

THE
POLITICAL
HISTORY OF INDIA,

FROM
1784 TO 1823.

BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM,
G.C.B., K.L.S., F.R.S., &c. &c. &c.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

MDCCCXXVI.

1826

POLITICAL

HISTORY OF ENGLAND

BY JOHN HALLAM

LONDON :

Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES

Northumberland court.

MALDEN STREET AND JOHN HALLAM

IN TWO VOLUMES

LONDON

JOHN HALLAM, MALDEN STREET

TO
HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

MY LORD DUKE,

NEITHER the long and sincere friendship which I entertain for your Grace, nor the pride which I take, in common with every Englishman, in your achievements, could of themselves have induced me to offer you this mark of my respect. I dedicate these volumes to you as one who thoroughly understands and appreciates the consequence of the subjects of which they treat to the interest and reputation of his country, and who, I trust, will add to his former great services by employing the force of his abilities, and the weight of his character, to promote the prosperity of an empire in which he obtained his first celebrity as a commander and a statesman.

I have the honour to be,

Your Grace's most faithfully,

JOHN MALCOLM.

London, May, 1826.

P R E F A C E.

It is fifteen years since the Author published a *Sketch of Political India*, the first five chapters of which have been incorporated into this more extended work, which gives the history of political events from 1784 until 1823, including the administration of the Marquess of Hastings. He has chosen this period to close his labours, as the epoch at which the complete supremacy of the British power over all India was avowed and acknowledged. The necessity of adequately fulfilling the great duties which this condition imposes, combined as it is with other changes, may require some alterations in the form, if not the constitution, of our government, both in India and in England. On the character and extent of such alterations the Author has

ventured to express his opinions. Additional experience, and more maturity of judgment, have led to a confirmation of some of his former sentiments upon these subjects, and to a different view of others; but his object is more to give his readers the means of forming their own judgments upon the various and extensive matter treated of in these volumes, than to press his opinions upon their adoption. With reference to this object, he has added to the account of the administration of the several governments of India since the passing of Mr. Pitt's Bill, a brief summary of the motives and principles which appear to have actuated those at their head from the time of Lord Clive, and given his own observations and opinions upon every branch of the administration of our eastern empire; but the character and limits of this work have not permitted more than opening those subjects to that fair discussion and examination to which they are entitled, not only from their own magnitude, but their import-

ance in relation to general principles of rule. Our empire in India is one of which the study cannot safely be confined to parts: a competent knowledge of the whole is indispensable to the decision of every question connected with that extraordinary possession.

The Author is much indebted to the Earl of Minto for access to valuable documents connected with the administration of his father; and to the Earl of Powis, whose kind and unreserved confidence has placed him in possession of all the papers, public and private, belonging to his lordship's father, Lord Clive. Reference to a few only of these has been necessary in the present volumes. A separate work may probably be formed from this interesting collection, which will throw equal light upon the history of our rise to political power in India, and the character of that great man, who may be called its founder.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

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THE great empire which England has established in the East will be the theme of wonder to succeeding ages. That a small island in the Atlantic should have conquered and held the vast continent of India as a subject province, is in itself a fact which can never be stated without exciting astonishment. But that astonishment will be increased when it is added, that this great conquest was made, not by the collective force of the nation, but by a company of merchants, who, originally vested with a charter of exclusive commerce, and with the privilege and right to protect their property by arms,

were in a few years, through the enterprise and ambition of their agents ; the hostile and rival spirit of the other nations of Europe ; and the weakness and perfidy of the princes of Asia, to whom they became, from their encroachments or their riches, an object of jealousy or plunder, hurried into the possession of royal power ; and actually found themselves called upon to act in the character of sovereigns over extended kingdoms before they had ceased to be the mercantile directors of petty factories.

Those who look deep into the causes of great revolutions, and find them, not in the successful issue of the complex schemes of ambitious statesmen, but in the simple operation of natural and obvious causes, will perhaps discover, that the means by which India was rendered subject to England (however inadequate they might at first glance appear) were, of all others, the best calculated to effect that great object. Force and power could not have approached the shores of India without meeting with resistance ; but to the unpretending merchant every encouragement was offered ; and when the spirit with which the early settlers defended their property from spoliation showed that they were as superior in their military as their commercial character, they became more an object of admiration than of jealousy to the principal powers of India, who in process of time courted their alliance and aid against each other.

A refusal of such aid was, perhaps, in many cases, impossible, or dangerous to their immediate security, while by granting it, additional immunities and privileges, calculated to benefit and increase the trade of the company, were often obtained; and thus the desire of promoting the security and improving the prosperity of their commercial establishments, first led them to political connexions. From that moment the substance, though not the form, of their government was altered; and they were involved, beyond the power of retreating, in all the complicated relations of a political state. This important change was reluctantly admitted by the managers of the Company's concerns in England, as the profits derived from the early commerce with India made the proprietors of that capital by which it was carried on view with anxiety and alarm a revolution which seemed to increase their risk, without a prospect of adequate advantage. They, consequently, denounced at every step that progress which their agents made to territorial power in India; and, with a view of checking this spirit of aggrandizement, they at last called for the aid of the legislature, which readily seconded their efforts, and gave the authority of law to their orders. But had those proprietors, or the English ministry, been more fully informed, or had they drawn their conclusions from plain practical reasoning, combined with a correct view of human nature (as it existed in the country for which they legislated), rather

than from abstract principles of general policy, they might, perhaps, have been more moderate, and less dogmatical in their efforts to correct the system, and have discovered, that though they might regulate, it was a vain attempt to endeavour to stop altogether, the career of a state, which was rising rapidly into greatness under the influence of causes that were irresistible in their force, and which it was not possible to control. The truth is, that from the day on which the Company's troops marched one mile from their factories, the increase of their territories and their armies became a principle of self-preservation ; and at the end of every one of those numerous contests in which they were involved by the jealousy, avarice, or ambition, of their neighbours, or by the rapacity and ambition of their own servants, they were forced to adopt measures for improving their strength, which soon appeared to be the only mode by which they could avert the recurrence of similar danger.

Such, in a few words, is the history of the progress of the East India Company to power in India ; but in the separation of that body of merchants from the nation of Great Britain, we may discover many other causes, which, while they gave a peculiar character to their system of government, tended greatly to promote that general success which has raised this Company to such an eminence of political power.

The servants of the Company had a vast field

open for the exercise of their talents in India ; and, in the early part of their history, the advancement of individuals to wealth and authority depended, in a great degree, upon the advancement of the government which they served. Under such circumstances, and acting in a scene too distant to admit of much check or control, it was natural that they should apply all the knowledge and ability which they possessed toward the latter object, with that ardour which such a combination of personal interest and patriotic pride was likely to produce ; and there cannot be a doubt that the comparative smallness of their numbers contributed more than any other cause, or, perhaps, than all others put together, to their success. For that circumstance, while it lulled the jealousy of the different states in their vicinity, forced them to the adoption of the only means by which such a revolution could have been effected. It made them bend their superior and commanding knowledge to the conciliation and management of the natives of India, whom, when forced into hostilities, they literally employed to conquer each other ; and this purpose was greatly facilitated by the actual condition of that vast continent.

The East India Company began to rise into political power and consequence, as a state, about the period of the downfall of the imperial house of Timour ; when the different princes of India were contending for the fragments of the broken empire,

every province of which was distracted by their petty wars, or groaning under their temporary oppression. It cannot be a matter of surprise that, at such a period, the inhabitants of that country rejoiced at the introduction of a government which gave toleration to their religion, security to their property, and which, from its character, promised to them and their descendants a tranquillity more durable than what they had ever enjoyed.

To men tired out as they were with wars and contentions, and who, from the repeated conquests to which they had been subjected, were lost to all feeling of national pride, the very permanency of usurpation was a blessing; and it was natural for them to forget their prejudices against their European masters in a contemplation of that superior regard to justice, good faith, and civilization, by which they saw their rule accompanied.

The princes and chiefs of India, who have been the great, and, indeed, the only sufferers by the rise of the East India Company, became aware, too late, of the error which they had committed in allowing it to attain a strength which they could not shake; and had the mortification to find that their efforts for its destruction tended but to confirm and enlarge its power; which they not only saw improve by success, but rise still higher from misfortune. This latter circumstance made a deeper impression, as it was effected through the means of resources drawn from a distant land, which were unseen, and, there-

fore, conceived by the nations of India to be inexhaustible. "I am not alarmed at what I see of the force and resources of the Company, but at what is unseen*," was the emphatic speech of one of their most able, powerful, and inveterate enemies; and it faithfully represents the impression which was made upon ignorant nations of the power of a state which they observed to draw support at pleasure from a country with whose means they were unacquainted, and whose power they had only been able to judge of by its effects; and these have been of a nature calculated to make them form the most exaggerated opinion of its magnitude.

These general reflections upon the causes of our rise to power in India have been suggested by a sense of their importance. It is only by continually reverting to the past that we can hope for success in the future. For if, in the pride of power, we ever forget the means by which it has been attained; and, casting away all our harvest of experience, are betrayed by a rash confidence in what we may deem our intrinsic strength to neglect those collateral means by which the great fabric of our power in India has hitherto been supported, we shall with our own hands precipitate the downfall of our authority. But that event is still more likely to be accelerated by the opposite error, which should lead us

* This observation of Hyder Ally Khan was repeated to me by Purneah, the present Deman of Mysore.

to disown our greatness, and, under an affected and unwise humility (ill suited to our condition), to pursue a policy calculated to discourage friends and give confidence to enemies, and, in its consequences, to involve us in those very wars and conquests which it pretends to disclaim.

Between these extremes there is a mean which we must follow if we desire that our empire in India should be durable ; and that mean must combine the unshaken firmness and dignified spirit of an absolute but tempered rule, with the most unceasing attention to the religious prejudices and civil rights of our Indian subjects. Their condition it must be our continual study to improve, in the conviction that our government, on the great scale upon which it is now established, cannot be permanent but by their means ; and that it is not in nature that they should contribute their efforts to its support unless they are, by a constantly recurring sense of benefit, made to feel a lively and warm interest in its prosperity and duration.

The British legislature has hitherto but slowly followed the progress of the power of the Company in India. It had legislated for factories on a foreign shore, when that Company was in the possession of provinces ; and when the laws were completed to govern those, it had obtained kingdoms. That the present system of government is inadequate, and the laws, under which it exists, defective, and not calculated for the greatness of the empire, every one

acquainted with the subject must acknowledge ; and the time probably approaches when some great change must take place. But, at all events, our interests in India have become, at this moment, an object of the most serious consideration ; and whether the present constitution of government be confirmed or changed, it is of importance to examine all those facts which can enable us to judge of its merits and defects. Such alone can qualify those on whom that duty must devolve to form plans for its future security and improvement.

The most prominent error in all the laws and regulations which have been passed in England relative to the political government of India is, that dogmatical principle on which they proceed, in the endeavour to fix that which is constantly changing. This principle is, perhaps, too natural to those by whom these laws and regulations must be framed ever to be wholly eradicated. It arises out of a warm interest in what immediately affects the mother country, and a feeling which approaches to indifference toward our distant possessions. But empire is a substance which has hitherto defied, and always will defy the power of man to fix in any desired shape. It is mutable, from causes beyond the control of human wisdom. This character, which our empire in the east has in common with all others in the world, has hitherto disappointed, and must always continue to disappoint those expectations which are formed of limiting the precise extent of the dominions, or of

fixing the exact power of the British government in Asia.

That this consideration renders our connexion with India as awful as it is important, no person can deny. Human wisdom cannot foresee the consequences which the possession of such an extended empire may produce ; but we must not allow our plans of amendment to be arrested, because we are threatened with distant and uncertain evils. We should rather appreciate justly the advantages which Great Britain has already derived from her Indian possessions, and the benefits which may be anticipated from their preservation and improvement, while we reflect most seriously on the dangers which would result from those possessions being lost, or passing into the hands of an European rival.

Reflections of this nature ought to dispose the legislative wisdom of our country to adopt measures for placing the administration of British India upon the basis which it judges best calculated to preserve that country to Great Britain ; and, in the accomplishment of this purpose, while it respects just and established rights, and rejects every crude and hasty plan of rash innovation, it will no doubt proceed, on the most enlarged and enlightened principles, to fix the government of our empire in India on a foundation commensurate with its present magnitude ; and which shall reconcile, as far as the two objects can be reconciled, the most vigorous and efficient system of local government for India with

an observation of those important principles of check and control which form the soul and essence of the government of England.

It has been observed by one of our greatest statesmen*, that any plan which could be suggested for the government of a country so situated as the British empire in the East must be inadequate; that in such a case no theoretical perfection could be imagined, much less executed; and that the option of a form of government was only a choice of inconveniences. But a conviction of the truth of this general observation should rouse, instead of discourage the minds of those to whom this great and difficult work is assigned; and while it reconciles them to the necessity of changes in a system which was declaredly † deemed by those even by whom it was established as an experiment, it ought to elevate them to efforts proportionate to the performance of the most arduous task which has perhaps ever been attempted by human wisdom.

It is the object of this work to afford information to those upon whom this important labour must devolve, and to elucidate (as well as the author can) the political principles upon which the government of British India has been conducted since the introduction of Mr. Pitt's bill in 1784. But it will be

* Mr. Pitt.

† Vide 'Plans for British India.'

necessary to preface this account with a general and concise view of the proceedings of the Company, from the first date of their union as a corporation to that on which the more detailed history of their progress commences.

Though the merchants of Great Britain, after the discovery of the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope (A.D. 1497), made early efforts to share with the Portuguese in the rich trade which was carried on by the newly-discovered channel between Europe and that quarter of the globe, more than a century elapsed before they were in any degree successful. Individual capital, after several attempts, was found too limited for a trade which, however lucrative, was attended with great risk, and required force to protect it.

It is to these causes that we must trace the original association of that body of wealthy merchants who petitioned Queen Elizabeth to grant them encouragement, and exclusive privileges, for the purpose of carrying on the trade with India. That princess, alive to every project which promised to increase the wealth and greatness of her country, sent an embassy to the Emperor of Dehli (Akbar), to solicit him to extend his favour and protection to her subjects trading with his dominions. Elizabeth, however, when she adopted this measure, did not wait for its result, which was not very successful, but granted a charter on the 31st of

December, 1600, which erected the merchants* who had petitioned her into a body or corporation, under the title of "*Governors and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies.*" By this charter they were vested with the power of purchasing lands without any limitation; and their commerce was to be directed by a governor and twenty-four persons in committees. Their first governor, Sir Thomas Knight, was named in the act. The Company, their sons when of age, their apprentices, servants and factors in India, were vested, for a period of fifteen years, with the privilege, to use the words of the charter, of an exclusive trade "into the countries and parts of Asia and Africa, and into and from all the islands, ports, towns, and places of Asia, Africa and America, or any of them, beyond the Cape of Bona Esperanza, or the Straits of Magellan, where any traffic may be used, and to and from every of them."

The general assemblies of the Company were vested with the power of making any laws and regulations for the conduct of their concerns which should not be at variance with the laws of the realm; and their exports were made free of custom for a term of four years. They were empowered to fit out and send six good ships and six pinnaces annu-

* The petition was signed by the Earl of Cumberland, and two hundred and fifteen persons. The earl's name is specified in the grant.

ally to India ; and to export, under some restrictions, thirty thousand pounds in foreign coin or bullion.

This charter concludes with a proviso by which, in the event of its operation not being profitable to the state, the crown had the right, upon giving two years' warning, to resume the grant, which in the same clause it pledged itself to prolong for fifteen years beyond the first period, in the event of its proving advantageous to the country.

Such was the first charter under which the merchants of England commenced their commerce with India. Their original capital was seventy-two thousand pounds, divided into shares, each of which was fifty pounds.

The first fleets which the Company sent to India were successful, but particularly the third, which was commanded by Captain Keeling, who returned to England in 1610, after a prosperous though long voyage, with his ships richly laden, and without the loss of a man.

Notwithstanding these successes, the trade to India was inconsiderable and uncertain. Its prosperity depended upon the good-will and honesty of the natives of the countries to which the Company traded, and the address of the local agents by whom their concerns in India were managed.

Destitute of settlements or forts, they had neither accommodation nor security for their servants or property ; and were consequently subject to

every insult or injury which the jealousy or hatred of European rivals could stimulate the inhabitants of the ports which they frequented to offer; and they had early to encounter the full force of that active and implacable hostility which characterizes disputes involving questions of commercial interest; but the checks which those disputes gave to their success appear only to have excited their spirit of enterprise.

In the year 1609 they obtained a second charter, by which this right of exclusive trade was made perpetual; with a proviso, however, like the former, by which the crown was declared to have the power of resuming the grant (giving three years' warning), "if it was not found to promote the interests of the realm."

Though the Company had received the permission of the Emperor of Dehli to form considerable settlements, and establish factories upon the shores of his empire, they had been hitherto prevented from taking advantage of this indulgence by the intrigues of the Portuguese, and they were ultimately obliged to have recourse to force to obtain justice from that nation, which claimed, on the ground of prior possession, an exclusive right to the commerce of the Indian seas.

The vessels of the Company were armed to oppose this arrogant pretension; and in the year 1612, a fleet of them, under Captain Best, defeated the Portuguese in two actions. These victories

not only raised the reputation of the English, but enabled them to establish a factory at Surat, under circumstances every way propitious to their success. Anxious to confirm the advantages which they had obtained, the Company solicited the King of England to send an embassy to the court of the Emperor Jehaugier, to settle their commerce upon a more secure and liberal basis. King James complied with their request; and Sir Thomas Roe proceeded in the year 1614 to the imperial court, which was then residing at Ajmere.

He was received with every honour by Jehaugier, who seemed disposed to accede to all his requests; but the caution of his son and ministers, and the intrigues of the Portuguese missionaries, prevented that success which had been expected.

A confirmation of former grants, and an extended privilege of having resident agents at some of the principal towns in the empire, were, however, obtained. Having finished this arrangement, the ambassador returned to Surat, where he passed some time in settling the new factories at that place and Baroach, and then sailed for Persia, where he was equally, if not more, successful with Shah Abbas, the reigning sovereign of that nation, from whose friendship he obtained every privilege which could promote the commerce of the Company with the Persian Gulf.

The effort which the Portuguese had made to check the progress of the English on the continent

of India, was feeble, and perhaps accelerated their success by stimulating them to active and decided measures; but it in some degree deranged their finances, as it forced them to the expense of military equipments. Their pecuniary embarrassments were greatly increased by the unfortunate result of an endeavour, made at this period, to share in the lucrative trade carried on by the Dutch with the Spice Islands. Though they at first succeeded in conciliating some of the Malay Princes, and obtaining the cession of several valuable settlements, their factories were ultimately destroyed. This was effected by a course of policy which, though it attained its immediate object, has excited lasting feelings of resentment in the British nation, and left an indelible stain upon the fame of the country by which it was pursued.

The massacre of Amboyna (for such the tragical issue which closed this scene of contention must ever be termed) had the effect which the cold calculating foresight of its perpetrators had anticipated; and from 1622, when it happened, the English may be said to have abandoned to their rivals the commerce of the Eastern Islands.

This catastrophe, some radical defects in the constitution of the Company in England, the smallness of their capital, their increased expenditure, their want of forts, and consequent reliance on the precarious protection of the native governments, brought the affairs of the Company into great dis-

tress. Their commerce, which had from the first depended upon lucky adventures, began rapidly to decline ; and their history, for a long period, offers nothing but a detail of misfortunes in trade, connected, however, with a series of spirited actions, particularly at sea, where the English invariably asserted their character, and revenged themselves upon the Dutch and Portuguese for the injuries which they suffered on shore.

It was during this moment of distress that accident led to the formation of that settlement in Bengal which has since proved the source of all their prosperity. The Company were indebted to the professional skill of a physician for this origin of their power and greatness.

This gentleman, whose name was Boughton, had proceeded from Surat to Agra, and had the good fortune to cure the daughter of the Emperor Shah Jehaun of a severe illness ; for which, among other rewards, he received the privilege of carrying on a free trade. He went to Bengal, and there his abilities obtained him equal favour from the Nabob of that country, who extended the privilege, which had been given to him personally by the emperor, to all his nation, and, in the year 1636, the Company's servants at Surat built a factory at Hoogley, about one hundred miles from the mouth of the branch of the Ganges which takes its name from that town.

But this event, though it opened a new and rich

channel of commerce, was not sufficient to prevent the decline of the Company's affairs ; and the very existence of that body, as a corporation, would appear to have been nearly annihilated during the civil wars in England.

The trade to India was indeed thrown open from 1652 to 1657, in which year Cromwell renewed the privileges of the Company. Nothing can be more opposite than the accounts given by different authors of the result of this short suspension of the Company's monopoly. One, who wrote in 1681, asserts, that the nation had nearly lost, during this period, all its privileges in India ; that the value of English commodities was lessened ; and that those of India were advanced ; while another, whose work appears in 1680, declares that, when the East India trade was laid open, the English merchants afforded the Indian commodities so cheap as to supply most parts of Europe, and even Amsterdam * itself.

The death of Cromwell disappointed those ex-

* This last fact would appear to be confirmed by a passage in the letters of Thurloe, the secretary to Cromwell, which states, that the merchants of Amsterdam " having heard that the Lord Protector would dissolve the East India Company at London, and declare the navigation and commerce to the Indies to be free and open, were greatly alarmed ; as they considered such a measure would be ruinous to their own East India Company.

pectations which the Company had latterly cherished, in consequence of the support of his government: but these were more than fulfilled by a new charter, which they obtained from Charles the Second, dated April, 1661.

In this all the rights and privileges which had been granted by Queen Elizabeth and King James were not only confirmed, but new ones of great importance were added. The Company were vested with a right of exercising civil jurisdiction, and military authority; and with the power of making war, or concluding peace with the “infidels of India;” the state reserving to itself, by this distinction, those prerogatives with respect to European governments. The clause in the former charters, which gave the power of annulling them if their operation proved in any way detrimental to the general interests of the nation, was, however, inserted.

Charles the Second, having married the Infanta of Portugal in 1662, obtained the island of Bombay, in 1663, as a part of the portion of that princess; but finding the expense of supporting that possession greater than its revenue, he ceded it to the Company, in the twentieth year of his reign. Five years afterward he granted to them the island of St. Helena; and, in the same spirit which dictated these important cessions, the whole aid of his government was applied to promote their interests and prosperity.

This encouragement and protection, combined with the active exertions of the Company, raised them to a state of affluence ; which, though it excited attack, gave them great means of resisting it. The charter granted in 1661 was confirmed by Charles the Second in the twenty-eighth year of his reign, and their privileges were extended by an act passed in the thirty-fifth. But they were still more indebted to James the Second, whose influence had been their chief support during his brother's life, and who, when he ascended the throne, granted them increased immunities, and a still larger portion of royal power. He authorized them to build fortresses, to levy troops, to determine causes by courts-martial, and to coin money. By these privileges he conferred upon them a degree of power which they disgraced by numerous acts of corruption, violence, and oppression.

It has been well observed by an able anonymous author, who has written a history of the early period of the East India Company, that " unlimited power in the hands of a single person may be prevented from degenerating into acts of tyranny by the terrors of ignominy, or by personal fears. But a body of men vested with authority, is seldom swayed by restraint of either kind : as they derive, individually, but little applause from their best measures, so the portion of infamy which may fall from each for the worst public actions is too small to affect personal character. Having, there-

fore, no generous inducement to follow virtue, the most sordid passions frequently lead them into vice. It is from this circumstance that the decisions of public bodies* sometimes partake of that mortifying species of tyranny which is incapable of redress, and yet is beyond revenge. These observations may be applied, without the least injustice, to the actions of the Indian Company both at home and abroad. Avarice, the most obstinate and hardened passion of the human mind, being the first principle of commerce, was the original bond of their union; and humanity, justice, and even policy, gave way to the prospect or love of gain."

"Besides that want of generous principle," the same author adds in a note upon the above paragraph, "which seems excluded from the very constitution of a sovereign corporation of commerce, the great distance of their administration in India secured the Company from a general inspection into their conduct, and, consequently, furnished ample opportunities for a wanton and uncontrolled exercise of power. All resistance, therefore, to their arbitrary edicts, whether they regarded their own servants or the natives of the country, was considered as treason, and punished with severity. The

* Those republics whose conduct would appear an exception to this rule have acted under the influence of motives which could not exist in the minds of men who had no national feeling for the country they ruled, and only viewed their possessions and power as sources of commercial advantage.

rulers at home had their favourites abroad, whom they protected in the most cruel and oppressive measures by their authority. Hence it happened that private resentments and selfish views were too frequently the only rules of their conduct; and that their administration had scarce any other principle of union than a mutual permission to commit injustice. Even the exclusive privilege which was thought necessary for the prosperity of their commerce, became an engine of tyranny against all those whom they considered as interlopers; and such instances of their barbarity might be produced, supported by facts, as would excite horror."

This author, who, though neither moderate nor impartial, is able, and argumentative, supports this general reasoning by some strong facts. Of these, such only will be adduced as appear to rest on credible authority. The Company had for a period thrown a veil of secrecy over their affairs, under which those who managed them had, no doubt, practised many frauds. Though they had doubled their capital in the year 1682, they had not taken in more than one-half of the sum at first subscribed; and at the moment they were endeavouring to support an appearance of health in a declining body, by making extravagant dividends to the proprietors of stock, they had incurred a debt of two millions; and, instead of answering the legal demands against them, had affixed a paper to the treasury door, declaring they would pay no more till a certain date;

though they pretended, at the same time, that their affairs were in the most flourishing condition*.

These deceptions at home were supported by iniquities abroad, where the Company's factors, in obedience to the instructions of their employers, first borrowed large sums, and then quarrelled with their creditors†. Sir John Child, one of the most notorious of their governors, is represented to have gone still further, and to have seized thirteen large ships at Surat, the property of the merchants of that place, and to have retired with his shameful spoil to Bombay‡.

Though the Company had obtained a new charter in 1694, several flagrant abuses in the conduct of their affairs were detected by Parliament in 1695. Their home expenses, it was found, had rapidly increased from the sum of 1200*l.* per annum to that of 90,000*l.*; and their governor, Sir Thomas Cooke, on whose notes this money had been lent, was terrified by a Bill of Pains and Penalties into a confession, that ten thousand pounds of this cash had gone to the king himself, and other sums to his ministers and principal servants§. The Duke of Leeds, who

* White's 'Account of Indian Trade.'

† Hamilton, Vol. I. page 187. Harris, Vol. II.

‡ As afterwards appeared on oath, in the Court of Exchequer. The value of 300,000*l.* of this spoil was sent home to the Committee of the Court of Directors, who gave the orders,—White's 'Account of Indian Trade.'

§ Journals, April, 1695.

was the most obnoxious offender, was impeached for receiving five thousand pounds; but King William put a sudden end to the session; and by that act not only quashed the impeachment, but checked all further inquiry.

The principal, and indeed natural enemies of the Company, against whom all their violence both at home and abroad was directed, were those English merchants who wished to interfere with their monopoly, and who were termed, in the language of the day, interlopers. Their endeavours to check and destroy these led, no doubt, to many acts of oppression, which have been exaggerated, by the writers of the suffering party, into deeds of the most barbarous tyranny. The interlopers, however, in spite of that violence of which they complained, continued to gain strength; and, in 1698, they were able to bring under the cognizance of Parliament the charter granted to the Company in 1694; and having outbid that corporation, by offering an advance of two millions* sterling, at eight per cent., in consideration of an exclusive right of commerce with the East being vested in the subscribers, a bill was passed in their favour. But their triumph did not last long, for the old Company obtained a confirmation of their charter in the ensuing season. On the adoption of this measure, the nation had two East India Companies by parliamentary authority, instead of

* The old Company offered 700,000*l.*, at $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

one by prerogative*. Nothing could be more violent than the contests of these companies during the short period that they continued separate. The great efforts of both were directed to the object of gaining power in the house of commons; and, in the general elections of 1700, each was detected in bribery and corruption. The old Company corrupted members, the others purchased seats. Thus the one bribed the representatives, the other the constituents. But, tired out at length with a struggle which threatened ruin to both, they united their stock under the charter which had been granted to the old Company, bearing date the 5th of September, 1698; and assumed that name under which they have ever since been incorporated, *The United East India Company*.

During such contentions at home, the state of the Company's affairs abroad may be imagined. The spirit of the principles upon which these were regulated will be collected from an extract of a letter from their governor at home to an officer who had been appointed judge for civil affairs in India. "I expect," says this commercial despot, "my will and orders shall be your rule, and not the laws of England, which are a heap of nonsense, compiled by a number of country gentlemen who hardly know how to govern their own families, much less the regulating companies, and foreign commerce.

* Ralph, Vol. II. page 845.

Having now the power of condemning the Company's enemies, or such as shall be deemed so, particularly those that shall question the Company's power over all the British subjects in India, I expect my orders from time to time shall be obeyed, and received as statute laws."

The union of the two Companies in England had not an immediate effect in reconciling their servants either at home or abroad; and it was some period before their rooted animosities gave way to a feeling of common interest. It did, at last; and in the year 1708 the united corporation obtained a bill most favourable to their commerce and privileges, which was granted on condition of their lending to government the sum of 120,000*l.*, over and above the two millions which had been lent when the new Company was first established.

That tranquillity, and consequent commercial prosperity, which the peace of Utrecht brought to Europe, was felt by the British settlements in the East; and these were about this period (1713) under the rule of men of prudence and ability. But success created enemies. A very general clamour was raised against their monopoly, which was stated to be adverse to the general commercial interests of the kingdom; and they were obliged to agree to an arrangement, which was considered advantageous to the state, in order to maintain their right of exclusive trade to India. It is, however, but fair to state, that while we find in the first century of the

history of the East India Company abundant proofs of their misconduct, we also discover a spirit of bold enterprise and determined perseverance, which no losses could impede and no dangers subdue. To this spirit, which was created and nourished by their exclusive privileges, they owed their ultimate success. It caused them, under all reverses, to look forward with ardent hope to future gains; and if it occasionally led them to stain their fame by acts of violence and injustice towards the assailants of their monopoly, it stimulated them to efforts, both in commerce and in war, that were honourable to the character of the British nation.

The French, who had failed for nearly eighty years in all their attempts to erect and support an East India Company, had succeeded in accomplishing this object about the year 1720; and the regular returns made by this Company, from the period of their establishment in India, had been so considerable, that the jealousy of the British Company was raised, and the government entering, with some degree of warmth, into that jealousy, turned their attention toward the East, when war was likely to arise between the two nations. The French, anxious to promote a commerce still in its infancy, had proposed a neutrality between the two Companies as early as the year 1742, which the court of directors at first accepted, and then rejected. When, therefore, war commenced in Europe, in 1744, the flame soon spread to Asia. Their re-

spective sovereigns assisted each Company. The pursuits of commerce yielded to the occupation of arms; and the strange spectacle was presented, of two European nations combating with each other on the shores of India, aided by different native princes of the country. These chiefs, impelled by a short-sighted policy, thus sacrificed their permanent independence for the attainment of momentary objects of hatred and ambition. For it was early in this contest very obvious that, whether the troops of England or France prevailed, the native allies must become dependent on the conqueror.

What has been said of the history of the Company shows, in a very strong light, not only the origin but the character of their early power; and proves the urgent necessity which existed, from the earliest period of their association, for the strict and constant interference of the legislature of the country to check excesses by which the national character of England was so exposed to injury. The Company, or rather the individuals of the direction by whom the corporation was governed, were little alive to those feelings which urge the mind to good and great actions. They, in fact, recognised no motive but a desire to enrich themselves, their relations, and dependents. Their strength as a community, which was the natural consequence of this system, increased with their means of corruption and oppression: but such was the venality of the times, that it appears that hardly

any, however high their station, escaped the contamination.

The occurrence of war, in 1744, between England and France, was the commencement of a new era to British India. The same system of government remained; but the scene was changed. It had gained importance from becoming one of national contest, and from the new actors who were introduced. These were no longer unobserved factors, and agents of a trading company, whose obscurity left them without an incentive to virtue, or a dread of shame; but officers of distinction, who not only acted under the control of honourable superiors, but under the observation of their country, which now began to take a warm interest in Indian affairs.

Though it cannot be supposed that the desire of fame, thus excited, could, by its operation on the minds of a few individuals, effect a complete change in a system which was radically bad, it must be acknowledged to have had a wonderful effect. India became a scene in which character and reputation, as well as wealth, were to be acquired; and many of those who were employed in distinguished stations in that country attained the highest honours which respect and approbation can bestow, or courage and talents command. The names of Lawrence and Clive (both of whom commenced their career about this period of the history of the Company) will live as long as the annals of England, and be regarded as glorious examples, until

the qualities of valour, military skill, and elevated genius, shall cease to receive the applause and admiration of mankind.

The peace of Aix la Chapelle, which was concluded in 1748, terminated those direct hostilities which the French and English nations had carried on in India ; but the armies, which both states maintained at that period on the coast of Coromandel, continued to assist different native princes, with the object on each side of obtaining, through such policy, a strength that would make their power, at the renewal of a contest, paramount to the other.

Both the English and French had proceeded in this course for some years, with fluctuating success ; when the embarrassment to which it led induced the directors of each Company to apply to their sovereigns to interpose their power as mediators ; and the terms of accommodation were actually agreed upon, when the war of 1756 broke out between the two nations, and caused their subjects in India to enter upon a more extended field of contest than ever. This contest was marked by a series of unparalleled successes on the part of the English, who remained, at the peace of 1763, sovereigns of the rich provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, of the Northern Circars, of part of the Carnatic, and of all their old possessions on the Malabar coast.

The rapid aggrandizement of the Company naturally attracted observation in England to their

affairs ; and, in the year 1767, the house of commons appointed a committee to investigate the nature of the Company's charters, to consider their treaties and grants, and to calculate all expenses, civil, naval, and military, which had been incurred by government on their account.

Their right to any territorial acquisition was, at this period, boldly questioned, and their monopoly was a subject of very free discussion ; but they found means, as they had on former occasions, to silence opposition from those quarters where they thought it might be dangerous. Their personal and political influence in the state had increased with their fortune and patronage ; and too many had become interested in the golden harvest which, about this period, opened in the East, to make it easy to control, much less to subvert, a body so strong and so united. The result of this inquiry, therefore, was a compromise between the Company and the Ministers, by which the possessions of the former were confirmed to them for the term of two years, on condition of their paying the public 400,000*l.* per annum. A new engagement, nearly similar to the former, took place in 1769 ; but the period of its duration was extended for five years.

Before this agreement expired, the Company's affairs fell into considerable embarrassment ; and in 1773 they petitioned government for pecuniary aid, which was granted ; but the inquiry that the house of commons made upon this occasion into their

affairs, was followed by an act of the legislature, which made many important changes in their government both at home and abroad. The principal of these were :

1st. That the court of directors should in future, instead of being chosen annually, be elected for four years ; six members annually ; but none to hold their seat for longer than four years.

2d. That the qualification-stock should be 1000*l.* instead of 500*l.* : that 3000*l.* should confer two votes ; and 6000*l.* three votes.

3d. That in lieu of the mayor's court, the jurisdiction of which was limited to small mercantile causes, a supreme court of judicature, consisting of a chief judge and three puisne judges, should be appointed by the crown, with great and extended powers of cognizance over the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the subjects of England, their servants, and dependants, residing within the Company's territories in Bengal.

4th. A Governor-general and four counsellors were appointed to Fort William, and vested with full powers over the other presidencies. When any differences should occur, the opinion of the majority was to be decisive ; and this board was directed by the act to transmit regular reports of its proceedings to the directors, who were, within fourteen days of the receipt of their despatches, to furnish copies of them to one of his majesty's secretaries of state, to whom they were also to send copies of any rules

and ordinations which they should have made; and these, if disapproved by his majesty, were to become null and void.

This act appointed Warren Hastings, esquire, Governor-general of India; and John Clavering, esquire, the Honourable George Monson, Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, esquires, the four first counsellors.

It would be foreign to the intent of this work to enter into a narrative of Mr. Hastings's government. From its commencement till its termination, it was marked by events of uncommon magnitude, which ultimately gave rise to a discussion that not only diffused a more general knowledge of Indian affairs, but awakened the British nation to a more just sense of the importance of its interests in India.

Whatever may have been the opinion of contending parties and factions at this period, there are some leading facts relating to this part of the history of British India, upon which all dispassionate minds are now agreed. It is admitted, even by those who condemned part of his conduct, that Mr. Hastings, during a time of unexampled public embarrassment, and at a moment when he had to contend against those from whom he should have derived support, showed all the active energy of a great statesman; and, by his spirited and extraordinary exertions, saved the interests of his country in India from the ruin with which they were

threatened ; and in which they undoubtedly would have been involved, had a man of less resolution, fortitude, and genius, held the reins of government. This is his praise ; and no man could wish higher : but the most strenuous advocates of this distinguished person, while they defend his personal integrity, are forced to acknowledge, that the whole system of the government over which he presided was corrupt, and full of abuses. The control, or rather right of superintendence, given by the act of 1774 to his majesty's ministers, had tended more to increase than diminish the radical defects of the system. The ministers were vested with a right of interference, but had little, if any, responsibility with respect to the conduct of the Indian government. Their favour and aid were indispensable to the Governor-general ; and it became necessary that, in addition to the friends of the directors of the Company, those of the ministers of the crown should be served. Thus the exercise of patronage in India became the chief, if not the only means, through which the Governor-general could expect support in England ; and the canvassing nature of the British constitution made it unlikely that any minister would cast away such a source of strength as a share in the rich appointments of the East. Consequently, this system, corrupt and inefficient as it was, might have long continued, had not an unwearied spirit of investigation dragged the voluminous records of the Company into light, with

the view of criminating their principal agents. The first or secret committee of the house of commons, of which Mr. Dundas was president, commenced the attack; and its reports were soon followed by those of the select committee, which, acting under the direction and guidance of Mr. Burke, one of the wisest men and greatest orators that England has ever boasted, disseminated among all classes a general knowledge of the affairs of the Company.

There can be no doubt that the promoters of these inquiries, however mixed their motives might have been, became entitled to the gratitude of their country; as, unless such knowledge had been made general, every attempt to ameliorate and improve a government, where the temptations to continue a corrupt system were so strong, must have proved vain and abortive.

The extended jurisdiction given, by the act of 1773, to the supreme court of judicature established at Fort William, was found, in its operations, so hostile to the prejudices of the natives of the Company's provinces, and so likely to destroy the authority which it was meant to support, that it was limited by a subsequent act, passed in 1781, to the town and suburbs of Calcutta.

From the year 1779, when an act was passed, by which the right of the Company to territorial possessions was extended for one year only, till the year 1783, a continual conflict existed between

the directors and his majesty's ministers respecting the terms on which the Company's charter and exclusive privileges should be prolonged and supported. It is not necessary to dwell upon the various offers which were made, during this contest, by that corporation, or to particularize those which were rejected or accepted by his majesty's ministers: the great measures by which this period was followed have condemned them to oblivion; nor had they any pretensions (for they were avowedly temporary expedients) to escape the fate which they have experienced.

The most serious discussions regarding Indian affairs took place in 1783. Mr. Dundas, who had been chairman of one of the committees of inquiry, brought forward in the beginning of this year a bill, which proposed few great changes, except that of appointing a person who, under the high title of Governor-general and Captain-general, should exercise in his own person (under certain checks) complete authority and control over British India. This high public officer was to be approved, but not nominated, by the crown, by whom alone he could be removed. It was proposed by this bill, that his majesty's principal secretary of state should receive copies of all despatches; and to these provisions were added some good general rules with regard to the preservation of the laws, religion, and usages of the natives.

The principle of this bill, which was the intro-

duction, during the remainder of the charter, of a more active interference on the part of the executive government in the administration of the affairs of the Company, was generally approved. It was allowed, that a more efficient and energetic local government was required; and that a responsibility more defined, and more operative on all parties, than that established by the act of 1773 was indispensable to correct the gross abuses of the existing system; but there was a wide difference of opinion in the house of commons regarding the nature of the checks which it might be expedient to fix over the controlling powers it went to establish; and it was chiefly on this ground that its utility was combated. Though Mr. Dundas's bill for the government of India did not succeed, it gave birth to one of a nearly similar character, which was introduced and carried by Mr. Pitt in the next session. But as this great measure owed its success principally to the feelings created in the minds of the directors and proprietors by the agitation of the plan brought forward by his political rival, Mr. Fox, it will be necessary to take a short view of that previous plan.

In 1783, Mr. Fox brought forward his celebrated bills for the better regulation and government of the British possessions in India. These bills * pro-

* They were two; one meant to regulate the home, or, as the bill termed them, the *domestic* affairs of the Company; the other, their foreign government.

ceeded on a principle, stated in their preamble, that disorders of an alarming nature and magnitude had long prevailed in the administration of the territorial possessions, revenue, and commerce, of British India; that the natives were reduced to distress, and the public interests in danger of being ruined; a remedy was in consequence become necessary, and the following was proposed:—

That the whole power, now vested in the court of directors and proprietors, should be transferred, for the space of four years, to seven directors or commissioners, named in the act; to aid whom, nine assistant-directors, named also in the act, were selected from proprietors holding at least 2000*l.* stock each. These, however, were entirely placed under the orders of the former. In the event of the death, resignation, or removal (on charges substantiated before the house of commons), of one of the seven principal directors, the vacancy was to be supplied by the king; if one happened among the nine assistant-directors, the proprietors of stock (as qualified by the act of 1773) were to elect another.

The principle of these bills, in regard to the power to be given to the Governor-general, was directly opposite to that of Mr. Dundas. It was declared, that the powers of the Governor-general in council should on no occasion be delegated to such Governor alone, or to any person or persons whatever; and the Governor-general and council were restricted in all cases, as much as seemed practicable, but par-

ticularly in that of making war. The Governor-general was declared not to have the power of entering or invading with an armed force the dominion of any prince of India, except upon intelligence, the credibility of which was to be admitted, and individually recorded, by the majority of the members of his council, that such prince was about to make war on the Company or their allies. The Governor-general and council were not permitted, without orders from the commissioners, to enter into any offensive alliance for the sharing of any country between the Company and a native prince; nor were they to hire out any troops (European or native) in the territories of any Indian state.

Such were the leading provisions of these celebrated bills, which, though passed with a great majority in the house of commons, were thrown out by the lords, and terminated in the expulsion from office of the statesman by whom they were framed, and the party by whom they were supported. Mr. Fox's measure was declaredly temporary, and adopted as an expedient for the moment. The seven commissioners, whom he proposed, were to act like trustees to a bankrupt house of commerce, and were to manage the affairs of the East India Company until it was determined what was best and wisest for the future regulation of their concerns. What would have been the ultimate arrangement for the government of India, had this plan been carried into execution, cannot be known; but it is not pro-

bable that the Company would ever have regained their power. It is not, however, intended to enter in this place into any discussion regarding the merits or defects of Mr. Fox's bills. The wisdom and foresight which they displayed in some parts were certainly clouded by strong party-spirit and prejudice; and, from the want of correct and complete information, many of his leading principles were every way inapplicable to the actual state of the country for which they were framed by that great statesman.

His scheme, though an improvement upon the former administration of India, would probably have been found erroneous in some of its most fundamental principles; but particularly in that by which, instead of giving confidence to the ruling authority of India under great and direct responsibility, it multiplied checks upon the local government; and thus, by the diminution of its power, lowered and weakened its means of action; and rendered it more incompetent than it had been before to those great, and indeed sovereign, functions which it has to perform. The clamour against Mr. Fox's bill was excessive. His scheme of seven commissioners was represented as a mean devised to perpetuate his own power. His measures went, it was said, to establish an influence in the hands of ministers unknown to the constitution of the country; and the East India Company, who had been before hated and abused on account of their monopoly and im-

puted crimes, became the object of pity and commiseration; and were represented by the writers of the day as an injured and unprotected body, likely to have their privileges violated, and their rights invaded, by a rash and ambitious minister.

From this violence of opposition, the right of regulating the Company's affairs became a political conflict between two great and nearly equally balanced parties; and the scale was turned by a coalition between Mr. Pitt and the court of directors, or rather the great majority of the proprietors of India stock; who, though originally adverse to any interference in their concerns, when they found that they could not avert it, naturally chose the side which was least unfavourable to what they considered as their established rights and privileges.

CHAPTER II.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD CORNWALLIS.

Mr. Pitt's Bill for the better Administration of India.—Observations upon that Bill.—Lord Cornwallis appointed Governor-General.—Account of the Engagements entered into with the Nizam.—Treaty concluded with that Prince.—Treaty with the Mahratta State.—Causes of the War with Tippoo.—Consequences of that War.—Considerations upon the Policy of Lord Cornwallis in commencing War, and concluding Peace.—Connexion between the Nizam and the British Government becomes more intimate.—Consequent Jealousy of the Court of Poonah.—Great Increase of Sindia's Power.—View of the Affairs of the Carnatic—of Oude.—Lord Cornwallis returns to Europe.—Reflections upon the State of India at that Time.

It will be useful, in this place, not only to take a view of Mr. Pitt's bill of 1784, but of the explanatory act of 1786, and of such acts as have been subsequently passed; as they collectively form the basis of the present constitution of our Indian government.

Mr. Pitt's bill of 1784 appointed six privy counsellors to be commissioners for the affairs of India; with one of the secretaries of state for the time being

for president. These commissioners, who were appointed by his majesty, and removable at his pleasure, were vested with a control and superintendence over all civil, military, and revenue affairs of the Company.

The commissioners were obliged to return the copies of papers which they should receive from the court of directors, with their approbation; or to state at large their reasons for disapproving of them; and their despatches, so approved or amended, were to be sent to India, unless the commissioners should attend to any representations of the court of directors respecting further alterations in them*.

In all cases of secrecy, and particularly such as related to war or peace with the native powers of India, the commissioners could send their orders to the local government of India through a secret committee of the court of directors; which committee could, in this case only, be considered as the vehicle of such instructions.

The chief government in India was by this act to consist of a Governor-general and three counsellors; and the commander-in-chief of the forces for the time being had a voice and precedence next after the Governor-general; but was not to succeed, in the

* If the commissioners forwarded any orders to the court of directors on points not relating to the civil or military government, or to the revenues of the territorial possessions of the Company, the directors might appeal to the King and council.

event of a vacancy, unless by special appointment of the directors.

The constitution of the government of the subordinate presidencies of Madras and Bombay was made the same as Bengal; and at both, the governor had, like the Governor-general, a casting vote in council.

These settlements were by this act placed completely under the rule of the Governor-general in council, on all points connected with negotiations with the country powers, peace or war, and the application of their revenues and forces.

The king had a right, by this act, to recall the Governor-general, or any officer of the Company, from India; and if the court of directors did not, within two months, nominate some person to a vacancy which had occurred in any of the principal stations to which it was their duty to appoint, the crown became possessed of the right to make such nomination.

It was declared by this act that, as the pursuit of schemes of conquest was repugnant to the wish, to the honour and the policy of the British nation, it was not lawful for the Governor-general in council of Fort William, without the express authority and concord of the court of directors, or of the secret committee, either to declare or commence hostilities, or to enter into any treaty for making war against any of the native princes or states in India, or any treaty guaranteeing the dominions of such princes or

states, except when hostilities should have been commenced, or preparations actually made for the attack of the British nation in India, or of some of the states and princes whose dominions it shall be engaged by subsisting treaties to defend.

The subordinate presidencies were prohibited by this act from making war or peace without orders from Fort William, the court of directors, or the secret committee; except in cases of sudden emergency or imminent danger, when it would be ruinous or unsafe to postpone such hostilities or treaty. The supreme government had the power given them of suspending any of the governors of the subordinate settlements who should disobey their orders.

A new and extraordinary court was constituted by this act, for the trial of Indian delinquents. It was formed of a specified number of members of the house of lords and house of commons; and had great powers given to it, for the purpose of bringing to justice persons whom (as was stated) common courts could not reach. But it is needless to dwell upon this part of the bill, as, in consequence of representations from the British subjects in India, it was completely new-modelled and changed.

An act was passed in 1786, by which several parts of the act of 1784 were explained and amended. The power of appointing a civil servant of twelve years standing, on the occurrence of a vacancy, to

councils, was given to the local governments of India.

The appointment of a commander-in-chief to councils was made an act of option, not of necessity. The directors were vested with the power of appointing the commander-in-chief in India Governor-general, &c., of making the commander-in-chief at Madras and Bombay president of those settlements; and, what was more important, the Governor-general, and the governors of Madras and Bombay, were vested by this act with a discretionary right of acting, in extraordinary cases, without the concurrence of their councils, being held solely and personally responsible for any consequences which might ensue from the measures adopted under such circumstances.

This great power was given to such Governor-general or Governors only as were specifically appointed to those stations, and did not devolve to their casual successors; and it did not extend to cases of a judicial nature, or to the alteration of any established regulations for the civil government of the British settlements in India*.

The intention of Mr. Pitt's bill for the better administration of Indian affairs was avowedly more that of temporary reform, than of final establish-

* In 1797 an act was passed, by which courts were established at Madras and Bombay, with powers nearly similar to those which had been before given to the supreme court of judicature at Bengal. These courts were made altogether inde-

ment. Its object was rather directed to a correction of abuses, and to a control of power, than to the complete removal of admitted evils, or the actual introduction of an efficient system. More could not have been expected, and perhaps was not intended. As his plan proceeded on the avowed ground of maintaining, instead of demolishing, the established constitution of the Company's government, a great part of the efficiency of the new system was sacrificed to the forms of the old; and much of that embarrassment which has attended the operation of this measure may be traced to that spirit of conciliation in which it was originally framed.

The circumstances under which this system commenced were particularly favourable to its success and popularity. The admitted abuses which it corrected, the great strength of the administration in England at the time when it was introduced, the ability and influence of the president of the board of control, and the firmness and integrity of the nobleman first invested with the high powers which the amended bill of 1786 so wisely gave to the Governor-general of India; all contributed to cover its

pendent of the Company's governments in India; but they were not competent to try informations against the governor or council, unless in cases of felony or treason. The regulations of these courts were in some respect altered, by an act passed in 1800, when a chief judge, and two puisne judges, were appointed to the court of judicature at Madras.

defects, and to bring its merits into the most prominent point of view. But subsequent events have shown, that it required all these aids to render it successful, and that the failure of any one of them would have had the most serious effect upon its operation.

The best mode of judging every system of this nature is by its practical result; and a cursory view of the principal political events which have occurred in the government of India since the introduction of Mr. Pitt's bill will be the best comment upon the merits and defects of the measure, which (as already observed, and should never be forgotten,) was deemed by its great author as an experiment; and one in which, from the difficulty of the task, human wisdom could hardly venture to anticipate success.

The first person to whom the great powers vested in the Governor-general of India by the act of parliament passed in 1786, were intrusted, was Marquis Cornwallis; and the character of that nobleman was well suited to the high charge. Firm in his purposes, possessing unwearied zeal, and unsullied honour, he proceeded toward the objects which he had in view with a vigour and decision that commanded success. The great reforms and changes which he effected in the military and civil establishments of India, and the system of internal rule which he introduced into the provinces of Bengal and Bahar, will ever reflect the highest honour on his name.

The consideration he enjoyed in England greatly promoted the success which attended him in India. His rank and character, while it placed him above the influence of the ministers of the crown, or the fear of the court of directors, commanded a respect from the civil and military servants of the Company, which, added to the increased powers with which he was vested, freed him from every shadow of opposition. He was enabled, from the same causes, to stimulate to exertion, by the distinction which his personal favour bestowed, the first talents in India; and to combine the efforts of every ambitious and honourable mind in the support of the measures of his administration.

It is not necessary to enter into any detailed history of Lord Cornwallis's government. A concise review of the prominent political events which marked his administration, and of the principles which guided his conduct under them, will sufficiently answer the object of this sketch.

The principal event which occurred was the war with Tippoo Sultaun. This had its origin in a violent aggression of that sovereign, who, on the 29th of December, 1789, stormed the lines of the Rajah of Travancore, a prince acknowledged to be under the protection of the English government by the stipulations of a treaty concluded with Tippoo in 1784.

To understand the nature and extent of the great political changes which were the consequences of

this event, it will be necessary, before the causes of the war with Tippoo Sultaun are detailed, to trace, in a succinct manner, the history of the alliances which Lord Cornwallis thought it his duty, on this important occasion, to form with the states of Hyderabad and Poonah.

By a treaty, concluded between the Nizam and the Company in 1766, the latter engaged to furnish that prince with a subsidiary force, when required, to settle the affairs of his government; with a provision, however, that they should be at liberty to withdraw either a part or the whole of such force whenever the safety of their own settlements, or the territories of the Carnatic, rendered such a measure necessary; and by a subsequent article of the same treaty, the Nizam engaged (with a similar provision) to afford the Company, when required, the aid of his troops.

Under this treaty a corps of two battalions joined the Nizam's army, but, by the treachery of that prince (who formed a connexion with Hyder), were soon obliged to return to the Company's territories.

The rupture, which this conduct on the part of the Nizam caused with the Company's government, terminated in 1768 in another treaty, by which that prince not only agreed to consider Hyder Naigue as an usurper, and to revoke all sunnuds*, or distinctions, which that chief had received from him, or any

* Patents, or Charters.

former Soubahdar of the Deckan; but to aid the Company in obtaining possession of the country of Hyder*, on the condition of their paying him seven lacks of rupees † for that country.

The cession of the Circar of Guntoor to the Company, on the death or misconduct of the Nizam's brother, was an express stipulation of this treaty; and it was also agreed, that the English should furnish the Nizam, on requisition, with a subsidiary corps of Sepoys, with guns, of two battalions, on the condition, however, of his defraying the expense of such corps while it remained in his service.

This corps had never been required by the Nizam, and the connexion between that prince and the Company was, notwithstanding this treaty, of a general and unsettled nature, till Lord Cornwallis ‡, with a view to obtain the Guntoor Circars, and to effect a settlement of the arrears of peishcush due for the Circars, deputed a British resident § to Hyderabad.

The demand of the cession of Guntoor was accompanied with military preparations, which secured a prompt compliance on the part of the Nizam. That prince, from the unfortunate issue of a recent contest with Tippoo Sultaun, appeared most anxious for the alliance of the British government, and he

* The Dewanee of the Carnatic Balaghaut.

† A peishcush.

‡ In the year 1788.

§ Sir John Kennaway.

had deputed Meer Abdool Cassim to Calcutta, for the purpose of conveying fully his sentiments and wishes on this head to the Governor-general.

The mission of Meer Abdool Cassim* was productive of a new engagement, explanatory of the treaty of 1768, conveyed in the form of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam ; but declared by the former to be equally binding upon the British nation as a regular treaty †.

* This able man was afterwards better known under his title Meer Allum. He died prime minister at Hyderabad in November, 1808.

† Lord Cornwallis informed the Nizam, that he was prevented, by the laws of his country and the injunctions of the King and Company of England, from entering into such treaty, unless just cause should be given. This public instrument, which was dated the 1st of July, 1789, after stating the motives which regulated the conduct of the English government in insisting on the cession of the Guntoor Circars, and the objections which existed to giving any farther security than the pledge of national faith for the regular payment of the peishcush (the arrears of which had been settled in a manner satisfactory to both parties), proceeds to explain the 6th article of the treaty of 1768, which, it states, shall be agreed to mean, " That the force engaged for by this article shall be granted whenever the Nizam shall apply for it ; making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any powers in alliance with the Company, *viz.*, Pundit Purdhaun, Madhajee Sindia, Madhajee Ragojee Bhonslah, and other Mahratta chiefs, the Nabob of Arcot, Nabob Vizier, or the Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore." This explanation altered one very material part of the alliance, The right which the Company had, under the treaty of 1768,

It would appear from this letter, that Meer Abdool Cassim must have been directed to use his endeavours to persuade the Governor-general to adopt measures for the fulfilment of those articles, in the treaty of 1768, which related to the vesting of the Dewanee of the Carnatic Balaghaut in the Company, on the condition of paying a sum of seven lacks of rupees annually to the Nizam for that country; or, in other words, to proceed, on the grounds of the treaty of 1768, to dispossess Tippoo Sultaun of his territories.

The Governor-general rejected those propositions as inadmissible, from the lapse of time which had occurred, and the relations of general amity in which the British government then stood to the prince whose possessions such an engagement would affect.

But though, at this period, Tippoo Sultaun had not shown any open indication of hostility against our government, or allies, his conduct must have been such as to make Lord Cornwallis believe that he cherished hostile projects against us, otherwise his lordship would hardly, in consequence of the above propositions, have entered into a political engagement with the Nizam, which might justly be

to withhold or withdraw the subsidiary force with which it was bound to aid the Nizam, was abrogated; and the right of that prince to keep and employ that force in any manner he chose, so long as it was not employed against the above specified princes and chiefs in alliance with the Company, was fully recognised and established.

deemed more than merely defensive against Tippoo Sultaun.

The desire, indeed, of not offending against the letter of the act of parliament would appear to have led to a trespass on its spirit upon this occasion, by the revival of an offensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun; for such the treaty of 1768 undoubtedly was; because, though Lord Cornwallis, in his letter of the 1st of July, 1789, declares, that circumstances have totally prevented the execution of those articles in the treaty of 1768 which go to vest the Company with the Dewanee of the Carnatic Balaghaut; yet he adds, "Should it hereafter happen, that the Company should obtain possession of the country mentioned in those articles with your highness's assistance, they (the Company) will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of your highness and the Mahrattas."

It is necessary to remark in this place, that two treaties had been concluded, subsequently to the treaty of 1768, between Hyder Ally Khan and the British government; and the latter state had concluded a treaty of peace with his son, Tippoo Sultaun, in 1784, by which it had fully recognised his right of sovereignty to the territories which he possessed; and assuredly, under such circumstances, the revival, with any modification, of an offensive alliance against his power could not but alarm that prince. Nor was his alarm likely to be dispelled by a qualification in the engagement, which provided that no

immediate operation should be undertaken against his dominions ; as the expression by which that qualification was followed showed, that the eventual execution of those articles which went to divest him of his territories was deemed not improbable, or at least impossible, by the contracting powers.

Another part of this engagement calculated to excite apprehension in the mind of Tippoo was, the stipulations regarding the employment of the subsidiary force granted to the Nizam ; which was made discretionary, with the exception of not acting against some specified prince and chiefs, allies of the British government ; among whom he was not included.

That such ideas were entertained by Tippoo, from the moment he heard of the conclusion of this engagement, there cannot be a doubt. It would indeed appear, by a letter from the resident at Poonah, that the minister of that court considered this engagement as one of an offensive nature against his master.

There is no person acquainted with the nature of the times in which this engagement was formed, but must be sensible that every measure of precautionary policy was then necessary, on the part of the British government, to counteract and frustrate the ambitious designs of Tippoo Sultaun ; but what has been stated will show, that the literal construction of the restrictions of the act of parliament had, upon this occasion, the effect of making the Governor-

general pursue a course, not only questionable, perhaps, in point of faith, but which must have been more offensive to Tippoo Sultaun, and more calculated to produce a war with that prince, than an avowed contract of a defensive engagement framed for the express and legitimate purpose of limiting his inordinate ambition.

As soon as the actual hostile aggressions of Tippoo Sultaun relieved Lord Cornwallis from the restraints under which he considered himself placed by the letter of the act of parliament, he hastened to secure, by every effort within his power, the hearty co-operation of the Nizam, in the war in which that aggression had involved the Company. In his instructions to the resident at Hyderabad*, he directs him to inform that court of the infraction, by Tippoo, of the treaty of peace between him and the Company; to take every opportunity in his power to expose in its proper colours the faithless character of that prince, and to explain to the Nizam and his ministers the great advantages which they would derive from forming a close connexion with the British government.

The Governor-general also authorized the resident to assure the Nizam, that no peace would be concluded with Tippoo, without securing to him a full participation of the advantages which might be obtained by the war; and that, as the conduct of

* Under date the 28th of January, 1790.

Tippoo had placed the English government at liberty, it was ready to enter into an alliance for the mutual guarantee of the territories which might be possessed by the respective parties when the war should terminate.

The Governor-general, in the same instructions, vested the resident of Hyderabad with the fullest power to encourage every advance which might be made by Tippoo Sultaun's tributaries, or subjects, toward forming a connexion with the Company; and directed him to employ persons of rank in obtaining information of Tippoo's designs; or in persuading any of his ministers or principal officers to abandon him, and to act under the direction of the English government in their endeavour to overturn his power; and the resident was assured, that whatever engagements he might contract with persons of that description should be punctually fulfilled by government.

A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was, in conformity to these instructions, concluded with the Nizam, and immediately ratified by the Governor-general in council*.

The provisions of this treaty were, that measures should be immediately taken to punish Tippoo Sultaun, and deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity; that the Nizam and Paishwah should both vigorously prosecute the

* On the 4th and 29th of July, 1790.

war; that the former should send a contingent of ten thousand horse to act with the Company's army, which body were to be paid by the Company; that an equal division of conquests between the contracting parties should be made at the conclusion of the peace, with the exception of such forts and territories as the honourable Company might take previously to the commencement of hostilities by the other parties.

That particular Zemindars and Polygars* who were specified, having been formerly dependant upon the Nizam and Mahrattas, should (if their forts and territories were taken) be placed upon the same footing, in relation to these powers, as formerly. That in the event of a peace becoming expedient, it should be settled by mutual consent; and that, after its conclusion, any attack by Tippoo on one of the parties was to be punished by all, in the mode, and on the conditions, which the contracting parties might hereafter settle.

It appears from the correspondence of the resident, that the Nizam throughout this negotiation testified the greatest suspicion of the Mahrattas; and at one conference, he asked the British resident what his government would do, if, during the absence of his army, while assisting the Company, the Paishwah, invited by Tippoo, should invade his do-

* Chittledroog, Annagoondy, Harponelly, Bellaree, Roydroog, &c. &c.

minions? "The Company ought to sacrifice their all in your highness's defence," replied the resident, with an honourable warmth, which gave confidence to that prince; who, however, continued to use his earnest endeavours, during the negotiation of this treaty, to induce the English government to make, by a specific article, the guarantee of his dominions. And though the Governor-general, from a just apprehension of giving offence to the Paishwah, and of losing the benefit of his co-operation in the war, evaded a compliance with his request, he nevertheless authorized the resident to give the Nizam assurances calculated to confirm his hope of accomplishing this object at a more favourable juncture.

The principle on which Lord Cornwallis resisted the solicitations of the Nizam on this point is distinctly expressed in a despatch to the resident*. "I trust," he states, "that the more that his highness reflects upon the nature of his proposition, that I should engage to interfere in case the Mahrattas should at any time make unreasonable demands upon him; he will more clearly see, that as the Mahrattas have acceded heartily and cordially to the confederacy, it would be highly improper in me to suppose that they would be inclined to treat one of their own allies with injustice; and consequently, that such an assurance must appear to them in a light highly injurious and offensive.

* Of the 12th April, 1790.

“ But in order,” his lordship continues, “ to prove to his highness how anxious I am to go every justifiable length to show my regard to his interests, and to gratify him in his wishes, you may inform him that, provided the Mahrattas do not positively object to it, I will agree to its becoming an additional article in the present treaty ; that should differences arise between any two of the confederates, the third party shall be bound to interpose his good offices, and to take every means in his power to bring those differences to a just and amicable settlement.”

The resident was, in the same despatch, authorized to inform the Nizam and his ministers, that, should an article to the above effect be assented to by the Poonah government, and any case should arise in which Lord Cornwallis's interference should be called upon in consequence of it, they should always find him in the best disposition to endeavour to save his highness from the necessity of submitting to mortification or injury.

These assurances appear to have had the effect of giving confidence to the Nizam, and of reconciling him to the treaty in the shape in which it was concluded ; and in a despatch to the resident*, which accompanied the treaty, Lord Cornwallis confirmed the hopes which his former assurances had led that prince to entertain upon this point.

* Under date the 29th July.

“ I am perfectly convinced,” he informs the resident in his despatch, “ that you will spare no pains to shew the Nizam how much he is called upon, by considerations of honour and interest, to fulfil his engagements with the strictest punctuality, and to exert the whole power of his government in the most vigorous prosecution of the war; and although it will be necessary for you to be constantly upon your guard against encouraging his highness and his ministers in too sanguine hopes respecting the value of the future connexion which they may expect to form with this government, and to avoid making use of any expressions of attention to the Nizam’s interests which could furnish ground for jealousy to the Mahrattas; yet you may constantly assure the Nizam and his ministers, that they may depend upon receiving the most unequivocal marks of cordiality and friendship from the Company, in return for whatever proofs they shall give of their attention to our interests and wishes in the prosecution of the present war; and that they will find us well disposed, when a proper opportunity offers, to take such further steps for drawing the connexion closer between the two governments as may be consistent with good faith and a due attention to subsisting engagements with our other allies.”

Such was the policy which the Marquis Cornwallis pursued on this critical occasion with the Nizam. He afforded to that prince immediate security by the aid of a subsidiary force; he held out

prospects to him of great and permanent advantages by the favourable conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun; and by the assurances conveyed to him through the British resident at his court, he taught him to expect a complete security against that most serious of all dangers which threatened his power, the restless and insatiable ambition of his Mahratta neighbours.

The wisdom of this policy was seen in its result. The Nizam co-operated with perfect sincerity in the war against the Sultaun; and though the character of his troops, and the habits of his government, prevented the benefit of his aid from being as great as might have been expected from the numbers of his army, and the extent of his resources, there cannot be a doubt that his exertions, however ill conducted, contributed in a considerable degree to the happy termination of the war; which indeed could never have been carried on upon such a scale without his alliance.

The connexion of the British government with the court of Poonah, subsequent to the treaty of Salbhye*, had been of a general, though friendly nature. On the first appearance of a rupture with Tippoo, Lord Cornwallis had directed his attention to an alliance with the Paishwah; and when the

* The treaty of Salbhye, between Maha Rajah Row Sindia, Mahdajee Sindia, and the English government, was concluded in 1782.

conduct of the Sultaun made war unavoidable, he transmitted instructions to the resident at Poonah*, of nearly similar import to those despatched on the same occasion to the resident at Hyderabad. There existed no subsidiary engagements with the court of Poonah; and in these instructions† his lordship expressed a hope, that the Mahrattas would act by themselves in the war, as he apprehended risk from the composition of their army (being almost all cavalry), to any small body of English infantry attached to it: he, however, informed the resident that, if they could not be induced to take an active part without the aid of a British corps, measures should be devised to afford it.

The Poonah state appears to have been, from a variety of causes, perfectly inclined to the proposed alliance; but the emergency of the period made the delays which are habitual to a Mahratta state a subject of the most serious anxiety; and it would appear‡ that Lord Cornwallis felt strongly at this moment the injurious operation of the restrictions which had prevented his cultivating, at a less urgent and more favourable period, the alliance of the Paishwah.

“Some considerable advantages have, no doubt, been experienced,” his lordship states, “by the sys-

* Sir Charles Mallet.

† Dated the 27th of January, 1790.

‡ Despatch to Sir Charles Mallet, under date the 28th of February.

tem of neutrality which the legislature required of the governments in this country ; but it has at the same time been attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war, without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies.

“ The late outrageous infraction of the treaty of peace by Tippoo Sultaun,” his lordship adds, “ furnishes a case in point. We could not suffer the dominions of the Rajah of Travancore, who was included by name as our ally in that treaty, to be ravaged or insulted, without being justly charged with pusillanimity, or a flagrant breach of faith, and without dishonouring ourselves, by that means, in the view of all the powers in India ; and as we have been almost daily obliged, for several years past, to declare to the Mahrattas, and to the Nizam, that we were precluded from contracting any new engagements with them for affording them aid against the injustice or ambition of Tippoo, I must acknowledge that we cannot claim, as a right, the performance of those promises which the Mahrattas have repeatedly made to co-operate with us whenever we should be forced into a war with that prince.”

His lordship, in this despatch, repeats his intention to offer the Mahrattas a defensive alliance against Tippoo ; to which they would, he states, “ in reason and equity have a good title, if they were to take a part with us without having made such a previous engagement.”

In another despatch* Lord Cornwallis authorizes the resident to declare to the court of Poonah the objects which he has in view in the war; the first of which he states to be an indemnification for the expenses and losses sustained by the Company, either in preparations or in military operations. In the event of the Nizam and the Mahrattas joining, Lord Cornwallis declares his next object will be, to oblige Tippoo to restore all that he or his father have usurped or retained from either of these powers; as well as to force him to surrender that part of the Carnatic, Payen-Ghaut, which he now possesses; and, on account of the shocking barbarity with which he treated the Nairs on the coast of Malabar, he declares it to be his intention, “to insist upon his setting those people free from all future dependance upon him.”

After some delay, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun was also concluded and ratified between the English government and the Paishwah †.

The conditions of this treaty were in substance little different from that concluded with the Nizam. It was stipulated, that the Paishwah should have an option, during the war with Tippoo, of the aid of an equal English force to that serving with the Nizam; and that he should, jointly with that prince, furnish

* Under date the 22d of March.

† On the 1st of June, and the 5th of July, 1790.

cavalry to serve with the English army, if such aid was required.

The courts of Dowlut Row Sindia, and of Ra-goojee* Bhonslah, were solicited by the Governor-general to exert their influence to promote the success of this important negotiation; but their efforts, if they even used them, would never have prevailed upon the wary Nanah Furnavese, who then presided over the Paishwah's councils, to adopt such a line of policy, had he and the military chieftains of the Poonah state not been stimulated by stronger motives. Among these may be included a deep sense of recent injuries sustained from Tippoo Sultaun, an apprehension of future violence from him, and an expectation of regaining the fine provinces wrested from them by him and his father, Hyder Ally Khan.

Similar motives had operated on the mind of the Nizam; and Lord Cornwallis, though he left no expedient untried which promised to promote the alliance both with that prince and the Paishwah, was fully sensible that his hopes of success rested entirely upon the grounds which have been stated. His lordship indeed observes†, “My dependance upon the support of both those powers (the Paishwah and the Nizam), upon the present occasion, is

* Rajah of Berar.

† Letter to Sir Charles Mallet, under date the 28th of February, 1790.

grounded solely upon the expectation of their being guided by the common influence of passions, and by considerations of evident interest, which ought to dispose them to seize a favourable opportunity, with eagerness, to reduce the power of a prince, whose ambition knows no bounds, and from whom both of them have suffered."

It will now be necessary to recur to those events which immediately produced the war with Tippoo; the conduct observed at the period of their occurrence by the government of Fort St. George; and the measures which that conduct led Lord Cornwallis to adopt.

The pretext upon which Tippoo Sultaun approached the country of Travancore was, to recover two places, Cranganore and Jaycotta, which the Rajah had purchased from the Dutch, but which Tippoo alleged were dependant upon him, as forming part of the possessions of his tributary, the Rajah of Cochin. The Rajah of Travancore had been desired by the Madras government (acting under instructions from Bengal) to annul this arrangement; but had remonstrated, on the grounds of Tippoo's assertion being false, the places in question having, he alleged, been obtained by the Dutch from the Portuguese, to whom they had belonged, long before the Rajah of Cochin became tributary to the Mysore government.

In consequence of this remonstrance, which was forwarded to Bengal, the supreme government sent

detailed instructions to the government of Fort St. George.

The purport of these instructions* was, that if the places in question were found, on full investigation, to have belonged to the Rajah of Cochin subsequently to that chief having become a tributary of Mysore, the Rajah of Travancore must be obliged to restore them to the former possessor: that if, on the contrary, they had not belonged to the Rajah of Cochin subsequently to the period stated, the claims of Tippoo Sultaun were to be resisted, and the legitimately-acquired right of the Rajah of Travancore to those possessions was to be supported. In the event of Tippoo having obtained possession of them previously to the arrival of the instructions, the Madras government was directed to open a negotiation with him, with a view to effect, if possible, an amicable adjustment of the point on the above principles. "Of whatever importance," the supreme government observes in this despatch, "the two places in question may appear to the defence of the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, it cannot be opposed to the serious consequences of a war: but we are equally convinced that a tame submission to insult or injury would, in its effects, prove the most fatal policy."

The supreme government further directed the government of Fort St. George to take no measures,

* Dated the 13th of November, 1789.

without its previous sanction, for dispossessing Tippoo Sultaun of Cranganore and Jaycotta, if he was in actual possession of those places, unless he attacked the other territories of the Rajah of Travancore; but, on such an attack being made, they positively ordered the government of Fort St. George to deem it an act of hostility, and the commencement of a war, which they were to prosecute with all possible vigour and decision.

These instructions do not appear to have been fully attended to by the government of Fort St. George; who, indeed, in their answer*, arraign the reasoning upon which they were grounded, and state their opinion, that the proceeding of the Rajah of Travancore, in purchasing the forts of Cranganore and Jaycotta from the Dutch, was unwarrantable on every principle of policy and justice; and therefore not entitled to the support of the British government.

Under these impressions, they do not, in the letter they addressed to Tippoo, inform him (as they had been directed to do), that in case the right of the Dutch to sell these places was established, it was the intention of the English government to resist any attack which he might make upon them; and the letter which they addressed to the Rajah of Travancore, on the same occasion, was not only silent on this point, but, in its general tenour, cal-

* Of the 3rd of January.

culated to discourage him from entertaining any expectation of support or assistance.

The government of Fort St. George had also been directed to assemble the army, to suspend the commercial investment, to stop all payments to the Nabob's creditors, and to make no disbursement which could be avoided, in order that the whole resources of the state might be applied to military preparations: but these instructions seem to have been in a great degree evaded, if not neglected. The military preparations were made in a tardy manner, and on a limited scale, for the declared purpose of saving expense; and the provision of a large proportion of the investment was continued.

These proceedings were early marked by the strongest censure of the supreme government; who commented on them with great severity*, and demanded, in the most categorical terms, an explanation of the causes which, upon this critical occasion, had led the government of Madras to disregard, in the manner in which it had done, their positive and repeated orders and instructions.

After Tippoo was repulsed from the lines of Travancore, he had addressed two letters † to the government of Fort St. George; in which he attempted to palliate his conduct upon that occasion, and to attribute the attack to the sudden impulse of re-

* In despatch of the 5th of February.

† Dated 24th of December, and 1st of January.

venge felt by his army at the conduct of some of the troops of the Rajah of Travancore. These letters were full of extravagant professions of friendship to the English government. These professions, though contradicted by the whole tenour of Tippoo's conduct, seem to have been received by the government of Fort St. George as strong presumptive proof of his peaceable intentions; and in a letter from Mr. John Holland, governor of Fort St. George, to Lord Cornwallis*, in which he apprizes his lordship of his intention to proceed to England, he makes use of the following expressions: "As far as I am able to judge, it is not Tippoo's intention to break with the Company; he probably feels himself injured by the conduct of our tributary, the Rajah of Travancore; and it rests with your lordship to consider how far such conduct may have been consistent with the respect which he owed this government, or with the laws of nations. I confess it appears to me a very important question; and, from the late letters received from Tippoo Sultaun, there is every reason to think that he will be disposed to enter into negotiations for the adjustment of the points in dispute."

The indignation excited in the mind of Lord Cornwallis by the whole tenour of the conduct of the government of Fort St. George, upon this occa-

* Dated the 13th of February.

sion, was forcibly expressed in his lordship's letter to Mr. E. J. Holland, acting-governor of that presidency*, which he concludes thus:—

“ So far am I from giving credit to the late government for economy, in not making the necessary preparations for war, according to the positive orders of the supreme government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation ; I think it very possible that every cash of that ill-judged saving may cost to the Company a crore of rupees : besides which, I still more sincerely lament the disgraceful sacrifice which you made, by that delay, of the honour of your country, by tamely suffering an insolent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the dominions of the Rajah of Travancore, which we were bound by the most sacred ties of friendship and good faith to defend.”

Lord Cornwallis had determined to proceed immediately to Fort St. George, to prevent the serious dangers which appeared to him to threaten the public interests from the conduct of the local authority at that presidency ; but the arrival of General Meadows, who was appointed to succeed Mr. Holland, led him to change his resolution, and to intrust to that officer the conduct of a war which, in a despatch to him †, he describes, as “ a measure not less necessary to vindicate the insulted honour of

* Dated the 30th of March, 1790.

† Dated the 8th of March.

the nation than to provide for its future security, by accomplishing, at a favourable moment, the reduction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun." The government of Fort St. George, in a despatch* subsequent to the arrival of General Meadows, transmitted to the supreme government a letter, which had been received from Tippoo Sultaun, in reply to the letter addressed to him by Mr. Holland. In this letter Tippoo entered into a long defence of his conduct, both as it related to the Rajah of Travancore, and to the Nabob of the Carnatic; and assented to the suggestion, which had been made by Mr. Holland, of appointing commissioners, whom, however, he requested might be sent to his court. No answer was made to his communication by the government of Fort St. George, who expressed in this despatch an opinion, that a compliance with the requisition of sending commissioners to his court would be highly derogatory to the dignity of the English government.

The supreme government, in their reply to this communication, adverted to their former directions for considering the attack of the lines of the Rajah of Travancore as a declaration of war; they said that they had concluded, that the government of Fort St. George, in obedience to their repeated orders, were either busy in making the necessary preparations, or in carrying on the war with vigour;

* Dated the 8th of March.

and did not see how any negotiation could commence with honour, till full reparation was made by Tippoo Sultaun for the outrages which he had already committed.

In concluding this letter they direct, that the presidency of Fort St. George "should, in answer to all Tippoo's letters, explicitly inform him, that it had incontrovertibly appeared, that Cranganore and Jaycotta were held by the Dutch as independent possessions, and never paid tribute to the Rajah of Cochin; and, therefore, that the Dutch had an undoubted right to dispose of them to the Rajah of Travancore, or to any other power whom they might think proper; that they cannot look upon the attack which Tippoo made upon the Rajah of Travancore's lines to have happened by accident, as he was upon the spot, and conducted it in person; and as the Rajah has been in possession of those lines upwards of twenty years, and they were consequently guaranteed to him by the late treaty of peace; so violent an act of hostility can be seen in no other light than as an infraction of the treaty with the Company."

General Meadows, on the receipt of these final instructions, proceeded from Madras to join the army, which was assembled on Trichinopoly Plain, and reached the camp on the 24th of May. He had informed Tippoo Sultaun of his arrival; and after he had joined the army he received a letter from that prince, remonstrating against the assembly

of troops which had taken place on the frontier of the Company's dominions, and requesting to be allowed to send a person of rank to make such explanations as were necessary to restore confidence and friendship between the two states. To this letter General Meadows returned the following short and dignified answer:—

“ I received yours, and I understand its contents. You are a great prince ; and, but for your cruelty to your prisoners, I should add, an enlightened one. The English, equally incapable of offering an insult as of submitting to one, have always looked upon war as declared from the moment you attacked their ally, the King of Travancore. God does not always give the battle to the strong, nor the race to the swift ; but, generally, success to those whose cause is just : upon that we depend.”

On the 12th of June, and a few days subsequent to the despatch of this letter, General Meadows entered the territories of the Sultaun ; and commenced a war, which was terminated by Lord Cornwallis in person, on the 23d of February, 1792, in a manner most glorious to the British government, and its allies.

After the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun had showed that he was decidedly hostile to the British government and its allies, the policy of Lord Cornwallis was neither directed to obtain a delay of hostilities, nor limited to the object of repelling the immediate danger with which the state, over whose

councils he presided, was threatened. When fully satisfied of the designs of Tippoo, he hastened to attack him. He saw the great advantages which were likely to result from early active offensive operations ; and the moment he resolved on war, he contemplated (as appears from the whole tenour of his correspondence previous to the commencement of hostilities) the increase of the Company's territories in the quarters of the Carnatic and Malabar as a desirable object of policy, both as adding to the power and resources of the British government, and as reducing those of one of its most formidable rivals. Acting upon the same principles, he held out conquest and increased resources as incentives to the ambition of the Nizam and the Paishwah in the contest, in which he solicited them to engage as allies of the British government.

The favourable impression made by the promptness and vigour with which Lord Cornwallis engaged in war to vindicate the honour and maintain the faith of the British government, was not more improved by the success of our arms than by the moderation which he evinced at its close. Tippoo Sultaun, shut up with a defeated and dispirited army in the fortress of Seringapatam, resolved to throw himself upon the clemency and generosity of his conquerors, or, in other words, of Lord Cornwallis ; for so complete was the confidence placed in him by the allies, that they unreservedly intrusted the care of their interests to his integrity ; and in no in-

stance questioned his motives nor opposed his decisions. A higher tribute could not have been paid to individual character, or to the principles of his government.

The envoys of Tippoo Sultaun arrived at an appointed spot, near Lord Cornwallis's camp, on the 14th February, where they were met by Sir John Kennaway, on the part of the English; Meer Allum on that of the Nizam; and two agents of the Mahrattas. The first proposition made was, that Tippoo Sultaun should cede half his territories, and pay six crores of rupees; but on the representation of Tippoo's agents of their master's absolute inability to pay that sum*, the demand was reduced to three crores, to which thirty lacs† of rupees were added for Durbar expenses, at the suggestion of Hurry Punt, the Mahratta general, who stated, that in all

* This they offered to confirm by oath, and entreated Lord Cornwallis to send into Seringapatam and ascertain, by an examination of accounts and the state of the treasury, that their assertion was grounded on truth. What was known of the contributions he levied, and of his subsequent receipts and expenditure, combined with the amount found in his treasury when Seringapatam was taken, in 1799, (which was only one million, inclusive of jewels,) gives ground to believe the statement made by Tippoo's envoys was correct.

† The Mahratta general suggested to Sir John Kennaway to ask sixty lacs, but be content with thirty, on account of Durbar expenses. The little objection offered by Tippoo's envoys to this demand shewed that they considered it quite in conformity to usage.

such settlements an amount under this head was required for the benefit of the civil officers of government who had been employed during the war.

When the preliminary articles were agreed upon, Tippoo sent two of his sons to remain with Lord Cornwallis as hostages for the conclusion and fulfilment of the treaty of which these articles were the basis.

The negotiations which took place before that was settled, were protracted for nearly a month. An abstract taken from the minutes of each day's conference is given in the Appendix. It merits attention, as it exhibits the evasions, artifices, and delays, employed on the part of the Sultaun and his officers, and the patience and temper with which these were met and defeated. Whether we refer to the hurry in which circumstances required this treaty to be concluded, the details into which it was necessary to enter, or the obstacles which were to be overcome, we are alike disposed to give our tribute of praise to the information, talent, and unwearied labour of the high political officer to whom Lord Cornwallis committed this arduous task. It was concluded on the 19th of March, when the hostage princes delivered the definitive treaty*, con-

* Another copy was given by the princes to the representatives of our allies, who attended at the ceremony. We are told by the able author of the narrative of this campaign that the eldest of the princes, "On receiving two of the copies of the treaty returned to him by Lord Cornwallis, delivered a

firmed by their father, into the hands of the British commander.

Lord Cornwallis having determined not to prosecute the war to the annihilation of Tippoo's power, endeavoured to reconcile him as far as possible to his humbled condition. It is to this desire that we must attribute the restoration of Bangalore; a concession which surprised the allies. There can be no doubt that our retaining that important fortress and the districts which connected it with the lands ceded above the Ghauts would have been the most complete defence against his future hostility. In a military point of view it had much more importance than Coorg, which Lord Cornwallis determined upon keeping, not from any consequence he attached to it as a position for troops, but from regard to good faith, and from a knowledge that Tippoo wished to retain it, that he might wreak his vengeance on a prince whose greatest crime was the zeal and attachment he had displayed in favour of the English.

Tippoo made every opposition he could, short of a renewal of hostilities, to the cession of Coorg. He arraigned the demand as contrary to good faith, on the ground that it was not adjacent to our posses-

copy to each of the vakeels of the other powers, which he did with great manliness, but evidently with more constraint and dissatisfaction than he had performed the first part of the ceremony.—*Dirom's Narrative*, p. 247.

sions (the term used to describe the proposed cessions in the preliminary articles), and that its demand was purposely kept back till the payment of a crore of rupees, and the delivery of his sons as hostages, were considered to have put it out of his power to resent it. In answer to these allegations, the right we had to make the demand from its contiguity* to other cessions, was proved; and it was satisfactorily shewn to be a principle of the nego-

* "The cession of the principalities of Malabar, adjacent to no English possession but the commercial establishment of Tellicherry, was so far from being questioned as a departure from the preliminary treaty, that the Suldaun and his vakeels openly congratulated themselves on that selection, which was avowed in the conferences even before the conclusion of the preliminary articles. Coorg was a continuation of the same territory, without any intervention: no limitation in the length of radius, or form of frontier line, was stipulated by the preliminaries; and that the territory of Coorg was above the Ghauts, and in a commanding situation, relatively to the Suldaun's capital, and remaining territories, would be too much to urge as a conclusive objection, in discussing the principles of a treaty which had for its professed object to cripple his resources, and render him incapable of further mischief. But admitting, as was the fact, that the demand was really unexpected by Tippoo Suldaun, it may be affirmed, without the fear of reasonable question, that it ought not to have been unexpected; and that no reflecting mind, acquainted with the principles on which the war had commenced and been conducted, could have expected from Lord Cornwallis the intention of abandoning the only ally who had performed all his obligations with fidelity, efficiency, and honour."—WILKES'S *South of India*, vol. iii., p. 246.

tiation not to name the countries which the allies meant to claim till the moment that their cession should be required. It was true that this principle had been departed from in some instances, in consideration of Tippoo's feelings; but he had taken such advantages of those disclosures, in the valuation of all the countries named by the allies, as had led to a more rigid adherence to it in the latter period of the negotiation.

It is difficult to conjecture the motives which made Tippoo act as he did upon this remarkable occasion. He had already, indeed, sent his sons and a crore of rupees to the English camp; but these pledges of sincerity had gained him an invaluable portion of time. His loss was in fact limited to the pecuniary sacrifice. For the safety and kind treatment of two of his younger children in the hands of Lord Cornwallis, he could feel no apprehension. On the other hand, he knew that the three weeks which had elapsed had been productive of consequences greatly detrimental to the besiegers. The troops, from inaction and the nausea of a standing camp, had become unhealthy, and much of the materials, which were constructed of dried cypress, had entirely perished; besides that the trenches were so far damaged as to require to be made anew. These were not points to escape the Sultaun's attention, and when we add that he had at this period a secret correspondence with a person of rank and influence in the camp of one of our allies, we

may conclude that, struggling as he was for half his kingdom, he looked upon every hour gained as a new ray of hope, and, consequently, continued to make efforts to the very last to lessen as much as possible, if he could not altogether avert, the evils with which he was surrounded. Amongst the conflicting passions of his mind at this moment, none probably preyed more upon him than his resentments against those of his tributaries who had contributed to his fall. Of these the Rajah of Coorg was the most prominent. But as Tippoo was perfectly aware of our engagements with that Rajah, who had a body of troops serving with our army, it is difficult to believe that he could ever have really expected such an ally would be gratuitously abandoned to his vengeance. Whatever were the motives that led him to push this point to such an extreme, he soon found the error of his calculations. Lord Cornwallis did not hesitate a moment as to his own line of action. Every thing was at once put to the hazard rather than allow a stain to rest upon the good faith of the British government. The hostages were moved in the direction of the Carnatic. The guns were ordered into the batteries, and every other preparation was made for renewing the siege; but Tippoo, alarmed by this prompt proceeding, prevented its renewal by signing the definitive treaty.

The conduct and termination of this negotiation were alike honourable to Lord Cornwallis. The

enemy he had subdued paid a reluctant homage to his virtues, and the confidence reposed in him by the allies was, if possible, increased* ; but these feelings were personal, and could be calculated upon as strength to the state only while the individual so honoured and so revered continued at its head.

The court of directors † had earnestly called the attention of Lord Cornwallis to the conclusion of an early peace with Tippoo as alike essential to the finances and the interests of the Company, declaring their readiness to sacrifice some portion of the benefits they might justly expect from the success of the war rather than risk its continuance. The whole bent of his own mind was in unison with this moderate counsel. He well knew the nature of the Sultaun, whom he describes in the letter to the court of directors which accompanied the definitive

* When Lord Cornwallis requested the allies to appoint their representative to aid in the negotiation, they consented (they said) because he desired it, but with no desire or intention of interference, as they confided wholly in him. Their conduct shewed this not to be mere compliment. No wish was expressed to have any charge of the hostages ; and what was more extraordinary, when the first payment of Tippoo's contribution (one million sterling) arrived, they not only left its receipt, but the counting and shroffing (a) of this large amount entirely to the British Commanders.

† See letter from the court of directors, dated the 21st of September, 1791.

(a) *Shroffing*, a word equivalent to *assaying*, means the examination of money ; a regular business in India performed by *Shroffs*, or money-changers, on every sum, from a rupee to a lac.

treaty, as a "faithless and violent character, upon whom no dependence could be placed." He could not, therefore, expect that such a prince would be changed, by what had occurred, into a friend on whom we could rely, nor though his means had been greatly reduced that he would cease to be formidable as an enemy. With this anticipation upon his mind, and being of opinion* that the capture of Seringapatam would increase the difficulty of a settlement with the allies; and entertaining doubts besides as to the continued co-operation and good understanding of the latter, he concluded that, having gained certain and great advantages, it was not wise to put them to hazard in pursuit of contingent and questionable objects of policy.

Without seeking for speculative grounds † of ac-

* See abstract of Lord Cornwallis's correspondence with the government of Madras, given in their Letter to India, 15th September, 1792.

† In an article of the *Annual Register*, 1792, it is stated, "the wise moderation of these counsellors, which directed a partial division only of the conquered countries, cannot be too much praised; for had not a sufficient extent of territory been left to Tippoo Sultaun to make him respectable, and still, in some degree, formidable to his neighbours, the balance of power in India might again have been materially affected, the future adjustment of which might have led to new wars." We may observe, in answer to this conclusion, that Lord Cornwallis knew too well the elements of which the native governments were formed ever to ground his measures upon an imaginary balance of power among states whose objects of policy

tion, these plain and strong reasons will sufficiently account for Lord Cornwallis having concluded a peace at the moment he did, as well as for that anxiety and uneasiness which he describes himself to have suffered during the short period that he contemplated the necessity of renewing hostilities*.

It appears from the conferences with Tippoo's envoys during the negotiation, that his lordship did every thing he could do, short of a sacrifice of faith and of essential interests, to conciliate the Sultaun. His reception and treatment of the hostage princes was more than kind—it was parental. The whole course of his conduct on this memorable occasion exhibited an union of good feeling, manly simplicity, and firmness, which added as much as his victories in the field to the fame of his country.

Though no specific change was made, after the termination of the war, in the conditions of the treaty with the Nizam, the relations of friendship between that prince and the Company became more intimate from the sense of the mutual benefit which had attended the alliance; and the subsidiary force continued in his service. A contrary feeling, however, appears to have been produced about this period in the court of Poonah. After the peace with Tippoo Sultaun, a proposition was made to Lord

and principles of rule are at complete variance with all conventional systems for the maintenance of general tranquillity: but of this more hereafter.

* Vide Lord Cornwallis's Letter to the Court of Directors.

Cornwallis by Hurry Punt, the commander of the Mahratta army, for eventually subsidizing a British detachment, of the same force and on the same terms as that with the Nizam, for the declared purpose of aiding the Paishwah to reduce to obedience any of his dependants who might prove refractory. The proposition was rejected by his lordship on general grounds; but he states, in a despatch upon the subject, that the principal cause of objection to the measure was, his conviction that it was meant to obtain the countenance and support of the British government against Madhajee Sindia, of whose design of establishing his influence at Poonah Nanah Furnavese then entertained the most serious apprehensions.

The independent power of Madhajee Sindia was first recognised by the British government in the treaty of Salbhye. He had greatly increased both his army and his territories subsequently. The able resident* at his court, in 1786, proposed a plan to Sir John Macpherson (then Governor-general) for checking a career which he foresaw, if not arrested, must terminate in a rupture with the British government. This proposition was not adopted; and Lord Cornwallis, declaredly governed by the system of neutrality prescribed by the legislature, appears to have thought himself not at liberty to make

* Mr. James Anderson.

even a political effort to prevent the aggrandizement of that chief. The consequence was, the complete establishment of Sindia's power over the northern parts of Hindustan; the possession, by that chief, of the person of the emperor of Delhi; the formation of a large and formidable corps of regular infantry under European officers, chiefly French; the erection of founderies and arsenals: in short, the accumulation of the vast military resources which enabled his immediate successor to carry on a war at the same moment in the Deckan and Hindustan against the British government and its allies.

Previous to the commencement of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, Sindia had made overtures to become a party in the confederacy against that prince, on the condition of an improved alliance with the British government, of whom he solicited two battalions, to remain with the army with which he, at that period, proposed to march to Poonah. He also expressed an expectation that the British government would engage to defend his possessions in Hindustan during his absence. In addition to these specific requests, he demanded the general aid of the Company against the Rajpoot chiefs in Hindustan, who continued to resist his authority. For obvious causes, these conditions were deemed inadmissible; and the alliance which he wished was not formed. Towards the close of the war with Tippoo,

the councils of this chief were suspected* of being more of a hostile, than a friendly nature to the British nation. His conduct, subsequent to the conclusion of the peace, appears to have been viewed with considerable jealousy by Lord Cornwallis. Upon receiving a paper of intelligence, transmitted by the public news-writer of Delhi in July, 1792, that the emperor of Delhi had written to the Paishwah, and to Sindia, signifying that he hoped, through their exertions, to obtain some tribute from Bengal, his lordship furnished the British resident at Sindia's court with immediate instructions upon the subject †, in which he observed that, though the want of authenticity of the said paper of intelligence prevented his making a formal representation, he was very desirous that his sentiments should be conveyed to Sindia and his ministers in the most explicit manner; and the resident was directed, if unable to discover the truth of the statement in a manner that would justify a public representation, to take advantage of any opening which might occur to deliver his sentiments concerning it. "You will inform Sindia," Lord Cornwallis observes, "that, in the present situation of the king, I consider all letters written upon political points in his name to be by his (Sindia's)

* This suspicion was proved to be well grounded, from a correspondence between Sindia and Tippoo, in 1793, discovered on the capture of Seringapatam in 1799.

† These instructions were dated the 9th of August, 1792.

sanction and authority only; and that you are instructed by me to add, that an attempt to establish principles of the above description, by any power whatever, will be warmly resented by this government."

"You will," he continues, "in the course of any conversation or correspondence, which you may hold with Sindia upon this point, take care to recall, in the most forcible manner, to his recollection, the spirit of moderation and forbearance that has been manifested by the government during the long period in which he has been employed in extending his conquests in the northern parts of Hindustan; and that it would give us pain to be forced to depart from the neutral and pacific system that we have hitherto observed in that quarter. You will, at the same time, inform him, that it is by my particular directions that you say, that we have no desire to make any new acquisitions; nor even to interfere in the internal affairs of the empire, if we can avoid it with honour and safety; but that if any of our neighbours should be rash enough to insult us by unjust demands, or in any other shape whatever, we feel ourselves both able and resolved to exact ample satisfaction."

These instructions were grounded on that proud but just sense of national honour which will not suffer itself to be approached by the breath of insult, and which keeps danger at a distance by alacrity to meet it. They appear to have had the best

effects at the moment; Sindia's minister having assured the British resident, that the use which his master wished to make of the emperor's favour was to establish his authority over the territories which he held, not to subdue or invade those of others.

No political connexion of any intimacy had ever subsisted between the British government and Ragojee Bhonslah. The personal character of that chief, and the local situation of his territories, made it unlikely that any efficient aid could be obtained from his co-operation in the war with Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis, nevertheless, neglected no means to conciliate him to an acquiescence in the justice and policy of that measure, and even invited him to join the confederacy. With a view to those objects he deputed a resident to his court, who was intrusted also with the negotiation of some minor points, connected with the commercial intercourse between the two states; and who was directed to convey a just impression to the Rajah's mind of the imperious causes which had obliged the Governor-general to march a body of troops through the province of Cuttack, before he could obtain the Rajah's approbation of that movement.

In order to complete a general view of the political administration of Lord Cornwallis, it will be necessary to consider his principles of policy in cultivating the more intimate alliances which subsisted between the Company and the native princes

whom a course of events had rendered immediately dependent upon its support and protection; and whose interests were, from the nature of their political relation, identified with those of the English government.

The chief of those princes are, the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Vizier of Oude. A brief statement of the leading measures which Lord Cornwallis adopted with these two princes, will be sufficient to throw every requisite light upon this part of the subject.

Subsequently to the arrival of Lord Cornwallis in India, Sir Archibald Campbell, then governor of Fort St. George, negotiated a treaty with the Nabob of the Carnatic. This treaty was framed upon the principle of providing, by an equitable arrangement, for the defence of the possessions of the Nabob and the Company in the Carnatic and Northern Circars*. It was considered, at the period of its

* The principal of the conditions of this treaty which was concluded on the 24th July, 1787, were, that the Nabob should contribute to the amount of nine lacs of star-pagodas, annually, toward the support of the military peace establishment to be maintained by the Company for the security of the dominions of the two contracting parties; that in the event of failure on the part of the Nabob in the punctual payment of this sum, the Company was to possess a right to appoint its own officers, with adequate authority to superintend and receive from the Nabob's aumildars, or managers, the revenue of certain districts, specified, and by an article of this treaty, made answerable for such payment. It was further stipulated,

conclusion, a great improvement of the political relations subsisting between the Company and the Nabob of the Carnatic; and such it certainly was in one material point. It vested the sole military power in the Company, and thereby gave security to the empire, which had been exposed before to the most serious danger from its resources being applied to the support of two armies formed upon opposite principles, and acting under distinct and often opposite authorities.

This, however, was the only view in which this arrangement could be considered beneficial: in every

that after the amount of the deficiency should have been realized, the officers appointed by the Company were instantly to be recalled. These provisions, however, were only for a state of peace. In the event of war, it was agreed that the Company should charge themselves with its conduct, and that four-fifths of the revenue of their possessions in the Carnatic and Circars should be applied to its prosecution; and, by another article, the Nabob agreed that four-fifths of his revenue should be applied to the same purpose; and that his proportion of the debt of the war should be settled at twenty-five fifty-one parts. In case of the above four-fifths, or any portion of them, being diverted from the current expenses of the war, or the debts and expenses incurred thereby, the Company was vested by the treaty with a right of appointing receivers and superintendents, to obtain the revenues of all the Nabob's country from his officers, in the same mode, and upon the same conditions, as had been stipulated in the case of districts mortgaged for the security of the annual payment of the nine lacs of pagodas fixed for the military peace establishment.

other it evidently carried the seeds of its own destruction. The sword was placed in one hand, the purse in another; and to combine both, in order to produce efficient exertion, which the contracting parties were aware might be required for their mutual safety, it became necessary, unless the Nabob altered the whole principles of his government, to introduce a complete change into the administration of the provinces from which their resources were to be drawn, during the actual existence of a war with a foreign state. In addition to this inconvenience, or rather danger, it must be evident, that the constant changes of authority, to which the territories of the Nabob were by this treaty made eventually subject, were likely to be destructive to every hope of improvement in the country, or of permanent comfort and prosperity to its unfortunate inhabitants.

The early result of this treaty was, a failure on the part of the Nabob in the most essential of its conditions; and when the war occurred with Tippoo Sultaun, in 1790, Lord Cornwallis found himself obliged to take possession of all his highness's country, in order to secure the two states against the dangers to which he thought them exposed from the mismanagement of the Nabob's officers. This consideration made him direct the actual appointment of the Company's officers to collect the revenue; contrary to the stipulations of Sir A. Campbell's treaty, which left the collections to be made

by the Nabob's own officers, under the superintendence and authority of those of the Company. It was, however, desired that the Nabob should appoint officers to observe the conduct, and inspect the accounts, of the servants of the Company, in order that a satisfactory settlement, upon the principles prescribed by the alliance, might hereafter be made between his highness and the British government.

In a letter*, in which Lord Cornwallis directs the government of Fort St. George to adopt this measure, he states most forcibly the causes which had created its necessity, and gives positive orders for its immediate execution, expressing great regret that the Nabob had not been prevailed upon to give his assent to its adoption. The government could not, however, he states, gratify the Nabob's private feelings by omitting to exact the performance of his engagements to the Company, without flagrant neglect of the attention due to the honour and interests of their country, and to the security of his highness's own dominions.

Lord Cornwallis also expresses in this letter his expectation, that the Nabob would ere long become sensible of the interested and criminal motives of the advisers who had influenced him to resist the solicitations of the Madras government; and that he would soon see that, while his people

* Dated the 21st of June, 1790.

were treated with justice and humanity, a liberal fund would be secured for the support of his own dignity, and that of his family; and the remainder of the revenues (to use Lord Cornwallis's own words) "would be rescued from the hands of extortioners and usurers, and honourably applied to the defence and protection of his subjects and dominions."

The assumption of the country of the Nabob facilitated greatly the operations of the war, not only from its placing the resources of the Carnatic in the hands of the British government, but from giving that state the undivided power of drawing forth, in the promptest manner, to the aid of the public service, every military supply which the country possessed.

When Lord Cornwallis returned to Fort St. George, after the termination of the war with Tippoo, he opened a negotiation with the Nabob of the Carnatic, which terminated in the conclusion of a new treaty with that prince*.

* The preamble of this engagement, which was concluded the 12th July, 1792, annulled the treaty of 1787, concluded by Sir A. Campbell, on the grounds of a representation received from the Nabob, under date the 9th June, 1792, addressed to Marquess Cornwallis, that the resources of the Carnatic were not competent to enable him to perform the stipulations of the former engagement; and that the security which the Nabob had agreed to give to the Company for the regular discharge of the stipulated sums (which he had to pay

Though there can be no doubt that the treaty made by Lord Cornwallis simplified in some points,

under that engagement), was not equal to the ends intended: the engagement also into which the Nabob had entered with the Company for the liquidation of debts due by him to private persons, was annulled; and the treaty entered into by Lord Cornwallis was declared to provide for all cases stated in either of the engagements which it rescinded.

By this treaty, the defence of the territories of both states was (as fixed by Sir A. Campbell's treaty) intrusted to the Company, who, in the event of war, were to assume the management of the Carnatic; which was to remain in their hands during the continuance of such war, and to be restored to the Nabob at its termination, except in cases particularly specified. It was also a stipulation of this engagement, that, as long as the Company remained in possession of the Carnatic, they should pay to the Nabob one-fifth of its revenue.

The Nabob, by an article of this treaty, agreed to pay nine lacs of pagodas annually, on account of the expenses of the military establishment of the Company during peace; and further to pay the sum of six lacs twenty-one thousand one hundred and five pagodas annually for the liquidation of the debts due by him to his private creditors.

The Company were to be put in possession of the Poligar tribute, as part payment of these sums; and the Nabob was to receive credit for the sum of two lacs sixty-four thousand seven hundred and four pagodas, on this account, without the Company having a right to make any deduction for charges of collection. The amount remaining after this deduction, which the Nabob was to pay annually on account of military expenses, and the liquidation of his private debts, *viz.*, twelve lacs fifty-six thousand and four hundred pagodas, was to be paid in regular instalments; and in the event of any failure on his part, specified districts, yielding revenue to the amount stated,

and greatly ameliorated in others, that which Sir A. Campbell had contracted, none of the radical defects of the latter were corrected. The most material point in which this new treaty differed from the former, was, in the stipulation which provided for the complete introduction of a new authority in the

were, under the conditions of this treaty, to be assumed by the Company; and, on this event occurring, the Nabob was to recall all his officers from the said districts, except one in each, who was to remain, and annually to receive from the Company's officers attested statements of its gross revenue and net receipts.

The revenue of these countries, when assumed, was to be deducted from the sum to be paid by the Nabob; and they were to remain in the possession of the Company until the arrears due on the instalments were cleared, and the debts due by the Nabob to his private creditors fully liquidated; after which, those districts were to be restored to his authority. It was, however, stipulated, that on his failure in the regular payment of any of the instalments of the amount of six lacs thirty-five thousand two hundred and ninety-five pagodas, which would remain to be paid annually on account of military expenses, exclusively of the paishcush or tribute, the Company possessed a right to resume such one or more of the specified districts, the revenue of which was equal in value to the amount of the instalments which had fallen in arrear; and, on such event occurring, the district or districts so resumed were never to be again restored to the Nabob.

Besides these regular and stipulated payments, the Nabob agreed to defray such additional charges as should be incurred in granting him the occasional aid of the Company's troops to support his authority, or preserve internal order in his dominions.

government of the Carnatic on the occurrence of war with any foreign power. This change of authority, which was conditional in the treaty of 1787, was rendered absolute by that of 1792. By this essential alteration, the faint hopes which might before have existed of benefit to the contracting parties from the operation of an efficient administration of the affairs of the Nabob, or any of his successors, were altogether extinguished. This treaty also left the Nabob as much exposed as the former to the destructive intrigues of interested and bad advisers; and to the ruinous arts of usurers and extortioners, who, it was evident, would continue, as they had done before, to stimulate him, by every effort in their power, to the baneful resource of anticipating his revenues for the purpose of avoiding, or, at least, protracting, the diminution of his personal authority, by the alienation of any part of his territories.

Lord Cornwallis, from the general tenour of his despatches written at the moment, appears to have entertained strong hopes of the happy operation of this treaty. But the authorities in England did not partake of this impression, and they early directed an endeavour to modify the whole arrangement, which they justly apprehended would never yield the advantages expected from it.

In order to understand the nature of the arrangement which Lord Cornwallis made with the Vizier

of Oude, it will be necessary to take a short general view of the connexion previously subsisting between the Company and that prince.

By the treaty of Fyzabad, which was concluded with the Nabob Vizier Asuph ud Dowlah, in the beginning of the year 1775, soon after the accession of that prince to the Musnud, the Company came into possession of Benares, Ghazipore, and Chunar; and it was stipulated that a regular brigade of the Company's troops should be stationed in the territories of the Nabob, for the defence of the Subah of Oude, Corah, and Allahabad. The Nabob agreed to pay the monthly amount of two lacs and sixty thousand rupees for the services of this corps as long as it was stationed with him; and it was also agreed, that if he required further aid to defend other countries than those specified, a sum should be fixed, at the period of the requisition, proportioned to the service.

A few months after this treaty was concluded, Asuph ud Dowlah, in consequence of the great disorders which prevailed in his country, and the want of discipline and regularity in his army, applied to the Governor-general for the aid of a body of English officers sufficient for six battalions of sepoys, a corps of artillery, and a proportion of cavalry. This corps, he stated in his application, would be a complete check upon the rest of his army, and greatly strengthen his government. He

left the formation entirely to the English government, engaging himself to make arrangements for the regular discharge of its pay.

The corps thus formed was, in 1777, incorporated with the army of the Company, and stationed at Furruckabad. It was termed the temporary brigade, in distinction from the regular brigade in the Nabob's service, which was fixed at Cawnpore. The annual charge to the Vizier for the temporary brigade was about twenty-three lacs of rupees.

The Vizier was informed by the Governor-general, at the period when the temporary brigade was formed, that it should remain a fixed charge to him for so long a time as he should require it for his service. The court of directors, however, appear to have disapproved of this stipulation. "If by this proposition," they remarked, "it is intended to leave the Vizier at liberty to discharge the troops at his pleasure, we think such a stipulation dangerous, and likely to operate to our very great inconvenience; and if more be meant than is expressed, and you intend to exert your influence, first to reduce the Vizier to acquiesce in your proposal, and afterwards to compel him to keep the troops in his pay during your pleasure, your intentions are unjust and a correspondent conduct would reflect great dishonour on the Company."

The embarrassment anticipated by the court of directors from this arrangement soon arose. In the year 1779, two years after the measure had been

adopted, the Vizier, on the ground of a great de-falcation of his revenue caused by a failure of rain, declared his inability to make the advances necessary for the payment of the brigades, and the satisfaction of the other claims of the Company: and, though the estimate of the whole demand of the Company on him for the year was 13,612,188 rupees, he refused to grant orders to the resident for more than 6,882,000. The resident, when he reported this proceeding, transmitted a letter from the Vizier*, in which he professed his attachment to the Company; but earnestly solicited, that a consideration of his distress might induce the English government to relieve him from the burden of maintaining the new brigade stationed at Futtý Ghur, which he declared was not only useless to his government, but the cause of great loss in his revenues and customs. He also required the sanction of the government to the dismissal of some other corps in his service, commanded by European officers; and, according to his statement, attended with great expense, and very little utility.

The government of Bengal considered, that a compliance with the Vizier's wishes would expose both his interests and those of the Company to the greatest danger, as it was evident that he possessed no immediate means of preserving the internal tranquillity of his own territories, much less of pro-

* Under date the 19th of November, 1779.

tecting them from the danger with which they were actually threatened by the Mahrattas, with whom a war was at the moment deemed unavoidable. Under this impression, they directed the resident not only to insist upon a full and prompt performance of his pecuniary engagements to the Company, but to declare to him that he stood pledged to maintain the armies, which had been formed for his protection; and that, under the present circumstances, to disband any part of those troops which were maintained for his service was a measure no less improper for him to suggest than for the English government to adopt.

A letter was written at the same time by the Governor-general to the Vizier, in which the dangerous consequences likely to result from a compliance with his requests were most forcibly stated. It never could have been supposed, the Governor-general informed him, that, when he applied for the new brigade, the Company would have been at the pains to raise and discipline so large a body of men, and to augment their establishment with such an extraordinary number of officers as were necessary to command that body, under a liability to be burdened with the sole weight and expense of maintaining these officers, by a sudden resolution on the part of the Nabob to discharge them without previous and timely notice, and without the Company's consent. He explicitly told the Nabob in this letter, that, if he was

determined to withdraw himself from the alliance and assistance of the Company, he must give timely notice of his resolution, in order to prevent the interests of the Company from suffering: that he could not consent to the Vizier dismissing the Company's troops at such a distance from home, and at such a crisis: and he expected as much time would be given to dispose of the force, when the Vizier had no occasion for its services, as there had been for raising it. Mr. Hastings concluded this letter, by expressing his conviction, that, notwithstanding the unfortunate failure of the harvest, his highness's funds were still sufficient to pay a force so indispensable for the security of his country. He therefore insisted on his making good his payment to the Company, even if he were obliged to leave in arrears, or to disband, part of his own troops in order to effect that necessary object.

No doubt appeared to have been entertained, at this period, of the imperious necessity which compelled the British Government to refuse compliance with the requests of the Vizier; but the evils of a subsidiary engagement, the stipulations of which were not absolute, and the dissolution of which depended in a great degree upon the caprice of a native prince, were never more forcibly experienced; and it perhaps required all the wisdom, firmness, and decision of Mr. Hastings, to save the public interests from the great danger to which they were on this occasion exposed by the conduct

of a weak and profligate prince, who, acting under the influence of wicked and designing men, would have sacrificed, for the gratification of his pleasures, or the attainment of a temporary object, the permanent interests and security of his own country, and of that state with which he had become completely identified.

Though the Nabob Vizier was obliged to acquiesce, for the moment, in the urgency of the reasons stated by the Governor-general, he took the first favourable opportunity of renewing his solicitations upon the subject: and when he had proved his attachment to the British government in a very unequivocal manner, by his conduct during the rebellion of Cheyt Sing, Rajah of Benares, he again earnestly requested the attention of Mr. Hastings, who, under a more favourable impression of his designs than he had before entertained, concluded an engagement with him upon the 19th of September, 1781. By this engagement it was agreed, that the temporary brigade should be recalled within the limits of the Company's possessions, that the different corps of Sebundy* in his service under English officers, should be reduced, and that he should be charged with the expense of the original brigade only †, and

* Troops employed exclusively in the collection of revenue.

† Which had been fixed at the rate of 260,000 rupees per month.

one battalion of sepoy's to be stationed with the resident at Lucknow*.

In the event, however, of the Vizier even requiring a further aid of troops, he was to be charged with their actual pay, and allowances, from the date on which they should cross the Carumnassa river.

All the conditions of this engagement appear to have been carried into execution except the most essential, that which related to the recall of the temporary brigade. This, Mr. Hastings states †, he was prevented from fulfilling by political causes, to which the nature of the times compelled him to pay attention. He further states in the same document that, by a subsequent accommodation, into which he entered with Asuph ud Dowlah in 1784, when he visited Lucknow, he again positively agreed to withdraw the detachment from Furruckabad, and actually left orders with the resident at Lucknow to that effect; but that, on his return to Calcutta, finding this intention completely at variance with the opinions of the other members of the board, he thought it his duty, (being on the eve of resigning the government,) not only to give up all idea of carrying the measure into effect, but to make the repeal of his former resolution upon this subject an act of his

* The expense of which was fixed at the rate of 25,000 rupees per month.

† See Memoir published by Mr. Hastings after his return to England.

own authority, that it might not appear the effect of opposition, and thereby produce a dangerous influence on the credit of the succeeding administration.

No material changes in the connexion between the Company and the Vizier occurred during the short government of Sir John Macpherson: but these delays made the Vizier more anxious for the accomplishment of his object; and, immediately after the arrival of Marquess Cornwallis in India, Asuph ud Dowlah deputed his able and confidential minister, Hyder Beg Khan, to Fort William, with a view of explaining his situation, and of effecting an arrangement which should relieve him from some part of the existing burden on his finances.

The nature and result of this negotiation were fully stated by Lord Cornwallis in a minute, which he recorded upon the 20th of April. This document elucidates, in the clearest manner, the principles which regulated the conduct of that nobleman in the final settlement of this difficult and important question.

The Vizier had expressed, through Hyder Beg Khan, his expectations that the English government would recall the brigade from Furruckabad, agreeably to the stipulations entered into by Mr. Hastings when at Lucknow; but Lord Cornwallis gave it as his opinion, that the continuance of that force in the Vizier's dominions was equally essential to the interests of the Vizier and of the Company.

His lordship, in a letter addressed to the Vizier upon this occasion, stated the motives for desiring the continuance of this force in his dominions; and in the minute which he recorded upon the subject, he sums up the arguments which had induced him to this line of conduct by the following remarks: “ I shall only observe, that I by no means considered a single brigade stationed at Cawnpore as adequate to the defence of the Vizier’s frontiers; that although it did not appear to me that there was reason to apprehend any immediate attack upon them, the recall of so considerable a part of our force as the Futtu Ghur brigade might have precipitated that event; that it is well known, that the forces in the service of the Nabob Vizier are under no discipline, and barely sufficient to preserve the internal peace of his dominions; that his own immediate subjects are retained within the bounds of duty and allegiance by the respect inspired by the Company’s troops; that the character of the Vizier, his inconsiderate profusion in his expenses, his inattention to provide for them, and his total disregard to every thing but momentary gratifications, rendered it impossible to depend upon his care either for the protection of his country from foreign invasions, or internal commotion; and that although the charges attending the continuance of the brigade at Futtu Ghur exceed the sum we are authorized to claim from him, under the orders of the court of

directors, the arrangements made by this negotiation render the additional charge of little importance, when the magnitude of the objects is considered."

Lord Cornwallis also observes in this minute, that, from a general statement of the payments which the Nabob Vizier had made under different heads to the Company for a period of nine years, they amounted to the average of eighty-four lacs per annum ; though, by the treaties of 1775, and 1781, the Nabob had only bound himself to pay to the English government the sum of 3,121,000 rupees, and 3,420,000 rupees per annum.

His lordship adds that, by the engagement which he had concluded with Hyder Beg Khan, the annual amount of the Vizier's payment was permanently fixed at fifty lacs of rupees per annum ; and expresses his conviction, that this amount would fully indemnify the Company for all expenses to which they might be exposed from their connexion with the Vizier ; and that prince had, he was assured, perfect ability to make this annual disbursement, without suffering in either his convenience or dignity.

Hyder Beg Khan acquiesced in this arrangement ; with a declaration, however, that he relied upon the justice of the British government, and its regard for the interest of his master, to diminish the expenses for the maintenance of the Company's troops in his dominions by a recall of part

of them whenever policy or convenience should warrant.

Lord Cornwallis, in his letter to the Vizier, made a promise to the effect of the expectation expressed by Hyder Beg Khan ; but, in his minute on the subject, he acknowledges, that he could not foresee a period when such a measure could with prudence be accomplished.

His lordship, in this very able minute, took a view of the nature of the connexion between the Company and the Vizier ; and the line of conduct which, in his opinion, it was the duty of the English government to pursue toward that prince, with the object of improving and preserving the alliance.

“ The connexion,” he observes, “ between him (the Vizier) and the Company now stands upon the only basis calculated to render it permanent. We undertake the defence of his country ; and in return he agrees to defray the real expenses incurred by an engagement of so much value to himself. The internal administration of his affairs is left to his exclusive management ; and my attention will be constantly directed to the preservation of this system, whilst the Vizier continues to fulfil the stipulations into which he has entered.

“ By this declaration of a non-interference in the detail of the Vizier’s government, I do not mean to preclude myself, or this board, from making representations to him on the subject of his adminis-

tration, whenever it may be essentially necessary ; or of proposing to the Vizier any general arrangement, of importance to the interests of both governments : mutual convenience may render such propositions expedient ; and on these grounds only they ought to be made. The board will also, I imagine, see a necessity of giving their countenance to the Nabob Hyder Beg Khan, or whoever may be the acting minister of the Vizier. At present he possesses the entire confidence of his master, who is anxious to procure for him the avowed protection of this government. I made no difficulty in assuring the Nabob Hyder Beg Khan, that he might depend upon the support of this government whilst he served his master with fidelity, governed the country with justice and humanity, and strictly adhered to the engagements formed with the honourable Company."

Lord Cornwallis, from the information which he had obtained, was too well aware of the private character of the Vizier not to be sensible of the indispensable necessity which existed for giving a decided support to the minister Hyder Beg Khan, and to those who were, like him, favourable to the friendship which had been established between the two states : and the sentiments he recorded upon this point prove in the fullest manner, that, if an emergency had happened, no apprehension of the great responsibility to be incurred by a departure from the prescribed system of non-inter-

ference and neutrality would have deterred him from the adoption of those decided measures of practical policy which he might have deemed, under the actual condition of affairs, best calculated to promote the interests and security of the empire committed to his charge. His intentions, indeed, upon this point, as well as the reasons upon which they were founded, are explicitly stated in the able minute before cited.

“The Board are well informed,” he observes, “that the administration of affairs in the Oude government depends entirely upon the minister; that the Vizier himself takes no farther concern in it than to give the sanction of his name and authority to the acts of his servants; and that such is his disinclination to every thing that has the appearance of business, that even this formality is not complied with, on his part, without reluctance. The Vizier himself being profuse to an extreme, and little solicitous concerning the mode of obtaining funds to supply his habits of dissipation; the Company must rather look to the minister than to him for the punctual performance of his engagement. Exposed as he is to the effects of caprice and intrigue, it is impossible to determine how long the Nabob Hyder Beg Khan may continue to possess the confidence of the Vizier.

“The embarrassments attending his situation are many; as he will find it difficult, if the idea which I have formed of his master’s character is just, to

combine the two objects of conciliating the esteem and affection of the Nabob, and establishing a system of government calculated to promote his true interests. I forbear to expatiate further on this subject, and only hope, that no occurrence will ever happen to compel this government to interfere between the Vizier and his acting minister, or to give countenance to the latter against the approbation of the former."

These were the principal features of the only arrangement of political importance which took place with the Vizier of Oude during Lord Cornwallis's administration of the Company's affairs in India. Its operation was perhaps as happy as the personal character of Asuph ud Dowlah admitted of its being; but the indolence, dissipation, and extravagance of that prince created a constant embarrassment in his affairs, and rendered it often difficult for him to fulfil his engagements with the Company; of the value of whose aid and protection he appears always to have become least sensible when the tranquil state of his dominions proved most forcibly the benefits of the alliance.

Until the last year of his lordship's administration, peace existed between Great Britain and France, which enabled his lordship to employ the whole of the British force in India against Tippoo Sultaun, and to avoid the increase of military establishment which must have been made, if it had been requisite to provide for the defence of the exposed

parts of our possessions against the possible attacks of France, or to have equipped armaments against the colonies and possessions of that state or its allies.

When the account of war between France and England reached India, Pondicherry was immediately attacked, and taken, by an army from Fort St. George, under the commander of the forces of that presidency, Major-general Sir John Brathwaite. The Marquess had hastened from Fort William to take the direction of this service; but did not reach the coast till it was accomplished. He did not return to Bengal, but sailed for England in the month of August, 1793.

The extraordinary success which attended Lord Cornwallis's administration of the affairs of British India is no doubt to be attributed in a considerable degree to the manly spirit, sound judgment, and unshaken firmness, which distinguished his character. But a retrospect to the former history of India will enable us to discover a still more powerful cause of success in the exercise of those great civil and military powers, which, according to the act of 1784, was vested in the Governor-general. It was the possession of these powers which enabled him to unite, with such effect to the promotion of every object in his administration, the efforts of the hitherto divided and distracted local authorities of British India; and the active control and direction which he assumed over the subordinate presidencies

of Fort St. George and Bombay, during the whole of his government, placed their means and resources as much at his immediate command as those of Bengal.

The impression originally made upon the minds of the native princes of India by the rank and character of Lord Cornwallis was confirmed by their observation of his extended powers. Their attention was directed to the supreme authority of the British nation in India with an awe and respect which they had never felt for it before. The manner in which his lordship drew forth the strength and resources of the British government to the reduction of Tippoo Sultaun excited sentiments of equal astonishment and alarm; and the success of that war, combined with the great addition of strength, of territory, and of reputation, which its termination brought to the English government, while it extorted the admiration of all the native powers of India, raised their fears; nor was it possible that these, the result of actual events, could be removed by any display of moderation, which in itself implied a sense of the superiority which formed the just ground of their apprehensions.

The Indian government in England could not be insensible to the probable effects of the great changes which had taken place in the state of British India. They had seen (perhaps with regret) that events, beyond their control, had forced the Marquess to a decided departure from the pacific

system of forbearance and neutrality which they had believed practicable, and had so earnestly recommended to his pursuit; and that in opposition to views which they had taken of their interests, their territories had been greatly increased, and their political relations been much extended, during his administration.

The admission of the necessity which forced Lord Cornwallis into a course of measures so contrary to the wishes and policy of the government at home does not appear to have been followed by a conclusion, that the same causes might again produce the same effect; and a general impression would appear to have been at this period received in England, that his exertions had placed the affairs of the Company on the true footing of security and strength which had been so long desired; and that nothing was requisite but mild, moderate, and conciliatory councils in the local authorities to secure the lasting tranquillity and prosperity of the British possessions in India. This error seems more extraordinary, when we consider the actual state of every native power in India, as represented in those authentic public documents which have been cited in this concise narrative of his lordship's administration.

CHAPTER III.

ADMINISTRATION OF SIR JOHN SHORE.

State of Affairs favourable to the Security of the British Government.—Great political Changes during this Administration.—Retrospect of the Guarantee Treaty proposed by Marquess Cornwallis.—Court of Poonah refuses to accede to this.—The Nizam anxious for a separate Treaty of Guarantee.—Reasons of Sir John Shore against this.—Hostile Disposition of the Court of Poonah.—Causes of the Quarrel between that Court and the Nizam.—Tippoo threatens to attack the Nizam.—The Governor-general resolves not to assist this Prince.—View of the Policy pursued on this Occasion.—Convention of Kurdlah.—British Influence at the Court of Hyderabad greatly impaired.—Rebellion of the Son of the Nizam.—French Corps in the Nizam's Service much encouraged at this Time.—Death of the Paishwah.—Consequences of this Event.—Failure of the Treaty with the Nabob of the Carnatic.—Proposed Modification of that Treaty rejected by the Nabob.—View of the Affairs of Oude.—New Treaty with the Vizier.—Invasion of Zemaun Shah.—Invasion from the Northern Tribes considered.—System of Policy pursued in this Administration.

SIR JOHN SHORE, a most respectable civil servant of the Company, who had recommended himself to the favour and notice of the court of directors by a series of important services in India, was appointed to succeed the Marquess Cornwallis as Governor-

general there; and it appears to have been expected by the authorities in England, that all the great advantages obtained by his lordship would be confirmed and improved by the local knowledge, industry, and ability, of his successor.

The state of the different native powers of India at the period when Sir John Shore took charge of the supreme government, as already described, certainly did not promise a very long exemption from hostilities; yet, on the other hand, the condition of the Company's affairs was in every respect free from danger. The English government had at no period been so strong in actual military force and resources. Its principal enemy, Tippoo, was much reduced. The Soubahdar of the Deckan, the most important of all its allies, was firm to his engagements, and disposed to the cultivation and improvement of the friendship which had been established between him and the Company; and the Mahrattas, though their jealousy had been evidently much excited by the success of its arms, and the extension of its territories and political relations, regarded that state with a respect and apprehension likely to make them cautious how they offended it.

It is of great consequence to consider how far the course of policy which Sir John Shore thought it his duty to pursue affected this state of affairs; and to what extent the favourable impressions existing among the native powers, which, in an empire like that of British India, have a value beyond

force, were altered by the measures of his government.

Although Sir John Shore engaged in no war, his administration was marked by political changes in the state of India of great importance; and which merit particular attention, from the impossibility of forming any just opinion of subsequent events without a clear and distinct knowledge of those changes by which they were immediately preceded and produced. The political event of most consequence was the rupture between the Nizam and Mahrattas. In order to understand the nature of the interference by which the British government attempted to prevent this rupture, it will be necessary to trace in a cursory manner the changes which took place in the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah from the peace at Seringapatam to the disgraceful convention of Kurdlah, which may be considered as having annihilated, for the moment, the independence of the Nizam's government.

The Marquess Cornwallis, soon after the conclusion of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, made an endeavour, in fulfilment of the treaty of alliance with the Nizam and Paishwah, to reduce into an explicit and definite form those articles by which it was generally agreed that the contracting powers should guarantee to each other, against any future attacks of the Sultaun, the territories which they actually possessed at the termination of the war.

His lordship, in a letter* to the resident at Poonah, states his opinion respecting the great importance of this arrangement, and also defines the principle upon which he conceives this treaty should be framed.

“The allies,” he observes, “are bound to guarantee against Tippoo the territories that each of them might possess at the conclusion of the war; but it must always be adverted to, that the stipulation is merely defensive, and cannot operate, unless Tippoo should attack either of them without just provocation.

“It must therefore be clearly expressed in the treaty of guarantee, that in case any difference should arise between one of the latter and Tippoo, the other allies are to have a right to expect that the nature and circumstances of such difference shall be fully communicated to them, in order that they may give their opinion and advice, and endeavour to settle it by a temperate negotiation, and that they shall not be considered as bound to take up arms in his favour until they are convinced that he has justice on his side, and all measures of conciliation shall have proved fruitless.

“Should a rupture become unavoidable, the interest and safety of the contracting powers will be so evidently and deeply involved in the event, that it would be highly injudicious in them to limit

* The 7th of August, 1792.

their exertions in endeavouring to bring it to a speedy and honourable conclusion; and it must, consequently, be stipulated that the whole force of each state is to be employed for that purpose.

“The distress and danger of the party that may be attacked being entitled to the greatest attention from the other members of the alliance, it ought to be understood and settled, that, whilst no time should be lost in preparing their whole force to take the field, every immediate assistance that may be practicable should be afforded with such troops as may be in actual readiness for service.”

Lord Cornwallis subsequently framed a schedule of a treaty upon these principles, which he transmitted to the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah. It is not necessary to detail the articles proposed, as it was never concluded; but it is of importance to notice the general causes which led to the defeat of an arrangement, stipulated by prior engagements, and in every respect essential to the interests and security of the British government and its allies.

At the period when this proposition was first made to the court of Hyderabad, the Nizam had referred to the British government a dispute* which

* The dispute referred to the English government related to some claims made by Tippoo on the Nizam's dependant, the Nabob of Kernoul.

had occurred between him and Tippoo; and, with that puerility and petulance which too often characterize a native court, had demanded, as the condition of consent to the proposition of Lord Cornwallis, the interference and support of the English government for its settlement. He was, however, soon rendered sensible of the folly and unreasonableness of such a demand, and made every reparation in his power, by a full and unqualified assent to the proposed treaty.

The conduct of the court of Poonah was very different: it treated the guarantee proposed by the English government with delay and evasion, clearly proving a desire of being relieved altogether from engagements that might have the future effect of limiting or counteracting the designs which it cherished against Tippoo and the Nizam. Acting upon these principles, a counter-proposition was given in by Nanah Furnavese, minister of the Poonah state, to the British resident; which, after some discussion, was deemed altogether inadmissible, and was rejected. This engagement included, among other articles, a recognition, on the part of the allies, of claims of the Poonah government upon Tippoo for chout*, which was not authorized by the stipulations of the treaty of Seringapatam. The Nizam, while he declared his perfect readiness to consent

* A fourth of the revenues, exacted as tribute.

to the proposition made by Lord Cornwallis, was positive in the refusal of his acquiescence in the engagement proposed by the Paishwah.

After a vexatious and procrastinated negotiation, the project of a treaty was altogether abandoned, and the British government contented itself with a declaration, that it was satisfied with the verbal acquiescence of the Nizam; and a vague promise by the Poonah state, which conveyed no more than that it would always be ready to act agreeably to existing engagements. The Nizam, throughout the latter part of this negotiation, showed great anxiety for the conclusion of a separate treaty of guarantee. He argued, with much apparent justice, that the failure of one of three parties in the fulfilment of its engagements was no reason why the other two should neglect their faith, or sacrifice the proposed advantages. It was also urged, that the conclusion of the treaty with the Nizam would be the most certain mode of bringing the court of Poonah to consent to that necessary measure.

These arguments, however, had no weight with Sir John Shore, who thought it more prudent to lose the benefits of an arrangement which had appeared to his predecessor essential to the security and tranquillity of the possessions of the allies than to incur any hazard of giving offence to the Mah-rattas, whose jealousy he conceived would be further excited by the formation of any new engagement,

which should improve or consolidate the alliance between the English government and the Nizam.

Before stating the causes of the war between the Nizam and Mahrattas, it will be necessary to remark the temper of those states towards the British government, previous to its commencement. That of the Nizam's court is fully described in a despatch* addressed to the Governor-general by the resident † at Hyderabad, wherein he states his conviction, that the circumstances in which the court of Hyderabad was then placed, and the character of those by whom it was ruled, afforded an opportunity which it was wise and politic to use, to establish an ascendancy in its councils, which would enable us to command its future exertions, and to benefit from its resources under any events that could occur.

“Should, however,” Sir John Kennaway observes, “such an alliance, and the kind of interference above alluded to, be deemed improper, and the limits to which it is at present confined be considered as sufficient; the friendship and confidence in us, which has been so happily established in his government, and the reliance which the Nizam must ultimately place on the Company, for checking any hostile league which the Mahrattas may form

* Under date the 1st of January, 1794.

Sir John Kennaway.

against the rights or dignity of his government, will, I imagine, prevent his engaging in any measures to our prejudice, and induce him even to be guarded in adopting any, of which our very marked and pointed disapprobation may be expressed."

The whole of the last political despatch of this distinguished public officer is conclusive as to the temper of the Nizam at this period; and shows in the clearest manner the nature of those expectations of aid and support which he had been led by the whole tenour of Lord Cornwallis's policy to expect from the British government, in the event of his being exposed to an attack from the Mahratta states.

The disposition of the court of Poonah towards the British government was not more strongly marked by its refusal to conclude the guarantee treaty than by the extreme jealousy which it shewed of our connexion with the Nizam; and the resentment which, in consequence, it openly entertained against the latter. The councils of the Paishwah were at this period much swayed by Madhajee Sindia, who was known to cherish views hostile to the general peace of India, over which it was his avowed ambition to re-establish the Mahratta authority. In a conference with the agent of the Nizam at Poonah, that chief did not hesitate to state, in the most public manner, his dislike to the guarantee treaty; and to advise the Nizam not to enter into any such engagement with the British

government, of whose intentions he entertained the greatest suspicions.

Sir Charles Mallet, in a despatch to the Governor-general*, noticed these intrigues of Madhajee Sindia, but, at the same time, represented Nanah Furnavese as very averse to the violent counsels and language of that chief, thinking him desirous of subverting his authority, and establishing his own, as more equal to the task of counteracting the dangerous increase of our power.

In a subsequent despatch † Sir Charles states his conviction, that no possible opening should be given to the encroaching spirit of the court of Poonah, "which," he observes, "notwithstanding our uniform firmness and candour throughout my whole ministry, continues to contemplate the mightiness of our power with a jealousy unwarrantable, but in the consciousness of its own principles, and its inability to give others the credit due to purer motives."

This opinion respecting the temper of the court of Poonah was fully corroborated by every measure adopted by that government; as well as by the language of those who influenced its councils, which is described in several despatches from the resident, about this period, to have been of a nature very inimical to the British government. Madhajee

* The 14th of October, 1794.

† The 24th of July, 1794.

Sindia is indeed particularly stated to have avowed openly his reliance on Tippoo as a counterpoise to our increased power.

What has been stated fully proves that, immediately before the occurrence of the rupture between the Nizam and the Mahrattas, the former entertained the most friendly disposition towards the British government, on the good faith and sincerity of which he was disposed to place every reliance; and that he consequently rejoiced at the events which had established its great ascendancy in the political scale of the peninsula of India; whereas the latter had viewed our success with alarm, and contemplated the actual state of our power with a degree of jealousy which approximated to hostility.

With such feelings, the Mahratta states were likely to seek every opportunity of diminishing that power; and there can be no doubt that, in the reduction of the Nizam, they contemplated this object as well as their own aggrandizement.

It is unnecessary to enter into a detail of the grounds in which the rupture between the Nizam and the Mahrattas originated. The seeds of quarrel existed in the nature of their political relations. An unsettled account was always pending between them: the Nizam owed arrears of chout, the amount of which was exaggerated by one party, and perhaps under-estimated by the other. But this was not the only claim to be adjusted. The artful policy of the Mahrattas had taught them to

subdue the other nations of India in the mode best suited to their habits and genius. They did not, like other conquerors, endeavour to establish their authority in an open manner; but commenced by obtaining a cession of a part of the annual revenue of particular provinces; and this the indolent and declining Mahomedan governments were glad to grant to these active freebooters, in the hope of obtaining an exemption from the desolation to which their territories were exposed by predatory inroads. These concessions, however, only generated further demands, and the establishment of other claims, on the part of the Mahrattas. They proceeded to assert a right to collect, through their own officers, an equal share of the produce of some provinces, and a duty upon the revenue of others. This led to vexatious interference in the internal management of the country, supported by a large and corrupt body of revenue officers.

The mixed nature of this connexion was particularly suited to the character of the Mahratta nation, which subsisted as a confederacy of military states almost entirely by plunder; and as, from their constitution, they were constantly liable to changes of fortune, it became important that they should be able to abandon, at a period of weakness, without any resignation of right, those advantages which their predecessors had obtained. Hence they have often been known to unite, in order to enforce payment of large arrears of claims which, from

their internal divisions, had laid dormant for years.

The government of the Nizam had been for a short time completely under their influence. The Nizam's former minister, Rukeen ud Dowlah, had at one period acted more at their command than at that of his master*; and the whole administration of his successor, Azeem ul Omrah, had been a struggle to emancipate his government from this thralldom. Events had favoured his endeavours; and before the revival of the alliance with the English government in 1788, he had succeeded to a considerable extent. But there can be no doubt, that the hope of accomplishing this favourite object was one of the principal motives that led him to advise the Nizam to divest himself of all those alarms and prejudices which that prince had ever entertained of the designs of the British government; and to seek in its good faith and friendship that powerful aid and support, which, in the actual state of India, was necessary to the security, tranquillity, and independence of his country.

Directed by the same principles which had led him to form the alliance with Marquess Cornwallis, the Nizam most earnestly solicited the interference of the English government, to prevent the extre-

* The subserviency of that minister to the views of the Mahrattas has generally been considered one of the chief causes which induced the Nizam to put him to death.

mities which he apprehended from the conduct and military preparations of the Mahrattas ; and though the chief officers of his court acted, upon this occasion, in that weak and undecided manner which is natural to almost all the natives, there cannot exist a doubt, from every evidence upon this subject, that the Nizam would have readily pledged himself to abide by the decision of the British government on the dispute between him and the Paishwah ; provided he had been assured that the latter state would adopt measures to make its decision respected.

The Mahrattas, on the other hand, received the proffered mediation of the English government, from the first, with evasion and inattention ; and from the moment they were fully satisfied that we had no intention of aiding the Nizam further than by the interposition of friendly offices, and the expression of earnest solicitude for an amicable accommodation between the two parties, they treated our interference with a neglect approaching to insult.

The Governor-general was fully sensible of the serious injury likely to arise from a rupture which might be said to commence in the annihilation of the most important of the political relations established by his predecessor for the security of the British interests in India. He was also aware, that the disputes made the pretext of this rupture were easy of settlement, and were only a cover to the real designs of the Mahrattas, which went to the annihilation of the power of the Nizam. " If," Sir

John Shore observed*, “the Mahrattas should proceed to extremities against the Nizam, it can only be, I think, with a resolution to annihilate the independency of his authority; for, notwithstanding the sense which they may entertain of their superiority in the field, I see nothing in the articles disputed between the two states, as far as they have appeared, that does not admit of adjustment; or of sufficient magnitude to induce them to maintain the rumours of a war. The preparations of the Nizam are necessary for his own safety, and may contribute to suspend the Paishwah’s resolution.”

The death of Madhajee Sindia, during this negotiation, was an event most favourable to the effectual interference of the British government; and the resident at Poonah expressed his opinion, that advantage might be taken of an occurrence so propitious. The Governor-general was, however, adverse to the incurring of the smallest risk of offending the Poonah state, by any alteration in the course of policy which had been pursued; and Doulut Row Sindia, who succeeded his uncle, hastened to assemble his army from the remotest quarters of Hindustan; equally with a view of strengthening his personal authority, and of giving himself an ascendancy in the confederacy forming against the Nizam.

Immediately before the breaking out of hostili-

* In a letter dated the 1st of October, 1794, to the resident at Hyderabad.

ties between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, an alarm of a very serious nature attracted the attention of the British government. Tippoo Sultaun's active spirit of hostility against that state had led him to commence intrigues with the French government, the court of Hyderabad, and the court of Poonah, almost at the same moment that he concluded the peace of Seringapatam. He now assembled an army, and threatened to come forward as an ally of the Mahrattas against the Nizam, in the expected contest between those states.

Under such circumstances it became a question, what part the British government was to act, in the event of this extraordinary occurrence; and the subject was fully considered by the Governor-general, who resolved, in such event, not to aid the Nizam. The chief arguments which influenced Sir John Shore's mind upon this occasion are stated in a minute*, which merits particular notice as very fully elucidating the principles that regulated his conduct in the administration of the political affairs of the great empire committed to his charge.

It had been before decided that we should take no part in the existing quarrel between the Nizam and the Mahrattas, as the act of the legislature prohibited an interference which would necessarily involve us in hostilities; but when it appeared pro-

* This document, dated 18th February, 1795, is given in Appendix, No. 2.

bable that Tippoo would act against the Nizam, another question arose; in considering which the Governor-general not only took a view of our general engagements, but of the peculiar claims which the Nizam appeared to have on our friendship and protection.

That prince, it was thought, might urge, that he was by treaty entitled to the aid of the Company, as well as the Mahrattas, if Tippoo attacked him without just cause or provocation; that the defection of one party could not exonerate the other; and that, so far from being justified in refusing him aid against Tippoo, it was incumbent on us to stand forth and compel the third party to perform its stipulations.

The Nizam, it was anticipated, would assert that the obligation of assistance, as stated in the treaty, was clear, and admitted of no evasion; that his reliance, in making the treaty, was upon our good faith, not upon that of the Mahrattas, whose treachery he well knew, and of whom he had intimated his suspicions during the preliminary negotiations; that, at the period when we sought his alliance, the connexion was so essential to our interests that we must have entered into an offensive and defensive engagement in general terms, if he had insisted upon it; and that if we considered ourselves at liberty to renounce the performance of our stipulations because the Mahrattas had violated their engagements, or for other reasons of convenience or policy, there

was an end to that faith which is the basis of treaties, as such pretext could never be wanting to authorize a departure from the most solemn obligations.

Tippoo's aggression, the Nizam would state, must be with or without the concurrence of the Mahrattas; and in either case we ought to oppose it: but more particularly if that prince took the field as the ally of the Paishwah; for that would be such a direct and insulting violation of the treaty as we were bound by every consideration of duty and honour to resent.

The Governor-general, on the other hand, conceived, that the treaty on which the Nizam's claims to aid were grounded was a tripartite engagement, which supposed a continued union between the three allied powers: that such union was essential to its continuance in any shape, because it was essential to the performance of the obligations imposed by it; and a war between two of the parties, therefore, totally changed the relations of all.

A junction between Tippoo and one of the two parties to the treaty, was to be judged, Sir John Shore thought, with reference to the causes of hostilities between the two parties; and supposing that the injustice of the war between the Mahrattas and the Nizam was decidedly on one side, and that the other was compelled by unprovoked aggression, self-preservation would justify an alliance between

the aggrieved party and Tippoo; but a confederacy between him and one of the parties to the triple alliance, grounded on ambitious motives against another party, would no doubt be a gross infraction of the treaty by that state confederating with Tippoo. The inference from this reasoning appeared to the Governor-general to be rather against the Nizam, whose advance to Beder, if not an aggression, was certainly with a view of interfering in the internal affairs of the Mahratta government; all the bad consequences of which had been repeatedly, though ineffectually, stated by the British resident to the minister at the court of Hyderabad.

Should the English government support the Nizam against Tippoo, if the latter seized the opportunity of a war between the former and the Mahrattas to attack his country without provocation, we should necessarily be involved in a war with the Mahrattas; a predicament never contemplated in the triple alliance. The stipulations of that alliance, which bound the English government not to aid the enemies of either state, seemed to impose a strict neutrality on that government, in the event of these powers being at war with each other; such war being in fact a temporary subversion of the principles of the alliance. The arguments which represented the treaty of Paungul as a separate treaty, or that the secession of one party did not release the other because it is not

so expressed in that treaty, were, Sir John Shore thought, quite inadmissible. The alliance, he conceived, was one formed by three parties, not two, and to be maintained by their joint efforts; and not to admit that the secession of one party released the whole, required, in his opinion, more than ever the treaty intended, as it involved the necessity, or, at all events, the risk of a war with one of the parties to it; a case which the treaty never supposed, and contrary, indeed, to that presumption upon which all its stipulations were founded.

Though the occurrence of war suspended the operation of this alliance, the return of peace would, in the Governor-general's opinion, restore it to its former footing; and it was his intention, if Tippoo attacked either the Nizam or the Mahrattas while at war with each other, to call upon the third party to perform his stipulations. Such a call might, he conceived, induce the two parties at war to make peace; or, at all events, would show whether Tippoo's attack was in concert with one of the allies, and establish a direct breach of the treaty against that ally who should refuse his aid in defence of the party attacked, and leave the English government at liberty to act as it should think proper. But the Governor-general did not conceive that he was bound to assist either party, unless peace was previously concluded between the Mahrattas and the Nizam.

The Governor-general did not expect the Nizam would ever be convinced by the arguments which had satisfied his own mind upon this question, but feared that on the contrary he would be inclined to view our neutrality as a desertion of his cause, which ill repaid his co-operation with us, and his anxiety to unite with us by the closest ties; and that such impression upon the mind of a prince of the Nizam's political character would be likely to make him in future an enemy to the British government.

It was obvious to the Governor-general, at this period, that the Nizam, unsupported by the English government, must sink under the combined attack of the Mahrattas and Tippoo, who would become more dangerous than ever by this change. But when he contemplated the obstacles which presented themselves from the vices of the Nizam's administration; the impossibility of directing his politics without usurping his government; the difficulty of making any impression upon the Mahrattas; the comparative facility with which they could injure the British government; the magnitude of the resources and number of troops necessary to oppose the Mahrattas and Tippoo; and the inevitable ruin of a long-protracted war, he thought the inducement to support the Nizam, at the hazard of such consequences, ought to be much stronger than the apprehension of evils from the subversion of his power.

In the event, however, of the Nizam's power being annihilated by a combination of Tippoo and the Mahrattas, the Governor-general thought there was as great a probability of their attacking each other as of their uniting in an invasion of the frontiers of the Company. Our political estimation might, he conceived, lose something in the eyes of the native powers, by leaving the Nizam to his fate; but, although fully aware of the great value of opinion to the British government in India, he did not think it was on this occasion to be put in competition with the greater evils attending a war with Tippoo and the Mahrattas, which he believed would be the certain consequence of supporting singly the Nizam against Tippoo, if that prince should attack him whilst engaged in hostility with the Paishwah.

Sir John Shore appears to have been very sensible to the loss of reputation at this moment; as he justly conceived that the conduct of the British government, in resenting the attack upon its ally, the Rajah of Travancore, and the character of the negotiation by which the war with Tippoo was terminated, had gained us the confidence of our allies, and established the British reputation throughout India for good faith, firmness, and moderation. But while he acknowledged the advantage of such impression, he conceived it more necessary to attend to considerations of self-preservation.

He was of opinion, that whether the disputes between the Nizam and Mahrattas were to be determined for the present by war or negotiation, they would end in the subjection of the former to the latter; and, consequently, bring a great accession of strength to the Mahrattas, whose power he thought even then exorbitant; that the Nizam, in despair of the support of the British government, would court the alliance of Tippoo; but that their union was impracticable; and that if the latter prince attacked the Nizam without previous concert with the Mahrattas, they would make their own terms with the court of Hyderabad, and then unite with the English government against Tippoo.

Though the weakness of the Nizam might offer a temptation to Tippoo, the subversion of the British power was suspected by the Governor-general to be the great aim of that prince. The confirmation of our alliance with the Mahrattas was considered by him an object of the first importance; because, with their aid, we might always oppose Tippoo, or any European power: whereas the aid of the Nizam was not of itself equal to these objects.

Sir John Shore, therefore, expressed his full conviction that the best mode of maintaining tranquillity was to have our military establishment on so respectable a footing as to impose peace upon our neighbours. This, he thought, was the wisest as well as most economical system. He

appears, however, to have strongly felt (as Lord Cornwallis had done before) the injury and danger to which our interests might eventually be exposed from the operation of the act of 1793, restricting our alliances with the native states of India.

The clause of that act which interdicts us from declaring war, or commencing hostilities, except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations made for their commencement, against the British government, was decisive, the Governor-general conceived, taken in its literal construction, against any interference on our part in favour of the Nizam, if attacked by Tippoo without the co-operation of the Mahrattas; and the circumstances of the case confirmed, he thought, this construction, in point of expediency. But he considered it very possible, that, without any view to the extension of our dominions, a case might arise in which the security of our possessions might be best consulted at the risk and even certainty of hostilities, by taking part with one state against another; and the question was, whether we should be justified in such a determination where we are not bound by treaty to defend or guarantee a state which, under such circumstances, it might be expedient to assist?

From the above abstract of Sir John Shore's recorded sentiments upon this important question, it appears, that he had resolved to abandon the Nizam to the resentment of Tippoo Sultaun, on the

ground of such a measure being defensible in point of faith; expedient in point of policy; and conformable to the letter of the act of the legislature for the government of our possessions in India. He conceived, that the English government would be fully justified in their abandonment of the cause of that prince, as long as he might be involved in a war with the Mahrattas; because the latter state was one of the parties to the triple alliance: or, in other words, that if Tippoo should succeed in the hostile design, which the Governor-general believed him to entertain, of fomenting a disunion among the allies, and entered into a league with the Mahrattas, (which formed, on their part, a complete breach of the triple alliance,) the English government would be thereby emancipated from all obligation to fulfil its treaty with the Nizam.

The Governor-general appears also to have been content to sacrifice, upon this occasion, part of that high reputation and character which the conduct of his immediate predecessor had obtained for the British government in India; provided he could, by such sacrifice, secure immediate exemption from the difficulties and dangers to which, he thought, the state might be exposed by a more spirited and decided course of action.

One of the chief causes which inclined the Governor-general to determine upon not aiding the Nizam was, the existence of that very weakness in

his administration, and that need of support which, three years before, had been allowed as just and legitimate causes for inducing that prince to seek and cultivate the connexion with the British government.

The Governor-general appears to have cherished a hope that, by not supporting the Nizam, he should in some degree disarm the hostile jealousy of the Mahrattas against that prince, which had been obviously much excited by the relations of friendship he had recently contracted with the English government; and under the great and alarming political changes which appeared likely to result from the destruction of the Nizam's power, he found a consolation in the possibility of a subsequent rupture between Tippoo and the Mahrattas, and in the prospect that the latter would find occupation more immediately inviting than an attack upon the British territories, in the consolidation of their vast power, by the final subjection and reduction of the few petty states which continued to resist their authority in Hindustan.

On all these grounds the Governor-general came to a conclusion, that the act of parliament was against aiding the Nizam if attacked by Tippoo while at war with the Mahrattas, and that the circumstances of the case were such as to justify this line of policy in point of expediency.

This conclusion, it is however to be observed, was formed, after assuming that the defection of

one party from a triple offensive and defensive alliance, and its actual union with that very power against whom the alliance was originally formed, for the purpose of attacking one of the other parties of the alliance, cancelled the obligation of the remaining party, and gave it a right to remain neuter. But allowing this general position to be correct, it was hardly applicable to the particular case under discussion; for the Nizam concluded the treaty, which bound him to the triple alliance, on the declared principle of placing his sole dependance upon the faith of the English. His fears from the treachery of the Mahrattas were expressed at the very moment of signing the treaty, and were removed only by repeated and solemn assurances of the permanent friendship of the British government.

Marquess Cornwallis declared* to the resident at Poonah, that the Mahratta state, by acting against Tippoo in concert with the British government, became entitled, in reason and equity, to a defensive alliance against that prince, even though no previous engagement existed. This declaration sufficiently showed the sense which that nobleman entertained of the obligations which the mere act of aid, during hostilities (independent of formal engagement) imposed upon the British government. He was fully sensible that we owed our power in India to that reputation which led the most perfid-

* In a letter dated 28th of February, 1790.

dious nations to rely with confidence upon the verbal assurances of our representatives; and to consider that, in espousing our cause in any war in which we were engaged, they established a right, which nothing but their own misconduct could ever forfeit, to our future friendship, and to our protection against any power whom they had offended by exertions in our favour.

Sir John Shore was aware of the reproaches which his proposed line of conduct might draw upon the British government, and the loss of reputation and of political consequence likely to ensue from abandoning the Nizam. But though he declared himself fully sensible of the value of opinion in India, he did not "think it could be placed" (on this occasion) "in competition with the greater evils likely to attend a war with the Mahrattas and Tippoo Sultaun." It may appear difficult to fix the nature or extent of the exertions which a state would be warranted in making upon any occasion to maintain its reputation and character; because these are qualities of which the precise value can never be ascertained: but the history of every nation of the globe sufficiently proves that they have been always most cherished by states which were rising, or in the zenith of their power; and neglected by those only which were on their decline, or on the eve of dissolution. If this rule be just with regard to states in general, how much more must it apply to that extraordinary empire

which the British nation has founded in the East! For there can be no doubt that empire is held solely by opinion; or, in other words, by that respect and awe with which the comparative superiority of our knowledge, justice, and system of rule, have inspired the inhabitants of our own territories; and that confidence in our truth, reliance on our faith, and dread of our arms, which is impressed on every nation in India.

These feelings are in the first place to be ascribed to that wretched and oppressive rule, from which the introduction of our power relieved our present subjects; and to the comparative tranquillity and happiness which they enjoy under our dominion: and, in the second, to those principles of falsehood and treachery which mark the intercourse of the native states of India with each other, and which make each of these, in turn, anxious to cultivate the friendship of a nation which, though different in religion, in usages, and in language, has maintained a character for faith and courage which gives the highest value to its friendship.

Assuredly, according to this view of our situation, we can contemplate no danger so great as that of hazarding the smallest diminution of the reputation upon which the British empire in the East is grounded.

The best criterion of every system of policy is its result; and we now proceed to examine the events

produced by the course adopted by the British government towards that of Hyderabad.

In February, 1795, a war between the Mahrattas and the Nizam became certain: the advanced corps of the army of the former, under the command of Dowlut Row Sindia, attacked that prince*, who had advanced from Beder to meet it. After a general action, in which both parties were thrown into some confusion, and neither obtained any decided advantage, the Nizam, hurried by the fears of his women, who attended him in the field, retreated during the night, and took shelter in the small fort of Kurdlah. This fort is surrounded with hills, except on one part, which the Mahrattas immediately occupied; and thereby completely hemmed in his army, and cut it off from all supplies.

After remaining for some weeks in this situation, the Nizam was obliged to conclude a peace, the exact particulars of which were not known; but, independently of the full admission of all the former claims of the Mahrattas, as established by the treaty of Edgheer, it was understood that the Nizam agreed to cede to his enemies a country of about thirty-five lacs of rupees in annual revenue, including the fort and district of Doulutabad, and to pay them three crores of rupees, one-third immediately, and the remainder in annual instalments

* This action took place on the 11th of March, 1795.

of twenty-five lacs. To these conditions were added one still more disgraceful, the delivery of his prime minister, Azeem ul Omrah into the hands of the Mahrattas, as a hostage for the faithful performance of his engagements.

After the convention of Kurdlah was settled, the Nizam returned to Hyderabad; and the Mahratta confederates marched towards their respective countries; which they had hardly reached when two unexpected occurrences took place—the sudden death of the young Paishwah, Madhoo Row, and the rebellion of Ally Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam. These two events conspired to revive the lost influence of the British government at the court of Hyderabad, and to restore the Nizam to his former consequence among the powers of the peninsula. It is necessary, however, to take but a very cursory and general view of them. The latter event was the one of most consequence to the British government, as it prevented the entire dissolution of the connexion established between that state and the court of the Soubahdar of the Deckan.

The Nizam, when encamped at Beder, had shown great anxiety that the two battalions, which he subsidized from the English government, should join his camp; but a compliance with this wish was evaded, as it was thought their junction would give offence to the Mahrattas: it was, however, afterwards so arranged that, while the Nizam continued at war with the Mahrattas, the English

battalions should be employed in preserving the tranquillity of his dominions.

After the Nizam returned to Hyderabad, he intimated his desire to dispense with the service of the two English battalions; and that corps, in consequence, removed to the territories of the Company.

The same feeling of resentment towards the British nation which dictated this measure, led him to pay the greatest attention to the increase and improvement of a large body of regular infantry in his service commanded by French officers. Their representations* were at this time artfully directed to impress the Nizam with an exaggerated belief of the successes which had attended the French arms in Europe. This corps, commanded by Monsieur Raymond, which had consisted of two battalions only in 1792, was augmented after the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam; and no less a body than twenty-three battalions, with twelve field-pieces, is stated by the resident to have accompanied the Nizam in the campaign against the Mahrattas. After the return of that prince to his capital, he not only ordered considerable new levies for this corps, but put great power into the hands of its commander by a large grant of territory for its regular payment.

The British resident endeavoured to make the

* See despatches from the British resident at Hyderabad.

court of Hyderabad sensible of the dangers which might result from this procedure; but little attention was given to him; and his remonstrances against the intention of sending a considerable part of this force to occupy Kurpah and Cummum, districts immediately upon the frontier of the Company's possessions, were equally disregarded.

This last measure appears to have occasioned much uneasiness to the Governor-general, whose apprehensions of its possible consequences were strongly stated in his minute upon the subject*.

“The determination of the Nizam,” he observes, “to depute a part of Monsieur Raymond's corps towards Kurpah, near the frontiers of the British possessions, requires, in my opinion, more serious opposition than has been made to it by the resident at Hyderabad. The measure itself has a suspicious, not to say criminal appearance; and although we may acquit the Nizam of any hostile designs against the Company, and should certainly avoid imputing them to him, I can entertain little doubt of the disposition of Monsieur Raymond and the officers of his corps to co-operate with the French in any attempts upon the Northern Sircars. Such an attempt may not be probable; but as it would, if carried into execution, be attended with very serious consequences to the British possessions in India, the strongest representations ought

* Under date the 15th of June, 1795,

to be made to induce the Nizam to recall the detachment of Monsieur Raymond."

In a letter to the Nizam upon this subject, Sir John Shore adverted in a general manner to the consequences which might result from placing, in such a position, a force under the command of men who were the declared enemies of the British government, and requested him to withdraw it. But, in the instructions to the resident, he directed a more decided language to be used to that prince. After stating the arguments which the resident was to use to endeavour to prevail upon the Nizam to recall the detachment in question, he concluded by the following instructions:—

"These arguments, urged in firm, but moderate and conciliatory language, will, I hope, prevail on the Nizam to comply with my wishes and request in the recall of the detachment. I deem this a point of the first importance; but, if he should still persist in his determination to continue it at Kurpah, you will adopt the language of remonstrance; and ultimately acquaint him, that I shall, in this event, be compelled, with whatever reluctance, to advance a body of troops towards our frontier."

A correspondence appears to have been established at this time, between Raymond and several of the French officers (prisoners of war) at Pondicherry; and nothing but the great vigilance of Lord Hobart, who then presided over the Madras

government, prevented his being joined by a number of these officers, who were apprehended when just on the point of making their escape.

The dismissal of the English subsidiary force ; the increase of Raymond's corps ; the detachment of a part of that corps to the frontier of the Company, in opposition to the remonstrance of the British representative,—concurred to prove, that the influence established in the Nizam's councils by the wise and spirited policy of Lord Cornwallis was entirely lost ; and that the English government not only could place no dependence upon the aid of that prince, but had just reason to apprehend that his resources might be early directed against the Company's possessions, either from the prevailing power of a French faction, the complete subjection of his country to the Mahrattas, or from his throwing himself, to escape that extreme, into the hands of the irreconcilable enemy of the English, Tippoo Sultaun, who was most active at this period in his intrigues to effect this object, which too well combined with the obvious views of the rising French interest in the Deckan.

These consequences, which threatened to be the inevitable result of the policy that had been pursued, were fortunately averted by one of the events which have been mentioned, the rebellion of Ali Jah. The flight of that prince, which took place on the 28th of June, may be truly said to have

saved the British government from the very serious evils to which it was at this crisis exposed.

The Nizam, alarmed by the flight and rebellion of his son, pressed the instant return of the English subsidiary force to Hyderabad; agreed to the recall of the detachment of Raymond's corps from Kurpah; and took every step which could obtain him, at so critical a moment, the aid and support of a nation whose friendship he had so recently slighted.

The English government had become, from a very short experience, fully sensible of the importance of this accident to its interests. The battalions were directed to march to the Nizam's territory with every possible expedition; and they were already advancing to join the army acting against Ali Jah when accounts were received of the defeat and capture of that prince; whose death, soon after he was made prisoner, relieved the Nizam from the fears which this rebellion had excited.

The advantage derived on this occasion from the countenance and support of the British government was fully recognized by the Nizam; and he must have become more convinced of the value of the aid of the subsidiary force, from the activity and gallantry which it displayed under its able commander, Captain James Dalrymple, in the reduction of the fort of Rachore* ; and the defeat of

* March, 1796.

a large body of troops, who had risen in rebellion under the banners of a prince* of his family.

But, however satisfied the Nizam might have been of the utility of the English force in preserving the internal tranquillity of his country, he had learnt from experience, that he could not hope for their support in case of an attack upon his dominions by the enemies whose aggressions and rapacity he most dreaded; and his chief attention was in consequence bestowed on a rival corps, on whom he thought he could depend to resist any such attack. The battalions under Monsieur Raymond had acquired increased reputation by the active part which they took in the reduction of Ali Jah. Their numbers and appointments were increased: additional lands were consigned to their commander to ensure their regular payment; arsenals and foundries were formed for their equipment; and, in short, every effort was made which could add to the strength and stability of this favourite body of troops.

The ability of M. Raymond took advantage of this favourable disposition in the prince whom he served. He made every effort to improve the discipline of his corps, and to strengthen himself by connexions with the chief officers of the court. The hostile spirit of himself and his officers against

* This prince was the son of Darar Jah, the nephew of the Nizam.

the English government was displayed on every occasion. His battalions carried the colours of the French republic (then at war with England); and the cap of liberty was engraven on the buttons of their clothing: he encouraged desertion from the native corps in the English service; and, through the intrigues of his officers, who commanded the detachment of his corps stationed for a period on the British frontier, a partial mutiny was excited in a battalion of Sepoys on the Madras establishment; and two native commissioned officers, accompanied by a number of men, went over to the French party.

From this statement it is evident, that even after the return of the English battalions, and the apparent re-establishment of confidence between the Company's government and the Nizam, the English corps was only retained for a period in the Deckan, from considerations of convenience; while the actual power and resources of the Nizam's government were passing rapidly into the hands of a French faction, whose views were avowedly hostile to the British government.

The Nizam was not insensible to the danger to be apprehended from the power which necessity had forced him to place in the hands of this French party; and he continued to solicit that the British government would enter into such engagements with him as would prevent the necessity of his having recourse to such dangerous means of de-

fence. To obtain this object, he offered to dismiss the French corps as soon as the British detachment in his service was increased. But the conditions on which he wished to make this arrangement were thought by Sir John Shore to be incompatible with our engagements with the Mahrattas; and no decisive steps were taken.

The expedient of introducing English adventurers into the service of the Nizam was tried at this period: but these, though indirectly supported by the British resident, made little progress; and their corps never obtained a footing, to afford the least prospect of rivalling that of Raymond, whose activity and spirit of hostility were naturally excited by these inefficient attempts on the part of the English government to supplant his power and influence.

The death of the young Paishwah, Madhoo Row (the other event which has been mentioned), contributed to restore to the Nizam, beyond every hope that could have been indulged, a part of that power and rank among the states of India which he had lost by the disgraceful convention of Kurdlah.

This demise, which happened on the 27th of October, 1795, occasioned the most serious divisions among the Mahratta chiefs, whose interests were deeply involved in the succession. Nanah Furnavese, the principal minister at Poonah, de-

sired to place an infant, remotely connected with the family of the Paishwah, upon the musnud, to the exclusion of the legitimate heir, Badjerow, the son of Ragobah, who was the paternal uncle of the deceased Paishwah. This plan was opposed by the agent of Doulut Row Sindia ; and that chief, on receiving the account of the death of the Paishwah, prepared to march to Poonah, determined to espouse the just claim of Badjerow. To counteract this, Nanah Furnavese endeavoured to add to his strength by gaining the support of the government of the Nizam ; and for this purpose he released Azeem ul Omrah, and entered into a negotiation with that minister, which terminated in a treaty, by which Nanah Furnavese resigned, on the part of the Poonah state, all the great cessions obtained from the Nizam by the convention of Kurdlah.

During the course of this negotiation, Azeem ul Omrah had artfully managed to draw large bodies of troops from the Nizam's territories, to support the influence which he had established at Poonah, and to enable him to return to Hyderabad. But his views were in some degree frustrated by the arrival of Doulut Row Sindia with a force which gave him a decided ascendancy, and enabled him to place Badjerow upon the vacant throne.

This change occasioned a new negotiation with Azeem ul Omrah, which terminated in his agreeing, on the part of the Nizam, to cede one-fourth

of the territory, and to pay one-fourth part of the sum fixed by the convention of Kurdlah. After this settlement was concluded, which, though much less favourable than that made with Nanah, was still highly advantageous to the Nizam, he obtained permission to return to Hyderabad, where he resumed the office of prime-minister.

The success which attended Doulut Row Sindia upon this occasion established his ascendancy in the Mahratta empire. He soon afterwards made Nanah Furnavese prisoner; and the minister only regained his liberty by the payment of a large sum, and an acquiescence in every measure which Sindia thought necessary to establish his power. This was greatly augmented at this period by the death of the rival of his family, Tuckojee Holkar, most of whose possessions he usurped, after putting to death his eldest son, and making prisoner the next legitimate representative of the family.

In addition to these usurpations, Doulut Row forced the Paishwah to cede to him the important fortress of Ahmednuggur and its surrounding district; by which cession he not only obtained the command of the city of Poonah, but the best entrance into the territories of the Paishwah, and the Soubahdar of the Deckan.

The extraordinary power which Doulut Row Sindia possessed at this period was rendered more alarming to the British government from the nature and constitution of that force of regular in-

fantry by which it had been attained and established.

The command of that large corps, which General Deboigne had originally formed for Madhajee Sindia had devolved upon General Perron. The youthful ambition of Doulut Row Sindia led him to take every step to render more efficient a force which gave him so decided a superiority over the other native powers of India. The principal European officers were stimulated to exertion by every motive which could awaken avarice or excite ambition. The officers of subordinate rank had adequate allowances regularly paid; and the men were not only well paid, but, by an arrangement effected by the influence and power of their European commanders, they became entitled, when disabled by wounds or length of service, to retire on a pension establishment, formed on principles every way congenial to their habits.

Almost the whole of that part of Hindustan which had been subdued by Sindia, as well as the realization of his claims upon the Rajpoot states, was intrusted by that chief to the management of the French general who commanded his infantry.

This corps, independently of several separate bodies of infantry acting with it, already amounted to several regular brigades. They were chiefly recruited from the Company's provinces; were clothed and armed like English sepoy; had a numerous train of artillery admirably equipped,

and a considerable body of cavalry attached to them.

They were, from their strength, discipline, and union, decidedly superior to all the rest of Sindia's army; and their leader had become, in a great degree, independent of his authority. There was therefore just reason to apprehend that Sindia might be obliged (even if his avowed jealousy of the English should not incline him) to adopt, at a future period, any hostile projects which this French party might cherish against the prosperity of the British government.

There was but little intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun during the administration of Sir John Shore. The two sons of that prince, who had been given as hostages for the faithful performance of the treaty of Seringapatam, were conducted to Mysore when that engagement was fulfilled. Tippoo received the officer by whom they were conducted with cold and constrained civility, and gave him no encouragement to make overtures towards a more cordial union, which he had been authorized to do, if he found that prince disposed to cultivate the friendship of the English nation.

Tippoo Sultaun acted upon this occasion, as on every other, in a manner which evinced the most hostile sentiments towards the English government; and which shewed that he only waited for an opportunity of attacking its power. This he thought he

should be best able to do after possessing himself, either by negotiation or war, of the resources of the Deckan. His readiness to unite with the Mah-rattas ; his threatened attack of Karnoul ; his assembling a large force at Gooty in 1796 ; his intrigues with the nephew of the Nizam, Imteaz ul Dowlah, when Azeem ul Omrah was confined at Poonah ; and his active correspondence with Monsieur Raymond, at the same period, may all be ascribed to his desire of accomplishing this favourite object. Fortunately the revolution at Poonah, and the rebellion of Ali Jah, by restoring Azeem ul Omrah to power, and reviving the English connexion at Hyderabad, frustrated his designs.

Before concluding this sketch of the political administration of Sir John Shore, it will be necessary to refer to some changes of importance which took place during that period at the courts of the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Vizier of Oude.

The unhappy operation of the treaty concluded by Lord Cornwallis with the Nabob of the Carnatic has been already stated. No attempt was made, during the life of his highness Mahomed Ally Khan, with whom it had been concluded, to modify this treaty. Upon his death, however, which happened on the 13th of October, 1795, Lord Hobart, governor of Fort St. George, thought it his duty to endeavour to effect a modification with his successor Omdut ul Omrah. His lordship states, in his letter

to the Governor-general in council*, that he had opened a negotiation for that purpose, in consequence of several communications which he had held in England with Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Dundas, and assigned as his reason for not delaying this negotiation till he heard from the supreme government, the active intrigues of those, who, from motives of personal interest, endeavoured to persuade Omdut ul Omrah to make no change whatever in the treaty. His lordship concludes by expressing a hope that, although his efforts had been unsuccessful, the representations which he had made to England would produce instructions to put an end to a system which he represents as “destructive to the resources of the Carnatic, and in some degree reflecting disgrace upon the British government.”

The modifications † which Lord Hobart wished to effect were, the entire cession to the Company of the countries mortgaged for the regular payment of the pecuniary instalments: the cession of the right of sovereignty over the Poligars, which the Nabob retained, though the collection of the tribute from these Poligars had been made over to the Company; and the cession of some of the forts in the Carnatic.

The first of those conditions, his lordship conceived, would be attended with equal benefit to the Nabob and the Company, as it would effectually re-

* Of the 25th of October.

† Of the treaty of 1792.

lease the former from the necessity of applying to usurers, by whom his country had been ruined. It was also likely to prevent every future subject of irritation between the two states; and, finally, to save the countries ceded from a system of oppression and extortion, which had already greatly diminished their population, and which threatened to make them at a very early period inadequate, from their decrease of value, to that security for which they had been originally pledged.

The second condition required the cession of little more than a nominal power on the part of the Nabob; but it was essential to the Company, the exercise of whose authority over the turbulent Poligars had been much thwarted and obstructed by the name of sovereignty remaining with the Nabob. The third condition, the cession of some forts in the Carnatic, was at that period judged essential, to place that country in a proper state of defence against any aggressions of Tippoo Sultaun.

Lord Hobart offered considerable sacrifices to the Nabob with a view to prevail upon him to acquiesce in this arrangement; but in vain. Omdut ul Omrah gave an unqualified refusal to all his propositions; and, in answer to the numerous arguments by which they were recommended to his attention, he only stated his immovable determination to abide by Lord Cornwallis's treaty, which he declared he had been directed to do by the most sacred of all commands, "the dying injunctions of his father."

Lord Hobart, in his Minute*, conveys, in very strong language, his opinion of the total failure of the treaty of 1792. "If we look back," his lordship observes, "to the origin of the treaty of 1792, we shall find that it arose from the representations of the Nabob Wallajah; that without imposing burthens upon his people which they were not able to bear, he could not make the payments to the Company stipulated for in the treaty of 1787; but he had no sooner prevailed upon the government to acquiesce in a reduction of those payments, which he effected by the treaty of 1792, than, by the manner in which he carried the provisions of it into execution, he increased the miseries of his people tenfold, and defeated every humane and salutary object it was intended to attain.

"Under existing circumstances, the Company sustain no loss, except in the extinction of the inhabitants of the Carnatic; but in the arduous season of war they must experience the most fatal defalcations.

"It has been, with the deepest regret," his lordship adds, "that I have found the Nabob unmoved by my entreaties and remonstrances upon this subject: not that he has been insensible to the justice and expediency of what I have proposed, but, as he has candidly confessed at several interviews with me, that he has not the resolution to comply; in-

* Dated 4th of December, 1795.

forming me that his native ministers, and European advisers, so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him, that he could not venture upon this measure, notwithstanding his conviction that he ought to do so."

The supreme government, as soon as they received accounts of the death of the Nabob Mahomed Ally Khan, and before the receipt of Lord Hobart's letter, had sent instructions to the government of Fort St. George*, to endeavour to obtain the acquiescence of Omdut ul Omrah to the complete cession of all his territories to the Company.

They state, in this despatch, that their sentiments entirely correspond with those which had been expressed by Lord Cornwallis in his letter to the court of directors †, in which his lordship declares his conviction, that the disadvantage and danger arising from the separation of the internal government and management of the revenue of the country from the responsibility for its defence, was so obvious that, could he have indulged the slightest hope of the Nabob's consent, he would have proposed to him an arrangement which would have vested the Company with the entire management of the Carnatic, under a condition to pay to the Nabob a liberal portion of its revenues; and Lord Cornwallis had stated his full belief that this plan was the one

* Dated the 28th of October, 1795.

† Of the 9th of July, 1793.

best calculated to promote the real interests of the Nabob, and the comfort and happiness of the inhabitants of the Carnatic.

The supreme government concluded this despatch by an expression of their own opinion of the great importance of this object. "Whether the difficulties stated by Lord Cornwallis," they observe, "still exist in a degree to preclude any negotiation for accomplishing the arrangement pointed out, your lordship in council must determine; but if there can be any probability of obtaining the Nabob's acquiescence to it, we have only to express our wishes that it may be attempted; and our fullest conviction of the acknowledgments which will be due to your lordship's ability and address in effecting an arrangement of so much importance to the prosperity of the country, the interests of the Company, and the real happiness of the Nabob."

When the supreme government received information of the steps taken by Lord Hobart, they approved fully of the modifications proposed by him to Omdut ul Omrah, which were indeed much more limited than the arrangement they themselves had recommended; and they directed, in their letter to Fort St. George*, that these modifications should be again offered to his highness's consideration, as they thought it possible he might be more inclined to comply with them, from observing so

* Dated the 30th of November, 1795.

complete a concurrence of sentiment upon this subject between the two governments.

The supreme government state their opinion, that the assumption of the district of Tinnevelly for the liquidation of a debt (termed the cavalry loan) due by the Nabob to the Company, and the requisition of the forts in the Carnatic, (two measures suggested by the government of Fort St. George) would be considered by the Nabob as an indirect mode of compelling his consent to the modifications of the treaty of 1792, and consequently as an infraction of that engagement; and as they did not consider the English government had a right under it to assume, on account of the above loan, any of the Nabob's territory not mentioned in that treaty; and as the case had not occurred, in which the forts in question, as specified in Lord Cornwallis's letter, were to be garrisoned by the Company's troops, it was also their opinion, that neither of these measures should be attempted.

Sir John Shore addressed a letter to Omdut ul Omrah; and pointed out how much he would promote his own interests, and those of the Company, by a compliance with the propositions which had been made to him by Lord Hobart.

The exertions of the Governor-general upon this occasion were, however, altogether unsuccessful. The Nabob persisted in refusing his consent to any modification whatever of the treaty of 1792; and

continued, under that treaty, to deliver over one district after another of his unhappy country into the hands of those usurers and extortioners who excited him to oppose the wishes of the English government, while they supplied him, at enormous interest, with the sums necessary to fulfil punctually his pecuniary engagements with that state.

The tranquillity of the possessions of the Nabob Vizier, Asuph u Dowlah was disturbed, in the year 1794, by a very serious rebellion of the turbulent tribe of Afghans settled in Rohilcund. This was occasioned by the death of Fyzullah Khan, the chief of the Rohillas, and Jagheerdar of Rampoorah. The sons of the deceased disputed the succession; and Mahomed Ally Khan, the eldest, was killed by his brother, Gholam Mahomed Khan, who usurped the Jagheer, and made every endeavour to obtain the sanction of the Vizier to his usurpation. That prince appeared at first to listen to his overtures; but after some communication with the English government, (whose interests were to a certain degree involved in the question, from having guaranteed Rampoorah to the Afghan family, by whom it was held under the Vizier) it was determined to punish the rebels; and the Governor-general, after the army had marched for that purpose, under the command of General Sir Robert Abercromby, resolved to carry this punish-

ment to the extent of depriving the family of Fyzullah Khan of their Jagheer.

Previously, however, to the arrival of these instructions, an action had been fought, in which the Rohillas, after making a partial impression upon the British line, had been defeated; and their complete submission, after this action, had induced the commander-in-chief, with the acquiescence of the Nabob Vizier, to restore the inheritance of the family, under the guarantee of the Company, to Ahmed Ally Khan, the infant son of Mahomed Ally Khan, who had been slain by Gholam Mahomed. The latter chief, with several others, who had aided him, were pardoned on their coming into the British camp. This settlement restored complete tranquillity; and the supreme government subsequently acquiesced in the arrangement which considerations of policy and of humanity had induced Sir R. Abercromby to adopt.

The death of Hyder Beg put an end to those prospects of reform in the administration of the Vizier which Lord Cornwallis had expected from the energy and ability of that minister. A nominal successor was appointed to Hyder Beg; but the real power of the state passed into the hands of a few personal favourites, men of the most abandoned character, and some of them known to entertain sentiments hostile to the connexion with the British government.

Sir John Shore was fully sensible of the injury and danger to which the interests of the Company were upon this occasion exposed. He had, indeed, expressed a decided opinion, when speaking of the Vizier's dominions, that, whilst his administration continued on its present footing, we should derive no effective assistance from his troops, and that we must rather expect to find enemies than friends in his dominions.

Asuph u Dowlah died during Sir John Shore's administration, and was succeeded by his presumptive heir, Vizier Ally, who had been acknowledged as his son by the deceased prince, though generally known to have been of spurious birth, and consequently to have no claim to the vacant Musnud. He was, however, supported by several persons of rank and influence at Lucknow; and his right was formally acknowledged by the British government, to whose justice Saadut Ally, the eldest surviving brother of Asuph u Dowlah, had on this occasion appealed.

Sir John Shore, when he decided against the claim of Saadut Ally, recorded in a Minute*, that he did so after great hesitation; as he found it impossible to divest himself of the impression, excited by universal belief and assertion, of the spurious origin of Vizier Ally, and of the apprehension, connected with it, that the reputation of the Com-

* This minute is dated the 3d January, 1798.

pany for justice might suffer by a decision in his favour.

With such sentiments upon his mind, Sir John Shore proceeded to Lucknow: but he declares in the same minute, that the arrangements he had in view at that moment had no reference whatever to the alteration of the succession; though he conceived it possible, that the repugnance of the people to the new Vizier might force him to a further consideration of the subject.

On the approach of Sir John Shore to Lucknow he was met by the minister (Tuffuzel Hussein Khan), who informed him, that there was not a shadow of doubt but that Vizier Ally, as well as the other reputed sons of Asuph u Dowlah, were spurious, and that the right of succession belonged to Saadut Ally Khan. The minister added to this communication, that though no objection was made at the moment to the elevation of Vizier Ally, it had since become a subject of astonishment and disappointment: that it was the general opinion, that the act of raising him to the Musnud had been hasty and inconsiderate; but that few were disposed to declare their real sentiments in opposition to the acknowledgment of his title by the English government.

These accounts appear to have excited still stronger doubts in the Governor-general's mind with respect to the propriety of the steps which he had taken; and led him to make further and

more minute inquiries respecting the legitimacy of Vizier Ally : the result of which was, a full conviction of his spurious origin.

The Governor-general, in another minute upon this subject, enters into an examination of the conduct of Vizier Ally since his elevation ; and draws an inference from a great body of evidence, that he is a violent, unsteady, and sanguinary character ; that he already cherishes the most hostile designs against the interests of the Company ; and is to be restrained only by a want of power from an open opposition to them. After stating the sentiments generally prevalent respecting the conduct of Vizier Ally, he then adverts to the opinion which the natives of Oude entertain respecting the nature of the political relations between the Vizier and the Company ; and also to that which foreign states have formed of the right of the latter to decide upon the question of succession to the dominions of Oude.

“The government of Oude,” he observes, “both in the opinions of the natives, as well as externally, is considered a dependency upon the English, whatever its relations under treaties may be. Sindia refers the investiture of Vizier Ally Khan by his majesty (Shah Allum) to the Governor-general ; and there are many respectable families in Lucknow who live under the protection of the British influence. In the estimate of the natives of India, the kingdom of Oude is held as a gift

from the Company to Shujah u Dowlah, and as a dependent chief. By these remarks, I mean only to contrast the behaviour of Vizier Ally Khan with the popular sentiments and the conduct of his predecessor, and to point out the political discredit attending the subversion of our influence in Oude."

He next states, "that he had the mortification to find, that the reputation of the Company had suffered by an act which, in the opinion of all reputable people, had been no less disgraceful than unjust. It was impossible," he continues, "to silence these impressions by arguing, that the government had not directly interfered in deciding upon the succession; since, in the opinion of all, Vizier Ally's elevation was considered an act of the English government; and it is certain that, without their acknowledgment and support, he could not have maintained his situation."

Sir John Shore observes, that he was aware that the case had been materially altered by the formal acknowledgment of Vizier Ally in the first instance, and by the amicable correspondence and personal communication which he had subsequently maintained with him: but he considered that the first objection was answered by the precedent of the Tanjore succession, which, he affirms, though the sovereignty had been possessed eleven years by Omer Sing, was at that moment, by the

sanction of the directors, open to investigation and decision; and, with respect to the second, he thought, however unpleasant it might be, that he was bound to prefer justice, and the public interests, to a consideration of his own feelings. He adds, after expressing, in very strong language, the great difficulties by which he had been embarrassed, and the agitation of his mind upon the question, that, on a full view of the case, he had come to the following conclusion. “First: That Vizier Ally is undoubtedly the son of a *Furraush**; has no title to the Musnud; and, from his character, is unworthy of it. This decision is supported by evidence as to his real birth, by the sanction of the public opinion, by facts, and information. Secondly: That to support him on the Musnud would not only be an indelible disgrace to the reputation of the Company, but, in all probability, would prove the ruin of the country, and the destruction of the British interests in Oude. Thirdly: That the justice and reputation of the Company, as well as their political interests, require the establishment of the rightful successor. Fourthly: That as all the reputed sons of *Asuph u Dowlah* are undoubtedly spurious, the line of succession should be transferred to that of *Shujah u Dowlah*.

* *Furraush* is the Persian denomination of a servant employed in pitching tents, keeping the house clean, and other menial offices.

Fifthly : That Vizier Ally ought to be deposed, and Saadut Ally be placed on the Musnud."

Acting upon these conclusions, the Governor-general immediately adopted measures for placing Saadut Ally Khan upon the Musnud, and deposing Vizier Ally ; and from the strength of the British force which was collected, and the unpopularity of the latter prince, this change was likely to be easily effected.

Sir John Shore transmitted a treaty * to Mr.

* This treaty consisted of twenty-three articles. It vested the Company with the defence of the Vizier's dominions ; and the annual subsidy, to be paid by Saadut Ally Khan, was increased to the amount of seventy-six lacs of rupees ; and, in the event of the failure of any of the instalments, the Company were to be put in possession of territory in Oude of the annual value of ten lacs of rupees, which they were to retain till the amount due should be fully liquidated.

By one of its articles, Saadut Ally Khan stipulated to pay the amount of any expense which the Company might incur in placing him upon the throne. He also agreed to cede the important fortress of Allahabad to the Company ; to pay the amount of eight lacs of rupees to put it into a state of repair ; and to give three lacs of rupees to repair the fort of Futtly Ghur. It was agreed by this treaty, that as the country of Oude was henceforward to be considered entirely under the protection of the Company, and the Nabob relied upon them for its defence, he was not to maintain a larger force for the internal police of the country, than 35,000 men, 10,000 of whom were to be cavalry. The Company was vested with a right to change the stations of their troops in the Vizier's

Cherry, at Benares, with instructions to offer it to the acceptance of Saadut Ally Khan, who resided at that city. But, from these instructions *, he does not appear even then to have finally resolved upon the line which he would pursue, as he states, that measures might still occur to frustrate his present intentions in favour of Saadut Ally Khan, whose acquiescence in, or refusal of, the treaty proposed, he requested to be immediately given, without qualification or reserve. With this view, he directed the Nabob to be informed, that the engagement had been transmitted in the form in which it was, for execution, because the actual state of affairs would not admit of either delay or discussion.

Saadut Ally Khan gave a ready assent to the treaty dictated by the Governor-general; and expressed to Mr. Cherry his determination, if raised to the Musnud, to fulfil all its stipulations in the most faithful manner.

This treaty altered in some very essential points the political relations between the Vizier and the dominions, if deemed necessary for the better protection of the country; and all expense attending such change of cantonments was to be defrayed by the Nabob. It was also stipulated, that the force of British troops to be stationed in the Vizier's dominions should be afterwards specified; but that if at any time the number employed for the defence of the country should exceed 12,000 men, the Nabob should pay the amount of the actual expense month by month.

* Dated the 4th January, 1798.

Company. By this engagement, the latter became exclusively charged with the defence of the territories of the former ; the number of whose troops was limited, and to be employed only in maintaining the internal police. The increase of subsidy, it is to be concluded, was judged sufficient to defray the charge of the force stationed in Oude in ordinary times ; and, when necessity required an addition to this force for the defence of the country, the Nabob was bound, by a specific article of the treaty, to defray any actual increase of expense with which such measure might be attended.

This article, though indefinite, was evidently meant to provide against the Company suffering a loss by the general engagement which they had contracted of defending in future, with their own troops, the Nabob's dominions. The conditions of this article were absolute ; and, by the principle of the treaty, the English government was left the sole judge of the necessity for an increase of the troops requisite to the protection of the Nabob's territories from external enemies. This principle was virtually confirmed by those stipulations which restricted the Nabob from all negotiations with foreign states ; and, indeed, from having communications of any nature with such, except with the previous knowledge and consent of the British government ; as this restriction must obviously deprive the Vizier of the means of forming a judgment upon such affairs.

Before the Governor-general had learnt the decision of Saadut Ally as to the proposed treaty, he sent directions to Mr. Cherry to inform the Nabob, in case of his acquiescence in it, that he must proceed to Cawnpore instantly, where measures would be taken to place him on the Musnud; and, in case of not acquiescing, he was to be informed, that although the Governor-general admitted his right to the sovereignty of Oude, he did not think himself bound to run the risk of hostilities in supporting it, except under conditions which equally provided for the political interests of the Company. Pursuant to the wishes of the Governor-general, Saadut Ally Khan went immediately to Cawnpore, and was escorted from thence by a large body of European troops to Lucknow, where he was proclaimed Vizier upon the 21st of January, 1798. After his elevation, another treaty was concluded between him and the British government, differing in few material points from the preliminary engagement which he had signed at Benares. The most essential of the articles, which related to the future defence of the country by the Company, and the subsidy to be paid by the Nabob, remained the same both in principle and substance, though they differed somewhat in the terms*.

* By the last treaty it was stipulated, that the force to be maintained by the Company in Oude was never to be less than ten thousand men.

If at any time it became necessary to augment this force

By this treaty Saadut Ally Khan agreed to make an annual allowance of one lac and a half of rupees for the support of Vizier Ally, who, overawed by the force which the Governor-general had collected, and deserted by all parties, had not ventured to make any opposition to the arrangement; and beyond thirteen thousand, the Nabob agreed to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess above that number; and if the troops of the Company should, from any necessity, be less than eight thousand men, the Nabob, Saadut Ally Khan, became entitled to a deduction from the annual stipend of seventy-six lacs of rupees, (which he had agreed to pay the Company,) equal to the actual difference of men below the specified number.

By this treaty, the Nabob agreed to pay the sum of twelve lacs of rupees to the Company, as a reimbursement for the expenses incurred in placing him upon the throne; and, instead of the article in the preliminary engagement which gave the Company a right to take possession of part of his country on his failure in the regular payment of any of the instalments, and that which limited to a specific number the troops which he was to maintain by the treaty concluded at Lucknow, it was generally stipulated, that, on a failure in the regular discharge of any instalment, the Vizier was to give such security for the payment of existing arrears, and future regularity, as should be deemed satisfactory by the English government; and that, on a consideration of the increased subsidy, and other permanent charges upon his revenue, he should make such reductions in superfluous charges of his public establishments, servants, &c., as might be necessary to prevent his disbursements exceeding his revenue. It was further agreed, by the same article, that he was on this point to consult the Company's government; and to devise, in concert with them, the proper objects of reduction, and the best means of effecting it.

who, after it was concluded, was conducted to Benares, where Sir John Shore had determined that he should reside in the enjoyment of the stipend allotted for his personal support, which was secured to him by the guarantee of the Company, through whom it was to be paid.

It appears here necessary to advert to a danger of some magnitude, which threatened, at this period, to disturb the tranquillity of Hindustan, particularly the dominions of the Vizier; and which may be supposed to have considerably influenced the arrangements which the Governor-general made with that prince.

Zemaun Shah, king of Cabul, the son of Timour Shah, and the grandson of the celebrated Abdallee, advanced in 1796 to Lahore, and threatened to visit Delhi, from which Lahore is not more than twenty marches for a light army. The accounts of his approach seem to have excited the greatest hope among the more turbulent Mahomedans of Hindustan. The supposed design of the Shah to restore the fallen dignity of the imperial house of Timour, to which he was nearly allied by blood, gave popularity to his cause with almost all that tribe; while it created great consternation in the Mahrattas, who were at that moment ill prepared to resist so formidable an invasion.

The movements of the Afghan monarch, and the local weakness of the Mahrattas, induced the English government to make some preparations

against a danger which, though uncertain, was of too serious a nature to be altogether neglected. The troops at the cantonments of Cawnpore and Futty Ghur were ordered to encamp; and every arrangement was made to enable them to move to any quarter where their services might be required.

The alarm was dispelled by the retreat of Zemaun Shah to his own dominions, the tranquillity of which had been disturbed by the rebellion of one of his brothers; but the facility with which he had advanced to Lahore showed that no confidence could be placed upon the union or resistance of the Seikhs. From every account, indeed, as well as from actual occurrences, it appeared that this nation was so much distracted by the violence of its own internal divisions, as to be incapable of acting with concert; and, of course, that it was no longer to be considered as a barrier against the Afghans, whose invasion of India became, from this circumstance, more probable than it ever was before.

Sir John Shore, in a minute under date the 4th of July, 1797, enters into a full consideration of this subject. In this document, he states the force which the Shah brought to Lahore not to have exceeded thirty-three thousand men, which were almost all cavalry; and this inclined him to conclude, that the Afghan monarch did not at that time intend to invade Hindustan; but that his expedition was experimental, with an ultimate view to such invasion.

The Governor-general, however, had no doubt, that if Zemaun Shah had advanced, he must have reached Delhi, as the Mahrattas were not prepared to oppose him, and were greatly alarmed. They afterwards, he states, assembled a respectable army, and made overtures to the Company to unite in repelling him: but, though these preparations might have enabled them to dispute the possession of Delhi, or to molest his retreat, he is convinced that they would not have been able to prevent his advance. Under this impression, he proceeds to consider the probable consequences of that event, and particularly as it would have affected the tranquillity of the territories of the Nabob Vizier.

“ In this case,” he observes, “ the numerous adventurers in Hindustan, always ready to enlist for plunder, would either have joined his army, or have availed themselves of the protection afforded by its advance, to commit depredations. Bumbhoo Khan, the brother of Gholam Kader Khan, had assembled a considerable force, near Boreea Ghaut, and pretended that he had received orders from Zemaun Shah for this purpose; and wrote letters of invitation to several of the Rohillah chiefs at Rampore to join him; which, with a single exception, were concealed from Nusser Ulla Khan.

“ Without dwelling on the presumption, arising from this circumstance,” Sir John Shore continues, “ we are sufficiently apprized of the disposition of the Rohillas, to be assured that they would seize

the first favourable opportunity for rebellion ; and that they would have considered the arrival of Zemaun Shah at Delhi as furnishing it. The Patans in the district of Furruckabad, though less independent, are equally disposed to disaffection and plunder ; and nothing but the protection of the Company's arms would have prevented the greatest disorders in the Vizier's dominions, if Zemaun Shah had approached them. My opinion is, that they would have been overrun with marauders ; that a total temporary stoppage of the collections would have ensued ; and that these disorders, if not speedily quelled, would have ended in general insurrection.

“ On this occasion,” he adds, “ we had fresh experience of the imbecility of the Vizier's government, and of the insufficiency of his military establishment. The troops under Almas were respectable. The other troops of the Vizier, with little exception, would rather have proved an encumbrance than an assistance to the British forces ; and nothing but the most urgent remonstrances would have ensured the exertions or supplies of the Vizier.”

From these circumstances, Sir John Shore justly concluded, that the future designs of the Afghan monarch must always be an object of great interest to the British government ; and, under this view of the subject, he entered into a consideration of the likelihood of his future invasion of Hindustan.

It was not, he thought, very probable that Zemaun Shah would undertake such an expedition, notwithstanding the motives, which might tempt him to its adoption. It was possible that ambition, stimulated by the entreaties and misrepresentations of the court of Delhi, might lead the Shah to aspire to the character of the deliverer of India from the dominion of infidels, in emulation of his grandfather the Abdallee; and that a desire of effacing the disgrace of his late ineffectual attempt, and of revenging the defeat of a body of his troops, which the Seikhs had attacked after his retreat, might lead him again to carry his arms eastward. The Governor-general stated in this minute, that by all the accounts which he had received, a general opinion prevailed, that Zemaun Shah would advance at once to Hindustan, without previously establishing his authority in the Punjab; and this opinion, however contrary to probability, was of a nature that should not, in his judgment, be altogether neglected.

Sir John Shore professed himself averse from the adoption of any expensive measures of preparation against Zemaun Shah's designs. The Mahrattas had, he states, from a dread of his power, made proposals to the British government for uniting their forces to oppose it: but he was not decided in his own mind upon the policy of that measure; nor, indeed, whether it was most for the interests of the Company, and their ally the Vizier,

to support the Mahrattas, or to leave them to their fate. That the power of that nation in Hindustan should be diminished, the Governor-general thought highly desirable; but he doubted whether the substitution of that of Zemaun Shah would not be more dangerous: and it was his opinion, that, if that monarch should ever advance to Delhi, the danger would be very alarming to the Vizier; and that it would require the greatest vigour and exertion to preserve peace in his dominions, even though the Afghans should not invade them. The Rohillas appear to have been one of the chief objects of the Governor-general's apprehensions upon this occasion; and he stated it as his opinion, that it might be found prudent to require or compel the principal persons of that tribe to deliver themselves up as hostages for the good behaviour of the rest.

That there were just grounds for these apprehensions cannot be denied. The invasion of India had always been too favourite a project among the northern tribes of Cabul and Candahar, to leave a hope that it would be relinquished from any cause but their want of power, arising from internal dissension, to carry it into execution. The state of the whole country, from the Attock to the Jumna, was such, as opposed no obstacle whatever to their advance: and these barbarians, impressed with an exaggerated opinion of their own valour, and with hereditary contempt for the na-

tives of India, were not likely to be deterred from its invasion by a contemplation of difficulties which their forefathers had so often encountered and overcome; nor was it more probable, that they would be guided by a consideration of the actual strength of the power which possessed Hindustan. It was indeed unlikely that they should possess correct intelligence upon this head; or, if they did, that their rude understandings, and savage pride, would permit them to estimate justly the efficiency of armies constituted on different principles from their own.

The occurrence of such an invasion was likely, as Sir John Shore observed, to excite many of the chief Mahomedans to rebellion; and their junction with the Afghans would make it difficult for the Mahrattas to repel them; particularly as this nation, on such an occasion, must place its chief reliance upon its regular brigades, of which all the men were natives of Hindustan, and most of the officers French. They had consequently no tie or attachment to the Mahratta state, but that of temporary interest; and there was good ground to suppose, that under the establishment of a Mahomedan empire in Hindustan, (which must have been the object of Zemaun Shah's policy,) there would have been little difficulty in corrupting the fidelity of this corps, as the men, of whom it was composed, would have lost nothing by a change of masters; and the officers, under such revolu-

tion, might not only expect to improve their condition, but to obtain better means of accomplishing their ambitious designs; and above all, those which were directed against the prosperity of the British government.

Upon the whole, it was obvious, on this view of things, that no dependence could be placed upon the Mahrattas as an efficient barrier against the dangers to which the territories of the English government and its allies might be eventually exposed from any future invasion of the Afghan monarch: and it appeared not improbable, that the schemes of the invader might coalesce with the views and interests of the French corps in the service of Dowlut Row Sindia, to whom the defence of Hindustan must be intrusted; and that if they did not, and if the French commander by his courage, and the skilful application of the great military resources which he had accumulated, should defeat Zemaun Shah, he and his party would acquire such an increase of fame, influence, and power, as would render them much more dangerous neighbours than either the Mahrattas or Afghans.

Several expeditions against the Eastern settlements of the European enemies of Great Britain took place during the period in which Sir John Shore was Governor-general of India; but these were all fitted out from Madras: and to the eminent ability and energy of Lord Hobart, the governor of that presidency, aided by the cordial

and zealous co-operation of his majesty's naval commander, Admiral Rainier, the British government was indebted for the complete reduction of the Dutch settlements upon the island of Ceylon and of Malacca, and the valuable Islands of Banda and Amboyna. More important expeditions were prepared against the French settlement of the Mauritius, and the Spanish possessions of Manilla; neither of which, however, were carried into execution. The first division of the armament for the latter, which took place in 1797, had actually sailed to Penang, the port of rendezvous; but the complexion of the accounts received from Europe, combined with the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and the general state of the native powers in India, induced the government of Fort St. George to abandon this expedition.

Sir John Shore, who had been raised to the peerage by the title of Lord Teignmouth, sailed for England in the beginning of the year 1798. The situation of the different native powers, at the period of his taking charge of the administration of the affairs of British India, has been already described. It may be useful to take a view of their condition at the period of his departure, and to examine the causes of those great changes which had occurred during his government.

Tippoo Sultaun, whose spirit of hostility was unabated, had greatly recruited his resources, and continued most active in his intrigues with the

French, the Mahrattas, and the discontented party at the court of Hyderabad. The Nizam, reduced in reputation, as well as in real strength, no longer placed the confidence which he had done in the British government, whose friendship he had before sought, not more with a view of immediate benefit than of securing, by the improvement of those relations upon which his connexion with the English government was established, the permanent welfare and prosperity of his dominions. But disappointed in those hopes which he had been led by the assurances of Lord Cornwallis to entertain, he had, in despair, thrown himself into the hands of a French faction, of a nature the most dangerous that could be imagined to the British government.

At this period, the power of Dowlut Row Sindia had arrived at a most alarming eminence, and was indeed acknowledged paramount over almost the whole of the Mahratta empire. It had completely annihilated the independence of the Paishwah's government; and that prince only exercised a nominal rule in the city of Poonah, under the immediate control and direction of a subordinate officer of Sindia's court. By this revolution in the Deckan, that state of affairs in which Lord Cornwallis left India was completely changed. The strength and resources of the Poonah state were at the disposal of a chief known to be unfriendly to the English government; and it appeared almost certain, from the ambition of Sindia, the position of his terri-

tories, the constitution of his regular brigades, and the principles of those by whom they were commanded, that its territories must ultimately become the object of his attack.

Several opportunities had occurred, of which the English government might have taken advantage, for checking the growth of the enormous power of the House of Sindia; or for securing an alliance with that family, which would have prevented its resources being directed against our possessions in India.

Nanah Furnavese was very jealous of the rising power of Sindia, long before the influence of that chief was established over the Poonah government; and this jealousy had led to the indirect overture made to Lord Cornwallis, through Hurry Punt, to induce that nobleman to form a subsidiary alliance with the Paishwah; but the approach of Dowlut Row Sindia to Poonah, after the death of the Paishwab, Madhoo Row, changed this feeling into that of alarm; and Nanah would, at that moment, have most willingly entered into any alliance with the English government to secure the independence of the Poonah branch of the Mahratta empire. Nor can there be a doubt, that the interposition of the British nation, at this remarkable crisis, would have accomplished that object; and the exertion of our power and influence on the occasion would, in all human probability, have

enabled us to dictate to the contending parties an amicable adjustment of the disputes regarding the succession to the office of Paishwah, and not only have secured the public interests from the dangers to which they were exposed by our neutrality, but have added in the greatest degree to our reputation.

Madhajee Sindia had repeatedly solicited the aid of the English government, and had been desirous, at one period, of subsidizing a force from that state. His successor, Dowlut Row, had repeatedly evinced a similar disposition; and it would probably have been easy, either at his elevation, or when he returned to Poonah to support Badjerow, or at the season he so greatly feared an attack on his possessions in Hindustan by the Afghans, to negotiate an alliance that might have effected the removal of the French party, which was daily gaining strength.

But that system of neutral policy which had been prescribed by the authorities in England, and closely followed by the Governor-general, prevented any attempt being made to avert, or influence, the changes at Poonah, or to improve our alliance with the family of Sindia, although it was acknowledged at the moment, that our non-interference might be pregnant with the worst consequences to the interests of the British government.

Those who support this system have constantly asserted, that it is the only one consistent with the

intention of the act of parliament for the administration of the affairs of India. But it appears difficult, if not impossible, to imagine, that the wisdom of the British legislature, when it imposed restrictions upon ambition, and prohibited a policy, having for its object conquest and extension of territory, could ever mean (whatever be the literal construction of the legal terms by which its intentions are expressed) to deprive the local government of India of the power of adopting preventive measures against dangers which it might see in progress; and to prescribe, as a positive maxim of policy to a great state, a disregard to the concerns of its neighbours: or, in other words, to deny to a government the exercise of that influence and power which its former wisdom and courage had acquired, and which is, in fact, one of the principal and most legitimate means of maintaining peace and tranquillity.

The merits of this system were fully tried during the administration of Sir John Shore, who appears to have been uniformly actuated by a sincere and conscientious desire to govern India agreeably to the strict and literal sense of the act of the legislature, and to the wishes of his superiors in England; to the implicit execution of whose orders his great ability and experience were on all occasions most zealously applied. The result of this experiment offers an important lesson to those who are intrusted with the government of British

India. It was proved from the events of this administration, that no ground of political advantage could be abandoned without being instantly occupied by an enemy; and that to resign influence, was not merely to resign power, but to allow that power to pass into hands hostile to the British government. The consequence of political inaction was equally obvious. No one measure of importance was taken, except the elevation of Saadut Ally to the Musnud of Oude, which the Governor-general states, in express terms, was forced upon his adoption. But this inactive system of policy, so far from attaining its object, which was to preserve affairs upon the footing in which it had found them, had only the effect of making the British government stationary, while all around it advanced, and of exposing it to dangers arising from the revolutions of its neighbours, while it was even denied the power of adapting its policy to the change of circumstances. The ultimate consequences were such as might have been expected. A period of six years' peace, instead of having added to the strength, or improved the security, of the British dominions in India, had placed them in a situation of comparative danger. Though the British strength was not lessened, the power and resources of the other states of India had increased. The confidence and attachment of our allies were much shaken, if not destroyed; and the presumption and hostile disposition of the principal native

powers in India too clearly showed, that it was to a principle of weakness, or of selfish policy, and not of moderation, that they ascribed the course which had been pursued by the British government.

The extent of the danger to which our possessions in India had been exposed by this neutral system of policy, and the encouragement which the enemies of that nation had derived from our inaction, were not fully known till some time had elapsed; but the period at which Sir John Shore left India, though a season of peace, was regarded by no person who had any knowledge of the subject as one of security: and the authorities in England had felt, and expressed, considerable alarm at the numerous dangers which threatened early to disturb the tranquillity of our possessions in that quarter of the globe.

CHAPTER IV.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

State of India at the Commencement of this Administration.—Maturity of Tippoo's Plans.—French Party at Hyderabad and Poonah very strong.—Vigorous Course of Policy adopted by Marquess Wellesley.—Negotiations at Hyderabad and Poonah.—Treaty with the Nizam.—French Corps in his Service disbanded.—View of the Causes of the War with Tippoo.—Overthrow of his Power.—Establishment of the Government of the Mysore.—Policy of the Governor-general respecting the conquered Provinces.—Partition Treaty.—Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore.—Treaty with the Nizam.—Negotiations at the Court of Poonah.—War between Sindia and Holkar.—Treaty of Bassein.—British Army marches to Poonah.—Mahratta War.—Treaty of Peace with the Rajah of Berar—with Sindia.—War with Holkar.—Embassy to Persia.—Treaty with the Vizier of Oude.—View of the Transactions in the Carnatic.—Treaty with the Nabob, vesting the Civil and Military Government of the Carnatic in the Company.—Marquess Wellesley leaves India.—Observations upon the principal Measures of his Administration.

LORD TEIGNMOUTH was succeeded in the government of British India by the Marquess Wellesley, a nobleman whose rank and talents enabled him to enter upon the great duties committed to his charge with every advantage. The period at which

he reached India *, was one of a most critical nature for British interests in that quarter of the globe. The hostile designs of Tippoo Suldaun were ripe for execution. A French party was paramount at the courts both of the Nizam and of Sindia. The court of Poonah was at the mercy of the latter chief; and that of Berar was known to be adverse to the English, on whose progress to power it had long looked with peculiar jealousy.

The country of Oude, still agitated by the recent change which had been made in its government, was not likely to be kept in a state of tranquillity by its new ruler, Saadut Ally, who continued to proclaim his alarms, and to call upon the British government to protect him in the exercise of the power to which, by their interference, he had been raised.

The state of the Carnatic was little better. Omdut ul Omrah had been only irritated by the ineffectual attempts made to induce him to a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, and he continued to deliver over his country to the gripe of usurers, in order to anticipate his revenue; by which means its resources were rapidly declining at a period when it was obvious they must soon be urgently required to aid in the general defence of the empire.

* 26th April, 1798.

To add to these difficulties, our finances were much exhausted by the equipment of large, but necessary armaments, for the reduction of the Dutch settlements to the eastward, and the Island of Ceylon; and a considerable part of the army of the coast of Coromandel was absent on those expeditions.

Lord Wellesley had hardly arrived in Bengal, when an overt act of hostility on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and active intrigues of the French party at Hyderabad, demanded all his exertion. But the suddenness with which these occurrences were forced upon his decision, did not lead him to resort to any of those delusive political expedients by which a momentary and partial exemption from danger is so dearly purchased at the price of future security. His mind embraced the whole scheme; and at the time he deliberated upon the measures demanded by the emergencies of the moment, he took an extended view of the general condition of the British dominions in India; and having fixed in his mind those principles of policy which appeared to him best calculated to lead to a state of permanent peace and prosperity, he proceeded to combine the introduction of them into every branch of his administration with the means requisite for averting immediate danger.

Before entering upon the narrative of Lord Wellesley's government, it appears of importance

to notice those general considerations which induced him to resolve upon the system which he pursued. This is the more essential, as all political measures must be judged with constant reference to the actual circumstances under which they were first adopted. Their wisdom, moderation, or justice, can be decided by no other criterion; for when in progress, they become subject to the influence of an infinity of events, some of which may be of a nature that could neither be foreseen nor controlled, and against the effects of which no human wisdom could have guarded.

The sentiments of Tippoo Sultaun had been fully developed, leaving no possible doubt that he was disposed to join zealously in every effort having for its object the subverting of the British power in India. The designs of the French at this period were known to be directed with more than usual activity to that object; and the means which they possessed for their accomplishment though irregular, and difficult of combination, were far from contemptible: and the influence which individuals of the French nation had established at the courts of the Nizam and Sindia, by obtaining the command of the principal military resources of both these princes, afforded just ground of belief, that any plan formed for that end might eventually receive the greatest aid from their efforts. Of the dispositions of these individuals to promote the schemes of their country, there could be no doubt; and their power

and influence being such as we have mentioned, gave every reason to conclude, that they might possess ample means of acting agreeably to the dictates of that disposition.

Other circumstances were favourable to the designs of Tippoo Sultaun and the French. The triple alliance, formed by Lord Cornwallis as a barrier against the future ambition of the former, had been annihilated by the neutral policy of the British government; and the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah seemed more likely, from causes before stated, to act against than with the British government, in the event of a rupture with Tippoo Sultaun.

The absence of Doulut Row Sindia from Hindustan was, at this period, as injurious to the British interests as his presence at Poonah: for while he staid in the Deckan, the power of the Paishwah was dormant, if not extinct; and a large corps of infantry, commanded by French officers, was kept in a situation where it was likely that, either from the operation of the national spirit of its officers, or the ambition of Sindia, it might be led by events to act against the British government. On the other hand, the absence of Sindia from Hindustan threw upon the British government almost the whole defence of that quarter of India, if invaded by Zemaun Shah; and such invasion was rendered more probable from the defenceless state in which the possessions of this chief were left.

Under these circumstances, Lord Wellesley resolved upon political measures calculated, in the first instance, to check and frustrate the designs of Tippoo Sultaun and the French; and, in the second, to effect the permanent security of the British government in India. The means which he adopted for these purposes, while they afforded a reasonable hope of security against the designs of the Sultaun and the French, without coming to extremities with the former, gave the surest promise of war being successful in the event of its proving inevitable.

The disposition of Azeem ul Omrah, the prime-minister at Hyderabad, who had returned from Poonah, was favourable to the English government; but that minister, however secretly adverse to the French party in the army of the Nizam, had not the power of dismissing it without the active aid of the British government; nor could he, with common attention to the security of his master, advise him to disband that corps, until assured of the aid of a large body of English troops, and of eventual protection against any unjust aggression of the Mahrattas.

The young Paishwah, Badjerow, was at this moment anxious to be released from the thralldom in which he was kept by Doulut Row Sindia; and earnestly solicited the interference of the British government. The resident at his court, in a letter

under date the 1st of June, states*, that “the authority of that prince would be restored by the appearance of a strong British force at Poonah; and that Sindia, under the circumstance of Tippoo’s recent aggression, could on no just pretence object to such a movement of our troops; nor, in his present condition, be able to oppose it.”

This was the actual state of affairs when the Marquess Wellesley resolved to endeavour, through the means of improved defensive engagements, to recover the efficient aid of the governments of Hyderabad and Poonah; or, rather, to prevent the power and resources of those states from being employed against the British government. While endeavouring, through the means of negotiation, to effect these objects, he resolved to adopt towards Tippoo Sultaun the most moderate course which attention to the security and dignity of the government under his charge would admit. Nor was he without a sanguine hope, that the complete success of the negotiations which he had commenced at the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad would place the English government upon such a footing as would satisfy even that prince of the inutility of any further attempt against its power, and ultimately induce him to change his principles; to abandon his French allies; to rest satisfied with his

* Colonel Palmer.

own dominions; and to cultivate (as his true interests dictated) a good understanding with the British nation and its allies.

From what has been stated it will appear, that the views which led to the adoption of this system of policy were as moderate and just, as they were wise and enlarged; that its end was altogether defensive; and that it was dictated by a desire of security and peace, not by a spirit of ambition or aggrandizement. This will be more clearly shown in the course of the summary of the leading political events that occurred during Lord Wellesley's administration.

Though the state of the court of Hyderabad, at the period of that nobleman's arrival in India, was very unfavourable to the British interests, some circumstances had occurred which promised success to measures of so decided a nature as those upon which Lord Wellesley had resolved. The chief minister, Azeem ul Omrah, enjoyed a plenitude of power; and was inclined to agree to any treaty securing the government of the Nizam against the future aggression and excesses of the Mahrattas, by whom his power had been so recently reduced. This minister entertained the greatest jealousy and alarm at the designs of the Suldaun, with whom his enemies at Hyderabad had carried on the most active intrigues during his absence. He was sensible, from experience, that however the corps under French officers might add to the military strength

of the Nizam, it was not, in its actual state, equal to the protection of his dominions from the attack with which they were threatened; and he could not be ignorant, that any addition to its numbers, or improvement of its equipment, would be likely to excite a jealousy in the British government, which might terminate in an open separation of interests, and perhaps in a war between the court of Hyderabad and the only state in India that could efficiently protect and support its tottering power.

Under these impressions, Azeem ul Omrah was fully disposed to receive the overtures of the English government for an improved connexion; and was solicitous to engage that state to enter into engagements of a more intimate nature, as the best means of preserving the government of Hyderabad from threatened ruin. He had, however, no easy task to conquer the prejudices of his sovereign, the Nizam, against such an alliance; which, from the inequality of the parties, that monarch argued, would early terminate in rendering his dominions virtually dependent, for their future security, upon the British government. This the minister admitted; but contended, that it was better to be dependent upon a state whose regard to good faith was acknowledged, and whose power to protect was evident, than to continue exposed to the treacherous intrigues and unlimited demands of the Mah-rattas, or the more daring and ambitious projects of the Sultaun: that, as it was clear that the situ-

ation of the state of Hyderabad was such as to render it impossible to remain without the alliance of some one of those powers, it was assuredly wise to prefer a connexion with a government which brought with its protection the substantial blessings of security and peace, to the nominal friendship of states whose professed objects were plunder and conquest, and who had repeatedly shown that they held in contempt even the forms of public faith. The Nizam's prejudices and fears being at last subdued by this reasoning, he gave his assent to a negotiation for the dismissal of the French corps, and the increase of the English subsidiary force, provided a pledge on the part of the British government to protect his dominions from any future unjust demands on the part of the Mahrattas should enter into the compact.

The causes which had led the Governor-general to seek an improved alliance with the court of Hyderabad were of too urgent a nature, and too much connected with the immediate security of the British territories, to admit of his being influenced by a consideration of the effect which the line of policy that he pursued might have upon the court of Poonah. That consideration, indeed, could not, in the actual condition of affairs, be for one moment put in competition with the advantages to be gained by the dismissal of the French corps, and the complete introduction of the English influence

at the court of the Nizam. These points were of the highest importance, as they not only removed, at a period of real danger, every apprehension for the safety of the company's territories, but placed their power upon so commanding a ground, as to make it probable, that the hostile designs of Tippoo Sultaun would be abandoned, and that he would purchase, by early concessions, an exemption from the punishment which his conduct had provoked.

When mutual interests so strongly recommended an alliance, serious difficulties were not to be expected in its negotiation. A treaty was accordingly concluded*, by which the subsidiary detachment of British troops with the Nizam was made permanent; and four battalions were added to the two fixed by the former treaty †. The Nizam also engaged by this treaty to disband the French corps in his service, and to deliver over its officers to the British government, whenever the whole of the English force to be stationed in his dominions should have reached his capital. The British government became, on its part, pledged to arbitrate, on principles of impartiality and justice, the points in dispute between him and the Poonah government, and to obtain the consent of the Poonah state

* On the 1st of September, 1798.

† The subsidy to be paid by the Nizam, for the support of the whole, was increased from 57,713 rupees per month, to 201,425 rupees per month, or 2,417,100 rupees per annum.

to that arbitration; or, in the event of that being withheld, to protect the Nizam from any unjust or unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas.

The French force was so considerable as to render the execution of that part of the treaty which stipulated for their dismissal a more arduous undertaking than its negotiation; but the moment was favourable for its accomplishment. Raymond, by whom the corps was originally formed, and who was an able man, possessed of much influence, had died some months previous to the conclusion of the treaty; and disputes respecting the succession to the command had occasioned much disunion among the troops; and though these were apparently settled, and General Perron had succeeded to that station, his character and influence were not such as to enable him to take, with any prospect of success, those decided steps, which, under other circumstances, an able commander might have adopted to prevent its dissolution.

The measures directed by the Governor-general for the fulfilment of the treaty, were well calculated, from their celerity and vigour, to ensure success. A corps of four battalions, with their guns, which had been collected on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions during the negotiation, immediately marched to Hyderabad, where it joined* the two battalions formerly stationed there. The moment

* On the 10th of October.

this detachment arrived, the full execution of the treaty, as far as it related to the French corps, was demanded by the British resident*: but the Nizam, either from the influence of intrigue, or alarm, appeared at one time to hesitate how he should act; and even Azeem ul Omrah, whose character was very timid, shrunk from the fulfilment of his own plans, and expressed a desire to avoid, or at least to delay, extremities. The Nizam and his minister were, however, soon brought to a just sense of the attention due to public faith, by the representations of the British resident, who informed them in the most express terms, that, under the orders of the Governor-general, he could, at that advanced stage of affairs, admit of nothing short of the complete execution of the engagements into which the court of Hyderabad had entered with the British government; whose interests would be exposed to the most serious danger by allowing the French party to exist, for any period however short, after the resolution to disband it had been made public. It was therefore his determination, he added, if the Nizam should continue wavering, to authorize an attack upon the French camp by the British forces; and the Hyderabad court would become responsible for all the consequences of an event which must ever be deemed the result of its weakness and want of faith. To this communica-

* Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick.

tion was added a movement of troops*, which, by evincing a determination on the part of the British

* The military movements which took place between the 9th and 22d October had more influence in producing the fulfilment of the treaty than the obligations of faith. They merit, therefore, a short notice.

On the 9th Colonel Roberts's detachment, of four battalions, with a proportion of artillery, arrived in the vicinity of Hyderabad. On the same day six battalions of the French corps had joined their cantonments: both these parties were on the right bank of the Moussee. The minister, Azeem ul Omrah, from his own alarms and those of the Nizam lest an action should ensue, desired that Colonel Roberts should move to the left bank of the river: this the resident refused, telling him that the English corps of two battalions, under Colonel Hyndman, stationed at Hyderabad, was already on the left bank, where it would remain.

From the 9th October until the 19th, every intrigue was attempted, and every evasion tried, to defeat the fulfilment of the treaty. The Nizam left Hyderabad, and sought personal safety from the approaching conflict in the fortress of Golconda. The French party had numerous supporters, and the Pagah, or household horse, whose commander was in their interest, were ordered to the capital. When matters were in this state, the resident, on the 19th October, had an interview with the minister, which converted into certainty the suspicions before entertained of the disinclination to fulfil that article of the treaty which related to the disbanding of the French corps. Matters were, however, too far advanced to recede. Instant arrangements were consequently made for the attack of the French lines. Colonel Hyndman was moved to a position which enabled him to open a destructive fire on their rear, if necessary, and to set fire, with hot shot, to their storehouses and magazines; and Colonel Roberts was prepared to take possession of some heights, from

resident to proceed to extremities, put an end to all further evasion. An order was sent to the

whence he could advantageously attack their centre. These measures, the nature and intent of which were fully explained by the march of Colonel Hyndman to his position, satisfied the court of Hyderabad that there was no alternative between the instant fulfilment of the treaty or the open espousal of the interests of the French party, which, under the circumstances in which it was placed, and without the means of moving its artillery, was likely to be destroyed in the first action. The troops of the Nizam, on which this party most depended for support, had not yet reached the capital, and it was declaredly the intention of the English to bring the matter to issue before their arrival.

The delays and evasions of the Nizam and his minister had proceeded from fear, and their alarm was now greater at the consequences likely to result from the non-fulfilment of the article that required the dismissal of the French corps than at any which could result from its fulfilment. Orders were immediately given to dismiss the French officers, amounting to forty-five, who were to be made over to the English government as prisoners of war. The men of the French battalions were directed to be divided into different corps, and placed under native commanders. The mandate to this effect was sent to the French lines, where it threw both officers and men into the completest disorder and tumult. Monsieur Perron, the French commander, sent to the resident to state, that the moment he had received his dismissal he was eager to throw himself and officers on the protection of the British government, to whose justice and humanity they looked with the confidence which was imparted by the usages of civilized nations. An answer was returned, assuring the French officers of every liberal consideration. On the 21st, Monsieur Perron requested an officer might be sent from the residency to the French lines, to take charge of articles of public and private property.

French camp, by which the troops were informed, that the Nizam had dismissed their European officers from his service; that they were released from their obedience to these officers; and that, if they supported them, they should be considered and punished as traitors. This order, aided by the menacing position of the British troops, and the internal divisions in the French party, produced a

Captain Malcolm, assistant to the resident, was sent; but before his arrival a mutiny had broken out in the French corps, and he fell into the hands of the mutineers. Fortunately, however, there were among them some men who had, four years before, belonged to his company, in the 29th battalion of native infantry. These men had been tempted by offers of promotion to desert to the French, but their attachment to their former officer revived the moment they saw him in danger, and his life was saved by their active and spirited exertions. He pressed them to accompany him to the residency, where he assured them not only of pardon, but reward. They declined, saying, their object was only to place him in safety, and rejoined their comrades.

During the day and night of the 21st the French lines presented a scene of confusion and turbulence. Monsieur Perron and almost all the European officers managed to make their escape at night to the English camp, and their gratitude for the measures adopted to save them from danger, and the manner in which they were received and treated, made them for the moment forget all hostile feeling. The men of their corps were surrounded at daylight on the 22nd of October, and, owing to the good arrangements and moderation of Colonel Roberts, before the evening of that day, this large, well-disciplined, and well-appointed body of men, were completely disarmed, without the loss of one life.

violent mutiny in their lines, of which immediate advantage was taken. A strong body of horse belonging to the Nizam, and the whole of the British force, surrounded the French cantonments. The men who continued in a state of mutiny were promised a liquidation of their pay, and future service, if they laid down their arms; to which, after some discussion, they consented: and, in a few hours, a corps, whose numbers amounted to fourteen thousand men, and who had in their possession a train of artillery, and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores, was completely disarmed, without one life having been lost.

Such is the short history of this great political measure. The wisdom with which it was planned, and the promptness and vigour displayed in the execution, gave alarm to the enemies of the British government, and diffused joy and confidence among our subjects and allies; and these early impressions materially promoted the future success of Lord Wellesley's administration.

Negotiations for an improved defensive alliance were carried on at Poonah at the same time, and with the same activity, as at Hyderabad; but with very different success. The measures taken at Hyderabad were regularly communicated to the Paishwah; but that prince, either influenced by his weak counsellors, or acting under the control of Dowlut Row Sindia, obstinately withheld his formal consent to any acknowledgment of the right of the

British government to arbitrate in his disputes with the court of Hyderabad.

The double injury which the interests of the British government sustained by the absence of Sindia from his northern possessions, and by his presence in the Deckan, gave that government the justest grounds to use every endeavour to oblige him to leave Poonah; and as it was evident, from the state of the English army in Hindustan, and the weakness of Sindia in that quarter, that we had the power, if ever actuated by ambition, of seizing his most valuable possessions; the urgent solicitude which we showed upon this occasion could not be misinterpreted, or ascribed to any motive but that by which it was really produced.

A change occurred in the councils of Doulut Row Sindia* of a nature that, at one period, raised hope of a successful termination to the discussions at Poonah. That, however, was disappointed; and, after a negotiation marked by weakness and evasion on the part of the Paishwah, and by intrigue and duplicity on that of Sindia, the British government was forced to proceed in its operations against the Sultaun without any satisfactory settlement with either of these chiefs, who were strongly suspected (particularly Sindia) to be at this period much more inclined to take part with our enemy.

We shall now proceed to an examination of the

* In the month of August, 1799.

causes which led to the war with Tippoo Sultaun ; and the conduct pursued by the Marquess Wellesley previously to that event, and on its occurrence.

The whole tenour of Tippoo Sultaun's proceedings, subsequent to the peace concluded by Lord Cornwallis, had shown an implacable spirit of revenge towards the British government, which appeared to be rather inflamed, than mitigated, by the unremitting endeavours that were made to conciliate his friendship. His intrigues at Hyderabad, his embassies to Poonah, to the Mauritius, to Cabul, Persia, and Turkey, were all the result of the same animosity ; and the destruction of the British power in India continued to be the constant object of his contemplation. Though this disposition had been long evident in him, and had produced, more than once, considerable danger to our interests, it had not (previously to the arrival of Lord Wellesley) shown itself in any direct act of hostility. Immediately after that period a communication had taken place respecting a boundary dispute in Wynaud ; on which occasion, that nobleman, overlooking the impropriety of Tippoo's moving a body of troops towards the districts in dispute, had made a proposition in the most mild and conciliatory terms for an amicable adjustment of the difference. The Sultaun, therefore, had not the slightest pretext to complain of the English government : he had, indeed, never alleged any ; and his letters had uniformly expressed his satisfaction

with its conduct, and the firmest reliance upon its continued friendship.

It was, therefore, with some astonishment that the Governor-general received* accounts of the arrival of the ambassadors of the Sultaun at the Isle of France; and of the proclamation issued at that Island, with their participation and sanction, inviting volunteers to enter into the service of Tippoo, who was represented in this document to be on the eve of commencing an attack upon the English, in concert with the French government.

This public denunciation of hostility appeared so imprudent and precipitate, that the first account of it was received with great doubt, and the Governor-general deemed it his duty to make patient inquiry, and substantiate its authenticity, before he made it the ground of any measures, even of defensive precaution.

The result of these inquiries is fully stated by Lord Wellesley in a minute † in which his Lordship gives an account of the arrival of the ambassadors of the Sultaun at the Isle of France, and their proceedings there, in the following words:—

“Tippoo despatched two ambassadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived there at the close of the month of January, 1798. They hoisted Tippoo's colours, upon enter-

* Upon the 18th of June, 1798.

† Under date the 12th of August, 1798.

ing the harbour of Port Nord Ouest; were received publicly and formally by the French government, with every circumstance of distinction and respect; and were entertained during their continuance in the Island at the public expense. Previously to their arrival, no idea, or rumour, existed in the island of any aid to be furnished by the French, or of any prospect of a war between him and the Company.

“The second day after the arrival of the ambassadors an advertisement was published, of the same purport as the proclamation; and immediately afterwards the proclamation was fixed up in the most public places, and circulated through the town. One of the ambassadors was said to be conversant with the French language. A person accompanied the embassy from Mangalore, who was habited in the Turkish dress, who spoke French and English with uncommon correctness and fluency, and who appeared to possess considerable knowledge and talents, and to be well acquainted with most of the country languages of India. This person had been known at Bussorah by the name of Abdullah; at Surat, by that of Dervish; and in the Isle of France passed under that of Talomash; under which last name he had also passed in Bengal, where he resided for some years. The ambassadors, far from protesting against the matter or style of the proclamation, held without reserve, in the most open and public

manner, the same language which it contained, with respect to the offensive war to be commenced against the British possessions in India: they even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distributed at their own house. Talomash's conversation, though with more caution and mystery, corresponded in substance with theirs. In consequence of these circumstances, an universal belief prevailed in the island, that Tippoo would make an immediate attack on the British possessions in India: which opinion had gained so much force, that the persons who gave this evidence, and all those who arrived at that period in India from the Isle of France, expected to find us at war with Tippoo; but they all concurred in declaring, that the temerity of Tippoo's designs had excited general ridicule in that island. The ambassadors were present in the island when the French government proceeded to act under the proclamation in question; and they aided and assisted the execution of it, by making promises in the name of Tippoo, for the purpose of enticing recruits to enlist. They proposed to levy men to any practicable extent, stating their powers to be unlimited with respect to the number of the force to be raised.

“ The ambassadors aided and assisted in a levy of an hundred officers, and fifty privates, for the service of Tippoo, under the terms, and for the purposes, stated in the proclamation. Few of the officers are of any experience or skill; and the

privates are the refuse of the lowest class of the democratic rabble of the island: some of them are volunteers: others were taken from the prisons, and compelled to embark: several of them are Cafrées, and people of half caste. With such of these troops as were volunteers, the ambassadors entered into several stipulations and engagements in the name of Tippoo.

“ On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassadors embarked on board the French frigate *Preneuse*, together with the force thus raised; and they publicly declared an intention of proceeding to the Isle of Bourbon, with the hope of obtaining more recruits for the same service.

“ The proclamation therefore originated,” his lordship adds, “ in the arrival of the ambassadors at the Isle of France, and was distributed by their agents; was avowed in every part by their own public declaration; and, finally, was executed, according to its tenour, by their personal assistance and co-operation.

“ The proclamation itself furnishes the most powerful internal evidence of the concurrence of the ambassadors in all its essential parts. The principal facts stated therein are:

“ That Tippoo Sultaun, through two ambassadors, despatched for the purpose to the Isle of France, had addressed letters to the colonial assembly of the Isle of France; to all the generals employed there; and to the executive directory

of France; and had made the following propositions :—

“ 1st, That he desired to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France; and offered to maintain at his expense, during the continuance of the war in India, whatever troops should be furnished by the French; and to supply (with the exception of certain stores) every necessary for carrying on the war.

“ 2dly, That he had given assurances that all his preparations were already completed; and that the generals and officers would find every thing necessary for carrying on a species of war to which Europeans have not been accustomed in their contests with the native powers in India.

“ 3dly, That he only waited for the succour of France, to declare war against the English; and that it was his ardent desire to expel the English from India.

“ Upon the ground of these facts, the proclamation recommends a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo; and it concludes, by assuring all the citizens, who shall enlist, that Tippoo will give them an advantageous rate of pay and allowances, which will be fixed by his ambassadors, who will also engage, in the name of their sovereign, that the Frenchmen, who shall have enlisted in his army, shall never be detained there after they shall have expressed a desire of returning to their native country.”

After some comments upon the avowed purpose of this proclamation, the Governor-general draws such a series of conclusions from the facts adduced and the arguments used, as established, on incontrovertible grounds, the hostile nature of Tippoo's proceedings throughout the whole of this negotiation with the French government of the Isle of France; the character of which was, his lordship justly observes, strongly corroborated by the conduct of that prince in his communications with other powers: and concludes these observations by recording his opinion, that the motive of Tippoo Sultaun, in sending an embassy to the Isle of France, "was no other than that avowed in his correspondence with the enemy, and published under the eyes of his own ambassadors: *an ardent desire to expel the British nation from India.*"

From a conviction of such being his intentions, the Governor-general was fully satisfied, as he stated in a letter* to the court of directors, "that an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, appeared to be demanded by the soundest maxims of justice and policy.

"The act" (his lordship adds in the same despatch) "of Tippoo Sultaun's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and followed by the admission of a

* Under date the 13th of September, 1799.

French force into his army, was equivalent to a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war: but, while his hostile purpose had been clearly manifested, the immediate means of accomplishing it had happily disappointed the ardour of his hopes."

The immaturity, however, of the Sultaun's plans, formed, in Lord Wellesley's opinion, the strongest reason for an immediate attack upon his possessions; and such was his lordship's original intention: but this he was obliged to alter by reason of the delay that was to be apprehended in assembling the army on the coast of Coromandel, as it had been reduced to a very low establishment, and was in a very divided and unequipped state. He made no communication whatever to Tippoo Sultaun on the subject of his proceedings, till the military preparations, both at Madras and Bombay, were complete; and the course of the events, which has been described, had not merely restored the alliance with the Nizam, but had rendered it so efficient as to secure the full application of the resources of that prince in aid of the common cause*.

* The view which Lord Wellesley took at this period, of the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the great changes which had recently occurred in the political condition of the native states of India, claims our particular attention. A reference (a) to his able minute of the 12th of August, 1798, will not only show the necessity of the measures which he adopted to

(a) Vide Appendix, No. III.

When these essential measures of precautionary policy were accomplished, Lord Wellesley addressed a letter*, to the Sultaun, in which, after replying in a most moderate and conciliatory manner to a letter from that prince, respecting some villages in the possession of the Rajah of Coorg, to the revenues of which he laid claim, his lordship proceeded to expostulate upon the nature of the connexion which he had recently formed with the French government; and pointed out, in the most explicit and strongest terms, the consequences likely to result from it. "This connexion" (Lord Wellesley observes) "not only threatens to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion; to shake your own authority; to weaken the obedience of your subjects; and to destroy the religion which you revere."

His lordship, in this letter, after adverting to the amicable professions of Tippoo, and the proofs which the Company's government had given of a sincere disposition to maintain the relations of peace and friendship with him, states the causes which had obliged that government and its allies to avert immediate danger, but will convey a just idea of that system of policy which he determined to pursue, and explain those fundamental principles which regulated every act of his administration.

* Under date the 8th November, 1798.

adopt measures of precaution and defence: but those, his lordship added, were not connected with any views incompatible with their respective engagements, and were directed to no object but that of maintaining the permanent security and tranquillity of the dominions of each. He earnestly recommended this letter to the serious consideration of the Suldaun; to whom he stated his intention of deputing Major Doveton (an officer well known to the Suldaun) to explain, in a full manner, those means which appeared most likely to banish distrust and suspicion, and to establish peace and good understanding on durable foundations.

“ I shall expect your answer,” said Lord Wellesley, “ to this letter, with an earnest hope that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies; and that you may be convinced, that you cannot in any manner better consult your true interests, than by meeting, with cordiality, the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points on which any doubt or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies.”

The accounts which had been received of the landing of the French army in Egypt, and the immediate or remote connexion, which that expedition was supposed to have with an attempt upon India, had confirmed Lord Wellesley in his belief of the absolute necessity of either compelling Tip-

poo Sultaun to detach himself from the interests of France, or depriving him of the means to co-operate with that nation in any project hostile to the British government. The great victory gained over the French fleet by Lord Nelson, intelligence of which had reached Bengal on the 21st of October; the extraordinary success which had attended the measures adopted at Hyderabad; and the complete state of the preparation of the armies at Madras and Bombay; led Lord Wellesley to expect, when he wrote* to the Sultaun, that the latter would accede to the proposal for a pacific negotiation, and that the terror of the British arms would render their actual employment unnecessary. Notwithstanding this hope, he resolved to be prepared for every event: he accordingly proceeded in person to Madras, that, by being near the scene of negotiation or military operations, he might avoid the incalculable evils of delay; and give to the public service the advantage of prompt decision upon every question, military or political, which could arise. He informed † Tippoo Sultaun of this resolution, and at the same time urged him to give the earliest and most serious consideration to the communication which he had made to him in his former letter.

Lord Wellesley reached Madras on the 31st of

* Under date the 8th November.

† In a letter dated the 10th of December.

December, and found, on his arrival there, a reply had been received from the Sultaun to the letter which he had written to that prince before he left Calcutta.

Tippoo, in his reply, repeated his former professions of unalterable friendship to the English; expressed his bad opinion of the French; and asserted, that the reputed embassy to the Mauritius was merely a mercantile speculation of some of his subjects, and its destination to the French islands altogether accidental. Forty persons, he stated, among whom were twelve artificers, had returned in the vessel sent there; and to some of these he had given service, and others had departed from his dominions. "But the French," he observes in this letter, "who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship, to put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both governments."

In this communication, Tippoo expressed great surprise at the allusion to war in the Governor-general's letter; and, on this ground, he evaded an assent to the proposition made of deputing Major Doveton, as he conceived no further means than those already taken could be necessary to give strength and stability to a friendship resting upon such firm foundations as that which then existed between him, the British government, and its allies.

In his answer to this evasive letter, Lord Wel-

lesley stated in the fullest manner the grounds of the measures which he had adopted. All the proceedings of the embassy to the Mauritius were recapitulated; and the Sultaun was further informed that, by his conduct, he had compelled the allies to seek relief from the ambiguous and anxious state in which they had been placed for years past; and that they could no longer suffer those constant preparations for war, and hostile negotiations with their enemies, which exposed them, during a period of supposed peace, to all the solicitude, and hazard, and much of the expense, of war. In reply to that part of Tippoo's letter in which he evaded our negotiation, Lord Wellesley observed, "That a new arrangement had become indispensable, in consequence of that Prince's new engagements with the common enemy of the allies;" and, after repeating his entreaties to the Sultaun to meet with cordiality this moderate and sincere advance to an amicable explanation, he plainly informed him, that no further delays could be admitted; and required an answer to the letter then sent, a day after its receipt.

This letter was dated the 9th of January, and it reached the Sultaun about the 15th of that month. No reply, however, was received to it until the 13th of February, when a short letter was received, which took a very cursory notice of Lord Wellesley's proposition in the following terms: "Being frequently disposed to make excursions, and hunt, I

am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to despatch Major Doveton, (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written,) slightly attended."

The Suldaun's delay in replying to the letter of the 9th of January had been considered as a rejection of the proposition for an amicable settlement, combined with a design to procrastinate till the favourable season for the attack of his capital was past. Under such impressions, which were greatly strengthened by his deputing at this period another embassy to the Isle of France, the British army under General Harris, and the Nizam's army under Meer Allum, had been directed, on the 3d of February, to advance against his dominions.

Lord Wellesley, however*, acknowledged the receipt of the Suldaun's last short letter; and informed him that his long silence on so important and pressing an occasion had compelled his lordship to the measures which he had adopted. The deputation of Major Doveton, his lordship stated, under actual circumstances, could be productive of no advantage; but that as the allies still retained a desire to effect a settlement, General Harris had been instructed to receive any embassy which Tippoo might send; and he was empowered to enter into a new treaty of friendship with him, founded upon such conditions as should appear to the allies

* In a letter dated the 22nd of February.

indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

It will be useful, before touching on the events of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, to advert to the nature of the terms on which the Governor-general was disposed, at different periods, to come to an amicable settlement with that prince; as a reference to them will best show the principles of policy by which Lord Wellesley's conduct was governed throughout the whole of this arduous and difficult proceeding.

From his lordship's letter to the court of directors*, it appears, that, when he discovered the inadequacy of the means requisite to reduce the Sultaun's power and resources by a sudden and unexpected attack, his views were limited to the detaching of that prince from his friendship with the French nation; and that he would have been contented with any adjustment which offered a reasonable prospect of securing that object. This he judged might be effected by the establishment of a permanent resident at Seringapatam; the dismissal of all the French in the Sultaun's service; and their perpetual exclusion from his armies and dominions.

The invasion of Egypt by the French, if it had not been originally planned with a view to the assistance of Tippoo, might, the Governor-general

* Dated the 3d of August 1799.

thought, be converted to that purpose. This rendered the reduction of the Sultaun's power more urgent than before; while the success at Hyderabad, and the forward state of the military preparations at Madras and Bombay, made the accomplishment of it less difficult. These considerations caused Lord Wellesley to extend his views; and, at the period when he addressed the letter of the 8th of November to the Sultaun, he was resolved, in addition to the terms before specified, to insist upon exchanging the province of Canara (the only line of sea-coast in Tippoo's possession) for an equal extent of territory in some other quarter: for he conceived such an adjustment was then requisite, to afford complete security against any designs which the Sultaun might have in combination with the French, whose intercourse with Mysore would by this arrangement have been completely cut off. No opportunity, however, was offered of discussing these terms; and the perseverance of the Sultaun in the cultivation of a connexion with the French, and his neglect of every advance to an amicable settlement, combined with the concentrated state of the forces of the British government and the Nizam, made the Governor-general, after his arrival at Madras, resolve to add to the other demands, the payment of a considerable sum of money, as an indemnification for the expense to which the hostile and treacherous conduct of Tippoo had exposed the allies.

It was not till the month of February, 1799, that the Governor-general found himself compelled to abandon all hopes of effecting any amicable settlement. He then directed the British armies to advance against Tippoo; empowering, however, the commander-in-chief, General Harris, to treat with him, if he showed a sincere desire for peace. The terms upon which this was to be concluded were, of course, to depend upon the stage of the war at which negotiations commenced; but in the event of any decided victory, or of the batteries against his capital having been opened, the demands were to be extended to the cession of one half of his dominions, and the payment to the allies of two crore of rupees; and he was to be required to give four of his sons, and four of his principal officers, as hostages for the faithful performance of these conditions.

The army under General Harris having been joined by that of the Nizam, had entered the territories of Mysore on the 3d of March, without opposition. The Sultaun, as soon as he saw the advanced state of the preparations of the allies, had hastened to attack the Bombay army under General Stuart, which was posted in the country of Coorg, and ready to co-operate in the reduction of his capital. Being repulsed in this attack, with great loss, his next object was to obstruct the march of General Harris's army, which he met between Sultanpet and Malavelly on the 27th of March, where a partial

action took place, which terminated in the Sultaun's defeat, and instant retreat to Seringapatam; and that fortress, a few days afterwards, was regularly invested by the combined armies of the British government and the Nizam.

The Sultaun, who had hitherto entered into no communication whatever with General Harris, addressed a short note to that officer on the 9th of April, in which he required to know the cause of the hostile advance of the British army. In answer to this demand, he was referred to the letters which he had before received from the Governor-general; which letters, he was told, were fully explanatory of the subject. The Sultaun returned no reply till the 20th of April, when the operations of the siege were far advanced. He then addressed General Harris again, desiring that he would appoint a person to conduct a conference for the purpose of restoring peace. The general replied by sending a draft of the treaty which he had been instructed to conclude under such circumstances of advantage.

This communication was not acknowledged; and the siege continued till the 4th of May, when the fort was taken by assault, Tippoo Sultaun slain, and the empire of the house of Hyder subverted.

Such was the termination of a war which, whether we consider the temper and wisdom that marked the negotiations by which it was preceded, the ability and courage with which it was prosecuted,

or the important political consequences by which it was attended, will be found unparalleled in the annals of British India. In the short period of a few months a rival power was destroyed; which, from the first day of its existence, till that of its dissolution, (a period of thirty-eight years,) might be said to have directed all its efforts against the English power in India.

Important as the conquest of Mysore was to the British interests in India, the solid and permanent advantages to be derived from that great event depended chiefly upon the settlement of the territories subdued. The justice and success of the war had given to the company, and the Nizam, an undoubted right to dispose of these territories as they judged proper; but on the manner in which they exercised this right, not only the reputation of those states, but the future tranquillity of the southern part of the peninsula of India, in a great degree depended.

The Nizam, having at the commencement of the war given the Governor-general full powers to negotiate a peace, now directed the commander of his forces to acquiesce in any plan upon which Lord Wellesley should decide respecting the disposal of the territories of the Sultaun. From this act of honourable confidence, the Governor-general was left free to make such a settlement of the conquered kingdom of Mysore as, in his opinion, should be consistent with those principles of

moderation and justice upon which the war was undertaken.

It will suffice to take a short general view of the character of the arrangement which Lord Wellesley made, and of the leading considerations which governed his conduct upon this important occasion. But, in doing this, it is impossible to refrain from giving occasional extracts from those clear and luminous despatches, in which that nobleman reported to his superiors in England the motives of his proceedings. "In regulating the exercise of our right of conquest," Lord Wellesley observes in his letter* to the directors, "it appeared to me, that no principle could more justly be assumed, than that the original objects of the war should constitute the basis of the peace, and of the general settlement of our territorial acquisitions. These objects had been repeatedly declared by the allies to be a reasonable indemnification of our expense in the war, and an adequate security against the return of that danger which originally provoked us to arms.

"With a view," he continues, "to each of these just and necessary objects, it was requisite that the Company and the Nizam should retain a large portion of the conquered territory; but it required much consideration to determine the precise extent of that portion, as well as the just rule of partition.

* Under date the 3d of August, 1799.

The war had not been undertaken in pursuit of schemes of conquest, aggrandizement of territory, or augmentation of revenue. In proportion to the magnitude and lustre of our success, it became a more urgent duty to remember, that a peace, founded in the gratification of any ambitious or inordinate view, could neither be advantageous, honourable, nor secure.

“The approved policy, interests, and honour, of the British nation, required that the settlement of the extensive kingdom subjected to our disposal, should be formed on principles acceptable to the inhabitants of the conquered territories; just and conciliatory towards the contiguous native states; and indulgent to every party, in any degree affected by the consequences of our success.

“To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, to the exclusion of any other state, would have afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Mahrattas, and aggrandized Nizam Ali's power beyond all bounds of discretion. Under whatever form such a partition could have been made, it must have placed in the hands of the Nizam many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontiers of Mysore, and exposed our frontier, in that quarter, to every predatory incursion. Such a partition would have laid the foundation of perpetual differences, not only between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, but between the Company and both those powers.

“To have divided the country into three equal portions, allowing the Mahrattas (who had borne no part in the expense or hazard of the war) an equal share with the other two branches of the triple alliance, in the advantages of the peace, would have been unjust towards the Nizam, and towards the Company impolitic, as furnishing an evil example to our other allies in India; and dangerous, as effecting a considerable aggrandizement of the Mahratta empire, at the expense of the Company and the Nizam. This mode of partition also must have placed Chittledroog, and some of the most important northern fortresses, in the hands of the Mahrattas; while the remainder of the fortresses, in the same line, would have been occupied by the Nizam; and our unfortified and open frontier in Mysore would have been exposed to the excesses of the undisciplined troops of both powers.

“The Mahrattas, unquestionably, had no claim to any portion of the conquered territory; and any considerable extension of their empire was objectionable, especially when accompanied by the possession of strong fortresses bordering on the line of our frontier. It was, however, desirable to conciliate their good will, and to offer to them such a portion of territory as might give them an interest in the new settlement, without offence or injury to the Nizam, and without danger to the frontier of the Company's possessions. On the other hand, it was prudent to limit the territory retained in the

hands of the Company and of the Nizam within such bounds of moderation as should bear a due proportion to their respective expenses in the contest, and to the necessary means of securing the future safety of their respective dominions."

After these observations, his lordship concludes this part of the subject by stating, that an attentive investigation of every comparative view of these important questions had terminated in his deciding, "that the establishment of a central and separate government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Mahrattas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties; to secure to the Company a less invidious and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commerce, advantage, and military strength, than could be obtained under any distribution of territory or power; and to afford the most favourable prospect of general and permanent tranquillity in India."

His lordship next explains, in this despatch, the considerations which had regulated the partition of the country. The districts of Canara, including all the sea-coast of Mysore, and the provinces immediately contiguous to the possessions of the Company on the coast of Malabar, and the Carnatic, were of course assigned to the English government; to which were added the forts and posts at the heads of the different passes into Mysore, and the

fortress and island of Seringapatam, which was deemed essential to secure the communication between the possessions of the Company on the coast of Coromandel and that of Malabar, and to connect the different lines of defence.

The districts of Goorum-conda, Gooty, and others contiguous to his dominions, were assigned to the Nizam; and though that prince had no claim, from the letter of his engagements, which could entitle him to a share in the advantages of the settlement, beyond his relative proportion in the expenses and exertions of the allied forces during the war, Lord Wellesley thought it desirable that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company, after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to tenure, should not exceed that assigned to the Nizam; "but he decided that, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expenses and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new government of Mysore should be reserved for the Company."

The share of territory reserved as an eventual cession to the Poonah government, Lord Wellesley resolved should be of an amount neither exceeding in value two-thirds, nor falling below one half, of the portion allotted to the Company and Nizam Ali Khan; and this share comprised the Harponelly, Soondah, Annagoondy, and other

districts contiguous to the possessions of the Paishwab. But as this cession* could only be considered as a favour, the government of Poonah having taken no share in the war, his lordship determined that it should not be made unconditionally, but should form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire.

The reasons which led Lord Wellesley to determine upon restoring the ancient Hindu family of Mysore are very fully stated in his letter, to which we have before referred. The strongest considerations of policy forbade the restoration of the family of Tippoo. They had been brought up in hereditary hatred of the English government; and could not, under any arrangement that it was possible to make, be expected to forget the great power and independence from which they had fallen. The sentiments of Lord Wellesley upon this subject are forcibly expressed in the following passage:—

“The heir of Tippoo Sultaun must have been educated in the same principles, encouraged to indulge the same prejudices and passions, and instructed to form the same views of the interests

* This cession amounted, in annual revenue, to upwards of two lacs and sixty-three thousand Canterai pagodas; while that reserved for the establishment of the government of Mysore, was in value upwards of thirteen lacs of pagodas; and comprised more than the ancient possessions of Mysore, previously to the usurpation of Hyder Ali Khan.

and honour of the throne of Mysore. These sentiments would necessarily acquire additional force in his mind from the issue of the late war. But unexampled success had subverted the foundations of his father's empire, and transferred to our possession every source of the civil or military power of Mysore; and, placed on the throne by our favour, and limited by our control, he must have felt himself degraded to a state of humiliation and weakness so abject as no prince of spirit will brook. Under such an arrangement, our safety would have required us to retain at least all the territory which we now hold by the partition treaty of Mysore. Whatever we retained must have been considered by this prince as a new usurpation upon his royal inheritance, and an additional pledge of his degradation and disgrace. In proportion to the reduction of his territory and resources, he would have had less to lose, and more to regain, in any struggle for the recovery of his father's empire; nor does it seem unreasonable to suppose, that the heir of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire, which for many years had rendered his

ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of this quarter of India.

“ In the most narrow view of the subject, it must be admitted, that the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of any settlement of Mysore, founded on a partition of his father’s dominions, and a limitation of his own independence. If, therefore, a prince of this race had been placed on the throne of Mysore, the foundation of the new settlement would have been laid in the very principle of its own dissolution. With such a prince, no sincere alliance, no concord of sentiment nor union of views, could ever have been established: the appearance of amity or attachment must have been delusive; even his submission must have been reluctant, if not treacherous; while all his interests, his habits, prejudices and passions, his views, and even his virtues, must have concurred to cherish an irreconcilable aversion to our name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause, to exasperate the animosity, and to receive the aid, of every enemy of the British nation. Whatever degree of influence or strength might have been left to the native government of Mysore, in such hands would always have been thrown into the scale opposed to their interests. The hostile power of Mysore would have been weakened, but not destroyed: an enemy would have still remained in the centre of your possessions, watching every occasion to repair the

misfortunes of his family at their expense, and forming a point of union for the machinations of every discontented faction in India, and for the intrigues of every emissary of the French."

Under these impressions, he resolved to exclude this family from all power, and to raise the ancient house of Mysore to the government of that country; a measure, which was recommended by every consideration of policy, humanity, and justice.

"The indignities" (Lord Wellesley states *) "which the family of Mysore had suffered, especially during the cruel and tyrannical reign of Tippoo Sultaun, and the state of degradation and misery to which they had been reduced, must naturally excite a sentiment of gratitude and attachment in their minds towards that power which should not only deliver them from oppression, but raise them to a state of considerable affluence and distinction. Between the British government and this family an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted: in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune they had formed no connexion with your enemies: their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity; and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultaun, or against any other

* In his letter to the Directors.

claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy all the friends of the usurping family, and consequently be adverse to the French, or to any state connected with that family in its hereditary hatred of the British government. The heir of the Rajah of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that station depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts; it must therefore be his interest to unite, with cordiality and zeal, in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety; in the place of that power would be substituted one, whose interest and resources might be absolutely identified with our own: and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity or alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence, and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies."

Having resolved upon these measures, orders were given for their immediate execution. The descendants of the Sultaun were removed to Vellore; where excellent accommodations were prepared for their reception; liberal pensions assigned for their support; and every attention and indulgence shown, which were due to their rank and situation, and could be rendered compatible with

the prevention of their escape from that fortress. The chief Mahomedan Sirdars* of the Sultaun were also provided for by liberal pensions; and every step was taken which could tend to reconcile the family, adherents and servants, of the late Sultaun to the arrangement which was intended.

Immediately after the departure of the sons of Tippoo Sultaun from Seringapatam, Kistna Raj Oudawer, a child of three years of age, the lineal descendant of the ancient family of Mysore, whose power Hyder Ally Khan had usurped in the year 1761, was raised to the throne of his ancestors; and Purneah, a bramin of great ability and reputation, who had been the chief financial minister of Tippoo, was appointed dewan or minister to the young prince. Two treaties were formed with this prince, one termed the partition treaty †, and the other the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam ‡.

The first of these treaties was contracted between the English government, that of the Soubah of the Deckan, and the new state of Mysore. The exact amount of the territories to be kept by the British government, and that of Hyderabad, was settled in this treaty; and the amount and mode of payment of the pensions allotted for the support of the family and chief officers of the Sultaun was also fixed. The territory, which it had been resolved to

* Principal officers.

† Under date the 22nd of June, 1799.

‡ Under date the 8th of July, 1799.

secure for the state of Poonah, was, by the conditions of this treaty, to be given to the Paishwah, provided that prince acceded to it within a month from the day on which it should be communicated to him; and provided he gave satisfaction to the English government, and that of Hyderabad, respecting some points pending between these courts and that of Poonah. In the event of the Paishwah not acceding to the treaty to be offered to his acceptance, the territories reserved for him were to be divided between the Nizam and the Company; but a proportion of two-thirds was to be given to the former.

To the subsidiary treaty of Mysore* the Soubahdar of the Deckan was not a party. It was an engage-

* By this treaty it was stipulated, that the Company should maintain a military force for the defence of the kingdom of Mysore, and that the Rajah should pay an annual subsidy of seven lacs of pagodas for the support of this force. It was further agreed, that in the event of extraordinary expenses being incurred for the defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or in preparations for hostilities against any enemy of the two states, the Rajah of Mysore was to contribute towards the expenditure in such proportion as should appear to the Governor-general of India, after an attentive consideration of his means, just and reasonable.

Under the declared resolution of providing against the possibility of the Company's government suffering by any future failure of the funds appropriated for the support of the forces which it was bound to maintain for the defence of Mysore, it was stipulated, that, on such event appearing probable, the English government possessed a right, either to introduce such

ment formed to settle the relations between the new state of Mysore and the British government; and, from its stipulations, the former became in a great degree dependent upon the latter for its political existence.

The jealous, and almost hostile, spirit with which the Mahrattas regarded our operations against Tippoo, and the conflicts with which the southern part of the Peninsula was threatened from the weak and distracted condition of the Paishwah's government, pointed out the urgent necessity of adding, by every practicable means, to the efficiency of the alliance with the Nizam, as that became the chief

regulations and ordinances in the internal management of the revenues, or to assume, and bring under its direct management, such part or parts of the country of Mysore, as might be necessary to render the funds fixed for the maintenance of the troops efficient and available. On the part of the British government it was agreed, to render the Rajah a true and faithful account of the revenues so assumed; and it was stipulated, that the actual receipts of the Rajah, under no possible circumstances or arrangement, were to be less than one lac of pagodas territorial revenue, and one-fifth of the produce of the countries ceded to him by the treaty of Mysore.

In this treaty the Rajah of Mysore agreed to refrain from all communication or correspondence with any foreign state, and to admit no European foreigners into his country or service. He also agreed to permit the British government to garrison with its own troops such fortresses in the country of Mysore, as it might think necessary to the fulfilment of its engagements for protecting and defending that kingdom.

means of preserving the British possessions, and those of its allies, in a state of peace and tranquillity.

For the attainment of this object, it was necessary to add to the strength of the subsidiary force with the Nizam; and to adopt measures for securing the English government against those risks to which it was probable this connexion would be early exposed from the weak and fluctuating councils of that prince.

To effect this important point, nothing seemed so desirable as to commute the monthly pecuniary payment of subsidy for a cession of territory. The advantages of such an arrangement were manifold and obvious. By its adoption, an end would be put to that recurrence of irritation which must always be expected to attend pecuniary payments from sordid or extravagant courts. The resources upon which the support of a large English force must depend would be placed in the hands of the British government, instead of being in those of another state, whose imprudence, distress, or treachery, might, at any critical moment, endanger the general safety; and no future prince of the Deckan was likely to desire the dissolution of the connexion when, by a cession of territory, he had paid in perpetuity, and by advance, for the services of the troops by which his dominions were protected. These were among

the leading considerations which induced Lord Wellesley to negotiate with the Nizam the new treaty*, bearing date the 12th of October, 1800.

* By this treaty the British government engaged to permit no power nor state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked aggression or hostility upon the territories of the Nizam; and to enable the Company to fulfil this engagement in an efficient manner, two battalions of sepoy, and a regiment of native cavalry, were permanently added to the subsidiary force to be maintained by the state of Hyderabad. To secure the constant and regular payment of this augmented force, the Nizam ceded in perpetuity to the Company all the territories which he had acquired by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, and the treaty of Mysore in 1799. With a view of preserving a well-defined boundary, some changes were made in this cession; the Nizam retaining Kupool, Gujunderghur, &c., and giving Adoni, &c., in their lieu, being countries situated to the south of the river Toombuddrah, which, by this settlement, formed the boundary between the two states.

In the event of war taking place between the contracting parties and a third state, the Nizam agreed that the whole of the subsidiary force, except two battalions, which were to be kept near his person, should be employed against the enemy; and that the force should, on such event, be immediately joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of his own troops.

The Nizam also agreed to enter into no negotiation with other states without informing and consulting the Company's government: and the latter agreed, that it would in no instance interfere with the Nizam's children, relations, or subjects; with respect to whom it would always consider him absolute.

The Nizam engaged not to commit hostilities against any other state; and, in the event of differences arising between

The revenue of the territories ceded to the Company by this treaty was about 17,58,000 pagodas; but their importance, in a political and military point of view, was still greater than their pecuniary value. Their local situation added to the security of the former possessions of the Company on the coast of Coromandel, and to those of the new state of Mysore; to both of which they formed a defined and good military boundary.

The British government (as we have mentioned) reserved a considerable portion of the conquered territories of Tippoo Sultaun, to be given to the Paishwah, on the condition of his acceding to an alliance calculated to preserve the general tranquillity. That prince, however, acting under the control of Dowlut Row Sindia, (who continued with a large army, and almost the whole of his French brigades, at Poonah) rejected this equitable proposal; and the reserved territory was shared, agreeably to the stipulations of the partition treaty, between the English government and that of Hyderabad.

him and another power, it was stipulated that they were to be adjusted by the Company's government, and that the Nizam was to acquiesce in the justice of its decision.

It was stipulated, that in the event of either the Paishwah, Ragojee Bhonselah, or Dowlut Row Sindia, desiring to be a party in this treaty, they should be admitted to all its advantages.

In the beginning of the year 1801, the occurrence of war between Jeswunt Row Holkar and Sindia had forced the latter to move from Poonah; and the distraction which this event had created among the Mahratta states appeared to Lord Wellesley to constitute a most favourable crisis for compassing the complete establishment of the British interests at the court of Poonah. This he desired to do upon a basis that, while it secured the stability and efficiency of the Paishwah's authority, interfered with none of the real rights or possessions of the great feudatories in the Mahratta state; and, consequently, could only be opposed by them on the grounds of its frustrating their plans of encroachment and aggrandizement, which it had become the imperious policy of the British government to check, as their prosecution was altogether incompatible with the maintenance of the system which it had been compelled to adopt for its own safety, and that of its allies.

The Paishwah had himself made a general proposition for entering into a defensive alliance with the British government; but the nature of the conditions of the treaty which he proposed, and the actual state of his power, induced the Governor-general to reject his proposition, the sole object of which was to re-establish and support his own personal authority, without admitting our govern-

ment to the exercise of the influence necessary for its own security and that of its allies.

Before the date* on which Lord Wellesley received the report of the negotiations at Poonah, accounts had reached India of the peace of Amiens. The scene was consequently open to French intrigue; and if Sindia regained, by the defeat of Holkar, (an event then probable,) the complete ascendancy over the Paishwah, and the entire control of the Mahratta empire, from the banks of the Ganges to the sea of Malabar—there could not be a doubt in the mind of any man in the least degree acquainted with the constitution of the army of that chief, and the influence and authority of the French officers in his service, that their nation might, in a very few years, without violating one article of the treaty of peace, aid him to the consolidation of a military power which would strike at the very existence of the British government in India. It did not appear likely that the execution of such a plan would meet with any serious obstacle in the jealousy of Sindia, who had become familiar with the system which it was the policy of the French to pursue. To that both his predecessor and himself had owed their power; and he was consequently disposed to pursue it.

The territories of the Paishwah having been the scene of continual conflict, from the death of Mad-

* June, 1802.

hoo Row, were not able, in their exhausted state, to support, even for a few months, the hordes of banditti which were daily pouring in from Malwa and Hindustan, to contend at Poonah for the sovereignty of the Mahratta empire.

This fact, which cannot be disputed, made it evident, that if the armies of Sindia, Holkar, and Ragojee Bhonselah, were permitted to make the provinces of the Poonah state their theatre of warfare, those armies must be early forced by want, if not invited by policy, to invade the territories of the British government, or its allies. This circumstance therefore formed in itself a strong proof, not merely of the expediency, but of the necessity, of the measures pursued on this occasion by Lord Wellesley.

In the contest which took place in 1802, between Dowlut Row Sindia and Holkar, the Paishwah joined with the former, whose army sustained a signal defeat near Poonah, on the 25th of October. Badjerow, who had moved out of his capital before the action commenced, immediately fled towards the sea-coast, having previously sent his minister to the British resident*, with a writing sealed with his own seal, containing his consent to receive a subsidiary force, and to cede, for its subsistence, territory either in Guzerat, or in his southern territories, producing an annual revenue

* Colonel Close.

of twenty-six lacs of rupees. The minister, at the same time that he made this proposition, assured the resident in the most positive manner, that it was the intention of his master to conclude a defensive alliance with the honourable Company, on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad.

The Governor-general, as soon as he received the preliminary engagement offered to his acceptance from the Paishwah, confirmed it; and desired that prince should be informed, that all the resources of the British government should be employed for the re-establishment of his authority. The resident was also directed to give to the preliminaries the form of a defensive treaty, and to obtain the Paishwah's consent to such articles as were requisite in favour of the British government.

The Paishwah, when near the sea-coast, solicited the aid of a vessel and protection from the government of Bombay. His requests were complied with, and he embarked on board the *Herculean*, an English vessel, sent for his accommodation, and proceeded to Bassein, where he arrived on the 16th of December. He was joined at that place by the British resident; and, after a short negotiation, a definitive treaty of defensive alliance was concluded between him and the British government.

By this treaty, which is dated the 31st December, 1802, the English government bound itself to

furnish to the Paishwah a subsidiary force of six battalions of native infantry, with a complement of field-pieces and European artillery-men: for the payment of which force, the Paishwah agreed to make over territory to an amount of twenty-six lacs of rupees. All claims of the Paishwah, and his family, on Surat, and the districts under the English government in Guzerat, were finally adjusted; and that prince agreed to abide by the arbitration of the Company in all his unsettled disputes with the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and in the adjustment of some unsettled accounts with the family of the Gwickar in Guzerat, whose previous engagements with the Company he fully recognised. The Paishwah also engaged to discharge from his service any Europeans belonging to nations hostile to the English, or discovered meditating injury, or carrying on intrigues injurious to the interests of our nation.

Such were the principal conditions of this treaty. It will be next necessary to state the measures adopted to facilitate its complete execution, and to secure to the British government all the advantages expected from this important alliance.

The army of Fort St. George, under the command of General Stuart, had advanced to the bank of the Toombuddra, to support this treaty, which included the restoration of the Paishwah to his throne at Poonah. General Wellesley was de-

tached in front, with a select corps, to effect this object; and advancing in co-operation with the subsidiary force in the Deckan, commanded by Colonel Stevenson, through the southern parts of the Paishwah's territories, he reached Poonah on the 20th of April. The troops of Holkar fled at his approach; and Badjerow, who had left Bassein when he learnt that the British forces were coming to his aid, entered Poonah, and was reseated on his Musnud in that capital, on the 13th of May.

The first fruits of the alliance, which were the flight of Holkar, and the cheerful and dutiful obedience of some of his chief feudatories*, gave great satisfaction to the Paishwah, and afforded to the English government a momentary hope, that this great measure of policy would be effected without a war. These hopes were, however, early disappointed, by the advance of Dowlut Row Sindia, and the Bhonselah, towards the frontier of our ally the Nizam, and the delays and evasions with which these chiefs treated the different propositions offered to their consideration by the British resident † at the court of Sindia.

* The southern Jagheerdars, who were the principal feudatories of the Paishwah, had joined General Wellesley as he marched through their country, and accompanied him to Poonah, to pay their obeisance to Badjerow, which some of them had not done for many years before.

† Colonel Collins.

Dowlut Row Sindia, after several communications with the resident, had acknowledged that he could have no right, from his being guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, (the ground of objection he had first taken,) to oppose any treaty between the British government and the Paishwah; and after admitting, that his interest had been advanced by the expulsion of Jeswunt Row Holkar from Poonah, and the re-establishment of Badjerow, he declared in explicit terms, "That he had no intention to impede the performance of the arrangements lately concluded between the Paishwah and the British government; but that he should, on the contrary, desire to perfect the amity which then existed between the Paishwah, the British government, and his own states."

Five days after that declaration, Sindia's ministers remonstrated with the resident against the advance of the British troops to Poonah; but this, they were informed, could not be prevented, as it was a condition of the engagement into which we had entered with the Paishwah, and of which, they were reminded, Sindia had expressed his full approbation.

About the period at which the resident reached Sindia's camp at Bhurrampore (February 27th), he received secret information of a league being in agitation between the principal Mahratta chiefs, for objects hostile to the British government; and the advance of the army of the Rajah of Berar

to join Sindia, combined with the active negotiations which the latter chief carried on with Holkar, gave some credibility to this information. But, on the other hand, when the nature of their respective governments was considered, there appeared good grounds to doubt their power of combination; and it was quite evident, that if such a league were even formed, their rooted animosities, and clashing interests, would prevent any serious danger from it.

Sindia had, in fact, no objection to the interference of the British government for the restoration of the power of the Paishwah, as long as he saw a prospect of that being usurped by Jeswunt Row Holkar. He thought that our policy might aid his efforts to destroy his rival, who, from his success at Poonah, had obtained great power and reputation: but the moment he found that the British government had, by its energy, and the great celerity of its operations, obliged Holkar to fly, and established the Paishwah at Poonah without his assistance, his plans changed; and he resolved to oppose that treaty, to which he had before given the most unqualified assent.

To effect this, his first object was to reach Poonah. But as his presence at that capital could have no other effect than that of disturbing, if it did not altogether annul, the recent engagements concluded with the Paishwah, the Governor-general determined to oppose it. He accordingly directed the

resident at his court to insist upon Sindia either retreating from the threatening position he then occupied upon the Nizam's frontier, and recrossing the Nerbuddah; or that he should give some unequivocal proof of his intentions not being hostile.

As there were grounds of apprehension, that Sindia would not relinquish his schemes without a contest, orders were given to Major-general Wellesley to be prepared to act; and that officer, with a view of eventually co-operating with the subsidiary force in the Nizam's territories, advanced a few marches to the northward of Poonah, where he established a constant and almost daily intercourse with the British resident in Dowlut Row Sindia's camp.

The resident, at an interview with that chief on the 27th of May, communicated the treaty of Bassein; and Sindia and his minister declared, after a careful perusal of every article, that it contained nothing in the slightest degree injurious to his legitimate authority. But, though he made this declaration, he would not explain to the resident what were his intentions; and on being much pressed at this conference for an explanation, Sindia broke it up, saying, "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed whether we will have war or peace."

This extraordinary menace, placing the question of war or peace upon the result of a conference

with the Rajah of Berar, lessened the hopes of terminating this negotiation amicably. The Bhonslah, on whose decision it was likely to turn, had never been on a cordial footing with the English government; and there was reason to think that he would view any measures which strengthened the power of the Paishwah with particular jealousy, as he was known to cherish hopes of obtaining for himself the first dignity in the Mahratta empire, to which, from birth, he had some claims. The Governor-general, aware of these sentiments, had taken every means in his power to conciliate this chief; and had addressed a letter to him explanatory of the scope and intention of his proceedings at Poonah. But the manner in which this communication was received afforded little hope of his being an advocate for peace: on the contrary, there was just ground to believe, that the Bhonslah would, upon this occasion, stimulate Sindia, and every chief over whom he had influence, to hostilities; for though his character was the opposite of warlike, he, like almost all the Mahrattas, anticipated success in such a contest. It was evident, both from their expressions and correspondence, that they drew all their conclusions from the events of the former war which they had carried on against the English. They seemed, indeed, at this moment to have forgotten the changes produced by a period of twenty-two years; and, both from their constant recurrence to the success which had formerly at-

tended the combination against us, and from the obstacles which their ignorance and pride opposed to their taking a just view of the increase of our power subsequently to that period, it was early obvious to all persons near the scene of negotiation, that they were resolved on precipitating a war in spite of every effort which could be used to prevent that extremity.

Lord Wellesley, as soon as he received an account of the unfavourable state of the negotiations with Sindia, vested the officers in command of the armies in Hindustan and the Deckan with the most complete civil, military, and political powers in those quarters. Major-general Wellesley was specifically authorized, at this early stage, to negotiate arrangements or treaties, either by himself, or through residents or agents, with Sindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, with a view of prevailing upon those chiefs to retire with their armies within the boundaries of their own states, or to give some sufficient pledge of their pacific disposition towards the British government and its allies: he was further charged to demand a peremptory declaration of Sindia's intentions, and to insist upon the declaration being given in a certain number of days, to be settled at the discretion of the Major-general; but to be fixed reasonably with reference to the season, and to the possible opening of the campaign in a manner advantageous to the British government. If satisfactory explanations were not given, the general was instructed to recall

the resident from Sindia's camp; and directed, if hostilities became inevitable, to carry them on in the most active manner, and follow up his success, without listening to any proposal for peace, until the power of the chiefs against whom the war was waged should be totally annihilated. General Wellesley had also authority given him to conclude a peace with Sindia, or the Rajah of Berar, conjointly, or separately, as might appear most expedient.

In the instructions to Lord Lake, who was at the head of a large army in Hindustan, the objects to be accomplished, if war took place, were fully pointed out. These were, the complete reduction of that independent and formidable French authority which had been established in Hindustan; the occupation of the whole space of the Duab, or country between the Jumna and the Ganges, as far as the mountains of Cumaoun; and the possession of Delhi, Agra, and a chain of posts on the right banks of the Jumna*, from the mountains of Cumaoun to the province of Bundelcund.

* The Governor-general informed Lord Lake in these instructions, that it was not his intention to extend the Company's possessions beyond the line of the Jumna, Agra and Delhi included, and a chain of posts to protect the navigation of the river. All the connexions, which might be formed to the south and west of the Jumna beyond this line, he desired to have upon the principles of defensive alliance, or tributary dependence, so as to leave existing between the British possessions and the Mahratta empire a barrier formed by petty states, freely

The Governor-general, in these instructions, placed great importance in the early rescue of the person and titular authority of the Moghul from the French party. He also signified his intention of subduing Bundelcund, the vicinity of which to Benares, and to several of the most valuable possessions of the Company, making it dangerous to leave that province in the hands of the enemy.

The opinion of the Governor-general, respecting the best mode of carrying every part of these instructions into execution, was conveyed to Lord Lake in detail; but with full license for altering or modifying any part of them, as circumstances might demand; and the commencement of that officer's operations was of course to depend upon the result of the negotiation then pending between General Wellesley and Dowlut Row Sindia.

Major-general Wellesley, in conformity with the instructions which he had received, addressed a letter* to Dowlut Row Sindia, wherein, after setting forth the amicable objects of the treaty of Bassein, and remarking upon the hostile spirit of the measures adopted by the confederate chiefs, since the conclusion of that treaty, he demanded the separation of the army of Sindia from that of the Rajah of Berar, and the retreat of the former across the

exercising the rights of independent government, each in its respective limits, in alliance with the Company, and under the protection of that government.

* Under date the 14th of July.

Nerbuddah, and stated his intention of making the British troops resume their ordinary stations as soon as the Mahratta chiefs had complied with this requisition.

On the 18th of July, when General Wellesley received the instructions of the Governor-general, dated the 26th of June, he addressed another letter to Sindia, informing him of the full and extensive powers with which he was vested. He at the same time directed the resident to demand of Sindia and the Rajah of Berar their separation, and the return of their armies to their usual stations; and instructed him, if these demands were not complied with, to withdraw himself instantly from the Mahratta camp.

Dowlut Row Sindia seemed at first inclined to comply with General Wellesley's requisition; but, after a consultation with the Rajah of Berar, and a delay of several days, it was at last stated to the resident, at a conference which he had with both chiefs on the 25th of July, that their troops were within their own territories; that they would promise not to pass the Adjuntee hills, nor to march to Poonah; and that they had given written assurances to the Governor-general, that they would never attempt to overthrow the treaty of Bassein.

In reply to these declarations, the resident repeated Major-general Wellesley's observation, that it was altogether impossible to confide in their professions while they continued to occupy a position not necessary for their security, and threatening the

frontier of our ally the Nizam. After hearing these and similar arguments, the chiefs requested a further delay, till the 28th of July, when they promised a definitive answer; and the resident, from his knowledge of the anxious desire of the Governor-general to avoid, if possible, the necessity of war, was induced to depart from the positive instructions of General Wellesley, and grant a further delay.

On the 28th, the resident sent to require the final answer promised. He received a message in reply, that Dowlut Row Sindia and the Rajah of Berar meant to hold a conference that day, at which it would not be proper for him to assist; "but that he should be informed of the time which should be fixed to receive him."

The resident, in reply to this communication, accused Dowlut Row Sindia of violating his promise, and informed that chief that he would wait till next day at noon for an answer; when, if he did not receive one that should be satisfactory, he would send off his tents towards Aurungabad, and follow himself next day.

After experiencing further evasions, the resident agreed to meet Dowlut Row Sindia and the Rajah of Berar once more, on the 31st of July; at which conference he received from them several propositions for an amicable adjustment. They proposed to retire to Bhurrampore*, provided General Wel-

* A town upon the Taptee, a few marches from their position.

lesley would agree to march his troops to their ordinary stations ; but on being told that this proposition was altogether inadmissible, as it would leave them in a situation to pursue any measures they chose, while it deprived the Company's government of the means which it then possessed of opposing their designs, they suggested that the resident should appoint a day for the march of the respective forces of these chieftains from the place of their encampment, and that he should pledge the faith of the British government for the retreat of the army under General Wellesley on the day on which the armies of the confederates should return to their usual stations.

Though the acceptance of this proposition was in opposition to his instructions from General Wellesley, his ardent desire for an amicable result to the negotiation which he had so ably conducted, led Colonel Collins to consent to forward the letter containing this offer of adjustment, and to remain in camp till he received the general's answer ; but that spirit of evasion, deceit, and falsehood, which had marked every stage of this negotiation, was conspicuously shown at its close. Letters from Dowlut Row Sindia and the Rajah of Berar to General Wellesley were sent to the resident ; but, instead of the proposition which he had consented to forward, they contained no more than the offer to retreat with their combined armies to Bhurrampore, while they required General Wellesley to return

with his troops to their ordinary stations. As the resident had before given the most formal and positive refusal to this proposal, he could not but consider such conduct on the part of the chiefs equally insulting and faithless; and he was confirmed by it in a belief, which he had been reluctant to entertain, of their unalterable resolution to endeavour to reduce, if they could not destroy, the strength of the British government, by an attack upon that state and its allies, which they were only delaying till they had collected all their means, and increased, by their negotiations and intrigues, the strength of the combination which they desired to form against its power.

Colonel Collins left the camp of Dowlut Row Sindia on the 3rd of August, and hostilities commenced by Major-general Wellesley's attack of the fortress of Ahmednugur, on the 8th of the same month.

Such were the negotiations that immediately preceded a war, the justice and actual necessity of which can be denied by those only who deny the wisdom of the policy which ensured the destruction of that inveterate enemy to our name, Tippoo Sultaun. It was altogether impracticable for us to fulfil the engagements which we had been compelled to contract with the Nizam, in order to induce him to aid us in the accomplishment of that primary object of Lord Wellesley's policy, unless we established a commanding influence in the

councils of the Poonah state ; and, after succeeding in that, it would have been a base abandonment of those whom we had become pledged to support, if we had been induced, by any circumstances, to hazard their interests or security, for the sake of obtaining to ourselves a short exemption from the evils of war.

It is foreign to the object of this sketch to detail the military operations between the British government and the Mahratta chiefs, Dowlut Row Sindia and the Rajah of Berar. They continued only five months, but were marked by a series of the most brilliant and decisive victories. The battles of Delhi and Laswaree, of Assye and Arghaum, and the reduction of the strong forts of Allyghur, Agra, and Gwalior, of Ahmednughur, Asseerghur, Gawilghur, and Cuttack, and a number of inferior conquests, were crowded into this short, eventful period. The confederate chiefs were compelled to sue separately for peace, after the annihilation of their infantry and cannon, with the loss of their finest provinces, and a number of fortresses, which they had deemed impregnable. The complete destruction of the regular brigades in the service of Sindia was certainly one of the most important events of this war. These brigades formed, altogether, a body of nearly forty thousand well-disciplined men, with a very large train of artillery, acting entirely under the control of a French commander, and supported by the

revenues of the finest provinces in India, which had been made over to him, that this great efficient force might possess every resource within itself. It was the early extinction of this part of his army which obliged Sindia to abandon all thoughts of a further prosecution of hostilities, and to throw himself completely upon the generosity of the British government.

He was anticipated, however, in this design, for the Rajah of Berar, immediately after the fall of his principal fortress, Gawilghur, entered into a treaty * with General Wellesley; who shortly afterwards negotiated a peace † with Dowlut Row

* By this treaty, which was concluded the 17th December, 1803, Ragojee Bhonsela ceded Cuttack, and all his share of the provinces of Berar westward of the Wurdah, of which he had before collected the revenues in participation with the Soubahdar of the Deckan, to whom this cession was not of more importance as it added to his revenue than as it strengthened his frontier, and freed him from the continual contests naturally attending the exercise of a double authority in collecting the revenues of the same country.

The Company engaged, by this treaty, to arbitrate all differences which might henceforward arise between the Rajah of Berar, the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and the Paishwah; and the Rajah agreed, that he would never admit into his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, at war with England. It was stipulated, that each of the contracting states should keep a resident minister at the court of the other.

† The following were the leading articles of this treaty, which is dated 30th December, 1803.—Sindia ceded to the

Sindia upon the admitted principle of the latter being completely subdued; and the terms, under the circumstances in which Sindia was then placed, were more favourable than he could have expected, as his ministers acknowledged. Some small provinces and villages, which had been hereditary in Sindia's family, were receded to him, and, to a certain degree, had the effect of reconciling him to his great losses.

By one article in this treaty, Sindia agreed to resign, with some modifications, all claims upon Rajahs, and others of his former feudatories, with whom the English government had made treaties or alliances. This engagement gave rise to a dispute, concerning the fortress of Gwalior and the

Company all the territories he possessed in Hindustan to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jypore, Joudpore, and the Ranah of Gohud; and the fort and territory of Baroach. He ceded also all lands to the south of Adjunttee; and all claims of every description upon the British government and its allies, the Soubahdar of the Deckan, the Paishwah, and the Gwickar family in Guzerat.

It was a condition of this treaty, that if Sindia should hereafter enter into a defensive treaty with the British government, the pay of any English corps, attached to his service, should be defrayed from the revenues of the territories ceded in the treaty of peace.

The Company agreed by this treaty, in consideration of the great losses sustained by the principal officers of Sindia's court and army from the cession of the provinces of Hindustan, to grant pensions to them, agreeably to a list given in by Sindia, to an annual amount of fifteen lacs of rupees.

territories of Gohud, which had the effect of disturbing, for the moment, the harmony that would otherwise have immediately followed the peace between the two states. In this dispute, right was, no doubt, on the side of the British government; but that did not prevent Sindia and his ministers from a constant and vexatious agitation of the subject; and, though compelled to admit, that strict justice was against them, they continued to entertain hopes of succeeding, declaredly grounded on the liberal and conciliating spirit with which the English government had used its great victories. Even the formal renunciation of this claim did not prevent their re-urging it, as soon as an occasion appeared in the least favourable to their wishes.

This treaty of peace was concluded on the 30th of December, 1803; and the connexion with Sindia was further cemented by a treaty of defensive alliance*, concluded by the acting resident † at his court on the 27th of February, 1804.

* By this treaty, Sindia became entitled to the assistance of a corps of six battalions of Sepoys, which were either to be stationed within his territories, or at a convenient frontier post in the honourable Company's territories (as by him preferred); and this corps was to be paid out of the revenues of those countries which he had ceded to the Company.

The other articles of this defensive alliance were nearly the same as those formerly concluded between the Company and the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah.

† Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm.

The conduct pursued by Jeswunt Row Holkar, during the war between the British government, Sindia, and the Rajah of Berar, was in conformity with the most characteristic features of a Mahratta chieftain. He had not only promised to join the confederacy against the British government, but had concluded, through the medium of the Rajah of Berar, a treaty with Sindia, by whom great cessions were made, to induce him to enter into their plans. But, though he promised everything, he showed no inclination, after hostilities had commenced, to assist the confederates. There is, indeed, ground to believe, that he rejoiced in the first reverses sustained by his rival Sindia: and if this sentiment underwent a change, as has been supposed, when he saw the ruin of that chief, the course of action was too rapid and too decisive to give him time for interference; but, before the treaties of peace were concluded, he had advanced towards Hindustan, as far as the frontier of the Rajah of Jypore, who was then under the British protection.

Though Jeswunt Row Holkar continued to profess friendship for the British government, his conduct at this period was of a different complexion; and the Governor-general instructed Lord Lake to enter into a negotiation for the purpose of leading to an early and full explanation of his views, and of relieving the Company's government from the expense and alarm to which its provinces must

be subject, while such a horde of freebooters as the army under his command were assembled on its frontier, or on that of its allies.

Lord Lake addressed a letter to Jeswunt Row Holkar*, stating generally the terms on which the British government was disposed to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority; but requiring, as a proof of the sincerity of his amicable professions, that he should withdraw his army from the threatening position it then occupied, retire within his own territories, and abstain from the exaction of tribute from the allies of the British government.

Holkar, after some delay, sent vakeels (or agents) to wait upon the commander-in-chief; to whom they made the following propositions on the part of their master:—

1st. That Holkar should be permitted to collect the chout agreeably to the custom of his ancestors.

2nd. That the ancient possessions formerly held by his family (twelve of the finest districts in the Duab, and a district in Bundelcund) should be given to him.

3rd. That the country of Hureanah, which was formerly in the possession of the Holkar family, should be ceded to him.

4th. That this country should be guaranteed to him, and a treaty concluded with him on the same terms as we had done with Sindia.

* Dated the 29th of January, 1804.

These extravagant demands were of course rejected; and their nature, as well as the manner of making them, satisfied Lord Lake of the real designs of Jeswunt Row; which were soon afterwards more fully developed by the contents of several letters which he wrote to the tributaries and dependents of the British government in Hindustan, whom he endeavoured to excite, by every argument he could use, to revolt against that state, whose territories, he informed them, it was his immediate intention to ravage and destroy. Lord Lake also obtained about this period a copy of a letter from him to General Wellesley (supposed to be written early in February), in which he had demanded the cession of several provinces of the Deckan, originally, as he affirmed, the property of the Holkar family; which letter concluded with this remarkable expression:—

“Countries of many hundred coss shall be overrun, and plundered. Lord Lake shall not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and calamities will fall on lacs of human beings, in continual war, by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea.”

These insulting menaces were followed by acts of positive aggression: Holkar sent an agent to Sindia's camp, and solicited openly the aid of that chief in an attack upon the British possessions; and at the same time commenced the plunder of the territories of the Rajah of Jypore. The com-

mander-in-chief, who could not but consider these proceedings as the commencement of hostilities, advanced against Holkar, who retreated from the position he had occupied, and was pursued to some distance by a British force.

Thus commenced a war, the great successes of which were chequered by some remarkable failures. But, though the circumstances which attended the retreat of Colonel Monson's corps, and the very severe loss of officers and men at the siege of Bhurretpore, must be deemed serious reverses, they did not prevent the destruction of Holkar's power being effected before the close of Lord Wellesley's administration. The battle of Deeg was fatal to his regular infantry and artillery; and the action at Futtoghur entirely broke the spirit of his cavalry. The fortresses of Chandore and Gaulnah, the strongholds of the family, were also taken; and in April, 1805, this boasting freebooter retreated across the Chumbul with an army reduced from forty thousand cavalry, twenty thousand infantry, and upwards of a hundred pieces of cannon, to a wretched body of about eight or ten thousand horse, four or five thousand infantry, and between twenty and thirty guns; and, though peace with him was not immediately concluded, all his future efforts served only to show how completely he had been subdued.

In the years 1799 and 1800, Hindustan was threatened with an invasion by Zemaun Shah; and, among other means adopted by Lord Wellesley to

avert this danger, was an embassy to Persia, to which country he had before sent a native agent, who had been received with honour, and had succeeded in the limited objects of his mission. The embassy deputed to the court of Teheraun was in a style of splendour corresponding to the character of the monarch and the manners of the nation to whom it was sent, and to the wealth and power of the state from whom it proceeded. It was completely successful in all its objects. The king of Persia was not only induced by the British envoy * to renew his attack upon Khorassan, which had the effect of withdrawing Zemaun Shah from his designs upon India; but entered into treaties of political and commercial alliance with the British government, completely excluding the French from Persia, and giving the English every benefit from this connexion; nor can there be a doubt, that, if this alliance had been cultivated with the same active spirit of foresight and penetration with which it was commenced, it would have secured the influence of the British government in that quarter from many of those attacks to which it has subsequently been exposed.

Lord Wellesley, in the year 1800, equipped an expedition to Egypt. A considerable force from India, under the command of Sir David Baird, marched from Suez to Alexandria, presenting the

* Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm.

extraordinary spectacle of a British army, composed chiefly of the natives of India, on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The political administration of the Marquess Wellesley was marked by a number of minor measures, undertaken and executed on the same principles, and with the same spirit and success, as those which have been described*: but, however deserving of notice, it is impossible to dwell upon every one without swelling this work to a size beyond what is intended. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a statement of changes which he effected in the connexion between the British government and the dependent states of Oude and the Carnatic.

When Lord Wellesley returned to Bengal from Madras, after the reduction of Tippoo Suldaun, one of the most important objects which occupied his attention was, the reduction of a part of the mutinous and useless military establishment of the Nabob Vizier; and the increase of the efficient force maintained by the Company to defend that prince's dominions. He was urged to the imme-

* The flight of Vizier Ali from Benares, after the atrocious murder of Mr. Cherry, our resident, when on a friendly visit to that gentleman, called forth all the vigour and resolution of Lord Wellesley's character: his lordship compelled the Rajah of Jypore, who had afforded the murderer protection, to give him up to the just vengeance of the British government; and he has ever since been kept a close prisoner at Fort William.

diate adoption of this measure, as well as to the general improvement of the principles of our alliance with the Vizier, by a strong sense of the dangers to which his territories were exposed from internal tumult, or foreign attack.

The Vizier at first concurred in the expediency of the proposed arrangement respecting those troops; but, repenting of this assent, when he found that the operation of such an arrangement tended to lessen his consequence with his immediate adherents, he endeavoured, by every evasion, to frustrate the execution of it.

This prince had proposed, in the year 1799, to abdicate his throne, and persisted for some time in this extraordinary proposal, in spite of every argument which the British resident could offer against it. The reasons which he gave for it, were,—the state of the country; his inefficiency to rule; and the rooted and reciprocal aversion subsisting between him and his subjects, which, on his part, he stated, had grown into absolute disgust. The notoriety of the truth of all he advanced led the Governor-general to believe him perfectly sincere in the design; and Lord Wellesley was confirmed in this belief from Saadut Ali having intimated a desire to retire with the treasures which he had amassed, as this wish was quite consistent with his weak and avaricious character.

There was, subsequently, reason to believe, that this proposal of the Vizier was illusory, and only

meant to delay the execution of the plan for reforming his military establishment. But the grounds for proceeding in that reform were too urgent, and too much connected with the general security of the interests of the British empire in India, for Lord Wellesley to allow its progress to be arrested by such weak and puerile evasions. He considered, indeed, that the Vizier's conduct on this remarkable occasion furnished another ground for the necessity of the arrangement which he had in contemplation.

Agreeably to the 7th article of the treaty concluded by Sir John Shore with the Vizier at his accession, the Company were at liberty to increase the force serving in Oude, if they deemed such increase requisite for the security of the two states; and irrefragable proofs of that necessity had occurred within the last two years.

Lord Wellesley resolved, therefore, to send an additional force, at the annual expense of fifty lacs of rupees; which, with the former fixed subsidy *

* Besides the fixed subsidy paid by the Vizier of Oude, there had formerly been a charge for extraordinaries. The fixed subsidy of Asuph u Dowlah was fifty lacs; but Lord Cornwallis states, that that prince had paid, previous to the year 1787, an average of thirty-four lacs per annum extraordinaries. By Lord Teignmouth's treaty, the increase of our force in Oude was to be at the discretion of the British Government. It has been argued, that the Vizier's consent was necessary to this increase, even under the construction of the treaty: but if this assertion had not been refuted by the

of seventy-six lacs, would make a total of one crore and twenty-six lacs of rupees.

The Governor-general was desirous to combine this increase to the force of Oude, with reductions of the Vizier's useless, and indeed dangerous troops, which should prevent that prince from feeling any burden upon his finances by the execution of a measure contributing so greatly to his security. But Saadut Ali, either from weakness, or the wicked designs of the interested rabble by whom he was surrounded, was led to offer the most serious obstacles to the accomplishment of this measure: his open opposition to which, connected with the whole of his former conduct, and the progressive ruin with which his mismanagement threatened his country, impelled Lord Wellesley to resolve upon the completion of an arrangement which should place the resources for maintaining the Company's troops on the frontier of Oude beyond the reach of the Vizier, and should likewise free both the Company and that prince from a constant and increasing source of irritation—the monthly payment of a heavy pecuniary subsidy.

evidence of the respectable nobleman who framed the treaty, it must have been by its own absurdity; for the cause of the increase is stated to be the existence of external danger—of which one party, the English government, can alone be the judge, as the other, the Vizier, is precluded by one of the articles of this treaty from all intercourse or communication whatever with foreign states.

Lord Wellesley conceived, that the whole conduct of the Vizier—his proffered abdication, his professed inability to rule, the light in which he considered his own troops when an invasion of his country was apprehended*, his consent to reduce them, his subsequent efforts to counteract, by the most unjustifiable means, an arrangement to which he had agreed, and the ruin which his mismanagement was bringing upon his country—fully warranted his lordship in insisting upon an engagement which would at once settle every cause of contest; and provide, as completely as possible, for the security of his dominions, as well as for the regular and permanent support of the troops by whom they were to be protected. Acting upon these considerations his lordship instructed his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, whom he deputed to Lucknow, to conclude a treaty for a territorial cession to the British government equal to the payment of the increased subsidiary force to be stationed within the territories of Oude.

The Vizier entered into this engagement with a great show of reluctance, which was perhaps in

* The Vizier had declared that they would be useful only to the enemy, and required that a detachment of the British army should be sent to guard his person. His statements were fully confirmed by the letters of Sir A. Clarke and Sir James Craig, who described them as a rabble, that, instead of affording any aid, in the event of service, would require part of the army to watch and keep them in awe.

some measure assumed, to prevent the unpopularity* that would have attached to any appearance of satisfaction with a treaty † depriving so many of his dependants of profits, which they had been accustomed to derive from the provinces required to be ceded.

By this treaty, the territories of the Company were interposed, as a barrier, between the domi-

* This supposed motive, which was consistent with the character of the Vizier, was in a great degree confirmed by his subsequent conduct.

† The principal article of this treaty (which was settled by Mr. Henry Wellesley, and Colonel Scott, resident at Lucknow) stipulated for the immediate cession of all the frontier provinces of Oude to the Company. These were estimated at the gross revenue of one crore, thirty-five lacs, twenty-three thousand four hundred and seventy-four rupees, eight annas, and three pice; which was received for the payment of the troops (whatever their number) maintained by the British government for the defence of Oude.

The other articles were of minor consideration. They stipulated, that the Vizier should dismiss all his troops, except a certain number; and that he should be entitled to the service of British troops, on all occasions and under all circumstances, without ever being subject to further charge or demand for such aid.

The Vizier agreed to introduce (under his own officers) into the territories which remained to him, such a system of administration, as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and to the security of the lives and property of the inhabitants. He also agreed always to advise with, and act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the Company's government.

nions of the Vizier and any foreign enemy. The actual net receipts of that prince's treasury from these districts was not more than the amount which he had before paid as a fixed subsidy, and far less than he had become liable to pay under the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth, as the Company's troops in Oude had been necessarily increased to a number exceeding thirteen thousand men, whose actual pay (which the Vizier was under obligation to furnish) exceeded the fixed subsidy by more than fifty lacs of rupees per annum.

The Company obtained an ample remuneration for this temporary pecuniary loss, in the happy settlement of its continual and irritating disputes with the court of Lucknow; in the prospect of an augmented revenue, under an ameliorated system of management, from provinces which had been ruined by misrule and oppression; and in the substitution of its own troops and resources for those of the Vizier, on a frontier from which the only danger that could affect the two states was to be apprehended.

Several subordinate, and comparatively unimportant, arrangements were subsequently made with the Vizier, who soon became reconciled to a treaty, which, however much its first proposal might have wounded his feelings, had a very happy operation on his own comfort and that of his subjects; and he afterwards took every opportunity of proving, both

by professions and actions, his attachment to the British government.

When the war with the Mahrattas commenced, Lord Wellesley had the satisfaction of receiving the cheerful and voluntary aid of this prince towards its prosecution. He not only sent a present of a number of fine horses from his stud, sufficient to mount a regiment of dragoons, but contributed to its success by large voluntary loans from his treasury. The manner, as well as substance, of this conduct of the Vizier convinced all, in any degree acquainted with his character, of his cordial reconciliation to the whole of the Governor-general's proceedings, and that relief and happiness had been extended both to him and his country by an arrangement that was final—that closed all irritating questions between the two states, and provided, under every contingency, for the permanent support of the British troops employed in defence of the territories of Oude.

Lord Wellesley received from the secret committee of the court of directors an early approbation of his proceedings in the reduction of the military establishment of the Nabob Vizier. In this letter* the committee observe, that they entertain a due sense of the high services of the Governor-general in effecting that reform, which, they

* Dated the 4th of December, 1800.

state, was “a measure not less contributing to the preservation of his excellency’s dominions, than to the relief of the Company’s finances, by furnishing a large additional subsidy to the amount of fifty lacs per annum, to reimburse the charges of the late augmentation of our troops in that quarter, so necessary to be made with a view to the ultimate security of our own possessions against the invasion of Zemaun Shah, or of any other power hostile to the British interests.”

The treaty* with the Vizier obtained an equally full approbation from the same authority; which was not, however, given till two years after its conclusion, when the court of directors were in complete possession of all the circumstances connected with the negotiation which had preceded it. The secret committee enhanced the value of their commendation by the just and clear view which, in bestowing it, they took of the grounds that gave importance to the arrangement.

“Having taken into our consideration,” they observe †, “the treaty lately concluded between the Governor-general and the Nabob Vizier, and ratified by his lordship on the 10th of November, 1801, we have now to signify our approbation of the provisions of that treaty.

* Dated November, 1801.

† In their letter to the Governor-general, dated November 19th, 1803.

“ We consider the stipulations therein contained as calculated to improve and secure the interests of the Vizier, as well as those of the Company, and to provide more effectually hereafter for the good government and prosperity of Oude, and, consequently, for the happiness of its native inhabitants.

“ Although the revenue of the territory ceded, according to its produce when in the hands of the Vizier, does not exceed the subsidy payable by his highness for the number of troops which it appeared expedient permanently to station in Oude, together with a reasonable charge for the civil administration of the same; we, nevertheless, do not disapprove of the Governor-general, in consideration of the cession, having liberated his highness from all extraordinary charges which may hereafter be incurred by the Company in providing for the internal as well as the external security of Oude, to which charges his highness would have been liable under the treaty of 1798: we are satisfied to accept, as compensation for such extraordinary expenses, the increased revenue which may reasonably be expected to arise from the superior administration of the ceded districts under the Company's management. And we feel the more satisfaction in such an indemnity, as, whilst it can alone arise out of the improvement and prosperity of the country, it will be unattended by any sacrifice on the part of the Vizier, under whose ruinous and oppressive system

of collection the produce of those districts was likely annually to decline, as it had hitherto done.

“ We also entertain a sanguine hope, that the Vizier, relieved from the embarrassment, as well as the charge, of a licentious and worse than useless army, and rescued, by the dissolution of the great proportion of that force, from the most abject dependence on his own powerful subjects, at whose disposal those mutinous and disaffected troops chiefly were, will now, supported and defended by a disciplined and orderly force, apply himself with energy to the internal administration of his affairs.”

In this letter, a just compliment was paid to the great merits of Mr. Henry Wellesley, the brother of the Governor-general, who, after the conclusion of the treaty of Lucknow, had proceeded to take charge of the ceded provinces, as Lieutenant-governor, in order to effect a settlement of their revenues: an arduous labour, which he performed in a manner as honourable to his own character as advantageous to the public interests.

This account of the proceedings at Lucknow has been thus circumstantial, from the impossibility of abridging it without an omission of essential facts; and the same reason necessitates some detail on the subject of the transactions which took place during Lord Wellesley's administration with the Nabobs of the Carnatic, in order to explain the motives and principles by which that nobleman was governed in his conduct towards those dependent princes.

Omdut ul Omrah succeeded to the Nabobship of the Carnatic, on the 16th of October, 1795. He took possession of the Musnud under the conditions of the treaty concluded between his father and the Marquess Cornwallis in 1792, having been specifically named, in the preamble to that treaty, as the successor and eldest son of the Nabob Mahomed Ali Khan, and, under that designation, made a party in the engagement.

The treaty of 1792 was soon found, both by the administration at home and the government abroad, to have produced few of the salutary effects which were expected. Mahomed Ali Khan, after its conclusion*, pursued a conduct not more at variance with his own interests and with those of the Company, than destructive of the happiness of his subjects and the prosperity of his country.

It has been already stated, that when Lord Hobart was appointed governor of Fort St. George, in 1794, he was instructed by the court of directors to negotiate for a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, on principles calculated to secure the interests of the Company, to improve the condition of the inhabitants of the Carnatic, or, rather, to save that country from ruin, and to put an end

* The state of the Carnatic, and the operation of this treaty, are very fully shown in Lord Hobart's Minutes, under date the 24th of November, 1795.

to those vexatious disputes, which, from the character of the Nabob and his principal servants, were found to attend the fulfilment of several of the most important stipulations of the treaty of 1792.

The obstinate and intemperate resistance which the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah opposed against all his lordship's endeavours to get the treaty modified, appeared, at the time, inexplicable; and the influence attributed to some low and interested counsellors seemed insufficient to account for his steady refusal to listen to an arrangement so earnestly pressed upon his acceptance by his majesty's ministers, the court of directors, and the government of Fort St. George; and which could not, under any construction, be judged injurious to his personal interests, or his power, as long as he stood in the same relation to the Company.

When the Marquess Wellesley arrived at Madras, in 1798, he employed the few days of his stay at that presidency, previously to embarking for Calcutta, in fruitless attempts to effect the same object. The impression made upon his lordship's mind by the mode in which the Nabob treated his proposal was, that further negotiation was useless; although at the same time he felt and expressed a conviction, that every moment brought further proof of the indispensable necessity of some arrangement to save the Company from loss, the Nabob from

ruin, and the inhabitants from misery ; all which he considered the inevitable consequences of permitting affairs to remain in the state in which they were placed by the treaty in question.

When Lord Wellesley returned to Fort St. George, in 1799, to prosecute the war against Tippoo Sultaun, he became still more sensible of the inconveniences of the engagements existing with the Nabob, which were aggravated by the conduct of that prince, who, on that critical occasion, acted more like an enemy than a friend.

The want of exertion of his officers, in every part of his government, when supplies were collecting for the army, and the manner in which some of them obstructed that service, raised suspicions in the mind of the Governor-general, which were much confirmed by a personal act of the Nabob calculated to impede the first operations of the war. His highness had agreed to advance three lacs of pagodas for the immediate use of the army, then on the eve of marching into Mysore. All the conditions which he proposed relative to such advance were agreed to by the Governor-general ; and the Nabob succeeded so fully in establishing a belief of his sincerity touching this important supply, (the promise of which he reiterated, in the most positive manner, the very day the army moved,) that, in the confidence of its receipt, the whole of the cash in the treasury was otherwise appropriated ; and it is not easy to cal-

culate the evils which might have been the result of his failing to fulfil his solemn promise on so critical an occasion, had not treasure arrived from Bengal. Lord Clive concludes a paper on this sinister transaction, with the following remarkable words:—"I am unwilling to attribute systematic treachery to the Nabob; but I have looked in vain for another motive to account for his extraordinary conduct."

Soon after the capture of Seringapatam, documents* were discovered among the secret records

* These documents were carefully examined, and reported upon, under the orders of the Governor-general, by Mr. Edmonstone, the Persian translator; and the evidence drawn from them appeared to establish the following conclusions in the most satisfactory manner.

1. That, in violation of an express article of the treaty of 1792, the Nabob Mahomed Ali Khan, by the agency and with the concurrence of his eldest son, Omdut ul Omrah, maintained a secret intercourse with Tippoo Suldaun, through the medium of Goolam Ali Khan and Ali Reza, vakeels of that prince; that this secret intercourse was directed to objects hostile to the interests of the Company, and was, consequently, subversive of the fundamental principles of his alliance with the Company.

2d. That the Nabobs, Mahomed Ali Khan and Omdut ul Omrah, had made communications to Tippoo Suldaun, on political subjects, of a nature calculated to promote the interests of that prince, and eventually to injure those of the Company.

3. That the Nabob had, both by communication from himself personally, and through Omdut ul Omrah, to Goolam Ali Khan and Ali Reza, manifested his marked disapprobation of the triple alliance (of the English, Nizam, and Mah-

of the Suldaun, containing conclusive evidence of a secret intercourse having been carried on between

rattas), which had reduced the power of the Suldaun; and that he had on such occasions stigmatized the Nizam as having acted contrary to the dictates of religion, which required that all true believers should join in support of that cause of which, he repeatedly stated, he considered Tippoo Suldaun as the chief pillar.

4th. That the evidence contained in the communications made to Tippoo Suldaun by his vakeels, of the treacherous nature of the intercourse subsisting between the Nabobs, Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, and Tippoo Suldaun, was confirmed by the discovery of a cipher, the key to which was found among the Suldaun's secret records; and which was not only written in the same hand in which all the letters of the Nabobs, Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, to the English government are written, but noted at the bottom, by Tippoo's head Moonshy, as a paper from Omdut ul Omrah; and several of the fictitious designations in this cipher were found to have been used in the correspondence. If the very circumstance of Omdut ul Omrah's having transmitted a cipher to Tippoo Suldaun was not of itself sufficient to establish the treacherous nature of his views, the names which, it was discovered by the key to the cipher, were used to signify the English and their allies, removed all doubts upon this subject. The English were designated by the name of *Teza Wareeds*, or *new comers*; the Nizam by that of *Heech*, or *nothing*; and the Mahrattas, by that of *Pooch*, or *contemptible*.

5th. That Omdut ul Omrah continued this secret intercourse as late as the year 1796, as appears by a letter found in the Suldaun's records, which, though it has neither seal nor signature, is written by the person who wrote all the Nabob's letters to the British government, and has the name of Goolam Hussein upon the cover; which, it is established by incontro-

the Nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, and Tippoo Sultaun, for objects hostile to the interests of the Company.

The substance of this evidence fully proved, not only the violation of the spirit of the whole treaty of 1792, but a direct breach of the letter of one of its most important articles, which expressly stipulates, "that the Nabob shall not enter into any negotiations, or political correspondence, with any European or native power whatever, without the consent of the Company." It being established by the law of nations, that the violation of any one article, especially a fundamental article, of a treaty, overthrows the whole, the treaty of 1792 was of course to be considered as abrogated; and the line to be pursued by the injured party was such as a due regard for its own safety and interests, and for the character of the alliance, might demand.

The relation in which the Nabob stood to the British government was that of a dependent ally, whose rank and power had been preserved from motives of justice, not of policy; and who owed his accession to the Musnud, upon the same condi-

vertible documents, was the fictitious name under which the Nabob corresponded in his own handwriting with Goolam Ali Khan, in 1794. The authenticity of this letter is also proved by its being found in the Sultaun's records, along with the other correspondence of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and its evident connexion with those letters in subject.

tions as his father enjoyed it, to the honourable adherence of the English nation to their engagements even when in obvious opposition to their interests.

The conduct of the Nabob from the commencement of his reign, proved what sacrifices the English government made, rather than violate, in the slightest degree, their good faith with his highness. To preserve that faith, the Company had, indeed, been exposed to great loss: and the Nabob had been permitted to destroy resources on which not only his own safety, but that of the Company, might eventually depend; and to impoverish and render miserable, by his mismanagement, the territory and inhabitants subject to his authority.

The conduct of Omdut ul Omrah, in several instances previous to the discovery of his treachery, though not of a nature to absolve the Company from the obligations of an engagement into which they had deliberately entered, could not but operate unfavourably for him in the situation in which his own perfidy had placed him, by diminishing his claim to confidence and generosity which he had so systematically abused.

An order from the secret committee* showed

* "In the event of a war with Tippoo Suldaun, the respective countries of the Nabob of Arcot, and the Rajah of Tanjore, will of course come under the Company's management; and we direct, that they be not relinquished without

that the Indian government in England considered his general conduct, previously to that discovery, of a nature to warrant a departure from the stipulations of the treaty of 1792, an express condition of which is, the restoration of the Nabob's country, *at the conclusion of the war*, unless in certain cases, afterwards specified, but which had not occurred at the date of the committee's order. This, though not applying directly to the case under the consideration of the Governor-general, was conclusive as to the principle upon which the court of directors desired that all transactions with the Nabob should be regulated.

Lord Wellesley was aware of the risk which might attend any delay in a case of so delicate and dangerous a nature; a risk rendered more serious by the disturbed state of most of the territories under Fort St. George: but he preferred incurring that danger to the adoption of any measures which might be deemed precipitate, in an affair where the honour of the British nation was so much concerned. Acting upon that principle, he contented himself, in the first instance, with writing to the government of Madras to

special orders from us, or from the court of directors, for that purpose, in order to afford sufficient time for the formation of arrangements for relieving those respective princes from all encumbrances on their revenues."—Despatch to Lord Wellesley, under date the 18th June, 1799.

prosecute their inquiry into the Nabob's conduct, by a personal examination of the vakeels, Goolam Ali and Ali Reza Khan, and some other officers of the late Tippoo Sultaun. At the same time he transmitted to England all the documents discovered at Seringapatam, with the Persian translator's report; and stated his opinion, that though the proofs obtained were sufficient to justify the Company in immediately depriving the Nabob of the means of abusing their protection, yet he had judged a cautious and moderate proceeding to be more consistent with the character and reputation of the British government.

In a letter, under date the 28th March, 1800, Lord Wellesley had directed, that the government of Madras should take no decisive steps in this affair, unless the Nabob died (an event rendered probable from the bad state of his highness's health); in which case, they were authorized to raise one of two persons to the Musnud—either Ali Hussein, the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah; or Azeem u Dowlah, the acknowledged son of Ameer ul Omrah—under the previous condition of resigning to the Company the civil and military administration of the Carnatic, on consideration of receiving an annual stipend for the support of his rank.

Agreeably to his lordship's instructions, the elevation of either of these princes was, however, to be considered as a measure of expediency, not

of right; the Governor-general considering the right of the family as forfeited by the conduct of Omdut ul Omrah. He directed that the offer should be made, in the first instance, to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah; and (in case of his refusing to subscribe to the said indispensable condition) then to Azeem u Dowlah; and if that prince also rejected the proposal, the Madras government were to refer to the Governor-general for further instructions.

A remarkable fact is proved by the contents of this letter, written long before any question of the respective claims to the succession was agitated, namely, that the impression upon the Governor-general's mind then was, that the right of inheritance (if any such existed) belonged to Azeem u Dowlah; and that the elevation of Ali Hussein, the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, would probably give great disgust to the Mahomedans, and excite attempts to alter the succession.

The Governor-general's reasons for directing the first option to be given to Ali Hussein, are expressly stated in this letter to proceed from causes unconnected with any admission of his claim or title to the Musnud.

The result of the inquiry instituted by Lord Clive, in pursuance of the Governor-general's orders, went to establish the principal facts of the treachery both of Wallajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah. The evidences examined were Goolam Ali Khan,

and Ali Reza; and though some points of the former proofs were invalidated, all the chief points, upon which the proof of the Nabob's violation of the treaty of 1792 rested, were fully confirmed by their depositions.

The whole of these voluminous examinations, accompanied by a report from Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe (the gentlemen who conducted the inquiry), were transmitted to the Governor-general by Lord Clive; with a letter from himself, under date the 23rd of May. The impressions which this further prosecution of the inquiry into the conduct of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah made upon Lord Clive's mind, will be best judged from the two following paragraphs, which concluded his lordship's official address upon the occasion.

“With this strong evidence of internal treachery, and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty, it is my deliberate opinion, that a further adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah has been, and now is, perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the Company, would be as inconsistent with the true principles of public faith, as it would be obviously incompatible with the preservation of our just rights and interests.

“On these grounds, I have no hesitation in recommending to your lordship the immediate as-

sumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such provisions as your lordship may be pleased to authorize for his highness the Nabob, his highness's family, and the principal officers of his government."

Upon the receipt of this despatch, the Governor-general resolved to proceed to Fort St. George, as soon as the season should permit, for the purpose of settling in person an arrangement that should effectually secure the interests of the company in the Carnatic. In consequence of this determination, he gave no further instructions to Lord Clive upon the subject, until the month of March, 1801; when, finding that the state of affairs in Oude, combined with other circumstances relative to the general government of India, made it impossible for him to leave Fort William, he directed Lord Clive to send Mr. Webbe, the chief executive officer of the Madras government, to Bengal, in order to have the fullest communications with that officer previously to issuing his final instructions for the settlement of the Carnatic, and other important points intimately connected with that arrangement.

When Mr. Webbe was at Fort William, to which he had proceeded in consequence of the above orders, the alarming condition of the Nabob's health induced Lord Clive to apprise Lord Wellesley of his own intentions in the event of the prince's demise in the interval.

On this occasion* Lord Clive stated, that though the Governor-general's letter of the 26th of March, 1800, prescribed the line of conduct he was to follow if the event apprehended should occur previously to his receiving further orders, he could not but think, that the circumstances which had occurred since that letter was written would so materially have altered the whole case under consideration, that any measures, grounded upon the instructions therein, would be more likely to defeat than promote the objects which the Governor-general might contemplate in consequence of the full information that he had subsequently obtained: that he, Lord Clive, therefore determined not to act upon them, if the Nabob should die previously to the arrival of further instructions, but to assume the civil and military government of the Carnatic, in the name of the Company, until a plan for its government should be finally arranged.

At the time of receiving this despatch from Lord Clive, one had also reached Lord Wellesley from the president of the Board of Control, fully coinciding in the conclusions drawn by his lordship from the documents found in Seringapatam, and in the measures which he had declared his intention of adopting: a despatch †, too, from the secret com-

* Dated May 21, 1801.

† Dated December 4, 1800.

mittee of the court of directors expressed their entire approbation of the resolution, which the Governor-general informed them* he had taken, of demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut ul Omrah than the Company then possessed. The secret committee distinctly state in this despatch, that many other circumstances might, in their opinion, be urged, besides those adduced by Lord Wellesley, to strengthen the doubts of the Nabob's fidelity to the fundamental principles of his engagements with the Company; and they particularly instance the mode in which he evacuated the Fort of Chandnagerry in 1796, on which they remark, "that a more decided instance of disaffection to the Company can scarcely be imagined."

The Governor-general being thus in possession of every information, and of every opinion, which could guide or influence his judgment on the decision of this important and delicate question, sent his final instructions † with respect to the measures to be pursued with the faithless prince.

After taking a complete review of the whole affair, and showing incontrovertibly, that his highness the Nabob was reduced by his own conduct to the condition of a public enemy, that he had forfeited every claim to the confidence of

* In a letter dated the 9th of June.

† These were dated the 28th May.

the Company, and that it was neither conformable to the dictates of wisdom or prudence, nor reconcileable to justice or policy, to permit him to retain the possession of resources greater than were requisite for the support of the rank which he should be permitted to hold in the Carnatic, these instructions directed Lord Clive to stipulate with his highness for the complete resignation of the civil and military government of the province, and (upon his agreeing to that, and some other conditions) to grant him a stipend not exceeding three, nor under two, lacs of pagodas annually; independent of a provision for the other branches of the family, and for his principal officers, which was to be made from the revenues of the Carnatic.

Upon this basis Lord Clive was instructed to negotiate a treaty with the Nabob; and authorized, for the purpose of obtaining his highness's consent to the terms proposed, to make him acquainted with the proofs of his treachery, which were in the possession of the British government.

Lord Wellesley expressly stated, that the proposition of forming a treaty on this occasion was dictated by a desire to consult the dignity of the British government, and not by a disposition to admit that the Nabobs, Mahomed Ali Khan and Omdut ul Omrah, had any claims to our forbear-

ance or generosity; though he confessed it would be painful to be compelled to expose the humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery with which these infatuated princes had acted towards that power which had uniformly proved their guardian and protector.

In the event of the Nabob's refusal of the treaty offered, Lord Clive was directed to assume the country under a proclamation, which accompanied the letter of instructions, and which fully exhibited the causes of that measure. If matters came to this extremity, his lordship was instructed to pay no attention to any appeal which the Nabob might desire to make to the court of directors, as it was both injudicious and unnecessary to listen to such; more particularly since the Governor-general was in possession of the sentiments of the secret committee, founded on the discovery of the Nabob's treacherous conduct. The admission of any such appeal, the Governor-general stated, would be entering upon a formal trial of the Nabob's criminality; whereas the case was one that demanded an immediate exercise of those rights and privileges which every power possesses, by the law of nations, to secure itself against the proved machinations of a perfidious ally. Lord Clive was, however, directed, even under the extremity of assuming the civil and military government of the Carnatic, to provide liberally for the Nabob's support, and in a suitable

manner for the different branches of his family, and the various officers of his state.

When Lord Wellesley's instructions on this subject reached Madras, the state of the Nabob's health was so bad as to prevent Lord Clive from taking any immediate measures on their receipt. When his highness's malady had attained a height that left no hopes of his recovery, intrigues were commenced among the different branches of his family, which disturbed the tranquillity of his palace; and a body of men were secretly introduced into it, by his brother Hissam ul Mulk, who was loud in asserting his pretensions to the succession. These circumstances obliged Lord Clive to send a detachment of the Company's troops to occupy the chief entrance into the palace, and to preserve order and tranquillity within its walls; as also to guard against the seizure of any treasure, or the dilapidation of any property, belonging to the Nabob, both of which, it was thought, would be attempted at the moment of his death.

This step was taken with a degree of delicacy and precaution which perfectly reconciled it to the Nabob, who was fully satisfied, by the explanation of Lord Clive, and by the conduct of the troops, that the object of it was no more than what was professed. Indeed its expediency and necessity could be arraigned only by those whose sinister views it defeated.

On the 15th of July, 1801, the Nabob expired; and the dangerous intrigues which had been carried on in his palace, the state of several provinces* under the government of Fort St. George, and a variety of other cogent reasons, forbade, in Lord Clive's opinion, a moment's delay in effecting a settlement of the country. He, therefore, a few hours after he heard of his highness's death, deputed Mr. Webbe, and Lieut.-Colonel Close, to confer with the principal officers of the court touching an immediate arrangement for the administration of the Carnatic.

These gentlemen had an immediate consultation with the two guardians † of Ali Hussein the young prince. But, though their negotiation was continued several days, it entirely failed; and they found themselves obliged, after the guardians had formally refused their assent to enter into any treaty on the basis of the civil and military government of the Carnatic being vested in the Company, to express their desire to see Ali Hussein, and to receive from him in person the final answer to a proposal in which his interests were so deeply concerned.

To their request for this interview the guardians made many objections, grounded on the alleged

* A very serious civil war at this period existed in the southern provinces of Fort St. George.

† Two Khans or Nobles, Mahomed Nejeeb and Tukee Ali, were left by the will of Omdut ul Omrah guardians to his son.

incapacity and inexperience of the young man; but, these being overruled, they were at last brought to give a reluctant consent to the meeting.

On the 19th, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe were introduced to Ali Hussein, the reputed son of the Nabob (a youth of 18 years of age), and stated to him in a summary manner all that had passed with his guardians; adding that, on a point which so materially involved his interests, they were naturally desirous of hearing his own sentiments and resolution, before they terminated a negotiation with which all his prospects of elevation must close. The young man referred them to his guardians. These Khans (or noblemen), he said, had been appointed by his father for the purpose of assisting him with advice, and that the object of his counsels and theirs could never be separated.

On receiving this answer, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe informed the Khans that Lord Clive had resolved, previously to the adoption of final measures on a subject of such importance, to have a personal interview with Ali Hussein; and that his lordship would, for that purpose, come to the tent of the officer commanding the troops stationed at the palace. This proposal was unexpected; and the Khans endeavoured to evade it by objections, similar to those which they had before urged, relative to the incapacity and inexperience of the young man: but finding their arguments of no avail, they consented; and both went to prepare

Ali Hussein's equipage and retinue. The young man, taking advantage of their momentary absence, whispered to Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, with much apparent anxiety, that he had been deceived by his guardians; and, after this communication, he proceeded, without attending to the Khans, to the tent prepared for his interview with Lord Clive.

When the ceremony of introduction to his Lordship was over, Ali Hussein's attendants (including the guardians) being desired to withdraw, Lord Clive, after adverting to the whole of the negotiation, informed him of the serious consequences of any resolution he might take; and stated the personal anxiety which his lordship felt, that he should be clearly apprized of his situation, and determine with caution on a point of such importance to his individual interests and reputation, as well as to those of his family.

Ali Hussein, without hesitation, declared, in the most explicit manner, that the conferences had been conducted by the Khans without his participation, and that he much disapproved of the termination to which they had been brought.

Upon this declaration, it was judged proper to recapitulate, in the most distinct manner, every part of the transaction; and, after the fullest comprehension of the whole subject, the young man declared his readiness to enter into an arrangement upon the basis of the Company exercising the civil and military government of the Carnatic.

He was very particular as to the secondary parts of the arrangement; such as the provision for his personal expenses, and the extent of his power over the treasure of the late nabob, which he evidently considered to be large.

This conference, which was frequently interrupted by the importunity of Nejeeb Khan, terminated by the young man desiring that a treaty should be drawn out upon a basis which vested the entire civil and military government of the Carnatic in the Honourable Company; which, he said, a conviction that it was for his benefit, and that of his family, would lead him to execute with, or without, the consent of his guardians.

On the 20th, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe again went to the palace, where they were met by the two Khans and Ali Hussein. The latter began the conference by retracting everything which he had said to Lord Clive at the private interview, and declared his fixed resolution to abide by the opinion of his guardians.

This extraordinary change was supposed, at first, to proceed from fear; and an adjournment to the tent, to meet Lord Clive, was proposed, and carried into execution. On arriving there, the young man's attendants and guardians were dismissed, and he was left in private with his lordship. He then repeated, in the firmest tone, his resolution to abide by the advice of the Khans, and his unalterable determination to accept of no engagement having for

its basis the cession of the civil and military government of the Carnatic. He had spoken the day before, he said, under the impression of the moment; but had received full information since, and now acted agreeably to his own sentiments, and to those of the whole family, who had been convened for the purpose of assisting his judgment. He was fully convinced, he added, of the risks he encountered, having received communications, the truth of which he could not doubt, respecting the Governor-general's orders. But he was prepared to meet every danger, rather than subscribe to the conditions proposed.

No argument was left untried by Lord Clive, which could persuade or convince this young prince that he was misled to his ruin, and that his prosperity depended upon compliance with the demands of the Company's government. It was in vain that his lordship pointed out in the clearest manner, the situation in which he stood; the motives which influenced his adherents in persuading him to a course incompatible with his true interests; and the certain distress into which he must inevitably bring himself, and all those dependant upon him, by perseverance in his refusal of the proffered terms.

Ali Hussein remained unmoved; and Lord Clive was at length reluctantly obliged to inform him, that he had forfeited all claim to consideration, and must await the extreme measures which his conduct had rendered unavoidable.

All hopes of concluding a treaty with the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah were now at an end : a negotiation which had been conducted throughout with a degree of temper and moderation reflecting the highest credit upon those to whom it was intrusted, and been marked, at its most important stages, with the extreme of kindness and humanity on the part of Lord Clive, was thus terminated, by the young prince refusing his assent, in the most deliberate manner, to any engagement founded upon the principle which had been stated, from the first, as indispensable ; namely, “ The Company being vested with the civil and military government of the Carnatic.”

The situation of the territories under Fort St. George (part of which were in rebellion) was unfavourable to any measure, however grounded on justice, that excluded the family of Mahomed Ali Khan altogether from the dignity of Nabob ; and the governor therefore resolved on raising Azeem u Dowlah to the Musnud.

The right of this prince to the succession (if all right had not been forfeited) was perhaps stronger than that of the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah. But this was not investigated ; the act being declared one of expediency and grace, not of right or of justice. His claims were to be considered of consequence only as they served to reconcile the great body of the Mahomedan inhabitants of the

English territories, and the Mahomedan rulers of neighbouring states, to the measure.

When Lord Clive adopted this resolution, he deputed Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe to negotiate with the Prince Azeem u Dowlah a treaty founded on the same basis as that which had been proposed to Ali Hussein. Their access to Azeem u Dowlah was a matter of serious difficulty, for he was kept in rigorous confinement; and there was reason to fear that, should any idea go forth of his intended elevation, it might prove dangerous to his life. The difficulty of seeing him was, however, removed by an incident, which evinced such a contempt for the Company's authority as required immediate correction. The guardians of Ali Hussein, impatient of delays, placed that prince upon the Musnud privately; and it was reported to Lord Clive, that they proposed performing the ceremony of it publicly next day. As there was no calculating the confusion which such a proceeding might occasion, his lordship gave immediate orders for the Company's troops to take possession of the whole palace, and to remove all the Nabob's guards.

One effect of this interference was, to bring Azeem u Dowlah under the protection of the English troops; and on the 23rd and 24th of July, he had interviews with Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, at which he settled with those gentlemen the basis of a treaty, which was finally concluded on the

25th of July; and on the 26th this prince was introduced to Lord Clive, and conducted to the palace of Ameer Bagh, the former residence of his father.

In the course of Azeem u Dowlah's interview with Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, a good deal of discussion took place on the subordinate articles of the treaty, in which the prince showed that he was not deficient in quickness or good sense; but possessed personal qualifications fully equal to the support of the rank to which he had been elevated.

This treaty vested the whole civil and military government of the Carnatic in the Company; provided for the Nabob's enjoyment of a clear revenue of from two to three lacs of pagodas annually*, unencumbered by any charge, as well as for the liberal support of all the different branches of the family of Mahomed Ali Khan; and it also settled for a gradual liquidation of such as were deemed just of the large debts with which a long system of usury, extravagance, and oppression, had encumbered the revenues of the Carnatic, and which were rapidly involving that fine country in ruin.

Lord Wellesley left India on the 20th of August,

* The sum fixed for the support of the Nabob was one-fifth of the revenues of the Carnatic; and the Company agreed that, under all circumstances, he should receive, in advance of the fifth to which he was entitled, twelve thousand pagodas per month for his personal expenses.

1805, soon after the Marquess Cornwallis, who had been appointed to succeed him, had reached Fort William. The narrative of this nobleman's administration would be incomplete without some general observations upon the leading political measures which he adopted; the impressions they made; and the general result of his government to the British interests in India.

The state of India, at the period of Lord Wellesley's arrival, compelled him (as has been shown) to the immediate employment of all the resources of the great empire committed to his charge. The restoration of the alliance with the Nizam, and the complete destruction of the formidable French party at his court, were objects of which the necessity as well as policy have never been denied. Their accomplishment was necessary, not only to enable us to carry on the impending war with Tippoo Sultaun, but to crush a rising danger of perhaps the most serious magnitude that ever threatened our dominions in India.

The most serious alarm had arisen in England respecting the intentions which the French were supposed at this period to cherish against our eastern possessions; and the connexion of their efforts in India with their invasion of Egypt was doubted by none. Buonaparte's letter to Tippoo Sultaun* was of itself conclusive evidence on this

* This letter, dated at Head-quarters at Cairo the 7th of Pluiose, and 7th year of the republic, was as follows:—

head; and it was evident that, at the commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration, the French had such means as were of all others the best calculated to give success to the designs which they were known to cherish against the British government. Their influence at the court of Tippoo was predominant. His union with them was grounded upon a congenial feeling of hatred to the English name. At the court of Sindia, who was still more formidable than the Suldaun, the French had more than influence—they had power. They had founded an empire of their own within the dominions of that prince. The whole of Hindustan, from the river Sutlege to the borders of the unsettled country of the Vizier of Oude, was in possession of an army of nearly forty thousand infantry, with an immense train of artillery, and every military resource; commanded by a body of

“ You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of releasing and relieving you from the iron yoke of England.

“ I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

“ I could even wish you would send some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer. May the Almighty increase your power, and destroy your enemies!

“ Yours, &c. &c.

“ BUONAPARTE.”

about three hundred European officers, of whom not more than forty were British subjects; and these (who were for the most part in subordinate stations) it was the marked object of their French superiors to disgust, that they might make way for others on whom they could better depend, when that crisis should arrive which they always contemplated.

At Hyderabad the power of the French was considerable, as they had at their disposal an army of fourteen thousand disciplined troops, with a large and well-appointed train of cannon; but their influence had not yet conquered that of the English at the court of the Nizam. That prince had too just a dread of Tippoo Sultaun and the Mahrattas to listen readily to counsels calculated to involve him with the only state able to protect him from such enemies; and, though he was too wise to resign those means of defence to which the neutral policy of the British government had compelled him to resort, without an adequate security against the dangers to which he was exposed, he did not hesitate to make every sacrifice required of him, the instant he received a decided pledge of protection against the Mahrattas. It must here be recollected, that it was impossible for Lord Wellesley either to engage in the war with Tippoo, then inevitable, or to expel the French from the Deckan (an object of equal, if not greater neces-

sity), without agreeing to give the Nizam that promise of protection against the future unprovoked aggressions of the Mahrattas, which he had constantly solicited from the first hour of his intimate alliance with the English, in 1788, and which Lord Cornwallis had only declined on the ground, that such a measure would be offensive to the Mahrattas, who were at that moment as cordial as the Nizam in their alliance with the English government against Tippoo. The consideration which had chiefly influenced Lord Cornwallis's determination no longer existed; the power of the Poonah state, with whom the triple alliance had been formed, was almost extinct; and its resources were at the direction of Dowlut Row Sindia, who appeared, from his whole conduct, much more likely to join in a combination against the British government, than to aid it to frustrate the plans, or repel the attack, of its enemies.

Under such circumstances, Lord Wellesley could not have rejected the just demand of the Nizam, without incurring the most serious dangers, and, indeed, exposing the empire under his charge to all the consequences of meeting, without allies, a war with Tippoo Sultaan, and a combination of the means which France could bring in aid of his attempts upon our power. He was compelled, therefore, by attention to the safety of the British territories, to conclude the treaty of Hyderabad.

This measure gave rise to a series of events which completely changed the condition of the British government in India. Its first consequence was the overthrow of Tippoo Suldaun, and the establishment of the government of Mysore; and its second was, to produce such a complete alteration of our political relations with the Mahratta states, that it was early evident we must either retract the engagement which we had formed, and abandon the territories we had acquired, or endeavour, by negotiation, to make the principal Mahratta chiefs so to modify their policy and habits of rule as to render them compatible with the altered political state of the peninsula.

The Mahrattas, it is true, from the period of the conclusion of the treaty of Salbhye, had respected our territories, and those of the allies whom we were bound to protect: but these, it is to be observed, had before only joined theirs in one quarter, that of Oude; and, from the date of the treaty of Salbhye, both Madhajee Sindia, and his successor Dowlut Row, had been too intently fixed upon consolidating a power in Hindustan, which would make them masters of the Mahratta empire, to think of offending the British government by any predatory incursion upon the territories of its ally, the Vizier of Oude. But the causes of this forbearance were hourly generating a more serious evil to the British power; and that neutrality, which we thought recompensed by this temporary

exemption from attack, left us, in its result, exposed to a more imminent danger than the British arms in India have ever had to encounter.

In other quarters of India our territories were remote from those of the Mahrattas. We had interposed the countries of the Nizam, and those of Tippoo Sultaun, between us and those freebooters. But, when a course of policy, the expediency and justice of which have never been questioned, led us to form an intimate alliance with the Nizam, by which we became bound to defend his territories as we would our own; when a government was established in Mysore under our immediate guarantee and protection; we, of course, virtually succeeded to all the local and political relations which subsisted between the Mahrattas and those states.

The previous history of these countries will show, that a year had hardly ever passed without some dispute arising between them and the Mahrattas; and, as the causes of such quarrels were interwoven in the system of the Mahratta government, we could hope for exemption from the constant disputes and wars with which we were threatened, only by the adoption of one of the courses before stated. The first was, to retract our pledged faith to the Nizam and the government of Mysore, and to abandon our conquests; the second, to endeavour to effect, by negotiation, a change in the constitution of the Mahratta government, render-

ing it more favourable to the maintenance of general peace and tranquillity.

To adopt the first of those measures would have been equally disgraceful and ruinous; and could not, therefore, have been attempted under any modifications. The second was the safest, as well as the most moderate course; and the divided state of the Mahratta empire gave some reason to hope that it might be accomplished without resorting to war. But as the successful issue of our negotiation soon became very doubtful; and as it was evident that nothing but their fears could prevent the Mahratta chiefs from immediately commencing hostilities, it seemed wise to seize every political advantage likely to add to their motives for avoiding a contest, or to our means of making it successful, if inevitable. These were the grounds of our negotiations with the court of Poonah; without an alliance with which we could not, from the state of India at the moment, maintain our engagements with the court of Hyderabad or the Rajah of Mysore, unless by assembling an army on the frontier, to secure respect to the system of neutrality which we had adopted; and as we could place no reliance on their faith, this expensive precaution against the designs of the Mahrattas must have been repeated whenever their armies were in the field, or, in other words, every year. We should, in short, have had to preserve an armed

neutrality when the Mahratta chiefs were contending with each other, and to make still greater preparations against danger, when those contentions were ended either by their union *, or by the establishment of the paramount power of one chieftain. Our finances must have sunk under this ruinous system; and we could have indulged no hopes of its termination, as our views and those of the Mahrattas were irreconcilable. They desired power, for no object but that of extending their depredations: we, for that of maintaining tranquillity. Under such circumstances, it appeared alike indispensable for the safety of our own territories, and those of our allies, to conclude an alliance with the Paishwah, which should not only secure him in the enjoyment of his hereditary possessions, but give him an interest in the preservation of the peace of the Deckan.

From these observations it will appear, that Lord Wellesley was more governed by considerations of necessity than of choice, in his anxious pursuit of an alliance with the court of Poonah. It originated in a desire to avoid, not to provoke war. His policy in this instance, as in all others, was directed to the permanent security of the state he ruled; and though most solicitous for an amicable termination of the different negotiations into

* Their attack of the Nizam, in 1795, affords a remarkable instance of their uniting, when an object of plunder was in view.

which that course led him, he accounted no measure worthy of his adoption which should obtain a temporary exemption from danger at any hazard to the fame or future tranquillity of the British government.

The ultimate success in forming a defensive alliance with the Paishwah, and the glorious termination of the war with the Mahratta chiefs, have been already related. The result of those events soon refuted all the prognostications hazarded by men who took a limited or prejudiced view of this great question; and Lord Wellesley, before he left India, had the gratification to see the complete fulfilment of almost every hope formed from the wise and enlarged measures he had adopted.¹

A glance at the actual state of India at the period of his departure will show this in a clearer point of view.

The designs of the French against the British government, as far as depended upon the great aid which that nation might have expected from its subjects in India,* were completely frustrated. The old and venerable emperor of Delhi, who had been in the hands of the Mahrattas, and latterly of

* The nature and extent of these designs are now generally understood. The quality and numbers of the military staff sent to Pondicherry with General de Caen, was of itself conclusive as to the hopes which the French government entertained from adding to the strength and efficiency of such means of attacking our power.

the French party established in Hindustan, was relieved from distress, and enjoyed, under the protection of the British government, an affluent repose.

Secunder Jah *, the Soubahdar of the Deckan, who had succeeded his father in the year 1803, was completely confirmed in his alliance with the Company; and maintained permanently, within his territories, a large subsidiary field force †, the expense of which was defrayed by a territorial cession, consisting of provinces conquered from Tippoo, and ceded to this prince; whose revenues, subsequently to the last treaty, had received a considerable accession from the conquest of Berar, and the cession to him of the share held by the Rajah of Berar in that rich province.

The complete reduction of the Mahratta chiefs, Sindia, Ragojee Bhonselah, and Holkar, had freed

* The British Resident at Hyderabad was directed to give this prince, who was the eldest son of the Nizam, the full and unconditional support of the British government. Secunder Jah, in gratitude for this aid, made a cession of an annual tribute of seven lacs of rupees, which the Company have long paid the Soubahdar of the Deckan for the Northern Circars. This cession was not received by Lord Wellesley, who considered it at variance with those principles of disinterested policy on which it had been resolved to support Secunder Jah in his succession to the throne of his father.

† Composed of one regiment of Europeans, two corps of native cavalry, six battalions of sepoys, and a proportionate train of artillery.

the Soubahdar of the Deckan from every alarm respecting his future safety, and had given to his subjects a tranquillity which they had never before enjoyed.

The government of Tippoo Sultaun was annihilated; and the family of the former Rajahs of Mysore were raised, by the magnanimity of the British government, to that throne of which they had been thirty-eight years deprived by the usurpation of Hyder Ali Khan and his son. The considerations which led Lord Wellesley to make this arrangement have been noticed; but it will be useful to say a few words on its operation.

The general theory of this government, is that of a prince exercising an independent authority over his own country, and maintaining sufficient force to preserve its internal quiet, and to contribute eventually to the aid of an ally which charges itself with the defence of his territories from all foreign attack; which ally, to enable it to fulfil this stipulation, has a large body of subsidized troops stationed within his territories, and is vested with the sole and exclusive conduct of all foreign relations.

The success of reducing this theory into practice would evidently depend upon the vigilant care with which the connexion was watched in its infancy; and this point received, as it merited, all Lord Wellesley's attention. The example of the courts

of Lucknow, of Chepauk*, and Tanjore, furnished an ample chart to show the rocks which were to be avoided on this occasion: and, though the origin of our connexion with Mysore differed widely from that which we had formed with those princes, our task with the former being establishment, with the latter, reform—there was still cause to fear that, if the greatest caution were not used, the young Rajah of Mysore, and his ministers, would soon fall into a course of intrigue and corruption, which would bring ruin on his country and its inhabitants, and consequently defeat all those objects which had been expected from his establishment in the government.

The state of Mysore was in reality so dependent upon the British government, that it appeared difficult, if not impossible, consistently with the check which it was necessary to maintain over its councils, to raise those by whom it was ruled into estimation and dignity, with themselves and others, sufficient to enable them to perform properly the important functions with which they were trusted. This condition of the young state required, that the first public officers of the power by which it had been created should exercise a firm but delicate, and, as far as possible, unseen control, and make it their particular duty to support, in the

* Nabobs of the Carnatic.

most public and decided manner, its government; and to raise, by every effort, its consequence and reputation as an efficient and separate state.

The early and successful accomplishment of all the objects proposed from the establishment of this government "is, (as Major Wilkes observes, in his clear and able Report on the affairs of Mysore,) next to those measures of a general nature which directed the great arrangements of that period, to be attributed to the energy, the talents, and cordial co-operation, of the uncommon men* who were selected for the execution of the civil and military duties; and to the fortunate choice of a dewan †, who, to a mind of singular vigour, added an extensive acquaintance with the resources of the country, and an intimate knowledge of characters; and was thus capable of collecting and combining at once all that had been useful in the establishment of the late government."

Our relations with the government of Mysore, though admirable, are of such a delicate texture as to make them require constant attention. The

* The name of the able writer of this report must ever occupy a distinguished place among those who have contributed by their integrity and talents to the happy operation of this great arrangement.

† Poorneah, a Brahmin, who had been minister of finance under Tippoo Suldaun, was selected by Lord Wellesley as the fittest person to fill the office of prime-minister to the young Rajah of Mysore.

smallest departure from any of those fundamental principles upon which they are grounded, will infallibly lead to their dissolution: but while those are respected, this connexion will form the bulwark of our strength in the south of India; and, in the course of events, it may be a consideration of policy to increase, instead of diminish the wealth and limits of a state, which, while it affords us resources fully equal to the same extent of our own dominions, is exempt from some of the objections of rule to which those are subject; and particularly to that popular, and, to a great degree, true one, of not giving sufficient employment to the higher ranks of our native subjects.

Superficial observers have been too ready to compare our connexion with Mysore to that with the Nabob of Arcot, the Vizier of Oude, and the Rajah of Tanjore; and to conclude on general but erroneous principles, that it would soon run its course; as it carried, like them, the seeds of its own destruction, and was not of a nature constituted for duration. But a very little reflection will show the radical difference which subsists in those connexions. Our relations with the Nabob of Arcot, the Vizier of Oude, and the Rajah of Tanjore, were gradual in their formation; and were marked by intrigue and corruption from their origin. The revenues of those states were anti-

icipated by usurious loans ; and individuals (some of them even high in rank in the English government) benefited too largely by this usage to attend to those dictates of public virtue which would have taught them, that such a system must not only prevent the state by which it was followed from ever being an useful ally, but must accelerate its destruction. And when at last this obvious result was forced upon our observation, it was too late for remedy: the deep-rooted evil could not be eradicated; and the governments in question, from the occurrence of different emergencies, have naturally sunk into complete dependence on the British government, in which condition, considering the vicious principles of their constitution, they could alone be allowed to exist.

It is also of importance to remark, that from the causes stated, these governments have progressively declined in power and splendour from the period of their connexion with the English; and though there can be little doubt that, if the connexion had not been formed, they would long ago have been subdued by their powerful neighbours, the probability of such event has in all likelihood seldom entered their imagination. It was indeed natural that the minds of the Nabobs of Arcot, the Viziers of Oude, and Rajahs of Tanjore, and their dependents, should have dwelt chiefly upon their past glory; and the sentiments they have entertained of the English government have been such as were

likely to arise from a comparison of that glory with their actual condition, and a belief, as strong as it was erroneous, that the great reverse was solely produced by their connexion with our state.

The Mysore government presents a perfect contrast to this picture. It has been created by the generosity of the British government; and that weight of original obligation must long operate, and attach* it to the state to which it owes its existence. It must also give popularity, and the appearance, as well as the reality, of justice to the right which the English government has acquired (and which is sanctioned by the form of treaty), of exercising a liberal control over the administration of its affairs; of directing, in a general way, the disposal of the revenue, the organization of the army, and the employment of the resources of the country. Hitherto that right has been exercised in a manner that has augmented the wealth, population, and prosperity of Mysore. The attachment of the state has been tried, and has exceeded expectation. Throughout the whole of the Mahratta war, no part of the Company's territories, of the same extent, afforded

* During the mutiny at Vellore, though the name of the family of Tippoo Sultaun was the watchword of revolt, not a man in the army of Mysore (upwards of 10,000 in number), not an inhabitant of the country, was convicted of mutiny or treason:—a proof (beyond all opinion) of the vigilance, vigour, and excellence of the existing government, as well as of the general attachment of its subjects.

such resources in men, money and grain, as Mysore; and these were supplied with a readiness and zeal, practically, and therefore incontrovertibly, demonstrating the happy operation of the alliance.

This government has, no doubt, defects; but it appears as good as it is possible for a native government to be; and it is pure, as far as we are yet concerned with its administration. There have hitherto been no intrigues at the Rajah's court, no clashing of authorities, no corruption, no usurious loans; and, consequently, no anticipation of revenue, that fruitful source of ruin and oppression.

These are the great and radical points on which this connexion differs from those we have formed with the Nabob of Arcot, the Vizier of Oude, the Rajah of Tanjore, and many of the inferior states in India. And, if we have wisdom and courage to defend those principles of purity from every attack, we may promise ourselves a continued source of increasing strength from our alliance with Mysore. It is, however, the misfortune of this connexion that its nature, though excellent, is so delicate, as to be more liable, perhaps, to injury from inattention, or from a cessation of active and spirited support, than from a bold and unblushing attack. The Mysore state is, in fact, so actually dependent upon us, and its dependence is so marked by the number of British troops stationed in its territories, that nothing but the English government being constantly alive to the character

and value of the connexion can keep it in that state of elevation and respectability which appear to be absolutely necessary for its existence.

The revenues of Mysore have greatly increased, from their ameliorated system of management, and the internal tranquillity of the country; inasmuch that, after the payment of the Company's subsidy, and of its own civil and military establishments, there has been a considerable surplus revenue, part of which has been annually employed in great and useful works. The canals, public roads, and bridges, already surpass those of any province in India; and, if the same active spirit of improvement continues, will soon rival those of the most civilized parts of Europe.

Such was the change that Lord Wellesley, on his departure for England, had to contemplate in a country, which, when he arrived in India, was in possession of a tyrant who had no object but that of collecting means to annihilate the British power there.

The authority of the Company, as already stated, had been completely introduced into the Carnatic; and that fine country, no longer a prey to a system of usury and oppression, was rising rapidly into prosperity. Even those who questioned the justice of the arrangement with the Nabob, could not deny the great amelioration of the condition of the inhabitants and the country.

The conquest of Cuttack had connected the

territories of Madras and Bengal; and, combined with the important cessions previously obtained in Guzerat, Malabar, and Canara, gave the Company the possession of almost the whole line of sea-coast, from the mouths of the Ganges to those of the Indus.

The subordinate government of Bombay had obtained, during the administration of Lord Wellesley, a great and essential addition to its resources, by the territories in Guzerat ceded by the Paishwah and Sindia, and by the Gwickar, with whom the government of Bombay, acting under that nobleman's orders, had formed a subsidiary alliance; and this important presidency had become, from this acquisition, more equal to answer the calls on its military resources, which, from the state of Europe, appeared likely to be made on them.

The Paishwah, whose natural weakness of character had led him to hesitate at entering into a defensive treaty with the British government, had hitherto proved a most faithful and useful ally. Early sensible of the advantages which the connexion brought to him and his subjects, he endeavoured, by every means within his power, to evince his fidelity to the engagements he had formed; and his territories, which, from the day of his accession till that on which the treaty of Bassein was concluded, had been annually wasted by his rebellious feudatories, had enjoyed uninterrupted tranquillity from the latter date. The subsidiary

corps, in the territories of this prince, was stationed forty miles to the northward of Poonah, and formed, with the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, a complete chain of defence against any possible attack which could be made; and not only covered the frontiers of the Paishwah and Nizam, and secured the internal tranquillity of the countries of these princes, but gave permanent security and peace to all the southern parts of the Peninsula.

The power of Dowlut Row Sindia had been completely reduced; and at the period of Lord Wellesley's departure, though that prince was discontented at the alienation of Gohud and Gwalior, which he continued to hope he might regain, through the liberality of the state by which he had been vanquished, he was nowise inclined to a renewal of hostilities. He had, indeed, shown a decided aversion to the violent counsels of his minister and father-in-law, Serjee Row Gautkea, who had endeavoured, by every means, to involve him with the British government; and, among others, had recourse to the disgraceful and cowardly expedient of attacking the escort, and plundering the baggage, of the acting British resident with Sindia's camp.

Jeswunt Row Holkar was at this period reduced from the condition which he had once enjoyed, of a chief at the head of a state with regular resources, to that of a freebooter commanding a body of dispirited troops, having nothing to

depend upon but plunder; and whom, it was evident, he never could again persuade to meet the British armies in the field, or indeed to trust themselves within fifty miles of an English force*.

In the quarter of Hindustan, all the great prospects which Lord Wellesley had contemplated at the commencement of the war had been completely realized. The French party had been annihilated, the Mahrattas expelled, the British government established over the whole of the Duab, and along the right banks of the Jumna; and a line of petty states, from the mountains of Cumaoun to Bundelcund were established, under the protection of the British government, as a barrier between its most fruitful provinces and the future predatory encroachments of the Mahrattas. The rich province of Bundelcund was subdued, and occupied by British troops; and the countries ceded by the Vizier, in 1801, were completely settled, and greatly improved in revenue; while that prince was not only reconciled, but happy, under a change which left him undisturbed, and in perfect security to pursue his pleasures, and amass treasure.

It would be endless to attempt to take a view of the minor arrangements of Lord Wellesley's govern-

* The last campaign this chief made was literally a rapid flight before the British troops, from the day he entered their territories to the westward of Delhi, to that of his arrival at Amratsir, in the Punjaub, where he concluded a treaty with Lord Lake.

ment: it will be sufficient to observe, that they were all made in the same spirit of substantial improvement as those which have been described; and were all equally attended with permanent benefit to the public interests. The general result of his administration changed the face of India: and a course of events, as extraordinary as they were important, gave, in that quarter of the globe, an entire new character to the British power; which, at the close of this nobleman's government, was completely paramount to that of all the states in India, and at liberty to choose, as its wisdom should dictate, the course of policy best suited to its new condition. From the nature of the events which had occurred, and the manner in which its power was established, it had no danger to fear, either from the efforts of any one state, or of any confederacy. The discontent of Sindia, and the continued hostility of Holkar, cannot affect this conclusion; as it has been shown, that the condition of these chiefs was such as to preclude the apprehension of any evil from their attack, beyond a short continuation of embarrassment in our finances, which had been the unavoidable consequence of the great exertions made, but which would be merely temporary, as the improvement of our own revenues, the receipts from the conquered countries, and the reductions commenced by Lord Wellesley, before he left India, promised not only a speedy relief to this pressure,

but even an early and large surplus revenue from our possessions.

The great success which attended Lord Wellesley's administration of British India is, on a general view, calculated to excite astonishment: nor will that be diminished by a nearer contemplation of the manner in which he ruled the large empire committed to his charge. His great mind pervaded the whole; and a portion of his spirit was infused into every agent whom he employed: his authority was as fully recognised in the remotest parts of British India as in Fort William: all sought his praise; all dreaded his censure: his confidence in those he employed was unlimited; and they were urged to exertion by every motive that can stimulate a good or proud mind to action. He was as eager to applaud as he was reluctant to condemn those whom he believed conscientious in the discharge of their public duty. It was the habit of his mind to be slow in counsel, but rapid in action; and he expected the greatest efforts from those he employed in the execution of his measures, whom he always relieved from every species of vexatious counteraction and delay that could arise from the untimely intrusion of official forms, or the unseasonable pretensions of inferior authorities. It was, indeed, with him a principle, to invest them with all the power they could require to effect the objects which they were instructed to attain; and though there can be no doubt of the great and ex-

traordinary merit of the distinguished officers who commanded the British armies during his administration, it is to that liberal confidence which gave them all the impression of the fullest power, and the most complete scope for the exercise of their judgment, that their unparalleled success is chiefly to be ascribed.

It could not be a matter of surprise to those acquainted with the clashing of opinions in England with regard to the government of British India to find, that a strong and violent prejudice had been excited against Lord Wellesley; and that, by partial and distorted statements of his administration, numbers were for a moment led to conceive it had been as ruinous as it was in fact glorious. But truth soon prevailed; and that nobleman now enjoys, in the just admiration of his country, the highest reward that can attend eminent public service.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD CORNWALLIS ;

AND

ADMINISTRATION OF SIR GEORGE BARLOW, TILL THE CONCLUSION OF
PEACE WITH JESWUNT ROW HOLKAR.

Public Feeling in England concerning Lord Wellesley's Administration.—Marquess Cornwallis succeeds him.—Negotiations with Sindia.—British Resident released from Sindia's Camp.—Instructions from Governor-general respecting Treaty with Sindia.—Lord Lake's Observations upon the Policy of them.—Connexion of the Company with the Rajah of Jypore.—Death of Lord Cornwallis.—Character of that Nobleman.—Succeeded by Sir George Barlow.—Treaty concluded with Sindia.—Correspondence respecting Articles in it.—Treaty of Peace with Holkar.—Alliance with Jypore dissolved.—That with Bhurretpore and Macherry preserved.—Interference at Hyderabad.—Discussions respecting Treaty of Bassein.—Policy pursued in these Transactions.

MUCH alarm was excited by an indistinct and exaggerated apprehension of evils to result from the system of policy pursued by Lord Wellesley. This feeling was rendered more general and popular in England, among persons connected with the Company, from the increase of the Indian debt; the interest of which, together with the want of sales for their accumulated investments,

threatened immediate distress, which many were desirous of ascribing exclusively to the political measures of the Governor-general of India. The little knowledge which many of the best-informed persons in England have of the detail of Indian politics, added to the remoteness of the scene, and the general nature of the accounts from that quarter, gave great advantage to those who now desired to make impressions upon the public mind unfavourable to the administration of Lord Wellesley. But it is only just to observe, that many, who were violent against that nobleman's measures, were perfectly conscientious in the sentiments which they entertained and expressed on the subject; for it required minute and complete information with respect to the changes which had occurred, before even men of enlarged and liberal minds, viewing this question at a distance, could be competent to pronounce with justice on a revolution so great and extraordinary, and so much at variance with established opinions and rooted prejudices, as had taken place within the few years that Lord Wellesley presided over the British interests in the east.

To minds under the influence of the feelings that have been mentioned, it was natural to look round for a remedy for the great evils apprehended; and no one can be surprised that the choice of Lord Cornwallis as the successor to Lord Wellesley met with almost universal approbation in Eng-

land at such a moment: and to those acquainted with that venerable nobleman's character, it will be a subject of still less surprise, that his accumulated years and infirmities did not render him insensible to such a call. Though his health was in a very declining state, he caught, with the enthusiasm which belongs to good and great minds, at the prospect of performing one more important service to his country, before he died; and he listened, as was natural, with avidity to those who, desirous of the authority of his great name to their plans, represented to him, that his presence alone could save from inevitable ruin the empire which he had before ruled with such glory. It is to the impression made by such representations, and to the infirm state of this nobleman's health, which could not but in some degree impair the vigour of his mind, that we must ascribe the difference in character of the few political measures adopted during his last short administration of the affairs of British India, from those which distinguished his first government.

The Marquess Cornwallis arrived at Fort William in July, 1805. The state of all the native powers at this period has already been minutely reviewed. It is only necessary to add, that the acting resident* at the court of Dowlut Row Sindia was still detained in the camp of that chief,

* Mr. Jenkins.

though Lord Lake had demanded his release, and had notified to Sindia, that a recommencement of hostilities would be the certain consequence of his non-compliance with this demand. As this communication produced no effect, Lord Lake addressed a letter* to that chief, signifying that, by his conduct in this instance, he had not only annulled the treaty of peace and subsidiary alliance, but had violated, in the grossest manner, the law of nations; and that his lordship considered the British government at liberty to act towards him in such manner as its interests and security might dictate. His lordship concluded this letter by remarking, that the release and safe conduct of the British residency to his camp was an indispensable preliminary to any renewal of amity or intercourse between the two states.

The proceedings of Lord Lake upon this occasion had been confirmed by Lord Wellesley, in a despatch of the 25th July, 1805, which transmitted a letter to Sindia, signifying the complete acquiescence of the Governor-general in all the measures which Lord Lake had taken; and informing him, that that nobleman was vested with the fullest military and political powers, and that his acts were as valid as if they proceeded direct from the supreme government.

In this stage of the proceeding Lord Cornwallis

* 18th July, 1805.

arrived; and immediately addressed a letter to Sindia, stating that it had not been his intention to write to him before he heard of his compliance with Lord Lake's requisition, for the release of Mr. Jenkins, the acting resident; but that, wishing to manifest an inclination for peace, he had been induced to do so by information from the acting resident, that his highness had declared his intention of permitting him, accompanied by two confidential agents, to join the camp of Lord Lake; who was fully authorized, Lord Cornwallis observed, to communicate [with these agents on all points connected with the welfare of both states.

A letter* from Mr. Jenkins stated that Sindia, though he had received the letter of Marquess Cornwallis, still hesitated in granting him permission to leave camp: and, in a subsequent letter †, he transmitted an answer from Sindia to Lord Cornwallis's letter; in which, after many professions of friendship, Sindia observed, that the dismissal of the acting resident was, agreeably to usage, delayed until a successor arrived in his camp.

Though Lord Cornwallis continued for some time to think that, after the great insult which the English nation had received from the residency with Dowlut Row Sindia being plundered, and forcibly detained, its release was an indispensable

* 11th September, 1805.

† 16th September, 1805.

preliminary to any negotiation with that chief; his anxious desire for peace led him, first to a modification, and ultimately to a complete alteration, of this sentiment. In a letter addressed to Sindia, whom he still urged to allow the acting resident to depart, he informed that chief, that Lord Lake had been authorized to enter into a negotiation with him, on the basis of restoring the fortress of Gwalior and the territories of Gohud; and in a despatch* to Lord Lake, accompanying the letter to Sindia, Lord Cornwallis expressly states that, though aware of the disadvantages of immediately relinquishing, or even compromising, the demand so repeatedly made for the release of the British resident; yet that, as he considered it a mere point of honour, he would certainly be disposed to do so, should it ultimately prove to be the only obstacle to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs with that chieftain. No opportunity was afforded of judging of the impression which this extreme solicitude for peace would have had upon Dowlut Row Sindia, as Lord Lake had effected the release of the acting resident before these instructions from Lord Cornwallis were received. That nobleman had authorized the political agent † of the Governor-general, in his camp, to send for Moonshee Kavel Nyne from Delhi, a respectable native, who had long been one of Dowlut Row Sindia's favourite and confi-

* 19th September. † Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm.

dential servants; but had fled from the temporary tyranny of that chief's father-in-law, Surjee Row Gautka, into Hindustan. When he arrived, he was instructed to depute one of his relations to explain to Sindia the manner in which he could best open a negotiation for an amicable adjustment of differences between him and the British government; and Sindia, as had been expected, caught at this new and unexpected channel of communication, and sent proposals for a settlement, to be laid before the commander-in-chief by Kavel Nyne. In answer to this overture, Lord Lake observed, that he could not attend to any proposition whatever till the British residency was released. The immediate accomplishment of that object ensued; and Mr. Jenkins was on his march to the British territories before the last letter of Lord Cornwallis to Sindia reached the British camp; and it was, in consequence, not forwarded.

Lord Cornwallis gave Lord Lake the fullest instructions* with respect to the treaty which he wished to be concluded with Dowlut Row Sindia. He stated it to be his decided opinion, that it was desirable to abandon the possession of Gwalior and Gohud, independently of any reference to the settlement of differences with Sindia; and that consequently he had no hesitation in transferring these possessions to Sindia, after having secured a

* See Lord Cornwallis's Letter, 19th September.

suitable provision for the Ranah of Gohud. The Governor-general, however, stated, that he did not wish to make an unconditional surrender of these countries, but was desirous that Sindia should be induced by this measure to relieve the Company from the burden of the Jagheers and pensions granted by the treaty of peace; to bear the charge of a suitable establishment for the Ranah of Gohud; and to reimburse the public and private losses occasioned by the plunder of the British residency. The Governor-general observed in this letter, that it would be at the option of the British government to augment the cession to Sindia by a portion of the territory in our possession to the westward and southward of Delhi. The expediency of this measure must, he thought, be determined by political considerations; and was of opinion that, if circumstances would admit, the dissolution of our alliance with the Rajah of Jypore, and the amount of tribute which Sindia would then be at liberty to demand of that chief, might be considered as an additional benefit which he would derive from the general arrangement.

Lord Cornwallis, who had appeared from the first resolved upon making the Jumna the boundary* of the Company's possessions, stated in this

* Retaining Delhi and Agra, and a small district near the latter fortress; but, as his lordship was anxious to remove the old emperor from his capital, he probably contemplated, at one period, the abandonment of Delhi. An erroneous idea had

letter his opinion, that though it would be advisable to establish any other than a Mahratta power to the westward and southward of Delhi; yet he should consider even that arrangement more expedient than our maintaining any further connexion with the territories in question ourselves. The following is the basis upon which Lord Cornwallis desired this treaty with Sindia to be concluded.

“ 1st. To make over to Sindia the possessions of Gwalior and Gohud.

“ 2nd. To transfer* to him, according to the provisions of the treaty of peace, the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah; and to account to Sindia for the collections from those districts since the peace.

“ 3rd. The eventual restoration of the Jynagur

been entertained, that the Jumna river was in itself a strong barrier: this Lord Lake corrected in a communication to Lord Cornwallis, in which he transmitted the most particular information upon this subject; the result of which was, that the Jumna was only useful as a barrier during the rainy season, when, from the general state of the country, military operations were almost impracticable. It was fordable in several places above Agra, even before the 1st October; and could not be looked upon as a boundary of any strength, at any place above its junction with the Chumbul, for more than a few weeks of the wet season.

* “ I am aware,” Lord Cornwallis states, “ that this is not to be considered in the light of a concession; but I am willing to relinquish that stipulation of the treaty, which prohibits Sindia from stationing a force in those districts—an object which I should suppose to be highly desirable to that chieftain. ’

tribute, amounting to the annual sum of three lacs of rupees.

“ 4th. To require from Sindia his consent to the abrogation of the pensions, and to the resumption of the Jagheers in the Duab, established by the treaty of peace.

“ 5th. To require from Sindia the relinquishment of his claim to the arrears of the pensions.

“ 6th. To demand a compensation for the public and private losses sustained by the plunder of the residency.

“ 7th. To require Sindia to make a provision for the Ranah of Gohud, to the extent of two and a half, or three lacs of rupees per annum.”

But although Lord Cornwallis desired that the negotiations should be commenced upon this basis, he declared his intention of relaxing in some of the demands, rather than delay the conclusion of peace; and, to attain that object, he was ready, he said, to extend the cessions to Sindia, should such appear necessary for the satisfactory adjustment of affairs between the two states.

It was not his intention, he observed in this communication, to renew our defensive engagements with Sindia, though he was ready to act in concert with that chief, as an ally, against Holkar, until the latter should be brought to reasonable terms. He stated in these instructions the grounds upon which he was disposed to make that arrangement, which annulled the alliance with the Ranah

of Gohud. These were:—the utter incapacity of that chief to rule, and his inability to perform the engagements which he had contracted with the Company; but, at the same time, he conceived it just to make a suitable provision for the future liberal support of this inefficient prince.

Lord Cornwallis also communicated to Lord Lake, in this letter, the plan which he had contemplated for disposing of the conquered countries southward and westward of Delhi; which was to give part of them to the several chieftains* for whom we were bound to provide, on condition of their not claiming our protection; and dividing the remainder between the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurretpore, on their agreeing to relinquish the alliances which they had formed with the British government.

The territories of these chieftains would, his lordship thought, when extended, constitute the desired barrier between the possessions of Sindia in Hindustan, and those of the Company in the Duab; and, in the reduced state of Sindia's power, he deemed it not improbable that these Rajahs might be able to oppose him, particularly if aided by the independent Jagheerdars. At all events, his lordship declared, that he was satisfied of the expediency of even admitting the power of Dowlut

* Commanders of corps of native horse, and others, who had by their defection from our enemies, or by their services during the war, entitled themselves to reward.

Row Sindia into the territories in question, rather than that we should preserve any control over, or connexion with them. "But Sindia's endeavours," his lordship adds, "to wrest those territories from the hands of the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurretpore may be expected to lay the foundation of interminable contests, which will afford ample and permanent employment to Sindia; and, under any circumstances, I cannot," he adds, "admit the apprehension of any hostile attempts on the part of Sindia against the British possessions in the Duab; still less should I deem it probable, in the event of his rendering the chiefs of Macherry and Bhurretpore his perpetual enemies, which must be the consequence of his endeavours to deprive them of a portion of their dominions."

Lord Lake, in his reply to these instructions, referred to a letter which he had before written to Lord Cornwallis, on the subject of the great benefits which must result to the Company's territories from the complete expulsion of the Mahrattas from Hindustan; and stated his perfect conviction, (founded upon his local experience,) that the maintenance of the strong boundary which we possessed would soon cause the Mahrattas to abandon every idea of attacking our provinces in that quarter; which he was fully persuaded they would never do, if permitted to possess territory in Hindustan, or to employ their armies against the petty states or Jagheerdars immediately west of

the Jumna. Lord Lake, in this despatch, stated the numerous reasons which convinced his judgment that, if the British protection was withdrawn from those petty states, they would either be subdued by Dowlut Row Sindia, or some other chief, who would found on their ruins a power, formidable from its strength and local situation to the British government.

Lord Lake observed in this letter, that the armies of Sindia and Holkar had comparatively few Mahrattas* in them, and were mostly composed of Rajpoots and Mahomedans, natives of Hindustan, most of whom had returned to their homes, or entered into the service of the British government; and he was satisfied that, by a liberal

* This extraordinary composition of the armies of the different Mahratta chiefs, while it led to very false conclusions respecting the actual military strength of that nation, was one, among many causes, which prevented their combination. It was, indeed, a radical cause of their division and ruin: for the fact was, that the Mahrattas, originally inhabitants of one of the divisions of India, taking advantage of the decline of the Mogul empire, had spread their power over the greatest part of that vast peninsula; but, like every barbarous nation, which carries with it nothing but force to effect conquest, it was weakened by extension; and the descendants of those chiefs who first led Mahratta armies into distant countries have of late led bands of foreigners to plunder and desolate the provinces of their ancestors: and all the ravages which this race formerly committed on other parts of India have, within these few years, been amply revenged upon their own country by armies of Mussulmen and Rajpoots, led by Mahratta chiefs.

line of policy, they might be detached from their habits within a very short period, and rendered useful subjects : but that every plan of this nature would be completely frustrated if the territories west of the Junna were permitted to become a scene of perpetual warfare and contest ; or if they fell under the dominion of any one native prince whose views were directed to plunder and conquest. In either of those cases, the habits of this tribe of men would be perpetuated, and hordes of plunderers would be formed, ready to join the first bold adventurer who should offer to lead them from the countries which their excesses had wasted into the neighbouring rich and fertile provinces of the Company.

These, Lord Lake observed, were his sentiments upon this subject, in a political point of view. He next proceeded to consider its practicability ; and whether it could be carried into execution without a violation of the faith, and deep injury to the honour and reputation, of the English nation. After a full explanation of the grounds upon which his opinions on this head were founded, he stated his conviction, that the plan which Lord Cornwallis had in contemplation was impracticable by other means than that of loading the revenues of the Company's territories, to a great amount, with the compensations which must be made to those from whom considerations of policy had induced that government to withdraw its protection.

“ I am fully satisfied,” Lord Lake remarks in this letter, “ that no inducement whatever would make the lesser Rajahs in this quarter renounce the benefit of the protection of the British government: such a proposition, even, would excite in their minds the utmost alarm; they would, I fear, consider it as a prelude to their being sacrificed to the object of obtaining a peace with the Mahrattas: nor would it, as far as I can judge, be possible, by any explanation, to remove from their minds an impression so injurious to the honour and reputation of the British government.

“ Not one of the chiefs,” he adds, “ who have claims upon the British government, and whom it appears to be your lordship’s intention to settle to the west of the Jumna, would ever consent to be provided for in the country of any of the Rajahs, except under a guarantee, that would prove a thousand times more embarrassing than their settlement under the direct authority of the British government: and, on the other hand, I do not believe that any of those chiefs would be able to maintain themselves, for even a short period, against the more established local authorities, if the protection of the British government was withdrawn.”

Lord Lake, in this letter, reported the progress made in the negotiation with Sindia; and expressed his regret, that the personal incapacity of the Ranah of Gohud should have defeated all the objects which were anticipated from the arrange-

ment made regarding him; and fully concurred with the Marquess Cornwallis in the opinion that, though just grounds existed for the abrogation of that alliance, it was better to obtain the consent of that chief to a change of his condition, from a power he was unequal to exercise to one more suited to his weak and inefficient character.

As some serious discussions took place, at this period, respecting our connexion with the Rajah of Jypore, it will be necessary to trace, in a few words, the rise and nature of that alliance.

The Rajah of Jypore, one of the principal Rajpoot chiefs who possess a tract of country which divides Malwa from Hindustan, entered, very early in the war with Sindia, into an alliance with the English government, the general conditions of which have been mentioned. The Rajah had certainly on many occasions deviated both from the letter and spirit of this engagement. But, at the moment when both Sindia and Holkar were on the frontiers of Jypore, and the Bombay army had marched to Tonk-Rampoorah, a place in the immediate vicinity of the capital of the Rajah, from whose territories it drew most of its supplies, Lord Lake conceived it consistent with good policy to relieve the solicitude expressed by the agent of the Rajah of Jypore, residing in his camp, as to the consequences which might attend the wavering part his master had pursued; and he directed him to inform the Rajah, that he had now an oppor-

tunity, which his lordship hoped he would not neglect, of proving himself worthy of the friendship and support of the British government.

After Lord Lake had made this communication to the agent of the Rajah of Jypore, he received a despatch* from Lord Cornwallis, on the subject of this alliance. Lord Cornwallis there stated that, in his opinion, the Rajah of Jypore, so far from performing his engagements with the Company, had favoured the cause of the enemy; that he, therefore, considered the alliance to be dissolved: and that, as he saw nothing but inconvenience and and embarrassment from the connexion, it had been resolved by government not to repel any aggression which Sindia or Holkar might make on the territories of Jypore.

Lord Lake was instructed to transmit orders to Major-general Jones, who commanded the Bombay army (then cantoned on the frontiers of the Jypore state), not to give the Rajah any aid in the event of an attack from the Mahrattas, as the Governor-general in council had resolved to abandon the connexion. But Lord Cornwallis stated in these instructions, that it was thought impolitic to declare to the court of Jypore the dissolution of the subsisting engagements, as such a declaration, in the actual situation of affairs, might be productive of great disadvantage to the interests of the British

* Under date the 3d of August.

government. The resident at the court of Jypore was therefore to be informed of the resolution which the Governor-general in council had taken respecting the alliance, and desired to make no communication whatever upon the subject; but he was instructed not to give the Rajah any promise of aid from British troops, in the event of his territories being invaded by Sindia, Holkar, or any other chief.

Lord Lake, after the measures he had adopted, felt the greatest embarrassment on receiving these orders; and immediately communicated to Lord Cornwallis those assurances of continued support and friendship which circumstances had induced him to make to the Rajah of Jypore, on the condition of that prince meriting, by his future conduct, the protection of the British government.

When Lord Lake, subsequently to this communication, received information * from the resident at Jypore, that Holkar was advancing through the territories of Jypore towards the Company's frontier, and that the Rajah did not seem inclined to oppose him, but was employing the principal part of his army towards effecting the subordinate object of his marriage with the daughter of the Ranah of Odipore; his lordship addressed a letter to the Rajah, recapitulating the various instances in which he had violated his engagements, and informing

* In a letter dated the 1st of October.

him, that he expected the Governor-general would issue immediate orders for the abandonment of such an useless and burdensome connexion: he then stated, that it was probable General Jones's army would soon move against Holkar; in which case the Rajah might yet retrieve his credit by a hearty co-operation with that officer, and by adopting the most active and efficient measures for securing him the supplies necessary to his army.

This measure was not only in consistency with the line of proceeding which Lord Lake had adopted towards the Rajah of Jypore, but, from the actual situation of the enemy and of our forces, was quite essential to the success of the opening campaign; and it was attended with the completest effect. The resident at the court of Jypore informed Lord Lake * that the Rajah, as soon as he received his lordship's letter, had relinquished his favourite project of marching a force towards Odipore, and prepared a detachment to join General Jones's army, with which he co-operated in the most decided and zealous manner during the remainder of the war with Holkar.

Upon Lord Lake's report, Lord Cornwallis had suspended the execution of the measures which he had taken regarding the dissolution of this connexion. It was concluded, therefore, by Lord Lake, that the Rajah of Jypore, by his complete fulfil-

* Vide Capt. Sturrock's letter 16th October, 1805.

ment of the conditions proposed to him, had fully re-established his claim to be considered an intimate and faithful ally of the British government.

Lord Cornwallis, during his last administration of British India, took no measures of importance with the courts of Hyderabad, Poonah and Berar. On his arrival at Fort William, he addressed letters to each of the courts, reminding their rulers of the principles of his former government; professing the greatest moderation, and a desire to remove from their minds the impressions which late events might have produced. The general tenour of these letters was no doubt calculated to convey a belief, that the measures of Lord Wellesley had been condemned, and that another system was to be pursued; and in one instance, at the court of Berar, this proceeding gave rise to a long and vexatious discussion between the Rajah and the British resident; the former contending, that it was evidently Lord Cornwallis's intention, from the expression of his letter, to restore affairs in India to the posture in which he had left them in 1793*, which included

* The Rajah of Berar, in speaking upon this subject, distinctly stated that when Lord Cornwallis, of his own free will, had written to him, expressing great grief at his reduced condition, and a desire to renew the ties of friendship with him on the ancient footing, and a determination to make restitution to the utmost extent which good faith would permit, he expected the restoration of all his lost territories on the strength of this declaration!

the restoration of Berar, Cuttack, and all the possessions which this chief had lost since that period.

Lord Lake received instructions for bringing about a settlement with Jeswunt Row Holkar, upon the general basis of leaving him in possession of the territories of the Holkar family, on affording the British government reasonable security for his future conduct : but no such negotiation was opened while Lord Cornwallis lived, as no opportunity occurred of making any proposition to that chief; who, accompanied by a comparatively small number of distressed and disheartened adherents, advanced through the barren provinces to the north west of Delhi, into the provinces of the Punjab *, about the period of that nobleman's death.

From his first despatches to the court of directors, his lordship appears to have been very anxious to adopt measures for relieving the finances of the Company from embarrassment, the inevitable consequence of the wars in which we had been and were still engaged; but it was of course impossible to make any reductions of consequence in our military establishments † before war was com-

* This extensive and fertile country is inhabited by Seikhs, an extraordinary race; of whom a very full account is given in the eleventh volume of the *Asiatic Researches*.

† Much has been said respecting the enormous expense of the irregular horse with Lord Lake's army; and this large item in the military disbursements attracted the early attention of Lord Cornwallis; but it is to be recollected, that it only

pletely at an end, as its successful termination depended upon the efficiency and equipments of the army.

The health of Lord Cornwallis, which was declining when he left England, became worse from the period he left Fort William to join the army in the upper provinces*, and his existence terminated at Gazeepore, near Benares, on the 5th of October, 1805.

Thus closed the life of this distinguished nobleman; whose memory will be revered as long as

began to be heavy when the retreat of Holkar from Hindustan occasioned the defection of almost all the chiefs belonging to that country; who, with their numerous followers, joined the British army. The heaviest amount of this temporary disbursement was five lacs and eighty-three thousand six hundred and sixty-nine rupees, four anas, and three pice per month, which did not continue for more than three months. Its reduction was in progress before Lord Cornwallis's arrival; and this charge was, in September, 1806, reduced to three lacs and ninety thousand four hundred and fifty-five rupees, nine anas; in December, to two lacs, nineteen thousand six hundred and sixty-seven rupees, and ten anas; and in February, 1807, to a sum under one lac of rupees.

* In the condition of his health, during the last month of his existence, it is hardly possible to conceive how he was able to transact any business of importance. He continued the greatest part of the morning in a state of weakness approaching to insensibility: towards evening he revived so much as to be dressed, to hear the despatches which had been received, to give instructions respecting such as were to be written; and it is stated by those who attended him, that, even in this state, his mind retained much of its wonted vigour.

the sacred attributes of virtue and patriotism shall command the approbation of mankind. To a dignified simplicity of character he added a soundness of understanding and a strength of judgment, which admirably fitted him for the exercise of both civil and military power; and his first administration of the British empire in India must ever be a theme of just and unqualified applause. His second administration, in which he seemed to act upon a different system, was of so short a duration as to make it difficult to pronounce what would have been the results, had his life been prolonged. Thus far is certain, that the evil effects of those concessions which he seemed disposed to make would have been corrected by his great personal reputation; as every state in India was aware of his character, and of the spirit and promptness with which he had formerly asserted the honour and interests of the British government. But however questionable the policy of some of the last acts of this nobleman may be to many, or whatever may be their speculations upon the causes which produced such an apparent deviation from the high and unyielding spirit of his former administration, no man can doubt the exalted purity of the motive which led him to revisit that country. Loaded with years, as he was with honour, he desired that his life should terminate as it had commenced; and he died, as he had lived, in the active service of his country.

Upon the death of Lord Cornwallis, Sir George Barlow* succeeded, by a provisional appointment, to the administration of the affairs of British India.

The instructions which he gave to Lord Lake for the conclusion of the treaty with Sindia differed nowise in principle from those given upon the same subject by his predecessor. He expressed, indeed, in his first communication to the commander-in-chief, his resolution to follow the steps of that nobleman; and his conviction, that the public interests would be best promoted by our throwing off, at the earliest practicable period, all connexion with the petty states west of the Jumna, limiting our boundary to that river, and a line of territory not exceeding eight or ten miles in breadth on its right bank; and trusting, in a great degree, for our future security, to the contests of our neighbours. Upon this principle, while he desired to be free of all defensive engagements

* Sir George Barlow was a civil servant of the Honourable Company. He recommended himself to the notice of his superiors by an able and honourable discharge of the various subordinate offices which he filled before he reached the high station of Governor-general. He was actively employed, under Lord Cornwallis, in introducing the code of regulations for the civil administration of the territories of Bengal; and filled the office of chief secretary to government under Lord Teignmouth and Lord Wellesley, before he was raised to the supreme council, of which he was a member during the four last years of the administration of the latter.

with Sindia, he expressed himself more desirous of a peace with Holkar than of the complete reduction of that chief.

On the 23rd of November, a treaty was concluded by the political agent* of the Governor-general (acting under the authority of Lord Lake), and Moonshee Kavel Nyne, whom Dowlut Row Sindia had appointed his agent, and vested with full powers. The following are the heads:—

Every part of the treaty of Surjee Azjengaum, except what might be altered by this treaty, was to remain in force.

Although the Honourable Company did not acknowledge that Sindia possessed any claim to Gohud and Gwalior, under the above-mentioned treaty, yet, from considerations of friendship, they agreed to cede to him Gwalior, and such parts of the territories of Gohud as were described in an accompanying schedule.

Sindia relinquished all claim to the pensions granted to different officers of his court by the original treaty of peace, to the amount of fifteen lacs annually.

The Company agreed to pay the arrears of those pensions up to the 31st of December, 1805; and the balance due upon the revenues of Dholpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah, up to the same date; making deductions on the following heads:—

* Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm.

1st. Pensions forfeited by Bappoo Sindia, and Sudasheo Row, by acts of hostility towards the British government, to be stopped from the date of their hostility.

2nd. Plunder of the British residency.

3rd. Cash advanced by Mr. Jenkins to parties of the Maharajah's horse.

4th. Charges of collection, &c., for the provinces of Dholpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah.

The river Chumbul* was to form the boundary between the two states, from the city of Kottah to the west, to the limits of the territories of Gohud to the east; Dowlut Row Sindia was to have no claims whatever to the northward of that river; and the Honourable Company, in like manner, to have no claims to the southward of that extent of its course. The Talook of Bhadek† and Soosepe-

* The Chumbul was not taken as a boundary from its being of any use as a barrier, but as a distinct line of demarcation; an object of the greatest consequence, to prevent future discussions with a power of the nature of that of a Mahratta chief. This article was considered by Lord Lake to be more essential, at the time when this treaty was concluded, from his conceiving that the maintenance of our alliance with the state of Jypore was, under the conduct which the Rajah had lately pursued, a matter of course.

† The small and unproductive districts of Bhadek and Sooseperarah, though to the northward of the Chumbul, were granted to the Company, as being on the banks of the Jumna, and preserving unbroken the communication from the province of Agra to Bundelcund.

rarah, which are on the banks of the Jumna, to remain, notwithstanding, in the possession of the Honourable Company.

By the preceding articles, Sindia resigned all claims and pretensions on the countries of Boondee, Sumedee, Dholpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah.

The Company granted to the Maharajah, personally and exclusively, the sum of four lacs of rupees annually; and assigned, within their territories in Hindustan, a jagheer, to the amount of two lacs of rupees per annum, to Baezah Bhye, wife to Dowlut Row Sindia; and another, of one lac per annum, to Chumnah Bhye, daughter of that chief.

The Company also engaged to enter into no treaties with the Rajahs of Odipore and Joudpore, and Kottah, or other chiefs, tributaries to Dowlut Row Sindia in Malwa, Mewar, or Marwar; and in no shape to interfere with the settlement which Sindia might make with those chiefs.

In the event of the conclusion of a peace with Jeswunt Row Holkar, the Company engaged not to restore to him, or desire to be restored to him, any of the possessions of the Holkar family in the province of Malwa, lying between the rivers Taptee and Chumbul, taken by Dowlut Row Sindia; nor to interfere in the disposal of those provinces; but to consider Sindia at liberty to make what arrangement he pleased with Jeswunt Row Holkar, or any branch of the family, respecting its claims to any tribute or territorial possessions north of the

river Taptee, and south of the river Chumbul: with a clear understanding that the British government would not take part in any dispute or war which might be the consequence of such arrangement.

A stipulation was made in this treaty, by which Sindia agreed never to admit Surjee Row Gautka* to share in his councils, or to hold any public employment under his government.

In addition to the jagheers given to Sindia and his family by this treaty, estates to an amount of upwards of three lacs of rupees were given to the chief officers of his court; but, calculating the cessions to the northward of the Chumbul, which Sindia had made by it, at seven lacs of rupees, and the jagheer or pension which was to be assigned to the Ranah of Gohud, at three lacs, the Company

* This atrocious character had been declared a public enemy by the British government; and this article, which was a complete vindication of our insulted honour, was confirmed, and one of a similar nature inserted in the treaty concluded with Holkar: but a few months afterwards, on a report that Surjee Row Gautka was about to join Holkar, the abrogation of these articles was directed, as it was feared they might lead to an embarrassment, which, agreeably to the policy of the day, it was deemed prudent to avoid. The necessity of this article, and the impolicy of its abrogation, can be judged only by those intimately acquainted with the construction of governments such as Sindia's. Where power, like revenue, is often divided into shares, and servants are frequently independent of their master, the former must become personally responsible for acts in a degree that those ignorant of the interior frame of such a state cannot understand.

gained by the treaty, in lieu of the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, a revenue of upwards of eight lacs of rupees per annum, which was nearly the amount of the subsidy settled in the treaty with the Ranah of Gohud.

Sir George Barlow did not altogether approve this treaty; and though he expressed his high satisfaction at the readiness with which Dowlut Row Sindia had consented to withdraw from any concern in the affairs of Hindustan to the northward of the Chumbul, he stated his most decided conviction, that the actual condition of our affairs confirmed the policy and expediency of the principles upon which he had it in contemplation to effect a final arrangement with respect to the chieftains and territories west of the Jumna. He was fully satisfied, he informed Lord Lake, that, when these arrangements should be carried into execution, they would constitute a degree of security against all hostile attempts which could not be augmented, though it might be impaired, by the preservation of our alliances with the petty states west of the Jumna.

Sir George Barlow thought that, with the exception of the defensive alliances subsisting between the British government and the great powers of India, it was for the interest and security of the Company to limit all relations with the surrounding states to those of general amity; and to trust the safety of its territorial possessions to the supre-

macy of our power, a well-regulated system of defence, and a revival of those contests and commotions which formerly prevailed among the states of Hindustan.

Under such impressions, the Governor-general conceived that the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty might preclude the accomplishment of this general system, as they imposed upon us an obligation to protect from Sindia's encroachments all the states and chieftains to the north of the Chumbul, from Kottah to the Junna.

In order to remedy the inconvenience which the Governor-general apprehended from this arrangement, he transmitted declaratory articles, to the following purport, to be annexed to the treaty:—

1st. That Sindia ceded to the Honourable Company all the territory north of the river Chumbul, which was ceded him by the 7th article of the treaty of Serjee Azjengaum; that is to say, the whole of the districts of Dholpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah; and the Company gave up all claim to any rule, tribute, or possessions, on the south bank of that river. The Talooks, however, of Bhadek and Sooseperarah, on the banks of the Junna, remained in possession of the Company.

2d. That the Company, from friendship to Sindia, agreed to pay him the annual sum of four lacs of rupees. Also, that they assigned, within their territories in Hindustan, a jagheer, amounting to a revenue of two lacs of rupees per annum, to Baezah

Bhye, the wife of Sindia; and a jagheer, amounting to one lac of rupees per annum, to Chumnah Bhye, the daughter of that chief.

The intention of these articles was, as has been stated, to supersede the operation of the fifth, sixth, and seventh articles of the treaty; and they were to be delivered to Moonshee Kavel Nyne with the ratified treaty of peace.

The Governor-general was also desirous of ceding the districts of Tonk-Rampoorah to Sindia, in lieu of the four lacs of rupees per annum to which that chief became personally entitled by the treaty; and he conceived this cession more desirable, as the territory in question was formerly possessed by Holkar, and its cession to Sindia would tend to confirm and perpetuate an opposition of interests between those chieftains.

The remaining parts of the treaty were entirely approved by the Governor-general; who stated in his despatch, that, after the maturest deliberation, he was satisfied of the policy and expediency of dissolving the alliance with the state of Jypore; but would defer to a subsequent despatch the communication of the mode in which this arrangement ought to be carried into execution.

Lord Lake immediately communicated the declaratory articles to Moonshee Kavel Nyne; and proposed the exchange of Tonk-Rampoorah for the annual pecuniary stipend. To this proposition, however, Sindia would not agree, Kavel Nyne said;

and added his own conviction, that his master would not accept the districts of Tonk-Rampoorah if given gratis, as such an act would form an insurmountable bar to any reconciliation between him and Holkar. Kavel Nyne earnestly recommended, that the declaratory articles should not be sent to Dowlut Row Sindia, till a British resident had reached the court of that chief, who could furnish the requisite explanations, and satisfy Sindia's mind with regard to the policy which had dictated them. As there appeared much good sense in this opinion, Lord Lake informed the Governor-general that he had delayed their transmission; and took this opportunity of again urging to Sir George Barlow the necessity of some modification of the general principles laid down for his guidance. Lord Lake, in this letter, dwelt upon the grounds which had led him to insist upon the Chumbul being the line of demarcation between the two states; and observed, that the territories of the Boondee Rajah, which were immediately to the northward of the Chumbul (opposite to Kottah), though small both in revenue and extent, were very important, as they commanded a principal pass into Hindustan; and that the Company was, in his opinion, bound to defend and protect that Rajah for his uniform friendly conduct, and particularly for the great aid which he had the courage to give Colonel Monson during his retreat; by which conduct he had exposed himself to the vengeance of Jeswunt Row

Holkar, who was known to cherish the most inveterate hostility against this petty chief. From this fact, Lord Lake observed that he had always imagined, that under any arrangement which might eventually be made with Jeswunt Row Holkar, it would be difficult, consistently with a due regard for the honour and reputation of the British government, to give the Boondee Rajah over to the resentment of that chief; and he had therefore thought it would be desirable to release him altogether from Mahratta power and influence.

Lord Lake stated in this despatch, that he had viewed the assent given by Sindia, to retire altogether from Hindustan northward of the Chumbul, as an unequivocal and complete acknowledgment of our established power and superiority; and gave it as his opinion, that no secure or honourable peace could be concluded with Holkar, without a similar concession; for though it was possible that the British territories might experience an increased security from the remote contests of the principal Mahratta chiefs, he was satisfied, that if Sindia and Holkar were allowed to renew their claims upon any of the states immediately west of the Jumna, and to mix in their disputes, there would be serious danger of reviving ambitious hopes which were now completely extinguished, and of causing another contest for that supremacy which was now so fully acknowledged.

These opinions had no effect whatever in chang-

ing, or even modifying, the resolutions of the Governor-general; who, though he admitted the great attention which was due to the local experience of Lord Lake, deemed it his duty to adhere to the general principles by which he had determined to regulate his conduct in this proceeding; and the declaratory articles were forwarded from Sir George Barlow to Dowlut Row Sindia, with a letter explanatory of their nature and object.

During the period of these discussions, Lord Lake was in pursuit of Jeswunt Row Holkar, whose last campaign was only a flight before the British army; which, leaving our own provinces, pursued him as far as the banks of the Beeah*, where Holkar, reduced to the extreme of distress, sent agents to Lord Lake, to solicit peace. The following is an abstract of the conditions which were offered for his acceptance:—

That he should renounce all right to the districts of Tonk-Rampoorah, Boondee, &c., and places north of the Chumbul.

The Company would agree not to interfere with any Rajahs, or other dependants of the Holkar family, south of the Chumbul; and to restore, eighteen months after the conclusion of the treaty, Chandore, Gaulnah, and other forts and districts south of the Taptee and Goudavery, belonging to

* The Beeah, one of the five rivers which run through the country of the Punjab, is the Hyphases of the Greeks.

the Holkar family, which we had conquered and occupied, provided the conduct of Jeswunt Row Holkar was such as to satisfy the English government of his amicable intentions towards us and our allies.

Holkar was to renounce all claims upon Kooch and Bundelcund; and all claims whatever upon the British government and its allies.

He also engaged to entertain no Europeans in his service, without the consent of the British government.

Surjee Row Gautka was never to be admitted into his councils or service.

Jeswunt Row Holkar was, on these conditions, to be allowed to return to Hindustan; but a route was prescribed, by which he was to avoid injuring the territory of the British government, and its allies.

After a short negotiation between the agent* of the Governor-general and the vakeels of Holkar, these articles, with a very few and unessential modifications, were reduced into a treaty, which was confirmed by the latter on the 7th of January. The terms of the peace being, in fact, dictated by the Commander-in-chief, the treaty was of course formed agreeably to the general tenour of the instructions of the Governor-general.

Sir George Barlow considered this treaty as

* Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm.

highly honourable and advantageous to the British government. He had instructed the Commander-in-chief to insist upon the cession of Tonk-Rampoorah, with a view to an arrangement with Sindia respecting these provinces; but, as he found that impossible, and that no state or chief would venture to take them without a guarantee, we were, he conceived, reduced to the necessity of either consenting to such guarantee, or of keeping them ourselves; and, as neither of these measures were consistent with those general principles of policy which he had resolved to pursue, he determined to annul the provisions of the second article of the treaty, and restore them to Holkar; and for that purpose he returned the treaty, with a declaratory article annexed, by which a re-cession of these valuable provinces was made to him; and the Boondee Rajah was also abandoned. Lord Lake endeavoured, but in vain, to alter the sentiments of the Governor-general relative to this principle of concession to Sindia and Holkar; and to prevail upon him not to withdraw our protection from those petty chiefs, whom he thought entitled to it by their conduct and attachment. He was particularly desirous, for reasons before stated, to obtain protection for the Rajah of Boondee; but Sir George Barlow was inflexible, and considered that any deviation from the course he had adopted would be not only inconsistent with the system of

policy which he judged it his duty to pursue, but could not fail of producing at an early period the most serious political embarrassment.

The moment Lord Lake received intimation that the new Governor-general intended to dissolve the alliance with the Rajah of Jypore, his lordship represented that, though the Rajah's former conduct had been directly contrary to good faith, especially upon Holkar's advance into Hindustan, yet his co-operation in the approaching campaign had appeared of such great importance as had induced his lordship to endeavour, by promises of entirely overlooking the past, and by assurances of continued friendship and protection, to excite him to a zealous fulfilment of his engagements; that this object had been fully accomplished, and a British army, under Major-general Jones, enabled, by the Rajah's aid, and the ample supplies which his country furnished, to maintain a position of the greatest consequence to the success of the war; that, from the communications which he had received from General Jones, he did not doubt that if Holkar had attempted to retreat, as was expected, in the direction of that general's position, the Rajah's troops, who had joined his camp, would have co-operated efficiently; and that the sincerity and good faith with which the state of Jypore had acted at this crisis was most strongly corroborated by General Jones, which had led his lordship to address the Rajah in a style he never would have used had he not conceived that

the circumstances now set forth would change the intentions which government previously entertained of dissolving the alliance.

Lord Lake stated his opinion, that although there might be sufficient grounds for opening a negotiation to new-model the alliance with the Jypore state, or even to effect a dissolution of all engagements between the two states, he doubted how far we had a right, after what had passed, to dissolve it in a peremptory manner; because, as such a proceeding would expose the Rajah of Jypore to an instant attack from both Sindia and Holkar, it would, unless it rested upon clear and undisputed grounds, make an impression among the states of India highly unfavourable to the reputation of the British government. Lord Lake, in this communication, referred the Governor-general to the conferences* between his agent † and the vakeels of Holkar, regarding the tribute which

* Holkar's vakeels demanded, with no slight degree of pertinacity, the cession of the Jypore and Boondee tributes; and one of them, speaking of the former, stated, that he no doubt would continue to enjoy the friendship of the English, as he had disgraced himself, to please that nation, by giving up to their vengeance the unfortunate Vizier Ali, who had sought his protection. The vakeel was very severely rebuked by the agent of the Governor-general for this insolent reflection on the conduct of an ally of the British government, who, upon the occasion alluded to, had delivered up a murderer, whom it would have been infamy to shelter.

† Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm.

their master claimed from the Rajahs of Boondee and Jypore; and stated his expectation, that Sir George Barlow would agree with him, (after he had seen the report of these conferences,) that neither of these points could have been conceded to that chief in the negotiation without injury to the character of the British government. His lordship concluded by expressing his earnest hope that, if the Governor-general should ultimately resolve upon the dissolution of the alliance with the Jypore state, he would defer the execution of the measure till Holkar had passed the territories of the Rajah, and reached his own dominions in Malwa, to which, by the treaty, he was pledged to return instantly.

Lord Lake had before communicated his sentiments respecting the policy of this measure; but, as his opinions differed from those of Sir George Barlow, he confined himself, upon this occasion, to the question of faith. His arguments, however, made no impression upon the mind of the Governor-general, who continued to think, after the receipt of this communication, as he had done before, that, from the former conduct of the Rajah of Jypore, we had obtained a right to dissolve the alliance, which was not at all invalidated by his subsequent adoption of measures recommended to him more forcibly by considerations of his own safety and convenience than by any returning sense of good faith;

and considering the question of faith in this view, he could not, he observed, hesitate in dissolving an alliance, which was likely to include much future inconvenience and embarrassment.

The English government had given a proof of its liberality towards the Jypore state, the Governor-general thought, in not dissolving its alliance pending the negotiation with Sindia, when it might have derived advantage from the cession of the tribute of Jypore to that chief: with respect to the period of adopting this act, he conceived the Company at liberty to choose that which was most convenient; and he had resolved upon its instant dissolution, from an apprehension that, as Holkar passed the territories of Jypore upon his return, he might commit some excesses which we should be obliged to notice if the alliance was not previously dissolved.

In conformity with this resolution, Sir George Barlow directed the resident at Jypore to announce the dissolution of the defensive alliance; informing the Rajah at the same time, that the English government would be most happy to maintain with him general relations of amity. The resident was at the same time desired to deliver to the Rajah a letter from the Governor-general, explanatory of the grounds upon which this measure had been adopted. The justice of these grounds, however, was warmly disputed by the court of Jypore,

which, under a lively sense of imminent danger, to which it became exposed from this measure, almost forgot, for a moment, that temper and respect which it owed to the British character. One of the principal agents of the Rajah of Jypore, in a conference with Lord Lake at Delhi, after stating all that his prince had desired him to say upon the occasion, had the boldness to observe, that this was the first time since the English government was established in India, “that it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience.”

Sir George Barlow was equally anxious to dissolve the defensive alliances which we had contracted with the minor states of Bhurretpore and Macherry, as he was that with Jypore. But as those Rajahs had given no pretext for this dissolution, without their consent, he directed a negotiation to be opened with them for the purpose, and authorized Lord Lake to make a considerable cession of territory, as a means of prevailing upon them to relinquish their right to our protection.

Lord Lake, however, was induced by a variety of urgent considerations, to defer offering any proposition of such a nature to these Rajahs; and he stated, in the most forcible manner, his fears that the very rumour of such a project being in the contemplation of the British government would again involve in anarchy and confusion countries which had been settled at much expense of blood

and treasure. The Governor-general declared that, although he was quite resolved upon the adoption of this measure, he did not desire to have it precipitated. Subsequent communications* occasioned him to delay its execution; fortunately for the public interests, the question was not again agitated; and the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurret-pore, with other chiefs settled in their vicinity, continued, in the faithful fulfilment of their engagements, to form an essential part of the strength which we derive from the maintenance of the territories to the west of the Jumna.

So far Sir George Barlow acted upon those principles of neutral policy to which Lord Cornwallis had professed his attachment; but a crisis occurred at Hyderabad which compelled him to deviate from that system. Meer Allum, the able minister of the Nizam, whom we had for many years supported, had lost, by his attachment to our interests, the confidence of his weak and almost incompetent sovereign. After many efforts, however, he had effected an apparent reconciliation; and the Nizam had agreed that Rajah Mohiput Ram, a Hindu chief of influence, who had intrigued against the minister, should be sent from

* The Governor-general's agent, Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm, when he returned to Calcutta, gave a very full statement of the actual condition of the countries to the west of the Jumna.

court to his government of Berar. This was done; but it was soon discovered that the Nizam was insincere in his professions towards Meer Allum, and that he countenanced a plot carried on by the exiled favourite, the main objects of which were the ruin of Meer Allum, and the subversion of the alliance with the British government. The nature of this conspiracy, and the character of those associated for its execution, which included all the discontented soldiery, required prompt decision.

Sir George Barlow had to determine whether that system of non-interference, which he had pronounced it to be his desire and intention to pursue, should be rigidly maintained, or a departure made from it in this particular case. He recorded*, in a very able minute, the reasons which compelled him to adopt the latter course, as the only means of preventing the dissolution of the alliance with the government of Hyderabad.

“ In this extraordinary conjuncture,” he observes, “ no arguments were required to demonstrate the danger of leaving, in a condition of ostensible solidity but real decay, the foundations of our alliance with the state of Hyderabad, for, in the event of a renewal of war, not only would the resources and forces of that state claimable by treaty be withheld, but our subsidiary force be virtually placed in the country of an enemy, and, conse-

* Vide Sir George Barlow's Minute, 2nd October, 1806.

quently, be exposed to all the hazards of such a situation, without the advantages of the occupation of posts, the establishments of depôts, or the security of communication with the Company's territory.

“ There is no alternative, therefore, but either to abandon the alliance, or to make an effort to replace it on its just and proper foundation, by a direct and decided interposition of that weight and influence which our relative situations should enable us to command.”

Sir George Barlow next examined the question whether, under the supposition that the Nizam was averse to the continuance of the alliance in the true spirit of its formation, the British government were required on principles of public justice to dissolve it.

On this point he observed, that “ the object of this alliance was to combine, in perpetuity, the interests of the two states, to concentrate their strength for their mutual safety, and for the maintenance of peace, and participation of the hazard and advantages of unavoidable war ; that its stipulations were not conditional, but absolute ; that it became interwoven in the system of the respective governments, and complicated with the relations which both governments, separately and conjointly, bore to other states, and that new relations and new obligations of public faith and honour had been engrafted upon it, and had grown up with it ;

that if either party were to assume the right of abandoning the alliance at its own pleasure, it would, in fact, become the arbiter of the interests, the honour, and security of the other, insomuch as its arrangements and obligations were founded on this alliance."

Reviewing all the consequences which would follow a dissolution of the alliance with the state of Hyderabad, he observed, "that by such an event the very foundations of our power and ascendancy in the political scale in India would be subverted; that it would be the signal and the instrument of the downfall of the remaining fabric of our political relations; that the power and resources which we have now a right to command for our support and security would be turned against us; that the hopes and ambition of the turbulent and discontented would be excited and animated by such a dereliction from our strength and influence; and by such a confession of weakness and timidity on our part, that the territorial cessions acquired under the treaty of Hyderabad, for the maintenance of the subsidiary force, must necessarily be relinquished, if the subsidiary force were withdrawn. If" (added Sir George Barlow) "to recede from power and influence is at all times dangerous, how much more so would it be at present, when the motives of our moderation have been industriously misrepresented, and when the relinquishment of the alliance would

necessarily corroborate those artful and malicious insinuations by which his highness's flagitious advisers have endeavoured to inspire him with a contempt of our power, and a persuasion of our weakness and our fears."

The measures which this view of the subject induced Sir George Barlow to adopt, and which were alike recommended by wisdom and policy, evinced in a very strong manner the utter impracticability of a retreat from that position among the states in India to which we had advanced. It was clear that we could neither abandon our influence nor our power, without the ground being occupied by enemies, who, incapable of understanding the motives of our conduct, would refer to weakness what was the result of moderation, and impute to alarm what was the effect of confidence. Such mistakes and misrepresentations could have but one result, that of encouraging insult and attack, and of accelerating the admitted evils of war and conquest. The reasons which Sir George Barlow stated for this wise deviation from a system of non-interference merit particular attention, as they exhibit, on the best authority, the narrow basis upon which that policy rested.

"I am aware," he observes, "that the adoption of such measures involves a deviation from that system of non-interference in the internal concerns of his highness's administration, which has been established as a principle of wise and equitable

policy; but the adoption of that system necessarily presupposed a just conception, on the part of his highness, of the true principles and solid advantages of the alliance, and a sincere disposition to maintain it. It presupposed a degree of firmness, discernment, and dignity, on his part, which would lead him to reject the councils of profligate and interested advisers, who would endeavour to persuade him, that the obligations of dependance and degradation are synonymous, and would urge him to renounce it. Unsupported by these just and reasonable presumptions, that system is deprived of its sole foundations, and the change is adopted, not from choice, but necessity. It is not a renunciation of our general principles of policy, but is produced by the utter impracticability of applying these principles to the condition of his highness's government, without the certain loss of all the benefits expected from an adherence to them. It is the adoption of a measure of security against great and impending dangers!"

A policy similar to that which he had adopted towards the state of Hyderabad, led Sir George Barlow to oppose himself to the wishes of the authorities in England regarding the changes they desired to make in the treaty of Bassein. That treaty continued to be viewed by them on the ground of the same narrow reasoning which had led them at first to object to it, as the fruitful source of our multiplied embarrassments, and they

had in consequence suggested that it should be modified, if not dissolved. The impolicy and danger of measures which would have added, to the retraction from treaties, the loss of revenue and of power, were strongly pointed out by the Governor-general, who, in a despatch* to the secret committee observes, “before we close this address, we deem it proper to advert to the observations contained in your honourable committee’s despatch, on the subject of modifying the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein.

“Any relaxation in the stipulations of that treaty would be gratifying to the Mahrattas, in proportion to the hope which it might afford of weakening, and ultimately subverting, the influence of the British government in the state of Poonah. The endeavours, therefore, which under such circumstances would be made by the principal Mahratta chieftains for the accomplishment of that object, would evidently occasion much embarrassment to the British government—would produce the necessary alternative of either suffering these endeavours to take effect, or of interfering in the intrigues of the Durbar of Poonah, in a manner inconsistent with the principles which we profess to maintain; and would, probably, involve us in disputes with the principal Mahratta chieftains, and lay the foundations of interminable troubles. We are

* This despatch is dated the 1st June, 1806.

satisfied that, as far as respects the object of reconciling the Mahratta chieftains to our connexions with the Paishwah, there is no alternative but either to maintain the alliance on its present basis, or to abandon it altogether; the former secures the advantages, for the attainment of which the alliance was originally formed. The latter, admitting its practicability consistently with public faith, would only serve to revive the ambition of the Mahratta states, and afford additional means of prosecuting hostile designs against the British government, with a view not only to the recovery of the conquered territory, but to the subversion of the British power—in the prosecution of which the Mahrattas would possess the means almost uncontrolled of efficient co-operation with a French force.

“Your honourable committee appears to suppose, that the suggested modifications of the treaty of Bassein would be consistent with the wishes of the Paishwah. Your honourable committee, however, will observe, from a reference to the correspondence with the resident at Poonah, that whatever may have been the original reluctance of his highness to accede to all the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, he now considers his welfare to depend entirely on the maintenance of those stipulations, and we are satisfied that the Paishwah has no desire whatever for the modification of the treaty. That of the two propositions suggested to

your honourable committee, he would receive with indifference the proposition for the abrogation of the article which prohibits him from entering into any negotiation with a foreign state, without the knowledge and concurrence of the British government; and that the proposition for the removal of the subsidiary force to a position without the limits of his dominions, would be received by his highness with alarm, and would be decidedly rejected. With reference to these facts, it only remains to consider the dissolution of the alliance, and the suggested modifications in a practical point of view.

“ With regard to the dissolution of the alliance, assuming, as is undoubted, the Paishwah’s solicitude for its continuance, it becomes a question whether, consistently with public faith, the British government would renounce the alliance, even though such renunciation should be accompanied by the restitution of all the rights and territorial acquisitions obtained by the treaty of Bassein, and its subsequent modifications. The restoration of these rights and acquisitions, however, would certainly be indispensable, under the supposition that, consistently with public faith, we could declare the dissolution of the alliance without his highness’s consent.

“ When your honourable committee adverts to the importance of the rights, and the territory acquired under the treaty of Bassein, your honour-

able committee will judge of the injury and embarrassment which would result from the surrender of them,—considered not only with reference to their political advantages, and to the actual resources of the ceded territory, but also to the danger of unlimited concession to the chieftains lately in arms against us; for in favour of their views, and not those of the Paishwah, the concession would in fact be made.

“ But in the dissolution of the alliance with the state of Poonah, the question of our public faith is involved not only with the Paishwah, but with his highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, the treaty of Bassein containing stipulations in favour of his highness, of which the foundation* was laid in the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in October, 1800, and which, by anticipation, are confirmed by the provisions of the secret and separate articles of that treaty.”

With respect to the suggested modifications of the treaty of Bassein (still adverting to the disinclination of the Paishwah to the introduction of any change in its existing stipulations), it is obvious that “ his highness’s consent to such modifications could alone be obtained by sacrifices or concessions adequate, in his opinion, to the benefits he would relinquish; and we have already stated

* This incontrovertible fact is in itself fatal to the arguments of all those who, after approving the treaty of Hyderabad, in 1800, disapproved of that of Bassein, in 1802.

to your honourable committee our opinion of the evils that would result from those modifications !”

The Indian government in England, in their anxiety to counteract the measures of Lord Wellesley, had committed to Lord Cornwallis, when drooping under age and infirmities, the task of introducing an opposite system of policy. During the short period that nobleman lived after his arrival in India, he evinced every disposition to carry their wishes into effect. In addition to the overtures made towards negotiations for withdrawing* as much as possible from the intimate alliances we had formed with some of the principal native states, and to free ourselves from the obligations and protection contracted with minor chiefs, it was contemplated to abandon the

* That eminent public officer, the late Sir Barrey Close, in a letter to Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm, under date the 17th August, 1805, comments with great severity on the system introduced by Lord Cornwallis, and adopted by his successor. “The tenour of Lord Cornwallis’s letter to you (he observes) agrees much with the principles expressed in his public despatch to me: that is, that we are encumbered with alliances, and all we have obtained is a burden to us. Our alarms at our successes put me in mind of the Poligars, who, after beating us from a breach, generally take fright, and run out at the opposite side of the fort. From present reasoning, it would appear that we never can be safe or prosperous, unless we have an armament frowning on our frontier. What a pity it is that we have not the French again at Hyderabad, and at Seringapatam, and at Allighur, and all the ports of the western side of India open for French regiments. But, in truth, I am sick when I think of present principles !”

greater part of our possessions west of the Jumna, as likely to prove a source of trouble and danger, instead of profit and security. It is not difficult to calculate what would have been the results, had these plans been carried into execution.

We have the best grounds for forming a judgment upon this point, from the events which almost instantly followed the dissolution of our recently-established ties with the Rajpoot and Seikh chieftains; but however much Sir George Barlow was disposed to pursue the course prescribed for his predecessor, he wisely withheld from application to the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah the principles of non-interference upon which he had acted in Hindustan. The line he pursued towards those states, and the opinions he gave relative to the character and value of our connexion with them, and of the imminent danger that would attend the proposed modifications of subsisting ties, do honour to his discernment and judgment. Stronger evidence than what is furnished by his recorded sentiments upon this subject could not be brought to show the impracticability, as well a impolicy, of the schemes which were at this period entertained for effecting a change in our whole system relating to the political administration of our empire in India.

CHAPTER VI.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD MINTO.

Condition of the several States of India on Lord Minto's arrival.—Adherence to the stipulations of Treaties inculcated from England.—Extension of political Connexions deprecated.—Affairs of Hyderabad—of Poonah and Mahratta chieftains.—Ameer Khan menaces Berar.—Incursions of the Pindaries.—Difficulties of neutral Policy.—Affairs with the Court of Lahore.—Missions to Persia—and Cabul.—Excesses of the Ghoorkas.—Turbulent Chiefs restrained.—Relations with Oude—Delhi—Baroda.—Lord Minto's sentiments concerning Balance of Power in India.—He appeases Ferment at Madras—makes the conquest of Java—returns to England and dies.—Peculiarity of his Administration.

LORD MINTO reached India in the month of July, 1807. A glance at the actual condition of the principal native states, at the period of his arrival, will be an useful preliminary to an account of the political measures of his government.

The situation of the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah has been depicted at the close of the preceding chapter.

Though two years only had elapsed since the treaty of peace with the Mahratta chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, that short period had been sufficient to develop the character of the policy we had

pursued in concluding it. Its operation had proved most baneful to the countries of Malwa and Rajpootana. To the number of the uncontrolled hordes by which they had before been ravaged, were now added all the irregular horse which we had disbanded at the termination of the war. Such elements as these could not remain at rest. Success swelled their ranks. The very desolation they carried along with them brought them recruits, and in a few years the flame of predatory war had spread far beyond those limits within which some had vainly imagined it might waste itself. The Rajah of Berar was among the first sufferers from the excesses of these freebooters. The army of Holkar, through the insanity of its chief, was broken into bands of plunderers, and Sindia sought employment and support for a large portion of his troops amid these scenes of anarchy and confusion.

This is not the place to enter into any detail concerning the chiefs under whom these plunderers acted. Suffice it to say, that, whether they were commanded by generals professing nominal obedience to Sindia or Holkar, whether serving under the banners of Ameer Khan, or those of the Pindaree leaders Cheetoo, and Kureem Khan, their actions were the same; and there appeared less prospect of termination to the miseries they inflicted from the sordid and base motives by which they

were impelled, and the total absence of that ambition and love of glory which, seeking to heal as well as to wound, and to build up as well as to destroy, scatter some rays of hope over a suffering land, and lead the peaceable inhabitants of a country, in their anticipation of future security, to dwell with less anguish on the evils of present conquest.

The situation of the ancient Rajpoot states of Odipore, Joudpore, Jypore, and other principalities, became at this period truly deplorable: but their condition and sentiments cannot be painted in truer colours than by using the terms of a despatch from the resident* at Delhi, who, advertising to their repeated applications for the aid of the British government, observes: "When I reply to these various applications, I find it difficult to obtain even a confession, that the moderate policy of the British government is just. People do not scruple to assert, that they have a right to the protection of the British government. They say, that there always has existed some power in India to which peaceable states submitted, and, in return, obtained its protection; that then their own governments were maintained in respectability, and they were secure against the invasions of upstart chiefs and armies of lawless banditti. That the British

* Sir C. Metcalfe's despatch, June 20, 1816.

government now occupies the place of the great protecting power, and is the natural guardian of the peaceable and weak: but, owing to its refusal to use its influence for their protection, the peaceable and weak states are continually exposed to oppressions and cruelties of robbers and plunderers, the most licentious and abandoned of mankind."

The countries of the independent states of the Vizier of Oude, of the government of Baroda, and of the Rajahs of Mysore and Travancore, continued tranquil, no essential changes having taken place in their condition. The province of Bundelcund, which, on its first acquisition, had presented so unpromising an aspect, was every day improving, and its numerous chiefs, under the confidence arising from British protection, were rapidly changing their habits, and becoming subordinate and peaceable. The same effects had been produced by similar causes among the princes and chiefs in the Duab*, and to the westward of the Jumna. All those who had been confirmed in old possessions, or who had received new grants, continued in a state of tranquillity: but the territories of the Seikh chieftains, from whom our protection had been withdrawn, were in a state of alarm and disturbance.

Such was the situation in which Lord Minto

* Duab, literally, two waters, is the name of the country lying between the Jumna and Ganges.

found the different states of India. The marked feature in this nobleman's character was moderation; but that was combined with firmness and capacity; and it was expected that, while he improved our actual possessions, and maintained those connexions to which our faith was pledged, he would refrain, unless compelled by urgent necessity, from any line of conduct which might in its consequences involve the state in war or embarrassment.

It is here necessary to remark, that the controlling government in England had not been altogether satisfied with the measures pursued by Sir George Barlow, at the conclusion of the war with Holkar. Doubts had been expressed as to the observance of good faith in the breaking of our alliance with Jypore. The court of directors, in a despatch* to Bengal, admitted that the Rajah of that principality had failed in the performance of his engagements with the Company during the war with Holkar; but, as it appeared that he had furnished assistance to our arms towards the conclusion of the war, at the instance of Lord Lake, and under an expectation, held out by his lordship, that the protection of the British government would be continued to him, they were of opinion that the justice of the dissolution of the alliance was extremely questionable. They con-

* September 2nd, 1807.

ceived that the Rajah was at least entitled to expect that this step should have been accompanied with some arrangement under the Company's mediation for the adjustment of all existing claims and disputes between him and Sindia, to whom that alliance must certainly have rendered him obnoxious. "We do not," they observe, "mean to direct the renewal of the engagements which have been abrogated; nor do we see how the interests of the Rajah of Jypore can be served by any step which can be now taken on our part, without the risk of producing a new war in Hindustan; a risk which we do not feel ourselves called upon to incur, but think it right upon this occasion to express our hopes, that our supreme government in India will take care, in all its transactions with the native princes, to preserve our character for fidelity to our allies from falling into disrepute, and will evince a strict regard in the prosecution of its political views to the principles of justice and generosity."

The government in England had also shown that it was alive to the evil impressions that might result from the Governor-general having rescinded the article of the treaty, concluded by Lord Lake, which precluded Sindia's minister, Sirjee Row Ghatkia, from all employment, on the ground of his treacherous and atrocious attack on the British residency. The court of directors, in approving

this proceeding, expressed a "hope that neither in the motives by which the supreme government was actuated, nor in the communications with Sindia, any just ground was afforded for a suspicion on the part of the Mahratta chieftains, that the British government entertained any dread of the consequences which might possibly result from insisting on a scrupulous adherence to the stipulations of treaties."

With these just sentiments regarding the bad consequences which might arise from any measures that weakened reliance on our faith, or cast a shadow of doubt on our power to fulfil our engagements, there existed a strong desire to endeavour, by every means, to avoid further extension of our political connexions. A hope seems still to have been indulged, that peace might be preserved without our assuming that paramount power which, the more it was within our grasp, the more alarm it appeared to create in the minds of those who contemplated it at a distance, and saw all its evils and dangers (which were many) through an exaggerated medium. How far it was yet possible to arrest our progress, and to stop short of the assumption of the supremacy, if not of the sovereignty of India, was an experiment it was desired to try; and the trial could not have been intrusted to abler or safer hands than those of Lord Minto. The result of this nobleman's unwearied efforts to combine

strict obedience to the wishes and instructions of the authorities in England with a careful preservation of the great interests committed to his charge, claims our particular attention, not more from its immediate influence on his own administration, than on that of his successor.

No alteration took place, in our treaties, with the Nizam of the Deckan, during Lord Minto's government; but there were, nevertheless, some important changes in the political condition of that state which materially affected the character of our relations with it.

Meer Allum, who had been confirmed in the administration of affairs, died in the latter end of the year, 1808; an event not more unfortunate for the prince and his country, than for the British government. For upwards of thirty years, this nobleman had taken a lead in the administration of affairs in the Deckan. Throughout the whole of that period, he had been the avowed and able advocate of the alliance with the English, and the reputation of the nation was advanced by the support of a minister whose views were liberal, and extended far beyond those of the generality of his countrymen.

At the death of Meer Allum, there were several competitors for the vacant office, and much correspondence took place between the Nizam and the Governor-general, which terminated in the succes-

sion of Moneer ul Mulk, a Mahommedan Omrah, to the name of minister, and of Chand u Lal to its duties under the appellation of Dewan.

This arrangement, which was a compromise between the wishes of the English government, to raise Chand u Lal, and of the Nizam, who favoured Moneer ul Mulk, was confirmed by a written pledge on the part of the latter, to allow all affairs of state to be conducted by his Dewan; but this engagement did not prevent his making every effort to obtain the substance of that power of which he had the name; and his intrigues, combined with the conduct of the Nizam, and the want of weight and dignity in the Dewan, tended to create much embarrassment in the affairs of Hyderabad.

A despatch had been received from the Indian administration in England, under date September 14th, 1808, which, while it approved the line of conduct adopted by Sir George Barlow, dwelt upon the necessity of a strict observance of the principle of abstaining from all concern in the internal affairs of the state of Hyderabad, further than the prosecution of the plan which had been commenced to form the army of the Nizam; a measure which was deemed alike essential for the interests of that prince and of the English government, and which derived, in their opinion, additional importance from its being calculated to subvert the views of the enemies of the alliance. In conformity with these

instructions, the commanding influence of the British government, at Hyderabad, was exclusively directed to the reform of the military establishment. Corps were disciplined by British officers, and a regular army sprung up, organized in all its branches by the British resident.

The Dewan, who personally derived great support from this force, implicitly acquiesced in every proposition which the resident made for the appointment of officers, and for the pay and equipment of the new battalions. In return for this, and his steady adherence to the engagements of the defensive alliance, he was protected by our influence and power from the attacks of his numerous enemies, and left to control, as he thought best, the internal government of the country; the prosperity of which began early to decline under a system which had no object but revenue, and under which, neither regard for rank, nor desire for popularity existing, the nobles were degraded and the people oppressed. The prince (of whose sanity doubts had often been entertained) lapsed into a state of gloomy discontent; and while the Dewan, his relations, a few favourites and money-brokers flourished, the good name of the British nation suffered; for it was said, and with justice, that our support of the actual administration freed the minister and his executive officers from those salutary fears which act as a restraint upon the most despotic rulers.

The above is a strong, but true picture of the condition of the Hyderabad government. The unhappy result of those arrangements which the fear of greater evils had led him to confirm, appears to have been felt and deplored by Lord Minto; but the remedy was most difficult, without overstepping the limits prescribed for his observance; and the consequence was, that no effectual effort was made to change this state of affairs during the course of his administration.

At Poonah, there occurred no material alteration during the government of Lord Minto. The Paishwah showed on several occasions a disposition to revive the federative relations of the Mahratta states, which was repressed by the Governor-general. The only question requiring decided interference was that of those feudal chiefs, termed Southern Jahgeerdars. From the day of the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, the question of the duties of these chiefs had been a subject of irritating discussion. Seeing the probability of its leaving a source of future trouble, General Wellesley*, after the campaign of 1803, had anxiously desired to have it early investigated and settled. After many delays, this settlement was effected by Lord Minto, a short time previous to his quitting India. The subject, as connected with our conduct towards Bajerow, merits attention. Though the English

* Duke of Wellington.

government, from a sense of those claims which the southern Mahratta chieftains had established upon its consideration, during the war of 1803, refused to conciliate the Paishwah by an arbitrary exercise of authority for their extinction, it was forward to support him in a just assertion of his rights, as their Lord Paramount; but this will be best understood by a short abstract of the proceeding connected with our interference on this point, which had long been a fertile source of irritation between that prince and those powerful lords who, though calling themselves the subjects of the Paishwah's family, had, for generations, showed it but a lax obedience, submitting to its orders, or usurping upon its right, according to the character and means of the sovereign upon the throne.

The terms proposed by the resident at Poonah for adjusting the differences between the Paishwah and the Southern Jahgeerdars were—The mutual oblivion of past injuries.—The abandonment of all pecuniary claims on either side.—The guarantee to them of the Serinjamny Lands * as long as they served the Paishwah with fidelity.—The relinquishment, on their part, of all former usurpations.—Their attendance, when required, with the whole of their contingents; and of a third part, at all

* Serinjamny lands are those granted for the support of a specific number of troops for the service of the paramount prince.

times, under the command of a relation. The British government agreed to guarantee their personal safety, and that of their relatives, as long as they conformed to those terms.

The resident recommended that if the jahgeerdars hesitated to comply with the said terms, force should be used; and that if the Paishwah refused his assent, his refusal would be a sufficient apology for withdrawing the assistance of the British arms in the event of hostilities between his highness and these feudatories.

Upon the receipt of these suggestions, Lord Minto recorded a minute in which he observed that, as it was clearly established that the Paishwah had a right to the obedience and services of the jahgeerdars, the British government could not deny him the aid and support to which he was entitled by the treaty of Bassein, unless we could impugn the justice and equity of the claims he advanced. His lordship coincided with the resident in the view which he took of the evils likely to result from the differences between him and these chiefs being allowed to remain unsettled, for, as matters then stood, it was evident that the Paishwah, in the event of a war, would be unable to fulfil his engagements with the British government, by which he was bound to furnish a force of 10,000 cavalry and 6000 infantry*.

* This quota was afterwards reduced to 5000 cavalry and 3000 infantry.

Lord Minto stated in this minute, that he entirely approved of the proposed terms of adjustment, which there was little probability of the jahgeerdars rejecting, at the hazard of a contest with the British government: but that if a spirit of turbulence and disaffection should make them determine on a general opposition, it obviously became an object of augmented importance to reduce them to obedience with a view to preclude the dangers which a combination for that purpose would produce at a season when we might be less in a condition to encounter it. His lordship further observed that, although it was not probable that the British troops would meet with serious resistance from the jahgeerdars, yet it was proper that every precaution should be adopted for bringing any contest which might arise to a speedy termination; and with this view, he sent orders to Madras, Mysore, and the Deckan, to hold a sufficient force in readiness to promote the success of this negotiation, and suppress any spirit hostile to the just rights of our ally.

The resident, at Poonah, experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining the Paishwah's consent to submit the arbitration of his claims on the jahgeerdars to the British government, as his highness, in the first instance, would not listen to any proposition which did not comprehend the entire resumption of their lands, and their submission to his authority by force of arms.

These difficulties were however overcome, and

the resident addressed circular letters to the jahgeerdars, requiring them to appear personally at Punderpore, to which place he had accompanied Bajerow, attended by part of the subsidiary force. They were further called upon to deliver up to his highness the lands which they respectively held without sunnuds or grants; and it was intimated that, in every case of refusal or neglect, troops would instantly move against them to enforce obedience. Notwithstanding this communication, the major part of the jahgeerdars, and with them* Appah Sahib (son of the late Purseram Bow) hesitated to obey, till the advance of a considerable force satisfied them that they had no alternative but compliance. They all joined the Paishwah at Punderpore, from whence they attended him to Poonah, where everything was definitively settled.

The character of the parties, and the nature of the interests in collision, presented very serious difficulties to this arrangement; and nothing short of the vigorous and decided course that was pursued, could have terminated, without bloodshed, disputes which had so long distracted the Poonah government; the ruler of which, however, was ill satisfied that we had not, on this occasion, aided him to an unqualified resumption of the lands of

* A detachment advanced against a fort in the possession of Appah Sahib, which soon surrendered, and the resistance was not imputed to that chief, but to its commandant.

his powerful nobles, a measure from which we were withheld by obligations of equity, and which we could not have adopted without making our power the instrument of oppression and injustice.

The questions which arose at the court of Sindia, during the government of Lord Minto, were of a minor nature, connected with the settlement of disputed claims and accounts arising out of the treaty of Serjearjingham. These were all amicably adjusted, and the Mahratta prince remained on terms of general amity with the British government; giving countenance, however, to some of those bands of Pindaries who had already begun their destructive inroads upon the Deckan.

Jeswunt Row Holkar became insane (as already mentioned) soon after he returned to Malwa in 1806; and the confusion into which this event threw his government, so far deprived it of any substantive character that all relations with foreign states, except those of mere form, ceased.

Ameer Khan has been before noticed. As soon as Jeswunt Row Holkar became incapable of the administration of his own affairs, that Mahomedan chief endeavoured to establish an ascendancy at his court: but soon left it with the large army he commanded to pursue the separate objects of his own ambition.

One of the first of his acts was to threaten with invasion the territories of the Rajah of Berar, from whom he claimed large sums in the name of

Holkar. The Rajah had not solicited the aid of the British government, but the Governor-general could not contemplate with indifference the army of Ameer Khan, now swelled by the Pindaries, encamped on the banks of the Nerbudda, and ready to overwhelm the country of Nagpore. In recording his opinion of the course proper to be pursued on this occasion, Lord Minto observed*, “ that the question was, not simply whether it was just and expedient to aid the Rajah of Berar in the defence or the recovery of his dominions, (although, in point of policy, the essential change in the political state of India, which would be occasioned by the extinction of one of the substantive powers of the Deckan, might warrant and require our interference;) but whether an interfering and ambitious Mussulman chief, at the head of a numerous army, irresistible by any power but that of the Company, shall be permitted to establish his authority, on the ruins of the Rajah’s dominions, over territories contiguous to those of our ally the Nizam, with whom community of religion, combined with local power and resources, might lead to the formation of projects probably not uncongenial to the mind of the Nizam himself, and certainly consistent with the views and hopes of a powerful party in his dominions, for the subversion of the British alliance: of such a ques-

* Vide Lord Minto’s Minute, dated October 16th, 1809.

tion," observed his lordship, "there can be but one solution."

Having, upon the grounds stated in this minute, decided upon the expediency of taking active measures for opposing the progress of Ameer Khan, no time was lost by the Governor-general in assembling a considerable force on the eastern frontier of Berar, under the command of Colonel Close*; and a detachment of the Bengal army, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Martindale, was stationed on the south-west frontier of Bundelcund, as well to provide for the security of that province as to co-operate eventually in an attack upon the enemy.

The Rajah of Berar, although he had not formally solicited the assistance of the British government, was very glad to receive it, especially when informed that it was gratuitous. In resolving not to demand any compensation, either pecuniary or territorial, for this service, the Governor-general was influenced by two considerations: 1st. That the proffer of our assistance proceeded entirely from a sense of our own interests. 2nd. That the Rajah had suffered greater territorial losses by the result of his contest with the British government than either Sindia or Holkar, and, therefore, our gratuitous support on this occasion might be considered as an equivalent for any claims

* The late Major-general Sir Barry Close.

which he might conceive himself to possess on our generosity.

Lord Minto, after the force under Colonel Close had assembled, wrote to Ameer Khan, requiring him to withdraw from the Nagpore territory; and also to Jeswunt Row Holkar. He addressed the latter with the view of ascertaining whether Ameer Khan was acting under orders from his government, or not. The answer of Ameer Khan was a denial of our right to interfere in his disputes with the Rajah of Berar, and a menace that if our troops advanced, he would invade the British territory. The reply of the minister of Holkar contained a positive disavowal of the proceedings of the Mahomedan chief*, with whom they were at variance; and he was, at this period, obliged to abandon his position on the frontiers of the Nagpore territories, in order to defeat their plots for the subversion of his authority.

During this period, Colonel Close, who had been joined by Lieutenant-colonel Martindale, advanced into Malwa, where he occupied Seronge, the capital of Ameer Khan, and other possessions of that freebooter, whose overthrow appeared certain, when he was saved by a change of measures of the supreme government. The Governor-general's views, when he first resolved to interfere in the defence of the Rajah of Berar, were directed to the de-

* Vide *Central India*, vol. i.

struction or dispersion of Ameer Khan's army; and corresponding instructions were accordingly issued to Colonel Close; but on further reflection, his lordship, contemplating the great extent and complicated nature of the political arrangements and military operations to which the prosecution of those views would lead, the numerous interests they would affect, and the heavy burden of expense which they would occasion, limited his plan to the mere expulsion of the invaders from the Rajah's territories; giving, however, to Colonel Close a discretionary power of acting upon his first instructions, if he should be of opinion that such a course of proceeding would not involve those consequences which his lordship apprehended. It is not surprising that this gallant and able, but cautious officer, should have declined following the impulse of his own ardent mind, under circumstances of such heavy responsibility; his efforts were, therefore, confined to the object of securing the immediate safety of the Rajah's territories, and Ameer Khan escaped with an unbroken army to prosecute new schemes of conquest and oppression.

The Governor-general, aware that a similar danger would recur next season, if the territory of Nagpore was unprotected, entered into a negotiation with its prince on the principle of affording his highness the permanent aid of a body of British troops. The Rajah was at first averse to the proposition; but when he found that Colonel

Close's army had been ordered into cantonments, he changed his mind and became very eager for the arrangement, on condition, however, that he should not be charged with any part of the expense. The Governor-general not being disposed to exonerate him from all share of the burden, the extra * disbursement attendant on a permanent measure which would ensure his future safety, was demanded. To this, the Rajah, after much hesitation, consented; but before he had signified his agreement, the troops had been withdrawn, and Lord Minto having embarked on the expedition against Java, the negotiation was not, at this period, brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

When these proceedings came before the authorities in England, they recognised the policy of concluding a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore, on the terms proposed; and, in a letter from the secret committee †, it is distinctly stated, "that the determination of the Governor-general in council to interpose the power of the government in protecting the Rajah of Berar was a measure of defensive policy, and, therefore, could not be deemed a violation of the law, or a disobedience of the orders, prohibiting interference in the disputes of foreign states." In the same despatch, the secret committee express themselves "not sa-

* The additional Batta allowed to troops in a state of field encampment.

† Under date the 10th of September, 1811.

tisfied with the expediency of abstaining from disabling any power against whom we may have been compelled to take up arms from renewing its aggressions." They further observe, that "the permanent security of the British interests in India does not depend upon any supposed balance of power among the native states; it is like the naval supremacy of this country; our power ought never to be extended for the purpose of oppression or injustice, but it ought to be paramount over all, if all should be combined against it, or it will probably cease to exist."

It is not possible to have stronger evidence than the conduct of Lord Minto and the government in England afforded, upon this remarkable occasion, of the impracticability of maintaining, even for a short period, any system of neutral policy. The Governor-general, in his minute*, adverting to this fact, very justly observes—"It has not, perhaps, been sufficiently considered that every native state in India is a military despotism; that war and conquest are avowed as the first and legitimate pursuits of every sovereign or chief, and the sole source of glory and renown: it is not, therefore, a mere conjecture deduced from the natural bias of the human mind, and test of general experience, but a certain conviction founded on avowed principles of action and systematic views,

* Under date December 1st, 1809.

that, among military states and chiefs of India, the pursuits of ambition can alone be bounded by the inability to prosecute them.

The Pindaries, who had long existed as plunderers, attached to the Mahratta armies, rose rapidly into independent power at this period. The obedience they paid Sindia or Holkar, was merely nominal; while acting under their own chiefs, they spread desolation in every quarter, augmenting their numbers by those whom their successes had reduced to poverty and despair.

The advance of the British troops under Colonel Close into Malwa had excited great alarm amongst these freebooters; but his retreat was the signal for their reassembling, and becoming more daring than before. They overran different provinces of the Rajah of Nagpore and burnt one quarter of his capital. A party of these plunderers, in 1812, violated the English territory by an irruption into the fertile province of Mirzapore, and succeeded in carrying off a considerable booty.

The Governor-general, in remarking on their excesses, as combined with the views and cotemporaneous operations of Ameer Khan, called upon the government in England to decide whether it was "expedient to observe a strict neutrality amidst those scenes of disorder and outrage which were passing under our eyes in the north of Hindustan, or whether we should listen to the calls of suffering humanity, and interfere for the protec-

tion of those weak and defenceless states who implore our assistance to deliver them from the violence and oppression of an ambitious and lawless upstart."

And again, in a secret letter* from Bengal, Lord Minto, alluding to those considerations which made him anxious to form an alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore, thus expresses himself regarding the Pindaries. "The situation of these freebooters on the frontier of the dominions of Nagpore, in the vicinity of those of our allies, the Paishwah and the Nizam, and at no very remote distance from our own possessions; their augmented numbers, improved organization, and increased boldness, arising from the success and impunity with which their depredations have been attended; the powerful instrument of conquest or devastation which they present to the hand of an ambitious or enterprising chief, or a foreign invader; and a variety of other reflections, which are not new to your honourable committee, and which it would be superfluous to state in this place, all combined to render the adoption of an extensive and energetic system of measures for their suppression, a matter which presses with increased urgency on our attention, and will become an early object of our concern. Such a system requires the most mature deliberation, and much laborious

* Under date the 4th of February, 1813.

arrangement and combination, political and military, which must necessarily defer the execution of it. It would, therefore, be premature to enter at the present moment into a more extended consideration of the question, and the subject is only alluded to here as forming a powerful argument in favour of the establishment of a British force on the Nerbudda; a measure which will not only afford additional means of intermediate security to our allies and to ourselves, but will materially facilitate the execution of any further operations, whether offensive or defensive, which it may be judged advisable to undertake."

Though Lord Minto was most reluctant to involve the government in a measure likely to lead to hostilities, without the previous sanction of the authorities in England, he evinced, on more than one occasion, his opinion, that attention to this rule ceased, whenever the honour or the interests of the empire of which he had charge required prompt action.

Sir George Barlow having withdrawn his protection from the petty chiefs south of the Sutleje, Runjeet Singh, Rajah of Lahore, ever on the watch to extend his power, had twice interposed in their quarrels, and obliged the contending parties to acknowledge him as their superior. This encroachment had at first passed unnoticed, but when Lord Minto found that he acted upon a systematic plan of extending his dominions, and in contempt of

the British government, he determined to check his future progress; being satisfied, as he stated in his despatches* to the government in England, that it was a safer policy to protect the Seikh chiefs settled to the south of the Sutleje, than to allow an ambitious prince, whose sole object was aggrandizement, to bring his territories in contact with those of the Company. Upon this just view of the subject, our supremacy over the Seikh chiefs between the Jumna and the Sutleje was declared. A strong force was assembled on our frontiers, which, at first, created both surprise and alarm in the mind of Runjeet Singh, who appeared, for a moment, resolved to try a contest; but reflection led him to withdraw his troops from the fort of which he had taken possession.

The main body of the English force then returned to its cantonments, leaving a strong detachment, under the command of Sir David Ochterlony, in occupation of a permanent position at Lodiana, on the left bank of the Sutleje.

In the despatch † in which Lord Minto describes the military movements that gave such

* Lord Minto addressed a long and able letter, under date 15th December, 1808, to the secret committee, in which he described the impolicy, and indeed impracticability, of persevering in the course of policy adopted two years before by his predecessor, without incurring, in a very increased degree, those very hazards and embarrassments which this neutral system purposed to avoid.

† Letter to the secret committee, dated 15th April, 1809.

effect to the negotiations of the envoy at the court of Lahore, his lordship expresses his opinion, that Runjeet Singh had alone been induced to meditate the extension of his dominion over the territories between the Sutleje and the Jumna, by a manifestation of our intention not to exercise those rights of supremacy over the southern Seikhs which had been exercised by the Mahrattas. "If," he states, "we had not at an early period of time declared the Seikh chiefs to be entirely independent of our control; if, at the time when the Rajah projected his first invasion of those territories, we had declared a resolution to protect them; or, even if we had attended to the united solicitations of the chiefs of those territories, about the middle of last year, to protect them against a second projected invasion, by announcing that resolution, no doubt can be entertained that the mere declaration of it would have been sufficient to deter Runjeet Singh from the execution of his design: it could not, therefore, be supposed, that, after we had not only declared the territories in question to be under our protection, but by assembling an army, had manifested a determination to carry that resolution into effect, the Rajah of Lahore would resume the prosecution of his ambitious schemes."

The apprehensions entertained of a French invasion, which had led to the missions to the courts of Persia and Cabul, had been the principal cause of a deputation to Lahore; but the

ignorance of Runjeet Singh made it difficult for him to comprehend the real object of that solicitude which we evinced at this period to obtain his alliance. It is also probable, that this prince totally misunderstood the motives which induced us to disown the power we had attained, and not only to cast off willing dependants upon our government, but to look on and see them rendered subject to another state. Such erroneous impressions must, in a very short period, have precipitated a contest with the Rajah of Lahore, which probably would have terminated in the overthrow of that chief, and the establishment of our influence, if not our power, upon the banks of the Indus. But these results were avoided by the wise and decided measures of Lord Minto, which, by restoring our protection to the chiefs south of the Sutleje, gave peace and security to all the territories between that river and the Jumna, and placed Runjeet Singh in his proper relation to the British government, with which he concluded a treaty, stipulating, on our part, that we should not interfere with his territories or subjects, and on his, that he should never maintain a greater body of troops on the left bank of the Sutleje, than was actually necessary for the internal management of his districts in that quarter.

Some fear was entertained lest the advanced position of our force at Lodiana should excite the jealousy and alarm of Runjeet Singh; but if that

was the impression on its first establishment, it was immediately removed, by the greater part of the force put in motion being withdrawn; and confidence took place of all other feelings in his mind, when he saw that the English government, though neither deficient in power nor spirit, refrained from further action the moment its professed objects were accomplished.

A mission from the emperor Napoleon arrived at the court of Persia in 1808, with the declared intention of establishing a connexion which might facilitate his views of attacking the English in India. This created considerable alarm, and led the Governor-general to determine upon immediately sending an officer of rank to Persia, vested with full powers, to counteract the designs of our enemies, whatever these might be. This measure was interrupted in its progress by the government of England having sent an envoy with credentials from the throne, and instructions from the secret committee, to accomplish the same objects. The representative of the Governor-general proceeded to Aboushir; but on the King of Persia refusing him leave to advance to Tehran, and insisting on his negotiating with his son, the Viceroy of Shiraz, he declined going any further, as unbecoming the dignity of the English nation that its representative should treat with a prince at a provincial capital, while the French ambassador, who had been received in direct vio-

lation of an existing treaty, enjoyed the distinction of residing at court, and carrying on his negotiations with the king. These reasons, and many others, for not complying with his majesty's desire, were embodied in a memorial and sent to Tehran; but producing no effect, the representative of the supreme government sailed for Calcutta. On his arrival there, orders were given to prepare an expedition, which was meant to occupy an island in the gulph; and, as the early failure of the promises of the French was anticipated, there existed no doubt that the Persian government would soon be reduced to the necessity of asking that friendship which it had slighted; and, until it should be in this temper, it was concluded the alliance would never take a shape that merited confidence or promised benefit. But a different view of these subjects was taken by the envoy accredited by the crown, who, after he had gone to Persia, in consequence of a latitude the Governor-general had given him, refused all further attention to orders from India, and proceeded towards the court in direct opposition to the wishes and the commands of the supreme government. The anticipated failure of the French to fulfil their extravagant promises, the alarm excited by the military preparations in India, and the cupidity of the Persian court, which had been strongly excited, prevented any difficulty to his advance. On his arrival he immediately concluded a treaty, by which it

was agreed that a subsidy* should be paid to the Persian government as long as they were at war with the Russians, on the condition of giving their aid to repel any attempt of the French; or, in other words, for the fulfilment of the engagements which they had contracted ten years before. The Governor-general protested in the strongest manner against all these proceedings; and though the force that had been prepared was countermanded, in consequence of news reaching India of Buonaparte being involved in a war with Spain, and not likely to prosecute his designs in the East, the representative of the Company was directed to proceed to Tehran, to redeem the Indian government from the degradation to which it had been exposed.

Omitting all remark on the large expenditure of money, and the loss of local influence and character produced by these proceedings, suffice it to say, that though the English envoy who visited Persia in 1800 had strongly stated the necessity of credentials from the throne to add to the rank and consequence of any subsequent mission, it never had been contemplated that the conferring of such distinction upon the person employed would lead to his being

* The subsidy was settled to be 120,000 tomans (about 100,000*l.*) per annum; a supply of 16,000 stand of arms; 20 field-pieces, complete; and such numbers as could be spared of artillery-men and officers, to instruct the Persian army. This treaty was concluded in March, 1809.

placed under any authority except that of the Indian government, which, as was obvious, must be the only competent judge of the measures necessary to form and maintain an alliance that could have little consequence to Great Britain but as connected with its eastern territories. It was on this occasion represented, that to transfer the management of our political relations with Persia from India to England, and to employ an agent in that country, independent of the supreme government, was to embarrass the exercise of that great power which the law had vested in the Governor-general, and to take from him the means of providing for the defence of the extensive empire committed to his charge, and for the safety and tranquillity of which he alone was responsible.

“ It cannot be necessary,” Lord Minto observes*, “ to enter into any discussion for the purpose of demonstrating the inconsistency of our being charged with the defence and security of India against the dangers in which the mission to Persia originated, without possessing power to direct the negotiation with that court, or to control the conduct of the minister deputed there; without being at liberty to determine the point of time at which such negotiation should be undertaken; to judge whether or not the prosecution of it is compatible with the honour and interests of the government committed

* In Letter to the Secret Committee.

to our charge, or to limit or extend the engagement for the execution of which we are exclusively responsible.

“ A state of affairs may readily be supposed, which would render the prosecution of a mission to Persia, on the part of the British power, utterly subversive of the dearest interests of this country. In such a case, it cannot be contended that the appointment of a minister, accredited to the court of Persia by the authorities in England, under the contemplation of a different condition of affairs, should supersede a discretionary power, on the part of the local government, to require him to suspend the exercise of his ministerial functions, or that a minister so appointed, proceeding without the authority of this government, or in direct opposition to it, is empowered by his commission to pledge its faith to the adoption of a course of measures, not only unsanctioned by the government on which the execution of those measures must depend, but expressly declared to be incompatible with its honour and its interest. The assumption of such a power is an assumption of the authority of the government of this country, not the exercise of the ministerial functions delegated by the crown to its accredited envoy. It is the assumption of a power which the throne itself never claimed; and it is a direct opposition, not only to the spirit, but to the very letter of his majesty's commands.”

Lord Minto when describing the grounds on which the supreme government of India had carried on the connexion with Persia, previous to the assumption of powers independent of its authority by the envoy extraordinary of the king, observes, "by the laws which have been framed for the management of the honourable Company's affairs, the local government of this country is vested with the power attached to sovereignty. It is empowered to administer civil and criminal justice, to levy war, and to conclude peace. It is equally essential to the preservation of this valuable branch of the British empire, that the states of Asia should consider the British establishment in India in the light of a sovereign state, as that the government should actually exercise the powers annexed to it.

"In this character, the Company's government has legitimately negotiated, by means of ambassadors, and concluded treaties with the state of Persia on a footing of equality. In this character, the state of Persia has been accustomed to consider the British government in India as vested with absolute authority to employ its resources as in aid of the Persian monarch as an ally, or to direct its power against him as an enemy. It is in this character alone that we have been enabled to obtain those manifestations of respect, that regard to the claims of dignity, which, amongst all nations of the world, but in a special degree among Asiatic

states, are essential to the maintenance of real power in the scale of political interest. This acknowledged character, as it constituted the basis, so it must form the cement of our external relations; to depreciate, therefore, that estimation of the power, and the dignity of the British government in India, which, under a just sense of its importance, we have hitherto successfully laboured to preserve among surrounding states, is to fix upon the British government the stigma of deceit, to affect the reputation of our public faith, and to expose as much of the danger arising from a real loss of power and authority, by diminishing that awe and respect with which this government has hitherto been contemplated, and on which the tranquillity and security of the British dominion in India materially depend."

All these general arguments, and many others which more particularly applied to the case in question, were strongly stated by Lord Minto in despatches to the government at home, but without avail. A course was persevered in, which led many of the Persians to believe that an actual difference of interests, as well as of name, subsisted between the government of the king of England, and that of the East India Company; and even those few who were better informed were not anxious to correct an error which afforded the means of promoting their personal interest, while it formed a pretext for intrigues, the object of which was to

feed the vanity and avarice of a proud and venal court.

The same alarm of a French invasion, which had caused these missions to Persia, suggested one to the court of the King of Cabul; and though Shuja-ul-Mulk, with whom an alliance was concluded, soon afterwards lost the throne, and became a fugitive, dependant on the generosity of the English government, no embassy ever better repaid the cost which was incurred, or more fully justified the wisdom of the government by whom it was sent. Before this mission, we were in comparative ignorance of the country of Afghanistan, its inhabitants, and the actual condition of its rulers and chiefs; a knowledge of which was quite essential as the ground of every future measure relative to the most vulnerable part of our eastern empire. This knowledge, through the zeal and talent of the distinguished officer* employed on this occasion, was obtained in a degree which must have far exceeded every expectation that government could have formed. Nor was this the sole benefit; a proud and ignorant race of men were taught, by their communication and intercourse with this mission, to understand, and to appreciate, the character of Englishmen, and the nature of the government which we have established in India. The importance of such impressions is above cal-

* The Honourable Mr. Elphinstone, now Governor of Bombay.

culation. It can only be estimated by men who know, from experience, the character of the motives by which barbarous nations are impelled, or restrained from action.

The Ghoorkas, a warlike race of mountaineers, who possess the government of Nepaul, committed, during the administration of Lord Minto, some depredations on the provinces of Gorruckpore and Sarun. These excesses seem, at first, to have been considered more as the irregular and unpremeditated acts of individual officers on the frontier, than as evincing any hostility in the nation; but their frequency, and increased boldness, soon gave them another shape, and compelled Lord Minto to address the Rajah of Nepaul in very decided language. "I cannot believe," his lordship observes*, "that while an amicable inquiry into disputed points concerning lands is going on in the district of Gorruckpore, the unprovoked and unpardonable outrage just described to have taken place in the adjoining district can have the sanction of your government; on the contrary, I am convinced it will excite your severe displeasure. It is impossible for me, however, to suffer it to pass, without bringing it distinctly to your notice, and calling on you to disavow and punish the perpetrators of this act, and to cause the people who have been forcibly carried away

* In a letter to him, dated 4th June, 1813.

to be released, and the plundered property to be restored: complaints have also reached me of encroachments committed by your subjects in the district of Tizhoot, which cannot be permitted to continue.

“ If redress is not afforded, and similar proceedings in future not prevented, the British government will be obliged to have recourse to its own means of securing the rights and property of its subjects, without any reference to your government. But I will not relinquish the hope that your immediate compliance with the requisition contained in this letter, and a strict control over your officers and subjects in future, will prevent the recurrence of circumstances, which cannot fail to render nugatory any attempt to adjust the disputed points by amicable inquiry and discussion, and to produce consequences which it must be the wish of the government to avoid.”

The character of this document fully shews that, while Lord Minto was disposed to make every effort to conciliate the state of Nepaul, and to reclaim it to a more amicable course, he was quite sensible of the necessity of resorting to other measures, should our moderation be misunderstood, and our forbearance have no effect, except to increase aggression. But he left India so soon after this occurrence that the duty devolved upon his successor of checking the encroachments of this proud and warlike people, and of vindicating,

by their punishment, the insulted honour of the British government.

No material change occurred during the administration of Lord Minto, in any of the minor or more dependant governments, except at Travancore; where the ambition and treachery of the Dewan compelled government to employ a strong military force to maintain its authority. This measure was attended with such success as placed the future peace of the principality on a firmer foundation than it had rested before.

In Bundelcund, as in all countries which have been long under the loose rule of a weak native government, vigorous measures became necessary to reduce some turbulent chiefs, who, confident in their strong holds, and in the attachment of their followers, continued to resist the authority of the state to which they had become subject. The military operations against these freebooters were completely successful; and the reduction of the celebrated forts of Adjeghur and Callinjur established a tranquillity in Bundelcund beyond what that country had known for a century. To secure the continuance of peace in this valuable possession, it became necessary to extend the protection of the British government in a very decided manner to its Rajahs or petty princes; and the happy effects of this policy were soon apparent, in the increasing order and prosperity of these countries. But while encouragement and protection were afforded to those

who merited it by their good conduct, the prince of Rewa was punished for the countenance he had given to the Pindaries, in the incursion they made into the province of Morzapore, in 1812; and the Rajah of Machery, who, taking advantage of the distractions of the country of Jypore, had seized upon one of the small forts of that principality, was not only obliged to restore it, but to pay the expense of the troops which his conduct had forced us to assemble. These acts of consideration and vigour preserved the smaller dependencies of the state in good temper, and due subordination.

The territories of the Vizier of Oude continued subject to petty revolts of refractory Zemindars, to subdue whom into obedience, his highness had no efficient means but the aid of the British government, the character of which often suffered from the cause in which its troops were employed. Lord Minto, with a view to remedy this evil, instructed the resident at Lucknow to propose a plan to the Vizier for establishing regular courts of judicature within his dominions, expecting by this and other institutions to ameliorate the whole system of his government. His highness at first assented to this proposition; but before any measures could be adopted to give it effect, he suddenly changed his resolution, declaring he would never adopt the plan, unless every subject of doubt and apprehension regarding its operation should be removed from his mind. The resident, after some se-

vere comments on the evasive and insincere conduct of the Vizier, recommended* “a firm and decided refusal of the future assistance of our troops to support the proceedings of the Aumils, or coerce the defaulting Zemindars,” as a means which must of necessity have the desired effect of obliging him to assent to the proposed measure; and in anticipation of this course being pursued, he informed the Vizier “that the future † support or assistance of a single soldier of the British army to the present baneful system, or to any of its instruments in the persons of his excellency’s Aumils, was entirely out of the question.”

The supreme government, though disappointed at the result of the negotiation, did not consider itself at liberty to follow up the course which the resident had recommended, and in fact commenced. In a very able despatch ‡ from the chief secretary to that officer, the considerations of faith and policy by which the government deemed itself restrained from such a course are very fully stated. The abuses of the Vizier’s administration, and the support we gave it had, it was stated, conferred on the English a right to demand a reform of the system, and to bring forward the strongest arguments it could to affect its accomplishment; but the resi-

* Vide Captain Baillie’s letter, 28th June, 1811. Oude Papers, p. 23.

† Vide Oude Papers, p. 233.

‡ Vide letter to Captain Baillie. Oude Papers, p. 234.

dent was informed that his declarations to the Vizier, "intimating a positive resolution on the part of government to refuse, hereafter, the aid of its troops in the suppression of disorders in his excellency's country," had exceeded the intentions of the Governor-general in council. The chief secretary observes:—

"The introduction of compulsory measures, as they are above explained, would entirely change the ground of the negotiation. It would bring into immediate question the continuance or dissolution of the relations between the two states, as established by treaty; for if a demand be made by one of two contracting parties on the other, on the basis of a specific article of treaty, accompanied by a declared resolution not to fulfil a positive and fundamental stipulation of the same treaty, in the event of a rejection or evasion of such demand, and that resolution be carried into effect, the system of connexion established by the mutual engagements of the parties ceases to exist.

"It is unnecessary to trace the consequences of such a state of things between the government and that of the Vizier; it is sufficient to observe, that the menace of refusing the aid of our troops for the suppression of disorders within his excellency's dominions must, in the end, be nugatory, since this government would be compelled by considerations connected with its own most important in-

terests to interpose its military power for the restoration of tranquillity.

“But situated as the dominions of the Company and the Vizier relatively are, the state of affairs implied in a dissolution of the treaty could not be suffered to remain even for a day. The compact must be renewed either in the same or another form, and the course of transactions would naturally lead to the establishment of a degree of control over the Vizier’s reserved dominions, incompatible with the obligations which formed the price of his excellency’s extended cessions in the year 1801.

“The belief that the Vizier would be induced by the menace alone to accede to our views, furnishes no argument in reply to the preceding observations, since it is inconsistent with unalterable principles to menace a measure, of which considerations either of expediency or of justice would preclude the adoption.”

There can be no doubt of that wisdom which, under the circumstances described, refrained from pressing to completion a plan to which the prince of the country we desired to reform was so repugnant; and it is probable, that if a different course had been pursued, our efforts at improvement would either have been nugatory, or we must have supported them by such a minute interference in the internal affairs of the country, as would soon have

destroyed all that remains to this prince of independent action.

The situation of the British resident at Lucknow, as the representative of the superior and controlling state, is one of great delicacy and difficulty. While his primary duty is to give every support to the prince at whose court he resides, it is essential that he should make himself acquainted with the internal state of the administration of the country, that he may be able to give such information as will enable government to offer advice or remonstrance (which it is entitled by treaty to do) when any mismanagement in the Vizier's reserved dominions shall be likely to have consequences injurious to its interests. Upon the mode in which he performs this important branch of his duty, the temper of the two states will materially depend. The sources, from which he draws his information, are not likely to be impartial. He will be assailed with the complaints and misrepresentations of the discontented and disaffected. These will naturally exaggerate the errors and crimes of their ruler and his ministers, and the effects of despotic power will appear the stronger, from the near observation of the opposite administration in the adjoining provinces of the English government. But let it be recollected, that the system established for the latter is not without faults and disadvantages; and some of these are of a character which, from the

nature of our power, are almost beyond remedy. This fact ought to make us tolerant to the defects and abuses inherent in native states, the existence of which it is our policy to preserve as long as possible, even when not pledged, as we are to the Vizier of Oude, by the faith of treaties.

Shah Allum, the nominal emperor of Delhi, died in 1806, and was succeeded by his son, Akbur Shah, who made some weak attempts to increase his influence and power. These were properly resisted, but at the same time the pledge given by Lord Wellesley, to increase the allowance of the imperial family when the revenue of the country improved, was redeemed by an act of politic liberality. An augmentation of ten thousand rupees per mensem was appropriated for the support of the new emperor's eldest son, when he was declared heir-apparent; (which he was contrary to the wish of the father, who desired to elevate his third son to that dignity.)

The proposed change in our relations to the Mahratta government of Baroda gave rise to a discussion regarding the policy of preserving, or rather restoring, the balance of power in India, which was considered as destroyed by our territorial acquisitions. The agitation of this question led Lord Minto to give his opinion very fully upon the subject, and the facts, the arguments, and the conclusions, which are stated in his despatch to the

secret committee *, demand our particular attention, as proceeding from a statesman whose avowed opinions, when one of the managers appointed by the House of Commons to conduct the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, as well as his recorded sentiments, when president of the Board of Control, were adverse to any interference with the internal affairs of the native states of India. It would, indeed, appear impossible to bring forward a stronger proof than this document affords, to shew that necessity under which the most eminent of his predecessors acted; nor can we more ably refute the theories, grounded on imaginary premises, which have misled so many with regard to the true nature of our political career in India, than by the following extract from that able letter:—

“As an abstract proposition,” Lord Minto observes, “all opinions will agree that a balance of the power of states united in political or commercial intercourse, affords the best, if not the only, security which human ingenuity can devise against the projects of ambition or the ruinous effects of reciprocal enmity. But a balance of power, to be efficient, must be formed on principles of convention such as those under which it subsisted on the continent of Europe before the French revolution. It must arise out of a consentaneous submission to a system of public law, and a recognition of reciprocal rights

* Under date, 14th April, 1810.

as they respect the several states individually, and of reciprocal duties as they relate to the imposition of restraints on their own ambition, or on the ambition of their neighbours. It must be founded at least on a *declared* renunciation of views of conquest, as a principle of government, and it must operate by the apprehended, and, as the occasion may require, by the actual association of several states to resist the endeavours which any one state may employ to aggrandize its power at the expense of another. At no period of the history of India do we recognise the existence of any such system of federation or balance of the power of states, nor indeed is it compatible with the character, principles, or constitution of the states which have been established on the continent of India. With them, war, rapine, and conquest, constitute an avowed principle of action, a just and legitimate pursuit, and the chief source of public glory, sanctioned and even recommended by the ordinances of religion, and prosecuted without the semblance or pretext of justice, with a savage disregard of every obligation of humanity and public faith, and restrained alone by the power of resistance. Under the successful impulse of these principles the vast empire of the Mahomedans was established over more than the continent of India. On its ruins arose the power of the Mahratta states, which subsequently branched out into a confederation of chiefs, professedly directed to objects of conquest and universal exaction,

the fruits of which, by regular convention, were to be decided in specific proportions. The same views and principles animated and extended the usurpations of Hyder Ali and his successor. The checks which the Mahrattas and the rulers of Mysore occasionally received from the power of the Nizam, and from different combinations among these three states, were the result, not of a pre-established federation and balance of power, but of the prevalence of a system of conquest, violence, and usurpation. The efforts of the contending parties were directed, not to the just limitation, but to the subversion of each other's power, and the aggrandizement of their own; and it is unnecessary to refer to the testimony of specific facts, with a view to demonstrate the self-evident proposition, that the permanent existence of a balance of power is incompatible with reciprocal views of conquest and ambition. We have referred the period of time when it is said that a balance of power existed in India, and that it was becoming daily understood, to that which immediately preceded the conclusion of the treaty of alliance with the state of Hyderabad in the year 1800; because, from that date must be considered to have commenced that system of supposed oppressive connexion to which, and to its consequences, are ascribed the evils so feelingly deplored. At that time we discern no traces of a balance of the power of states. Five years before, the dominion of the Nizam had been laid at the

feet of the Mahrattas, and he was compelled to purchase their lenity by enormous sacrifices. His dominions were subsequently invaded by the troops, and his government insulted and menaced by the power of Sindia, and he continued in this degraded state of dependance and control until relieved by the complete consolidation of the general defensive alliance concluded with the British government. The Mahratta power extended, in the North of Hindustan, from the Ganges to the Jumna, and from the Jumna to the Indus; in the North and South, from Sirhind to the Nerbudda; to the East and West, from Bundelcund to Guzerat. In the Deckan, it extended from the Nerbudda, on one side of the Nizam's dominions, to the confines of Mysore; and, on the other, to the northern Circars. The several Rajpoot states, and the various petty chiefships interspersed throughout that vast extent of country, unable to oppose, yielded their contributions to the predatory armies of the Mahrattas. It will not be contended that this description of the political state of Hindustan and the Deckan exhibits any features of a balance of power. But it may, perhaps, be alleged, that this enormous extent of dominion, though comprehended under the general denomination of the Mahratta empire, and united by a species of confederation, consisted, in fact, of four distinct powers counterbalancing each other. That this bond of association might induce them to protect

each other from the attacks of a foreign power, may be admitted; but it involved no restraint against their own projects of conquest and royalty, nor provided against the ambitious designs of one to control or absorb the power of another. Accordingly, at the period alluded to, we have seen Sindia, at the head of a powerful army, domineering over the state of Poonah; at another, we have seen him exacting contributions from the state of Nagpore. We have seen him contending for the supremacy with Holkar, and the latter usurping the government of Poonah, and expelling the Paishwah from his capital: while, in the midst of this collision, they were all ready to unite in the prosecution of foreign conquest, eager to extend their general dominion, but careful to provide for their separate interests by a division of the spoil. We are at a loss to discover, in this representation of facts, any improved knowledge, or practical application of the principles of a balance of power among the states of India. But it may, perhaps, be intended to maintain, that the power of the Mahratta state was counterbalanced by that of the British government, and that the former was withheld by a dread of the latter, from prosecuting against it any hostile designs. Admitting this fact, still the solid principles of a balance of power, grounded on political and commercial intercourse, are not to be found in such a situation of affairs. Such a counterpoise of power must

momentarily be subject to destruction, when tranquillity and self-defence are the sole objects of one party, and war and conquest constitute the governing principle of the other. It then behoves the former to combine every means of additional security that justice may warrant, and circumstances may render attainable. We shall not adduce, in proof of the existence of that spirit of insatiable conquest, which we have ascribed to the native states without distinction, the various efforts which they have employed to subvert the British government in India, since the period of its establishment. The existence of it as the actuating principle of every Indian power requires no demonstration; and we found upon it this undeniable conclusion, that no extent of concession, or territorial restitution on our part, would have the effect of establishing any real and effectual balance of power in India, or forbearance on the part of other states, when the means of aggrandizement should be placed in their hands. Your honourable committee has, indeed, justly remarked, in your letter of the 30th October, 1805, ‘that to recede ‘is often more hazardous than to advance;’ adding, ‘that this observation is peculiarly applicable to ‘India, where there is little probability that concession would be attributed by the native powers ‘to any other motives than weakness and fear.’

“To enter more amply into this discussion would require a laborious review of transactions and

events during a long course of years, and an inquiry into the views, character, disposition, and relative condition of the present states of India, the necessity of which is superseded both by the knowledge which your honourable committee already possesses on these subjects, and by the conviction which we entertain, that no argument can be requisite to demonstrate how vain would be the expectation of augmenting our security by diminishing our power and political ascendancy on the continent of India."

Lord Minto had been compelled to visit Madras, in 1809, in consequence of the height to which the discontent of the European officers at that presidency had attained. The occasion was one which required all his firmness and moderation; and the whole character of his proceedings, after his arrival, left nothing to regret, but that he had not repaired at an earlier period to the scene, where his presence was alone wanting to allay a ferment threatening the state with incalculable mischief. From Madras the Governor-general proceeded with a large military force to the conquest of Java. The history of that important achievement does not belong to this work, further than as it added to the general strength of India, and increased the personal fame of its ruler. But it is due to the memory of this nobleman to state that, both in the expedition against Java and the French islands, he acted on his own responsibility, and displayed a

promptness and energy to which much of the success of these important enterprises is to be ascribed.

In 1813, Lord Minto returned to England, where he had been but a few weeks, when a sudden illness terminated the useful life of this virtuous and distinguished public servant. His loss at that juncture was a very serious misfortune, for no one was ever more calculated to succeed in impressing others with a just idea of the true condition of the Indian empire, or to give wiser counsel on every point connected with its future government.

The administration of Lord Minto differs essentially from that of every Governor-general who preceded him. It was impossible for a man possessed of such clear intellect, and so well acquainted with the whole science of government, to be long in India without being satisfied that the system of neutral policy which had been adopted could not be persevered in without the hazard of great and increasing danger to the state. His calm mind saw, at the same time, the advantage of reconciling the authorities in England to the measure which he contemplated. Hence, he ever preferred delay, where he thought that it was unaccompanied with danger, and referred to the administration at home, whom he urged, by every argument he could use, to sanction the course he deemed best suited to the public interests. But this desire to conciliate, and carry his superiors along with him, did

not result from any dread of responsibility; for wherever the exigency of the case required a departure from this general rule, he was prompt and decided. The case of the Rajah of Lahore is a striking proof of this fact; and we may add, that of the petty Rajahs whom he took under the British protection in the province of Bundelcund. The most questionable act of his policy was, his conduct towards Ameer Khan and the Rajah of Nagpore. He certainly embarked too far in operations against the Mahomedan adventurer, unless he had determined to go further. The force he assembled was equal to the subjection of Malwa; and that would evidently have been necessary before the Patan chief could have been completely subdued. It was indeed the near contemplation of this consequence, which, according to Lord Minto's own statement, induced him to rest satisfied with the salutary impressions anticipated from the display that had been made of our strength. He was, probably, withheld by a fear of embarrassment from concluding a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore; and we may, perhaps, add to other motives his want of confidence in the sincerity of that prince, and his being engaged at the moment on the expedition to Java. Besides these reasons for desisting from the active course which he had commenced, Lord Minto, probably, indulged an expectation that the measures he left

incomplete, would be taken up as part of the great plan which he foresaw would be necessary to destroy that predatory system which, before he left India, threatened the general peace. He not only recorded his own sentiments upon this subject, but took care that those of the ablest political officers should be transmitted to England. The concurrence of opinions in these voluminous documents, regarding the necessity of our interference to repress an evil so subversive of order and tranquillity, tended to confirm the opinions of the authorities at home with regard to the character of the existing danger. These opinions indeed had been before expressed in a despatch, in which they condemned the too-limited operations against Ameer Khan, and directed the concluding of a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore, at the very earliest opportunity.

The government of Lord Minto had no result more important, than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home, of the utter impracticability of perseverance in that neutral policy they had desired to pursue. It was a progressive return to a course of action more suited to the extent, the character, and the condition of the British power; but when compelled to depart from the line prescribed, the measures adopted by this nobleman were so moderate, and the sentiments he recorded so just, that it was impossible to refuse assent to

their expediency and wisdom. A gradual change was thus effected in the minds of his superiors in England, and this change tended in no slight degree to facilitate the attainment of the advantages which have accrued from the more active and brilliant administration of his successor.

CHAPTER VII.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.

Alliance refused by the State of Nagpore, formed with Bhopaul and Sagur.—War with Nepaul.—Treaty for Peace.—Hostilities renewed.—Submission of the Nepaulese.—Chief of Hatrass chastised.—Relations with Jypore.—Affairs of Nagpore.—Conduct of Bajee Row, the Paishwah.—His affairs with the Guickwar Prince of Baroda, whose Minister is assassinated.—Bajee Row violates his Engagements.—Terms granted him.—New Settlements with Baroda and Oude.—Instructions from England.—Operations against the Pindaries.—Submission of Sindia—His Infidelity.—Engagements with other States.—Infidelity of Appah Sahib, Rajah of Nagpore, who becomes a Fugitive.—Bajee Row breaks out into hostilities.—Submits to be deposed.—Terms granted him, a subject of Discussion.—Affairs of Nagpore.—Oude.—Baroda.—Mysore.—Ameers of Sind.—Mugh Refugees from Arracan.—Disputes with the Burmese Government.—Insurrection at Bareilly.—Policy and Successes of Lord Hastings's Administration.—British Supremacy in India proclaimed.

THE Marquess of Hastings arrived in India in 1813, with the authority of Governor-general, and commander-in-chief. This nobleman was well qualified both by his rank and character for the union of power which circumstances of the moment rendered it expedient to place in the hands of the same person. The government at home had been for some time fully aware, that it would soon be neces-

sary to resort to strong measures for the protection of our subjects and allies from the inroads of those large hordes of freebooters whose excesses appeared to increase with our forbearance.

Notwithstanding such impressions, it seems to have been still expected that hostilities might be avoided, and the object we sought be effected through alliances with such states as had not yet become predatory. These sentiments and wishes formed the basis of the policy upon which the Governor-general determined to act: but though resolved to make every effort to maintain peace, he gave an early proof that his mind was not of a stamp to shrink from the responsibility of war, when that became necessary to vindicate the honour of the government committed to his care, by arresting the course of insolent aggression.

The encroachments of the Nepaulese, noticed under the administration of Lord Minto, had continued in a greater or less degree for several years. The utmost forbearance had been shewn, extending even to cases where the violent seizure and occupation of lands belonging to the British government was open and avowed. Lord Minto had been compelled, before he left India, to threaten them with war. This, however, did not deter them from persevering in the same course, until it was no longer possible to overlook the constant recurrence of such injuries. The measures adopted by Lord Hastings to suppress this spirit of aggres-

sion evinced the anxious wish of the supreme government for an amicable settlement of the different questions in dispute between the two states.

Inquiries were instituted and commissioners appointed to meet those of the Nepaul prince, but to no purpose: points which had been adjusted on apparently incontrovertible evidence, and with the assent of both parties, were revived by the Nepaulese commissioners; and on the Governor-general refusing to enter anew into discussions on what had been so adjusted, his agent was warned to quit the frontier, and those of the Ghoorka government were recalled to Katmandu, the capital of Nepaul. Even this offensive proceeding did not induce the Governor-general to depart from the course he had prescribed to himself. A letter was addressed to the Rajah, reviewing the conduct of his commissioners, and requiring him to send orders for the peaceable surrender of the districts which the Nepaulese had seized, and of which they retained possession, though by themselves admitted to belong to the British government. The Rajah was distinctly informed that, unless these districts were restored, possession of them would be taken by the British troops; and that all those villages which had been conditionally made over to our authority, until the termination of the inquiry, should be declared permanently annexed to the dominions of the Company.

These demands and threats being equally disre-

garded, orders were issued to occupy the districts in Gorruckpore, while a further appeal was made to the Nepaul prince, to surrender those in the province of Sarun; but this being also without effect, a detachment was sent to take possession of them, which it did without encountering any resistance, the Nepaulese troops retiring as ours advanced. Such was the state of affairs when the setting-in of the rains, which in this tract of country is a very unhealthy period, made it expedient to withdraw the troops, and commit the charge of the disputed lands to the native civil and police officers appointed to manage them. The Nepaulese no sooner saw the latter defenceless than they attacked them; and after killing eighteen, and wounding six of the police establishment stationed at Bootwall, they deliberately, in cold blood, murdered the superior local officer of the British government. This murder, which was attended with circumstances of particular barbarity, and perpetrated in the presence of the Foujdar or commander-in-chief of the Nepaulese on that frontier, was followed by other outrages.

Such acts of open hostility would have justified immediate recourse to arms; but the Governor-general, still anxious to avoid this extremity, made another representation to the Rajah of Nepaul, whom he called upon to exculpate himself by the disavowal of these atrocities, and the punishment of the perpetrators.

The answer to this appeal was evasive, and even menacing, but conclusive as to two points. The first, that the Rajah avowed and supported the outrages committed by his officers; and, secondly, that he was not disposed to make any reparation for the injury and insult offered to the British government.

Hopes of an amicable adjustment were now at an end, and the Governor-general prepared for war. To explain to the native states of India, and to our own subjects, the necessity which compelled him to this extreme measure, he published a proclamation*, in which these aggressions were fully stated, as also a subsequent attempt of the Nepaulese to destroy the troops and subjects of the Company in the province of Sarun, by poisoning the water of the wells and reservoirs to a very considerable extent. In the concluding paragraph of this official document it is stated, "that the British government, having been compelled to take up arms in defence of its rights, its interests, and its honour, will never lay them down until its enemy shall be forced to make ample submission and atonement for his outrageous conduct, to indemnify it for the expense of the war, and to afford full security for the future maintenance of those relations which he has so shamefully violated."

The conduct of the Rajah of Nepaul on this occasion may be ascribed to pride and ignorance; to the intrigues and influence of interested persons belonging to his court; and to that habit of procrastina-

* Vide Appendix, No. VII.

tion which pervades the councils of all such states. To these causes may be joined an insolent spirit of aggression, founded on past success, and supported by a confidence in the courage of his people and the strength of his country.

When Lord Hastings determined on war, he made every preparation to secure early success, but his measures were not limited to the attack of Nepaul. Soon after his arrival in India he became convinced that it would not be possible, even for a short period, to tolerate the increasing excesses of the Pindaries; and he had represented in the strongest manner to the government in England the necessity of their immediate and specific sanction to a course of measures calculated to remedy this alarming and impending evil.

The negotiation with the Rajah of Nagpore, which commenced in 1812, had, at this period (1814), come to an unfavourable termination. That prince had not only refused to enter into a defensive alliance with the British government, but had leagued with Dowlut Row Sindia to reduce Vizier Mahomed (the Nabob of Bhopaul), a gallant chief who had long maintained himself* against the Hindu states, by whose combined armies he now appeared on the point of being overwhelmed. The position of the Nabob's territories, his per-

* For a full account of the combination against Vizier Mahomed, at the siege of Nepaul, vide *Central India*, vol. i., p. 349.

sonal character, and the former* friendship which had subsisted between the principality of Bhopaul and the English government, pointed him out, on the failure of the negotiation with Nagpore, as an ally essential to the prosecution of the operations which were contemplated for the suppression of the predatory system.

The Governor-general, in consequence, directed a negotiation to be opened with him, and also with Govind Row (the hereditary lord of Sagur), conceiving an alliance with these two chiefs would connect our military stations in Bundelcund with those in Berar, and be of great advantage, whether we adopted measures defensive or offensive. This proceeding was, in Lord Hastings's opinion, rendered more urgent by the intrigues carried on at this period among the different princes of the Mahratta nation, as well as by Runjeet Singh of Lahore, and of Ameer Khan. The approach of the latter chiefs towards our frontier, combined with other appearances, indicated that a confederacy was forming which might be expected to attain maturity sooner than it otherwise would from the war with Nepaul.

Vizier Mahomed, as soon as an offer of alliance was made to him, signified his readiness to engage in it; and the resident at the court of Sindia, deem-

* The predecessor of the Nabob of Bhopaul had been singularly useful to General Goddard's detachment, in his march across the Peninsula. Vide *Central India*, vol. i., p. 366.

ing this assent, though made in general terms, tantamount to a preliminary engagement, communicated it to that prince, who protested against it in the strongest manner, asserting that the Nabob of Bhopaul was one of his dependants, and that, as such, the English government had no right to form any engagements with him. This assertion was not grounded in fact. The Nabobs of Bhopaul had never been tributary* to the family of Sindia, though they had been occasionally obliged to pay large sums to its chiefs for aid and protection against the attack of other states, and at times to purchase the forbearance of these very chiefs themselves. The Governor-general insisted upon this being the relation in which Vizier Mahomed stood to Sindia, and assumed, on this ground, the right of the British government, when it suited its interest, to form an alliance with the Mahomedan chief. Sindia was further informed that the negotiation with Bhopaul had arrived at that stage which entitled the Governor-general to demand of him to abstain from all further attack on that principality. The same communication was made to the Rajah of Nagpore; and, to add to its effect, a body of troops was formed in Bundelcund, while the subsidiary force with the Nizam was advanced to Elichipore †.

Dowlut Row Sindia, however dissatisfied with

* Vide *Central India*, vol. i., p. 387.

† Elichipore is the capital of Berar.

these measures, was not prepared for an immediate rupture with the British government, and, notwithstanding the use of language bordering on menace, gradually withdrew from the prosecution of hostilities against a chief whose gallant defence of his capital had made ultimate success doubtful. The Rajah of Nagpore professed to meet the Governor-general's wishes with cordiality, promising not only to refrain from the attack of Bhopaul, but to allow the British troops employed to protect that principality a free passage through his territories.

Vizier Mahomed, being thus freed from immediate danger, showed so little anxiety to complete the alliance that the Governor-general broke off for a period the negotiation with both him and the chief of Sagur, whose conduct was very nearly similar.

The unexpected obstacles which arose to impede our operations against Nepaul, and the reverses which attended our first efforts in the war with that country, gave rise to intrigues and movements among the native states of India evincing a very general disposition to combine against our power. Runjeet Singh approached the Sutleje; Ameer Khan encamped near our frontier in Hindustan; and letters and messengers passed daily between the Mahratta courts of Poonah, Nagpore, and Gwalior. The precise nature and extent of the projects entertained at this moment of anticipated misfortune to the British government were not

exactly ascertained; but no doubt remained of the agitation of plans directed against its existence. The success, however, which attended the operations of Sir David Ochterlony, in the hills of Kumaon, completely changed the scene; and if it did not alter the character, it at least checked the execution of the measures projected by this combination.

The aspect of affairs in December, 1814, and the two months following, had been very discouraging. The Governor-general, however, contemplated the untoward events with firmness; and while he persevered in his attack on Nepaul, to which the whole strength of the Bengal army was directed, he ordered the disposable force of Madras and Bombay to assemble on their respective frontiers, to keep in check the Mahrattas and Pindaries: but the success of our arms in April, 1815, was sufficiently decisive to admit of the troops of the subordinate presidencies returning to cantonments, as all danger of any serious invasion of the British territories appeared at an end.

The Nepaul government was so alarmed at our conquest of its districts west of the Gogra, and at our preparations for further attack, that the prince earnestly sued for peace, and Lord Hastings dictated the following treaty for his acceptance:—

“ The cession in perpetuity of the hill country which had been conquered west of the Gogra.

“ Of all the low lands that had been in dispute

before the war, as well as the whole line of the Teraee*, to the very foot of the hills.

“Of a tract of territory which had been taken before the war from the Seikhim Rajah, the ally of the Company.”

To these conditions was added that of the Nepaulese government admitting a British resident at Katmandur, a measure to which they had always shewn great repugnance, their jealous fears leading them to view it as the first step towards complete subjugation.

The schedule of this treaty was deemed so inadmissible, that the Gooroo, or spiritual adviser of the Nepaul prince, who had been deputed to make peace, broke off all negotiations, declaring that the cession of the Teraee would strip the nobles and ministers of Katmandur of their only support; and that they never would agree to give up any part of the low lands, except the districts which had been disputed; and these they were now ready to resign. This took place in August, 1815, and a subsequent negotiation, which was opened through another agent about a month afterwards, was broken off on the same ground.

It appearing that the demand of the Teraee was a bar to peace, and that this proceeded from no motive of pride, but a consideration of its pecuniary value to the individuals to whom it had been

* The Teraee is the tract of country which skirts the foot of the hills.

granted, the Governor-general determined to relax, and offered a compensation for it, either in territory or in pensions, to the amount of from two to three lacs of rupees, to those who possessed estates in that tract; but this offer was also rejected. That no effort might be left untried, a new draft of a treaty was prepared, in which it was proposed to retain only that part of the Teraee which lies between the Kalee branch of the Gogra and the Gunduk; and pensions were still offered as a compensation for individual losses. But the Nepaul commissioners did not deem themselves authorized to conclude even this treaty without a reference to their prince; they however pledged themselves, that he should send an answer in fifteen days: but none was received, and it was soon learnt that the propositions had excited the greatest ferment at the court of Nepaul.

The proposal to compensate the losses of individuals by the grant of pensions was violently opposed, on the ground of its tendency to render many of the nobles and ministers of the Rajah's court dependant on a foreign power. This argument was particularly urged by Ameerah Singh Tappa, the highest in rank and character of all the military chiefs of Nepaul.

The part which this old warrior had taken throughout the contest is deserving of notice. He was opposed to its commencement, and had justly deprecated the policy which had provoked

such a danger; but when war was entered upon, he became the bold and avowed advocate for carrying it on with the utmost vigour, and to the last extremity. In an early stage of it, he had been directed to make large concessions to obtain peace. His answer, which was intercepted, is a document not less valuable as it throws light upon the character of an individual than as it exhibits the feelings and sentiments of a high-spirited race of men, and the construction of that power by which they are governed, and to which they give a regulated obedience, but not slavish submission, such as, in our ignorance, we too often conclude that all Asiatics pay to their rulers.

While Ameerah Singh condemned the rashness which had precipitated war, he inveighed against the cowardice that would purchase exemption from its dangers by abject submission. "With regard to the concessions now proposed," he observed in his letter, "if you had, in the first instance, determined on a pacific line of conduct, and agreed to restore the departments of Bootwul and Sheoraj, as adjusted by the commissioners, the present contest might have been avoided. But you could not suppress your avarice, and your desire to retain those places; and having murdered the revenue officers, a commotion arose, and war was waged for trifles."

"Should you now succeed," he states, in another part of this letter, "in bringing our differ-

ences to an amicable termination by the cession of territory, the enemy, in the course of a few years, would take possession of Nepaul, as he did of the country of Tippoo. The present, therefore, is not the time for treaty and conciliation. These expedients should have been adopted before the murder of the revenue officers, and must now be postponed till victory shall crown our efforts. If they will then accede to the terms which I shall propose, it is well; if not, it will be my business, with the favour of God and your fortune, to preserve the integrity of my country from the Khunka to the Suttleje. Let me entreat you, therefore, never to make peace. Formerly, when some individuals urged the adoption of a treaty of peace and commerce, I refused my assent to that measure, and I will not now suffer the honour of my prince to be sullied by concession and submission. If you are determined on this step, bestow the humiliating office of making peace on him who first advised it."

This address to his prince was written in the early part of Ameerah Singh's campaign against Sir David Ochterlony in the Kumaon Hills, during which he evinced equal valour and patriotism. After the capitulation of the Fort of Malaown, where he commanded in person, he retired to Katmandur, and there continued strenuously advocating the prosecution of the war to the last, rather than submission to terms which ap-

peared to him calculated to destroy the fame and independence of the Ghoorka government.

A belief that the Nepaul state was sufficiently humbled, and a knowledge gained from experience of the small value of the Teraee, as a territorial possession, combined with an anxious desire for peace on any conditions that were safe and honourable, led the Governor-general to a conciliatory modification of the terms he had proposed. This overture had not reached Katmandur before the Gooroo, who was the principal negotiator, arrived from that capital with the treaty signed as it before stood; an occurrence upon which Lord Hastings congratulated himself, as it gave (he observes) "the points he had resolved to yield more the appearance of a gratuitous boon, and was likely to make a favourable impression of our generosity upon a conquered enemy."

While these negotiations were going on, the advocates for war had gained the ascendancy in the court of Nepaul, and the ratification of the treaty was not only withheld, but active preparations were made for the renewal of hostilities. This conduct was attributed to the wavering counsels of that court, its insincerity, and the hope of successful resistance, grounded on the failure of our former weak attempts to penetrate the country at any part east of the Gogra. We may, perhaps, add to these causes, its misconception of the true motives of that moderation which induced the

Governor-general so repeatedly to change in its favour the terms first offered for acceptance. Incapable of acting on the same principles as, on this occasion, influenced the decision of the British government, or of taking the same view of the subjects in dispute, they, no doubt, conceived that the spirit of conciliation, shewn by the Governor-general, proceeded from some doubt as to the success of another campaign. If, however, they did entertain any such sentiments, they were soon undeceived. The large force that had been assembled on the frontier was placed under Sir David Ochterlony, who immediately assailed their mountain barrier. In the short space of one month, an uninterrupted career of success placed the Nepaulese completely at our mercy. The prince of Nepaul now signed and ratified the treaty which had been previously concluded by his envoy. He was, however, given to understand that his conduct had deprived him of all right to expect those gratuitous modifications which the liberality of the English government had previously intended.

When the articles of the treaty had been fully carried into execution by the Nepaul government, the Governor-general deputed a resident to Katmandur*, and empowered him, as an act of grace and consideration, to meet the wishes of the Rajah, so far as to commute the pensions which it had been agreed to give to those nobles and ministers

* The Honourable William Gardiner.

who suffered from the loss of the Terace, by a retrocession of all that province, with the exception of such part of it as skirted the dominions of the Vizier of Oude. The latter, with a district of our own bordering upon it, was made over to the Vizier as a compensation for one crore of rupees which he had lent the British government at the commencement of the war.

The liberality of the Governor-general to the Nepaulese reconciled, as far as was possible, this proud and warlike nation to that ultimate defeat and loss which had been the result of their unequal contest with the British government.

This early measure of the administration of Lord Hastings was very important. It not only punished a bold spirit of aggression, but reduced the power of a brave, ambitious race, who, by spreading their conquest along the ranges which stretch east from the country of Assam, to the northern frontier of the Punjab, were rapidly adding to military means already very formidable.

An equal benefit resulted from the impressions made over all India by our success; for the mountains of Nepaul were conceived by the native states to form a barrier of defence which even our power could not overcome.

Objections were raised to that policy which, at the moment when we were engaged in a contest, requiring the exclusive application of the whole force of the Bengal government, changed (as it

was alleged) the passive, if not friendly feelings of several princes and chiefs, into a spirit of hostility, by our proposed alliance with the petty states of Bhopaul and Sagur. This, it was said, could not be carried into execution without the certainty of our being involved in hostilities, not only with Sindia and Holkar, but with Ameer Khan, and all the predatory leaders; and it was argued, that the position we must take to protect the prince of Bhopaul, and the chief of Sagur, would bring us into immediate collision with the former. It was also urged, that the combination which threatened the British government in the end of 1814, and the beginning of the year following, when affairs had taken so unfavourable a turn in the war with Nepaul, was chiefly to be attributed to the jealousy and irritation produced by our ill-timed negotiations.

To these arguments it was answered, that, under the circumstances of the Rajah of Nagpore having declined a subsidiary alliance, the proposed measure was the best calculated to increase our means of ensuring success in the contest long anticipated with the predatory hordes of Central India; and that the utmost irritation which this measure could produce would add little to those motives which must impel Sindia, and the other rulers whom we had so severely humbled, to take advantage of a favourable opportunity to redeem their fortunes.

It was added, that a proceeding which excited

hopes amongst the petty princes and chiefs of Malwa of obtaining our protection, must raise a spirit that would, in all probability, prove a better curb on the loose governments of the Mahrattas, than any restraints which, in the actual state of India, we could expect as the result of our forbearance and moderation; but, whatever different opinions might be formed of the policy (with reference to the period) of entering into such alliances, there could be none as to those vigorous military measures which the Governor-general took upon this occasion, not only to guard our frontiers and those of our allies from aggression, but to prosecute to their fulfilment any treaties that might have been the result of his negotiations.

The successful termination of the Nepaul war raised the reputation of the British arms; which, in the subsequent year, was increased by the reduction of Hatrass, the possession of a chief* tributary to the Company, who, confiding in the extraordinary strength of his fort, shewed a spirit of contumacy and disobedience which it was resolved to chastise in an exemplary manner. The vicinity of the military depôt at Cawnpore enabled a train of artillery to be brought against this place, equal, if not superior, to any that had ever been seen in India; and a few hours of its tremendous fire breached this boasted fortification. Its demolition was completed by the explosion of the principal

* Diaram.

magazine, which destroyed almost all that remained of its buildings. This achievement, which was attended with no loss on our part, made a most salutary impression, where it was much wanted, on our subjects in Hindustan, and also on all that class to which the chief of Hatrass belonged.

The boldness and numbers of the Pindaries increased with our successes. Immediately after the peace with Nepaul, and the reduction of Hatrass, a strong body of these freebooters invaded and devastated part of the Madras territories; and both in that and the succeeding year, they repeated their incursions in the Deckan, which all our troops, and those of the Nizam, could not protect from their merciless ravages. The Governor-general, confident that these continually-recurring aggressions, and his repeated representations, would early draw the serious attention of the authorities in England to the consideration of this intolerable evil, limited himself to a defensive system, whilst he proceeded in making every preparation for that early contest which now appeared inevitable.

It has been before stated that the India government in England had expressed doubts concerning the propriety of our withdrawing from the alliance with Jypore, in 1806. Subsequent events had proved the impolicy of the measure, and instructions were transmitted at the close of 1813, to take that state under our protection, if an opportunity offered. The existence of the war with Nepaul, when

these instructions arrived, led the supreme government to abstain from acting upon them; and they stated to the authorities in England their opinion, that it would be better, for many reasons, to defer the formation of this connexion till it should become part of that general arrangement then in contemplation for the suppression of the Pindaries. When peace was concluded with Nepaul, the Governor-general, notwithstanding this reference, was induced by the imminent danger in which the capital of Jypore was placed by the attack of Ameer Khan, to make an overture for an alliance with its prince. The offer of this alliance, which had been so sedulously courted when the British government withheld its protection, was now received coldly; and it was discovered that the negotiations for its accomplishment were protracted in order that Ameer Khan might be induced to abandon his views, from a knowledge that the Jypore prince could, at any moment he chose, secure the aid of the British government. The Governor-general, disgusted at such conduct, and seeing no impending danger, deferred the prosecution of the overture to the period of making the more extensive arrangements mentioned, according to his first project.

The death of Ragojee Bhonslah (the Rajah of Nagpore), which occurred on the 22d of March, 1816, enabled Lord Hastings to form, with that court the subsidiary alliance which had been for several years an anxious object with the British

government. Purseram Bhonselah, the only son of the deceased prince, though conjectured to be in a state of body and mind that disqualified him for the active duties of sovereignty, was elevated to the throne. His complete incapacity was not manifested till he was publicly brought forward. To a wretched, diseased body, was added a weak and unsound intellect. He could, therefore, only inherit the name of power. The substance became a contest between an ambitious chief of the name of Dhurmajee and Appah Sahib (the nephew of the late, and presumptive heir to the reigning, prince.) A scene of active intrigue took place; Dhurmajee obtained possession of power; but he was in a short time not only deprived of it, but made prisoner by Appah Sahib. The latter acted with the apparent consent of his cousin Purseram, who declared publicly his wish, that his relation should become regent, and have the sole conduct of public affairs.

The British resident had been instructed to act with the greatest caution; but he was directed, should the incapacity of Purseram be completely proved, and should Appah Sahib be proved to be the next heir, to give the latter his support as regent of the country. Both these points were established to his satisfaction. The state of Purseram's body and mind became evident; and the son of the daughter of the late prince was the only other near relative. The Hindu law admits of no

inheritance through a female branch, and the claims of this boy could have come in competition with Appah Sahib only by his having been publicly adopted by Purseram.

In this state of affairs, the resident found himself at liberty to attend to an overture made by Appah Sahib for a subsidiary alliance, the terms of which were soon settled. The Rajah of Nagpore became one of the league with the English, the Nizam, and the Paishwah, for the defence of the Deckan. The English agreed to furnish him with six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, for which he was to pay, annually, the sum of eight lacs of rupees, the computed expense of the extra field-charges of that force*.

The negotiation† of the treaty was kept so secret from all but the confidential advisers of Appah Sahib, that others belonging to the court of Nagpore received the first intimation of its conclusion from the arrival of the English troops. The rage of Nasoba (one of the principal ministers of the deceased Rajah), and of the ladies of the palace (including Purseram Bhonselah's wife),

* This small subsidy was diminished half a lac of rupees on its being settled (in accordance with the wish of the Governor-general), that a grant of territory, yielding that amount, should be changed into a pecuniary payment.

† All the circumstances attending the negotiation of this treaty are fully stated in the letter from the Governor-general in council to the court of directors, under date the 10th July, 1816.

exceeded all bounds; but they asserted that their indignation was not at the alliance, but at the faithless conduct of Appah Sahib, who, when they combined their influence for his elevation, had solemnly promised to take no important measure without their knowledge and concurrence. Their violence on this occasion so alarmed the Rajah, that, fearing for his personal safety, he left the palace, and went to a house in the country, in the vicinity of the British cantonments.

In the actual condition of India, no event could be more fortunate than the subsidiary alliance with Nagpore. It struck a serious blow at the power of the Mahratta confederacy; and though likely to excite the utmost jealousy and alarm, not only in the minds of the princes of that nation, but in those of Ameer Khan, and the leaders of the Pindaries, the advantage it gave us in the position of our troops, and the facility for all measures, whether of defence or offence, against those predatory chiefs, far overbalanced any bad effects which could result from their dissatisfaction.

The events which had occurred at Poonah, in the three first years of Lord Hastings's administration, demand much of our attention, as being the grounds of those subsequent measures which have terminated in the extinction of the dynasty of its rulers, and the final subversion of the Mahratta confederacy, of which the Paishwah was the acknowledged head.

Lord Wellesley (as has been shewn) had deemed the continuance of that predatory system interwoven with the very existence of the Mahratta states to be irreconcilable, not only with the prosperity but with the safety of the British government and its allies; and it was with the view of weakening the power, and eventually of changing the principles of these confederated plunderers, that he formed the treaty of Bassein, which he concluded with a full contemplation of all its consequences, both as they related to the jealousy of other states, and to the future conduct of Bajee Row, the reigning sovereign.

“It was evident,” this distinguished nobleman observed, “that the Paishwah had only entered into the defensive alliance with the British government because his highness was convinced he had no other way of recovering any part of his just authority, or of maintaining tranquillity in his empire. The state of his affairs taking a favourable turn, his highness, supported by the sentiments of the different branches of the Mahratta empire, would be desirous of annulling the engagements he had made with the British government.”

Notwithstanding these anticipations, nothing occurred for ten years to interrupt the harmony between the two states. Bajee Row, secure from foreign attack, paid great attention to the improvement of his territories and resources. He sought (as almost every ruler in his condition would have

done) to reduce the power and means of those military feudatories who, when the Poonah government was weak, used to slight its orders, and at times openly contemn its authority. The aid of the British government had been frequently given to maintain the supremacy of the Paishwah : but in the case of the southern jahgeerdars, from a consideration of their conduct in the war of 1803, we had been led to arbitrate an adjustment* of his rights, with which he was far from being content. This dissatisfaction, which was particularly excited by his being obliged to renounce a groundless claim of sovereignty over the petty states of Kolapoor † and Sawunt Warree, increased that disposition which he had manifested, from the first day of the alliance, to keep up secret communication with the Mahratta princes and chiefs, who were before nominally subject to his power, and who still recognised him, in all forms and public acts, as the head of the nation. Such communications were directly contrary to treaty, but as they were veiled with that art which particularly distinguishes the Mahrattas, it was difficult to detect them ; and, as long as they were not

* This adjustment took place in 1812.

† These states were addicted to piracy, and in order to secure our trade from depredation, Lord Minto, in the year 1812, compelled them to enter into engagements, by which certain ports were placed in our hands, through the possession of which we were enabled to prevent their fitting out vessels for piratical purposes, as they had done for more than a century.

suspected of having any dangerous tendency, they were viewed with great toleration, and referred as much to the inveteracy of habit and desire of maintaining his personal importance, as to any deliberate design against the influence and power of the British government.

It has been thought that Bajee Row, from the first day of his restoration to power in 1803, pursued a systematic course having for its object the destruction of the British power, or at least the complete emancipation of himself from its authority. He had, no doubt, the disposition at all times to effect such objects ; but it required the established influence of bad advisers, and the concurrence of events favourable to their purposes, to make him act the conspicuous part which he did for their attainment. This, at least, is the conclusion we must draw from his character. He was bold in intrigue, but cowardly in action, and, consequently, his ambition, though great, was kept in check by his fears. The collision of these qualities produced a conflict in his mind which continually exposed him to the designs of worthless favourites ; and he at last fell into the hands of one of the most profligate and wicked of men, who, acting upon a perfect knowledge of his character, gained a complete ascendancy over this unfortunate prince, and led him, step by step, through crime, treachery, and war, to his downfall.

Trimbuckjee Dinglia was originally a menial ser-

vant; his first step to favour is affirmed to have been the prominent part he acted in scenes of debauchery which disgraced the palace of his master, to whom he recommended himself by being the ready instrument to promote the gratification of his sensual pleasures. He was first brought forward, as an ostensible minister, in 1814: but his rise was so rapid that in a few months he had no rival; and, to complete the influence he had obtained by his nomination to the command of the contingent troops (called out in the end of that year), he was appointed to conduct the intercourse with the British resident, who observed, from the moment that Bajee Row committed his affairs to this bold and bad man, so decided a change of tone and measures, such arrogant language, and undisguised ambition, that he foretold, at a very early period, its probable effects upon the alliance between the two states.

The English government had, in 1812, concluded a subsidiary alliance with Anund Row Guickwar, the prince of Baroda. This Mahratta chief had been, like the rest, a nominal dependant of the Paishwah; but while an article of the treaty rendered him for the future independent of that prince, we bound ourselves to arbitrate a settlement of all disputes and unadjusted accounts between the two states.

This treaty was confirmed by that of Bassein, in which we pledged ourselves to the Paishwah, in the same manner as we had before done to Anund

Row Guickwar. For twelve years there had been no appeal to our arbitration; and, in this case, as in the disputes between the Paishwah and the Nizam, whenever we had proffered our mediation to Bajee Row, he had declined it. But circumstances occurred at this period to change this feeling, as far as related to the court of Baroda. The prince of that state had for ten years rented the half of the Soubah of Ahmedabad from the Paishwah; and when the lease expired, it was of consequence, both to him and the English government (for reasons connected with the peace of the country), that it should be renewed. Every offer was made, and all fair influence was used to effect the renewal, but in vain. Trimbeckjee was put in possession of the resumed territory. The deputy, whom he sent to manage it, instantly commenced intrigues, of which the early result was an anxiety expressed on the part of Bajee Row and his minister, that the settlement of the claims with the court of Baroda might be immediately made; but this, it was urged, could never be accomplished in a satisfactory manner, unless Gungadhur Shastree (the minister of the Guickwar) came to Poonah. To this there seemed no objection, except the marked repugnance of Gungadhur himself, which was at last overcome by the solicitation of the British government, and by their express guarantee for his safety while at a court to which he knew he was personally obnoxious.

The claims of the Paishwah on [the Guickwar were very great, and their settlement would, under any circumstances, have been a matter of much perplexity; but it soon appeared that difficulties were increased, for the attainment of objects to which the adjustment of accounts was only a secondary consideration. The attachment of Gungadhur Shastree to the English government was decided, and he was, therefore, a bar to all intrigues at Baroda against that power. A plan, the object of which was either to gain him over to the Paishwah's interests, or to effect his removal from office, soon developed itself. The first occurrence that attracted attention was the sudden appearance and favourable reception at Poonah of two agents, who came on the part of Setaram, an ex-minister of the Guickwar prince, whose intrigues had been for years directed to regain his former station, from which he had been excluded through the influence of the English government. The British resident remonstrated against a proceeding on the part of the Paishwah so contrary to his treaties with both states, in which it was stipulated that his government, and that of Baroda, should have no direct intercourse or interference with each other; but Trimbeckjee, who was all-powerful at this moment, assumed his usual insolent tone, and spoke of the Guickwar as a vassal of Bajee Row, whose feudatory condition could not be changed by any engagement he contracted with another

power. This assumption was denied in the most decided manner. The Paishwah was called upon to renounce all right of interference with the Guickwar government, and, at the same time, distinctly told, that, until he did so in the most formal manner, we could not arbitrate between the two states. He was further informed, that the two agents of Setaram must be given up, or at least discountenanced, and dismissed as offenders against the established government of Baroda. The resident concluded these demands by stating, that, unless this were complied with, Gungadhur Shastree must instantly return to Guzerat.

This proceeding greatly disconcerted Bajee Row and his minister, who immediately changed their conduct towards Gungadhur Shastree, and so completely succeeded in conciliating him, that he entreated the resident to allow him to remain, as he saw some prospect of an amicable settlement without the interference of the British government. This leave was readily granted, and a satisfactory adjustment was brought to the point of conclusion by the Paishwah's acquiescence in a proposition made by Gungadhur, that the former should receive a territory valued at seven lacs of rupees per annum, in lieu of all claims. No arrangement could be more favourable to the Guickwar prince, whose debts to the Paishwah were very heavy : nevertheless his dislike to cede land made him reject it.

While this negotiation was pending, Gungadhur Shastree was courted in a most extraordinary manner. He was distinguished on every occasion by Bajee Row. He was the chosen intimate of Trimbuckjee. Offers were believed to have been made to him of high office at Poonah; and to cement this new friendship, a marriage was proposed between his son and the sister-in-law of the Paishwah. The latter arrangement had proceeded so far, that Bajee Row, in order to complete it, took his family on the pilgrimage to Nassuck, accompanied by the Guickwar minister and the British resident.

When Gungadhur Shastree received the refusal of his prince to the proposed cession of territory, he did not at once inform Bajee Row of this rejection of the moderate proposition that had been made, but had recourse to evasions. At the same time, he continued by frivolous pretexts, to delay the marriage of his son, which he desired should not take place, unless he could bring the negotiation with which he was intrusted to a favourable termination. The real state of affairs was, however, soon discovered, and the apparent slight of the prince's alliance was aggravated by Gungadhur refusing to allow the females of his family to visit the wife of Bajee Row, on account of the notorious licentiousness which prevailed in the palace of that sovereign.

Disappointed intrigue, rejected friendship, slight-

ed family alliance, and open censure of his conduct, by a man of inferior rank, were crimes that no prince could be expected easily to forgive; and though outward appearances were still preserved, these offences rankled in Bajee Row's mind, which, it is probable, was only soothed at the moment by Trimbuckjee promising him full revenge at a more convenient opportunity. The latter, no doubt, partook of his master's feelings, and was, with justice, very indignant at being made accessory to an insult on the honour of his prince by the rupture of the proposed marriage. To these feelings we must ascribe the assassination of Gungadhur Shastree. That event took place a month afterwards, at the holy city of Punderpore*, to which place Bajee Row earnestly solicited the Shastree to accompany him. The day after his arrival, he was pressed by Trimbuckjee to join him at the pagoda, to pay his devotions. This invitation he twice declined; but on being urged the third time he went. When prayers were ended, he left Trimbuckjee at the shrine; but had only proceeded a few paces on his return when some assassins, who rushed out of the temple where Trimbuckjee remained, speedily perpetrated the murder, and ran back. No investigation took place regarding this atrocious act. The only care of the Paishwah and Trimbuckjee

* A town in the province of Bejapore, eighty-six miles from Poonah. The Brahmins assert that not only the town but the lands around it are holy.

seemed to be for their own safety ; and to secure this, every precaution was used which alarm or consciousness of guilt could suggest.

Independently of the circumstances here detailed, the guilt of Trimbeckjee was established by further evidence, the character of which is described by the resident as "irresistibly conclusive:" but no remonstrance would induce Bajee Row either to seize him or the two agents of Setaram, who were also implicated. This, however, was an occasion on which only one course could be pursued ; for whatever offences Gungadhur might have committed in consequence of the intrigues and connexions in which he became entangled, his person was under the specific guarantee of the British nation, and the vindication of its honour demanded strong and decided measures. These were taken, and Bajee Row was reluctantly compelled, by the presence of the British subsidiary force at his capital, first to imprison, and afterwards to deliver up his favourite, having been previously assured that, on his doing so, no further measure would be adopted concerning the murder. The fact was, that there was every ground to conclude that Trimbeckjee had acted on this occasion with the knowledge and by the authority of his prince ; but there was no wish to ground any proceeding upon this suspicion. It was deemed sufficient to oblige Bajee Row to abandon a worthless favourite, and the manner in which it was done raised the British reputation

throughout India; for whatever might have seemed, under other circumstances, harsh in its conduct towards the head of the Mahratta empire, was deemed lenity, from a general conviction that he shared the guilt of his minister in the sacrilegious crime of murdering, within the precincts of a holy shrine, a Brahmin of high rank, who added to the right of protection which he should have derived from his caste that to which he was entitled as an accredited minister of another state.

Bajee Row could not but feel severely the degradation he had brought upon himself; and he appears to have been stimulated, rather than deterred, by what had passed, to a perseverance in his intrigues against the British government. His agents were more active than ever at the different Mahratta courts; and documents, discovered both at that period and since, prove that his object at this moment was, to form a general combination of the Mahratta states to subvert our power. These intrigues, according to the subsequent confession of Trimbuckjee, had commenced before Gungadhur Shastree came to Poonah. They were now, however, prosecuted with increased eagerness; but the Paishwah, sensible the master-spirit was wanting, continued to urge the resident in the most earnest manner to release his favourite. This was, however, firmly refused, and, to put an end to such fruitless solicitations, the Governor-general wrote to Bajee Row, that his request could never be

granted: but the art and boldness of the prisoner, and the want of sufficient caution in those who had charge of him, accomplished what the entreaties of his prince had failed to do. He had been lodged in what, afterwards, appears to have been a very insecure prison in the Fort of Tannah, which is separated only by a narrow passage of the sea from the Paishwah's territories. The consequence was, that, having eluded the vigilance of the sentry, he passed the rampart by means which had been prepared for his escape, and was in a few minutes beyond the reach of his pursuers.

Trimbuckjee escaped in September, 1816, during the season of the rains, and for three months remained perfectly concealed. The Paishwah, aware of the suspicion that must attach to himself, exerted all his art to satisfy the resident, and through him, the Governor-general, that he was not only ignorant of the ex-minister's place of concealment, but that he had repented of his past conduct, and was desirous to conciliate the confidence of the British government. He seemed anxious to be associated in the plans (then in progress) against the Pindaries. He made a parade of sending orders to his agent with Sindia, to abstain from all communications, except such as related to his possessions in Hindustan, and he professed to be satisfied with the very moderate compensation of six lacs of rupees for his claims upon the Guickwar. This apparent change of sentiments was referred to his known caution and timidity. These qualities, how-

ever, were expected to have a salutary effect on his future acts, and his present professions, were, in consequence, met with cordiality. The tone of Lord Hastings's letter to Bajee Row*, at this juncture, is considerate and friendly, and shews that, up to this period, great hopes were entertained that his good sense would prevail, and withhold him from a course, which must terminate in his ruin. These expectations, however, were completely disappointed. It was discovered that Trim-buckjee was on the Mahadeo Hills collecting troops; that Bajee Row, who, with apparent zeal in the cause, had called upon us to take measures to repress the expected insurrection, was actually in close league and correspondence with him; and that he was, in fact, the principal promoter of a rebellion ostensibly against his own government.

The establishment of the above facts †, and the more important ones that the Paishwah was preparing for war, by removing his treasures from Poonah, repairing and garrisoning his forts, collecting his adherents, and levying troops in every direction, forced the English government to the adoption of strong measures for its own security. It was decided by the Governor-general, in council, that Bajee Row had violated his engagements, and

* Under date the 17th of January, 1817.

† The series of facts by which Bajee Row's double conduct on this occasion is proved, are fully given in the official letters from the resident at Poonah (under date the 9th and 14th of April, 1817).

placed himself in the relation of an enemy. Viewing him in this light, it was resolved to adopt one of three measures.—The first, supposing he should go to extremes, was to make war upon him and occupy his country in the name of the British government.—The second, to dethrone him and place his brother Chumnajee upon the throne.—The third, to compel him to give us satisfaction for his past conduct, and security for the future, by a new treaty, which should increase our means of checking those dangers by which we had been so recently threatened through his weak and treacherous proceedings*.

This last was the measure adopted; and, after some negotiations and military movements not necessary to be detailed, Bajee Row (who had been obliged to place some of his strongest forts in our possession, as a preliminary to any arrangements that left him on the throne) was reduced to the alternative of either hazarding an immediate contest, for which he was not prepared, or of signing the treaty dictated to him by the British government. After a severe struggle, in which shame, fear, pride, and despair, had alternate sway over his irresolute mind, he put his name, on the 18th of June, to a treaty, of which the principal articles were:—

* For a full statement of Lord Hastings' sentiments and orders on this occasion, vide Printed papers, Mahratta and Pindarie War, p. 109.

“ The denunciation of Trimbuckjee as the murderer of Gungadhur Shastree, and a rebel; and the surrender of his family as hostages to the British government.

“ An engagement on the part of the Paishwah, to consider the Mahratta confederacy, of which he was nominal head, to be dissolved, and the abandonment of all rights and claims which he had, in that character, over the rulers and chiefs beyond the limits of his personal dominions.

“ The commutation of the Paishwah’s claims on the Guickwar, for the annual sum of four lacs of rupees; and the cession to the Company of territory equal to pay and maintain that contingent * which it had a right, from former engagements, to require from the Paishwah.

“ The cession to the Company of the fortress of Ahmednagur, in the Deckan, and of all the personal possessions of the Paishwah in Malwa and Hindustan. The lease, in perpetuity, for the sum of four lacs and a half, of the Paishwah’s share of Ahmedabad.”

The southern Jahgeerdars were by this engagement rendered more dependant on the British government than on the Paishwah, though the latter still continued their national head. Some of their lands, of which Bajee Row had taken possession, were restored; and the whole of the Jahgeer of

* The strength of this contingent had been fixed by a former treaty.

Rastea, which had been resumed, was, at the recommendation of the English government, given back to that once powerful Mahratta family.

The character of this treaty* will be mistaken, if it be considered in any other light than as a measure which the government thought itself under the necessity of compelling the Paishwah to adopt, that it might avert local danger, and deprive a prince, who had evinced so hostile a disposition, of a portion of that power which he was likely to employ in counteracting or opposing the plans then in progress for the destruction of the Pindaries.

Bajee Row had been considered and treated as an enemy, and he had been subdued into acquiescence by military operations, not by negotiations. He had been discomfited without a battle; and though it would have been impolitic to embarrass the whole plan of operations by precipitating a war with this prince, all hopes of his being restored to a feeling of friendship towards the British nation were at an end. But it was still expected that his fears, increased as they were by the severe lesson which he had received, might operate as a check upon further treachery; and it was thought that, instead of a desperate attempt to regain his territory by a rupture with the English government, he might be induced to seek that object by the more easy path of doing

* Ratified by the Governor-General, on the 5th of July, 1817.

his duty as a faithful confederate in the projected plans for the destruction of the predatory system. To encourage him in such a line of conduct, his performance of the principal articles of the treaty was early followed by the restoration of the hill forts which he had given in pledge; and every effort was made to satisfy him that the British government would rejoice if his future conduct gave them the opportunity of conferring benefits upon an ally whom they had once prized so highly, and whom they had been reluctantly forced to treat as an enemy.

The consequence of the treaty with Bajee Row was, the negotiation of a supplementary engagement with the Guickwar, to whom the events at Poonah were attended with the greatest benefits, as all the claims of the Paishwah were compounded for the comparatively trifling sum of four lacs per annum. The object of a new settlement with the court of Baroda was, to effect such a change in our relations as would benefit both states, and put an end to those recurring discussions and differences among local officers, resulting from governments, administered on very opposite principles, having mixed territories and claims upon tributaries. The negotiation to accomplish this desirable object was protracted till November, 1817, when a treaty was concluded, which adjusted all points in a satisfactory manner by mutual cessions of rights and interchanges of lands. The most important stipulations

were those which gave to the British government the possession of the city of Ahmedabad*.

The mal-administration of the Vizier of Oude, as it involved our reputation in the employment of our military force to support his authority, called forth the strongest remonstrance on the part of Lord Hastings, who, soon after his arrival in India, urged that prince by every argument to reform a system oppressive to his subjects; but on the failure of these remonstrances, he hesitated at an interference with the Vizier's internal government, since this, however called for by his conduct, and justifiable by the terms of existing treaties, might have alienated the mind of an ally, whose cordiality and good feeling were, at the moment, of consequence to the success of his general plans for the tranquillity of India.

The Vizier had contributed a loan of two crore of rupees to our resources for carrying on the war against Nepaul, on the termination of which a treaty was concluded, commuting half of this debt, for the cession of the districts of Khyraghur and other lands conquered from the Nepaulese, contiguous to his highness's territories. The interest of the other half of this amount was appropriated for pensions, chargeable on the Vizier's revenues, but for the regular payment of which the English go-

* This city was the Mahommedan capital of Guzerat. It is situated on the banks of a small navigable river, which falls into the sea near the city of Cambay.

vernment was guarantee. This arrangement put an end to frequent and unpleasant discussions.

The progress of events in India had for some years been very anxiously watched by the Indian government in England. The necessity of an effort to suppress that predatory system which was every day gaining strength, was admitted, but the mode by which this end was to be accomplished presented a very serious difficulty. Lord Minto had made frequent references to the government in England upon this subject*; and Lord Hastings, in a despatch to the secret committee†, urgently pressed this danger upon their attention. Speaking of the arrangements made to guard against the excesses of the Pindaries, he observed; "They will, of course, be renewed on the return of the season, in which the country will be again exposed to the danger of predatory incursions, and must be annually resorted to until some great and comprehensive system of measures can be formed and accomplished, for putting down the evil against which they are meant to guard."

* A letter, under date the 2nd October, 1812, from the Governor-general in Council to the Secret Committee, after describing some defensive measures, remarks, "We are sensible, however, all these measures and arrangements are but palliatives, and we cannot but contemplate the necessity, at some future time, of undertaking a system of political and military operations calculated to strike at the root of this great and increasing evil," &c. &c.

† Under date the 30th of May, 1814.

The Governor-general had not formed the alliance with the court of Nagpore, till that measure had received, by anticipation, the approbation of the authorities in England. In the war with Nepaul, and in the negotiations at Poonah, he had acted without orders, under a strong sense of the necessity for an immediate vindication of the insulted honour of the British government, and of providing against proximate dangers*. In points, however, on which delay did not appear hazardous, Lord Hastings had desired the sanction of the authorities at home; but this, for many reasons, was not easily obtained. Independently of a calculation of the changes which are likely to occur in such questions, before an answer can be returned, the salutary prejudice which exists in England against wars in India; the terms of the act of parliament, which prescribe the policy to be observed towards the native states; and the responsibility attached to the ministers for all acts which they originate or direct, render it a much more satisfactory task for them to approve and support those measures of indispensable necessity, which local circumstances lead a Governor-general to adopt, than to take the responsibility upon themselves by issuing instructions for his

* In the letter from the Supreme Government to the Court of Directors, 10th July, 1816. It is assumed, that the policy of a subsidiary alliance with Nagpore, had been distinctly recognised by the court.

guidance, or giving to his intended measures the authority of their previous sanction.

These causes had for some time prevented the transmission of definite orders to India, on the subject of the Pindaries; but an account of the inroads made by them into the Company's territories in 1816, with a detail of the atrocities by which it was accompanied, satisfied the authorities* in England, that to hesitate any longer in sanctioning the punishment of such aggressions, would be a dereliction of the first duty of a government, the protection of its subjects. In consequence of this feeling, a letter was addressed to the Governor-general in Council †, fully authorizing such proceedings as might be necessary to put an end to this intolerable evil. In this despatch, after dwelling upon the atrocities committed by the Pindaries in their irruption into the territories of Fort St. George, and their safe retreat with their plunder, the Secret Committee ‡ observed, "our instructions of the 29th of September, 1815, as well as those we have recently issued, discouraged plans of general confederacy, and of offensive ope-

* Mr. Canning was, at this period, President of the Board of Control.

† Under date 16th September, 1816.

‡ This despatch, though transmitted by the Secret Committee, was, in reality, that of the Board of Control. For the relative powers of these two parts of the Indian government, *vide* vol. ii. chap. ix.

rations against the Pindaries, either with a view to their utter extirpation, or in anticipation of an apprehended danger; but they were not intended to restrain your lordship in the exercise of your judgment and discretion upon any occasion where actual war upon our territories might be commenced by any body of marauders; and where the lives and property of British subjects might call for efficient protection. We think it, however, due to your lordship, not to lose an instant in conveying to you an explicit assurance of our approbation of any measures which you may have authorized or undertaken, not only for repelling invasions, but for pursuing and chastising the invaders."

After offering some remarks and opinions upon the various modes in which the Governor-general might deem it politic and wise to punish past aggression, and prevent the occurrence of future evils, this letter concludes with the following observations and instructions.—

"We entertain confident hopes, that in the event of another attack, you will be enabled so to deal with the perpetrators, as effectually to prevent its repetition. The dreadful cruelties which, we are informed, were committed by these freebooters on the inhabitants of the villages, have excited our warmest indignation.

"To protect those peaceful inhabitants against such outrages is a duty which no apprehension

of inconvenience* can justify us in leaving unperformed.

“ Whilst we rely, therefore, confidently on your constantly keeping in mind our general system of abstinence from any avoidable hostilities, we wish that you should understand us, as distinguishing between a plan of policy essentially warlike, or directed to objects of remote and contingent advantage, and a vigorous exertion of military power in vindication of the honour of the British name, and in defence of subjects who look to us for protection.”

This clear and decided expression of the sentiments of the Indian administration in England reached Lord Hastings at the end of March, 1817; and his lordship immediately determined to adopt every preparatory measure for the reduction of the Pindaries.

The armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, were called into the field; and, though the Governor-general wished to limit his military operations to the destruction of freebooters, he prepared the

* Before the receipt of this despatch, the Governor-general, in council, in a letter under date the 12th December, 1816, had stated their opinion (the result of complete experience), not only of the total inefficacy of any measures merely defensive, but of those involving an annual expenditure exceeding the most extravagant calculations of the cost of vigorous operations, which would destroy the predatory system effectually.— Vide Papers on Pindarie and Mahratta War, p. 43.

means of overcoming every obstacle that could intervene to delay or prevent that primary object of his policy.

He contemplated the scene upon which he was to enter as one likely to open as he advanced; for it was not against a tribe, a nation, or a government that he had to wage war, but against that predatory system, which, after being nearly destroyed by Lord Wellesley, had been suffered to revive and become once more dangerous to the general peace of India. When forming his comprehensive plans, military and political, for the accomplishment of this great object, Lord Hastings referred to all those officers whose local knowledge and experience could add to his information, or aid his judgment; and we collect from the voluminous documents which were, in consequence, placed upon the records of government, a concurrence of opinion in men of opposite character and views, and whose stations were remote from each other, that is perfectly surprising. They differed (though not essentially) as to the mode of remedying the evil; but on the question of the immediate necessity of having recourse to arms, and on that of reviving the principles of policy pursued by Lord Wellesley, there was but one sentiment.

It would impede the course of this narrative to introduce a detailed statement of the situation of the British government, and that of other states of India, at this period; but as more value will be

attached by those who study such questions to opinions that preceded, than to those which followed, events, a letter to the Marquess of Hastings is given in the appendix *, in which the whole of this subject is treated in the fullest manner. This letter, which was written at that nobleman's express desire, and after the most unreserved communication with him on every part of the subject, will exhibit the view taken at this critical moment of our actual condition, and the conclusions to which twelve years of experience had compelled us to come, as to the effect of our neutral system of policy; it will also shew the anticipations of success in which the Governor-general had a right to indulge from the wise and vigorous measures with which he had commenced his great undertaking.

The detail of military operations is foreign to the object of this work, further than as it may serve to illustrate political transactions; but in that view, the disposition made of our forces in the autumn of 1817 requires particular attention; not merely as it tended to the success of the ensuing war, but as it produced those happier results which saved princes and chiefs from ruin, by the seasonable proximity of armies which were equal to protect or to destroy them, accordingly as they should adopt the cause of peace and order, or that of plunder and anarchy.

* Letter from Sir John Malcolm to the Marquess of Hastings, dated Madras, 12th July, 1817. Vide Appendix, No. 4.

While the divisions of the Deckan army, under Sir Thomas Hislop, and a strong corps from Guzerat, under Sir W. Keir, advanced from the south, with the declared purpose of attacking the Pindaries, the troops of Bengal were so ably directed upon the different points which they were to occupy, that they completely succeeded in the accomplishment of the Governor-general's objects. "What I contemplated," Lord Hastings observes, in describing those operations, "was, the pushing forward, unexpectedly, several corps which should occupy positions opposing insuperable obstacles to the junction of the army of any state with that of another; and even expose to extreme peril any sovereign's attempt to assemble the dispersed corps of his forces within his own dominions, should we see cause to forbid it. The success of this plan," his lordship adds *, "depended on the secrecy with which the preparations could be made, the proper choice of the points to be seized, and the speed with which we could reach the designated stations."

Dowlut Row Sindia, the most formidable of the Mahratta princes, and to whom the chiefs of that nation, as well as the Pindaries, looked for aid, was so placed at the very commencement of the war, by the position of a large division, under Lord Hastings' personal command, and a corps under Major-general Donkin, that he was reduced to the

* Vide Lord Hasting's letter, under date 1st March, 1820. Printed correspondence, p. 383.

alternative of acceding to a treaty dictated by his lordship, or of exposing himself to defeat and ruin. Sindia preferred the former course, however contrary to his inclination, and repugnant to all his cherished feelings, as a member of the Mahratta confederacy. His public defection from a cause, the success of which rested chiefly on his efforts, was a fatal blow, not only to the Pindaries, but to that more general combination against our power, the designs of which were so ably anticipated*.

About this period, Lord Hastings had discovered a correspondence between the court of Sindia and that of the Rajah of Nepaul, the object of which was unfriendly to the English. This discovery he communicated to Sindia, in expectation that the manner in which he treated it, and his refraining

* The manner in which Lord Hastings opened and concluded negotiations with this ruler, is fully described in his letter (a) to the Secret Committee, under date the 1st March, 1820, in which he takes a clear and comprehensive view of Sindia's condition as the head and support of the predatory system, and of the indispensable necessity which existed of compelling that prince, either to give his aid towards the establishment of general tranquillity, or to hazard destruction by a contrary course. The means which Lord Hastings took to effect this object are fully detailed in the able despatch referred to; and it is impossible to peruse it without a tribute of just admiration of the plan and execution of this first and most important negotiation, on the success of which that of future measures and operations so materially depended.

(a) Vide printed Pindarie and Mahratta papers, p. 383.

from all reproaches, would be duly appreciated by that prince. This expectation was not disappointed. The impression made was favourable to the negotiation, but still the success of that depended more upon military movements than upon any diplomatic efforts. Lord Hastings, referring to this fact, and to the local situation of Sindia at this crisis, observes, "Residing at Gwalior, he was in the heart of the richest part of his dominions; but independently of this objection, that those provinces were separated from our territory only by the Jumna, there was a military defect in the situation, to which it must be supposed the Maharajah had never adverted. About twenty miles south of Gwalior, a ridge of very abrupt hills, covered with the tangled wood peculiar to India, extends from the little Scind to the Chumbul, which rivers form the flank boundaries of the Gwalior district and its dependencies. There are but two routes by which carriages, and perhaps cavalry, can pass that chain; one along the little Scind, and another not far from the Chumbul. By my seizing with the centre a position which would bar any movement along the little Scind, and placing Major-general Donkin's division at the back of the other pass, Sindia was reduced to the dilemma of subscribing the treaty which I offered him, or of crossing the hills through bye-paths, attended by the few followers who might be

able to accompany him, sacrificing his splendid train of artillery (above one hundred brass guns), with all its appendages, and abandoning at once to us his most valuable possessions.

“The terms imposed upon him were, essentially, unqualified submission, though so coloured as to avoid making him feel public humiliation. Their intrinsic rigour will not be thought overstrained, or unequitable, when it is observed, that I had ascertained the Maharajah's having promised the Pindaries decisive assistance, and that I had intercepted the secret correspondence through which he was instigating the Nepaulese to attack us. Nothing in short but my persuasion that the maintenance of the existing governments in central India, and the making them our instruments for preserving the future tranquillity of the country, were desirable objects, could have dictated the forbearance manifested under the repeated perfidies of that prince. He closed with the proffered conditions, and was saved by the acquiescence. The advantage in any other quarter could only be a transient ebullition. To the more distant states, this non-appearance of a formidable force with which they were to co-operate, was an event which absolutely incapacitated them from effort.”

The impressions made upon Sindia and his ministers, by the prompt and decided measures

described, were improved to the utmost by the temper and talent of the British resident* at his court, who, by pointing out in the strongest manner the safety of one course of action, and the inevitable ruin which must attend any other, succeeded in obtaining his signature to a treaty by which it was settled,—that Sindia should contribute his best efforts to destroy the Pindaries; that he should furnish a specific contingent, to act in concert with the British troops, and under the direction of a British officer, against these freebooters; that the contingent should be kept in a state of complete efficiency; that to provide for this, Sindia should renounce for three years his claims upon the English government, as settled by the treaty of Surjee Arjengaum†; that the amount of the annual sums hitherto paid, as pensions, to his family and ministers, should be applied, through British officers, to the regular payment of the bodies of his highness's horse, appointed to co-operate with the British troops: and it was arranged, that, with the exception of these corps, all the divisions of Sindia's army should remain stationary at the posts assigned by the British government, without whose concurrence no part of them should move.

Sindia agreed to admit British troops to gar-

* Major Robert Close.

† This was the treaty concluded by General Wellesley, in 1804.

risson the forts of Asseerghur and Hindia, during the war, as pledges for the faithful fulfilment of his engagements ; and he consented to the abrogation of the 8th article of the treaty concluded with him on the 22nd of November, 1805, and by that act placed the English government at liberty to conclude treaties with the Rajpoot states of Jypore, Joudpore, Odipore, Kottah, Bhondee, and others on the left bank of the Chumbul. This article, however, secured to Sindia, under the guarantee of the British government, his established tribute from these principalities, but restricted him, in the event of their forming engagements with the Company, from any future interference in their affairs.

The above is the substance of a treaty which constrained Sindia to a conduct contrary to his inclination, but consonant to his interests. The obvious necessity under which he signed his engagements was the only excuse he could make to himself or others for his defection from a confederacy in which he had certainly joined, but the plans of which were as yet immature. The advance of the Pindaries towards Gwalior, after the Paishwah and Bhonsela had commenced hostilities, created a sensation which led to a belief that Sindia would not maintain the engagement he had contracted. If he did waver at this period, he was soon called to a recollection of his situation by a movement of Lord Hastings, who, by interposing

between him and the freebooters, put an end at once to his irresolution and the hopes of those who had so long looked to him for support.

Dowlut Row Sindia continued inactive, if not neutral, throughout the operations that immediately ensued; and much effort was necessary to bring into action even those parts of his army which we had obtained the means of paying. The strong fortress of Asseerghur was not delivered over to us. The pretext was the disobedience of its governor, Jeswunt Row Lar, who openly espoused the cause of Bajee Row. When the same chief subsequently gave protection to Appah Sahib, the ex-Rajah of Nagpore, he was summoned to surrender, and orders were sent by Sindia, requiring prompt obedience. With these he refused to comply, and the fort was regularly besieged by the British troops. After its capitulation, accident brought to light a letter from his prince, directing him to obey all commands which he might receive from the Paishwah.

When the resident with Sindia showed him this letter, he at once admitted its authenticity, and the violation of faith of which it was an evidence; but pleaded in palliation those hereditary ties which had for generations subsisted between his family and that of the Paishwah. This fair plea was not rejected. Lord Hastings, with politic liberality, limited his demand, consequent to this discovery, to the perpetual cession of the fortress of

Asseerghur, which, from its position, became in our hands a check upon robbers and freebooters; whereas it had been, and would have continued to be, a place of refuge and protection for them as long as it remained with the Mahratta prince. The cession was cheerfully made, and the moderation of the Governor-general on the occasion was fully recognised by the court of Gwalior.

No change of our political engagements with the Nizam of the Deckan took place during the administration of Lord Hastings. The state of this prince's dominions had been already described. Arrangements had been made with a minister who owed everything to our support, which placed at our complete disposal a very considerable and efficient force, both of cavalry and infantry, commanded by British officers, and enjoying through our means regular pay and adequate establishments. They were, in fact, more our troops than those of the prince they nominally served, who could hardly be said to have any army, except his household guards, which paid him direct obedience and allegiance.

The efficient force of Salabut Khan, the hereditary jahgeerdar of Elichipore, could not be deemed soldiers of the Nizam; for though the chief whom they served was one of that prince's omrahs, he had, by his zeal and gallantry during the Mahratta campaign of 1803, established such a claim upon our future favour and protection as had led to

an arrangement by which he was made in a great degree independent of the court of Hyderabad. This obligation he returned by holding himself, and all over whom he had command, constantly ready at our call; and his contingent, consisting of a regular brigade of infantry, with an excellent body of irregular horse, proved very serviceable during the Pindarie war.

The condition of the territories of the Nizam, however deplorable, was, perhaps, fortunate for the object of the moment. It placed the resources of this country more at our disposal than it is likely they would have been, had its situation been different. The efforts made by it during the war were recognised at its close, and the English government, which had succeeded to the territory and rights of the Paishwah, not only gave up the arrears of Choute, due to that prince by the Nizam, but abrogated all claims whatever that the state of Poonah had upon that of Hyderabad. Some exchanges of districts, alike convenient to both states, were made, and the whole of these arrangements were afterwards reduced into the form of a treaty, under date the 12th of December, 1822.

The engagements entered into with the principal Rajpoot states of Odipore, Joudpore, Jypore, Kottah, and Bhondee, were nearly of the same date (immediately after our first successes), and were all to the same purport. Each of them con-

tained a full acknowledgment of the supremacy of the English government, an obligation on the part of the Hindu princes to act in what was termed "subordinate co-operation," and to pay it the accustomed tribute of their respective principalities. In those cases where the whole or a part of that tribute was the acknowledged due of Mahratta chiefs, the British government was bound to answer such claims, and to preserve its dependant allies from all foreign interference, demands, or attacks. They were also guaranteed in the absolute and exclusive management of their internal administration. The object of all these treaties was the same, and the slight differences in their terms were referable to localities, or the personal condition of their princes. For instance, at Kottah, which had been long ruled by a regent, the celebrated Zalem Sing, a secret article guaranteed the continuance of the power which he actually enjoyed to his personal descendants. The causes of a measure which promised immediate advantages, that were thought to overbalance any evil that could ultimately result from it, are fully explained in another work*. All the benefits anticipated from forming a connexion with this extraordinary man were realized; and he was early rewarded for his exertions in aid of our operations by the cession† of some districts formerly belong-

* Vide "Central India," vol. ii. p. 501.

† Vide "Central India," vol. ii. p. 500.

ing to Kottah, which had been occupied, if not usurped, by Jeswunt Row Holkar.

The same promptness and wisdom which had, without a blow, subdued Sindia into peace, if not friendship, produced a similar effect on Ameer Khan. This chief had on various pretexts avoided the ratification of the engagements which his agent had concluded with the resident of Delhi: but the movement of troops to his vicinity, and their occupation of positions which left him only the option between engaging in an unequal conflict and signing this treaty, induced him to adopt the safer course. He was confirmed in the possession of all the territories he held from the Holkar family, but compelled to surrender his large train of artillery to the English government, and to disband that great body of plunderers which had been, for more than ten years, the scourge of Malwa and Rajpootana.

The condition of the Rajah of Nagpore, and of the Paishwah, in the beginning of the year 1817, has been described. The Governor-general, adverting to the character of those princes, to their obligations towards the British government, and to that view which (giving them credit for common penetration) they were expected to take of their own interests, did not anticipate that they would be the first to precipitate hostilities, and to compel him to a course of action which produced results

widely different from those he originally contemplated.

Lord Hastings, when alluding to their conduct, observes *—“ But for the unforeseen perfidy and unaccountable folly of the Paishwah and the Rajah of Nagpore, I might have congratulated myself and your honourable Company on the successful accomplishment of my original hope of effecting the suppression of the predatory system, without disturbing any of the established powers of India, or adding a rood of land to the possession of the British government. I feel assured that your honourable committee has been satisfied that such was my earnest desire; and that its disappointment has been occasioned by circumstances beyond my control. When those circumstances did occur, and the necessity arose for my directing your arms against treacherous allies and declared enemies, you will, I am persuaded, admit the impracticability of adhering to those limits which my duty and inclination would otherwise have prescribed, without a sacrifice of your interest and security which no profession of obedience to orders issued under a different view of things would have justified to myself or my country.”

The above is one of those continually-recurring instances in the page of our Indian History which

* Vide Lord Hastings's letter 1st March, 1820, printed Correspondence, 383.

proves, most clearly, the impossibility of our prescribing to ourselves exact limits to any scene of operations in which we become involved; and a very short detail of events will show, that if it is admitted that the supreme government could no longer delay, without the sacrifice both of its reputation and interests, the measures now taken for the suppression of the Pindaries, it was forced by an equal necessity to prosecute its hostilities against both Appah Sahib and Bajee Row, to the complete extinction of the power of those faithless rulers.

Appah Sahib, Rajah of Nagpore, although he was, in a great degree, indebted for his elevation to the English government, early evinced a disposition as inconsistent with the gratitude which he owed to that state, as with the obligations of good faith. He dismissed from their stations the ministers* who had been instrumental in forming the subsidiary alliance, and he entered into an active and secret correspondence with Bajee Row, at a period when that prince was occupied in plans known to be hostile to our interests. This correspondence was an infraction of the treaty; but there was no desire to press a point of this nature to an unpleasant issue. Every allowance was made for Mah-ratta habits, and for the weak character of a young prince exposed to artful intrigue.

The court of Nagpore was, at this period, divided into two parties, one of which was decidedly

* Nagoo Pundit and Narrayn Pundit.

adverse to the English interests. Their influence had latterly much increased; but still the Rajah appeared so open and sincere in all his personal communications with the resident, that less acute vigilance than that of Mr. Jenkins would have been lulled into fatal security. He, however, continued to attend to actions more than words. An addition of numbers made to the Nagpore army, the increased activity of the correspondence with Poonah, the public reception of a khelat (or dress of honour) from the Paishwah, after that prince had attacked the British troops, were circumstances which, however palliated by plausible excuses, could be referred to no cause but a spirit of hostility. Nevertheless, some events occurred which led the resident to hope that Appah Sahib might still be restrained from proceeding to extremes. The intelligence of the treaty with Sindia, and of the failure of Bajee Row, reached Nagpore on the same day, and were communicated to the Rajah with a hope of a salutary effect. "The Rajah," Mr. Jenkins observes, "expressed his satisfaction at the former occurrence, praised the wisdom of Sindia, and lamented the folly of the Paishwah, who could think that a partial success, even if he had obtained it, could shake our power." Although the resident appeared to think it possible that the consternation created in the minds of Appah Sahib's evil advisers by these events might have a beneficial effect, this did not prevent his making a re-

quisition for immediate reinforcements; and in a very few days after he had adopted this precaution*, he learnt that an attack was meditated on the small British force at Nagpore. In his letter to Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Hislop, of the 24th of November, 1817, we find the following remarkable passage, which exhibits, in its true light, the duplicity of the Rajah: "With regard to the project (Mr. Jenkins states) of attacking the British troops at this place, I have received continual communication, since my despatches of the 14th ult. and 6th instant to your excellency, and to Sir John Malcolm, describing the arguments which have been used to excite the Rajah to such a step, and the hitherto successful opposition of his more prudent advisers; but not a word indicative of any complaint against, or any intention on the part of the Rajah to break with us, has appeared from any of his public communications; on the contrary, his highness being alarmed a few nights ago by a false report, doubtless fabricated by the warlike faction, that the British troops were moving out to attack him, sent for my Mahratta moonshee, and talked for an hour against the treachery of the Paishwah, and the impossibility of his following his example. Whether his means were considered, his actual situation, lying as he was with his family, in an open town, and without any fort of

* Vide Mr. Jenkins' letter to Major-general Malcolm, dated 16th November, 1817.

consequence, except Chanda, to place them in security; and above all his gratitude towards the British government, to whose favour and protection he owed everything, and should always desire to owe every thing to it, and it alone!

“ We are so far on our guard (the resident concludes), as we can be, without assuming an open attitude of distrust; but in consequence of the general feeling industriously excited by our enemies, that an attack is intended, and the false reports propagated regarding the Pindaries, which are made the instrument of exciting alarm, and the pretence of keeping the Rajah's troops in a continued state of readiness for movement, I have warned the Durbar, that they must take the consequence of any movement of our troops towards the residency, which such alarms, whether true or false, may render necessary, since it is obvious that the reports of Pindaries are propagated by the Rajah's instructed agents.”

Notwithstanding the continued amicable professions of the Rajah, the movements of his army coincided so exactly with the reports of his intended proceedings, that no doubt remained of the course he meant to pursue. The brigade was, in consequence, removed from its defenceless cantonments to the occupation of the residency, and the adjoining heights of Seetabuldee*.

The particulars of that attack, which was made

* Small hills immediately overlooking the city of Nagpore.

by an apparently-overwhelming force upon this small body of men, on the night of the 26th of November, and its glorious result, after an action of eighteen hours, belong to the page of our military history. Suffice it to say, that the complete defeat of the enemy at all points, and the approach of part of the reinforcement which had been called for, put an end to all hope of success in the mind of Appah Sahib, who commenced a negotiation for renewed friendship, by a solemn declaration that the assault made upon our troops was without his will or consent. He was desired to withdraw his army from the vicinity of the scene of action, before any answer could be returned to his communication. This demand was complied with, and during the period which intervened between the withdrawing of his troops, and the arrival of Brigadier-general Doveton's army, the advance of which reached Nagpore on the 12th of December, this infatuated prince continued making protestations of submission, but pursuing at the same time a weak and vacillating course of conduct.

The following preliminary terms were offered to him, after General Doveton's arrival; "that he should acknowledge that his recent attack on our troops had placed him at our mercy, and that his only hope was in our forbearance and moderation; that his whole ordnance and warlike stores should be delivered up to us, a portion of them to be eventually restored on fixing the military esta-

blishment of the state; that he should disband, in concert with the resident, his Arabs, and other troops, as soon as practicable; that his army should immediately move to a position to be assigned for it; that the city of Nagpore should be occupied by our troops, all public and private property to be protected: the Rajah's civil authorities to remain in the exercise of their functions, on his behalf, and the city to be restored, on the conclusion of the treaty: that the Rajah should repair to the British residency or camp, and reside there until every thing should be settled: that the terms of the intended treaty should not go to deprive him of any considerable portion of territory, beyond what might be necessary for the payment of the subsidy, and the efficient maintenance of his contingent, as fixed by former engagements. Such other changes as became necessary, were to have no object but the preservation of tranquillity, and a due regard to the respectability of the Rajah's government."

With these terms, the Rajah was required to comply by four o'clock on the morning of the 16th; and it was also stipulated, that his army should be withdrawn from their position in and about the city, which was to be occupied by British troops, at seven o'clock on the same morning, the Rajah himself being at liberty to come in, either before the execution of the terms, or afterwards, in the course of the day, as might be most agreeable.

The terms offered to his acceptance, though they greatly limited his power, still left to him the name and functions of sovereignty. After many evasions and efforts to obtain delay, he accepted them, and repaired to the British residency, attended by some of his ministers. The troops, who made a weak attempt at resistance, were attacked and routed. The horse dispersed in every quarter, a great part of them retiring to their homes; a large corps of Arabs, however, retreated to the palace, which they defended for some days, and then capitulated.

The resident, swayed by reasons connected with local circumstances*, and the actual state of affairs of India, had pledged the public faith to restore Appah Sahib to power; and he was not deterred by the receipt of the instructions of Lord Hastings to depose him, from allowing him to return to his palace; but instead of a definitive treaty, which had been prepared, and to which the Rajah's assent had been gained, a provisional engagement, subject to the Governor-general's approbation, was substituted †.

* The principal reason that led Mr. Jenkins to restore Appah Sahib, was a conviction that the party of the young prince, who must be raised to the Musnud if he was deposed, had neither strength nor influence to carry on the government.

† According to this new agreement, Appah Sahib resigned all his territories to the northward of the Nerbudda, as well as certain districts on the southern bank of that river, and all his rights and possessions of Gualghur Sergooja and Jubulpore.

The Governor-general had for many reasons, and, above all, from a perfect conviction that, after what had passed, no reliance whatever could be placed in Appah Sahib, resolved not to restore him to the throne; and the instructions transmitted to Nagpore on this head proceeded on the supposition that the resident had not entered into any engagement with Appah Sahib, implying, however remotely, his restoration. But the instant Mr. Jenkins's letter was received, Lord Hastings wisely determined to confirm the engagement that had been made, "rather than take a step which might shake the confidence universally reposed by native states and chiefs in the acts and assurances of the British

The Company agreed to accept these cessions in lieu of all former subsidy, as well as military service. It was stipulated that the civil and military affairs of the Rajah should be conducted by ministers possessing the confidence of the British resident.

The Rajah agreed to reside with his family at Nagpore, under the protection of the English troops. The arrears of subsidy, due on settling this treaty, were to be discharged, and the subsidy itself paid, till the countries agreed to be ceded were made over to the British government.

It was also agreed, that any forts in the Rajah's territories, which the English government might wish to occupy, should be given up; that those persons, whom he represented as having involved him in hostilities contrary to his wishes and orders, should be seized and delivered up; and, lastly, that the two hills of Seetabuldee, with a portion of ground near them, should be made over to the British government, to erect upon them such military works as it might deem necessary.

agents." Acting on this ground, his lordship directed that the articles of the provisional engagement should be embodied in a treaty. This however was delayed, in consequence of a subsequent proposition from Appah Sahib to resign all his territories to the Company, and to remain contented with the title of Rajah, and an annual stipend sufficient to maintain his personal dignity. Lord Hastings, not deeming it politic to accede to this proposition, transmitted orders to the resident, that the treaty should be carried into execution as at first proposed; but before his instructions to this effect could reach Nagpore, another revolution had taken place at that capital.

The refusal of several of the governors of forts in different parts of the dominions of Nagpore to surrender, gave rise to suspicions, which were soon confirmed by incontestable proof, that their treacherous prince had directed them to oppose us. His correspondence with the disaffected part of his troops, and with those ministers who had instigated his former conduct, was detected; and it was distinctly established that he continued, in despite of the moderation with which he had been treated, to cherish designs of renewed hostility. It was also discovered at this period, by proofs deemed conclusive, that he had murdered his predecessor Bala Sahib, in order to obtain that elevation which he had so disgraced. These plots and crimes, although

enormous, might have admitted of the resident waiting the result of a reference to the Governor-general; but the information that the Rajah intended making his escape from his capital, and the renewed activity of his communications with Bajee Row, with the movement of the latter in the direction of Nagpore, left Mr. Jenkins no time to deliberate. He ordered troops to take possession of the palace, and seize Appah Sahib, who was brought immediately to the residency, where he continued in confinement till directed to be sent under a strong escort to the Company's territories in Hindustan. When arrived at Raichorah*, he contrived, by bribing some of his guards, to make his escape. He fled first to the Mahadeo hills, from whence he went to Asseerghur, and joined the Pindarie chief Chetoo, who was attacked and routed in the vicinity of that fort, by a detachment of British troops, a few days after the ex-prince's arrival. From this period we know nothing of this contemptible and treacherous individual. It is believed that, after having for a short period found a refuge in Asseerghur, he fled to the Punjab, where he is said still to exist, a miserable dependant on the charity of the Prince of Lahore, Runjeet Singh.

The measures which the Governor-general adopted for the settlement of the administration of

* A village within one march from Jubulpore.

the country at Nagpore will be noticed hereafter. It is now necessary to revert to affairs at Poonah, where a conduct not dissimilar to that of Appah Sahib compelled the British government to measures which terminated in the subversion of the power of Bajee Row, and the extinction of the dynasty to which he belonged.

During the severe struggle of mind that preceded the large sacrifices exacted by the treaty which the Paishwah had been constrained to sign, in order to give security against his renewed treachery, he had wavered between the counsels of the violent party and of those who were the advocates for peace on any terms, with a government with which they were satisfied their sovereign had no power to contend.

The head of the former was Gockla, a high-spirited military chief of the Brahmin tribe, who owed everything he possessed to the liberality and protection of the British government, which had been extended to him in consequence of his gallantry and activity in the campaign of 1803; but whose inordinate ambition, at once stimulated and blinded by a spirit of religious fanaticism, now actuated him to become the advocate of war. The leader of the peaceful party was Moroo Deckshut, a Brahmin minister of plain habits and manners, who possessed sufficient good sense to deplore Bajee Row's infatuated attachment to Trimbuckjee Dinglia, perceiving that, under the influence of

this partiality, and of his excited passions, his sovereign was hastening to his ruin. The advice of this minister, and of some other respectable chiefs of the Poonah states, who entertained similar sentiments, aided by Bajee Row's excessive fears, had led to the conclusion of the treaty of the 13th of June. It was expected, that the same counsels and personal motives which made him comply with the terms dictated to him, as the price of his continuance on the throne of his ancestors, would operate to prevent an infraction of the engagement into which he had entered; for it was thought that, since a sense of necessity (grounded on the despair of successful resistance) had induced him to surrender several forts and territories to the English government, he would not, with means so essentially decreased, venture on an appeal to arms, from which he had before shrunk when on the very point of the attempt. The causes of a conduct so opposite to reason as that which he pursued are to be found in his weak character; in the ascendancy gained over his mind by Gockla; in the urgent remonstrances of the prescribed favourite Trimbuckjee; and in the pledges which he no doubt received from every Mahratta court, of support and co-operation against a power which those princes and chiefs beheld aiming at the destruction of the predatory system so inveterate in their nature. These united causes would, probably, not have overcome the personal fears of Bajee Row, so

far as to make him commence hostilities, had not the principal part of the British force stationed in his territories, been moved (in consequence of preparatory operations against the Pindaries) to a distance from his capital. This appears to have given him courage; and when he perceived that his plans (now hardly disguised) had led the British resident to call for aid, and that corps were on the advance to strengthen the small detachment in the vicinity of Poonah, he determined to strike the first blow. His assembly of a large army at Poonah; the plunder of the English cantonments, and of the British residency, when his hostile language and movements had compelled the resident to withdraw to a safer position in the vicinity of that capital; his subsequent unprovoked attack upon the small British force at Kirkee, and his complete repulse, are events which will be found fully recorded in Mr. Elphinstone's letter* to Lord Hastings, under date the 6th November, 1817. It appears from that despatch, that Mr. Elphinstone used every effort, even after acts of open hostility, to deter Bajee Row from a rupture which, as was evident from the first, must terminate in his ruin.

The war with the Paishwah was not marked by any effort on his part evincing a mind at all fitted to the circumstances into which he had been

* Vide Printed papers, Pindarie and Mahratta War, p. 119.

precipitated by his rash advisers. The more correct accounts which were obtained when we gained possession at Poonah showed, that Bajee Row, on the very eve of the action of the 23rd November, sent to Gockla a request that he would not fire the first gun; but this impetuous leader, anticipating the alarm of his pusillanimous prince, hastened to commence the cannonade. Gockla (according to his own statement) rested his principal hopes of success on the expected defection of our native troops. Never, indeed, was there an occasion on which political intrigue was more artfully or sedulously applied to corrupt a body of men; and there never was one on which it more completely failed. The Sepoys, though a great proportion of them were natives of the Paishwah's dominions, withstood the most tempting offers of high pay and preferment. Their fidelity was neither to be corrupted by bribes, nor shaken by threats of maltreating their families. Their conduct at this crisis raised still higher the reputation of the native soldiers of the Bombay army.

The Paishwah, from the day that hostilities began until his surrender, fled before the British troops. The only attempt to oppose them was made by a party under Gockla, who fell, gallantly fighting to the last, leaving behind him the reputation of an unwise and evil councillor, but of a brave and determined soldier.

Though Bajee Row was contemptible in the

field, the power which he had shewn of evading our pursuit rendered him formidable as an enemy. His standard was the rallying point of the discontented, and he still possessed treasure to pay their services. We had, it is true, issued a proclamation deposing him; and the Rajah of Settarah, released from confinement, had a part of the Poonah territories assigned for his support; and was vested with the reality of that power of which his ancestors, in latter times, had enjoyed only the name. But with a people like the Mahrattas, neither our words nor our acts could destroy the impressions of a hundred years. Bajee Row, though we might refuse him the name of Paishwah, was still the representative of a family of princes to whom every branch of the Mahratta nation had for generations actually paid or professed allegiance. A desire for his success was cherished by other states: all who dreaded our power (which included every prince and chief that it had humbled) were inclined to hope that, as long as he kept the field, there would remain a nucleus around which something might form dangerous to our supremacy. It was, therefore, a matter of no slight congratulation to the supreme government, as well as to those local officers whose situation made them the best judges of the character of the period, that the Paishwah, after reaching Asseerghur, in the month of May, 1818, made a proposition to submit himself to the generosity of the British nation.

So much has been said of Bajee Row in the course of this work, and so many political events in Indian history are associated with the rulers of Poonah, that it will gratify curiosity, while it conveys information, to give a detail of the circumstances which attended the submission and abdication of this last of the princes of a dynasty whose power had, at one period, extended from the province of Lahore to the sea of Malabar. This cannot be better done than it has been in an authentic narrative of them, written at the time by one who was an eye-witness, and had free access to every public document, and which is, therefore, given in the Appendix*.

In it we find, that two vakeels or envoys from Bajee Row reached Brigadier-general Malcolm's camp at Mhow, in Malwa, on the 10th of May. They brought a letter from their prince, which expressed his extreme desire for peace, and his hope that the general (whom he professed to consider as his only remaining friend †) would be his mediator. It is needless to repeat the arguments by which his envoys endeavoured to enforce this re-

* Vide Appendix, No. V.

† Bajee Row, upon this and every similar occasion, repeated, "that he had once three friends; Close, Wellesley, (the Duke of Wellington,) and Malcolm. Close was dead; Wellesley a great man, in a distant country; and Malcolm the only one left that could be of use to him." His constant allusion to the above three persons was owing to their being associated with the events that restored him to his throne in 1803.

quest. Their object was, to prove that Bajee Row had been hurried into war contrary to his wish. They even pleaded his well known personal cowardice, as a proof that the conflict into which he had been plunged was not of his option; and on this argument they grounded a hope of forgiveness being yet extended to him. They were, however, distinctly informed, that after what had passed, and after the proclamations which had been issued on our occupying the Poonah territories, Bajee Row could expect no terms that did not include the abdication of his throne, and his leaving the Deckan.

The Paishwah entreated Sir John Malcolm to come to his camp near Asseerghur. This was declined, as it would have evinced a solicitude that might have retarded a settlement; but in order to prevent delay, Captain Lowe (Sir John's assistant) was deputed to ascertain how far the overture was sincere, and to learn the actual condition of Bajee Row and his adherents.

This application of the Paishwah to Sir John Malcolm had not been anticipated, and that officer was, consequently, without instructions. He was not, however, deterred by a fear of responsibility from an effort to finish the war; an event which nothing could accomplish but the capture or submission of the Paishwah. Of the former of these, there was now no hope, as he had reached Asseerghur, the Governor of which had placed him

self, his troops, and his fortress, at the Paishwah's disposal; and the advanced state of the season made its reduction impracticable* before the monsoon was over (a period of five or six months to come.) Under these impressions, Sir John Malcolm, on finding that serious delays were likely to occur, resolved to approach nearer to the scene. Brigadier-general Doveton had taken up a position at Bhurrampore, which shut out the Paishwah from retiring to the southward or westward; and Sir John Malcolm, as he advanced, disposed the troops under his orders in such a manner as barred the prince's retreat to the northward and eastward. The object was, to give him no alternative between submission and throwing himself into Asseerghur, where his infantry alone could have accompanied him, and where, if he did not make his escape, he was certain of being besieged as soon as the season admitted of active operations.

During the period occupied in moving the troops to their positions, and during Sir John Malcolm's advance, negotiations were carried on; but they took no specific shape, until he agreed to meet Bajee Row, whose alarm, on this occasion, was so great, that he came to the meeting guarded by nearly all his troops. Sir John Malcolm, satis-

* The impracticability of this measure, before the end of the season of the rains, was distinctly stated in an official letter, by Brigadier-general Doveton, to the Honourable Monstuart Elphinstone.

fied that nothing could remove these fears but the manifestation of a confidence incompatible with insincerity, went attended by a very small escort.

This proceeding so far re-assured the mind of the Paishwah, that he entered upon the conference with calmness, and apparently without any feeling of personal distrust. The terms on which his submission would be accepted were fully stated to him, and he was informed that there could be no deviation. He was to abdicate the throne; to reside for life on the banks of the Ganges, within the territories of the English government; from whom he was to receive a pension of eight lacs of rupees per annum. The above propositions were put into the shape of an engagement, and sent to Bajee Row on the 1st of June, the day after the meeting.

In a letter* to the Marquess of Hastings, Sir John Malcolm, after detailing the various military movements made by General Doveton, observes; "Your lordship will readily conceive the consequence of every movement at this moment, and the various considerations it involved. Though necessary to press Bajee Row to a decision, I wished to refrain from every measure that would drive him to despair, or make him take refuge in Asseer. He had still between five and six thousand horse (whom a halt of twenty-five days had

* Under date the 7th June, 1818.

refreshed), and four or five thousand infantry, of which the greatest number were Arabs. He was adding daily to his force; and, however desperate his condition might appear to us, his name, and the number of loose soldiers in the country, made hundreds flock to his standard. What greatly added to the difficulty of this moment was the advanced state of the season, and the decided opinion of Brigadier-general Doveton, founded, as far as I can judge, upon correct data, that Asseerghur (with the means at his command) could not be besieged with any prospect of success during the rains. This delay threatened consequences that appeared to me of the utmost importance to avoid. Besides the fear of protracted war and heavy expenditures, questions of so delicate and trying a nature must have arisen between us and Dowlut Row Sindia, that it is difficult to say how they would terminate. My own observations in Malwa, and the reports I had of the state of the country to the southward, made me satisfied that, from the frontier of Mysore to the northern extremity of Malwa, every province would be in a state of agitation till Bajee Row submitted, or was taken: the latter, which would have been difficult under any circumstances, was, if he accepted the refuge offered him by Jeswunt Row Lar, impossible; and this consideration had as much, if not greater, weight than any I have yet stated in making me decide without reference to your lordship, and

without any instructions to guide me on the liberal amount for the support of the Paishwah, his family, and personal dependents. This was a point upon which it was impossible to keep Bajee Row's mind at such a moment in suspense; besides, making the specific promises I did, to him and his adherents, gave me the tide of opinion (even in his own camp) in my favour; and your lordship will perceive, from a view of the whole subject, that such a feeling was quite essential* to my success."

* Lord Hastings, in a letter under date the 20th June, 1818, to the Court of Directors, which was laid before the House of Commons, observes, "The troops, with which Bajee Row had crossed the Taptee, were completely surrounded. He found progress towards Gwalior impracticable, retreat as much so, and opposition to the British force altogether hopeless; so that any terms granted to him under such circumstances were purely gratuitous, and only referrible to that humanity which it was felt your honourable court would be desirous should be shown to an exhausted foe."

This despatch was probably written before the Governor-general could have been aware of the minute local circumstances of Bajee Row's position near Asseerghur, or the terms granted to him would not have been termed "purely gratuitous." With regard to the humanity with which he was treated, that sentiment mixed with other considerations throughout the whole of the negotiation; but it actuated the mind of Sir John Malcolm, not as a personal feeling, but as a principle of action associated with the reputation and the interests of the British government. On no other ground could it have been admissible into such a negotiation. But, after all, the real fact was, that Bajee Row was not in our power. He had

The force that accompanied Bajee Row to Sir John Malcolm's camp was between four and five the means, by going into Asseerghur, of protracting the war for five or six months, and keeping all India disturbed and unsettled during that period. Such were Sir John Malcolm's sentiments, as expressed in his letters to the Governor-general. Finding that a different impression was entertained, he afterwards addressed Brigadier-general Doveton to learn his opinion upon this subject, considering that he, beyond all others, must be the best judge of the actual situation of affairs at the moment that the engagement with Bajee Row was concluded. The following extract from the answer of that distinguished officer must put this question at rest:—

General Doveton observes, "Having been an actor in that part of the drama (the surrender of Bajee Row), and on the spot, few can be better qualified, perhaps, to give an opinion than myself. You have not gone a tittle beyond what my sentiments always were, are, and ever will be, as to that transaction in your representation of them. There cannot be a doubt that it was your negotiation with Bajee Row, and the assurance of protection which it contained, that kept him where he was during my advance: that he had the perfect power of going into Asseer (the gates of which are well known to have been open to him by order of the Killidar's master, as it now appears,) at any hour of the day or night, without its being possible for any efforts of ours to have prevented it at that time.

"This I can not only declare here, but will swear to it, if you wish it, anywhere else; seriously speaking, however, there can be no doubt whatever in the mind of any unprejudiced person, fully acquainted with the actual situation of all parties, and every circumstance connected with them, as I was, that, in procuring the submission of Bajee Row at the time you did, you rendered a most important service to the interests of your country in this part of the globe."

thousand horse, and about three thousand infantry. Of these twelve hundred were Arabs, whose numbers were increased two days afterwards to nearly two thousand, by the junction of parties that had been left to guard the passes in the hills; Sir John Malcolm was determined, as he wrote to the Governor-general, "not to disturb, by harsh interference, the last moments of intercourse between a fallen prince and his remaining adherents." His experience, moreover, led him to expect that this force would gradually dissolve, and he knew that, in its actual state, it possessed little means of combined action.

Bajee Row proceeded towards the Nerbudda with General Malcolm's force for several marches, without any very particular occurrence, except that of some of his followers leaving him to retire to their homes in the Deckan; a large body however still remained in spite of the friendly remonstrances of Sir John Malcolm, who pointed out the imprudence of keeping together such a number of armed men, the great proportion of whom must, from their situation, be discontented. He particularly adverted to the Arabs, from whose violence and desperation the worst consequences were to be dreaded. The Paishwah and those about him, to whom these admonitions were addressed, admitted their truth, but without profiting by them. Bajee Row clung to the shadow of his former power, and appeared as if reluctant to own to himself or others

his actual condition. His conduct was still further influenced by the suspicion and timidity that marked his character, and which Sir John Malcolm knew he could overcome only by the apparent absence of all solicitude, and by a shew of entertaining no apprehensions of the prince acting contrary to his engagements. If the Paishwah had real fears of treachery, such a course was the only way to remove them; if he cherished plans of deceit, his pursuit of them was not likely to be encouraged by an indifference which he could alone refer to a consciousness of strength. Acting upon these considerations, Sir John Malcolm indulged Bajee Row in his hours of marching, and in his desire to encamp at some distance from the English force, always giving his opinion as a friend; but adding, that he would not interfere between him and his followers, unless called upon to do so. An occasion soon arose which made Bajee Row sensible to all the value of the counsels he had neglected, and threw him completely upon the protection of the Brigadier-general.

The occurrence of a mutiny of the Arabs in his camp, the personal danger to which he was exposed, and the manner in which he was relieved, will be found fully detailed in the narrative already referred to; suffice it here to state that, subsequent to this event, Bajee Row complied with every wish expressed by Sir John Malcolm with respect to his marching, place of encampment, and indeed all

other points. His attendants were reduced to between six and seven hundred horse, and two hundred infantry, and he himself became daily more reconciled to his condition. There was indeed every reason why he should be so. The provision made for him was princely, and far beyond what his conduct had given him any right to expect; but the considerations which led to this arrangement had little reference to his personal character or merits. The first ground of the settlement with Bajee Row rested on the policy of terminating a war* which kept all India agitated and unsettled.

* The Honourable Monstuart Elphinstone, commissioner of the Poonah territories, in a letter under date the 10th of June, 1818, says, "I congratulate you on your success with Bajee Row: I most heartily congratulate myself on the same event, which will secure me the peace of this country, and give me more time to think of the important task of its civil settlement.

"I have little doubt," Mr. Elphinstone adds, "of Bajee Row staying with you now you have got him in, but I do not think he would ever have made up his mind, if you had not been so peremptory: eight lacs I think a very reasonable provision."

Mr. Jenkins, the resident at Nagpore, in a letter to Sir John Malcolm, dated 16th June, observes, "I sincerely congratulate you on the success of your measures with Bajee Row. Nothing can be more fortunate than the so early termination of the war, and in my opinion the sacrifice made to obtain the object is trifling."

Sir Thomas Munro (then in the southern territories of the Paishwah), in a letter to Sir John Malcolm, of the 19th June, after stating that he deemed the annuity of eight lacs allotted to

The second ground referred to what was due to the character and dignity of the British nation, whose

Bajee Row below what might, under such circumstances, have been given, observes, "His surrender is a most important event: it will tend more than anything else to restore tranquillity, and facilitate the settlement of the country. It deprives all the turbulent and disaffected of their head and support."

Sir David Ochterlony, impressed with the same sentiments, observes, in a letter to Lieutenant-colonel Agnew, dated the 4th of June, "I rejoice that Malcolm has brought matters to a conclusion by the extinguishment of the firebrand, which, low as it was reduced, still contained a spark that might have produced an amazing conflagration. Our success, however, has been so miraculous, that the surrender of Bajee Row may not be duly appreciated. It strikes me that his surrender will enable us to know the exact extent of the force and expense to be kept up, and I do not think the ablest calculators could have either while he was wandering even in the lowest state."

Mr. Russel, resident at Hyderabad, after congratulating Sir John Malcolm on the submission of Bajee Row, when speaking of the impression it was likely to make, observes, "In my opinion there was as much policy as generosity in the moderation with which you treated him. All feelings of resentment must have been disarmed by the abjectness of the situation to which he was reduced, and such an opportunity ought not to have been neglected of holding forth an example of magnanimity to a people who are as susceptible as any other in the world of kindness and forbearance."

Such were the sentiments felt and expressed on this occasion by those high political officers who had the charge of the peace of all that part of India which must have remained in a disturbed and unsettled state as long as Bajee Row continued to display his standard.

proceedings on all similar occasions had been marked by the utmost liberality; and, lastly, it appeared an important object to make an impression that should reconcile all ranks to the great change which had occurred, and leave a grateful feeling in the minds of the Paishwah's former adherents towards a government which, in the hour of victory, could forget its own wrongs, and respect their prejudices in the treatment of their fallen prince.

With respect to the probable effect of this liberality upon the mind of Bajee Row, though gratitude was not to be expected from a prince towards the state that had dethroned him, yet it was anticipated that he would be influenced by the treatment he received, and that, the better his condition should be made, the less it was likely he would be inclined to hazard a change. This last consideration had peculiar reference to his personal character.

The annual sum granted to Bajee Row, though munificent for the support of an individual, was nothing for the purposes of ambition; but, supposing his habits of intrigue so inveterate, and his ambition so imprudent, that he should make another attempt at sovereignty, the character and terms of his submission had destroyed that hope of success which he might have entertained under other circumstances. By becoming a voluntary exile, he had emancipated his subjects from their allegiance; his firmest and oldest adherents, released

from their duty to him, were left to form new ties, and to pursue their individual interests. By his anxiety to secure the means of continuing a life of luxury and self-indulgence, he had diminished, amongst his nation at large, that sympathy which would have attended his downfall had it been associated with distress. To sum up all in the words used by Sir John Malcolm in a despatch to government, "Bajee Row had unstrung a bow which he never could rebend."

Though the terms granted to Bajee Row were much more liberal than the Governor-general contemplated, and though his lordship did not approve of the first measure which Sir John Malcolm had adopted on receiving an overture from the prince*, he did not lose a moment in confirming the engagement into which that officer, acting on his own responsibility, had entered previous to the receipt of any orders.

The Governor-general, in his despatch to the secret committee*, states the grounds upon which he disapproved of Sir John Malcolm's proceedings, first, in negotiating at all with Bajee Row; next, in deputing an officer to his camp; and lastly, in the large amount assigned to him as a pension: but his lordship gives, in the same letter, a full statement of the reasoning by which Sir John Malcolm defended the measures which he had adopted; and concludes by the following liberal testimony

* Under date the 17th October, 1822.

to the result of the arrangement made by that officer.

“The importance of Bajee Row’s surrender was an advantage I always felt and acknowledged, and the zeal and ability manifested by Sir John Malcolm have invariably received my warmest testimony. Now, after the lapse of four years from the period of Bajee Row’s surrender, I am happy to state, that none of the ill consequences I apprehended, from the very favourable terms offered by Sir John Malcolm, have taken place, except that, perhaps, a larger actual expense has been incurred than would have sufficed to put him down. On reviewing the whole transaction, however, I see no reason for admitting that my original view, formed on the facts before stated, was erroneous.”

After the full consideration of the whole discussion regarding the settlement, the court of directors, in their general letter to Bengal*, signified their opinion in the following terms.—

“We received, with the highest satisfaction, the important intelligence of Bajee Row’s surrender; an event which brought to a happy close the operations of a brilliant and successful war, and which was calculated more than any other circumstance to accelerate the return of tranquillity throughout India, could not be otherwise than gratifying to us.

“We have perused the whole of the correspondence recorded on your secret consultations

* Dated 13th November, 1822.

relative to Bajee Row's submission; and we observe, that on some of the measures which were resorted to for the purpose of bringing about this event, there has been a considerable difference of opinion: this difference does not extend to any of the military arrangements, which must be admitted to demand unqualified applause; neither is there any question respecting the zeal and public spirit, and the indefatigable and skilful exertions of Sir John Malcolm, in the very prominent part which he took in the transaction. Whether, in the circumstances in which he was placed, Sir John Malcolm was justifiable in assuming a large discretion, and whether he exercised that discretion wisely, are the only points which have been brought into discussion; and on these we observe that the Governor-general and his political agent have arrived at opposite conclusions.

“When Sir John Malcolm received the first overtures from Bajee Row, at Mhow, in May 1818, he was without any further instructions for his guidance than those which had been issued to Mr. Elphinstone, on the 15th December, 1817, copies of which were transmitted to the several residents, and which declared all further negotiation with Bajee Row to be inadmissible. Considering, however, that the circumstances in which Sir John Malcolm was placed authorized him to exercise his discretion, we approve of the course which he adopted.

It was, indeed, to be apprehended, that whatever

sum might be placed at the disposal of Bajee Row, beyond a provision for his suitable maintenance, would be expended for purposes of intrigue; and that on that account, it might not be advisable to grant him so large a pension as eight lacs per annum: it was also possible that he might have been compelled to surrender unconditionally, had no terms been offered to him; but it does appear to us that he still had some chance of escape, and that, by throwing himself into Asseerghur, he might, at all events for a considerable period of time, have deprived us of the important advantages which resulted from his early surrender; and, in this view of the subject, we are disposed to think that these advantages justified the terms which were granted to him."

Affairs at Nagpore had been thrown into great confusion. After the dethronement of Appah Sahib, the grandson of Ragojee Bhonsela was elevated to the musnud. On this occurrence, the Governor-general expressed a solicitude that this government should be restored to its consideration among the states of India; but the entire dissolution of the former administration, and the want of native instruments of rule in whom the inhabitants could be brought to place any confidence, compelled Lord Hastings to concede his opinion to the arguments of the resident, in favour of the expediency of keeping the whole of the territories of Nagpore for a limited period in the hands of the English govern-

ment. The reasons which governed his lordship upon this occasion, and the course of measures he adopted, cannot be better expressed than in his own words*. “In conformity with the declared intention of gradually receding from the exercise of direct interference in the administration, I was careful in enjoining Mr. Jenkins to avoid any material departure from the established and constitutional forms of the ancient government, which, if recalled to their original principles, might be found sufficiently adapted to ensure regularity and integrity in the transaction of the ordinary affairs of the state. I was persuaded that Mr. Jenkins would feel it no less his duty than his inclination to detect and reform the corruption and abuses that disgraced the late administration, and to lay the foundation of an improved order of things in the return to those salutary institutions of the former government which had been perverted by the errors and vices of Ragojee Bhonsela and his successor: in so noble and laudable a pursuit, I did not require Mr. Jenkins to seek the attainment of that degree of perfection which it might be practicable to reach under a system to be permanently administered through British agency. With the deliberate intention of restoring the native government, the direct executive administration, as soon as the

* Vide Lord Hastings' letter to secret committee, dated August 21st, 1820. Printed papers respecting Pindarie and Mahratta War, page 416.

agitation and disquietude arising out of previous events should be composed, and the new government should have acquired sufficient security and solidity to enable it to conduct its own affairs without having recourse to our immediate assistance, it was obviously neither judicious nor equitable to attempt the establishment of a system which, when it should cease to be conducted under the integrity, energy, and vigour of British agents, would necessarily cease to operate beneficially, either for the people or the rulers of the country.

My views then, in the form of the civil administration, were limited to the restoration of it, as nearly as might be practicable, to the character of its original institutions; to the correction and punishment of gross abuses and frauds in the collection and appropriation of the revenues; to the introduction of order, regularity, and economy, in every branch of the administration; and to the establishment of such plain, simple, and efficient regulations on the basis of the ancient usages and laws of the country as may afford to the Rajah's government, when it shall assume the administration, every reasonable expectation of being able to carry it on under our protection with credit and success. Even when the British government shall relinquish the direct share in the administration, that it has in the outset been compelled to exercise by the imperious circumstances to which I have endeavoured to attract your attention in this despatch, it will still

retain, under the terms of the treaty, the right of offering its advice and aid, and will, I hope, be able, by timely and judicious interposition, to prevent any gross mismanagement, and to recall the native administration to the just principles of government."

In 1819, the Vizier of Oude, to the surprise of all the native part of the population of India, renounced his ancient, though nominal, allegiance to the emperor of Delhi, by changing the title of Vizier or prime minister, by which he, as well as his predecessors, had been hitherto distinguished, for that of Padsha or King. Lord Hastings *, in a letter to the court of directors, gives his opinion that this act of the Vizier is beneficial to the Company's interests, inasmuch as, without changing the relations in which that prince stood towards the English, it created a marked division amongst the Mahomedans, which gave us more security than we had before against any union of the fanatics of that religion. His lordship appears, from the contents of this letter, to have entertained an idea of eventual danger from the possible succession of a junior prince of the imperial family, who was supposed to be disaffected to our interests; and upon that ground also, he deemed it important that Oude should be detached from any possible combination with the possessor of the throne of Delhi.

This measure, to which Lord Hastings so decidedly expressed his consent was approved by the

* Under date the 13th November, 1819.

authorities in England, who probably viewed it as not likely to have consequences either one way or another; but no measures which we can adopt in India are so likely to have consequences beneficial, or the reverse, as those which make changes even in the names of long-established authorities and institutions. In the present case, some of the good effects which the Governor-general anticipated may result from the Vizier of Oude having adopted a measure that was certain to produce hostile feelings between his family and that of the emperor of Delhi; but on the other hand, the emperor, his immediate relations, adherents, and all Mahomedans who continued to revere the house of Timour, were certain to be roused by this act from their usual torpor on such subjects.

It will be thought by many, that the reverence which Mahomedan princes and chiefs entertained for the memory of their former great rulers could not be more safely at rest than where it had remained innoxious for more than half a century. The progress of the Company's government, from the day it received the grant of Dewanee, or administration of the countries of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, to the present period, had been in remarkable conformity to the feelings and prejudices of the natives of India on all such points. We had obtained credit by our liberal treatment of the Imperial family, and they were, no doubt, grateful for the superior condition in which we had placed

them, in all that concerned their pecuniary means, to that which they had enjoyed when dependant on the Mahrattas: but it is to be doubted whether their keen sense of our sanction of the Vizier's conduct* in casting off his nominal allegiance did

* The Nizam of the Deckan stood in nearly the same relation to the Titular Emperor of Delhi as the Vizier of Oude, and would, no doubt, have received the same countenance from the British government had he desired a higher name than he enjoyed; but he was forward to condemn the conduct of the Vizier, as an outrage upon the feelings of all Mahomedans. This was to be expected, from the disgust and indignation which the court of Hyderabad had evinced when the pride and ambition of Tippoo led him to assume the title of Sultaun, and to coin money in his own name. Two days after the fall of Seringapatam, in 1799, Meer Allum, the commander-in-chief of the Nizam's troops, (who was afterwards his minister), assembled all the Mahomedan chiefs and soldiers of his army, and went in procession to the principal mosque in the conquered capital in order to read the kutba, or prayer, in the name of Shah Allum. When Meer Allum informed the political agent (Captain Malcolm) of his intention, he stated his desire to mark, by this proceeding, the sense which was entertained of Tippoo's conduct in withholding that remnant of respect which Mahomedans still pay to a family who had so greatly advanced their fame.

This occurrence, it may be argued, is in favour of that policy which sought to divide and destroy an attachment that might become a point of union against our government; but the respect paid to the family of Delhi is associated with no feelings likely to combine Mahomedan princes for the purpose of elevating a sovereign who could be restored to real authority only by the repossession of the dominions which they had usurped upon the weakness of his ancestors. Such an event,

not effect a change in their sentiments towards the British government sufficient to overbalance all their gratitude, and, perhaps, to implant feelings of a very different character, but of a nature much more likely to gain them adherents among the discontented, in the improbable event of any branch of this family ever cherishing designs hostile to our power.

Though the nominal minister of the emperor, and real dependant of the English, was permitted to assume the title and attributes of majesty, no alteration was made in the relations subsisting between the Company's government and the Imperial family, to whom Lord Hastings continued that respect and attention which they have received from the first establishment of our power in India.

To those who take a general view of the character of this connexion, and consider only the
therefore, can hardly be deemed within the verge of possibility; and with regard to the danger which might result from the representative of this family being used as an instrument, it is obvious such a measure must be the act of an individual, not of a combination, and it would be more likely to embarrass than to advance the success of an attack of our established supremacy in India. The history of the whole world, and above all of Asiatic nations, proves that there is much more to be apprehended from that pride and enterprising spirit of ambition which is awakened by new names and new ties than is ever likely to result from feelings of grateful recollections towards power fallen into poverty and decay.

actual condition of the parties, nothing can appear more contrary to reason, or a more absurd mockery of terms, than for the English government, enjoying as it now does the sovereignty of India, continuing to coin money in the name of the emperor of Delhi, and styling itself, upon the face of that coin, the servant of a monarch who owes his daily subsistence to its bounty. But we must recollect, that the founder of the British empire in the east deemed the title to our first and most valuable territories incomplete, till conveyed by a grant from an emperor who possessed as little of real power as his successors. General reasoners may deem such conduct a sacrifice to prejudice, a reverence to a shadow. But the fact cannot be denied, that by making that sacrifice, and by reverencing that shadow, Lord Clive went in unison with the feelings and opinions of millions of men. Our situation, it may be argued, is greatly changed since that period. We are much more powerful, and the emperor of Delhi is more powerless: but this change cannot of itself constitute a ground for any alteration in our nominal relations to that weak sovereign. Such inconsistencies as those which exist in our connexion with the fallen descendants of the house of Timour are frequent in political communities, and particularly as these have existed from time immemorial in India. They grow out of the habits, the sentiments, and sometimes the superstition of human beings, and wise

statesmen, referring to their source, will ever treat them with consideration and respect.

Lord Hastings, soon after his arrival in India, had commenced a negotiation with Sadut Ali, the Vizier of Oude, which had in view the same objects that had been pursued by his predecessor, and he desisted from pressing them to completion from the same reasons, the invincible repugnance of the Vizier to such great changes in the system of his internal administration. When Sadut Ali died*, hopes were entertained that his successor might be more ready to meet the wishes of the Governor-general. The court of directors, anticipating this change of sentiment in the reigning prince, expressed † their concurrence in Lord Hastings' proceedings, adding:

“ We feel it proper to take this opportunity of expressing our desire, that, in the event of the discussion being renewed, you will not, however favourably disposed the present Vizier may be to attend to your suggestions, proceed to introduce into his dominions any system of administration, which shall not be founded upon a due and considerate attention to the established institutions and general usages of the country.”

The Vizier appeared at first willing to accede to the plan proposed, with some modifications, but he

* Sadut Ali died on the 11th July, 1814; he was succeeded by his eldest son Ghazee Udeen Khan Ruffeit u Dowlut.

† Vide letter to Bengal, 22nd March, 1816.

changed his mind, and evinced so determined a resolution against its introduction that it was abandoned, and every means taken to conciliate a prince whose conduct in the pecuniary aid he gave during the war with Nepaul well merited that kindness and consideration with which the Governor-general treated him.

The court of directors, after receiving a full report of Lord Hastings's proceedings in his several negotiations with the government of Oude, observe, "Your political letter of the 16th of December, 1820, informed us that since the British government had abstained from that interference in the Nabob's administration, which had produced formerly so much irritation, the affairs of the country had improved. At Lucknow there do not appear to be the same motives for interference which exist elsewhere; it is not necessary for the security or realization of any pecuniary rights; and whatever may be the merit of our institutions, we see no reason for importuning our neighbours to adopt them."

The arrangements made with the court of Baroda, subsequent to the subversion of the Poonah government, proceeded upon the principle of giving to its prince Syajee as much power as was compatible with the fulfilment of our obligations to different branches of his family, to his tributaries, and to those creditors of the state who had the guarantee of the British government.

The circumstance of our being so implicated in the affairs of this state had its origin in the mental weakness of its former ruler, in consequence of which the administration had been for a long period conducted by a commission, of which the British resident was one. His acting in this capacity, which was deemed at the moment indispensable for the peace and prosperity of the dependant state, had involved pledges of faith which embarrassed every step towards our present object, that of giving power to the reigning prince, and withdrawing, as far as was consistent with our reputation, from all interference in his internal government. A settlement upon these principles was, however, after much discussion, agreed upon. The collection of tribute devolved upon the British government, to which adequate security was given for the future payment of the pensions to different branches of the Guickwar family, as well as for the gradual liquidation of the large debts still owing by that state. The principal attention of the resident was directed to the fulfilment of these engagements, and he was instructed to abstain from all concern in matters which did not affect our obligations of faith, or threaten the public tranquillity.

An account has been given in a preceding chapter* of the establishment of the Hindu government of Mysore. No political act of an Indian administration was ever so happy in its result. This

* Vide page 241.

originated in causes which have been detailed. Among these the most prominent was the occupation and provision which the construction of this dependant state ensured to the higher and more respectable classes of the natives, who, if not destroyed, are in almost all cases rendered discontented and turbulent by the introduction of our direct sway. Of these classes the most important is the military, because they have the most power to maintain or disturb the general peace.

From the hour when the government of Mysore was established, the whole attention of its able minister Purnea had been directed to the object of saving his country from such internal troubles as are the common consequences of those changes which throw the military part of the population suddenly out of employ. Besides some battalions of regular infantry, he kept in service a very numerous local militia, and a large and efficient body of irregular horse, formed of the very best of those troops who had served Hyder Ally and Tippoo Sul-taun, and commanded by the officers most distinguished in the service of those princes. This measure, grounded as it was on a knowledge of human nature, and of the peculiar feelings and habits of the natives of India, had the complete success which it merited. The internal tranquillity of the country was undisturbed, and the troops of the Rajah of Mysore, particularly the horse, were found useful and efficient auxiliaries.

A consideration of the above circumstances, and of the just title to favour which the Mysore government had established, induced Sir George Barlow, when Governor-general, to consent to the modification of the 3rd article of the treaty of Mysore, which gave to the British government an indefinite power of calling on the Rajah for pecuniary assistance on the occurrence of war. This article, which was alarming to the dependant state, from its being undefined, was commuted for a contingent of four thousand horse, upon whose services we had a right at all times to call, paying only a small extra allowance, necessary for their support when employed beyond the limits of the Mysore dominions.

The above engagement, negotiated and concluded in the true spirit of those principles on which this connexion was formed, by rendering that specific which was indefinite, and by making that which was before a question of expediency or policy an obligation of faith, not only confirmed the benefits derived from this alliance, but gave it durability, by placing beyond the power of the Rajah the means of diminishing his own respectability and his utility as an ally.

The constitution of that body of men, for whose permanent support this arrangement provided, corresponded with the character of the government which they served*. The commanders of

* The maintenance of such a body of troops as the Mysore

these horse form a part of the aristocracy of the state to which they belong ; and, by their good conduct with the British armies, they obtain a title

horse must prolong the existence of a dependant native state, by adding to its respectability and utility. The introduction of regular corps, whether cavalry or infantry, must accelerate its dissolution. The reason is plain. The one is suited, and the other opposed to the shape and character of the government. A regular army can only exist in a regular state ; pay must be certain, and fixed provision made not only for their subsistence in ordinary times, but for all those casualties to which they are liable in war, or men will not endure the restraints and penalties of that strict discipline without which they cannot be efficient. The consequence is, that though such a force may be maintained for a short time by the energetic character of a particular ruler, it can never take root in a state, to the whole construction of which its principles are so uncongenial ; and when the impetus which first formed it, or the energy which maintained it, ceases to exist, it becomes the most useless and dangerous of rabbles.

The result of all experiments which the native states of India have made to raise or maintain a regular army has been, and will continue to be, the same. These corps, it has invariably been found, could not maintain long their efficiency when left to the native powers ; and when we took them under our protection so far, as to give them officers, and make arrangements for their regular payments, they became in fact, whatever they might be termed, our troops ; and their being denominated " the army of a native prince," though it might meet the object of the moment, can never as a system be desirable. It must have the effect of depressing instead of elevating the government they nominally serve, and tend by this effect, and the constant interference they call for, to accelerate the period of its downfal.

to our favour and protection, which, without trenching on the right of their prince to raise or degrade them, renders such an act, when opposed to justice, so ungracious, that there is hardly an instance of its occurrence; and in almost every case, where an officer of distinction dies, the command of his men devolves, according to the usage of the service, on the son or next heir.

A change took place in the internal administration of Mysore during the government of Lord Minto, which for a time was productive of unpleasant results. The enemies of Purnea succeeded in poisoning the mind of the young prince against that able minister, who was compelled to resign his power, and soon afterwards died. The deterioration which took place in some branches of the administration of the state was at one time alarming; but as the Rajah attained years, his affairs have assumed a better aspect. It is important to remark, that this change in no degree affected the efficiency of the Mysore horse, which served, during the campaigns of 1817 and 1818, in the countries of Malwa and Rajpootana, with as much zeal, fidelity, and gallantry, as they had before displayed in the Deckan during the Mahratta war of 1803.

It would exceed the bounds of this work to enter into a history of the progress of our connexion with smaller states, such as the numerous Rajahs of Bundelcund and Hindustan, who are

immediately under the Bengal government; the Rajah of Travancore and Cochin under Madras; and the chiefs of Kattywar, and the Prince of Kutch, under that of Bombay. The latter country, over which our influence or control has been lately extended, is the most westerly of those territories which we have to defend. It borders upon those of the Ameers of Sind, who, in 1820, made an incursion into it to retaliate an attack made, as they alleged, by our troops. There was some pretext for their complaint. A detachment, which was in pursuit of a band of plunderers of the tribe of Khosas, who annually devastated the frontier district of Guzerat, had fallen by mistake on a party of the Sindians, who, however, appear to have been mixed with the freebooters. But admitting the facts to be as the Ameers represented them, that in no degree justified the course pursued; and the government of Bombay, which had already expressed its regret for the mistake which had happened, now assumed a different tone, and demanded satisfaction for the unwarrantable acts of hostility committed by the rulers of Sind. This demand was supported by the assembly of a considerable force on the frontier. These measures were carried into execution with such promptness and spirit as had the happiest effect in preventing a contest, which, from the instructions of the Governor-general in council, he was most solicitous to avoid. The settlement made with the

envoy from the Ameers, who came to Bombay, was very satisfactory; and it was agreed, amongst other arrangements, that the Khosas, who had so repeatedly invaded the Company's territory, should in future be restrained from such aggressions.

A political history of India at this period would be incomplete without referring to some events which had brought us into occasional collision with the Burmese government. The recent conquests of that state included the countries of Arracan, Assam, and Cachar; and the consequence was, that, instead of having upon our eastern frontier petty Rajahs, who had neither the power nor the disposition to make encroachments, we have had, for the last thirty years, a state, with proud and ambitious rulers, too ignorant of our power, and too vain of their own, to give much importance to the preservation of friendly relations.

A Burmese general, during the government of Lord Teignmouth, had advanced into the province of Chittagong in pursuit of three criminals. A force was sent to repel this violation of our territories; but hostilities were prevented by his waiting upon the English officer who commanded, explaining his instructions, and pleading his motives. On his retiring, the criminals were made over to him; two were put to death by the most cruel torture, and the other again effected his escape to the British territories.

A number of persons, of a tribe called Mughs,

inhabitants of Arracan, had been long settled in Chittagong; and, during the years 1797 and 1798, a very large colony of this people emigrated to our territories, having been driven from their homes by the insufferable tyranny and oppression of the Burmese government. Alarm was taken at their numbers; the evil consequences of harbouring them were foreseen, and orders were sent to prevent any more crossing the frontier. These orders were, however, but partially obeyed: indeed, the conduct of the emigrants rendered it impossible that it should be otherwise. On one occasion, when a party of these unfortunate people were directed to withdraw, their leader boldly replied, "We will never return to the Arracan country; if you choose to slaughter us here, we are ready to die: if by force you drive us away, we will go and dwell in the jungles of the great mountains, which afford shelter for wild beasts."

About the close of the year 1798, not fewer than 10,000 of the Mughs rushed to the frontier, in a state of the utmost agony and distress. This body was followed by another still more numerous. It is, indeed, believed that two-thirds of the Mughs of Arracan forsook the province, the capital of which was at this period nearly depopulated. The fugitives are described as "flying through wilds and deserts without any preconcerted plan, numbers perishing from want, sickness, and fatigue. The road to the Naaf river (which forms the

boundary between Arracan and Chittagong) was strewed, we are informed, with the bodies of the aged and decrepit, and of mothers with infants at the breast." With regard to the numbers of the people, even policy became enlisted on the side of humanity in dictating that they should obtain at least a temporary asylum; for it would have been rather hazardous to attempt coercive measures, and these, if successful, would have consigned them to the cruel vengeance of a barbarous government. When the question came under the consideration of the government of Calcutta, it was resolved to assign to the refugees the waste lands, of which there were extensive tracts in the province of Chittagong. In the meanwhile, constrained as they were to feed upon reptiles and leaves, numbers were daily perishing. The case was urgent, and government determined to relieve their immediate wants, by providing them with food and with materials for constructing huts, to shelter them from the approaching rains.

To carry these arrangements into effect, Captain Hiram Cox, an officer who had been employed on a mission to the court of Ava, was sent to Chittagong; his character and experience pointing him out as the fittest person to be charged with this duty.

When the last emigration of Mughs from Arracan took place, there were not more than three hundred Burmese troops in the city; and these

were too much intimidated by the extent of the disaffection to attempt to oppose or pursue the fugitives, of whom a great portion were thus enabled to cross the Naaf without molestation. Their oppressors, however, were not disposed to lose their victims, and, having collected an army of about four thousand men, followed the emigrants into Chittagong, and fortified themselves in the woods of that province by means of a stockade, in which they maintained themselves several weeks, carrying on a petty warfare with our troops. The commander of these invaders addressed a letter to the civil magistrate of Chittagong, in which he observed, "If you, regarding former amity, will deliver us up all the refugees, friendship and concord will continue to subsist. If you will keep in your country the slaves of our king, the broad path of intercourse between the states will be blocked up. Our disagreement is only about these refugees: we wrote to you to deliver them, and you have been offended thereat. We again write to you, who are in the province of Chittagong, on the part of the king of the Company, that we will take away the whole of the Arracanese; and, further, in order to take them away, more troops are coming. If you will keep the Arracanese in your country, the cord of friendship will be broken."

To this threatening demand the magistrate*

* Mr. Stonehouse,

replied, that no negotiation could be listened to until the Burmese troops should have withdrawn from our limits, and that the commander must abide by the consequences, should he disregard this admonition. They continued, however, to maintain their post, where they were successful in repelling an attack* made by a detachment of Sepoys; but soon afterwards they retired to their own bounds, and Captain (then Lieutenant) Hill was deputed by the supreme government to the governor of Arracan, that he might endeavour to effect an amicable settlement.

Such was the state of affairs when Captain Cox reached Ramoo, on the banks of the Naaf †, and entered upon the performance of his duties. He reported, that, since the orders of government had arrived for the admission of the Mughls, they had necessarily, for the sake of subsistence, widely dispersed themselves; that some time would elapse before their numbers could be accurately ascertained; but that they were generally computed at from twenty-five to thirty thousand persons, of all ages and both sexes; and that, notwithstanding the relief extended to them by their countrymen, who had been long settled in Chittagong, and by the native inhabitants, who had hired several of them, the mortality continued to be great, especi-

* This attack took place 18th July, 1799.

† He arrived at that place on the 13th July, 1799.

ally among the children, of whom not less than twenty perished daily.

“ I anticipate,” said Captain Cox, “ the sensations of the honourable board on perusing this statement, so afflicting to humanity, and dismiss all fear of being deemed improperly importunate in earnestly entreating their early decision on the means of terminating the sufferings of the emigrants. The good of the state demands the encouragement of cultivation in this fair, fertile, and hitherto-neglected district. I am decidedly of opinion, that the whole of the emigrants should be settled together; collected, they will materially assist and comfort each other: they may more easily be protected from the injuries to which their ignorance exposes them. Governed by their own laws and customs, they will soon be naturalized to the soil, rapidly increase in strength and numbers, and become a useful and flourishing colony; while, if dispersed, individuals, indeed, might derive temporary benefit, but the majority would probably drag out a wretched vagabond life, and at no distant period become extinct.

“ The situation which I would recommend for their settlement, is the district between the Maw Calli or Ramoo River and the Naaf. My reasons for this choice are as follow:—

“ 1st. The emigrants themselves prefer it.

“ 2nd. The lands are almost entirely unoccu-

pied, and nearly free of legal claims, so that their settlement on them will be less difficult or expensive.

“ 3rd. They are for the most part under forest, and being so remote a frontier, hitherto subject to incursions of an active and audacious enemy, no other description of persons would choose to undertake the arduous task of clearing them.

“ 4th. The former refugees, being already settled on the borders of this district, will render material assistance to the infant colony.

“ 5th. The vicinity of the sea and three navigable rivers will prove an abundant resource in the article of provisions, as the natives of Arracan are very expert fishermen.

“ The great, and, indeed, the only objection that I know of to the settling the emigrants in this district, is, that it will be an eternal cause of jealousy to their former masters, and that their predatory incursions into Arracan may provoke an inextinguishable rupture with the Burmah government.

“ In respect to the first branch of this objection, I have to reply, that the rupture was not of our seeking; and humanity has already decided the choice of our alternative. In respect to the second, assuredly every irregularity may be prevented by the establishment of a proper post on the Naaf, and the vigilant administration of the person who may be appointed to govern the district.”

In a report, dated the 18th of April, 1799, Captain Cox stated, that he had registered thirteen thousand of the emigrants, and that he had every reason to believe that there were between forty and fifty thousand in the province, who would come forward as soon as he had ground enough for their subsistence; and he reported, before he left Chittagong, in June, 1799, that he had settled ten thousand four hundred and sixty Mughs in the district which he had recommended. Their principal settlement was named after him, Cox's Bazaar.

Lord Wellesley, in a letter* to the secret committee, notices the recent return of Captain Hill from his mission to the governor of Arracan; and adds, that the king of the Burmese had sent an ambassador to Calcutta, whom his lordship had dismissed with such explanations and assurances, relative to the emigrants, as were calculated to satisfy his mind of the friendly disposition of the British government †.

* Dated 9th June, 1800.

† The purport of the communication made to the ambassador was, that the Governor-general was willing to surrender any of the Mughs who could be proved to have been guilty of crimes which might render them unworthy of protection, and make it the common interest of nations to bring them to punishment; and that all emigrants, without exception, who might be so disposed, were at perfect liberty to return to their native country. A proclamation was, at the same time, issued, declaring, that any subjects of the Burmese king who might thereafter emigrate, should not be received within the British territories.

In 1800, the governor of Arracan peremptorily demanded the unconditional surrender of the Mughs, and addressed a letter to the magistrate of Chittagong, conveying threats of invasion if the requisition was not immediately complied with. The Governor-general, in remarking on this communication, states, that he would have considered himself justified in resorting to arms for the purpose of obtaining reparation for this insult, if he had not believed that the governor of Arracan had acted without the authority of his court. To ascertain this point, and to improve our commercial and political relations with the Burmah government, Lieutenant-colonel Symes was deputed to Ava, in 1802, and, in the mean time, a respectable detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Fenwick was posted on the frontier of Chittagong.

It is stated in a despatch reporting the result of this mission, that Colonel Symes received general assurances of the friendly disposition of the Burmese court, which he had impressed with full confidence in the good faith and amicable views of the British government.

The question of the emigrants appears to have lain dormant for several years; but when Captain Canning was at the Burmese court, in 1809, he ascertained that the king had long entertained the design of conquering the provinces of Chittagong and Dacca.

In the year 1811, the British government began

to experience the evil consequences of establishing the Mugh refugees in a situation which may be said to have afforded them a constant view of their native country, and which was too well calculated to keep alive a restless desire to recover their ancient rights and former homes.

Some bold adventurers belonging to the colony of Mughs, under a chief called Kingberring, commenced predatory attacks on the country of Arracan. This caused the troops of the latter to enter the Company's territory, and much complaint and recrimination took place between the officers on the Burmese and British frontiers.

In 1813, a mission reached Calcutta from the Viceroy of Pegu. The deputies were preceded by a person, charged with a commission from the king to Benares, for the professed purpose of purchasing some of the sacred works of the Hindus. Although there was reason to suppose this person had other designs, he was permitted to proceed; but instead of purchasing books, he spent his time in secret intrigues, of a character hostile to the British government. Another officer of the Burmese king solicited permission to visit Delhi, on a similar pretext (the collection of manuscripts); but as it was discovered that his real object was the forming of a confederacy among the native powers to expel the English from India, the supreme government refused to allow him to travel through our provinces, and apprized the Rajah of Arracan,

that, on his furnishing a statement of the sacred writings, and other articles required, they would be procured and transmitted to him without the trouble of deputing agents.

We learn from the despatches of the supreme government, that, during the year 1813, rumours were afloat of active and extensive preparations being made by the Burmese government for the invasion of our territories. The king, it is stated, was known to cherish designs upon the provinces of Chittagong and Dacca; and all the explanations which, on various occasions, we had afforded as to our conduct do not appear to have removed from his mind the persuasion that we countenanced the proceedings of the Mugh emigrants, a large body of whom, under the conduct of their chief, Kingberring, continued, in defiance of all our efforts to prevent them, committing the most daring depredations upon the territories of the Burmese.

In the month of September, 1813, Lord Minto became possessed of a letter from Kingberring, in which that chief openly avowed his intention of invading Arracan. His lordship in council, who had hitherto acted with great forbearance, and pardoned many excesses of the Mugh colonists (limiting himself to seizing and confining their leaders), resolved to check this bold offender and his followers by a more severe course. A proclamation was issued which declared that, in the event of the repetition of his inroads into Arracan, the British

government would surrender Kingberring and his principal associates to the Burmese authorities. But his lordship still thought it expedient not to commit the government to the pursuit of this course as an obligation of faith ; and he accordingly resolved to abstain from conveying to the officers of the Burmese authorities any communication of the resolution, which might have the effect, as he stated, “ of tying up our hands, and giving to the government of Ava a pretext for demanding, on the ground of our official declaration, the surrender of Kingberring and his followers, should they come into our power.”

The deputies who had been sent from the Viceroy of Pegu, to prevail upon Lord Minto to deliver up the Mugh insurgents, delayed their departure from Calcutta until after the arrival of Lord Hastings, to whom they renewed their application for the surrender of these offenders, but with no better success than with his predecessor. It does not however appear, that, on their return to Rangoon, the failure in the object of their mission occasioned any irritation in the mind of the viceroy.

The principal Mugh chief, Kingberring, who has been so frequently mentioned, appears to have exercised extraordinary influence over his tribe, and to have been governed by an insatiable thirst for vengeance against the Burmese. He collected a band from the emigrants established in our

territories, with whom secreting himself in the woods and mountains, he made annual irruptions into Arracan. The severe failures which he met with, and the dreadful examples made of some of his countrymen, who, though still within the reach of the Burmese, had ventured to support his cause, would have made most men in his situation despair of ultimate success.

Mr. Pechell, the magistrate of Chittagong, reasoning* from the unaccountable perseverance of this chief, rationally conjectured that he and his adherents, after they had ceased to expect success by their own exertions, looked to the accomplishment of their object ultimately through the occurrence of a rupture between the British government and the court of Ava; which rupture they hoped to produce by exciting the jealousy and pride of the latter state to acts which would accelerate the desired war: and of this war they anticipated, that the consequence might be, the conquest of Arracan, and their restoration to their homes, under a government of their own.

If such was their design, no means could have been better calculated to promote the end; for the different principles upon which the two states which they desired to embroil were governed, baffled all hopes of amicable settlement. It was impossible, by any explanatory embassies, or even

* Vide Mr. Pechell's letter, Bengal Pol. Dept. 29th April, 1814.

by limited military operations against the insurgents, to allay the suspicions, to sooth the pride, or satisfy the sanguinary desire for indiscriminate vengeance of the Burmese. That nation, tracing all the evils which they suffered to our protection of the Mughs, could ill understand our representations of the feelings of humanity which made us hesitate to deliver up notorious offenders to the tortures which they had prepared for them; much less could they comprehend the nature of those laws which prevented us from punishing men whose offences were avowed, because there was a want of that particular evidence which the forms of our courts require.

Lord Minto appears, from what passed previous to the mission in 1813, to have anticipated a rupture with the Burmese as a probable event. In a letter* to the court of directors, his lordship in council observes, "We shall not act on the basis of a dissolution of the relations of amity between the two states, unless positive outrages on the part of the Burmese government, or a vindication of the rights and dignity of our own, should, on the receipt of further information, appear to us to render a change of system unavoidable.

"It has been indispensable to protect the province of Chittagong against the inroads of a barbarous race of men, whose incursions, openly and

* Dated 25th May, 1812.

distinctly menaced, would have subjected the country to the extreme evils of devastation and outrage, and our government to affront and indignity. It was a branch also of general duty, never to be omitted, to repel insult and maintain inviolate the honour and credit of the British name. For the first of these purposes, the advance of a small body of troops, and the employment of an armed vessel or two became necessary; and the second object has required occasional remonstrance against insolence, and a firm, but always temperate, assertion of national dignity both in language and measures.

“But every part of our conduct which could bear the character of controversy or contest with the Burmese has been limited to those views, and we trust your honourable court will see with satisfaction the moderate, forbearing, and amicable character of the measures which have been pursued both on the frontiers of Chittagong and Rangoon. They have been perseveringly directed, under many provocations, from a very contemptible adversary, to the end of present conciliation, and the maintenance of a good understanding with the government of Ava. We shall continue to act, as long as circumstances admit, on the same principles; and we entertain a reasonable hope that the late occasion of mistrust and jealousy will pass over without having induced a rupture.

“We cannot, however,” his lordship concludes, “refuse to entertain the sentiment, that it may

become absolutely necessary, at some future time, if not at an early period, to check the arrogance and presumption of that weak and contemptible state."

Lord Hastings, when he succeeded to the administration, though he refused, as has been stated, to surrender several insurgent chiefs whom we had taken and imprisoned, endeavoured, by every other act, to satisfy the Burmese government of our sincere desire to suppress and destroy those who continued to commit depredations upon the Arracan territory.

When these depredators fled for refuge to the forests of Chittagong, the Burmese were permitted to pursue them; but this did not satisfy the Rajah of Arracan, who expressed, through agents sent to the magistrate on our frontier, an expectation, "that the Burmese troops entering the British territories should be supplied by the English government with arms, ammunition, and provisions;" a stipulation to which the Governor-general in council would on no account listen; and all further negotiations on this point were in consequence broken off. The agent sent by Mr. Pechell to announce this result to the Rajah of Arracan was placed in temporary confinement, to mark the displeasure of that ruler.

About the same time that this negotiation was broken off, another attempt was made by the Burmese court to send emissaries to form a confederacy against the English government. These

secret agents, who were in the disguise of merchants, were directed to proceed to Runjeet Singh, prince of Lahore. The attempt was deemed contemptible, and an early discovery stopped its progress. The notice of it will serve to shew the continued and cherished hostility of the Burmese government.

The principal leader of the Mughs (Kingberring) died at the commencement of the year 1815. This event, it was hoped, might aid the efforts made at this period to repress the excesses of the emigrants; and the government, from a desire to establish an influence with them through kindness, released a number of their chiefs who had been long confined, and even the principal associates of Kingberring, who had been sent to Buxar, were now returned, to Chittagong, with orders that after a certain period, and on giving adequate security, they should be set at liberty. This extraordinary lenity does not appear to have had the effect expected; for, during the years 1815 and 1816, we find the outrages committed by the Mughs, within the Company's districts, greater than any in the preceding years: but the depredations of these incorrigible offenders did not extend to the territories of Arracan, and it was therefore not without astonishment that, in the month of April, 1816, a letter was received from the Rajah of Ramere, governor of the Burmese frontier provinces, written in a style of more than ordinary bombast, and

containing a demand for the surrender of all the Mugh emigrants, with a very plain menace, that a refusal to comply with this demand must produce immediate hostilities.

“The English government,” he observes, “does not try to preserve friendship. You seek for a state of affairs like fire and gunpowder. The Mughs of Arracan are the slaves of the King of Ava. The English government has assisted the Mughs of our four provinces, and has given them a residence. There will be a quarrel between us and you, like fire. Formerly the government of Arracan demanded the Mughs from the British government, which promised to restore them; but at length did not do so. Again the Mughs escaped from your hands, came and despoiled the four provinces, and went and received protection in your country. If at this time you do not restore them according to my demand, or make delays in doing so, the friendship now subsisting between us will be broken.”

This letter was brought by the son of the Rajah of Ramere, who told Mr. Pechell that its contents were dictated by the king, and that he therefore did not require arguments, but an answer. Mr. Pechell said he had no authority to discuss the point, but that he would submit a translation of the letter he had received to the supreme government. He took occasion to express surprise at the renewal of the demand for the Mughs,—at a

time, too, when there was no probability of the recurrence of disturbances on the frontier. To the state of actual tranquillity the envoy assented; but added, that it had occurred to the government of Ava that, although Kingberring was dead, he had left many relations and adherents, who would doubtless take any opportunity that presented itself of renewing the troubles, and overrunning and endeavouring to reconquer Arracan and its dependencies. Mr. Pechell explained his reasons for doubting the likelihood of such an event, and recommended the precautionary measure of keeping a small Burmese force always stationed at our advanced posts on the Naaf. To this the Rajah's son replied, rather rudely "That they were the best judges where to station their own troops, and that the king was satisfied that the tranquillity of the frontier could never be reckoned on, for any length of time, unless the Mughs were delivered up." He repeated, that to this demand he expected an answer, either of compliance or of refusal. Mr. Pechell noticed the difference between the style of civility assumed at the commencement of the letter, and the expressions of a contrary nature introduced towards the latter part of it. The Rajah's son said, it was composed exactly as the king had ordered, and requested that Mr. Pechell would lose no time in forwarding it to Calcutta, and enabling him to return to Arracan.

The tenour of Mr. Pechell's discourse was fully

approved by the Governor-general in council, who directed * him to address an answer to the Rajah of Ramere to the same effect, observing a conciliatory but firm tone, and stating the answer to be written under the orders of government. Mr. Pechell was directed to discover, if possible, the motive and object of the court of Ava in reviving the question of the Mugh emigrants.

In order the better to ensure a clear exposition being made to the king of Ava of the sentiments of the British government upon the subject of the Mughs, the Governor-general addressed a letter to the viceroy of Pegu: in which, referring to the demand made by the Rajah of Ramere for the surrender of the Mughs, he observes, "That the British government could not, without a violation of the principle of justice on which it invariably acts, deliver up a body of people who had sought its protection, and some of whom had resided within its territories for thirty years; but that no restraint was imposed on the voluntary return of those people to their native country, although no authority would be exercised for the purpose of effecting their removal from the British territories; more especially when there appeared to be less cause than ever for such a measure, the exertion of the British government having established tranquillity: the death or captivity of Kingberring and his principal associates, and the return of the Mughs in general to industrious pur-

* 10th May, 1817.

suits, having rendered the renewal of disturbances a matter of great improbability." The viceroy was assured that the vigilance of the British officers would be continued, and that any persons who might engage in criminal enterprises would be punished with the utmost severity; but after the full explanations that had been made of the principles, views, and resolutions of the British government, the Governor-general expressed himself persuaded "That the enlightened mind of his Burmese majesty would perceive the inutility of agitating a question, the further discussion of which could lead to no result advantageous to either state."

The chief magistrate of Chittagong made at this period a representation to government of the inadequacy of existing regulations and laws to award any punishment commensurate to the object of deterring the Mugh settlers from their aggressions on Arracan; and these, if continued, he observed, might involve us in war with the Burmese. This representation was the ground of a proclamation, issued in 1817, by which the emigrants were distinctly informed that, in the event of such acts recurring, the perpetrators should be delivered over to the officers of Arracan, to be dealt with as they thought fit.

Soon after this proclamation, Charipo, a notorious leader of the insurgents, committed a most daring robbery in that country. He was seized, with a number of his followers; and Mr. Pechell recommended that this incorrigible offender, with

some of his most guilty associates, should be instantly delivered over to the Burmese government, as the only measure which could deter others from similar proceedings.

The vice-president* in council admitted the truth of Mr. Pechell's reasoning, and expressed his conviction of the salutary and permanent impression which would be made by such an example; but this conviction did not produce a resolution to adopt the course recommended by the judge at Chittagong. A letter † from the chief secretary of government to that officer, states, "That when the vice-president in council contemplated the barbarous punishments which the Burmese might be expected to inflict on the wretches delivered up to their vengeance, he felt that it would be repugnant to the merciful character of the British nation to expose so many persons to the vindictive resentment of their enemies, exasperated as they justly were by repeated aggressions. In resolving to abstain from delivering up the prisoners, the vice-president in council was influenced by the consideration that it would probably constitute an encouragement to a repetition of demands on the part of the Burmese authorities for the surrender of fugitives, and form a precedent, which, on such occasions, would create a considerable degree of embarrassment."

* Lord Hastings was at this period in Hindustan.

† Dated 31st August, 1817.

Having determined on this course, it was thought proper by government to depute a judge of circuit to aid Mr. Pechell in the investigation of the guilt of the offenders; but the impracticability of producing that description of evidence which the Mahomedan law required in such cases secured Charipo and his party from conviction, though their guilt was their boast, and notorious to the whole country. The judge stated his opinion that the utmost punishment which could be inflicted on this daring ringleader for his confessed incursions into the Arracan country, and his robbery of a merchant of that nation, was imprisonment for fourteen years.

After what had passed, it could not be expected that a government of the character of the Burmese should be satisfied with such a result, or that it could understand those considerations and principles which fettered our proclaimed desire to put an end to the recurring aggressions of which it justly complained.

The authorities in England had not been indifferent to these transactions. The court of directors, in a letter* to the supreme government, observes, "We earnestly hope that you have not been driven to the necessity of delivering up Kingberring, because we observe that every Mugh who is suspected of being a partisan of Kingberring is put to death, and that a whole village, containing

* Under date the 6th of January, 1815.

about two thousand five hundred souls, was massacred on this account, when neither men, women, nor children were spared. If, therefore, for the sake of avoiding hostilities with the King of Ava, you should have been compelled to the adoption of this measure, we trust that Kingberring has been the single person surrendered, and that none of his infatuated followers have been included in such surrender. Should Kingberring not have been delivered over to the Burmese government when you receive this letter, we should prefer his being kept in strict confinement, agreeably to the assurance to the Viceroy of Pegu in the Governor-general's letter of the 30th July, 1813." And in another letter*, after noticing in terms of approbation the proposal of uniting the Burmese with the British troops in the pursuit of the insurgents, they say, "We are pleased to observe, that the magistrate was cautioned to avoid using language which might be interpreted by the Rajah of Arracan into a promise, on the part of our government, to deliver the chiefs of the insurgents to the Burmese, in the event of their surrendering themselves to the British troops."

Subsequent communications, however, having evinced the incorrigible conduct of the Mugh emigrants, and the serious results to which their aggressions were likely to lead, effected a complete change in the sentiments of the court; insomuch

* 19th May, 1815.

that, after noticing* the grounds which had prevented the vice-president in council from surrendering offenders, they declared their opinion of the necessity of such being in future considered to have forfeited all right to our protection; and on this ground they desire that, when apprehended, they shall be delivered over to the Burmese government.

In the latter end of 1817, two envoys from the court of Ava to the Rajah of Lahore arrived at Calcutta. These deputies had also letters for the Governor-general, who was at that time occupied with the Pindarie war. Information obtained by Mr. Pechell, at Chittagong, led to a conclusion that this mission was the consequence of an imposition practised on the Burmese monarch by a fictitious ambassador from Runjeet Singh, as well as a fictitious nabob of Gohati†, who had obtained the support of Burmese troops to reinstate him in his pretended inheritance, and had actually obtained possession of that principality. In consequence of this discovery, the two envoys, who were on their first arrival favourably received at Calcutta, were made over to the officers of the Burmese government, as impostors; but the latter do not appear to have attached much importance to this attention to the ties of friendship, and it is not improbable that the imposition in which this

* In a letter under date the 4th Nov. 1821.

† Gohati is a small principality bordering upon Assam, unconnected with the British government.

extraordinary proceeding originated may have been practised with the connivance of some of the Burmese ministers, and meant to cover another attempt to send emissaries into the interior of India.

In 1818, the son of the Rajah of Ramere arrived, on a second mission, at Chittagong; from whence, he informed Mr. Pechell, that he desired to proceed to Calcutta, that he might deliver to the Governor-general a letter which his father, he said, had written under the orders of the King of Ava. Of this letter the young Rajah communicated to Mr. Pechell an authenticated copy. The sum of its contents was as follows: "The countries of Chittagong and Dacca, Moorshedabad and Cassimbazar, do not belong to India. Those countries are ours. The British government is faithless; this was not formerly the case. It is not your right to receive the revenue of those countries; it is proper that you should pay the revenue of those countries to us; if you do not pay it we will destroy your country."

There can be no doubt that the Rajah of Ramere had counselled his sovereign to wage war with the British government; and it would appear that the Burmese monarch conceived that the period was favourable to his views; and it was also believed, that he had an understanding with the Mahrattas. Before, however, the mission could reach its destination, a complete triumph had crowned the British arms, and the Burmese troops had sustained a reverse in a contest with the Siamese.

The course therefore adopted by Lord Hastings*, of treating this communication as a forgery, was probably not disagreeable to the king. "By this procedure," his lordship observes, "I evaded the necessity of noticing an insolent step, foreseeing that his Burmese majesty would be thoroughly glad of the excuse to remain quiet, when he learned that his secret allies had been subdued!"

The conduct of the Mugh emigrants, and its consequences, have been thus fully detailed with a view to develop the causes which have gradually operated to produce serious misunderstandings between the British and the Burmese governments.

The dreadful cruelties which were perpetrated on the conquest of Arracan by the Burmese drove the inhabitants of that country into our territories. They came in a condition which put it out of our power to deny them shelter; and local circumstances recommended that they should be settled in a position favourable for their future subsistence.

The objections to the spot fixed upon were strongly stated; but the agent employed conceived that they might be obviated, and his opinions were adopted by government.

From the day that the Mugh emigrants were permitted to colonise so near the frontier, the natural passions and patriotic resentment of this tribe, our feelings of humanity, and the principles of our internal rule, came in violent collision with the arrogant pretensions, the offended pride, and the in-

* Vide "Lord Hastings's Memoir."

dignant jealousy, of the Burmese government; and those conflicting causes soon created aggressions and retaliations which, it was easy to foresee, must sooner or later terminate in war.

Those reasonable grounds which the Burmese had for discontent, had certainly not increased during the administration of Lord Hastings. No serious incursions of the Mugh emigrants into Arracan had taken place subsequent to the death of Kingberring; nevertheless the tone of the communications and the letters of the high officers of that state became every day more insolent, and an evident desire on our part to avoid a rupture seemed only to inflame their proneness to hostilities. This conduct is to be attributed not only to their feelings of resentment and ambition, but to a gross miscalculation both of their own strength and of ours: and it is impossible to read the official documents from which this detail is extracted without a conviction that the crisis which has since occurred could, under no circumstances, have been much longer avoided.

Runjeet Singh, the prince of Lahore, continued during the whole administration of Lord Hastings to find occupation in the settlement of the Punjab, and in the subjugation of Cashmere and Moultan. This enterprising chief, during the above period, adopted no measures inimical to the British government, with whose strength he had become too intimately acquainted to be easily deluded into

any combination that would hazard the very existence of his power, which, in spite of its imposing appearance, is composed of very loose and incohesive materials. We cannot yet contemplate the kingdom of this prince as one that is likely long to outlive its founder.

The proceedings* which took place at Bareilly in 1816, though not directly of a political nature, are too much associated with the principles of our general policy to be passed over in silence in this work. An alarming insurrection at that city was originated by an attempt to impose a small tax for the support of the police. Such a measure had been adopted in several other parts of the country, and the obstacles which occurred to its introduction had been surmounted†: but the character of the population of Rohelcund threatened a more serious opposition; and, from the day when it was attempted to be enforced at

* A full account of these proceedings is given in the letters from the Bengal government in the Judicial Department, under date the 31st May, 1816, and 22nd July, 1818.

† In a letter, under date the 23rd March, 1814, the supreme government report the progress of this measure; and though they enumerate cases where it produced partial insurrection, they appear confident of its ultimate success. They refer the violent opposition it met at Dacca to the irritable temper of the people, and the perverse views which they take of their own immediate interest. This tax had been successfully introduced at Allahabad, chiefly owing to the good sense and temper of the magistrate, Mr. Fortescue.

Bareilly, the capital of that province, a feeling was evinced which threw the town into a state of commotion: but it is the facts and occurrences which ripened this feeling into open sedition that entitle the transaction to particular notice.

The fullest and most authentic account of the circumstances of this insurrection is found in the report* of the commissioners who were appointed by government to investigate its rise and progress, and to add their opinion on every point connected with the subject of their inquiry. According to the opinion of these commissioners, the choke-daree, or police arrangements, "under whatever denomination they might be described to the public," involved a direct contribution, not readily to be distinguished from a personal tax, and every such tax they conceived to have been at all times particularly obnoxious to the natives of Hindustan. The resemblance also to the former police tax and house tax†, which had been both surrendered to

* This report is in the form of a letter to Mr. B. Bayley, chief secretary to government. (Bengal Judicial Consultations, 25th October, 1816.) The commissioners were Sir Edward Colebrook, Mr. Elliot, and Mr. J. Perry. The character of these gentlemen, and, above all, that of their able and distinguished president, gives great value to this document.

† This alludes to what took place at Benares in 1812, from an attempt to introduce "a tax on houses in certain cities and towns in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orrissa. The character and manner of the opposition made by the whole population of Benares to this measure merit the most serious

popular resistance, was sufficient to induce an expectation that a similar clamour would, in the present instance, also be similarly successful*.”

The commissioners express their regret that the magistrate should have confided the executive part of the first levy of this tax to the cutwal, or native head of the police, who had recourse to threats and other measures, ill suited to the character and condition of many of the inhabitants; and against whom (owing to this conduct, and to his reputation for venality) the popular indignation was vehemently excited. This man appears to have been held in particular detestation by the higher class of Patans, who are feelingly alive to everything which can affect their personal honour, and to whose prejudices the coarse language of a vulgar Hindu villager (for such he is described to have been) was particularly disgusting. But though such a motive as the hatred of an executive officer might have increased the flame, and precipitated a crisis, it is fully established that the

attention, not only as they exhibit the sentiments of our native subjects in regard to taxation, but the power of those ties by which this extraordinary society is bound together. The influence of the Brahmins was, no doubt, considerable; but that of the heads of tribes and classes was still greater: and during the whole period that the shops were shut; and men refused to labour, they paid as strict obedience to their respective heads as if they had been a disciplined army.

* Extract from Judicial Letter, &c. &c., as above, p. 119, par. 6th.

serious opposition to this measure originated in the hostility of the whole population of Rohelcund, but more particularly the Hindus, to the principle* of any such taxation; and that the city of Bareilly made the first stand, simply in consequence of its being the capital of the province.

Some days after the tumultuous meetings at Bareilly had commenced, a petition from the inhabitants against the tax was transmitted by the Mufti †, or chief law-officer, to the magistrate, but produced no result.

On the 15th of April, the bad feeling that ex-

* In a letter from the supreme government to the court of directors, dated 16th Sept. 1812, after alluding to the instructions of the court regarding the improvement of the public resources, and detailing the grounds on which they had proceeded to impose the house tax, and which they deemed as little liable to create any particular or well-founded dissatisfaction as any which could be devised: first, because it had long been established in Calcutta; and, secondly, this particular tax was by no means unknown under the native governments;—they observe, “Still, however, we perceive a dangerous and almost universal combination formed against the tax; and, consequently, against the authority of government: the influence of the Brahmins and Faquiers employed to excite the people to resistance; the authority of the local officers openly contemned; and no means left to government but the employment of the military force of the country, to enforce its orders and regulations.”

† As the Mahomedan law is all grounded upon the Koran, their principal law-officers combine the offices of chief judge and high priest.

isted in the town was greatly increased by the circumstance of a woman being wounded by some police officers, while in the act of levying the tax, by distraining a trifling article equivalent to its amount. This female was immediately placed on a bed, and carried by a great crowd of the populace to the Mufti, who advised them to take her to the magistrate. On the latter directing the woman to proceed in the ordinary course, by lodging a complaint in the Adawlut, or court of appeal, they again carried her to their native judge, who immediately exclaimed, "If such was the magistrate's justice, no person's life or honour was safe in the town, and it was therefore high time for himself to leave it*." He was not long in executing this resolution; and having left his house with the declared intention of making a complaint to a judge of circuit, who dwelt in the vicinity, he most unfortunately encountered the magistrate, who had gone into the town accompanied by a few troops to endeavour to suppress the tumult. The Mufti, who had before heard a rumour that the magistrate meant to seize his person, on seeing him attended by armed men, was hurried into a belief that he had come for that express purpose. The consequence of this impression, which was participated by the populace on the spot, was an affray in which several lives were lost. The Mufti escaped with a slight wound; but two persons, nearly con-

* Vide Report of Commissioners.

nected with him, and under his immediate protection, were killed. One of these is supposed to have been the first aggressor, having cut down two of the horsemen with the magistrate, under an impression (as it is believed) that they were on the point of apprehending his patron.

The mob, who had from the first shewn no disposition to resist authority *, were soon dispersed; but the Mufti, who appears to have continued in the belief that it was intended to make him prisoner, took refuge in a mosque in the skirts of the town, where the green flag of Mahomed was hoisted, to assemble his friends and adherents for his protection.

On the morning of the 18th of April, a detachment of two companies of Sepoys, with two guns, under the command of Captain Boscawen, was ordered to take post close to the mosque. Though their orders were only to check tumult, the proximity of their position confirmed the belief entertained by all classes, that their object was to seize the person of the Mufti; who, in addition to that veneration in which from his age, and the sanctity of his character and office, he was before held, was now viewed as a popular victim, in whose defence it was the duty of all ranks and castes to unite.

Negotiations were entered into with the multitude, who had assembled round the Mufti, and

* This appears on the evidence of Lieutenant Lucas, who accompanied the magistrate.

various settlements were proposed, but with no success; for the proceedings had now assumed a new and totally different character. All sense of injury from the proposed tax, as well as hatred of those intrusted with its introduction, were banished from the minds of the Mahomedans, who, from the moment that an appeal was made to their religious feelings, were alive only to the impulses of a spirit of fanaticism. This was inflamed by the arrival of aid from the different towns in the vicinity, and by bold and turbulent leaders *, till the populace were no longer under the control of those who had first excited them to action. A desperate and persevering attack was made upon the detachment under Captain Boscawen, which had received some small reinforcements; but none which gave any confident hopes that it could long resist the daring and overwhelming multitude by which it was assailed. Fortunately, however, the conduct of the commandant and of those officers by whom he was supported, and the cool and firm intrepidity of the small but gallant band of Sepoys, aided by the fidelity and active valour of some irregular horse, (the connexions and relations of many of those whom they were opposing,) prevailed; and the infuriated mob were repulsed, after an action which continued for several hours, and in which two thousand of them were killed and wounded.

Had the event been otherwise, the consequences

* Amongst these leaders, Mahomed Esau, a discontented patan of rank, acted a prominent part.

must have been dreadful. Enough appeared to shew that, throughout the whole of Rohelcund, there was a congenial feeling, which had prepared almost all the inhabitants of that province to go along with Bareilly. To minds in such a state, restrained by no strong attachment to the government under which they lived, the appeal made to their feelings on behalf of the Mufti was irresistible. This appeal was answered in every place to which there was time to convey it, in a manner that evinced how soon the slightest spark could kindle the flame of popular or religious enthusiasm; and there can be no doubt, from what occurred at Bareilly, that, if Captain Boscawen's detachment had been destroyed, there would have been a general massacre of every European inhabitant in the province, who was not residing under the protection of a strong military force.

There can, however, be no opinion on this subject of equal value with that of the commissioners, which, in pursuance of their instructions, was not limited to the recent proceedings at Bareilly, but extended to a consideration of the effects produced by the whole system of our local administration in the western provinces of Hindustan. Their sentiments upon this important subject were delivered with a freedom suited to their own characters, and to the confidence reposed in them by government. They state in their report*, "That they discovered no ground for the commencement of the disturb-

* Commissioners' Letter, p. 34.

ances but that of the introduction of the obnoxious tax, which they represent to have been alike unpopular over all Rohelcund; and they comment upon the impolicy of introducing that or any other legislative measure in such countries without great caution, the fullest previous investigation, and the concurring opinions of the best-informed local officers. In these remote provinces," they observe, "particularly where the characters and dispositions, the habits and prejudices of the various and discordant classes of inhabitants cannot be intimately known to government itself, the concurrent opinion of the local functionaries, and of the principal authorities, both judicial and revenue, might save government from being unguardedly led into measures, which, at no great distance of time, it may be found expedient to retract.

"It might also be desirable," they continue, "that a mode could be found for learning the sentiments of well-informed natives in regard to the probable operation of any proposed law, in which (as in the present instance) government itself should have no direct interest. On such occasions the local authorities might be intrusted to ascertain from the persons of that description how far any measures, solely intended for the protection and benefit of the natives, might be likely to militate against their feelings and prejudices."

The commissioners entreat the attention of government "to the inexpediency of extending pro-

miscuously to every part of the provinces every law which the local circumstances of some parts of them, or of the lower provinces, may have suggested. The principle which appears to have prevailed, that all legislative enactments of the British government must necessarily be general," they pronounce to be erroneous; and they quote the instance in review in support of their observation, conceiving it to be evident that whatever "advantage the Sudder towns* of other Zillahs † may have derived from the introduction of the Chokedaree arrangements, they were not only needless at Bareilly, but actually tended to weaken the police establishment, which had until then been found adequate to the protection of the town, and had been satisfactory to the inhabitants themselves."

The commissioners do not conceal from government their opinion that both our mode of managing the revenue, and of administering justice, were far from popular with many of the principal classes of Hindustan; and they state their belief that many particular laws were highly obnoxious, as interfering with their national habits and social feelings. They further state, as an admitted fact, that our courts of judicature are in these provinces viewed "as grievances by the higher classes, and not considered as blessings by the lower. To the latter," they

* Sudder Town signifies the capital of a province; a seat of government.

† Zillah is a division or district.

observe, "these courts are hardly accessible from their expense, and nearly useless from their delays*.

The commissioners remark on that indiscriminate and over-zealous "activity with which the trace of public offenders has been sometimes pursued through the agency of common informers, and the summary arrests and domiciliary visits to which men of rank and respectability have been, in consequence, occasionally exposed." This they conceive to have produced an effect in the public mind extending "far beyond the immediate sphere of their occurrence."

The attention of the commissioners is next directed to the effects of our revenue system; and while an opinion is expressed favourable to a permanent settlement, it is earnestly recommended that, as long as a contrary course is pursued, less rigorous measures should be resorted to for the collection of revenue, and more consideration shewn in occasional remissions, particularly in the event of general or partial calamities.

The Hindu inhabitants of Bareilly, who were in the first tumult more numerous than the Mahomedans, were, no doubt, chiefly actuated by their desire to oppose the obnoxious tax; but it was remarked that on this occasion, as has occurred on others of a similar nature, they appeared to enter

* Letter from Commissioners. They add, that their opinion upon the unpopularity of our courts of judicature and system of revenue in Rohelcund is corroborated by that of the ablest public functionaries of that province.

into the religious feelings of the Mahomedans. The cause of this can only be traced to a general persuasion which pervades both these classes, of our desire to convert them to Christianity. This persuasion is kept continually alive by the discontented, and becomes on every occasion the watchword of union whenever designs are cherished hostile to the British government. The commissioners, adverting to this point, with reference to the occurrences at Bareilly, observe*, "That there can be no doubt that some Mussulmen entertain a rooted apprehension of an intention of our government to subvert their religion, catching, with the most jealous suspicion, at everything which indicates to their conception any, even the most remote, tendency to this end; and that, on the present occasion, they appear to have persuaded the Hindus that their religion also was similarly threatened."

A number of persons supposed to have been most active were taken up and brought to trial before the criminal court; but it is a remarkable fact that they were all acquitted † from want of evidence, except one ignorant youth, who was pardoned. A general amnesty was extended to all the inhabitants, with the exception of some of the principal instigators, who had early fled.

When we look beyond the scene of action at Bareilly, and consider the vast numbers of an armed, discontented, and fanatical population, that were

* Commissioners' Letter, par. 51, p. 188.

† Letter to the Court of Directors, 22nd July, 1816.

upon the brink of crimes which a government, constituted like ours, could hardly have pardoned, we must be forcibly struck with the facts that have been narrated. Events like these, which are but too likely to recur, afford, if read aright, those alarming but useful lessons, through attention to which we can alone hope to preserve our Indian empire.

In concluding this sketch of the political administration of the Marquess of Hastings, it is not intended to add much to the observations already made upon the measures which he adopted. The spirit and wisdom which he displayed in the war with Nepaul was equalled by the moderate and political use he made of the success which ultimately crowned the efforts of our arms against that state. The annual invasion of our territories by the Pindaries, and the discovery of reiterated hostile combinations of the Mahrattas, had satisfied his mind of the necessity of destroying the former and reclaiming the latter, either by negotiation or by arms, from a course of policy, which, as long as it was pursued, must defeat every effort to establish the peace of India upon a permanent basis: but a conviction of the expediency of such measures did not hurry him into the adoption of any step likely to precipitate a crisis which he perceived to be inevitable. He sought and obtained the sanction of the authorities in England to the proceedings which he contemplated as indispensable to punish aggression and to give protection to our subjects and allies.

When Lord Hastings recommended his wise and vigorous course of policy, he took care that the government in England should be possessed of the fullest information, as well as of his sentiments, on every part of this extensive subject. This was given in an able and luminous minute, in which he took a comprehensive view of the past and present condition of the empire. After reviewing those ties by which nations are held in obedience, or connected in social compact with each other, he considered in detail the application of those general maxims to the extraordinary situation of the British government in India; and drawing his inferences from lessons of experience, he concluded by stating his conviction of the wisdom of that line of policy which the Marquess of Wellesley had pursued; shewing, by the statement of incontrovertible facts, that, by following a contrary course, we had not only increased our embarrassments, but allowed war and desolation to spread over the face of the finest provinces of India, through the non-exercise of the commanding and paramount power which we enjoyed; and that we were now suffering from evils which had gained alarming magnitude, from our recent efforts to maintain this new system: a system, proved by a few eventful years to be not less at variance with the peace and security of other states, than with our own safety and the tranquillity of our possessions.

This strong appeal to the authorities in England

would not, probably, of itself have obtained their sanction to any measures likely to hazard a war, had not the increasing aggressions of the Pindaries verified the predictions of the Governor-general, and compelled the authorities in England to conclude "that we could no longer abstain," to use their own words, "from a vigorous exertion of military power in vindication of the British name, and in defence of subjects who look up to us for protection."

Strong in the approbation of his superiors, Lord Hastings carried the plans of Lord Wellesley to completion on that very theatre where their progress to a successful issue had been arrested twelve years before. This great work was finished in the spirit in which it had been commenced; and the Governor-general evinced, in the disposition and employment of the vast means which he called forth for its accomplishment, and in the attainment and the use of victory, all the high qualities of a general and a statesman.

At the close of Lord Hastings's government, our situation was very different from what it was at the time when that nobleman arrived in India. The Company's territories were greatly enlarged, and their revenues increased. The Pindaries were annihilated. The Paishwah had been compelled to resign his throne, and to retire to a spot assigned him on the banks of the Oanges. The state of Nagpore had become dependant on the British

government; and Sindia, the only ruler whose resources were undiminished, had shown, by all his acts, that he had ceased to cherish any plans of ambition.

The Mahrattas, from their feeling and policy, as well as from those habits of predatory warfare on which the whole construction of their government is grounded*, were the natural enemies of the British power. There could be no lasting peace between states whose objects and principles of government were always in collision. The first great shock to the power of this nation was given by Lord Wellesley. Their complete overthrow was reserved for Lord Hastings; and it has been confirmed by arrangements which limit the action of their remaining princes to a sphere that must prevent their disturbing, as heretofore, the general peace of India.

When the Pindarie and Mahratta war terminated, Lord Hastings did not hesitate to proclaim that supremacy which now indisputably belonged to the British government; and from the manner in which every prince and chief of India hailed an avowal by which we became pledged to maintain the general peace, we may anticipate the benefits and blessings that must result from its adoption. The principles upon which this paramount power

* For an account of the principles of the government of this extraordinary nation, vide "Central India," vol. I., page 66.

had been exercised are fully explained in another work*. Suffice it here to say, the leading objects are to protect the weak, to curb the strong, and to promote, as far as we have the ability, the happiness and prosperity of all over whom we have influence or control.

Lord Hastings returned to England in 1823, after having filled the station of Governor-general nine years. Differences of opinion exist regarding some minor points of his government; but even if they who differ from him are right, none of these points are of a character which can, in any degree, affect that just admiration which is given to all the great measures of his political administration.

* "Central India," vol ii., page 264.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

LONDON:
PRINTED by W. CLOWES,
Northumberland-court.

ERRATA.

VOL.	PAGE	LINE	
I.	7	last	<i>for Deman, read Dewan.</i>
"	153	last but one,	<i>for Darar, read Dara.</i>
"	284	last but one,	<i>for Minutes, read Minute.</i>
"	349	7	<i>for there stated, read stated.</i>
"	357	10	<i>for Azjengaum, read Arjenghaum.</i>
"	389	9	<i>for independent, read dependent.</i>
"	414	26	<i>for Shirar, read Shiraz.</i>
"	423	4	<i>for Tizhoot, read Tirhoot.</i>
"	442	3	<i>for formed with, read proposed with.</i>
"	464	21	<i>for Nasoba, read Naroba.</i>
II.	81	24	<i>for likely never, read never likely.</i>
"	98	19	<i>for duties detail, read duties of detail.</i>
"	111	13	<i>for compelle dinto, read compelled into.</i>
"	146	19	<i>for give, read gives.</i>
"	ccxxxiii	13	<i>for or him, read or he.</i>
"	ccxxxiv	30	<i>for that it is, read that is.</i>
"	ccxxxix	31	<i>for their existing, read there existing.</i>

Throughout the work, *for Bhurrampore, read Burhaunpore; and for Katmandur, read Katmandu.*