

*Based on the  
# College Book, Calcutta*  
COMMENTS,

BY

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B.

UPON

A Memorandum of The Duke of Wellington,

AND OTHER DOCUMENTS,

CENSURING

LIEUT.-GENERAL CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, G.C.B.

WITH

A DEFENCE

OF

SIR C. NAPIER'S GOVERNMENT OF SCINDE,

BY

CAPTAIN RATHBORNE,

LATE COLLECTOR IN SCINDE.

—◆—  
SECOND EDITION.  
—◆—

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## COMMENTS

ON THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S MEMORANDUM,

*&c. &c.*

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SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S posthumous Work has so damnified Lord Dalhousie, and the Directors of the East India Company's Government, that it could not be passed over without notice. Were it weak and untrue, the obvious course would have been to rebut its accusations and facts by a counter publication, bearing a name of authority. But as it is neither weak nor false—as it is of great power and interest, fear has repressed such an honourable mode of replying, and the following sinister resources have been called into activity:—

At a General Quarterly Court of Proprietors, one of the Members, probably by pre-arrangement, asked the Chairman, Mr. Russell Ellis, “If there were no documents touching Sir C. Napier's book to be laid before the Court?” To this it was answered in substance, “Yes, there are documents, and amongst them a memorandum by the late



“ Duke of Wellington, condemning Sir C. Napier’s  
“ conduct, which should be read to the Court.”  
This reading was apparently commenced, when two  
Proprietors, Mr. Lewin, and Mr. Serjeant Gazelee,  
with a generous indignation, opposed that mode of  
assailing such a man as Sir C. Napier, and insisted  
that, if any documents detrimental to him were  
used, all documents bearing on the matter should  
be presented, and be, not read, but printed. Their  
opposition was effectual, and a large blue book has  
been printed, not published, but printed for the use  
of the Proprietors. Whether it will attain the  
object of the Directors and Lord Dalhousie remains  
to be seen, but a concerted plan between them it  
is; for his Lordship has, at the same time, been  
printing a corresponding blue book at Calcutta,  
which it was designed to bring out first—hence  
the baffled attempt at reading.

Now let this pitiful trickery be considered. Here  
are a Governor-General and the supreme authori-  
ties of a great empire, publicly arraigned by their  
late Commander-in-Chief for mischievous ignorance,  
for factious proceedings, internal misgovernment,  
and oppressive external policy. How do they  
reply? By *reading*, after death, a censure of the  
Duke of Wellington’s, which was never made  
known in its entirety to Sir Charles Napier during  
life, but is now palmed on the public with all the  
cunning and cowardice of dishonesty. Had it not  
been for the manly opposition of Mr. Lewin and  
Mr. Serjeant Gazelee, the Duke of Wellington’s  
minute would have been read, and the Proprietors  
dispersed with an impression that Sir C. Napier  
had been condemned by that great man; yet  
unable, from a mere reading, to appreciate the



weakness of, or to know the grounds upon which, the censure was founded. The Duke's high name and authority would then have been bandied about as conclusive, and a herd of anonymous writers would have been hired to poison the public mind with added falsehoods, offered as fair deductions from a memorandum, founded as shall be shewn on previous falsehood from the same quarters; thus the memorandum, being first caused by false information, was to be used as the authority for that very falseness which produced it: already their hirelings are engaged in such deceptions.

This foul course has thus been denounced by a statesmen of eminence:—" I do not remember a scene more disgraceful to the actors in it than that which seems to have taken place at the India House the other day. Had a minister in Parliament acted as the Chairman did, there would have been a cry of indignation and disgust from both sides of the House."

What sort of cause can that be which requires such miserable support?

To contend in "*blue books*" with a powerful body, having an empire's revenue for unlimited expenditure, with hundreds of clerks at command, secret archives, and no scruples as to suppressions or simulations in extracting from them, would be obviously hopeless and foolish and must end in producing heavy works which would obtain no readers. Nor do the Directors and Lord Dalhousie hope for or desire to have readers; for notwithstanding the elaborate confusion and garbling of this production, in which Sir C. Napier's documents are imperfectly presented to give Lord Dalhousie an appearance of strength, they do not give him such



strength. Any person capable of disentangling a controversy of this nature, and willing to take the trouble, cannot fail to perceive that, even from his own admissions, Lord Dalhousie may be convicted of folly, inconsistency, and double dealing; in fine, that his statements answer themselves.

Sir C. Napier has, in his posthumous work, anticipated and demolished his and the Directors sophistries; but that neither care for; their object in printing their unreadable volume is, to enable their hired writers to foist on the public false assertions and spurious arguments as matters proved in the book; trusting to the indolence of the world for escaping detection, and knowing that it would require at least as bulky a volume to expose the deceptions. They hope also that the ponderous mass, placed in their archives, will mislead future historians; but they are mistaken. Sir Charles Napier's posthumous work and authority as a great man, will last as long as their slanderous records, and much longer than their power will last over the miserable people whom they have, by the inscrutable God, been permitted to misgovern and oppress. Short, therefore, shall be the present notice of their production, and principally directed to the Duke of Wellington's Memorandum, which they have mixed up with their own folly, as spice is infused to flavour a mawkish dish. They have however used a bad sample.

Why was this memorandum withheld in its entirety from Sir C. Napier during his life? nothing but the substance of the conclusion was ever communicated to him. Why is it produced now in all its length and condemnation? "Justice to Lord Dalhousie," it has been answered, "compelled its



“ delivery to the Directors by the Board of Con-  
“ troul.” But where was that sense of justice when  
the same Board of Controul refused Sir C. Napier  
the copy of a Minute drawn up by Lord Dalhousie  
in Council, and surreptitiously placed on record  
when Sir Charles Napier had quitted India, and  
could neither acquire an official knowledge of its  
contents nor place an answer on record, as one of  
the Council. That Minute is now produced, and it  
shall be shewn further on that in substance it  
makes this admission, redolent of folly and treachery,  
namely, “ *that the ration and mutiny question, which*  
“ *led to Sir Charles Napier’s resignation, was not*  
“ *the real ground for the reprimand ; but the style*  
“ *of the Commander-in-Chief’s correspondence had*  
“ *become offensive.*” Honest men and good Pa-  
triot!s!

It shall however be now explained that this  
correspondence, so offensive to the fair dealing  
Lord, was not so from style, but from its occult  
bearing. Sir C. Napier, as may be seen in his post-  
humous work and in this Blue Book, gave his  
opinion frankly and strongly upon the mal-ad-  
ministration of the Punjaub under its governing  
Board, thinking that Board was a free agent. This  
was a grievous error. Lord Dalhousie, while appa-  
rently standing only as Governor-General towards  
the Punjaub, secretly held the Administration, even  
to the small details, in his own hands ; he regulated  
all, directed all ; and Sir C. Napier’s animadversions,  
innocently designed to procure his beneficial inter-  
ference, were like cutting knives or galling caustic,  
eating deeply into Lord Dalhousie’s notoriously in-  
ordinate self-conceit.

From that moment he became the unsuspecting



veteran's enemy, nurturing secret venom, until the Regulation question gave him opportunity to discharge it with an appearance of provocation: meanwhile he poured his "leprous distilment" into the Duke of Wellington's ear! Hence this Memorandum, which the Directors, in their pitiful hatred of Sir C. Napier, have brought forward after death as high authority, though knowing it to have been written when the Duke, aged and infirm, had been imposed upon as to facts. So be it. If the authority is of weight here with them, they cannot repulse the following damning censure of their own body recorded by the same Duke of Wellington, in the prime and vigour of his understanding, and when no false view of facts could be imposed on him. Substitute Charles Napier for Arthur Wellesley, and the letter is as applicable now as then; for the system of the direction is now as it was then, and has been at all times, that is to say, inaccessible to honour, truth, justice or gratitude.

January 1805, Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote thus, —See Lord de Grey's "Characteristics of Wellington."—"In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the King's Ministers have any claim upon me to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the Governments; and there is not a single instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts; or of a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the



“ political, or civil authorities with whom I have  
“ served.—The King’s Ministers have as little  
“ claim upon me as the Court of Directors.”

*Analysis of the Duke’s Memorandum.*

It is with forbearance and uneasiness this document is approached, for to evince irreverence towards the author of it would be neither seemly nor wise; and personal feelings would prompt rather to the endurance of wrong than failure in respect for the foremost man in England. Nevertheless the Duke of Wellington, though confessedly the greatest, was not the only great man of our country; nor has he, or any human being, a title to overbear justice and reason by mere weight of position. Sir Charles Napier was also a great man, in glorious achievements approaching the Duke, perhaps inferior only in opportunity; his equal in public devotion and integrity, and certainly not behind him as to legislation and government, if success be a criterion of merit. Both are in their final resting-places. The one beneath the Cupola of St. Paul’s beside the embalmed body of Nelson; the other laid by the festering corpse of some brave unnoticed private Soldier in an obscure Churchyard at Portsmouth—no mean association for either. Yet the arranged pomp of Wellington’s interment was not more solemn, than the affecting tribute of esteem offered by the countless multitude voluntarily assembled, silent and mournful, at the private burial of Charles Napier.

Both died without knowledge of what either could say in support of their views on this question; for though each has told his story, Sir C. Napier’s posthumous work, curtailed by sickness and death,



was never seen by the Duke; nor was the nature of the Duke's memorandum ever made known to Sir Charles, beyond the substance of the conclusion; the process by which that conclusion was reached was not given. Had it been otherwise, he would have answered it with a force and clearness of explanation which none can now do for him; and the great authority of the Duke is thus brought to bear, after death, with undue weight in censure.

But is this authority good beyond the name? And shall the dead man's brother be deemed irreverent, if in defence he brings forward truth to repel the injurious power of error proceeding from such a source? Not justly can it be so. Yet shall the glorious man be separated from the vicious document, and even from himself, where a want of harmony with the general tenor of his great intellect is evident—a distinction not to be omitted in the consideration of a work, written when the mental beam was hastening towards re-absorption in the divine essence from whence it originally emanated.

An ancestor of Sir C. Napier, the first Lord of the name, a great statesman, and well acquainted with factions, has laid down the following maxims, respecting state affairs, and singularly applicable are they here, in favour of his descendant.

*“ Errors are induced by false information, which is always to be expected in matters of State, where private ends are to be gained.”*

*“ Truth can hardly be obtained, to the disadvantage of powerful men, when such men are the sources of the information on which the cause is to be judged; and it is never to be expected from factious men.”*

Applying these maxims to the Duke's memo-



randum it will be found that he accepts Lord Dalhousie's information implicitly, although coming from a "powerful man with private ends to gain;" and moreover with private means to forward them, having a direct family connection with the Duke, which could scarcely fail, though perhaps imperceptibly, of influencing him. That Lord Dalhousie is powerful as a Governor-General of India needs no proof; and it is clearly shewn in Sir C. Napier's work, that a very coarsely factious spirit pervaded his whole conduct, from his first vulgar insolence of speech, to his final insulting reprimand, conveyed through a subordinate, in violation of custom and of decency.

The Duke's memorandum commences with this premonition:—

“ The suppression of mutiny, particularly if at  
“ all general or extended to numbers; and the  
“ restoration of order and subordination to authority  
“ and discipline among troops who have mutinied,  
“ is the most arduous and delicate duty upon  
“ which an officer can be employed, and which  
“ requires in the person who undertakes it all the  
“ highest qualifications of an officer and moral  
“ qualities; and he who should undertake to per-  
“ form the duty should enjoy in a high degree the  
“ respect and confidence of the troops and of the  
“ Government.”

Let Sir Charles Napier be judged by this rule.

Scarcely had he assumed command in India, when a mutinous spirit amongst the Sepoys was displayed in several quarters distant from each other; a spirit said to be animating thirty regiments and having for object an increase of pay. Overt acts were perpetrated, combination was apparent, the



community generally was alarmed, and all the General officers, and those commanding regiments, were in a state of disquietude, anticipating mischief. Lord Dalhousie was as much alarmed as other men were, while he was near the danger; but throwing all the responsibility of meeting it upon Sir C. Napier, fled from the scene, at the age of thirty-seven, to seek health on the ocean.

He was ill. So was Sir Charles Napier—very ill; stricken at the age of seventy by that mortal disease which two years later laid him in a tomb. No! not in a tomb! but in the obscure grass-covered grave, assigned to him for having conquered kingdoms and governed them with matchless justice and success. Neither age, nor sickness, nor danger, nor responsibility, checked him in grappling with the mischief, and rendering it innocuous; and he then undertook and performed what the Duke of Wellington characterises in his memorandum as “the most arduous and delicate duty upon which an officer can be employed.” Wherefore, on the same authority, he “ought to have enjoyed in a high degree the respect and confidence of the Government.” The confidence of the troops he could not have at first, for they knew him only by name; but with a rare sagacity he gained it by the very measures he adopted to suppress their insubordination.

The memorandum says, that an officer employed on such a service is ordinarily “*highly instructed by the Government, and particularly instructed in respect to the terms which he is to hold out to the mutineers, whether pecuniary or other,*” and that “*it rarely happens that it is not necessary to perform some act, before order is established, which is not consistent with the provisions of the existing*



“ *law, and which the Commander-in-Chief cannot have authority to carry into execution.*”

Sir C. Napier was not highly instructed; he was not instructed at all. Lord Dalhousie, flying to the ocean, admitted the danger, assured him of confidence in all he should think fit to do, and promised him “unreserved support,” even though he should shed blood in torrents. Privately he thus assured him, but, as after events proved, with the design of ignoring such assurances in public, when it might be convenient to disavow them. Let those who doubt read his Lordship’s letters given in Sir C. Napier’s posthumous work, and in conjunction with what shall follow here.

But Sir C. Napier, although without particular instructions from Lord Dalhousie, had received from the Duke of Wellington general instructions, which, as if anticipating the very event which happened, laid down this leading maxim:—“On a station so distant, and of such magnitude and political importance, you must necessarily act in a great measure from your own discretion.” Thus the Governor-General’s private communications, the Duke of Wellington’s instructions, and the exigencies of the moment, united to throw Sir C. Napier on his own resources. Unhesitatingly he accepted the responsibility, and stifled the mutinous spirit without bloodshed, displaying the “highest qualifications of an officer, and moral qualities;” and he should have enjoyed in “a high degree the respect and confidence of Government.”

The memorandum proceeds thus:—“*If circumstances should have occasioned the omission fully to instruct the Commander-in-Chief, or an officer*



“ employed to quell a mutiny, and such officer should  
 “ have assumed authority with which he should not  
 “ have been regularly invested, it is usual, and is  
 “ but FAIR towards one who should have undertaken  
 “ the performance of a duty so necessary, but so  
 “ arduous and dangerous, to examine minutely all  
 “ the circumstances attending the case, to see that the  
 “ mutiny existed and was formidable on account of  
 “ the numbers engaged; the territorial extent and  
 “ political circumstances at the moment; and that it  
 “ was URGENTLY NECESSARY to interfere; and that  
 “ there was no time for reference to superior orders  
 “ on the measures adopted.”

More exactly to describe Sir C. Napier's position is impossible. The crisis of a mutiny was approaching, but had not arrived, when an injurious impolitic regulation, known to few persons, and not at all to the soldiers it was immediately to affect, became, under the routine orders of a commissary applicable to a quarter where overt mutiny had just been repressed, not suppressed. The mischief likely to ensue was evident, was pointed out by the General Officer on the spot, by the General of Division, and by the head-quarter Staff—all experienced men in the habits and feelings of the Sepoys. They with one voice urged the danger; and Sir C. Napier, thus advised, his own judgment concurring, suspended the application of the dangerous regulation, reported the fact to the Supreme Council, and demanded further instruction. He thus assumed a momentary authority with which he was not regularly invested, but it was urgently necessary to interfere—the object was vital, and he acted with a full reliance on the Duke of Wellington's public instructions quoted above, and



on Dalhousie's private assurances of confidence and support.

Now adopting the doctrine laid down in the memorandum, let these questions be answered,—What was the extent of the danger as to numbers and territorial and political circumstances? What the urgent necessity? “What the difficulty of reference?” What the responsibility?

The danger was that of provoking an outburst of insubordination from one regiment known to be disaffected, when the spirit of mutiny was believed to pervade twenty-four others; an outbreak which might draw after it not only the mutiny of those other disaffected soldiers, but an insurrection of the recently-conquered Sikhs—then peculiarly excited by the removal of their Prince Duleep Sing—to be followed by an invasion of the Affghans, and of the Maharajah of Cashmere, Golaub Sing: in fine, the safety of India was at stake.

The “urgent necessity” was the “danger;” the “difficulty of reference,” was the distance of the Supreme Council, with the total disappearance of the Governor-General. The responsibility was the suspending a reduction of the Soldiers' pay to the amount of *six pounds nine shillings* for one month to avoid a vital catastrophe; and that by a man, who was Commander-in-Chief and a member of the Supreme Council!

Having travelled so far in his memorandum the Duke of Wellington complains, that he had, “called in vain for the inquiries of the Governor-General in Council or the President in Council, into the fact of a general mutiny of the native troops, stationed throughout the Punjaub in the month of



“ January 1850, and most particularly the mutiny  
 “ of the native corps at Wuzzeerabad at that period.  
 “ —Yet he was certain, that if the Governor-  
 “ General in Council had examined this subject  
 “ minutely, as his Lordship in Council *ought*, before  
 “ he recorded the minute which appears against  
 “ his colleague in council the Commander of Her  
 “ Majesty’s forces in the field, there would have  
 “ been no want of information in the offices of the  
 “ India House which would elucidate the whole  
 “ transaction.”

Which way does this point? It is undeniable  
 that the Governor-General had not examined the  
 matter at all when he issued his reprimand, for he  
 had not even communicated with the Commander-  
 in-Chief on the subject; but when pushed to de-  
 fence by Sir C. Napier’s resignation, he concocted  
 certain minutes, founded on false data, to sustain  
 injustice and folly. Yet on those minutes, without  
 calling on Sir C. Napier for an answer; nay,  
 taking, as shall be shewn, the most virulent of  
 them, that one which Sir Charles was refused a  
 copy of, by the Board of Controul, as stated in his  
 work, we shall find the Memorandum deciding in  
 Lord Dalhousie’s favour!—Thus, in opposition to  
 the maxim of the statesman quoted at the begin-  
 ning of this examination, “ accepting as truth in-  
 “ formation coming from a powerful man, having  
 “ private ends to gain.”

Sir C. Napier never said there was “ a general  
 “ mutiny of the native troops stationed in the  
 “ Punjaub;” and there could be no report of a  
 “ mutiny at Wuzzeerabad, in January 1850,  
 “ because none had happened there in that



month. The Duke was here evidently in the dark as to facts; but suddenly a change came over him, which his memorandum thus announces:—

“ Since writing the above, I have received, from  
 “ the Board of Controul papers which contain a  
 “ review of the course of proceedings of the Go-  
 “ vernment of India in relation to the orders given  
 “ by General Sir C. Napier, in respect to the pay-  
 “ ment of certain troops at Wuzzeerabad of which  
 “ the Governor-General disapproved and which led  
 “ to the resignation of his office of Commander-in-  
 “ Chief of Her Majesty’s forces in India by General  
 “ Sir C. Napier.” “ A close examination of the  
 “ papers sent to me by Sir C. Napier himself with  
 “ his report of the transactions, convinced me that,  
 “ there was no mutiny of the troops at Wuzzeerabad  
 “ in December 1849, or January 1850. There  
 “ were murmurings and complaints, but no mutiny.”  
 —“ The pay day had not been fixed, the fixation  
 “ thereof might be postponed. But, if the Sepoys  
 “ required money, a measure not uncommon might  
 “ have been adopted, that is to say, that of making  
 “ to each of them an advance on account. In short,  
 “ the Commander-in-Chief should have availed  
 “ himself of every resource to prevent or delay the  
 “ explosion of disorder, and to avoid the extreme  
 “ measure of altering the Regulation of Government,  
 “ which on the contrary it was his duty to enforce.”

Let these extraordinary assertions be analyzed.

First. There is a confusing of distinct matters. The Wuzzeerabad insubordination, in December 1849, was one thing; the suspension of the Government Regulation at that place, in January 1850, which led to Sir C. Napier’s resignation, was another, having no connection with the first, as to



facts or circumstances. The first was a demand by the Sepoys for higher pay, which was resisted, the mutinous spirit dictating it quelled, and the affair settled by Courts Martial. The second was a resolution of the Commander-in-Chief, adopted privately on secret consultation, between himself and some Officers around him, to avoid exciting the Sepoys to fresh insubordination; it was totally unknown to them—a secret precaution against probable danger.

The Duke affirms that there was *no mutiny* at Wuzzeerabad, in December 1849. How is this startling conclusion reached? By a close examination, says the memorandum, of papers furnished by the Board of Controul, as coming from Lord Dalhousie; and by papers furnished by Sir C. Napier himself. What Sir C. Napier's papers were is not mentioned at this point; but in other parts it is said his report of the 22nd May, 1850. Now that was a general report accounting for his resignation and certainly not sufficient for his case, being naturally devoid of details; for he had no idea that facts as to the mutiny could, or would be disputed, and neither offered, nor was called on by the Duke to support his general statement in detail. Hence the judgment here could not have been formed on the whole case, and throughout it exhibits the confusion and incongruities always attending false information.

Sir Charles Napier asserted, that a dangerous mutinous spirit was evinced openly by five regiments; and that circumstances went strongly to prove eight regiments were secretly combined for an outbreak when time should serve; that thirty regiments were believed, by officers competent to



judge, infected with the same spirit, and secret information corroborated this view; that an unusual and suspicious correspondence was in activity between the regiments suspected; that overt acts had been committed, unlawful oaths administered; and that the object, namely the obtaining higher pay or rather resistance to a reduction of pay was one most likely to stimulate numbers to the combination which was evidently in progress: in fine that there was great danger.

Lord Dalhousie assented to this view when personally involved, but afterwards affirmed that there was only a slight partial discontent, no danger, no combination, no mutiny, and to say so was to libel the army. The memorandum adopts his view.

Let the weight of each authority be ascertained and then the value of the decision in the memorandum can be estimated.

Sir C. Napier was on the scene of disorder, and certainly could have no personal motive for pretending to find danger which did not exist. He founded his conviction on the reports of General Gilbert, General Campbell, General Hearsey, and those of the officers commanding the regiments most openly mutinous; on the distribution of seditious papers; upon the administration of unlawful oaths; on the detection of agitators; on the written curses, of awful import to the Hindoos, denounced against those who refused to combine for demanding higher pay; on the general uneasiness of the civil community cognizant of the secret ferment amongst the Sepoys; on overt acts of resistance and violence; on insolent and mutinous speeches; on secret information, bringing to his knowledge that the insubordinate regiments had avowed their intention to await the arrival of



other regiments for armed resistance. The verdicts of Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry confirmed this view of the matter, and finally a sudden attempt was made by one regiment to seize the strongest fortress of the Punjaub, in the most disaffected province, and at a critical moment.

Lord Dalhousie having unjustly reprimanded Sir C. Napier was interested to justify his conduct, by denying that danger existed; but his denial rests entirely upon hearsay. He had gone to sea acknowledging the danger, and before disappearing gave Sir C. Napier assurance of his unreserved support, even though he should shed blood without stint; hence his personal knowledge of facts had led him to believe a dangerous outbreak was at hand—else, why the promise of support? why the assent to shedding of blood? Indeed, so strongly was he imbued with the expectation of mischief that it was a common subject of conversation with his household on the voyage down the Indus: the officers of the Indian Navy who took him down know this. Nor did he change his note, even when he came back from the ocean to Calcutta, until all danger being over, he, from personal motives, shamefully reprimanded the man who had braved and suppressed it, and then, to support injustice, shamelessly asserted there was no danger.

Who told him so? Surely not the officers whose reports to Sir C. Napier affirmed the existence of great danger. Who then could have given Lord Dalhousie information so opposed to facts? Not a name is mentioned, or even hinted at; no reports were called for, no examination took place; no intimation was given to Sir C. Napier that a doubt



of danger had been entertained, until after the reprimand, when his resignation rendered it necessary to suppress the truth—an easier thing with Lord Dalhousie than to suppress a mutiny: The memorandum has, therefore, no support but Lord Dalhousie's assertions, founded upon the hearsay of unknown men, whose position and means of judging are concealed, and their information directly opposed to all the military men engaged in the affair—the internal evidence being in itself conclusive as to the danger; seeing it is admitted that mercenaries in arms were demanding money from a Government of a different race, colour, and religion! These mercenaries, entirely held together by the purse, refused to admit of a reduction in their pay; they did so at different quarters, and at Wuzzeerabad openly announced a design of awaiting the arrival of other regiments to give them sufficient force for resistance: they had agitators, unlawful oaths, seditious papers, awful imprecations—in fine, all the machinery of mutiny prepared. This cannot be denied; it was established by the reports of the Generals and Commanders of Regiments, and before Courts Martial, which condemned several men to death in consequence.

How does the Duke's memorandum get over these facts? By a simple assertion that there was no mutiny! And how does it propose that Sir C. Napier should have overcome the admitted difficulties of the moment, those murmurings and complaints on such a subject as increase of pay?

“The pay day was not fixed, the fixation thereof might have been postponed.” Soldiers of course



do not know when their pay is due! "But if the Sepoys wanted money"—the very thing they were demanding—"a measure not uncommon might have been adopted; that is to say, that of making to each of them an advance on account. In short, the Commander-in-Chief should have availed himself of every resource to prevent or delay the explosion of disorder, and to avoid the extreme measure of altering a regulation of Government which, on the contrary, it was his duty to enforce."

Would not a person new to the subject, suppose from the above observations, that some great error had been committed; that some dire calamity had occurred; that Sir C. Napier had failed to meet the evil and plunged India into trouble? Could it possibly be supposed that he had, without disturbance, without shedding a drop of blood, and at an expense of only six pounds nine shillings to the State, completely quelled this insubordination? But let the course recommended by the memorandum be examined. Take the matter even as "murmurings and complaints." Murmuring Sepoys reject their pay as insufficient, and the memorandum would have the Commander-in-Chief, without settling the question of their demand, advance money on account, as a means of delaying, or preventing an explosion of disorder! It would have been precisely the way to confirm them in their resolution and hasten disorder, by shewing that the authorities feared to deny them altogether: and the more so on that occasion because, as General Harsey, their immediate Commander, had already rebuked and menaced them, the Commander-in-Chief must have appeared timid and



willing to yield. Delay also was what they desired. To await the arrival of other regiments animated with the same spirit was part of their plan, when it would have been seen, whether advancing money on account, in answer to a mutinous demand for higher pay, was a good method to prevent the "explosion of disorder." Yet again be it observed there was no explosion, no necessity for other measures than those pursued by Sir C. Napier. It would seem from this strange doctrine that to advance money in abatement of a demand for high pay, was in the Duke's view, one of "the highest military and moral qualifications, of an officer engaged in the most arduous of duties!" Can we recognise here, the man who with such noble audacity seized all the powers of Government merely to check factious disorder?

There is great confusion of facts likewise. The demand for higher pay at Wuzzeerabad was made in December 1849; and, as before said, was an insubordination put down and settled by the Commander-in-Chief's measures. He therefore did not, and could not, for he had not then any knowledge of its existence, adopt the "extreme measure of altering a regulation of Government." Nor did he ever alter any regulation; he merely suspended the application of one pending a reference to higher authority. The inconsistency of the memorandum is however quite as striking as the confusion of facts, and singularity of the proposed remedies. The Commander-in-Chief should have "adopted any remedy rather than the extreme measure of altering a Government regulation." But the offering money on account, contrary to the general custom and rule for paying the soldiers,



thereby yielding the question of higher pay, would have been also a serious altering of a Government regulation, and one on which he had received positive instructions; for there is nothing more imperatively enjoined than regularity in paying the troops. So also would have been the retarding the settlement of the Sepoys' accounts, and the obtaining their acquittances. These are Government regulations of higher moment than a mere Commissariat arrangement, accidentally brought into partial operation. This strange logic, and stranger modes of quelling mutiny, is however continued, and pushed even to more singular conclusions.

“ I put out,” says the writer, “ *I put out of the question altogether Sir C. Napier's opinion that the regulation was impolitic and unjust: he had no right to consider of such an opinion, and act upon it at Wuzzeerabad. He ought to have given such an opinion to the President in Council, or to the Governor-General in Council, and have gone to Fort William, taken his seat in Council, and then with that body have discussed that opinion. He had no right to act upon this opinion at Wuzzeerabad in December 1849, or January 1850. And above all to omit any measure which would avoid or even delay the explosion of mutiny!!*”

What miserable finite beings we are! God gives and he takes away: an unseen wave of his hand and the glorious light of reason is obscured!

Sir C. Napier did not act, as before shewn, on that opinion in December 1849; he had not even formed it; and he is here accused of an error really imaginary, though the mutiny was not so. And again what inconsistency! He ought to have



postponed the regular payment of the insubordinate Sepoys, and given money on account; anything to delay or prevent an explosion—except suspending the partial operation of a Commissariat charge of six pounds nine shillings! Rather than do that, he should have gone, at seventy years of age, to Calcutta, fifteen hundred miles distant, in the very crisis of a threatened mutiny!—and come back to find the native Punjaub army in arms! Nay! he should have made this journey, and lost three months rather than have given *an opinion* on the policy of the regulation even in a letter. Although he was a Member of Council and Commander-in-Chief, he had “no right” to form an opinion upon the policy of a measure immediately affecting the fidelity of the troops under his command! He might have altered the Government system of paying the soldiers and advanced them money on account without authority; but to suspend a charge of a few pounds against them was an inexpiable offence. He should have “omitted no measure to prevent the explosion of disorder,” except the only one which could prevent that explosion! But what measure did he omit? and what explosion was to be feared if there was “no mutiny?” Why! the complaint against him is that he adopted one measure too many!

The memorandum had just before laid down, that if an officer in suppressing mutiny should assume authority with which he was not strictly invested, “it would be but fair” to weigh all the circumstances, the “urgent necessity,” and that there was “no time for reference.” Well! Here all the officers on the spot thought an assumption



of authority absolutely necessary and urgent; it required thirty-seven days to refer to, and receive an answer from, the supreme Council; and with the Governor-General there was no means of communication at all, for he was at sea. Is it then *fair* to condemn Sir C. Napier, because he did not make a journey of three thousand miles, in the very crisis of danger, to avoid the responsibility of suspending for a month, a subtraction of six pounds nine shillings from the Sepoys' allowances? He had no right to think of it, says the memorandum. His judgment as to the needs of the service, nay! his very senses, then, were to be held in abeyance until he joined the Council Board! But what if the mutineers had followed him in arms to ask for the result at the door of that Council Room! Was not that a circumstance to be considered? He had no right to form an opinion, much less to act upon it; yet he ought not to omit any measure which could delay or prevent the explosion of disorder; that is, he was bound to act and not to act, and between those stools India might have fallen to the ground!

The Memorandum says, the suspended regulation had been "adopted by Lord Gough and Lord Hardinge, the latter being one of the first military authorities, particularly in matters of financial regulation?" What then? It was not finance but mutiny that was to be dealt with, and the temporary assumption of authority was founded on the danger, not the financial demerit. And as to Lord Gough, Colonel Grant, his son-in-law and chief staff officer, who was, it is said, his amanuensis on all occasions, officially assured Sir C. Napier that Lord Gough adopted it under an



entire misconception of its import and bearing. Its injustice was however properly noticed by Sir C. Napier as likely to have great moral weight; seeing that to enforce a measure unjust as well as inexpedient, would be more likely to exasperate men already disposed to resistance than the enforcing of a just measure. To support the censure however, the Duke, adopting the Minute of the Supreme Council condemning the suspension, says that the regulation was not new, not unknown; that it had been announced generally, and even acted upon in the Punjaub. Be it so. But if it was, as General Hearsey clearly shewed, new to those Sepoys at Wuzzeerabad, whom it was immediately to affect, that was sufficient for the Commander-in-Chief to act upon. Indeed, the Duke, in the next paragraph, admits that the original object was to give higher allowances to the Sepoys, but that accident caused it there to lower those allowances; moreover that "it had seldom  
" been necessary to carry it into execution, and its  
" details were not accurately and familiarly known  
" to the officers or troops."

What if it had been known? the danger of enforcing it would have been the same, or worse, seeing that its operation would have been new to the Sepoys at Wuzzeerabad, who would however have known that it went to lower their receipts when they were demanding higher pay. The Duke thus admits the absolute accuracy of the grounds on which Sir C. Napier proceeded—viz. it was new to the Sepoys, and injurious to them: therefore dangerous to enforce.

Feeling here the necessity of supporting his dicta, that there was "no mutiny" or giving up the



argument against suspending the regulation, the Duke's memorandum proceeds in the following manner:—

“ *But it appears, according to Sir C. Napier's statement, that there existed in the country a general mutiny which pervaded the whole army of 40,000 men in the Punjaub in the month of January 1850.*”

This is not an accurate statement. It nowhere appears in Sir C. Napier's statements that 40,000 men were in mutiny, but that a spirit of mutiny existed in an army which numbered 40,000 men, and so existing might spread to the whole: he never did say that the whole army was in mutiny or mutinous, and Lord Dalhousie's attempt to give it that interpretation is falsely subtle, and belied by the context. What Sir C. Napier said was that insubordination had broken out in five regiments, and that secret information, and circumstances of various kinds led to a belief that a like spirit pervaded thirty regiments, which was credible and very dangerous, seeing that a desire for higher pay was a cause likely to spread further, and great prudence was therefore required to prevent a general outbreak.

However, pursuing his own erroneous view, the Duke asks,—“ *Where is the report, where the evidence of that mutiny, excepting in Sir C. Napier's report sent to the Horse Guards? And in the 66th regiment, the corps at Govindghur, which had been suppressed in a most signal manner, without difficulty and without effort.*”

It is clear from this, that the report received from Sir C. Napier, on which the Duke founded his judgment, could only have been the general report



which accounted for his resignation, and it merely said a mutinous spirit had existed, and been put down. That the Duke meant only that report is certain, for he in another place calls it the report of the 22nd, and the Govindghur affair alone is here mentioned in the memorandum. Hence he asks—"Where is the report? Where the evidence of mutiny?" He therefore knew nothing of the mutiny of the 13th and 22nd regiments at Rawul Pindee in July 1849; nothing of the reports of Sir Colin Campbell on that subject; nothing of the measures taken by Sir C. Napier to put it down; nothing of the alarm then felt and expressed by Lord Dalhousie; nothing of the insubordination of the 41st regiment at Delhi, in November 1849; and certainly very little of the mutiny of the 32nd regiment at Wuzzeerabad, in December 1849, or he would not have confused it with the suspension of the regulation at that place in January 1850; nor could he have avoided noticing the vigorous repression exercised there by Brigadier Hearsey, the capital sentences passed by Courts Martial, and the very important fact that a powerful European force was at that station to overawe the mutineers. He would appear also to have known nothing of the general alarm among the civil community, evinced in the newspapers of the day. In fine, he adopted, without calling on Sir C. Napier for information, all that Lord Dalhousie, his near connection, chose to tell him, and even his words, as may be seen by collation: thus illustrating the maxim of the statesman before quoted, viz: "*That truth can hardly be obtained to the disadvantage of powerful men, when such men are the sources of the information on which a cause is to be judged.*"



But was the Govindghur mutiny put down without an effort? Far from it. Captain M'Donald's strength and daring conduct alone prevented the gates from being closed against Colonel Bradford's cavalry men; and the accidental presence and arrival of that cavalry alone rendered M'Donald's resolute action efficient. And is it to the Duke of Wellington we are to point out that there is a crisis in all affairs of this nature, which may, and generally is, turned by the most trifling accidents to a decisive advantage for one side or the other? How did Cromwell suppress the formidable mutiny of his troops? How did Prince Rupert suppress the mutiny of his unpaid seamen? Each by a single act of personal vigour like that of Captain M'Donald. Cromwell seized two recusants with his own hand and shot them; Rupert seized a sailor and threw him into the sea.

But the memorandum says, "*The 66th at Govindghur piled its arms in the fort under its officers, was marched out, disbanded, and sent into the Company's provinces in the very month of January 1850, with the knowledge of the whole army of the Punjaub, and that there had not been the sign of movement of a man in favour or support of the mutinous regiment thus punished and disarmed, the Commander-in-Chief having quitted Wuzzeerabad and proceeded to Peshawur!*"

Would it not be supposed from the last sentence, that Sir Charles Napier had gone to Peshawur *after* the 66th had mutined, with a knowledge of and heedless of it, as unimportant! Yet that mutiny happened the 2nd of February, and on the 30th of January he was not going to, but was *at* Peshawur; he did not hear of the Govindghur mutiny until



the 20th of February, when, *returning* from Peshawur, and instantly took the vigorous resolution of disbanding the regiment and substituting the Goorkas. Wherefore it was not in January but in March that the 66th were disbanded and sent to the Company's provinces; and the whole passage of the memorandum evinces great unfairness, or very imperfect information: the latter undoubtedly, or rather both, for the memorandum not only adopts Lord Dalhousie's reports but nearly his words; and the Duke, writing on false information, was led into incongruities.

Why did the mutineers submit so passively? The reason is obvious. Having failed in their blow, they were, as all men in such situations are at first dejected and crest fallen; and they were on the spot disarmed and put forth under fear of the artillerymen of the fort, and the cavalry regiment which had just baffled their attempt. It is upon these reactions that great men always calculate when they confront such danger with inadequate means. Moreover, the most mutinous, above ninety in number, were seized and confined separately. But if it was a slight event why did Sir Walter Gilbert, the General of Division, ride thirty-four miles on one horse to reach the place? Why did Sir H. Lawrence, the chief of the Punjaub Civil Administration, come down in haste with the Judge Advocate-General to hold Courts Martial? And last, not least, why were troops of all kinds, Europeans as well as natives, horse, foot, and artillery, even the Governor-General's body-guard, put in motion to enforce obedience? It was under this pressure that the General-in-Chief disbanded the regiment, and substituted the Goorka regiment



—a politic blow which deprived them, and they felt it, of the main stay of their hopes of success by mutiny; inasmuch as it shewed the Brahmins, the chief instigators of the insubordination, that their services were not, as they before supposed, absolutely essential to the existence of the Bengal army.

Not "the sign of a movement of a man" had occurred in their favour, says the memorandum. Certainly not: their's was the last display of the mutinous spirit; all the other insubordinations had been met before, put down, and the mutineers punished. Bengal troops only had been infected, and a moveable column had been formed previously by Sir C. Napier of two European regiments, of Scinde horse and Bombay artillery, to meet the first outbreak, and the General officers were all alive to the danger: in fine, his measures had been so well taken that the disaffection was everywhere met and baffled, disunited without the opportunity of combining: the mutinously disposed knew well that the European and Bombay forces in the Punjaub were prepared to fall on them.

But, lo! the deduction from all this is, not that Sir C. Napier was able and successful, but that there was no mutiny!

Absolute, active, violent mutiny there was not, except at Govindghur, and it was never said there was by Sir C. Napier. Passive mutiny was the plan adopted until numbers could be collected for active mutiny; and in that lay the great danger, inasmuch as it shewed systematic combination, and not a sudden ebullition of discontent. But to faction nothing comes amiss. Even the orders he issued at first to encourage the well disposed, and open a door for repentance to the criminals who



had not committed themselves too deeply, are brought forward to prove that he did not himself believe there was danger! whereas those very orders shew, by their caution, how imminent the danger was. He has in his posthumous Work met and completely exposed the futility and disingenuousness of this argument; but it is not the great man whose name is attached to the statement that speaks; he has only repeated Lord Dalhousie's sophistry, and in Lord Dalhousie's words. A collation of the latter's minutes with the memorandum will shew this.

Sir C. Napier's object was to prevent an outbreak, to save bloodshed, to stir up any latent loyalty that might remain, to give force to the fears of the timid and the repentance of the misled; wherefore he addressed the bulk of the Army as good men, pretending only to see criminality in those who had committed overt acts. Moreover, he spoke of the India Army at large—four hundred thousand men—of which only the Bengalees regiments were even supposed to be tainted; his dread was, lest such a cause as the hope of higher pay should extend to all, from the Bengal to the Bombay troops, from the Punjaub to India; and his business was by praise and the expression of confidence generally, accompanied with menaces against the known guilty, to keep all quiet.

This the most sagacious course possible to follow, prompted alike by justice to the well disposed and a knowledge of human nature; the course that all great men have followed in like circumstances, was entirely successful—proving that he exercised on the occasion what the Duke



calls "the highest qualifications of an officer, and  
 " moral qualities for performing the most arduous  
 " and delicate duties upon which an officer can be  
 " employed." Yet the very success attending their  
 display is adduced to shew that there was no occa-  
 sion for them! This alone proves the one-sided  
 view taken by the memorandum; for had Sir C.  
 Napier *been asked* for the proofs and evidences of  
 the mutinous spirit, he would have sent the reports  
 and opinions of all the officers engaged in the  
 Delhi, Rawul Pindee, and Wuzzeerabad affairs, all  
 happening previous to that of Govindghur, and  
 with more correct particulars of the last.

Here shall be noticed a very discreditable argu-  
 ment used by Lord Dalhousie. He said that when  
 the letters of the 66th were opened, not a trace of  
 any mutinous design could be found in them—this  
 was for Englishmen. He knew well that never do  
 the Natives, when corresponding for combinations  
 on dangerous matters, address one another openly;  
 always they disguise their meaning under common  
 place phrases, such as the crop is coming on, for  
 the advance of a conspiracy, and so forth. So  
 entirely is this in their customs, that the circum-  
 stance of a letter, with any plain indication of  
 design being put in as evidence against a man,  
 would be taken at once as indicating that it was  
 the forgery of an enemy: but to return to the  
 memorandum.

"There is," says the Duke, "*no recorded report*  
 "*of the existence of such mutiny in any part of the*  
 "*country, excepting the one in the 66th regiment at*  
 "*Govindghur, above adverted to, and which it is*  
 "*concluded is the exception to the universal applause*



*“ of the conduct and feelings of the Army, conveyed  
“ in the general order of the 16th, the substance of  
“ which I have mentioned.”*

What is this but to say that Lord Dalhousie had entirely suppressed the true facts, “no recorded reports;” that is, none had reached the Duke, because Lord Dalhousie did not choose to send him any, and he decided without asking Sir C. Napier for them. There was however, and are, plenty of recorded reports from general officers, and others; and recorded Courts Martial, and capital sentences; and records of moveable columns formed to meet outbreaks; in fine, all that has been before noticed in these Comments, and the question resolves itself into this:—The Duke of Wellington in England, at eighty years of age, having but one-sided information, came to conclusions as to certain facts—not speculations but facts, which happened in India—directly opposed to the conclusions of Sir C. Napier and all the military men on the spot, Sir C. Napier having been acknowledged the better man for the nonce by himself, when he said “either you or I must go.” Surely to insist on this being adopted as irrefragable authority, is demanding too much homage to a name!

Having arrived at this false conclusion, the Duke terminates his memorandum thus:—*“ I have no  
“ hesitation in stating my opinion that there existed  
“ no sufficient reason for the suspension of the rule  
“ or order of the 15th of August, 1845, at Wuz-  
“ zeerabad. That the Governor-General in Council  
“ was right, and did no more than his duty in the  
“ expression of his disapprobation of the act of the  
“ Commander-in-Chief in suspending an order of  
“ Government in relation to the pay of the troops,*



“ *and in ordering the adoption of a former repealed order in providing for the same object.*”

“ *I regret that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir C. Napier, should have thought proper to resign the highest and most desired situation in the British Army, to fill which he had been selected in a manner so honourable to his professional character. But as he has resigned, and I declare my decided opinion that the Governor-General in Council could not with propriety have acted otherwise than have expressed his disapprobation of the conduct of General Sir C. Napier in suspending the order of Government of the 15th of August, 1845, at Wuzzeerabad, I must recommend to Her Majesty to accept his resignation of his office. W.*”

The frail foundation, the false information on which this opinion was founded, has been already shewn; but it is worth observing, that if the whole matter had been correctly laid down by the Duke of Wellington, his conclusion would be nevertheless anything but just or fair, or consistent with the guiding principles advanced by him in the beginning of his memorandum.

Suppose there had been no mutiny, save that of Govindghur, no insubordination at any place; only “murmurs,” without real danger. He does not even pretend to hint that Sir C. Napier could have had any personal object to gain; and the worst fault therefore that can be imputed is, that misled by those about him he was too readily alarmed. In fine, that at seventy years of age, over zeal in the public cause led him to take an unauthorised step to avoid a great danger, which he sincerely though erroneously believed to exist. That assumption of authority was the partial



suspension of a state charge of six pounds nine shillings for a month! Nothing more! Was that a ground for conveying a gross reprimand through a subordinate officer to a veteran Commander-in-Chief, whose scars, victories and age should have shielded him even from private reproach, much more from public insult, with the added intimation, from a man only thirty-seven years old and inexperienced, that he was never "again to exercise his discretion;" thus rendering him a mere cipher in an office to which he was called by the voice of the English people? And is it the Duke of Wellington who says that so to insult, so to bind a hero almost his own equal in glory, was quite right; and that it was wrong in that daring and lofty-minded old man to quit a command so degraded?

If the Duke had inquired, he would have found that this reprimand and this injunction did not form the only grounds of Sir C. Napier's disgust with his position. He says nothing of, probably because he knew not of the affronts previously poured upon the Commander-in-Chief; the thwartings of his honest endeavours to save the soldiers' lives by building good barracks; the slight cast upon his expedition to Kohat, the "little wars" undertaken in the hills and against the Sikim Chief, without even a communication to the Commander-in-Chief, who would have been condemned for the folly if they had failed. All these are unnoticed in the memorandum, which also ignores all the minor impertinencies, designed to drive an able upright man of character away because he, in the country's interest, sought to amend the misgovernment he found so active for



evil in the Punjaub, and thus unwittingly offended Lord Dalhousie's inordinate vanity and self-sufficiency.

Here then we have the Duke of Wellington deceived into sustaining a miserable intrigue to the detriment of the man he had himself forced to accept the situation from which he was now bowing him out with a censure—the bow open, the grounds of the censure secret; for he received Sir C. Napier on his return with an open hand and brow, and never made the slightest allusion to his own memorandum or to any dissatisfaction with his conduct.

“It is useless for me to go back to India, I have too many enemies there to let me do public service,” was Sir C. Napier's remark when the Duke pressed the situation on him.

A laugh of derision at his mention of enemies, and “*If you don't go, I must*” was the reply.

Sir C. Napier had just right to count on support after that; yet on the first occasion the Duke of Wellington, on one-sided information, supported those very enemies he told Sir C. Napier to despise! But enough has been said, more perhaps than the wronged man would have said himself, if death had not laid him at rest in ignorance of what was to be contended against: for always he looked towards the quarter from whence this blow has come with a generous humility.

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## PART II.

TURNING from the Duke's memorandum, the other documents touching the mutiny question shall be lightly touched upon. Sir C. Napier's posthumous work disposed by anticipation of all the arguments and facts, and the verbose arrogance and vanity with which they are here clothed may be safely left to public opinion: moreover to contend in Blue Books with the unscrupulous body which has put forth this bulky volume, would be like casting up a child's mud dike against the overflow of a river, whereas to float over the inundation while the dirt subsides is neither difficult nor dangerous.

That Lord Dalhousie's reports and minutes were the sources of the Duke's erroneous conclusions cannot be denied, yet it shall now be shewn by extracts from Indian newspapers of the day, that the community at large held different sentiments; and, what is far better, it shall be shewn, from Lord Dalhousie's own admission, directly and indirectly, that he felt and acknowledged the danger at first: nay, all through, even at the moment he was recording his verbose denials. He shall have precedence.



*Indirectly.* Sir C. Napier's posthumous work says he held in July 1849, a consultation with Lord Dalhousie and Colonel Benson, on the Rawul Pindee insubordination. The Colonel proposed to disband the 13th and 22nd regiments, but was opposed by the General on that point, as many regiments were infected with the same desire for high pay, and they would immediately follow the example of those two, knowing well that all could not be disbanded: hence the punishment proposed would increase rather than suppress the evil, and other measures must be adopted: to this Lord Dalhousie assented. Why did he so if incredulous of the general spread of the mutinous spirit; if he did not feel that the danger was one beyond the remedy of mere punishment; in fine, a danger requiring the utmost caution, prudence, and dexterity to deal with it properly?

Again. In his minute of April 13, 1850, page 6 of Blue Book. Treating of the suspended regulation, Lord Dalhousie says—"Sir C. Napier well knows the difficulty of reversing an order issued regarding pay, and he must be aware that that difficulty becomes an impossibility after what has occurred in the Punjaub." Why so? It was a Commissariat arrangement the existence of which was unknown to the Wuzzeerabad Sepoys, and the suspension of which was equally unknown to them: why could it not be enforced at the end of the month as well as at the beginning? What had occurred in the Punjaub to render this an *impossibility* or even a difficulty? The answer is obvious. Mutiny! Fear of reviving that mutinous spirit which Lord Dalhousie trembled to provoke while he denied its existence.



*Directly.* In his minute of February 28, 1850, page 49 Blue Book, he says—"I have never questioned the danger which would have been consequent on such a spirit of discontent if it had not been promptly and firmly dealt with." Surely the Duke of Wellington had not that admission before him when he affirmed that there was only "murmuring."

Writing to Sir C. Napier the 11th of November, 1849, Lord Dalhousie says—"With respect to any dissatisfaction, either in these corps or any other, on the score of the amount of allowances, there is no alternative of measures for us. The difficulty is begotten of the past. Every one was prepared for the probability of its shewing itself. It must be met. I hope this is only a passing grumble, but I think you are very wise in preparing for its being something worse; and I am sure of your doing everything that is right in the circumstances that may arise, whatever they may be. I shall move onward towards Lahore, where I shall probably be on the 27th unless the row thickens."

*December 30th, 1849.* "I am very sure that the course you contemplate is the truly merciful one, no punishment can be too severe for the men who deliberately instigate to mutiny; and though I am as little blood-minded as most men, I should be quite prepared to advise, if called upon, that these men should be put to death."

This was written in reference to the Wuzzeerabad insubordination, which in the Duke's memorandum is called "murmurings and complaints." We have therefore Lord Dalhousie agreeing to, and even urging the putting of men to death at once for complaining; while the Duke of Wellington says



that they should have had an advance of money ! Strange discrepancy as to the remedy. And yet they both agreed in condemnation of Sir C. Napier, who neither shed blood nor advanced money. Why was Lord Dalhousie, while asserting his own clemency of disposition, so ready to spill blood ? Certainly for his own sake he should admit that it was from a sense of danger, or he must be condemned for savage cruelty of disposition ; but if so, where is his after assertion that there was no danger ? *There was danger, and he knew it.* But so far from being then disposed to blame Sir C. Napier he thus continued :—

“ I am very glad you are where you are, and I  
 “ feel quite at ease when the conduct of measures  
 “ consequent on such offences are in your hands.”  
 Aye ! and he felt the extent of the external danger also ; for in the same letter he adds,—“ The people  
 “ hate us of course like Sikhs.” The Punjaub Board of Administration also, extending this view of additional danger, informed Sir C. Napier that “ the old  
 “ protected States were as dangerous as the Pun-  
 “ jaub itself.”

*January 18th, 1850.* Lord Dalhousie writes—  
 “ I looked with just anxiety to the result of a  
 “ measure which was indispensable from the first,  
 “ and I am well satisfied to have got so far  
 “ through it without violence. The Sepoy has  
 “ been overpetted and overpaid of late ; and has  
 “ been led on by the Government itself into the  
 “ entertainment of expectations and the manifes-  
 “ tation of a feeling which he never had in former  
 “ times. I would fain hope that flying rumours  
 “ are exaggerated, and that your prompt and de-  
 “ cided action at Delhi and Wuzzeerabad will  
 “ check all future danger.”



Nothing is here said of the Rawul Pindee insubordination, which was far more formidable than that of Wuzzeerabad, where a strong European force awed the mutineers. And the Govindghur outbreak took place soon afterwards notwithstanding his Lordship's vain hope—which he even then judged a forlorn hope for he thus went on:—

“ If my hopes are disappointed, the course of  
 “ action you indicate is the only right one—indeed  
 “ it is the only possible one ; a yielding or a com-  
 “ promise in this case would be worse than a defeat  
 “ by an enemy in the field, and would make our  
 “ Army more really formidable to us than the  
 “ Kalsa have been. On this point then our senti-  
 “ ments are in perfect unison, and whenever any-  
 “ thing may occur which requires, or would be  
 “ benefited by the support of Government, that  
 “ support will be unreservedly given.”

Here again a surprising discrepancy appears between the views of Lord Dalhousie and the Duke of Wellington. The first says, “ A yielding  
 “ or a compromise in this case would be worse than  
 “ a defeat by an enemy.” The second says, “ An  
 “ advance of money on account,” was the way to  
 avoid the danger. And as for the unreserved support of Government, be it known, and marked ! that it was promised in reply to a letter in which Sir Charles Napier expressed his resolution *to put a thousand men to death* rather than suffer the mutiny to go on. Lord Dalhousie therefore was ready to give unreserved support for the slaughter of a thousand human beings ; but the suspension of a Commissariat charge of six pounds nine shillings for the same object he treated as a crime. Humane



man, and economical! The slaughter was approved of when he was frightened; the money question disapproved when the danger was over. The sick Devil's religion.

In his minute of the 28th February, which has only come to light since Sir C. Napier's death, a copy having been refused to him during life, Lord Dalhousie in reference to these letters says:—"It has hitherto been usual among public men to preserve inviolate the confidence of private correspondence, and to abstain from dragging into the paragraphs of public dispatches each other's private letters written in all the careless frankness of familiar intercourse, and containing probably remarks that would not have been so conveyed, unless under the seal of that security which has been supposed to be imparted by the confidential nature of communications passing in personal intimacy. His Excellency Sir C. Napier has no such scruples."

Had this verbose insult been addressed to Sir C. Napier living, no scruples would have deterred him from chastising the insolence which dictated it; but fear withheld its production until he was dead—a copy of the minute was refused to him!

The doctrine is most convenient. Men in power are to urge on their subordinates to important and dangerous action with private promises of support; and be safe from exposure when they find it profitable to act and speak in direct contradiction, and to the detriment of the subordinate! What is this but to claim immunity for the basest falsehood and treachery.

But these letters were only so far private that



they did not bear the official formalities; they were written upon public matters of immense importance, and as guides for action involving the recipient's life and fame and the public safety. Moreover thus to write was in perfect accordance with the habits of the authorities of the Indian Government; for Mr. Waterfield, giving evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, says, "The Board of Controul carried on an uninterrupted correspondence with the Governor-General and other high functionaries, a correspondence which occupied no small portion of time, in a *private shape*, irrespectively of the public dispatches but relating to public business."

While indulging himself in this arrogance, Lord Dalhousie asserts that Sir C. Napier's correspondence with Government had been "habitually rude and discourteous in expression." Where are the proofs of this? It is not true. As long as Lord Dalhousie preserved any decency of conduct Sir C. Napier's correspondence was frank no doubt, for he could not cringe to official pomposity; but it was always such as became an officer of high rank and dignity, writing in the interests of the State to a higher functionary. When he was wronged, insulted and reprimanded in coarse violation of custom and decency, his language was such as became an English Gentleman of spirit who would not bend to official arrogance and misrepresentation. Here however a new light shall be thrown on Lord Dalhousie and his proceedings.

At page 46 of the Blue Book in that very Minute which was refused by the Board of Controul to



Sir C. Napier living, but which is freely used to damage his reputation after death—will be found these words:—

“ The orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief  
 “ regarding the compensation for Sepoys’ rations,  
 “ even if it had been an isolated act, would have  
 “ required explicit notice by the Government.  
 “ But it was not a single incident. It is well  
 “ known *that for some time previously the tone*  
 “ *assumed by Sir Charles Napier towards this*  
 “ *Government*, in the official papers submitted by  
 “ him on subjects of general importance, had been  
 “ of such a nature as to convince the Government  
 “ that it would shortly become absolutely necessary  
 “ to take measures for maintaining the just limits  
 “ of its own powers, and for protecting its authority  
 “ against disrespect.”

The falseness of Lord Dalhousie can be here laid open by a simple reference to dates. The suspension of the regulation took place the 28th January 1850, and the Minute says that for some time previously the tone of the Commander-in-Chief had become so offensive as to call for repression. Now, on the 18th of January, as may be seen by reference to Lord Dalhousie’s letters, given above, he wrote to Sir Charles on intimate terms, lauding all he had done and assuring him of unreserved support: the offensive correspondence must therefore have taken place previous to the 18th, and was kept in reserve for occasion, while with inexpressible treachery Lord Dalhousie corresponded in the most friendly terms with the man he was preparing to assail under a false pretence.

But there are no communications of Sir Charles



Napier's previous to that period which are not written in the most calm and decorous manner; openly and freely stating the truth indeed, and frankly advising what he deemed for the public good; in short, such letters as none but an assuming insolent eastern despot could object to, if there was not something beneath the style to offend his self-love and self-sufficiency. That something has been exposed at the commencement of these comments. Sir C. Napier, unwitting that Lord Dalhousie secretly regulated the details of the Punjaub Government, innocently animadverted, and was never forgiven. Hence, as shewn in the quotation from the minute, it was not the suspension of the regulation that produced the reprimand, but the wounded vanity of Lord Dalhousie; and all the pompous declamation and denials of danger from the insubordination of the troops, were but plaisters and black silk to hide the secret filthy sore!

It now only remains to shew, by the following extracts from India newspapers, what was the general feeling of alarm at the Sepoys' insubordination.

*Bombay Times*, Aug. 1849.—“The ‘Mofussilite’ notices the unhappy condition of two Bengal regiments at Rawul Pindee, who for a time refused to accept their pay. We have various rumours from Peshawur of a nature still more unpleasant. The ‘unsatisfactory state of feeling’ of which we hear some three or four times every year, will gradually compel Government to look whether the State contains no worthier sons than they.”

Delhi, 3rd Nov. 1849.—“Rumours strong and



“ most unpleasant are in circulation regarding  
 “ certain regiments, under orders for the Punjaub.  
 “ It would be more than improper to point out in  
 “ more direct terms either the corps or the reports.  
 “ Sir Charles is aware of the strong feeling of  
 “ dissatisfaction which exists, as also is the Govern-  
 “ ment.”

*Delhi Gazette*, August 1849.—Various rumours,  
 “ reports, and erroneous details, have recently  
 “ been put in private circulation, regarding an  
 “ alleged bad feeling said to have manifested itself  
 “ in a very dangerous shape amongst the native  
 “ troops at Rawul Pindee.”

*Bengal Hurkaru*, 11th Feb. 1850.—“ The first  
 “ issue of the Lahore Chronicle comes announcing  
 “ very ugly and mutinous proceedings in a native  
 “ infantry regiment. We shall not be surprised to  
 “ learn that Sir Charles is among them in all his  
 “ terrors, effectually to quell the evil spirit of  
 “ mutiny and at once check the spirit of insubordi-  
 “ nation.”

*Telegraph and Courier*, 16th March.—“ There  
 “ are ugly rumours of the 41st regiment having  
 “ struck for an increase of pay, and we have just  
 “ received accounts of the assassination of Captain  
 “ Boyle of the 39th Bengal Native Infantry. I  
 “ am afraid this is only the beginning of the  
 “ end.”

*Telegraph and Courier*, 16th March.—“ SIR,—  
 “ So the Bengalese have once more plucked up a  
 “ spirit although a mutinous one, and have doubt-  
 “ less instilled several drops of comfort into our  
 “ late gallant and powerful enemies, as they have  
 “ the prospect of the same occurrence on a larger  
 “ scale, when the Singhs will be only too happy



“ and proud to lend their assistance. The indi-  
 “ vidual who prophesied that we should have  
 “ to meet our own Sepoys in the field, might have  
 “ made worse guesses. These constantly recurring  
 “ shocks proclaim the subterranean fire which may  
 “ some time or other be only quenchable, if quench-  
 “ able at all, in rivers of blood! In Scinde the  
 “ Native Bengal Infantry used to taunt men of  
 “ other Presidencies with being such fools as to  
 “ submit to the orders of Government. We,”—  
 said a corps at Sukkur in 1841—“ have mutinied  
 “ three times, and always got what we want.  
 “ Why don't you Bombayites do so to?”

*Bombay Times*, Feb. 1850.—“ Painful intelli-  
 “ gence, received from Lahore, of the mutinous  
 “ spirit displayed by the 66th, forming the garrison  
 “ of Umritsur. Something of this sort amongst  
 “ the troops has been looked for for some time.  
 “ Among the inhabitants of Umritsur the officers  
 “ in garrison had verily a very narrow escape with  
 “ their lives, while the Government was nearly once  
 “ more engaged in a siege, if not another Sikh war!”

Letter from Wuzzeerabad, 21st Dec. 1849.—“ If  
 “ it had not been for the prompt, firm and  
 “ energetic manner displayed by the Brigadier  
 “ (Hearsey) and commanding officers, it would  
 “ have come to a serious affair, for it is said that  
 “ the Sepoys had sworn not to take their pay  
 “ without the Scinde Batta.”

*Englishman*, 14th February, 1850.—“ Letter from  
 “ Lahore. Yesterday a force was ordered out to  
 “ Umritsur, to put down a disturbance there; and  
 “ last night they discovered that the Sikhs were  
 “ undermining Lahore. It appears they have  
 “ advanced as far as the Dragoon Hospital, but



“ no mine has as yet been found. News likewise  
 “ came in this morning, that all the timber the  
 “ Government had taken out to Sealkote, beyond  
 “ Wuzzeerabad, for the building of barracks, &c.  
 “ has been seized by a body of twenty to twenty-  
 “ five thousand Sikhs, and destroyed. The guard  
 “ was beaten back, and the European officers out  
 “ there had a narrow escape of it. At Umritsur  
 “ two officers have been killed. An order has gone  
 “ round for all Europeans to be well armed, and  
 “ all the troops to turn out at a moment’s  
 “ warning.

“ A mutiny at Govindghur has broken out in  
 “ the 66th about the extra pay. The commanding  
 “ officer lost all control over them, and but for the  
 “ timely arrival of the Governor-General’s body-  
 “ guard, and two companies of Her Majesty’s  
 “ 32nd foot from Mooltan, the consequences cannot  
 “ be foretold. A little later, and they would have  
 “ given the fort up to the Sikhs and Ukchalees in  
 “ the city of Umritsur.”

“ A mutiny has also broken out in Captain  
 “ Baldwin’s troop of H. A. at Wuzzeerabad, about  
 “ the V. P. in Council’s order raising the price  
 “ of rum. They will have their grog, and *not*  
 “ beer.

“ The Board of Administration has issued  
 “ orders to all politicals and civilians in the  
 “ Punjaub, not to venture out into their respec-  
 “ tive districts without an escort for fear of assas-  
 “ sination.”

*Englishman*, 15th February, 1850.—“ News  
 “ from the Punjaub and in the Lahore Gazette,  
 “ shews the fires are not yet extinct, though smoul-  
 “ dering beneath the ashes. Any insubordination on



“ the part of our own troops will be taken  
 “ advantage of; had the fort of Govindghur been  
 “ handed over to the Sikh soldiery, nothing is more  
 “ probable than that another general insurrection  
 “ would have ensued.” A Lahore correspondent  
 says:—“ The 66th endeavoured to seize the fort,  
 “ a messenger was instantly dispatched to Lahore,  
 “ Sir Walter was at dinner, but immediately rose  
 “ with his A. D. C., they buckled on their swords,  
 “ mounted their horses, and leaving directions for  
 “ some guns to follow, galloped to the scene of  
 “ strife. Sir Walter galloped thirty-four miles on  
 “ one horse. The Sikh Regiment at Umritsur, and  
 “ the Singhs within the city would have joined the  
 “ Sepoyrevolt, and given the signal for another effort  
 “ to destroy the Feringhee power in the Punjaub.”

*Englishman*, 21st Feb. 1850.—“ The mutiny in  
 “ the 66th Native Infantry was general throughout  
 “ from top to bottom. A similar spirit of insubordi-  
 “ nation has been reported among other regiments,  
 “ arising from the same cause.”

*Bombay Times*, 3rd Dec. 1849.—A distinguished  
 officer of the Bengal Council of Administration  
 has expressed himself thus, conveying anticipation  
 of a future struggle, as fierce if not sanguinary as  
 any we have yet entered on:—“ I entertain no  
 “ fear for the peace of the country between the  
 “ Chenaub and the Sutlej, but beyond the former  
 “ there exists a formidable and increasing dislike  
 “ to our rule and distrust of our pacifying  
 “ measures. Conspiracies, only not dangerous  
 “ because ill-conceived, have been discovered  
 “ several times. At the slightest call of a man  
 “ of name, the barbarous population would rush  
 “ to arms.” This was the country in which



soldiers' demands for higher pay were to be met by advancing money!

These testimonies, which might be greatly multiplied if necessary, shew that the Civil community agreed with the Military men, and with Lord Dalhousie himself, as to the serious nature of the insubordination, when the latter, at the age of thirty-seven, disappeared from the scene of danger to seek health on the ocean, leaving Sir C. Napier at seventy, and in far worse health than himself, to confront it: but returning when peril was past to insult and defame the Veteran who had meantime saved him and India from a dire misfortune! Defamed and insulted him for acting on a principle which Lord Dalhousie was at the very time claiming credit for supporting himself—namely, overstepping legal authority in the interests of the State. Thus it is shewn:—

At page 254, para. 25, of the Blue Book this inconsistent Lord will be found using these words touching the height of barrack-rooms:— The “Honourable the Court of Directors object to the extra dimensions of such buildings, and the Governor-General considers it his duty to conform to their wishes, when he can do so, without injury to their own interests.” The line of public duty is here forcibly laid down, and applies exactly to Sir C. Napier's suspension of the Government regulation at Wuzzeerabad. He could not enforce it without danger of immediate and terrible injury to the interests of the Government: it was his duty therefore to suspend its action.

Now, let this question be looked at as a whole and broadly; for hitherto it has been treated only in detail.



Sir C. Napier, sent out with the acclamations of the people of England to save India at a moment of peril—Sir C. Napier, told by the Duke of Wellington that such was the necessity of the state, one of them must go to the East—Sir C. Napier, thus sent forth by his country and his country's greatest man, found himself on arrival involved in a greater peril than war—mutiny! He apprehended great danger, all the military men around him, all those connected with the insubordinate soldiery did the same; so did the community at large; and the Governor-General was as apprehensive as the rest but disappeared, leaving on record an avowal of his fears, and his confidence in the General who remained: in that record giving also his assurances of entire support.

In the course of his arduous task Sir C. Napier became convinced that a commissariat charge of a few pounds accidentally brought into operation, would excite the discontented Sepoys to an outbreak, and all the officers around him thought so likewise; they may have been mistaken, although every thing goes to prove they were not; but they acted on conviction, and the regulation clause was suspended for a reference to superior authority. For that Sir C. Napier was grossly reprimanded and insulted, and so restricted as to the future exercise of any discretion however imminent the peril and necessity might be, that he could not with honour or safety retain his high office, and therefore resigned.

Lord Dalhousie, the author of that insult, in concert and combination with the Directors of the East India Company, now prints and circulates, after Sir C. Napier's death, with all pitiful cunning



and variety of crooked ways to give it undue importance, a huge folio volume, filled with official verbosity and official documents, some of which the dead man never saw, to prove that it was right and just so to insult and maltreat him: dragging in a censure of the Duke of Wellington—founded on false information supplied by themselves—as a support to that same information by which in another form they had first misled the Duke to a false conclusion! Will not true English honour and feeling reject with loathing a cause so foul, so conducted, so supported? Springing from an inflated brain, without the ballast of a heart, it may float awhile in the atmosphere of faction, elsewhere it will collapse. Were it just and truly maintained it would be ungenerous, seeing how small the error could have been; but as it is unjust and untrue, and comes from those who have so largely profited from the dead hero's services, it is singularly infamous.

Lord Dalhousie has, so late as the 22nd of November, 1853, recorded a minute of council, in which, with reference to Sir Charles Napier's posthumous work, he says, "It contains much injurious misrepresentations regarding my conduct towards him."

Had he written injurious representations the facts would have been undeniable: he is injured in the opinion of honourable men beyond reparation, but by his own acts: it is false to say he has been misrepresented.

He adds, "Sir Charles Napier has gone to his grave; and I shall put forth no reply, either now or hereafter, to the personal attack he has left behind him."



Why? Because his case is naught, like his reputation; like his war against Sikkim, where pompous words would not sweep away jungle and he remained insulted and defied.

HE WILL NOT BECAUSE HE CANNOT!

Injurious misrepresentations! What were his own communications to the Duke of Wellington? What his present publications, so cunningly devised and concerted with the Directors, to be read at the India House, but published at Calcutta—to be supported in England by anonymous knaves, but commented upon in his favour openly by the press of India, where only The “Bombay Gazette,” “Englishman,” and “Eastern Star,” appear to have expressed honest opinions. Why this fawning? The answer is to be found in the “Times,” February 2nd, 1854, where it will be seen that the Select Committee on Indian Territories records that the Indian Newspapers are by bribery and terror rendered subservient to the Government; those who are docile being rewarded with patronage, money, and exclusive intelligence. And it is through such sewers, such edicts of filth and falsehood, that Lord Dalhousie has been pouring forth abuse of Sir C. Napier, and sickening praise of himself all over India, while complaining of misrepresentations, and in Council proclaiming that he will not reply! No. He prefers, as safer, every sinister method that malignant dishonesty can suggest.

In ancient times, combatants over a fallen warrior, never sought to deface the body with dishonest wounds. Lord Dalhousie “has no such scruples.” India, from fear of his power and spiteful disposition, may for a time seem to accept



these practices for fair dealings, but even there they will eventually recoil on himself; and meanwhile the people of England, repulsing them with contempt, will accept, not his falsifications of facts, but the following sad, yet true summary of Sir C. Napier's conduct, addressed to the writer of these comments by a younger brother; the youngest now, for he who was so by birth, followed in a few weeks the eldest to another world:—

“ To his sense of duty, even towards those who  
“ wronged him, our brother sacrificed high rank  
“ and great wealth; for his spirit was higher than  
“ his rank, and his integrity refused to wear even  
“ golden fetters. He soon found a grave: for  
“ though his services and his exploits were slighted,  
“ or but slightly remembered by Governments, the  
“ toilsome days, the watchful nights, the wasting  
“ anxieties, the wounds and the diseases through  
“ which he wrought out such noble ends were not  
“ forgotten by death.”

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## PART III.

The question of the mutiny having been disposed of generally and in detail, it remains to treat of the other documents crowded into the Blue Book, as if they were replies to Sir C. Napier's Work, whereas they are mere exhibitions of self-laudation on the part of Lord Dalhousie, of the Directors, and of the Punjaub Board of Administration. Tedious they are and confusing; designedly so, being copious without object, and where they have an object, as in the defence of the Punjaub Administration, so ignorantly false as to excite pity. A multitude of reports, investigations, orders and assertions about the barracks in India, fill many pages, but may be thus disposed of. Sir C. Napier, in his posthumous Work, says that the barracks of India are murderously bad; that he endeavoured to remedy the evil, but failed because the Directors were indifferent and parsimonious; because Lord Dalhousie talked, referred, and wrote where Lord Ellenborough would have acted, and thus the soldiers died of "red tape."

Now the Blue Book bears ample testimony to the exact justice of these remarks, for the Directors and the Governor-General, indeed every person



figuring in this voluminous mass of documents, profess the utmost anxiety to forward the soldier's comfort—on paper; but it is admitted by Lord Dalhousie that while Sir C. Napier fixed the minimum height, consistent with health, for barrack rooms at thirty feet, the Directors and the Military Board adopted twenty feet, and the Governor-General twenty-four; a nice steering between safety and wholesale killing; an inch-by-inch destruction with a toll of intervening misery from sickness for a slight prolongation of life. However, notwithstanding all this nicety and compassionate consideration; this prudent avoiding of expenses, and the voluminous documents proving the tenderness of the authorities for the soldiers; the barracks at Aden are still of mats; the Colaba barracks still require planks to keep the men out of the water; the hundreds of the 50th regiment, men, women and children crushed at Loodiana, lie in their graves; pestilence still decimates the regiments at Peshawur, and, with a few exceptions, the barracks of India are pest houses. Those commenced by Sir C. Napier on a salutary scale, have been altered or stopped, verbose pomposity is substituted, and the troops continue to die of red tape and Dalhousiesm.

The justification of the Punjaub Administration is, as might be expected, a very grave matter, filled with wise saws, historical reference, and legislative philosophy. It is a memorandum signed by the Members of the Board of Administration, but called for by Lord Dalhousie, and not unlikely dictated by him. It may, from the fact mentioned before of his secret management of that province, be certainly considered his defence, and



truly it bears his mark, being for pompous inanity and ignorance very remarkable; wounded vanity is apparent throughout. Although signed by Sir Henry Laurence, himself an officer, it is filled with civilian laudation of civil Government, in contradistinction to military Government; and with the peculiar logic of the class assumes, because civil Government is abstractedly a better permanent system of ruling than military Government, which nobody ever denied, that all civilians are born capable of governing, and all military men incapable.

It is often asked by complacent civil logicians of this class,—Would a General admit the qualification of a Bishop to command an army? No! Nor the qualifications of any other purely professional man, until he were tried. Neither would an officer, without study pretend to vie with a Prelate in divinity, or a Barrister-at-law; but what is to bar an officer from studying the general principles of Government, and understanding them as well as a snipe shooting, curry composing, beer drinking, cigar smoking, civil servant of the East India Company? An able civilian must be an able man, so must an able officer be—and surely he can compete with East India Directors in the art of ruling! He has brains for thought as well as them, a wider acquaintance with various men and countries, and adds, what they have not, a knowledge of the military art—no small portion of the very system of civil Government he is said to be incapable of conducting.

There is a deal of bald, disjointed talk in this memorandum about civil observances, useful civil dilatoriness in opposition to military promptitude,



about civil checks and counter checks, knowledge of customs and languages; in fine, all manner of excellence in governing is assumed as belonging to the system of the Punjaub which Sir C. Napier condemned; and in revenge for his censure, all sorts of evils and misgovernments are attributed to his Government of Scinde and enumerated. But if the writers of the Memorandum know as little of their own Government as they do of Scinde; and are as reckless and unscrupulous in announcing its merits as they are in denouncing Sir C. Napier's demerits, they are the greatest political impostors that ever drew salaries under false pretences.

The exposure which shall now attend their memorandum will shew how a Blue Book may be got up, and give a measure of the truth and value of Lord Dalhousie's defence and accusations, and of the contemptible trickery by which he and the Directors, and their satellites, are attempting to deceive the public on this occasion. Meanwhile, it may be asked, if amongst the vaunted civil checks of the Punjaub system is reckoned, the throwing of books and other articles at the heads of Indian gentlemen in Durbar; the depriving the Affreedees of their chief means of living by a prohibitive imposition on salt; the burning of villages and driving women and children to perish of cold and famine, and the excitement of a 'five years' war with the mountain tribes who were willing to be friendly? We may likewise ask whether the following contrast between the Military Governor of Scinde and the Civil Governor-General of the Punjaub is in favour of the latter?

Sir C. Napier travelled throughout Scinde with



an escort of cavalry kept in strict discipline and paying for everything required. He and his staff rode, two camels carried their baggage and the archives, and at night he slept in a small tent with a valise or box for a pillow. His journey was one of inspection and reform; he held Dhurbars, received petitioners in person and threw nothing at their heads; he attended to all appeals, redressed grievances, put down robbery and slavery, and reduced many taxes found to bear hardly on the people. Let this stand beside a journey of Lord Dalhousie's in 1850, thus described in the "Bengal Hurkaru," which takes it from the "Delhi Gazette."

The Vice-Regal Progress.—A correspondent, writing from Simla, upon the subject of the Governor-General, after reciting several items of current belief, which he requests us to understand that he will not subscribe to, goes on to observe:—But "what I *do* mean to say is, that his VICE-REGAL PRESENCE IS AN AWFUL SCOURGE TO THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE. His establishment is composed of all the blackguard riff-raff of Calcutta, and under the covering of their red and gold liveries, these fellows commit the most diabolical enormities. You are aware that the very time selected for the Vice-Regal march from China to Simla, was of all seasons the most important one to the cultivators of the soil. It was the season at which the 'Kurreef' crops required watching, prior to cutting down, and at which the 'Rubbee' sowings ought to take place! But not a particle of consideration was shewn to the poor creatures, whose ALL depended upon their presence with their fields. They were dragged by thousands, by the Commissioners' Chuprassees, away from



“ their homes, and kept for weeks in herds and  
“ droves of four or five hundred each, at every ten  
“ miles of the road by which the Governor-General  
“ was about to return.”

“ Gentlemen travelling along that road have  
“ told me that these poor creatures were in the  
“ plight which you may remember a Smithfield  
“ flock of sheep to have been when well worried  
“ and driven along by the drovers and dogs. You  
“ may imagine, Sir, that all this was necessary for  
“ the carriage required by Lord and Lady Dal-  
“ housie. Not a whit of it; and were there honest  
“ straightforward people about them, who would  
“ take the trouble to point out the iniquities their  
“ progress occasioned, I doubt not that they would  
“ have interfered, or at least seen that these Coolies  
“ were recompensed for their losses. But Coolies  
“ in such vast numbers were not wanted, although  
“ labour was found for them by the Government  
“ House Khidmutgars and Methers, who made  
“ these people carry them and their paraphernalia  
“ along the road!

“ You will not believe this probably though I  
“ never yet deceived you. But the menials be-  
“ longing to Lord Dalhousie's establishment have  
“ been seen carried down the hills in chairs sup-  
“ ported by poles, each of which requires six or  
“ eight Coolies to convey them. The progress is  
“ however not yet over; it has still to carry on its  
“ ravages towards Bhuddee, and if *en route*, every  
“ observer should see loads of charcoal, potatoes,  
“ and empty bottles being carried by these Coolies,  
“ who are dragged away from their fields; and if  
“ he were to ask whose things they were, he would  
“ be told that they were the private ventures of



“ the Government House servants. There is an  
 “ old story, that Lord Hastings’ Khansama earned  
 “ three thousand a month by making villagers be-  
 “ lieve, that unless a good bribe were given by  
 “ them the Lord would require a fat child to be  
 “ killed for his breakfast. In different ways the  
 “ Vice Regal retainers render their progress  
 “ through the country more pernicious than a  
 “ flight of locusts.”

Happy must India be under such civil checks and civil progress! But miserable Scinde languished under the military despotism of the war-worn Napier. No sort of oppression was wanting to it, if the memorandum on the Punjaub Administration is to be taken as a guide; but its vaunting ignorance has drawn forth the following letter from a gentleman, able from his experience of Scinde as a Collector to expose its fallacies; and he has done so in a way to convince all persons that the so called Blue Book is as deep a black as can be produced by malignity and falseness. One observation only shall be added here to his letter, namely, that the memorandum pointedly remarks, that amongst the facilities Sir C. Napier possessed over the Punjaub Board for governing was the great number of soldiers at his command for aiding the police! Will it be credited that the troops in Scinde amounted on an average to six or seven thousand and that the troops in the Punjaub reached *seventy thousand*! Such is the nature of Lord Dalhousie’s publications.

Letter from Captain Rathborne, late Collector and Magistrate in Scinde, to Lieut.-General Sir W. Napier.

15, *St. James’s Square*, 15th Jan. 1854.—My dear



Sir,—Agreeably to your request, I have the pleasure to send you my copy of the Blue Book, printed for the proprietors of India stock, and which I received at the India House the day before yesterday. You will find on perusal, that this Blue Book is divided into three parts. The first contains the papers relative to the resignation, by Sir Charles Napier, of the office of Commander-in-Chief; the second, those regarding his report on the military occupation of India; the third and last, papers referring to the construction and sites of barracks for the use of European troops.

Into the questions contained in the first and third part of this book it is not my intention to enter. Having had no official connection with the matters they relate to, anything I could say would consist merely of deductions made from the printed papers; deductions which you are infinitely more capable of making for yourself than I am; for added to your own great military experience, you have your brother's private papers to refer to, and must be as fully acquainted with his sentiments on all points as he was himself. What you may have to say on this subject will come before the world with all the general weight of authority due to the historian of the war in the Peninsula, and with all the personal weight of authority due to Sir Charles Napier, if he were alive to meet his foes in person.

The same reason that induces silence on my part, as to the first and third portions of the printed Blue Book, must also prevent my entering into any of that part of the second portion, which relates strictly to the military occupation of India. I may entertain my own views upon the subject, but I am not an authority on military affairs, and



to say anything therefore, on this point to a person of your competence would be going wholly beyond my province.

The published papers, however, are not limited to the discussion of the questions above indicated; they also enter collaterally into a long discussion upon the Government of Scinde—and as the remarks made by the Board of Administration for the Punjaub on the subject are replete with misrepresentations of what is true, and with allegations of what is wholly the reverse of truth, it does seem to me to be a duty to my late Chief to point out their errors; leaving you to make such use of the information I furnish you with as you may deem fit—for in regard to this point I am not only a competent evidence, but the most competent now existing, as must be admitted by all who are personally acquainted with India, or who have read your “HISTORY OF SIR CHARLES NAPIER’S ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.”

The first point to be noticed in this memorandum of the Punjaub Board is the estimate, made in paragraph 62 and at page 114 of the Blue Book, in which the population of Scinde is assumed to amount to only a million souls. The last census gave twelve hundred and fifty thousand I believe, for that part strictly British; and my own impression is that even this number is greatly under the mark. However, it is not meant to convey any imputation on the Board in respect of this error, because the population estimates of Scinde have been so various as to make error in that respect excusable. This is to be remarked, however, that scantiness of population does not diminish the difficulties of a police, but on the contrary greatly



increases them, particularly if it be, as in Scinde, the rural population, or rather robbers located at a distance from cities, who are the perpetrators of nearly all the crimes committed; the great difficulty the Scinde police had to contend with was the fact of the province being surrounded on every side by foreign states, with large desert tracts between—tracts which it was almost impossible to guard at all points, while in them many of these people resided, and towards them, when pursued, they almost invariably fled.

The Board, in the same paragraph, speaks of the large military force under Sir Charles Napier, and of his locating them in such a manner as to render an active support to the police of Scinde. But the Board seem to forget that on no single occasion were the military ever called upon to assist the police in Scinde; and that during the most dangerous crisis for India, namely, the first Sikh war, Sir Charles almost denuded the province of troops, leaving the maintenance of order entirely to the police. At Hydrabad, if I remember rightly, there was only a wing of a native regiment left; but whatever the exact number it was not more than enough for ordinary camp guards on the most reduced scale, and could have afforded no assistance whatever in putting down disorder except in the immediate neighbourhood. The police were entrusted entirely with the duty of preserving the peace; and the good feeling which Sir Charles Napier's wise system of Government had engendered, both among the Belooch nobility and the people, enabled the police successfully to perform their task.

The arguments used by the Board in their 63rd and 64th paragraphs, against a military police,



may be taken as a fair specimen of civilian reasoning against every improvement for India that is ever proposed. Suffice it to say, that the superior efficiency of the Scinde police, of the Irish police, of the Coast Guard police, and of the London Metropolitan police, have been hitherto, by all, admitted; and it has been always equally admitted, that this superior efficiency has arisen entirely from their organization on a military, or quasi military plan. It is amusing to see the Board arguing thus against the military police system in Scinde, *at the very time* that Lord Dalhousie and Lord Falkland were introducing a similar system into the Punjaub, and into Bombay, respectively; and when *Scinde police officers were being eagerly sought out by both their Lordships from that province, for the purpose of forming levies in their own Governments, on the Scinde Police plan.*

In the 64th paragraph of their memorandum, the Board remarks, that "*in Scinde His Excellency had a comparatively easy task; the facility alone of drawing troops from Bombay by steam, in four days, being a most important assistance to a Governor, in economizing his military force in Scinde.*" But, if the Board had only slightly examined the matter they would have found, that so far from being able to draw troops from Bombay by steam in *four days*, Scinde was, for upwards of *four months* in each year, shut out by the monsoon, from the possibility of getting troops from Bombay at all; and Bombay itself was always so under-garrisoned that it never had a man to spare for service anywhere, without first obtaining a draft



from some of its up-country stations, to supply the place of the men sent away.

Scinde sent troops to help the putting down of a great insurrection in Bombay; but no calls on Bombay were ever made for troops for the suppression of rebellions in Scinde. Were it otherwise however, were Scinde capable of being filled with troops at any instant, the intense heat at the period just preceding the inundation, and the malaria and physical obstacles existing while it lasted, would make it impossible to employ them with military effect during the larger portion of the year. To employ troops during the heats and inundation would be to sacrifice every European and a large portion of the Natives engaged in the operations. Even the deputy-collectors, though well housed, are obliged to leave their districts in Lower Scinde, and come into Hydrabad to avoid the fevers then prevalent in their districts; and for weeks sometimes the mounted police are unable to perform their ordinary patrol duty, in consequence of the manner in which the whole of the country is flooded. Perhaps, of all the countries that have ever been visited by British troops, there is none in which the attempt to keep the people down by mere force of arms would be more entirely hopeless; and in which, by consequence, the securing their fidelity and attachment by just government and kindly treatment, is the more essential to the maintenance of our rule. It was the knowledge of this, added to a naturally most humane disposition, that led Sir Charles Napier to view with such undisguised horror, anything having a tendency to involve the employment of the troops against the people of Scinde.



In the 68th paragraph of their memorandum the Board observes, that "*None of the Commander-in-Chief's officers had any previous experience or any knowledge of the Scinde language when they took charge of their districts.*"

With what face can the Board make this imputation, when they know perfectly well that many of their own employés in the Punjaub had no previous experience when they assumed their functions there, and that some of their most valued assistants *are men drafted from the civil and police services in Scinde?* With what face can they make it, when they know that the Punjaubee language must be at least as essential to any officer employed in the Punjaub, as the Scinde can be in Scinde; and there was not one of their body from top to bottom, with the possible exception of Sir Henry Lawrence himself, who knew one word of that language at the time they were first appointed to fill the offices in the Punjaub which they now hold. And as to general qualifications, it may be sufficient to state the following details, to shew how utterly unfounded is the charge of unfitness, which has been thus made by the Board against the officers selected for civil employ by Sir Charles Napier in Scinde.

Captain Brown, Sir Charles Napier's secretary, had filled precisely the same office under Mr. Ross Bell and Lieutenant-Colonel Outram; he had been in Scinde almost since the first establishment of a residency in that province, and was continued in his appointment by Sir George Clerk, after Sir Charles Napier left Scinde.

Captain Keith Young, the civil Judge Advocate, was afterwards, by the Bombay Government,



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Captain Keith Young, the civil Judge Advocate, was afterwards, by the Bombay Government,



made judicial assistant to the commissioner in Scinde, and is now acting Judge Advocate-General of the Army of Bengal, the highest judicial appointment in India which a military officer can fill.

Myself, the third on Sir Charles's list of office bearers, and appointed by him collector and magistrate of Hyderabad, though I had not been employed civilly in India, was well known to have made the system of civil government there my study, and my competence for the office held was, I believe, never doubted by any one. Mr. Pringle, Sir Charles Napier's civilian successor, I have reason to believe, had the highest opinion of my competency, similar opinions have been expressed by Mr. Frere, and on Sir Charles applying to Lord Dalhousie, without my solicitation or knowledge, to transfer me to the Punjaub, his Lordship's reply was, that he could not in justice to the government of Bombay deprive them of my services in Scinde.

The next on Sir Charles's list was Major Pope, the first Collector of Sukkur. He had been long employed in Scinde as chief of the Commissariat; he had long been a justice of the peace, and exercised the functions of that office in the province. He is a man known as one of the most talented officers of the Bombay Army, and is at the present moment acting Commissary-General of that presidency.

Captain Preedy, the Collector of Kurrachee, had long been employed in the Commissariat in Scinde; he had long been a justice of the peace, and performed the duties of that office in the province; and he is still collector of Kurrachee, an office for



which, it is therefore to be supposed the civilian successors of Sir Charles Napier have considered him entirely fit.

So much for the three Collectors, the Judicial Judge Advocate, and the Government Secretary selected by Sir C. Napier.

As to the others.—Mr. McLeod, his Collector of Customs, was an uncovenanted assistant of high standing and character in the Custom House at Bombay, and was selected specially by Sir Charles for his office, in consequence of his great knowledge of its very peculiar duties. He is still collector of customs at Kurrachee, and my conviction is that he might be safely pitted for knowledge of Custom House management, against any Indian civilian head of a custom house in the three Presidencies.

Major Goldney, originally a deputy-collector and magistrate, became a Collector in Scinde, and was afterwards transferred as a deputy commissioner to the Punjaub by the Governor-General, with the approval, it is supposed, of the Board. So was Captain James, so was Captain Farrington, and so was Lieutenant William Anderson, who was killed at Mooltan. These are proofs of the fitness of all of them, that ought to be sufficient for the Board of the Punjaub.—Another of Sir Charles' deputy magistrates, was, at his own request, transferred as a Deputy Judge-Advocate General to the establishment of the Bombay Presidency, and another has it is believed been offered the post of a stipendiary magistrate at home.

Sir Charles Napier's Captain of Police, Captain Marston, is still captain of police in Scinde; and is, I believe, admitted by the successive Govern-



ments he has served under, to come as near to perfection in that office as a man can do.—While of Sir Charles' Lieutenants, one has been promoted to be Superintendent of Police in Bombay, the highest office of the kind in that Presidency; another has been made by Lord Dalhousie a Captain of Police in the Punjaub; and a third has been made a Superintendent of Police in one of the collectorates of the Bombay Presidency; so also has one of Sir Charles Napier's first deputy collectors.

Such are the men whom Sir Charles Napier selected to fill the chief offices under his administration; and any one who reads this record can judge of their fitness, from the detail here given of their several subsequent careers. And in order to show the entire impartiality of Sir Charles in his selection of them, and how completely he was guided by the consideration of the public good alone, it is fit to mention that there was not one of them, who was, I believe, in any way related to, or connected with him; or more than one whom he had ever seen before he went to take command of the troops in Scinde.

As to the question of the relative fitness of civilians and military officers for the civil duties that have to be performed in newly-conquered provinces in India, it will be sufficient to say, that I am not aware of any newly-conquered province, saving the Punjaub, that has not been committed at the outset to the charge of military men; while in the Punjaub they are largely employed in civil duties, as the Board themselves admit: why this should be the case there, if they be really less competent than civilians for the task, it would be



difficult for the Board to explain. But as to the rest, not only Scinde, but the whole of the Decan; the whole of Guzerat; the whole of the Saugor territories; the ceded portion of Rajpootana; Mysore; Arracan; and finally Burmah, were all entrusted at the outset, and are many of them still entrusted to military men. While Lords Wellesley and Hastings, and Ellenborough, and Hardinge, and though last not least, Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, have strongly asserted their superior efficiency for such duties; and the names of Wellesley (afterwards the great Duke), of Reid and of Munroe, of Malcolm, of Ochterlony, of Kirkpatrick, of Sutherland, of Fraser, of Close, of Briggs; of Pottinger, of the two Robertsons, of Sleeman, and many others too numerous to recapitulate, have fully borne out the views expressed on this head by those great authorities.

The Board of Administration may think differently, and obtain the signature of their President, Sir Henry Lawrence, to his own condemnation as a military man and therefore unfit to rule; but the Army doubtless will survive the sneer, and still continue to illustrate the history of India with the magnificent civil services rendered by its members, long after the ephemeral existence of the Board shall be forgotten, and all trace alike of its deeds and its members have passed away.

In the 70th and 71st paragraphs of their Memorandum they say,—“ *The Board understands that in civil cases there was (in Scinde) no appeal whatever under His Excellency's rule.*” On this be it merely remarked, that whoever told them so, told them what is utterly untrue. There never was a case of the smallest magnitude decided in Scinde in



respect to which an appeal from the decision did not lie, if the parties chose to make it ; and there never was a Governor more ready to listen to appeals of every kind, from the decisions of his subordinates, than was the Governor of Scinde.

The Board goes on to say, that, "*In criminal matters the youngest officer could inflict fifty lashes, fine to the extent of one hundred rupees, and imprison for three months without taking down any evidence, but simply by entering the charge and sentence in a book kept for the purpose.*"

Whoever told them this, also told them what was equally untrue ; for no such system ever prevailed in Scinde under Sir Charles Napier's rule. The regulations issued by him on the subject of magistrates' jurisdiction and powers established in principle the same rules that are current all over India on this head. The only difference was that a much greater limitation on the power of the magistrates and a much greater facility for appeal against their decisions prevailed in Scinde than in the rest of India. A magistrate's summary powers were limited in Scinde to three months imprisonment, while in India they extend to twelve ! A magistrate in Scinde, as in India, had to keep a record of the evidence in every case, in the native language. In cases not requiring to be forwarded for confirmation, the evidence was not translated into English, nor is it in India ; the English record of the case was, as there, only the charge the finding and the sentence, which were entered into the English Record Book, from which the periodical returns of crimes and punishments were extracted.

But as regards all higher sentences, sentences



for six months or a year for instance—which may be inflicted summarily by any young Haileybury civilian in India on first joining—these were sentences which no power inferior to the Governor's was capable of inflicting in Scinde. In such cases the whole record was translated into English, and sent on to the Collector; he expressed his concurrence or dissent as to the finding and the sentence, and passed the case on to the Civil Judge-Advocate, who also made his remarks upon it, and then laid it for final orders before the Governor himself.

Justice was certainly speedily executed, which is objected to by the Board; but it was so in Scinde, not from want of consideration, but because all the officers were diligent and hard-working; because the cases were mostly simple, as they generally are in a state of society such as existed in Scinde; because the evidences were mostly truthful, the people not having become corrupted, as in India, under civilian rule; and, above all, because the confirming authority was a man whose devotion to his duties was unremitting, and who moreover resided near.

Justice was speedily executed, but I doubt whether it ever was executed in India as well; unless perhaps in the Crown Courts at the Presidencies; courts which undoubtedly possess that superiority over any Military Magistrates Courts, which Civilian Magistrates and Judges in India are always assuming to themselves, on grounds that are totally unfounded and unreal. For such Civilian Magistrates and Judges in India are utterly ignorant of law, unless where they have studied its principles as amateurs, which many



officers equally have done;—they are utterly ignorant of judicial practice, their Courts being informal and their decisions often unprecedented and absurd to a degree; and they have no code to decide by, but the criminal regulations of Government, which may be mastered by an officer in a week, and which are the guide for the Military Magistrates Courts as well. And these Civil servants have from their isolated position, and the petted manner in which they are brought up, a much less correct knowledge of natives generally than Military men have; for the latter being intimately associated with Natives from their very boyhood, and having to rough it amongst them, see them under circumstances which make any concealment of character by the Natives impossible. A Military man moreover, always thinks and acts for himself, while half the Civilians in the service are the mere puppets of their Native Moonshees and Carkoons.

In the 71st paragraph of their Memorandum the Board say,—“ *A Military Commission, also trying a revenue officer for fraud and embezzlement of the public revenue must have often found itself curiously situated to do justice in such matters; a thorough scrutiny into a mass of accounts in the vernacular, and considerable knowledge of the revenue system would have been necessary.*”

Now, if this assertion of the Board's be admitted, there is no man who could be justly tried for embezzlement of the revenue, or embezzlement of any kind, either in India or in the Punjaub; for I suppose the Board will not pretend it could, without assistance, go through a mass of accounts in the vernacular of the Punjaub, whether relating to revenue



or any other matter. In the whole civil service of India, I will venture to say, that there are not twenty men who could do so, *properly*, in respect to accounts in any single native language whatever; and they would equally be puzzled with the rest, to do it in respect to accounts in any language (save the one they are thus such perfect masters of. Nor can it be pretended by the Board that either themselves or any other civilians are proficient in every system of native accounts relating to private commerce and trade. Yet these, according to their doctrine, they must equally be masters of, in order to be able to try for embezzlement any native banker's accountant, or any native grain dealer's man.

By the Supreme Court Judges, no such knowledge as to either languages or system of accounts is laid claim to; nor could it be by the Suddur Adawlut, unless the members of it profess to know every dialect current in Bengal; nor do Courts Martial pretend to such, when trying Commissariat men for embezzlement, a not unfrequent duty, and hitherto supposed to be performed without such knowledge sufficiently well. In England too the Courts of Law are held sufficiently capable of trying people for embezzlement, though the accounts be perhaps in a foreign language, and relating to foreign trade. Lord Campbell would hardly refuse to try a Spanish accountant charged with embezzlement in the wine trade, because unacquainted himself with the Spanish language, and unable to tell how much deduction for wastage the man might legitimately claim. If he knew nothing of those points, he would see that trustworthy evidence was called in, and thus his own want of knowledge would be legitimately supplied.



In calling in such evidence he would under any circumstances act more in accordance with the law, than he would if he gave judgment according to his own understanding of such matters which would necessarily be imperfect and open to cavil and doubt.

This position in respect to which there is nothing apparently irrational, is precisely the position which the Punjaub Board ridicules, as so absurd in the case of a Military Commission trying for revenue embezzlement in Scinde. I am not an advocate of such commissions in the abstract, neither was Sir Charles Napier; he adopted them merely as a temporary expedient, to supply a pressing want in what may be called a transition period of society; a period in which the warlike spirit of the people had not been extinguished, though for the time it had been repressed; and when the country was perhaps hardly ripe for the crowning institutions of peace. In acting thus, he acted in accordance with the practice of military governors in every country and at every period, and he acted wisely too; for he was not a man to advocate an absurdity or a folly; nor do I think the Board, after this specimen of their own judgment, appear the fittest persons to correct him, even if he was.

The Board say in the 72nd paragraph of their report, that—“*in Scinde, for the first two years after the conquest, the revenue was nearly all collected in kind; subsequently some changes were made, to check fraud and corruption, but no fixed assessment of the land-tax was made while the Commander-in-Chief was there.*”

Now, here it is to be observed, that in Scinde, as in every other conquered province—save, it is



to be supposed from the above, the Punjaub—the revenue was collected for the first two years in the form in which it had been paid for centuries before; a form from which it would have been impossible at once to depart, even if it had not been the height of folly and imprudence to attempt to do so. For to add to the great difficulties attending the settlement of every newly conquered country, and to the enormous and peculiar difficulties attending the settlement of Scinde, by making a sudden change in the whole system of revenue—a change for which neither the collectors nor the people could be at once prepared, would have been an act of madness, even if it had been possible to effect it—which Sir Charles Napier was far too sagacious a man to dream of. He therefore limited his efforts at the outset to such alterations as should make the rent more bearable to the people by reducing it from its existing high rate to a reasonable demand, and at the same time remove the corruptions, anomalies and inequalities which had crept into the system in the Ameers' time. This he did completely and effectually to the infinite benefit of both Government and people.

These changes secured the applause and gratitude of all, and there for the time he paused. But to say no fixed assessment was introduced by him was totally untrue; for at the time he did this he greatly extended the system of an aggregate grain payment or cash payment per wheel, and he also established a composition at a fixed rate per acre cultivated, in lieu of the share of grain before paid. This principle, the only principle in the way of acreage rent that the lands



in Scinde could for the most part admit of, had made considerable progress before Sir Charles left Scinde. The principle the Punjaub Board advocate would be impossible in a country where cultivation depends on an inundation, and is consequently always shifting as it is in Scinde.

It is true that this money payment per acre actually cultivated, in lieu of the grain payment by proportionate shares, was not made by him compulsory as it was afterwards in the Punjaub; but there is no one fit to be called a statesman who will think that, in such a country the question could have been dealt with otherwise, or that Sir Charles did not act in this respect entirely for the best. Even in England the resistance to the tithe composition was in many places strong; but in Scinde, to make the acceptance of such composition other than voluntary, would have been only to set the whole country at once into a flame. The Bombay Government have since attempted to force the people to pay cash rent, and what has been the result? The market has been deluged with grain in order to realise; the obtaining an adequate price is impossible; daily more and more of the agriculturists become bankrupt; and their fortunes and the Government rental are, I am told, alike ruined. What else could be expected in a country like Scinde, where grain is abundant but money so scarce as to command any interest, and require any sacrifice of property to obtain it that the money dealers choose to demand?

Sir Charles Napier, however, was a man of another stamp; he felt as the Board express themselves in the next paragraph of their memorandum,



—“ *That, next to the security of life and property, there is nothing in Hindoostan on which the comfort and happiness of the people so much depends as on the system by which the land revenue is collected.*” Feeling this, knowing this, and regarding the comfort and happiness of the people as the most cherished feeling of his soul, he allowed, like a wise and generous ruler, the acceptance of his plans for their amelioration in this respect to be the act of the people themselves. He left the concurrence in his measures to be the result of the experience and judgment of each tenant in his own individual case. Would it have added to their comfort and happiness had he, as the Punjaub Board did, *compelled the Ryot by force to accept the composition its agents thought proper to fix*, and this in the face of a glutted market, and grain daily falling till the rent-payer knew not where to turn in order to convert his grain into cash to pay his rent with? I was near the Punjaub at the time. I was in correspondence with officers civilly employed there, and numerous natives from that country came down to Scinde; therefore, though unable to speak with the certainty of an eye-witness, I was in a position to know pretty well what was passing, and I believe there never was a more oppressive act committed since the Company began to rule, than this forcible conversion of grain rent into a money rent in the districts presided over by the Board of the Punjaub.

I do not mean to say that the Board knew that they were acting oppressively, for doubtless, as is always the case in India, they received numberless high flown reports in the measure's favour. But neither have I any doubt that the people would



gladly return to the grain payment system if they could to-morrow. Indeed the change being made a compulsory one is a sufficient proof that it was the interest and convenience of Government that was chiefly consulted in the measure, and not "the comfort and happiness of the people," which, according to the modern cant of India however, must always be pretended. It would be as absurd to say that it was for the "comfort and happiness" of the people that the Board imposed their enormous duty on salt which Sir Charles Napier alludes to; or that it was their "comfort and happiness" that led to the Board's view of requiring a revenue from the landholders of the Swat country, and from those of every other petty tract within their range, which under former Governments was free! But even when the question is one of excluding natives from all offices of consideration or value in their own country, "*the comfort and happiness of the people*" is still the civilian cry.

In the 74th paragraph of the Board's memorandum, they rightly describe the several modes of paying land revenue in Scinde, adding very correctly that the most general mode of payment was by a fixed portion of the crop, a third or a fourth, and the division of which for the purpose is called in the native language the *Buttai*. The only point they have omitted to notice is the great reduction in the amount of the impost which Sir Charles Napier made. But having stated the premises, so far truly, the Board go on in their next paragraph to give utterance to a string of misrepresentations which, after quoting the passage, I shall proceed to expose. I shall do this for the sake of truth, and wholly irrespective of the bearing



of their statements on the character for sagacity of Sir Charles Napier, as civil administrator of the Government of Scinde. For it would be as unfair to hold him accountable for the imperfections of the system of land revenue established for centuries in the province, and which he found existing at the time of the conquest, as it would be to hold the Directors responsible for the anomalies or imperfections of the Hindoo or Mahomedan law, under the provisions of the latter of which the land tax in Scinde was paid.

Sir Charles Napier, as I have said before, was not the inventor of the system, he was only unavoidably the minister of it, shorn by him of its imperfections, until a plan more consonant to English ideas, and which he had offered to the people should be by them received. Indeed the ignorance of the Board of Administration in charging him with the responsibility of it does seem the more extreme, because in Mr. Neil, B. E. Baillie's book, called the "*Land-tax of India*," and published at the expense of the Court of Directors last year, the system of land revenue is detailed which was found existing in Scinde, as it had existed for centuries in India; and in every country on earth where the religion of Mahomed prevailed. It is customary to condemn Omar for burning the Alexandrian library as useless; but to read these remarks of the Board on the revenue system of Scinde it would seem that there are despisers of libraries still to be found in the Punjaub.

The passage of the Board's Memorandum which I referred to previous to this digression is as follows:—"Every one who has the slightest practical knowledge of revenue matters, must instantly see



“ what a host of idlers such a system lets loose upon  
 “ the country. From the first appearance of the crop  
 “ until it was cut, thrashed, gathered, divided, until the  
 “ Government share had been stored and even sold,  
 “ a large body of watchmen were necessary. These  
 “ men received two rupees a month, and assuredly  
 “ did not starve on that pittance, while guarding grain.  
 “ But to these men must be added the agents who  
 “ weighed and stored the grain, and those retained to  
 “ sell it. All had to be paid their regular wages  
 “ and to be well fed; whether these people were to be  
 “ paid by the agriculturists or by the Government  
 “ they were a heavy tax. A native official entertained  
 “ on a salary of twenty rupees a month for a single  
 “ harvest on such duties has been known to pay two  
 “ hundred rupees as a bribe for his berth. It is bad  
 “ enough to levy a money rate by measurement at each  
 “ harvest, but payment in kind, founded on a division  
 “ of the crops or the measurement of the fields, it is  
 “ impossible to control.”

Now before proceeding to dispose of these  
 remarks I shall merely observe that from all this,  
 and particularly from the last sentence, you will  
 hardly fail to see that the real and true objection  
 of the Punjaub Board to the Buttai is because  
 they think it a very dear process for realising  
 the revenue, and that the parties employed by  
 Government must necessarily be beyond control.  
 As far as “ the comfort and happiness of the people ”  
 are concerned they have shewn nothing in this  
 system but what is entirely compatible with that;  
 for the hosts of idlers, as the Board call them, are  
 of course natives of the country; and the watching  
 the crops and cutting them and thrashing them,  
 and gathering them, and dividing them, being all



paid for out of the crop before the division is made, the system gives employment to more persons at the harvest than would otherwise be required, and lays a large portion of the cost of preparing and storing the harvest on Government, as the landlord, which otherwise would by the tenant alone have to be paid. The better then these people are paid the better they are fed, the more agreeable to the tenants themselves; for all the duties thus described, though paid for by the Government and by the tenant jointly, are really performed by the tenants themselves; that is, all except the duty of watching the crops and superintending the division of them—a duty performed by the officers of Government in conjunction with them.

That all this expenditure on the people should be very galling to a certain school of officials lately sprung up in India; men who seem to think that every morsel of bread that falls into a native's mouth is so much abstracted from their own vast platter, is what I can well understand. Such overgreediness always defeats itself however, and the abolition of the Buttai, or rather the substitution for it of a system of unparalleled absurdity by the revenue theorists of Bombay, reduced enormously the amount of land revenue realized by the Government in Scinde. But the Buttai is a system liked by the people, it is a system clung to by them as long as they were able; it is a system not unadapted to a state of things where agriculture is in its infancy, and where little or no capital is ever expended in land; and it is a system which, though abolished in respect to Government, still exists throughout Scinde, and throughout India



and the Punjaub, in respect to the dealings of Zemindars and Jagheerdars with their tenants, or with the cultivators of their ground. My own objections to it at one time were strong, but still it is a system which many eminent men in Europe have advocated, and the superiority of which many still maintain; finally it is a system which, as having been established in Scinde for centuries, Sir Charles Napier did not deem it either just or wise to force the people to change.

Nor after the improvements introduced by him was it, as regards the costs, so very costly; nor as regards the accounts so very complicated; nor as regards the trouble so very troublesome—a fifteenth of the grain accurately divided into separate and fixed proportions paid every person well who was concerned with collections; and fourpence half-penny a quarter was found ample for the store-keepers, &c. The system of accounts was so simplified as to be as easy of adjustment as the public accounts under any other system could be; while as to the trouble, the greater part of that appertained not to the Buttai; for watching and cutting, thrashing and storing grain are the necessary operations of agriculture in whatever form the revenue may be raised. Indeed it would be but a poor proof of the superior sagacity of our nation, if a system which had worked satisfactorily under all Mahomedan governments, ever since the period of their prophet, should become so utterly unintelligible and unworkable, as the Board's memorandum would make it out to be when committed to our hands.

Such a system may or may not have been long exploded under civil rule, I wish I could think



that the exploders of it may have understood more of what they were exploding than has evidently been the case with the Board for the Punjaub ; for the surest foundation for a better system in anything is a thorough knowledge and appreciation of the system to be altered or replaced. It was Sir Charles's superior knowledge, and not his greater ignorance that induced him to proceed so cautiously in his reforms of the revenue system of Scinde ; reforms however, which in their aggregate were greater than perhaps ever have been compassed in any country, under equally difficult circumstances and in an equal period of time. Throughout the greater part of India, the money assessment had not superseded the former assessment paid in kind, till the land had been at least ten times as long under British rule, as Scinde had been when Sir Charles Napier left that country. I remember the Buttai existing myself in Guzerat ; and in one part of the Bombay presidency it exists I believe to this day.

As to checks under such a system there was the only check the public service in India admits of, the appointing men as Kardars and Buttaidars, who had too large a stake in the country and too high a character to admit of their going wrong. Be the system what it may dishonest men will find the means of cheating, as Sir George Clerk told the Committee was the case even under the survey system, that in which the opportunities for speculation seem to be most rare. Talk of one poor bribe ! Why the Native revenue servants of Bengal and Bombay are gorged with bribery to repletion, as every civilian and military man in either presidency knows. And there too they seem



to be gorged with impunity—whereas men convicted of corruption were sentenced to labour on the roads in irons during Sir Charles Napier's government of Scinde. The Punjaub Board should read and digest the "Revelations of an "Orderly," published by Madden, in Leadenhall Street; and the "Tales of Bombay Briberies," written last year by Indus; or the work of a member of their own body, Shore, before they begin to throw stones at Scinde. I dare say "*Revelations*" equally interesting could be published in respect to the Board's own establishments in the Punjaub.

In the 74th paragraph of their memorandum, the Board reckon all the people, which the Buttai system requires to be kept up, at 12,000 men; but as they are only kept up for a certain portion of each year, not exceeding three months at the farthest, the charge would, by the Board's own shewing, be only seven thousand two hundred pounds. This is no very enormous per-centage on a revenue, which, at their own estimate, amounts to three hundred thousand, and which I am told considerably exceeded that sum. It is rather less than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the collection, so you can afford I think to make the Board a present of any conclusion against the system which they can extract from this amount. They also add that the watchmen assuredly did not starve, and I am happy to confirm that fact.—Not a single case of starvation occurred while I was in Scinde, and as each watchman received about a pound and three-quarters of grain for food daily, in addition to his pay, starvation was hardly to be expected. As the watchers however were strangers, being the per-



sonal followers of the Buttaédar, and as at least two-thirds of the grain, and in most cases three-fourths of it would, after division, be the villagers' own, it was not likely they would allow of very extensive depredations by the watchers, which would thus be made chiefly at their own expense. The Scindee is not a man of very deep research, but he knows enough to tell, that it is not for his interest to allow watchmen to steal grain, three-fourths of which is his own.

In paragraph 77 the Board go on to say that  
 “ *such a system has been long exploded under Civil*  
 “ *Rule.—With it there can be no Government rent-*  
 “ *roll; the income varies from harvest to harvest;*  
 “ *there can be no control, no check, but by informers.*  
 “ *It is a common saying, Buttai Lootai, i. e. the*  
 “ *division of the crop is plunder—plunder of the Go-*  
 “ *vernment, plunder of the people.*”

I remember very well, however, the system existing under civil rule in Guzerat; and it exists I believe in one portion of the Bombay Presidency to this day, while I have shewn that it certainly is not plunder of the people, for they are the party which chiefly profit by it; and the tēnacity with which they adhere to it when a fixed money rent is offered to their acceptance in lieu, shews clearly that the change would not in their opinion be a boon. In fact it is the Government that has all along desired the abolition of it. What the Government wants is a fixed rent-roll whether the season be a good one or a bad one, and whether the price of grain be high or low. The outcry against Buttai is an outcry from the treasury, and has nothing earthly to do, as any one who reads the Board's remarks may see, with “ *the comfort*



“ *and happiness of the people,*” to which, as a make-weight, they allude. As to Buttai being called Lootai by some discontented tax-payers, that very possibly may be; but I do not see that it is an argument against it, for tithes are called by some people clerical plunder in the same manner. Indeed there is not an impost which has not raised some bitter remark of the same nature on the part of gentlemen who have had to pay it. I could tell the Board that I have heard some very unflattering epithets applied by natives to their own favourite system of levying the rent in the Punjaub.

If indeed the people were to give the best evidence of believing a tax to be plunder by turning out to resist it, as in the case of the salt tax, and the land tax levied on certain chiefs in the Punjaub, then I should of course believe it was so. But I certainly should not when the people, as in this case, gave the best proof of a liking to the system by preferring it to any other as long as a choice was left them; and by continuing it among themselves after their right to choose was, as far as the Government rent was concerned, taken away.

What earthly connection there can be between the Buttai system and a military government as distinguished from a civil, I confess myself unable to discover. Had Sir Charles conquered the Lebanon, his revenue would have been paid in silk; had he taken Smyrna, it would have been paid in figs; but what a man's taking the revenue as he finds it, could have to do with the question of military or civil government, it would puzzle any one but the Board of Administration to tell. The Scinde system, as shewn in a previous paragraph, was established by Mahomed and his successors, and



has existed for centuries in Scinde. The system introduced by the Board in the Punjaub, was mainly the creation, a few years ago, of a Bengal civilian, Mr. Bird—which is the better plan, may be a fit subject for contest between the followers of the Arabian prophet and the admirers of Mr. Bird; but what connection the question can have with Sir Charles Napier and the military government of Scinde I know not.

One objection of the Boards to it remains, “Government is thus,” it says, “the great corn-factor of the country.” I admit it is, and it is bad that it should be so; but the Government in any case are *the great land factors of the country*, which in my opinion is a hundred times worse, and which the Punjaub Board must admit to be at least as bad.

I have now gone through the whole of the objections of the Board to the Government of Scinde, and think you will see the charges are totally unfounded which the Board have brought against Sir Charles Napier’s wise and just system of rule; a system of which the excellence is shewn by its fruits, and to the merits of which two civilian successors to him, Mr. Pringle and Mr. Frere, have borne publicly the highest testimony—a testimony which I think will be admitted by all impartial men to outweigh the waspish and ill-considered comments of the Board of Administration for the Punjaub.

There is left another observation for me to remark upon, which is contained in a page of their memorandum rather farther on. It is that the Beloochees, the soldiers of Scinde, are mostly dwellers in *the mountains*, and that the majority of



them *disappeared* after the battle of Hydrabad. So far is this from the truth, that there was not a single Hill Belooch in the battles at Hydrabad, though some thousands were marching down upon it when the battles took place; nor did a single Belooch leave that country *after* the battles, except Ahmed Khan Lugharee, who was outlawed, and a dozen or so who went away in Meere Shere Mahomed's train. These however have now returned, and excepting the Ameers themselves there is not a Belooch who has permanently left Scinde. How such an absurd mistake could be made by a man like Sir Henry Lawrence, who passed through the country on his road to the Punjaub, and by the other Members of the Board who were living in the province next to it, I am unable to imagine. It is a pity that the Board when they wanted to write about Scinde did not call Major Goldney to their elbow, for he would have prevented them falling into such ridiculous errors as they have made throughout the whole of their observations on Sir Charles Napier's Government of Scinde.

And now, Sir William, I must lay aside my pen, my task as far as this Blue Book is concerned is ended; it is not for me to say what should be done in regard to this Blue Book for it is you not I who are the guardian of your brother's fame. Shame is it for England that any guardian should be needed for the fame of one who devoted his whole life to England's service, and died with a lacerated heart the victim of her ingratitude when all was done.

But though you are the guardian of his fame, I too have my duties in that respect to perform. I have followed him in war; I have served under him in peace. I knew all the worth of his noble spirit,



and a purer and a nobler, and one more devoted to his country God never made. It is not then for me to stand idly by when by lifting my hand I can stay one missile aimed—how barbarously! who pitilessly!—at that poor unprotected corpse, before which, when living, the boldest of his assailants used to quail. I know that in doing so I expose myself to the enmity of many of the body to which I belong; but my part has, notwithstanding, long been chosen, and through good report and evil report I always have and always will maintain it.

It is not merely because I have eaten his salt that I am faithful to Sir Charles Napier's memory and to Sir Charles Napier's cause, I am faithful to it from the knowledge that he was really and truly one of the noblest and most admirable of England's sons, and would, had he lived and had he possessed the power, have been the regenerator of India and the saviour of our empire in the East. He would have fixed the foundations of that empire on the surest basis, justice to the people, securing the people's love. He would have made India a country to be a help to England in its necessities, instead of a sink to absorb alike its treasures and its men. He would have covered its surface with roads and canals, instead of devoting its resources to the maintenance in luxury of the drones who now overspread it.

Under a spirit like his, and an honesty of purpose like his, our empire in the East might have been put in fair train to last for ever; while, as it is, the frail foundations on which it rests are easily to be inferred from the panic which spreads throughout India and at home at the first news of any adverse fortune. When Charters are to be renewed



we vaunt loudly of the attachment to us of the natives; but the effect of a Cabool, a Ferozshehur, or a Chillianwallah shews unmistakably what our position in India really is, viz., that of a nation whom the natives throughout the length and breadth of the land will rise upon and expel whenever our weakness is sufficient to make their sufficient strength and opportunity.

These being my sentiments regarding Sir Charles and the feelings I bear to him, I willingly lend my aid to the demolition of that part of the Blue Book in which my own knowledge enables me to expose the wrong. As a proprietor I have an undoubted right to comment on the papers laid in such capacity before me, and on the proceedings of the servants of the proprietors, whether in England or in the Punjaub. Had there been any probability of a Court of Proprietors meeting at the India House, I should before that body have stated what in this letter I have said; but there is no probability of any Court being held for the next two months, and that is too long to wait. I have therefore recorded the remarks I had to offer in the shape of a letter to yourself, to be made such use of as you, in the unfettered exercise of your own judgment, may deem proper, &c. &c.

A. B. RATHBORNE.

P.S.—It occurs to me to add, that while the Board are declaring so dogmatically the unfitness of military men to be civil governors, they forget that nearly all the colonial governments are administered by military and naval men. They forget that many of the highest civil offices in the United Kingdom have been filled by soldiers in the same manner. Sir Arthur Wellesley and



Lord Hardinge were both Chief Secretaries in Ireland; and one of the best under Secretaries that Ireland ever had was a soldier, the late Mr. Drummond. Moreover, they forget that in India all the greatest Governors-General have been soldiers; or men so highly imbued with the military spirit as to be fairly claimable by military men. Lords Clive and Cornwallis, and Hastings, and William Bentinck, and Hardinge, were soldiers by profession; Lord Wellesley was a soldier in spirit; and Lord Ellenborough actually shared with the Army the dangers of a campaign.

The civilians on the other side have Barlow and Teignmouth to boast of, men of whom all that is now remembered is that such men lived. Indeed, at the time that India was won for the Company, at the time the foundations of our empire were laid, its civil servants then and till very lately, bearing the names of "*senior merchants*," "*junior merchants*," "*factors*," and "*writers*," confined themselves chiefly to the infinitely more profitable employments connected with the Company's monopolies and trade. It was only after the Company ceased to be a commercial body that their "*warehouse keepers*" and "*commercial agents*" and "*superintendents of factories*," in conjunction with the *tea agents at Canton*, who at the expiration of the last Charter were drafted as *judges and collectors* into their body, put forth any pretensions to peculiar fitness for ruling and governing the country which the military had for the chief part settled, and which they had entirely won. And even now, when an opium agency, or salt agency, or custom collectorship is vacant, the old leaven breaks out, and the post, or rather sinecure, that



may be in fact as well as in name the most repugnant to the ideas of a public man of spirit, is still the most sought after, so that it be only the most highly paid.

Nor while the Board forget all these antecedents of the military service, and of their own, do they less forget the peculiar advantages of previous training and preparation under which Sir Charles Napier assumed the government of Scinde? They forget that he had long governed the island of Cephalonia as resident, where the people, though Europeans by geographical position, are essentially of an Asiatic character and type, in many points resembling, and in civilisation perhaps little more advanced than the people of Scinde. While at the same time the proximity of the island to Turkey gave Sir Charles ample opportunity for studying the Mahomedan character and Mahomedan institutions, which are known to resemble each other very closely in all the countries of the East. What better preparation could any man have for undertaking the government of a strictly Mahomedan country like Scinde?

Nor was this all; for while he had thus peculiar opportunities of studying Eastern institutions and Eastern character, he neglected not the studies which more peculiarly distinguish the statesman of Europe. He had written largely on military law; and to write effectively on that, a knowledge of civil law, that is of the laws of the nation, is indispensable. The great social question of labour he had discussed in a pamphlet on Ireland; and colonization and the social progress of infant states had been made by him points of peculiar inquiry



as his works on our Australian colonies evinced. Indeed I will venture to assert, and all who knew him intimately will confirm the assertion, that there was not a question connected with war or politics, or political or social economy and commerce, or law, or literature, or even religion; in short, there was scarcely any question one could discuss on which the mass of information displayed by him was not positively marvellous, and only to be comprehended by those who knew how early he rose, how temperately he lived, and how entirely he devoted to writing and to study all the moments which public business left unoccupied.

How far such a preparation was a sufficient one for the Government of Scinde may be left to the world to judge; and how far also the Board are competent to be his critics, ignorant as they have shewn themselves of the History alike of England, of the Colonies and of India—and especially ignorant of the system of military Government they were discussing, and of all that relates to the origin and continuance of the land tax of Scinde.

A. B. R.

With this generous testimony to Sir C. Napier's character and genius, his posthumous work may, with more force, be again dedicated to the people of England, as exhibiting faction frustrating a great man's efforts to serve the public, and shewing how surely the Directors of the East India Company are proceeding in the destruction of the great empire unwisely committed to their government.

W. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General.

SCINDE HOUSE, *February* 1854.



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