only waited the arrival of the relieving regiments, and would then act together. Soon after this, the 66th, a relief regiment on the march from Lucknow (800 miles from Vizierabad), broke into open mutiny near Amritsir, insulted their officers, and attempted to seize the strong fortress of Govindghur, which then contained about £100,000 in specie. The 1st Native cavalry were fortunately on the spot; and being on their return to India, were not interested in the extra-allowance question. They took part with the Europeans; and, dismounting, seized the gates, which the strength and daring of a single officer (Captain M'Donald) had alone prevented from being closed, and which the mutineers, with fixed bayonets, vainly sought to hold. This occurred in February, 1850. Lord Dalhousie was not taken by surprise. Writing to Sir Charles Napier, he had declared himself "prepared for discontent among the Native troops, on coming into the Punjab under diminished allowances; and well satisfied to have got so far through without violence." "The sepoy," he added, "has been over-petted and overpaid of late, and has been led on, by the government itself, into the entertainment of an expectation, and the manifestation of a feeling, which he never held in former times."||

This was written before the affair at Govindghur; and in the meantime, Sir Charles had seen "strong ground to suppose the mutinous spirit general in the Bengal army."¶ He believed that the Brahmins

* Letter to General Sir William Gomm, July 15th, 1857.—*Times*, July 21st, 1857. † *Ibid.*

‡ Evidence of Colonel Greenhill.—Parl. Committee, 1832-'3.

§ Sir Charles Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., p. 227.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 216; 269; 427.

¶ Two great explosions of ammunition have been mentioned in connexion with the mutinous feeling of the period; one at Benares, of 3,000 barrels of powder, in no less than thirty boats, which killed upwards of 1,200 people: by the other, of 1,800 barrels, no life was lost.

were exerting their influence over the Hindoos most injuriously; and learned, with alarm, a significant circumstance which had occurred during the Seik war. Major Neville Chamberlaine, hearing some sepoys grumbling about a temporary hardship, exclaimed, "Were I the general, I would disband you all." A Brahmin havildar replied, "If you did, we would all go to our villages, and you should not get any more to replace us." Napier viewed this remark as the distinct promulgation of a principle upon which the sepoys were even then prepared to act. The Brahmins he believed to be secretly nourishing the spirit of insubordination; and unless a counterpoise could be found to their influence, it would be hazardous in the extreme to disband the 66th regiment, at the risk of inciting other corps to declare, "They are martyrs for us; we, too, will refuse;" and of producing a bayonet struggle with caste for mastery. "Nor was the stake for which the sepoy contended a small one—exclusive of the principle of an army dictating to the government: they struck for twelve rupees instead of seven—nearly double! When those in the Punjab got twelve by meeting, those in India Proper would not long have served on seven."*

The remedy adopted by Napier, was to replace the mutinous 66th with one of the irregular Goorka battalions;† and he expressed his intention of extensively following up this plan, in the event of the disbandment of further regiments becoming necessary. "I would if I could," he says, "have 25,000 of them; which, added to our own Europeans, would form an army of 50,000 men, and, well handled, would neutralise any combination amongst the sepoys."

The Goorkas themselves he describes as of small stature, with huge limbs, resembling Attila's Huns; "brave as men can be, but horrid little savages, accustomed to use a weapon called a *kookery,* like a straightened reaping-hook, with which they made three cuts —one across the shoulders, the next across the forehead, the third a ripping-up one."

The Nusseeree battalion, chosen to replace the 66th, welcomed, with frantic shouts of joy, the proposal of entering the regular army, and receiving seven rupees a month, instead of four rupees eight annas; which sum, according to their commanding officer, had been actually insufficient for their support. What the European officers of the 66th thought of the substitution does not appear; but Lord Dalhousie, while approving the disbandment of the mutineers, disapproved of the introduction of the Goorkas. The commander-in-chief was at the same time reprimanded for having, in January, 1850 (pending a reference to the Supreme government), suspended the operation of a regulation regarding compensation for rations; which he considered, in the critical state of affairs, likely to produce mutiny. This regulation, says Sir W. Napier, "affected the usual allowance to the sepoys for purchasing their food, according to the market prices of the countries in which they served: it was recent; was but partially known; was in itself unjust; and became suddenly applicable at Vizierabad, where it was entirely unknown." General Hearsey, commander at Vizierabad, and Generals Gilbert and Colin Campbell, deprecated its enforcement as most impolitic, and calculated, in the sullen temper of the sepoys, to produce a mutiny; and, in fact, only twelve days elapsed before the Govindghur outbreak occurred. The amount of money involved in the temporary suspension was only £10; but even had it been much greater, if a commander-in-chief could not, in what he believed to be a crisis, and what there is little doubt really was one, be allowed to use his discretion on a subject so immediately within his cognizance, he had, indeed, a heavy weight of responsibility to bear, without any commensurate authority. A less impetuous spirit than that of the "fiery Napier," would have felt no better than a "huge adjutant-general," when informed that he "would not again be permitted, *under any circumstances,* to issue orders which should change the pay and allowances of the troops in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which had been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme government alone."‡

The general at once sent in his resignation (May 22nd, 1850) through Lord Fitzroy Somerset; stating the rebuke he had received, and probably hoping that the

* Sir C. Napier's *Life and Correspondence,* vol. iv., pp. 261, 262.

† See *Indian Empire,* vol. i., p. 445.

‡ After Sir Charles left India, a minute was drawn up by the Supreme Council, which stated, "that the ration and mutiny question, which led to Sir Charles Napier's resignation, was not the real cause for the reprimand; but the style of the commander-in-chief's correspondence had become offensive."—*Life,* vol. iv., p. 411.

British commander-in-chief, the Duke of Wellington, would urge its withdrawal. The Duke, on the contrary, decided, after examining the statements sent home by the Calcutta authorities (which, judging by subsequent events, were founded on a mistaken view of the temper of the troops), that no sufficient reason had existed for the suspension of the regulation, and that the governor-general in council was right in expressing his disapprobation of the act. The resignation was consequently accepted; and Sir Charles's statements regarding the condition of the army, were treated as the prejudiced views of a disappointed man.

Yet the report addressed by him to the Duke in June, while ignorant, and probably not expectant, of the acceptance of his resignation, contains assertions which ought then to have been investigated, and which were after of primary importance as regards the causes of the sudden calamity, and the system that ought to have been adopted for its prevention.

"The Bengal Native army," Sir Charles writes, "is said to have much fallen off from what it was in former days. Of this I am not a judge; but I must say that it is a very noble army, and with very few defects. The greatest, as far as I am capable of judging, is a deficiency of discipline among the European officers, especially those of the higher ranks. I will give your grace an instance.

"The important order issued by the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, to prepare the sepoys for a reduction in their pay, I ordered to be read, and explained with care to every regiment. With the exception of three or four commanders of regiments, none obeyed the order; some gave it to pay-sergeants to read, and others altogether neglected to do so—such is the slackness of discipline among officers of high rank, and on an occasion of such vast importance. This want of discipline arises from more than one cause: a little sharpness with officers who disobey orders will soon correct much of this; but much of it originates in the great demand made upon the troops for civil duties, which so breaks up whole regiments, that their commanding officers lose that zeal for the service which they ought to feel, and so do the younger officers. The demand also made for guards is immense. * * * I cannot believe that the discipline of the Bengal army will be restored till it is relieved from civil duties, and those duties performed by police battalions, as was intended by Lord Ellenborough.

"The next evil which I see in the Native army is, that so many of the senior officers of regiments are placed on the staff or in civil situations; and very old, worn-out officers command regiments: these carry on their duties with the adjutant and some favoured Native officer. Not above one or two captains are with the regiment; and the subalterns being all young, form a society among themselves, and neglect the Native officers altogether. Nothing is therefore known as to what is passing in a Native regiment. * * * The last, and most important thing which I reckon injurious to the Indian army, is the immense influence given to "caste;" instead of being discouraged, it has been encouraged in the Bengal army. In the Bombay army it is discouraged, and that army is in better order than the Bengal army. In this latter the Brahmins have been leaders in every mutiny." *

The manner in which courts-martial were conducted, excited his indignation throughout his Indian career. Drunkenness and gambling were, in his eyes, unsoldierly and ungentlemanly vices, and he drew no distinction between the officer and the private. "Indian courts-martial are my plagues," he writes; "they are farces. If a private is to be tried, the courts are sharp enough; but an officer is quite another thing." He mentions a case of notorious drunkenness, in which the accused was "honourably acquitted;" and he adds—"Discipline is so rapidly decaying, that in a few years my belief is, no commander-in-chief will dare to bring an officer to trial: the press will put an end to all trials, except in law courts. In courts-martial now, all is quibbling and disputes about what is legal; the members being all profoundly ignorant on the subject: those who judge fairly, in a military spirit, are afraid of being brought up afterwards, and the trials end by an acquittal in the face of all evidence!" This state of things was not one in which he was likely to acquiesce; and in six months he had to decide forty-six cases of courts-martial on officers (some for gambling, some for drunkenness), in which only two were honourably acquitted, and not less than fourteen cashiered. In the celebrated address in which he took leave of the officers of the Indian army (9th December, 1850), he blamed them severely for getting into debt, and having to be brought before the Court of Requests. "A vulgar man," he wrote, "who enjoys a champagne tiffin [luncheon], and swindles his servants, may be a pleasant companion to those who do not hold him in contempt as a vulgar knave; but he is not a gentleman: his commission makes him an officer, but he is not a gentleman."

The luxury of the Indian system was, as might be expected, severely criticised by a warrior who is popularly said to have entered on a campaign with a piece of soap and a couple of towels, and dined off a hunch of bread and a cup of water. Previous commanders-in-chief, when moving on

* Sir C. Napier to the Duke of Wellington, 15th June, 1850.—Parl. Paper, August 6th, 1857.

a military inspection, used, at the public expense, eighty or ninety elephants, three or four hundred camels, and nearly as many bullocks, with all their attendants: they had also 332 tent-pitchers, including fifty men solely employed to carry glass doors for a pavilion. This enormous establishment was reduced by Napier to thirty elephants, 334 camels, 222 tent-pitchers; by which a saving was effected for the treasury of £750 a-month. "Canvas palaces," he said, "were not necessary for a general on military inspection, even admitting the favourite idea of some 'old Indians'—that pomp and show produce respect with Indian people. But there is no truth in that notion: the respect is paid to military strength; and the astute natives secretly deride the ostentation of temporary authority."*

"Among the modern military changes," he says, "there is one which has been gradually introduced in a number of regiments by gentlemen who are usually called 'martinets'—not soldiers, only martinets. No soldier can now go up to his officer without a non-commissioned officer gives him leave, and accompanies him! * * * This is a very dangerous innovation: it is digging a ditch between the officers and their men! How are Company's officers to study men's characters, when no man dare address them but in full dress, and in presence of a non-commissioned officer?"†

Sir Charles deplored "the caste and luxury which pervaded the army," as calculated to diminish their influence equally over European soldiers and Indian sepoys.

"His [the soldier's] captain is no longer his friend and chief: he receives him with upstart condescension; is very dignified, and very insolent, nine [times?] out of ten; and as often the private goes away with disgust or contempt, instead of good, respectful, comrade feelings. Then the soldier goes daily to school, or to his library, now always at hand; while his dignified officer goes to the billiard-room or the smoking-room; or, strutting about with a forage-cap on the side of an empty pate, and clothed in a shooting-jacket, or other deformity of dress, fancies himself a great character, because he is fast, and belongs to a fast regiment—*i.e.*, a regiment unfit for service, commanded by the adjutant, and having a mess in debt!"‡

It is, of course, exclusively to the sepoys that Sir Charles refers in the following passages, in which he upholds the necessity for discipline and kindly intercourse being maintained by the European officers:—

"They are admirable soldiers, and only give way when badly led by brave but idle officers, who let discipline and drill grow slack, and do not mix with them: being ignorant themselves, they cannot teach the sepoy. * * * I could do anything I like with these natives. Our officers generally do not know how to deal with them. They have not, with some exceptions, the natural turn and soldierlike feelings necessary to deal with them. Well, it matters little to me; India and I will soon be separate: I see the system will not last fifty years. The moment these brave and able natives learn how to combine, they will rush on us simultaneously, and the game will be up. A bad commander-in-chief and a bad governor-general will clench the business.§ * * * I am disposed to believe, that we might, with advantage, appoint natives to cadetships, discharge all our Native officers on the pensions of their present rank, and so give the natives common chance of command with ourselves—before they take it!

"Every European boy, aye, even sergeants, now command all Native officers! When the native saw the English ensign live with him and cherish him, and by daily communication was made aware of his superior energy, strength, daring, and mental acquirements, all went smooth. Now things have changed. The young cadet learns nothing: he drinks, he lives exclusively with his own countrymen; the older officers are on the staff, or on civil employ, which they ought not to be; and high-caste—that is to say, mutiny—is encouraged. I have just gotten this army through a very dangerous one; and the Company had better take care what they are at, or some great mischief will yet happen!

"I think that Native ensigns, lieutenants, and captains, aye, and commanders of corps too, will assimilate with our officers, and, in course of time,

* *Life*, vol. iv., p. 206. The ostentatious parade with which the progresses of Indian functionaries, both civil and military, was usually attended, not only aggravated, by contrast, the hardships endured by their inferiors, but inflicted most cruel sufferings on the natives of the countries through which they passed, thousands being pressed for palanquin or dooly (litter) bearers, and for porters of luggage, and paid very poorly, and often very irregularly. "The coolies," says Sir C. Napier, "who are summoned to carry the governor-general's baggage when he moves, are assembled at, or rather driven by force to, Simla from immense distances, and are paid about twopence a-day, under circumstances of great cruelty. Now, I happen to know, that from the delays of offices, and without, perhaps, any tangible act of knavery in any especial officer or individual, some 8,000 or 10,000 coolies employed to take Lord —— down into the plains when he left India, were not paid this miserable pittance for three years!" It is scarcely possible to believe that Englishmen could be either so ungenerous or so short-sighted as wantonly to outrage the feelings of the natives; but, on this point, the testimony of various authorities is corroborated by the special correspondent of the *Times*, whose sympathies naturally lay with his countrymen, and who would not, without strong evidence, venture to bring such a heavy charge against them. Seeing a native badly wounded on a charpoy (movable bed), with a woman sitting beside him in deep affliction, he asked for an explanation, and was told that an officer "had been licking two of his bearers, and had nearly murdered them." Mr. Russell probably did not disguise his disgust on this or other occasions; for he was often told, "Oh, wait till you are another month in India, and you'll think nothing of licking a nigger."—*The Times*, June 17th, 1858.

† *Life and Correspondence*, vol. iv., p. 325.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iv., pp. 306; 326. § *Ibid.*, pp. 185; 212.

gradually throw caste to the dogs, and be like ourselves in all but colour. I have no belief in the power of caste resisting the Christian faith for any great length of time, because reason is too strong for nonsense in the long run; and I believe if the Indians were made officers, on the same footing as ourselves, they would be perfectly faithful, and in time become Christians: not that I want to convert them; but so it will be."*

So far from any idea being entertained of elevating the Native officers according to the plan propounded by the commander-in-chief, their absolute extinction was discussed in public journals and periodicals; a fact which supplies a very clear reason for general disaffection.

Sir Charles Napier, in the year in which he died (1853), writes to his brother, Sir William:—

"The Edinburgh article you mentioned says, that if the Native officers were gradually gotten rid of, the operation would be safe, though not economical or generous. But however gradually it might be done, 300,000 armed men would at once see that all their hopes of rising to be lieutenants, captains, and majors, and when no longer able to serve, the getting pensions, would, for those ranks, be blasted for ever. The writer would soon find his plan unsafe; it would end all Indian questions at once. There is no sepoy in that great army but expects to retire, in age, with a major's pension, as certainly as every ensign expects to become a major or a colonel in our army. There is but one thing to be done: give the Native officers rank with our own, reducing the number of ours. This may endanger; but it will not do so more than the present system does; and my own opinion is pretty well made up, that our power there is crumbling very fast."†

The above statements have been given at length, not simply because they were formed by the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, but because they are the grounds on which he based his assertion, that the mutiny of the sepoys was "the most formidable danger menacing our Indian empire." Certainly Sir William Napier had done good service in his unreserved exposition of his brother's opinions; and though many individuals of high position and character, may, with justice, complain of the language applied to them, yet the sarcasms of the testy old general lose half their bitterness when viewed as the ebullitions of an irascible temper, aggravated by extreme and almost constant bodily pain. When he descends to personalities, his own comparison describes him best—"a hedgehog fighting about nothing:" but his criticisms on the discipline of the Indian army, its commissariat, ordnance, and transport departments, bear witness of an extraordinary amount of judgment and shrewdness. If, as "Indophilus" asserts, "Sir Charles Napier had not the gift of foresight beyond other men," it is the more to be regretted that other men, and especially Indian statesmen, should have allowed his assertions to remain on record, neither confirmed nor refuted, until the mutinies of 1857 brought them into general notice.

Sir Charles Napier was not quite alone in his condemnation of the lax discipline of the Bengal army. Viscount Melville, who commanded the Punjab division of the Bombay forces at the time of the mutiny of the two Bengal regiments under Sir Colin Campbell, in 1849, was astonished at the irregularity which he witnessed in the Bengal army. When questioned concerning its condition, on his return to England in 1850, he did not disguise his strong disapprobation; upon which he was told that, however true his opinion might be, it would be imprudent to express it.‡

Sir Colin Campbell kept silence on the same principle; but afterwards remarked, that if he had uttered his feelings regarding the sepoys ten years previously, he would have been shot.§

Major John Jacob wrote a pamphlet|| in 1854, in which he pointed out various defects in the system; but the home authorities were evidently unwilling to listen to any unpleasant information. The reports of the commander-in-chief who succeeded Sir Charles Napier, and of the governor-general, were both exceedingly favourable; but then the efforts of both Sir William Gomm¶ and of Lord Dalhousie, seem to have been directed exclusively to the furtherance of very necessary measures for the welfare of the European troops. Indeed, in his lordship's own summary of his administration, the condition of the immense mass of the Indian army, amounting to nearly 300,000 men, is

* Letter written May 31st, 1850; published by Lieutenant-general Sir William Napier, in the *Times* of August 17th, 1857.

† *Life and Opinions*, vol. iv., p. 383.

‡ Speech in the House of Lords, July 15th, 1857.

§ *Times*, 15th January, 1858.

|| *Native Troops of the Indian Army.*

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i.

dismissed in the following brief, and, if accurate, very satisfactory sentence:—

"The position of the Native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstance of his position in need of improvement."*

This statement is hardly consistent with that made by the chairman of the East India Company (Mr. R. D. Mangles) to the cadets at Addiscombe, in June, 1857. He adverted to the "marked alteration in the tone and bearing of the younger officers of the Indian army, towards the natives of all ranks," as a fact which "all joined in lamenting;" and he added, that if the "estrangement of officers from men, and especially of English from Native officers, was allowed to continue and grow, it was impossible to calculate the fatal consequences that might ensue."†

Here, at least, was one point in which the treatment of the Native soldiery was susceptible of improvement. But there were others in which the peculiar advantages they had once enjoyed had sensibly diminished: their work had increased; their pay, at least in the matter of extra allowances, had decreased. Sinde, for instance, was just as unhealthy—just as far from the homes of the sepoys, under British as under Native government; yet the premium previously given for foreign service was withdrawn on annexation. So also in the Punjab, and elsewhere.

The orders for distant service came round more rapidly as territory increased. The sepoys became involved in debt by change of station, and the Madras troops could ill afford the travelling expenses of their families, from whom they never willingly separate, and whose presence had probably been a chief cause of their fidelity during the crisis. One regiment, for instance, had, in the course of a few years, to build houses and huts at three different stations; and on their after return from Burmah, the men had to pay sixty rupees per cart, to bring their wives and children from Burhampoor to Vellore, a distance of 700 miles. This is said to be a fair average specimen of what is going on everywhere. "The result is, that the men are deeply embarrassed. A sepoy on seven rupees a-month, who has to pay fifty or sixty rupees for his wife's cart once in every two or three years, is unavoidably plunged in debt. He must borrow at exorbitant interest from the money-lender; and before he can reclaim the past, the 'route' comes for a fresh march to far-distant cantonments, and hurries him into fresh difficulties."‡

The Bengal sepoys did not carry their families with them on a campaign, but left them in their native villages, visiting them every year. The furloughs granted for this purpose, had been diminished in consequence of the growing necessities of the service; and another infringement of a prerogative, which their separation from their wives and children rendered very valuable, was committed by the withdrawal of their privilege of franking letters to their homes. Several other regulations regarding the payment of pensions, and increasing strictness on the part of the general invaliding committee, are asserted to have been viewed by the sepoys as involving breach of faith on the part of the government. They are said to have felt with the old Scotchwoman, "I ken ye're cheating me, but I dinna ken exactly hoo."§ Any alteration in the rules of the retiring pension-list, was watched by the sepoy with jealous care. The terms which secured to him a fixed monthly stipend in the event of becoming incapacitated for further duty after a service of fifteen years, and which, if he died in battle, or from sickness while on foreign service, made some provision for his family, could not of course be altered, even slightly, without exciting alarm as to what further changes might follow. The Bengal sepoys were largely drawn from Oude; and not from Oude generally, but from certain limited districts. Naturally there existed among them the feeling observable in British soldiers born in the same county, when associated in a regiment on foreign service; and possibly it was clanship, quite as much as caste, which bound them together: but whatever it was, a strong tie of union, and consequent power of combination, existed among them, which rendered them efficient for good or evil. Sir John Malcolm had given a memorable warning regarding them. Neither the Hindoo nor the Mohammedan soldier were, he said, revengeful, but both were prone to acts of extreme violence in points where they deemed their honour slighted. The absence of any fear of death was common to them all. Such an instru-

* Minute, dated 28th February, 1856; p. 41.

† See *Daily News*, July 13th, 1857, p.p. 26, 27.

‡ Norton's *Rebellion in India*.

§ Letter signed "Caubulee."—*Daily News*, July 17th, 1857

ment as an army constituted of men like these afforded, had need be managed with care and wisdom, or our strength would become our danger. The minds of the sepoys were alive to every impulse, and would all vibrate to the same touch. Kindness, liberality, and justice would preserve their attachment: besides this, Malcolm adds, "we must attend to the most trifling of their prejudices, and avoid rash innovations; but, above all, those that are calculated to convey to their minds the most distant alarm in points connected with their usages or religion."* This policy found little favour among the Europeans in 1856.

The exclusive payment of the troops in such an inconveniently heavy coin as the silver rupee (two-shilling) piece, obliged them to resort frequently to money-changers; and thus to lose a per-centage on their small stipend. Unfortunately, the governor-general, whose practical ability might have been so beneficially exercised in this and other matters, appeared to have listened to only one set of statements regarding the Native army, and to have acted upon the principle that the sepoy had been "overpetted," and required sterner discipline.

General Anson, who succeeded Sir William Gomm in command of the army, took the same view of the case, only a more exaggerated one. When the cartridge agitation first commenced, he set at nought the feelings of the sepoys, by declaring that "he would never give in to their beastly prejudices." † This speech sufficiently reveals the character of the commander-in-chief to whom it could be even attributed with any show of probability; and it certainly deserves a place among the immediate causes of the mutiny. The European officers appear to have too generally adopted the same tone, especially as regarded the Bengalees; and it was commonly said, that whereas the leading feeling with the Bombay and Madras sepoys was the honour of their regiment, that of the Bengal sepoy was the pride of caste. But, in fact, all the Hindoos, except the outcastes, maintained more or less strongly, those religious prejudices which interfere with their efficiency as soldiers; especially their invariable dislike to sea voyages, and to passing certain recognised boundaries.

The Afghan war was very unpopular for this reason; and the calamities and sore discomfiture endured there, deepened the unfavourable impression which it made upon the whole Native army, and generally upon the people of India. An insurrection in the Saugor and Nerbudda districts broke out in 1842. The wild barons of the hills and jungles swept down over the valleys and cultivated plains; yet the pillaged inhabitants yielded little support to the officers of the government, and would furnish no information with regard to the movements of the insurrectionists. Colonel Sleeman was sent by Lord Ellenborough to inquire into the cause of this inconsistency. He assembled a party of about fifty of the lowlanders in his tent; and there, seated on the carpet, each man freely spoke his mind. Umrao Sing, a sturdy, honest farmer, spoke of the conduct of the chiefs as quite natural. The sudden withdrawal of the troops for objects of distant conquest, and the tidings of disaster and defeat, awakened their hopes of regaining their former position, for they thought the British raj at an end. Colonel Sleeman said, that the farmers and cultivators of the disturbed districts, having been more favoured, in regard to life and property, than in any other part of India, ought to have been stanch to their protectors: "but," he added, "there are some men who never can be satisfied; give them what you will, they will always be craving after more." "True, sir," replied Umrao Sing, with the utmost gravity, "there are some people who can never be satisfied, give them what you will; give them the whole of Hindoostan, and they will go off to Cabool to take more."‡

Hedayut Ali, a subahdar of the Bengal Seik battalion, a man of excellent character, whose father and grandfather had occupied the highest positions attainable to natives in the British service, furnished some very important evidence on the causes of disaffection among the sepoys. He laid much stress on the sufferings endured by the sepoys in Afghanistan in 1838-'9, and the violations of caste which they were compelled to commit by the extreme cold, especially in the matter of eating without first bathing, and of wearing sheepskin jackets; whereas no Hindoo, except of the lowest caste, likes to touch the skin of a dead animal.

The annexation of Oude is cited by this witness as having, in addition to other real

* Malcolm on the Government of India, p. 219.

† Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 37.

‡ Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 95.

or imaginary grievances, caused universal disaffection throughout the army, which from that time determined upon mutinying. The grounds upon which this opinion is based, are very clearly stated. On the 14th of March, 1856, the King of Oude reached Cawnpoor, on his way to Calcutta. Hedayut Ali reached that city on the same day. He remained there six days, and had frequent interviews with the king's vakeels, courtiers, and servants; as did also the principal people of Cawnpoor, and many of the Native officers and sepoys of the regiments stationed there; all of whom were indignant at the king's dispossession. The vakeel of Nana Sahib was among the visitors, and took pains to increase the excitement, by saying how displeased and grieved his master was by the conduct of the English. Shortly after, Hedayut Ali proceeded to join his corps at Lahore, and marched thence to Bengal. On the way, he learnt that the Native infantry at Barrackpoor were showing symptoms of mutiny; and this, with other intelligence, he, from time to time, communicated to his commanding officer.

The King of Oude again visited Cawnpoor in December, 1856, and stayed about a fortnight; during which time much mischief is said to have been concocted. Meanwhile the commander-in-chief and the governor-general were initiating measures very displeasing to various classes of natives. The Madras sepoys had shown, at Vellore, how dangerous it was to interfere with the marks on their foreheads, or the fashion of their turbans. The Seiks and Mohammedans are scarcely less susceptible on the subject of their beards and moustachios. Consequently, in the extensive enlistments of these races, carried on after the annexation of the Punjab, a pledge was given that no interference should be attempted in the matter of hair-dressing. General Anson, however, issued an order, directing the Mohammedans to cut their beards after a prescribed fashion. They refused, pleading the condition of their enlistment. The general insisted on their obeying the order, or quitting the service; and many of them, sooner than suffer what, in their view, was a disgrace, took their discharge, and went to their homes. Sir Charles Napier understood the native character far too well to have so needlessly played the martinet, independently of the sympathy which he would naturally have felt for the recusants, by reason of having himself "a beard like a Cashmere goat." The discharged sepoys "bitterly complained of the commanding officers having broken faith with them; and several of them, who afterwards re-enlisted in the same regiment as Hedayut Ali, frequently spoke of the manner in which they had been deprived of the benefit of several years' service. But the crowning act of innovation enacted by Lord Canning and General Anson, was the general service order of 1856, by which all recruits were to be compelled to swear that they would go, by sea or land, wherever their services were required. The refusal of the 38th Bengal infantry to march to Burmah, was severely punished by Lord Dalhousie's sending the regiment by land to Dacca, where the cantonments were very bad, and the loss of life among the troops extremely heavy."* He did not, however, attempt to strike such a blow as that now aimed at caste; for the unqualified aversion to the sea entertained by the Bengal sepoys, would, it was well known, prevent many from bringing up their children to a profession which they had learned to look upon as an hereditary means of obtaining an honourable maintenance. They feared also for themselves. Hedayut Ali says—"When the old sepoys heard of this order, they were much frightened and displeased. 'Up to this day, those men who went to Afghanistan have not been readmitted to their caste; how are we to know where the English may force us to go? They will be ordering us next to go to London.' Any new order is looked upon with much suspicion by the Native army, and is much canvassed in every regiment."

This latter remark is unquestionably a just one; the intercourse maintained throughout the Bengal army, and the rapid and correct transmission of intelligence, having been one of the most marked features of the mutinies. The following observations are also painfully correct:—

"Of late years the sepoys have not confided in their officers. * * * A native of Hindoostan seldom opens his mind to his officer; he only says what he thinks would please his officer. The sepoys reserve their real opinion until they return to their lines and to their comrades. * * * The government must be aware, that when a soldier has once or twice shown a disposition to mutiny, he is useless as a soldier: one mutinous sepoy infects a whole company; and gradually, one man after another, from fear or sympathy, joins the mutineers.

"Many commanding officers, to my knowledge, reported that regiments were all right, when they

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, p. 21.

knew that there were discontent and bad feeling in the ranks; and, to my belief, for the sake of the name of their respective regiments, concealed the real state of their regiments, until at length the sepoys took to murdering their officers. * * * Another reason (and, in my opinion, a very serious one) why the army became mutinous and disaffected is this. Promotion all went by seniority, and not, as it ought, according to merit and proficiency. All the old men, from length of service worth nothing as commissioned or non-commissioned officers, received promotion; while younger men, in every way fit, languished in their lines: saying, 'What use is there in us exerting ourselves; we cannot get promotion until our turn comes, and that time can't come until our heads are gray and our mouths toothless.' For this reason, the sepoys for the most part drew their pay, and were careless with regard to their duty. The higher ranks of the Native army, from old age alone, were quite incapacitated from doing their duty, even had they the will to do it. I state confidently, that the generality of Native officers were an encumbrance to the state: instead of commanding sepoys, the sepoys commanded them; and instead of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks preventing the men from mutinying, they rather persuaded them to do so."*

The above opinion of a Native officer on the effect of the Bengal military system upon his countrymen, reads like the echo of that of Indophilus, regarding its operation on the Europeans. The arguments urged in the two cases are so nearly identical, that it may well be asked whether justice and common sense do not prompt to the same course of general legislation.

"Under a pure seniority system, an officer's promotion goes on precisely in the same manner whether he exerts himself or takes his ease; and as few love exertion for its own sake, the majority take their ease. Under a system of selection according to qualification and service, promotion is dependent upon exertion, and the majority consequently exert themselves. Those only who know the Bengal army can form some estimate of the amount of idleness and bad habit engendered by the seniority system co-operating with the enervating influences of the climate, which would be converted into active interest in professional duty, by the substitution of a well-considered system of promotion according to qualification and good service."†

Lord Melville‡ had also urged, so far as he was allowed to do, the evils of the seniority system. Other authorities, more or less directly, assert, that it was the defective character, rather than the insufficient number, of the officers left to do regimental duty as "the refuse of the army," which weakened their hold on their men. Brigadier-general Jacob remarks, that "qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of the native Indian soldiers;" and his opinion is corroborated by the fact, that the irregular and local force, which was officered entirely by a few but picked men, was—allowing for discrepancies of pay and dates of enlistment—generally held to be in an equally, if not more, efficient condition than the regular regiments.

A well-informed, but not unprejudiced witness says, that the conduct of irregular regiments, which possessed only three European officers, had always contrasted so favourably with that of line regiments, with their fourteen or fifteen, that the natural conclusion one would arrive at is, that the latter were over-officered. He also deprecates the seniority system, by which a sepoy who may enter the service at the age of sixteen, cannot count on finding himself a naik (corporal) before he attains the age of thirty-six; a havildar (sergeant) before forty-five; a jemadar (lieutenant) before fifty-four; or a subahdar (captain) before sixty; while, "after fifty, most natives are utterly useless." §

The full complement of European officers to each regular regiment was twenty-six; but of these half were generally absent, either on service or on furlough. The commander was usually a lieutenant-colonel; then there was an adjutant, to superintend the drill; a quartermaster whose duty it was to look after the clothing of the men; and, lastly, an interpreter. The necessity for this last functionary lied at the root of our sudden calamity; for the officers, if they had been able and willing to hold close intercourse with their men, and explain to them the reasons for the various unpopular orders recently issued, would, if they could not remove disaffection, at least have become acquainted with its existence. An infantry regiment on the Bengal establishment comprised ten companies, each containing a hundred privates, two native commissioned, and twelve non-commissioned officers.

The great increase of the irregular regiments had been in itself a source of jealousy and heartburning to the regular troops, who

* Translated by Captain T. Rattray, from the original Oordoo; and published in the *Times*, April 1st, 1858.

† *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 18.

‡ The directors are said to defend themselves for neglecting Lord Melville's representations, on the ground that his "evidence was contradicted most strongly, in every particular, by that of Sir Patrick Grant, who assured us, that the Bengal army (of which he had been long adjutant-general) was all that it should be."—Letter, signed "H. C."—*Daily News*, July 25th, 1857.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army* by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; pp. 1; 7.

expected that their numbers would have been largely augmented after certain annexations, and that extensive promotions would take place. This expectation was wholly disappointed. The enormous expenses of the army rendered the comparative cheapness of irregular troops an irresistible advantage. According to the Army List for 1857, the irregular and local force of Bengal numbered forty-two infantry, and twenty-seven cavalry regiments; and the so-called contingents of Native States, comprised sixteen of cavalry and nineteen of infantry: in all, ninety-four regiments; the whole officered by picked men from the twenty-four regiments of the regular army. The relative numbers of the three armies need not be given here, as their proportions and distribution are immediately connected with the history about to be entered on. The question of the greased cartridges has been already noticed under the head of "Caste;" and will frequently recur in the ensuing narrative.

A Mohammedan Conspiracy, widely ramified and deeply rooted, was urged by some authorities as in itself the great motive power of the political convulsion of 1857; others, on the contrary, denied its existence, on the ground of no sufficient evidence having beeng adduced therof.

Dr. Alexander Duff, the eloquent Presbyterian preacher of Calcutta, writing in August, 1857, says—"It is a long-concocted Mohammedan conspiracy now come to a head. The main object is the destruction of British power, and the reascendancy of Mohammedan. Even the cartridge affair was only a casual incident, of which the conspirators adroitly took advantage."*

In his published *Letters on the Indian Rebellion,* the Doctor throughout insists on Mussulman intrigues as being continually developed and exposed; but he wrote in a season of excitement, when rumours abounded of dangers and atrocities, many of which have happily proved unfounded, but which naturally served to confirm his preconceived opinion. The truth is terrible enough; and for the sake of our national honour, for the sake of human nature, and, above all, for the sake of truth itself, we should strive to strip this fearful episode of the obscurity in which conflicting exaggerations have wrapped its origin and progress. Beyond question, the Mohammedan princes of India had strong reason for combining to restore the green flag of Islam to its former supremacy in Hindoostan. If an opportunity offered, it is at least highly probable that the orthodox Sonnites of Delhi, and the heterodox Sheiahs of Oude, would be content to forget for a time the rival claims of Caliphs and Imaums to apostolic succession, and make common cause against the power which treated both with indifference.

The whole Mussulman body would of necessity be drawn closer together by the danger which threatened all alike. They had still something to lose; that is, something to fight for. Submission had not succeeded in preserving the independence of Oude; and even Hyderabad, much more the titular principality of Delhi, seemed tottering to a close. Still the Mohammedans were as a handful amid a heap; and the chief point to solve was, whether the recent innovations had sufficiently disgusted the leading Hindoos to render them willing to forget past usurpations, and join with their former subjugators in attempting the overthrow of the British raj.

Tippoo Sultan had made an effort of the kind, but without success; and it now appears, by his own proclamation, that Prince Mirza Feroze Shah, on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca, "persuaded many at Delhi to raise a religious war;" being incited thereto by observing that "the English were in a bad and precarious state."†

Great anxiety had been felt at Delhi, throughout the period of Lord Dalhousie's administration, regarding the manner in which his annexation policy would be brought to bear upon the family who, fallen as they were, still represented, in the minds of the Indian people, the mighty Mogul emperors of old, and whose restoration to power had been prayed for daily in the mosques throughout India for nearly a hundred years.‡

In 1849, the heir-apparent died, and the Indian government recommended the Court of Directors to "terminate the dynasty of Timour whenever the reigning king should die." The court consented; but so reluctantly, that the governor-general did not care to avail himself of their permission, and therefore recognised the grandson of

* Speech of the Hon. A. Kinnaird, 11th June, 1857: second edition; p. 35.

† Proclamation issued by Prince Mirza Mohammed Feroze Shah, 17th February, 1858.

‡ See *Times,* September 1st, 1857.

the king as heir-apparent; "but only on condition that he should quit the palace in Delhi, in order to reside in the palace at the Kootub; and that he should, as king, receive the governor-general of India, at all times, on terms of perfect equality."

These conditions show that something of external pomp and circumstance still lingered around Delhi, of which the representatives of the East India Company were anxious to be rid, and the royal family as anxious to retain. True, the power had long vanished; but even the tarnished pageantry was clung to, naturally enough, by those who had no other birthright, and no prospect of being able to win their way to wealth and honour as warriors; the profession of arms being the only one in which a Mohammedan prince of the blood could engage without forfeiting caste. The sullateen (plural for sultan)—as the various branches of the family are termed—were probably an idle and dissolute race. It is in the nature of things that they should have become so. Certainly we never did anything to hinder their debasement; and had, while acting as their political and pecuniary trustees, been lamentably indifferent to their moral and physical welfare. We never evinced the slightest interest in them; and have no right to wonder at their degradation.

With the downfall of the dynasty we had no concern. In dealing generously with Shah Alum, we acted with sound policy. All India respected us for it. Even in Leadenhall-street, sufficient memory of the bygone feelings and events lingered in 1849, to make the application of the new absorption laws seem peculiarly harsh in the case of Delhi. The scruples of the Court of Directors induced Lord Dalhousie to draw back his hand, at least as far as the titular sovereignty was concerned; but his proposal for its extinction having been once mooted, and even sanctioned, it may be considered that the sentence was rather deferred than reversed. This, at least, was the public opinion. It is a singular fact, that the same accounts from India, which have been already quoted as describing the unbroken tranquillity of the entire peninsula at the close of 1856, state that the palace of Delhi was "in a ferment," owing to the recent death of the heir-apparent from cholera, and the renewed discussion regarding the succession. "We have (it is added) no treaty, agreement, or stipulation with Delhi. The king's privileges and pension were all granted as of free grace; and the former will probably be withdrawn. The palace is a sink of iniquity; and the family, on the death of its present head, will probably be compelled to move."*

The same paper contained the announcement that the anticipated declaration of war against Persia had appeared in a proclamation published at Calcutta on the 1st of November, 1856. The *casus belli* was the breach of the treaty of 1853, by which the Persian government promised to abstain from all interference with Herat; the independence of that city, under its brave chief, Esa Khan, being deemed essential to the security of the British frontier. On the pretence that Dost Mohammed had been instigated to seize Candahar and advance upon Herat, a Persian army crossed into the Herat territory (which was declared to be Persian soil), and laid siege to the city. Under instructions from the home government, a force was assembled at Bombay for service in the Persian Gulf. The *Times*' correspondent described the departure of the force, in three divisions, as taking place in the middle of November. The first, consisting of H.M.'s 64th regiment and the 20th Native infantry, embarked from Vingorla in two steamers, each with its transport in tow. The second, comprising a European regiment, the 2nd Belooch cavalry, and two squadrons of the 3rd cavalry, sailed from Poorbunder and Kurrachee. The third embarked from Kurrachee a few days later, and consisted of the 4th Rifles (a very strong and well-appointed regiment), two troops of the Poona horse, a field battery, a troop of horse artillery, a third-class siege-train, and two companies of sappers and miners. The rendezvous was fixed at Bunder Abbas, a place near the entrance of the gulf, in the occupation of our Arab ally, the Imaum of Muscat.†

At the time the above facts were recorded, no idea appears to have been entertained of any connection existing between the Persian war and the ferment in the palace of Delhi. The declaration of war had been long expected; and, according to the *Times*' correspondent, created little excitement at Bombay. The Persians, who are numerous there, as also in other large Indian cities, relied on the promise of protection given them, and remained quiescent. "Even

* Calcutta correspondent, November 8th, 1856.—*Times*, December 9th, 1856.

† Bombay correspondent, November 17th, 1856.—*Times*, December 9th, 1856.

the Mussulman population, who sympathise with Persia," he adds, "sympathise still more with Afghanistan;* and the fact that we are fighting with, and not against, Dost Mohammed, is thoroughly understood. The European public accepts the war with a feeling of quiet resignation. The idea that it is our destiny to advance—that we cannot help ourselves, has obtained a control over the public mind; and every war breaks the monotony of Indian life, which is the curse of India, as of all aristocratic life."

It seems probable that the Persian war materially, though indirectly, contributed to break up the aristocratic monotony of high-caste European life, by denuding India of her most reliable troops. The number sent, of men of all arms, to the Persian Gulf, in November, 1856, amounted to 5,820, of whom 2,270 were Europeans. In the following February a still larger force was dispatched, under Brigadier-general Havelock, consisting of 5,340 men, of whom about 1,770 were Europeans; and 800 cavalry were subsequently dispatched at an enormous cost. Thus the "army of Persia" deprived India of about 12,000 men, of whom one-third were Europeans. Lord Canning considered this force quite sufficient for any operations which Major-general Outram could undertake before the hot season; but, he adds, "it is certain that very large reinforcements will be needed before a second campaign, commencing with the autumn of 1857, can be entered upon."

Man proposes—God disposes. Long before the autumn set in, an Indian campaign had commenced, which, whether the Persians had or had not withdrawn their claims on Herat, must have equally relieved the governor-general from the task of providing a third armament for the Persian Gulf, "to include not less than six European regiments of infantry and one of cavalry." The Persians were overcome, and the independence of Herat was secured, at a cost to Britain of about £500,000 in money.† Meanwhile, intimations of Persian intrigues were given to the authorities by various persons, but set at nought as idle rumours. The trial of the King of Delhi furnishes evidence that inducements to revolt were held forth by the Shah of Persia, who promised money and troops. His proclamation to that effect was posted over the mosque gate, and was taken down by order of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who, moreover, was informed by John Everett, a Christian risaldar very popular with the natives, that he had been warned to fly, as the Persians were coming, and the Mussulmans were greatly excited. Sir T. Metcalfe thought the information of no importance.‡ A statement of a Mohammedan plot was laid before Mr. Colvin; but he also suffered the warning to pass unheeded, and did not even report it to government.

At this very time Delhi was absolutely devoid of European troops, yet strongly fortified, and stored with the munitions of war. Its palace-fort was still tenanted by the representative of the *rois fainéants* of the East, whose persons had formerly been fought for by opposing factions as a tower of strength; their compulsory signature being used notoriously to legitimatise usurpation, and influence the populace.

Extreme insalubrity is given by Lord Ellenborough as the reason why no European regiment had ever yet been stationed there, sickness prevailing to such an extent, that, after the rains, two-thirds of the strength even of the Native troops were in hospital.§ Sanitary measures would probably have prevented, or greatly mitigated this evil (as at Seringapatam); nor does it appear that any cause but neglect existed to render Delhi less habitable than of old.

Sir Charles Napier's prediction was one which any chance traveller might have reasonably made; and there is, therefore, the less excuse for the absence of obviously necessary precautions. "Men," he said, "of all parts of Asia meet in Delhi; and, some day or other, much mischief will be hatched within those city walls, and no European troops at hand."|| He knew also, and officially urged upon the governor-general, "that the powder-magazine was defended only by a guard of fifty natives, and the gates so weak that a mob could push them

* This assertion may be reasonably questioned, since the Sheiahs of Oude looked up to the Shah of Persia as the head of their sect. Mr. Ludlow says that the Persian war caused great excitement in Northern India, where many of the Moslems were of the Sheiah sect; and he adds, that one of his relatives had himself, within the last two or three years, read placards on the walls of Delhi, calling true believers to the holy war in the name of the Shah of Persia.—*Lectures on British India*, vol. ii., p. 219.

† Speech of Lord Claude Hamilton: Indian debate, July 20th, 1857.

‡ Calcutta correspondent.—*Times*, March 29, 1858.

§ Indian debate, July 13th, 1857.

|| Letter to a lieutenant-colonel in the Bengal artillery: published in the *Times*, 20th August, 1857.

in; whereas the place ought to be garrisoned by 12,000 picked men."*

The absence of a European garrison in Delhi was the most unpardonable of our blunders; and—what does not always follow—it is the one for which we had most dearly to pay, not in money only, but in the life-blood of our best and bravest soldiers. One cannot think of Nicholson and his gallant companions without bitterly denouncing the neglect which suffered Delhi to fall defenceless at the feet of a few rebels, put at once a sword and shield into their hands, and gave them the ancient Mussulman metropolis of India as a nucleus for every aggrieved chief, every disaffected soldier, every reckless adventurer, escaped convict, pindarree, thug, dacoit, to rally round, for the destruction of the British raj—at least for a long carnival of war and loot. The very heroism of the troops who regained Delhi embitters the recollection of the neglect by which it was lost. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori!* as one of them (Lieut. Battye) said when mortally wounded; but, to their country, their very devotion only renders it more painful that the necessity for such sacrifices should have been so culpably occasioned. This is, however, anticipating events, the progress of which will best evidence how far Persian intrigues may have been connected with the mutiny. At the time, many assertions were made, the truth of which yet remains in dispute. It would seem, however, that the efforts of the King of Persia had been chiefly directed to Delhi; and that if communications were entered into with leading Mohammedans in other parts of India, these had not had time to ripen; and, consequently, when the mutinies broke forth, heralded by incendiary fires in every British camp, the conspirators must have been taken by surprise almost as much as the Europeans themselves.†

Shett Nowmull, "a native merchant of Kurrachee, for many years favourably known to government on account of his great intelligence, his extensive influence and connexions throughout the countries on our western frontier, and his true attachment to the British government," communicated, to Mr. Frere, commissioner of Sinde, in June, 1857, his reasons for believing that "Persian influence was at the bottom of the mutiny." He declared that cossids (messengers), under different disguises, with letters secreted in the soles of their shoes or otherwise, had, for the last two years, been regularly passing between Delhi and the Persian court, *viâ* Candahar; that a great spread of the Sheiah tenets of Islamism had been observable during the same period; and also that a very perceptible decrease had taken place in the rancour usually existing between the Sheiahs and Sonnites. The new cartridges had been used "through the same influence," to excite the feelings of the Hindoo portion of the army, and lead them to mutiny. Dost Mohammed, he said, thought more of Persia than of England, for a very pertinent reason—"Persia is on the Dost's head; Peshawur is under his feet:"‡ in other words, a man placed between two fires, would especially dread the more immediate one.

Prophecies of various kinds were current—always are current, in India; but when the mutiny broke out, more heed was given to them by the natives; and the Europeans also lent an ear, knowing that a pretended prophecy might disguise an actual plot, and, in more ways than one, work out its own fulfilment. The alleged prediction which limited the duration of the British raj to a hundred years, was repeated far and wide;§

* *Memoir on the Defence of India;* addressed by Sir C. Napier to Lord Dalhousie. See Indian debate of 23rd July, 1857.

† In the captured tent of the Shahzada commander, after the rout of the Persians at Mohumrah, there was found a royal proclamation addressed "to all the people of Heran;" but which also called on "the Afghan tribes, and the inhabitants of that country who are co-religionists of the Persians, and who possess the same Koran and Kebla, and laws of the prophet, to take part in the *Jahâd*." It expressly invited the followers of Islam in India and Sinde to unite and wreak vengeance on the British for all the injuries which the holy faith had suffered from them, and not to withhold any sacrifice in the holy cause. "The old and the young, the small and the great, the wise and the ignorant, the ryot and the sepoy, all without exception," are summoned by the Shah-in-Shah to arise in defence of the orthodox faith of the prophet; and having girt up the waist of valour, adorn their persons with arms and weapons; and let the Ullema and preachers call on the people in the mosques and public assemblies, and in the pulpits, to join in a *Jahâd*, in the cause of God; and thus shall the Ghazis in the cause of faith have a just title to the promises contained in the words of the prophet, "Verily we are of those who fought in the cause of God."—Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine* for 1857: article entitled "The Poorbeah Mutiny."

‡ Letter from H. B. B. Frere, commissioner of Sinde, to Lord Elphinstone, governor of Bombay, 11th June, 1857.—Parl. Papers (253), 4th May, 1858; p. 48.

§ Dr. A. Duff's *Letters:* London, 1858; p. 26.

and the Europeans in Calcutta and many of the leading cities, watched the approach of the centenary of Plassy with a feverish anxiety bordering on panic.

But prophecies such as these, are usually the consequence or the sign, rather than the cause, of popular tumults. In health we can smile at language which, in sickness, excites a fevered imagination to frenzy. For years the natives had been allowed to speculate on the future destiny, and comment on the present policy, of their rulers, without any restraint whatever; now, every third word seemed treason. Such of the English functionaries as understood Indian languages, began to examine the literature of the day; and were exceedingly puzzled to decide what was, and what was not, written with a sinister intent.

A Persian paper, for instance, was brought to Mr. Frere about the commencement of hostilities, which described the signs preceding the day of judgment, in language strikingly applicable to existing circumstances, and calculated to unsettle and excite men's minds, and prepare them for some sudden disturbance; but it read so like a free translation of a sermon by a popular English preacher on the same subject, as to render it difficult to decide how to act with regard to it.*

The struggle which had taken place between the Christians and the Mussulmans, in various distinct parts of Europe as well as Asia, and which had been contemporaneous with the Indian mutiny, was viewed as indicating a desire on the part of the present representatives of Islam to regain something of their former dominancy. The Indo-Mohammedans are, however, very unlike their co-religionists in other countries, and the anti-idolatrous doctrines of their founder have been so corrupted by intermixture of the superstitious practices of modern Brahminism, that it is not possible to judge their feelings by any test applicable to Mohammedans in general.

The English naturally viewed, with great alarm, the fanatical outbreaks at Jaffa, Marash, and Belgrade, and still more so the alarming one at Jeddah; but the government had wisely striven to repress the suspicious distrust and aversion manifested by the Europeans to the Mohammedans as a class, fearing to see them driven to revolt by conduct equally unjust and impolitic.†

This possible source of mutiny had been, however, but very partially explored, and the heat of prejudice and excitement that existed allowed to subside before any satisfactory conclusion could be formed on the subject.

Foreign intrigues were alleged to have been practised against us, and attempts made to undermine our position in India, in various ways by a Christian as well as by a Mohammedan power; by Russia as well as Persia. It is difficult to say how far the vague expectation of Russian invasion (which certainly existed in India) was occasioned by exaggerated rumours, and perverted reports gleaned from European journals, and circulated by the native press during the period of the Crimean war, or how much of it might be attributed to the deliberate machinations of Russia.

In England, botn sources of danger were equally disregarded; and, amid the miserable inconsistencies which marked the war from beginning to end, not the least was the fact, that one of the arguments used to reconcile the people to heavy additional taxation, was the necessity of maintaining and restoring effete and incapable Mohammedan Turkey, as a means of checking the inordinate increase of the power of Russia, and making the battle-field in the Crimea, rather than on the frontier of our Indian empire The Russian government intimated, that to roll back their European boundary would but lead them to advance their Asiatic one; and some years before the campaign of 1853, their organ at St. Petersburg declared that, in the event of war, the czar would dictate the terms of peace at Calcutta. In the teeth of this defiant warning, the British ministry, accustomed to treat India as a sort of peculiarly circumstanced colony, and to neglect colonies as a matter of course, paid no heed whatever to the strange excitement manifested throughout India at the first tidings of the Crimean conflict. No pains were taken to ascertain the tone adopted by the natives, or to guard against rumours circulated and schemes set afoot by foreign emissaries, in a country where a passport system would have been a common measure of prudence. Ministers concentrated all their energies on the conduct of the European struggle (though not with any very satisfactory result), and acted as if on the understanding that, "during the Russian war, the

* Letter from H. B. B. Freere.—Parl. Papers (253), 4th May, 1858; p. 48.

† See letter of Lord Hobart.—*Times*, December 3rd, 1857.

government had too much to do, to be expected to attend to India."*

The ill effects which the tidings of the Russian and Persian wars were calculated to produce in India, were aggravated by the drain of European troops thereby occasioned. The government demand for two regiments of infantry for the Crimean war, was earnestly deprecated by Lord Dalhousie.

"Although the war with Russia," observes his lordship, "does not directly affect our Indian dominions, yet it is unquestionably exercising at this moment a most material influence upon the minds of the people over whom we rule, and upon the feelings of the nations by which we are surrounded; and thus it is tending indirectly to affect the strength and the stability of our power.

"The authorities in England cannot, I think, be aware of the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India. I was myself unaware of it until the events of the past year have forced it upon my convictions. Letters from various parts of India have shown me, that the present contest is regarded by them with the deepest interest, and that its issue is by no means considered so certain as we might desire. However mortifying to our pride it may be to know it, and however unaccountable such a belief may appear in people living amidst the visible evidences of our might, it is an unquestionable fact, that it is widely believed in India, that Russia is pressing us hard, and that she will be more than a match for us at last.

"We know by our correspondence in the East, that the King of Ava has declaredly been acting on this feeling; and that, influenced by it, he has been delaying the dispatch of the mission which many months ago he spoke of sending to Calcutta. * * *

"India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance. We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so: but if European troops shall be now withdrawn from India to Europe; if countenance shall thus be given to the belief already prevalent, that we have grappled with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal to overpower us; if, by consenting to withdrawal, we shall weaken that essential element of our military strength, which has already been declared to be no more than adequate for ordinary times; and if, further, we should be called upon to dispatch an army to the Persian Gulf—an event which, unlooked-for now, may any day be brought about by the thraldom in which Persia is held, and by the feeble and fickle character of the Shah; then, indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express the same confidence as before, that the security and stability of our position in the East will remain unassailed. * * * In a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers, I feel it to be a public duty to record, that in my deliberate judgment, the European infantry force in India, ought in no case to be weakened by a single man, so long as England shall be engaged in her present struggle with Russia."†

The regiments were nevertheless withdrawn, and were not even returned at the close of the Russian war. Then came the Persian war, and the requisition upon Lord Canning, who complied less reluctantly than Lord Dalhousie had done; but still under protest. Lord Canning reminded the home authorities, that, for all Indian purposes, the strength of the army would be equally reduced, whether the regiments were sent to Persia or to the Crimea. He spoke of the excitement which even a distant war raised in the minds of the natives, and insisted on the necessity of an increase of European troops, as necessary to the safety of India during the continuance of hostile operations against Persia.‡

It is at least possible that the Russian government should have retaliated on us our invasion of its territory, by striving to sow discord in India. The course of the rebellion had afforded many incidents calculated to produce a conviction of their having done so: for instance, the assertion of one of the Delhi princes, that when the mutineers marched on that city, the royal family believed them to be the advanced guard of the Russian army. Another far more significant fact, which was communicated to me on the authority of a naval officer in a high position on the Indus, was the extraordinary amount of silver roubles seen in the bazaars in the North-West Provinces, immediately before the mutiny, and supposed to have passed to the tables of the money-changers from the notoriously well-filled pockets of Russian spies. The extent and mode in which this agency may have been employed, will probably never be revealed; but it can hardly be doubted that it was an active and recognised mode of obtaining the accurate and comprehensive information possessed by the government of St. Petersburg, regarding the condition of the domestic and foreign affairs of every other nation. Spies, in time of peace, may easily become political incendiaries in time of war, in countries hostile to the authority which they serve. As to detecting them that is next to impossible: a charge of this nature is always difficult to prove; but, to an Englishman, the difficulty is insur-

* Speeches of Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Vernon Smith, president of the India Board.—Indian debate, July 26th, 1857.

† Minute by the governor-general: 13th September, 1854.—Parl Papers, 12th February, 1858; pp. 7; 9.

‡ Minutes dated 7th and 8th February, 1857.—Parl. Papers, 20th July, 1857; pp. 8, 9.

mountable. Clever thieves, clever forgers, England has produced in abundance: unscrupulous politicians are not quite unknown among us; but our secret service department has, on the whole, been singularly free from subterranean and systematised "dirty work." The secret opening of a letter is scouted at, in a political functionary, as listening at a keyhole would be in a private individual; and, even while quite uncertain as to the extent of the mutiny in 1849, Sir Charles Napier would not entertain the idea of examining the correspondence of the sepoys, then passing to an unusual extent through the government post-offices. The Russian language has probably many words which, like the French one *fin, finesse*, and others, have no equivalent in English; nor has America—sharp, shrewd, and slick as some of her children are—annexed to the mother-tongue any words which serve as fit exponents for that peculiar branch of continental diplomacy which renders trained spies a regular governmental department. We have no political detectives among us. Our aristocracy, whether of rank or letters, may indeed be occasionally annoyed by the indiscretion of caterers for the public press, in the shape of newspaper reporters and gossiping memoir writers; but, at our tables, the host speaks his mind in the plainest terms regarding the most powerful personages of the moment, without fearing that one of his servants may be taking notes behind his chair, which may procure his exile or imprisonment; and the hostess is equally certain that none of her guests will drive from her roof to lodge information of some enthusiastic ebullition which has escaped her lips, and for which neither youth nor beauty, character nor station, would save her from personal chastisement under the orders of a Russian Usher of the Black Rod. What we call grumbling in Great Britain, folks abroad call treason; and that is an offence for which Britons have so little temptation, that they are slow to note its existence, or provide against it even when themselves exercising those despotic powers which, if men dare not openly oppose, they secretly strive against. To what extent Russian emissaries had fomented Indian disaffection, will probably never be proved; the natives could, perhaps, have given news on the subject, had they chose; and if that evidence had been got, and thoroughly sifted, by men possessing acquaintance with the Indian languages and character, united to sound judgment, some light might have been thrown on a subject every branch of which was most interesting as regarded the past, most important as regarded the future.

No Englishman, except under very peculiar circumstances, would ever detect spies amid a multitude of foreigners. I speak strongly on this point, because, in China, several Russians were pointed out to me by the experienced Dr. Gutzlaff; dressed in the costume of the country, speaking the language, adopting the habits of the people, and appearing, to the casual observer, to all intents native born.

It is notorious that a Captain Vikovitch played a conspicuous part in inciting the unjust and disastrous expedition to Afghanistan against Dost Mohammed. This and many other instances, leave little doubt that Russia maintains, in Central Asia, agents to watch and, if possible, influence the proceedings of England, and probably receives from some of the Greek or Armenian merchants settled at Calcutta or Bombay, accounts about the state finances, the army, and affairs in general; but, besides this, disclosures are said to have been made which prove that Russian emissaries, under various guises, long were successfully at work in inflaming the bigotry of the Mussulman, and the prejudices of the high-caste Hindoo.* It was possible, however, that information on this subject obtained by the government, was, for obvious reasons, withheld from the public.

This introductory chapter has extended to a greater length than the writer anticipated at its commencement. His design was simply to state the alleged causes of the mutiny, as far as practicable, in the words of those who were their chief exponents, and to refrain from mingling therewith his own views. But the future welfare of India and of England is so manifestly connected with the policy now evolving from the crucible of heated and conflicting public and party feeling, that it is barely possible for any one really interested in the result, to look on, and describe the struggle, without revealing his own convictions on points where right and wrong, truth and fallacy, justice and oppression, are clearly at issue.

In the foregoing summary, some alleged causes are noted which appear to be scarcely compatible with one another. The incom-

* Dr. Duff's *Indian Rebellion*, p. 93.

patibility is perhaps less real than apparent. What we call BRITISH INDIA, is, in fact, a congeries of nations, differing in language, creed, and customs, as do European states, and with even less points of union, excepting only their involuntary association under a foreign government.

It follows, that in striving to trace the origin of wide-spread disaffection, and the connection between seemingly distinct insurrectionary movements, we must be prepared to find great variety of motive—general, local, and temporary—affecting scattered masses, and manifesting itself sometimes in active hostility, sometimes in sullen discontent.

Under a despotic government, with an enormous army of native mercenaries, the outbreak of rebellion would naturally occur among the soldiery. While they were contented, the people would almost necessarily remain in complete subjection; but if the soldiery had grievances, however slight compared with those of the people, the two classes would coalesce; the separate discontent of each party reacting upon the other, the army would initiate rebellion, the people would maintain it. According to Mr. Disraeli, this has actually been the case; the conduct of the Bengal troops, in revolting, having been that of men "who were not so much the avengers of professional grievances, as the exponents of general discontent."*

It is difficult to understand what the reason can have been for keeping up such an enormous Native army as a peace establishment. Soldiers were used to perform police duties in the older provinces, where war had been unknown for years, simply because there were not policemen to do them; and this confounding of civil and military duties lies at the bottom of much misgovernment, extortion, and unnecessary expense. The troops so variously engaged were trained only for arms, yet employed mainly in duties which officers and men looked upon as derogatory to them as soldiers, and which, in fact, they had no business with at all. It was at once deteriorating their efficiency, and putting power unnecessarily in their hands, to employ them in functions which should have been, as a mere matter of policy, kept perfectly distinct.

There is much justice in Lord John Russell's remark, that we have had altogether too large an army, and that 50,000 Europeans, with 100,000 Natives, would be a much better security, as far as force is concerned, than a Native army of 300,000.†

At this time, the total amount of troops in our service was scarcely less than before the mutiny; so rapidly had new corps replaced the old ones, and new sources of supply become available to meet an urgent demand.‡

There was need of care, lest our new auxiliaries should prove equally, if not more dangerous than the old ones. There was more need than ever of moderation, or rather of justice and charity, being urged by the British public on their countrymen in India, lest we should have lost for ever our hold on the confidence of its vast population.

It was truly said that "the time is really come for the people of England and for the government of the country to meet the manifestations of a spirit which would render our rule in India not only a crime but an impossibility, by an active and resolute policy. Outrages on natives must be punished, unless we would willingly and knowingly accept the hostility of India, and, with our eyes open, justify the assertions of the intriguers, who tell the people that nothing will content us but their utter extermination."

The growing alienation of the Europeans from the natives has been already noticed as a cause of disaffection; but since that section was written, the free, fearless, graphic representations of Dr. Russell have thrown new light on the subject, and shown but too plainly a sufficient reason for "the rift, bottomless, and apparently causeless, which, even before the mutiny, was observed as separating the European from the native, and increasing in breadth every day."§

Unhappily, it is no new thing to be told

* Debate (Commons), July 28th, 1857. † *Ibid.*

‡ The new recruits are, however, very different men from the tall, well-formed Brahmin or Rajpoot sepoys of the old Bengal army. These were six feet in height, and forty inches round the chest; docile, polite, doing credit to their officers on parade, smart at drill, neat and clean on duty. Already the reaction has commenced; and Indian officers in general appear disposed to recollect (what the best and wisest of them have never forgotten), that "Pandy, until he went mad in 1857, was a good orderly soldier." "For myself," an officer writes in a recent Indian journal, "I would rather serve with them than with the dirty, unworthy, ungentlemanly (Pandy was a gentleman) set of strange bedfellows with whom misfortune has made us acquainted."—Dr. Russell—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858.

§ *Ibid.*, October 20th, 1858.

that Englishmen in India are arrogant and exclusive. In the last century, West Indian proprietors and East Indian nabobs were chosen by essayists, novelists, and play-writers, as representing a peculiar class of domestic tyrants, wealthy and assumptious; whose presence, Lord Macaulay said, raised the price of everything in their neighbourhood, from a rotten borough to a rotten egg. The habits they had acquired indicated the life they had led; and all who knew India, and had the intelligence to form, and the moral courage to express, an opinion on the subject, sorrowfully agreed with Bishop Heber in deprecating the "foolish, surly, national pride," of which he daily saw but too many instances, and which he was convinced did us much harm in India. "We are not guilty," he said, "of wilful injustice or oppression; but we shut out the natives from our society, and a bullying, insolent manner is continually assumed in speaking to them."

Some went still further than this, and echoed Lord Byron's emphatic warning,* of the sure retribution that would attend us, if, instead of striving to elevate India, by safe and sure degrees, to our own height of freedom, we tried, with selfish blindness, to get and keep her down beneath the iron heel of despotism, using the energy our own dear-bought freedom sustains in us, not to loosen, but to rivet the chains of a feebler race, for whose welfare we have made ourselves responsible before God and man.

Nothing can be more incompatible with the dignity of our position, than the "vulgar bahaudering" which disgusted Sir Charles Napier in 1850. It appeared then as if Mr. Thackeray's lash were needed to keep within bounds the vagaries of the Anglo-Indian variety of the *genus* "Snob." Now the evil seems to have passed dealing with by such means; it is the provost-marshal or the police-magistrate, not the accomplished satirist, who can alone cope with men whose insolent cruelty needs corporeal rather than mental discipline.

The Duke of Wellington always listened with impatience to commendations of the mere courage of officers. "Brave!" he would say, "of course they are; all Englishmen are brave; but it is the spirit of the gentleman that makes a British officer." Yet, at that very time, when Englishmen and Englishwomen had passed all former traditions of valour and steadfastness in extremest peril, when once again India had proved, in Canning's words, "fertile in heroes"—a class, it would appear not inconsiderable in number, were acting in such a manner as to disgrace the British army, and even the British nation, in the eyes of Europe, and to render the restoration of peace in India as difficult as they possibly could.

The excessive timidity of the Hindoos (of which their reckless daring, or passive submission when hopeless, is the natural counterpart), encourages, in coarse natures, the very arrogance it disarms in higher ones. The wretched manner in which our law-courts were conducted, and the shilling necessary to procure the stamped paper on which to draw up a petition to the court,† operated, in the extreme poverty and depression of the sufferers, in deterring them from bringing any formal complaint, even to obtain justice for a ferocious assault; and so the "sahibs" (European *gentlemen*), rode through the bazaars (markets), and laid open the heads of natives with the butt of their whips, just to clear the way; or, when summoned to court for debt, laid the lash across the shoulders of the presumptuous summonser in the open street, as an expression of opinion. A young gentleman in his cups would shoot one of his servants with his revolver; an officer would kick a servant downstairs because he had entered without leaving his shoes outside the door; and then, daily at the mess-tables, "every man of the mute white-turbaned file, who, with crossed hands, glistening eyes, and quick ears, stood motionless in attendance," heard the word "nigger" used every time a native was named, and knew well that it was an expression of contempt. In India, the ears of Europeans became familiarised with the term, which soon ceased to excite surprise or disgust. In England, it was felt to be painfully significant of the state of opinion among those who used it, and could not be dissociated with the idea of slaves and slave-drivers. It seemed the very last word whereby British officers (even in

* "Look to the East, where Ganges' swarthy race
Shall shake your tyrant empire to the base;
Lo! there rebellion rears her ghastly head,
And glares the Nemesis of native dead;
Till Indus rolls a deep purpureal flood,
And claims his long arrear of Northern blood;
"So may ye perish! Pallas, when she gave
Your free-born rights, forbade ye to enslave."
The Curse of Minerva.

† The number of petitions rejected because not written on stamped paper, was said to be enormous, and had been repeatedly alluded to in parliament.

the "griffin" stage) would have chosen to denote the men they commanded, or even the people among whom they lived, and who, whatever their colour, were not the less British subjects. But what is to be said for the example given to the European soldiery* by British officers, of Christian parentage and education, one of whom "takes his syce (native groom), because he has put a wrong saddle on his horse, and fastens him on a pole placed out in the full sun of May?"—or by another, who "fastens down his syce in the sun by heel-ropes and foot-ropes, as if he were a horse, and spreads grain before him in mockery?" These instances Dr. Russell gave publicly. Privately, he offered to send the editor of the *Times* evidence of still greater significance.

It was a mockery to talk of equal laws, and yet suffer such outrages as these to pass unpunished. It is difficult to understand why the senior regimental officers did not bring the offenders to justice, unless, indeed, the courts-martial were becoming, as Sir Charles Napier prophesied, mere forms, and the most undoubted offenders certain of "honourable acquittal." Some of the old officers were said to watch the state of affairs with great dissatisfaction; and Sir Frederick Currie (the late chairman of the Court of Directors), with Colonel Sykes and some other leading men, expressed their opinions with a plainness which exposed them to the invectives of a certain portion of the Anglo-Indian press.†

"That most vindictive, unchristian, and cruel spirit which the dreadful contest and the crimes of the mutineers have evoked," was not, however, confined to the army and the press; it extended to the counting-house, and even to the pulpit. "One reverend divine has written a book, in which, forgetting that the heart of man is deceitful and desperately wicked, he takes the cheerful view that the Oriental nature is utterly diabolical and hopelessly depraved, as contradistinguished from his own nature and that of his fellows. * * * An excellent clergyman at Simla, took occasion, in his sermon, to rebuke the disposition on the part of certain of his hearers to ill-use the natives; but generally, the voice from the pulpit has been mute on this matter, or it has called aloud, 'Go forth and spare not.'"‡

The plain speaking of Dr. Russell himself, was of the first importance to the best interests of England and of India. Nothing but the strongest and most genuine love of justice, and hatred of oppression, could have given him courage to write as he did, circumstanced as he was. Among the deeds of heroism he so eloquently chronicled, none could surpass that which he himself was enacting, in pleading even then for the rights of the wretched and despised native population, while *living* in the midst of the class to whom that very wretchedness furnished food for cruel tyranny, or idle, heartless, senseless jests. On this point, as indeed, on some other leading features of the rebellion, the public journals, with the *Times* at their head, and the fragmentary but deeply interesting accounts of individual sufferers, were almost the exclusive sources of information. The government had, it is true, furnished the House of Commons with reams of Blue Books and other parliamentary papers; but not one of these contained anything approaching a connected statement of the view taken by the home or Indian authorities of the cause, origin, or progress of the mutiny, which had then lasted fully eighteen months. Each department appeared to have sent in its own papers, duly sifted, weeded, and garbled: but no person appeared to have revised them as a whole. The omissions of one set were partially supplied by the admissions of another; decided assertions made in ignorance by one functionary, were qualified in the next page by the statement of a colleague. This was the case throughout the whole series then published, beginning with the various and contradictory allegations made regarding the greased cartridges. To enter into discussion on each point would be endless; and therefore, in subsequent pages, facts, so far as they can be ascertained, will be simply stated, with the authority on which they rest; the counter-statements being left unnoticed, unless they happen to be of peculiar importance or interest.

* The European soldiery are unhappily not slow to follow the example. It is alleged that a convoy, under a party of the 97th and 20th regiments, were on their way to Lucknow. Darkness fell upon them; there were confusion and delay on the road; probably there were apathy, neglect, and laziness on the part of the garrewans, or native drivers, who are usually a most harmless, inoffensive, and honest race. Some ruffians among the soldiery took advantage of the obscurity to wreak their brutal ferocity on the drivers, and pricked them with their bayonets so severely that one man died of his wounds almost immediately, and the others were removed to the hospital in litters.—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858.

† *Ibid.*, Oct. 20th, 1858.

‡ *Ibid.*, November 8th, 1858.

CHAPTER II.

JANUARY TO MAY, 1857.

At the commencement of 1857, the Indian army, exclusive of the contingents of Native states, stood thus:—

Presidency.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal	24,366	135,767	160,133
Madras	10,726	51,244	61,970
Bombay . . .	10,430	45,213	55,069
Grand Total . . .	45,522	232,224	277,172

The royal European troops included four cavalry and twenty-two infantry regiments, containing, in all, 24,263 men. The Europeans in the service of the Company, consisted of five horse brigades of artillery, twelve battalions of foot, and nine cavalry regiments. The Native cavalry was composed of twenty-one regular, and thirty-three irregular regiments; the Native infantry, of 155 regular, and forty-five irregular regiments.*

The whole expense of the Indian army, which, including the Native contingents officered by us, mustered 315,520 men, was returned at £9,802,235, of which £5,668,100 was calculated to be the cost of the 51,316 European soldiers, leaving £4,134,135 as the sum total required for 263,204 natives.

The number of European troops was actually less in 1857 than in 1835, whereas the Native army had increased by 100,000 men. The disproportion was greatest in the Bengal presidency. In Bombay, the relative strength of European to Native infantry was as 1 to $9\frac{2}{3}$; in Madras, as 1 to $16\frac{2}{3}$; and in Bengal, as 1 to $24\frac{2}{3}$.†

The preponderance of Brahmins in the Bengal army was very great, and the government had directed the enlistment of 200 Seiks in each regiment. But this order had been only very partially obeyed. A large proportion of the Madras troops were low-caste Hindoos. In the Bombay regiments a third were Brahmins, from one to two hundred men were Mussulmans, and the remainder low-caste Hindoos, with a few Jews.

The number and strength of the Bengal army (European and Native) in January, 1857, are thus shown:—

Description of Troops.	European Officers.	European Non-Com., and Rank and File.	Native Commissd., Non-Com., and Rank and File.
Queen's Troops:—			
2 Regts. of Dragoons .	56	1,310	—
15 ditto of Infantry .	473	13,956	—
	529	15,266	—
Company's Troops:—			
Engineers and Sappers	120	88	1,289
Artillery—Horse . .	63	999	798
" Foot (Euro.)	102	1,899	1,531
" " (Nat.)	76	27	2,302
Cavalry—Regular . .	106	28	5,002
" Irregular .	91	—	14,061
Infantry—Europeans .	114	2,460	—
" Native Regr.	1,276	136	83,103
" " Irreg.	126	56	27,355
Veterans . . .	85	186	—
Medical Establishment and Warrant Officers . .	370	163	326
Total . .	3,058	21,308	135,767
Grand Total 160,133			

The distribution of the above force was as follows:—

Distribution of Bengal Army.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Presidency Division, including the garrison of Fort William .	1,221	14,639	15,860
Sonthal District . . .	41	3,366	3,407
Dinapore Division . . .	1,174	12,251	13,425
Cawnpoor ditto . . .	314	16,048	16,362
Oude Field Force . . .	1,034	3,661	4,695
Saugor District . . .	257	5,864	6,121
Meerut Division . . .	3,098	17,248	20,346
Station of Sirdarpoor . .	1	656	657
" of Rewah . . .	6	762	768
" of Kherwarrah .	6	1,034	1,040
Sirhind Division . . .	4,930	12,849	17,779
Lahore ditto	4,198	15,964	20,162
Peshawur ditto, including Sind Sagur District .	4,794	20,129	24,923
Punjab Irregular Force . .	58	9,049	9,107
Troops in Pegu . .	1,817	2,121	3,938‡

The Native regiments in India were never quartered in barracks, but in thatched huts; each of the ten companies which formed a regiment having its own line, in front of which was a small circular building called

* Parl. Papers, April 16th, 1858; pp. 4, 5.

† Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857 (No. 1), p. 9.

‡ The above statements were kindly furnished by Captain Eastwick, late deputy-chairman of the East India Company.

"the Bells," in which the arms and accoutrements were placed after having been cleaned—the key being usually held by the havildar (sergeant) on duty. The officers resided in bungalows (also thatched, and very inflammable), each situated in its own compound; and the powder-magazines and depôts of stores were exposed without protection in the open plain. Each cantonment resembled an extensive camp; and the principal stations (such as Meerut and Cawnpoor) covered so large an area, that they required almost as strong a force to defend them as to occupy them; and a long time might elapse before what was done in one part of them was known in other parts.* The idea of combination to mutiny, on any ground whatever, was evidently the last thing the European officers suspected; and the construction of the cantonments was on a par with the blind security which marked the general arrangements of the period.

In 1856, the authorities desired to place an improved description of musket in the hands of the sepoys; that is to say, to substitute the Minié rifle for the old "Brown Bess." Considering the nature of our position in India, and the peaceful character of the duties which the Native army was then fulfilling, and which alone it seemed likely to be required for, the policy of this measure may be doubted; but of the suicidal folly with which it was carried out, there can scarcely be a second opinion.

In 1853, some rifle ammunition was sent from England to India, and experiments were directed to be tried, which induced Major-general Tucker (then adjutant-general) to recommend earnestly to government, that "in the greasing composition nothing should be used which could possibly offend the caste or religious prejudices of the natives."†

This warning did not prevent the authorities, three years later, from committing the double error of greasing cartridges in the Dum Dum arsenal, eight miles from Calcutta, after the English receipt, with a compound chiefly made from tallow; and of issuing to the Native troops similarly prepared cartridges, sent out direct from England, but which ought, of course, only to have been given to the European troops. Not a single person connected with the store department cared to remember, that to order the sepoys to tear with their teeth paper smeared with tallow made of mixed animal fat (a filthy composition, whether the animal were clean or unclean, and especially to men who never touch animal food), would naturally excite the distrustful suspicions of the Native soldiery—Mohammedan, Hindoo, and even Seik; for the Seik also considers the cow a sacred animal.

Such suspicions were unquestionably excited; and though much latent disaffection might have existed, it is clear that the cartridge affair was a grievance which gave the more daring a pretext for rebellion, and a rallying-cry, to which they well knew the multitude would respond.‡

The first persons who noticed the obnoxious means used in preparing the ball cartridges, were the Native workmen employed in the arsenal. A Clashie, or Classie, attached to the rifle depôt, asked a sepoy of the 2nd grenadiers for water from his lotah (or brass drinking-vessel.) The sepoy refused, observing he was not aware of what caste the man was; whereupon the Clashie rejoined, "You will soon lose your caste, as, ere long, you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows." Lieutenant Wright, the officer to whom this circumstance was reported, understood the feelings of the Hindoos too well to neglect the warning. He entered into conversation with the men; and they told him that the rumour of their intended degradation had spread throughout India, and that when they went home on furlough, their friends would not eat with them. Lieutenant Wright, "believing it to be the case," assured them that the grease used was composed of mutton fat and wax: to which they replied, "It may be so, but our friends will not believe it; let us obtain the ingredients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow-soldiers and others that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste." Lieutenant Wright urged the adoption of the measure suggested by the men.

Major Bontein, the officer in command at Dum Dum, on receiving the above statement, assembled all the Native portion of the depôt, and asked if they had any complaint to make. At least two-thirds of the

* Indophilus' *Letters to the Times*, p. 12.

† Letter of Major-general Tucker to the *Times*, 1857.

‡ A good summary of the official proceeding regarding the cartridges, is given in a pamphlet by George Crawshay, Esq., mayor of Gateshead.

detachment, including all the Native commissioned officers, immediately stepped to the front, and very respectfully, but distinctly, repeated their previous complaint and request. Major Bontein thought the matter so serious that he took immediate steps to bring it before the commander-in-chief.

Major-general Hearsey, the head of the presidency division, in a letter dated "Barrackpoor,* January 23rd, 1857," represented to government the extreme difficulty of eradicating the notion which had taken hold on the mind of the Native soldiery; and urged, as the only remedy, that, despite the trouble and inconvenience with which the arrangement would be attended, the sepoys should be allowed to obtain from the bazaars the ingredients necessary to prepare the bullet-patches.

On the 29th, Colonel Abbott, the inspector-general of ordnance, being desired to inquire into the nature of the composition used at the arsenal, found that it was supplied by a contractor, and that "no extraordinary precautions had been taken to insure the absence of any objectionable fat." He adds—"It is certainly to be regretted that ammunition was not prepared expressly for the practice depôt without any grease at all; but the subject did not occur to me, and I merely gave orders for the requisite number of rounds."†

Of course, after this admission, no officer, with any regard for truth, could state to his men, that contaminating substances had not been used in the preparation of the cartridges. Instead of withdrawing the cause of contention at once and entirely, the government resolved that the sepoys at the depôts should be allowed to use any mixture they might think fit; but that the question of the state in which cartridges should be issued under other circumstances, and especially for service in the field, must remain open for further consideration. The concession was both tardy and insufficient. It was not communicated to the sepoys at Dum Dum and Barrackpoor until the 28th. In the meantime, several fires occurred simultaneously at Barrackpoor and Raneegunge, where a detachment from Barrackpoor were stationed. The electric telegraph bungalow at the latter place was burned; and Ensign Chamier, of the 34th regiment, snatched an arrow, with a lighted match attached thereto, from the thatch of his own bungalow, and thus saved, or at least postponed, its destruction. The arrow was one such as the Sonthals use, and suspicion fell on the men of the 2nd Grenadiers, who had recently been serving in the Sonthal districts. A thousand rupees were offered for the conviction of the offenders, but without result. On the 27th, the men had been assembled on parade, and asked if they had any grievance to complain of; upon which a Native officer of the 34th stepped forward, and asked Colonel Wheeler whether any orders had yet been received regarding the new cartridges. The answer was, of course, in the negative. To add to the difficulties of the military authorities at the depôts, the officer in command of a wing of her majesty's 53rd, stationed at Dum Dum, received directions from Fort William (Calcutta), to be ready to turn out at any moment, and to distribute to his men ten rounds of balled ammunition, as a mutiny had broken out at Barrackpoor among the sepoys. General Hearsey represented the ill-feeling which such rash precipitancy was calculated to produce. He also pointed out the influence which was probably exercised by a Brahminical association, called the Dhurma Sobha, formed at Calcutta for the advocacy of ancient Hindoo customs, against European innovations (especially the recent abolition of the laws enforcing perpetual widowhood.) This association he thought had been instrumental in tampering with the sepoys; and had circulated, if not initiated, the idea, that the new ammunition was in some way or other connected with a general design of government for the destruction of the caste of the whole Bengal army. Everything connected with the cartridges was viewed with suspicion; and it was soon noticed that, although served out ungreased, they had a greasy look; consequently, by obeying the military regulation, "to bring the cartridge to the mouth, holding it between the fore-finger and thumb, with the ball in the hand, and bite off the top elbow close to the body,"‡ they might still incur the forfeiture of caste, in consequence of some polluting

* *Barrackpoor* (or barrack-town) is situated on the Hooghly, sixteen miles from Calcutta. The governor-general had a residence here, commenced on a magnificent scale by Lord Wellesley, and only partially finished, but standing in a park of about 250 acres in extent, laid out with great taste and care. Job Charnock is said to have built a bungalow here in 1689, before the site of Calcutta was decided upon. Barrackpoor has been called the Montpelier of Bengal.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, 1857; p. 7.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

ingredient in the paper itself. The new cartridges were, in fact, made from paper sent from England—much more highly glazed than that previously used, and altogether thinner and tougher; for the bore of the new rifle being far smaller than that of the former musket, the old thick paper would not contain the amount of powder necessary to throw the bullet to its utmost range, without being inconveniently long.

The officers vainly reasoned with the men: the paper, they said, tore like waxed cloth; and, when thrown in the fire, fizzed, so that there must be grease in it; in short, General Hearsey declared (February 8th), that "their suspicions having been fairly roused on the subject of cow and pig fat, it would be quite impossible to allay them."*

The excitement continued to increase, and information was privately given to the officers, of meetings held at night in the sepoy lines, where plans of resistance to the new cartridges, amounting to open and violent mutiny, were discussed. The four regiments then at Barrackpoor were the 2nd grenadiers, the 34th Native infantry, the 43rd light infantry, and the 70th Native infantry. By information which has subsequently transpired, the incipient mutiny appears to have been at this time confined to the two former regiments. They thought to induce their comrades to make common cause with them, and then to rise against the officers, burn or plunder the bungalows, and proceed to Calcutta and seize Fort William; or, failing that, take possession of the treasury. The man who communicated this intelligence could not be induced to divulge the names of the ringleaders, nor could any proof of the truth of his assertions be obtained.

General Hearsey understood the native character well, and spoke the language with rare facility. He caused the entire brigade to be paraded on the 9th of February, and reasoned with them on the folly of supposing the British government inclined to attempt their forcible conversion. "Christians of the Book (Protestants)," he said, "admitted no proselytes, and baptized none, who did not fully understand and believe in the tenets therein inculcated." His arguments proved successful in tranquillising the troops for the moment; but the brigadier knew well that the lull was likely to be of brief duration, and he wrote to government on the 11th, urging that his previous proposal of changing the cartridge paper, might at once either be confirmed or rejected; that no further time should be lost in coming to some decision; for, he adds, "we are dwelling on a mine ready for explosion."

On the 21st of February, Lieutenant-colonel Hogge wrote from Meerut, to propose that the biting of the cartridge should be altogether abolished, and that the men should be instructed to twist off the end with the right hand—a plan which would "remove all objections from that class of Hindoos who never touch animal food." On the 2nd of March, Major Bontein wrote from Dum Dum to the same effect; but he adds, that by his suggestion he did not "in the least intend to consult the caprice of the Native soldiers," and had no other motive than increased efficiency.

Apparently this was the right way of putting the case in the sight of the authorities; for the governor-general in council, with all due form, and without any undignified haste, informed the commander-in-chief, at Simla, of the proposed alteration; suggesting, that if his excellency approved, new instructions should be given for the rifle practice, in which no allusion should be made to the biting of the cartridge, laid down in previous regulations. Pending the answer of General Anson, private instructions were sent to Dum Dum, to let the musketry practice there stop short of actually loading the rifle.

While the European authorities discussed matters among themselves, the sepoys did the same, but arrived more rapidly at more important conclusions. It is not probable that they viewed the cartridge as a solitary indication of the feeling of government towards them: the general service order of 1856; the affront put on the Mohammedans in the Punjab by General Anson in the same year, by expelling them the service for refusing to allow their beards to be cut; the total withdrawal, when the penny postage came into operation, of the privilege of having their letters franked‡ by their commanding officers; the alterations in the invaliding regulations;—these and other recent innovations were probably rankling in their minds. The regiments understood one another; a certain power of combination existed, ready to be called into action; and by reason of constant correspon-

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, 1857; p. 20.

‡ The franking by the European officers, was in itself calculated to impose some check on the transmission of treasonable correspondence.