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K.K.Venugopal

ADVERTISEMENT.

EVENTS in Egypt have succeeded each other so rapidly, that specu
tion has been bewildered and exhausted in the variety of opinion
which those events have given birth. It would, however, appear,
notwithstanding the renewal of hostilities in Egypt by Kleber, the T
are not to be depended on, and that Great Britain has, as yet, no ap
ance of certainty, that the Divan of Constantinople will be able to
Egypt as a dependency, or be inclined to resist the private negotiati
the French.

The dangers which threaten this country have induced me to
exposition of facts important in themselves, and involving dee
commercial interests. The reasoning and observations containe
following sheets are intended to counteract as much as possible th
cable resentment of the French government towards Great Br
hope it is not too late to form such alliances, and to frame such
as may save this country from that ruin which its enemies conten
are preparing for execution.

I have judged it expedient to give a map of the countries
tween Great Britain and the East Indies, in order to show th

tuation of the different countries whose pretensions may probably interfere with our own. I have also given a view of Bombay, in consideration of its importance, and the necessity there is of its being retained under the crown of Great Britain. A chart of the trade with Russia is likewise necessary, as well as one of the exports and imports between this country and British India. Both of these are, therefore, given with great precision, and according to a method that has been approved of, on account of the facility and accuracy with which it delineates the progress of revenue and commerce during any given period.

In these charts * the horizontal lines represent the sums of money marked at the end of each, and the perpendicular lines the years marked the bottom of each of them. The waving and cross lines rise or fall the notes in music, according to the increase or decrease of the trade are meant to represent.

each chart the red line denotes exports from England, and the yel- imports. The intermediate space consequently represents the ba- for or against this country: but, as in both these branches of com- the balance has been uniformly against England during this century, ermediate space is in both stained with the same blue colour.

imports to this country from Russia are chiefly iron, hemp, skins, ry, or some other raw materials. Our exports, though but to a nount, consist of some of the choicest of our hard-wares, cloths,

st inventor of this mode (Mr. W. Playfair) published, sixteen years ago, charts of all the nches of commerce carried on by England. In the preface to that work he says, "As the best judge of proportion, and as the proportion between the amount of trade at one vhat it is at another, is the great object to impress on the mind, by giving form and hat would otherwise be a series of different recollections, a permanent idea is at once actly in the same manner that a map in geography gives a better idea of the width and river than the most accurate written description could possibly do."

prints, pictures, and formerly ale and beer, of which the Russians are particularly fond; but as it is known that a balance against a manufacturing country that consists in raw materials is no injury to it, so our trade to Russia is still an advantageous one to both countries, and would be still more so, were it not for the prodigious list of articles forbidden to be imported into the Russian dominions.

The whole exports of Russia do not annually exceed three millions sterling;—their imports a little more than two millions: so that there is a balance of about seven or eight hundred thousand pounds in favour of that country.

The chief trade of Russia is with Persia, China, and Tartary; for this reason, that the great mass of the people in Russia are still in a rude situation, and make no use of foreign articles; while the grandees, and those who follow the court, are so much in the other extreme, that Asiatic luxuries are only coveted. Our cheap slight stuffs and manufactures, intended for general use, will not do in a country where richness and magnificence are chiefly sought after *. Though since the time of Peter the Great the Russians have assumed European manners and European dresses, yet the taste for Asiatic magnificence and amusements still continues to prevail. The proximity of the southern and eastern parts of the Russian empire to those countries of Asia which produce the finest articles of merchandise naturally occasions a very considerable commerce; and as Russia advances in riches and civilisation, there is no doubt that their commercial connections will also increase.

* Even before the time of Peter the Great, the Russian court at Moscow was for dress and show the most magnificent in Europe. The earl of Carlisle, who was embassador in the time of Charles the Second, declared he never saw its equal. His expression was, "that the Czar and his courtiers, "habited in the Turkish manner, were completely covered with gold and jewels."

The trade between this country and India, from a diversity of causes, is rapidly augmenting. Since the commutation act revoked a great part of the duties on tea in England, and since Europe was convulsed by the French revolution, that trade has been greatly improved. The East-India Companies both of Holland and France have been annihilated, and the free port of Ostend has been shut up. The Danes, Swedes, and Americans, alone, enjoy with England any share of the trade to India. From these circumstances it is, that Great Britain has increased her commerce to India to a pitch hitherto unexampled.

The use of tea rapidly increasing on the continent of Europe will occasion a general augmentation of commerce, of which there is no doubt England, from her immense capital and great maritime resources, will always possess much more than a proportional share.

PREFACE.

AN early acquaintance with India has strongly impressed a prepossession in its favour. Circumstances have since occurred, which have given me the greatest concern; and I have to regret the necessity which compelled me to quit that country, and those scenes, where I may truly be said to have passed my best and happiest days. Nevertheless, during a long involuntary residence in Great Britain, I have never lost sight of those interests on which the security of our Indian establishments principally depend.

On a variety of subjects I have availed myself of such opportunities as the complexion of public affairs has, from time to time, presented. Considerable leisure, devoted to those pursuits, has contributed to extend my knowledge of the affairs of India. At the present juncture, previously to a general pacification, I have arranged some particulars, which appear to me of the first importance.

In following these and similar pursuits, I enjoy the satisfaction of bearing with patience, though not without anxiety, the load of protracted litigation. If, on the one hand, I have to regret the many disappointments

and hardships which I have experienced, on the other, I have the consolation to reflect that my ideas have been directed to certain objects, which, in a different situation, might never have attracted my attention.

The political consequence of India to Great Britain, its relative situation in regard to commerce, and to the other nations of Europe, as well as to the rising states of America, have not escaped my observation. I have long speculated on certain causes and events, which have taken place in the political horizon of this quarter of the world, as well as others yet in embryo; and I am now confirmed in the opinion, that those causes and events have for more than thirty years past had a direct tendency to open a more general participation in the lucrative trade with India. The partition of Poland, the annihilation of the Turkish empire by the joint or separate efforts of the Russians and Austrians, the jealousies of the French and Dutch, the blended politics and intrigues of the nations on the shores of the Baltic, seem to have had some reference, near or remote, to that object. It need only be observed that our successes in India, and the magnificent establishments of the East-India Company, have more than sufficiently proved the very great importance of our eastern possessions and commerce. In proportion as these objects have been improved and extended, so, in the same proportion, has a spirit of rivality and envy been produced in the minds of less fortunate nations.

The means of national prosperity, or at least to secure to Great Britain the benefits to be expected from her vast possessions in the East in the best manner possible, I have more than once endeavoured to explain. I have attempted to show by what measures of moderation and justice our extensive empire in that quarter was most likely to be consolidated, and in what

manner the great interests of foreign nations were probably to be compromised. Physical force is not on all occasions to be resorted to with effect. Measures dictated by prudence, founded on the basis of distributive justice, are more consonant to the law of nations, in their present form, as well as to the laws of nature, than an inordinate desire of unequal and unprecedented aggrandisement. The mind of man, at the appearance of injustice, whether in internal regulation, or the more extended acts of external policy, naturally revolts. It is to be expected that the legislative power of this country will be prepared at that awful crisis, a general pacification, *to render substantial justice*, which alone can preserve our tranquillity and opulence, or maintain our independence as a nation.

The Letters on India were begun at a period, when it was no longer doubted that it was the intention of the French republic to retain possession of Egypt, if possible, as a colony; but, at all events, if that was not practicable, till the final issue of the present war. It had also appeared, that a design to invade *British India* from that quarter immediately formed no part of their plan, and existed only in the minds of those who did not foresee the more subtle and certain evils arising from a different combination, more mature and dangerous. Egypt, in the hands of the government of France, would undoubtedly have produced, in a very few years, a change in our commercial and financial system, of the most destructive and irresistible sort.

Some of the observations which are brought forward in the present series of letters were submitted to men in power, on the present as well as other occasions. The declared purpose of this communication was to alleviate certain circumstances, and avoid subjects, which it was reason-

ably to be supposed would be brought forward on a convention being assembled for a general peace. The rights of nations, and the great and unalterable prerogatives of nature, whenever that event shall take place, will, no doubt, be seriously discussed.

Whether my remarks are to the purpose or no, I leave to others to determine. Allowance will be made by candid and enlightened politicians, to whom these letters are principally addressed, for the situation of public affairs at the period when they were written. However some particular passages may be judged not, at this juncture, strictly apposite, still the general reasoning is not injured, nor the political aspect of public affairs changed. The French, with arms in their hands, retain important posts in Egypt, and Alexandria is the last to be yielded. What security is there, that the imbecillity of the Porte, stimulated by its natural, and, indeed, well-grounded jealousy of the Russian and Austrian governments, may not yet listen to overtures from France? The speedy dissolution of the coalition against that country, by a separate peace, is highly probable, and even to be expected. But, should no such changes in the political balance of Europe take place, the invasion of Egypt may again be effected, with better hopes of success, at a different period. Perhaps that country may be given up to the general interests of Europe. At all events, we shall soon have to oppose the jealousy of the whole world, and to protect our commercial rights and territorial acquisitions at a proportionate disadvantage. The general interests of mankind are at this crisis more deeply involved than at any former æra of modern history. Whatever may be the fate of the Turkish empire, the possession of Egypt by some European power will very shortly be the infallible consequence of its declining power. By this means the ancient channel of communication be-

tween the East and the West, so much desired by all the states of Europe, will be again revived.

On all these points I have presumed to offer some reflections, which, I trust, will neither be found illusive and premature, or anticipated and unimportant.

The free navigation of the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and Mediterranean, are but steps preparatory to the renewal of commerce from India, by a route the most ancient, natural, and direct,—the Red Sea, and the Isthmus of Suez. That this measure has long been a favourite maxim with some of the preponderating powers of Europe, need not to be explained. Neither is it necessary to expatiate on the question, Why the order of political and commercial systems has been for a length of time gradually varying its former direction? The progress of commerce and colonisation has, for three centuries, laid the scene of contest among rival powers in the wide ocean. But, from the never-ceasing vicissitudes of human affairs, the attention of states and sovereign princes is about to be drawn from the Atlantic, to the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, to the Mediterranean and the Nile, to the Gulfs of Arabia and Persia. These movements in the political orbit plainly show that the Eastern hemisphere, and Eastern commerce, is soon to become the grand theatre of contention, as well as a subject of jealousy and rivality among European nations. That these speculations are not only pleasing to the imagination, but likely to become realised, I have ventured on a former occasion to assert. Combinations of a commercial nature, so hostile to the established interests of Great Britain, are more formidable and dangerous than the consolidation of the French republic. It is to be regretted that sentiments of such tendency are beginning to be developed on the continent of Europe. The

views of France, in regard to the possession of Egypt, either by themselves, or by some other European power, on a general peace, are greatly strengthened by the return of Bonaparte. At the head of public affairs in France, and possessing a greater degree of the confidence of the people than has fallen to the share of any former rulers since the destruction of the monarchy, he places his chief glory, his hopes, and his importance, on his Egyptian expedition.

It is evident that Egypt was not seised on by the French for the mere purpose of conquest or territorial aggrandisement, but also for that of commerce, and the extension of political influence; by the colonisation of that country, re-opening the ancient canals, and stretching to the North and East, intercourses of various kinds between the inhabitants of those countries and the French nation. As commerce extends the boundaries of knowledge, so knowledge extends the boundaries of commerce. The investigations of the French in Egypt were directed not only to the advancement of science, but, by means of science, to the improvement of manufactures and arts. The attentions of Bonaparte, when in that country, were not more occupied in precautions for self-defence, and securing its possession, than in investigating its natural history and productions, the moral and political situations of the inhabitants, and the means by which the whole of these might be improved for the advantage of France, and what, it may be presumed, he had no less at heart,—his own individual glory.

It does not yet appear that these views of the French, and their illustrious leader, are by any means frustrated. They are encouraged still, by the predominancy of French influence and arms; the jealousy entertained by other nations of the naval power of England; the interest of all na-

tions situated on, or having a communication with, the Mediterranean; and, finally, by the tottering state of the Turks, verging fast to the very last stage of declination, and to whom the French may be either a formidable foe, or useful ally. That this dilemma was, in fact, held out, and may be probably still held out, is evident from the declaration that was made by the French Chargé d'Affaires to the Sublime Porte, on the occasion of Bonaparte's taking possession of Egypt *. The threat contained in the note below will in truth, in all probability, be soon realised, with this addition, that the two Imperial courts will be joined in the menaced attack by the French republic. Such is the partitioning policy, by which the great powers of the present day either prevent or settle disputes. The map of Europe will show the portions which will naturally be coveted by the courts of Petersburg and Vienna. Actual possession, with the long-meditated projects of France, clearly indicate what is to be the share of the new republic.

But if the French should be permitted to retain Egypt, availing themselves of all the resources of that exuberant soil, physical and moral, they will extend their inquiries and experiments beyond the precincts of Egypt and Syria, to the productions, prejudices, wants, and political situations external and internal, of other nations. A competition with such a people, so enterprising, and so ingenious, is not to be successfully maintained, without the exercise of genius and adventure.

The discoveries made in Egypt, amongst others the level of that canal which united, by means of water-carriage, the Red Sea with the Me-

* —— "Qu'on se proposoient d'envoyer un ambassadeur pour venir ici arranger cette affaire, et "représenter à la Sublime Porte les différens rapports avantageux que cette expédition offroit pour "ses intérêts; et que si la Porte osoit, pour cette affaire, declarer la querelle à la republique Fran- "çoise, elle se verroit aussitôt attaquée par les deux cours Impériales."

diterranean *, are subjects of his greatest triumph. Whether the remains of the French army in Egypt are permitted, under a capitulation unknown in military annals, to remain quietly at Alexandria till the return of peace, or whether they are suffered to return to France unmolested, is of little importance. The capitulation, however, proves an existing sympathy between the Ottoman Porte and the republic of France, no doubt founded on that friendship and connection which formerly subsisted between these nations, and whose interests, from geographical and political causes, whatever may be the revolutions of internal government, must ever continue to be the same.

The intriguing spirit of the French nation is well suited to the dissemination of such principles as are injurious and subversive of our prosperity, and particularly of that trade which constitutes our pride and our support. Bonaparte has already declared his sentiments and intentions. That commander has influenced the opinions of the most popular writers. Those of the highest character for talents, reputation, and impartiality, at the same time whose works, translated into all languages, command a general sale on the continent of Europe—men of that description, as well

* The existence of this famous canal occupied greatly the researches of Bonaparte. Towards the end of November, 1798, a detachment of 1500 men, under the command of general Bonaparte, took possession of Suez. Bonaparte arrived in person on the 26th of December following at that place. His attention, in the first instance, was directed to the town, and to the country adjacent, in constructing works, and in making dispositions favourable to commerce. In proceeding to the northward, he discovered the entrance of the ancient canal of Suez, the course of which he traced for four leagues. Passing the fort of Adgeroud, he crossed the Desert, and, returning by Balbeis, found, in the Oäsis of Honoreb, the remains of the same canal, where it entered the cultivated lands of Lower Egypt. Having thus ascertained the direction of the former canal, which united the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, he gave orders to Peyre, the superintending engineer of highways and bridges, to commence his operations at Suez, and to describe its level.

as politicians and philosophers, are employed in disseminating general principles of commercial politics over all the world. Such as are most likely to be favourably received, by seeming to unite great private gain with public advantage, are more particularly attended to. On the one hand, they describe the rights and prerogatives of nature, in regard to free and general trade, a subject interesting to the philosopher, extremely important and necessary to the welfare of society, and involving all the feelings of humanity and justice :—on the other, they point to India as the only source of those riches which, in the present age of luxury and refinement, are almost universally deemed necessary to life, as well as the security and independence of nations.

Amongst other plausible productions, Dumas, at one period war-minister in France, has, in the Précis des Evénemens Militaires, expressed himself in the following terms—" Outre les divers avantages qu'on " peut se promettre de la possession d'un pays renommée pour sa fer- " tilité, quelles espérances n'offriraient pas au commerce des établisse- " ments sur le Golfe Arabique, des communications avec la Perse, la " Chine, et l'Indostan: quelques lent et difficiles que soient les trans- " ports par les caravanes on peut voir dans les recherches récentes de Ro- " bertson quel dégré d'importance a conservé jusqu'a ce moment l'ancien " commerce par la voie de terre : dailleurs, on ne peut se le dissimuler, la " route du Cap de Bonne Espérance est perdue pour toutes les nations du " continent Européen.

" L'Angleterre, comme nous l'avons déjà remarqué, a non seule- " ment affermi mais étendu sa puissance dans la presqu'isle de l'Inde ; " ses escadres a l'abri des Moussons, dans la rade de Trinquemale, et

" profitant des vents alternatifs et réguliers qui régnent dans ces parages
" difficiles, n'y laisseront plus flotter désormais que le pavillon Britan-
" nique. L'Europe est condamnée au joug du monopole; et toutes ces
" denrées précieuses, devenues de première nécessité, et ces tissus fa-
" briques, a un prix si modique, par un peuple patient et frugal, seront
" revendus par les dominateurs des mers au prix qu'il leur conviendra de
" fixer.

" Ce seroit donc un véritable service à rendre a toutes les nations Mé-
" diterranées, que de consolider l'établissement de la colonie Françoise en
" Egypte, et de donner au commerce de ce pays, qui, de tout temps, a fixé
" les regards des politiques éclairés toute l'extension dont il peut être sus-
" ceptible. Les Egyptiens dégradés par la misère, et avilis par le despo-
" tisme; les Grecs asservis, et les Arabes errants, deviendront citoyens, le
" jour qu'ils connaitront une patrie; l'existence d'une ville qui renfermé
" près de 400 mille ames suffit seule pour prouver que l'industrie n'a pu
" être entièrement détruite sur les bords du Nil, et le Caire puit encore, par
" les soins vigilants du gouvernement et par cette activité si particulière
" aux François, rappeller les beaux temps de Tyr et d'Alexandrie *."

The reasons which induced me to enter so minutely into the affairs of Egypt are now developed, and will be seen in the perusal of the following sheets.

I offered in proper time such observations † as might have prevented

* Were it necessary to explain farther the views of the French in regard to commerce with India, the sentiments and opinions of their best political writers might be adduced: Sonnini, Arnould, Anquetil, Duperron, and others.

† See Travels from England to India, &c. by Major Taylor.

the evil consequences which we are now likely to encounter. A force sent from India, at an early period of the war in Egypt, would, no doubt, have speedily dispossessed the French, and deprived them of the opportunity of acquiring such a knowledge of the importance of Egypt to the nations of Europe as they now possess—a knowledge which they will yet contrive to convert to the most destructive purposes. If the time which has elapsed, since the first communication of my ideas on this subject, has altered the political situation of public affairs, I am sorry to add that the danger has not been diminished: the facts on which my apprehensions and arguments were founded remain as before. The Letters on India will not be accounted either less interesting or useful, from the circumstance of the friendly capitulation on the part of the Ottoman Empire and the French. The same views and interests are still predominant; the same precautions against ambitious machinations necessary; the same system of conduct politically expedient. The assistance of our veteran native troops, from the coast of Malabar, may be yet necessary in Egypt, and serve to illustrate the truth and the necessity of my suggestions beyond a doubt. At that period, whenever it may happen, the Letters on India may probably be resorted to not unusefully. The importance of Suez, and the positions of Cossire and Ghinna, will be then better understood; and the good policy of supporting the Arabs against the tyrannical and effeminate Turks, then perhaps the allies of France, be admitted.

If it were necessary to dilate farther on the unpromising aspect of affairs, many observations might be made. It is, however, proper we should be prepared to meet such changes and vicissitudes as the ingenuity and designing minds of our opponents are preparing for our most vulnerable part, in order to destroy the great commercial interests of Great Britain.

The French, it must be allowed, even by those the least disposed to over-rate their powers, have conducted matters, during the whole of the present disastrous war, on principles more certain in their effect than any upon which we have yet acted. While we have only oppoced measures of force, and warlike preparations and exertions, the French have uniformly counteracted our best efforts by the same physical force, impelled by strong and unconquerable opinion, that which influences all the passions of human nature, and by which only, in the present day, miracles are performed. They have substituted one system, or order of systems, to combat others which have been opposed to them; and, in some instances, they have artfully contrived to make their own interests and that of their enemies the same. The exclusion of British ships and commerce, not only from their own ports, but from those of Spain, Holland, and the Netherlands, has been severely felt. Their designs on Hamburg and ports in the Baltic, as well as Portugal, convince us that their views will only terminate with an extension of this measure as far as it may be possibly accomplished. The possession of the Mediterranean, and a free and open trade to India by the way of Egypt, a colony in their hands, would probably satisfy their ambition, fatal at the same time to British commerce to India.

These are the systems and combinations which they now oppose to our numerous and powerful fleets, since they see no probability of being again able to compete with us at sea. The French observe, "Laissez les Anglais combattre sur mer, donnez nous la terre, et nous sommes surs de vaincre." They are, at the present crisis, endeavouring to satisfy and convince the house of Austria of their interests in these future measures of commercial arrangement; and they no doubt already

reckon on the acquiescence of the Turks, and the good will of the kings of Prussia and Sweden.

The political and practical result of all these observations on the present state of commerce and prospective views of nations is, that the empires of Great Britain and Russia should ward off the threatened evils as long as possible, not only by a treaty of amity and commerce, but by the strictest alliance, defensive and offensive. The remote situations, and the different circumstances of these empires, constitute a solid basis for the greatest mutual advantages and the most permanent friendship.

The political designs of the French, and the line of conduct which it may be proper for Great Britain to pursue in consequence, particularly with reference to the India trade, may perhaps derive some additional light from the following observations.

The grand lever by which that people endeavours to subvert the ancient order of affairs in Europe and the world, is the principle of individual liberty, or the rights of man. They call the nations to the standard of France by the sound of liberty. In like manner, it is reasonable to infer, that in due time, that is, when they shall have established peace on the Continent, they will summon all maritime nations to arrange themselves around the French flag for the purpose of vindicating, in opposition to the tyranny of England, the freedom of the ocean. They will insist, that the navigation of the open seas shall be uncontrouled and free,—yet they themselves will endeavour to bind in chains the coasts of the Mediterranean, to convert this, as it were, into a great canal appertaining to the French empire, and to draw thereto the most valuable, and that which is the grand

stimulus of all the commerce of the world. They will no doubt permit, and may not improbably invite, the other maritime powers to participate in that commerce, well knowing that they themselves will retain or command the largest share, and be able to give the law in what they will consider as their own *parages*. Their first object will be, by operating on that love of power and property which is inherent in human nature, to establish an order of maritime affairs that shall humble the power of England. Their aim will be to open the trade with the Mediterranean, *under the auspices of the French republic*, in the same manner as they talked of giving peace and tranquillity to the world, *under the same auspices*: thus pretending still to be the first of nations.

The French republic, while it conducts its military operations on enlarged, and on what may be called sublime principles, and calls to its aid every improvement of art and science, carries on at the same time, and with equal success, a kind of moral war on the minds of men. The French, having established their power on the Continent, can well afford, and will probably affect to exhibit to the world, a grand example of moderation. But new power, and high renown, may certainly be expected to give to the industry and enterprise of the French a new spring, which will carry them rapidly on, in the career of arts, commerce, and every kind of exertion.

Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, deaf to the calls of public law and the balance of Europe, may probably listen to the more immediate advantages held out by an extension of commerce.

The politics of the Prince who at present sways the sceptre of Russia

has an evident tendency to the amelioration and aggrandisement of his empire. His views, in regard to the arrangements to be made at a general pacification, are not yet developed. But I reason on the affairs of Russia as on those of France and Turkey, on general principles, which, sooner or later, and commonly at no great distance of time, controul the accidents of caprice and fortune. Will the court of St. Petersburg, will the Russian nation, long endure the immoderate aggrandisement of the friends of the Turks and Swedes, and the patrons of the revolution in Poland?

The grand question at the present moment seems to be this—Whether the resources of industry, or those of rapine, both on a scale of grandeur unparalleled in history, will be found the most durable?—Let us view our real situation, and particularly as it stands in relation to France, with a candid, though steady and undiverted eye. Trade is artificial, precarious, and fluctuating. Physical force, every day encouraged by successful exertion, is of a more permanent nature. The lion and the tiger, that subsist on prey, are not only more powerful, but longer lived than those that are nourished by vegetables and live in peace with their neighbours. The fruitful soil of France, nourishing men by nourishing vegetables, will remain. The heavy weights added yearly to the heavy load of British taxes, and the hostile combination of maritime nations against us, will, in the long run, discourage and overpower our industry, if we do not oppose to these discouragements farther and farther improvements, and keep a vigilant and constant eye on every important change in the political balance.

Though trade in every country be precarious and transient in such a country as Great Britain, with Ireland now happily united, of large extent, nourishing a hardy race of peasantry, and fitted to repel external attacks

by its geographical situation, it is less so than such states as Holland, the trading states in Italy, Portugal, and the Hanseatic towns, which are little more than mere magazines of commerce. The wealth acquired by commerce, and a general spirit of industry and improvement, contributes to the improvement of our lands and seas, while the cultivation of these again furnishes new materials for the extension of commerce and general exertion. These natural advantages on our side may counterbalance the physical resources of France; provided that we also oppose to the restlessness and subtility of French intrigue the wisdom of sound political negotiation. Divided from the great Russian empire by distance of space, we may, in some sort, be considered as approximated to it by the ocean, and united by a reciprocity of interests. It is on this ground chiefly that I would endeavour to build my hopes of weathering the storm with which we have at present to maintain a conflict, and which, though the gale may blow from another quarter, will not be abated by a general pacification, unless the interests of Great Britain be consolidated by those, not of all (though this would be desirable, were society in so advanced a state as to render it practicable), but of at least some other powerful nations or nation.

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LETTER V.

LETTER VI.


Map of the
Countries situated between
GREAT BRITAIN and the EAST INDIES;
Calculated to illustrate the Overland Communication
between
EUROPE and ASIA.
With Major Taylor's Route from London
to Bombay.
EUROPE
ASIA
AFRICA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
WESTERN OCEAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
RUSSIA
SIBERIA
INDEPENDENT TARTARY
KALMOOKS
MONGOULS
CHINA
HINDOOSTAN
PERSIA
ARABIA
TURKEY
GERMANY
POLAND
HUNGARY
FRANCE
SPAIN
BRITISH ISLES
SWEDEN
PRUSSIA
BARBARY
SAHARA or Desert of Barbary
NIGRITIA
ABYSSINIA
GEORGIA
KIPSHAK
BAY OF BENGAL
PENINSULA OF INDIA
Recapitulation and Co
West Longitude
East Longitude
Equinoctial Line
J. Fairburn sculp. 146 Minories

LETTERS ON INDIA.

INTRODUCTORY LETTER.

LETTER I.

General Reflections on Indian Affairs—Liable to be changed by the Board of Controul and the Court of Directors—The Stockholders, an intermediate Power—Their great Privilege not to be infringed—Marquis of Wellesley, his Abilities and Success in India—Alarm excited by a supposed Transfer of the Coast of Malabar to the Presidency of Fort St. George—Reasons why it should not take place—Injurious to the Company's Servants on the Bombay Establishment—Meritorious Services of the Bombay Army—Public Thanks given them by the Governor-General and Commander in Chief—What the Reward of Service should be.

DEAR SIR, London, March 1, 1800.

THE affairs of the East-India Company have of late years taken a very extraordinary turn, and the Proprietors of the Stock of that Company must soon prepare themselves for a grand and total change in the system of their imperial establishment. The phases which late revolutions in your governments have displayed ought to convince us, that it is the intention of the Court of Directors, in conjunction with his Majesty's Ministers, to bring about some changes, in the name of reforms, in all your various departments. The Proprietors, placed between the two Executive Powers,

are, in fact, the axis of the balance. In this situation they are occasionally resorted to on such questions as may require their concurrence and assent. I consider, therefore, the Proprietors as very materially interested in the prosperity of the Company, not only in their own persons individually, but also as the representatives in this country, of their numerous connexions in the East Indies, and all their servants abroad, among whom there may be some who have few or no friends in Great Britain.

It is to be observed, that there exists a very material difference between the powers necessary to conduct an establishment on a mercantile scale, and the government of exclusive territorial possessions, with an immense productive revenue. It is, besides, a matter of great doubt, how far, in sound policy, they ought to be at all connected, as the extent of so considerable a country as British India, and a population of nearly thirty millions of inhabitants, may, without the trouble of commercial calculation, be justly considered of sufficient magnitude and importance to occupy the mind of any man, however enlightened. It was said, on a former occasion, by one of the Directors, "That take away the sword, the purse would soon follow." This may be true in some respects, as the sword is, beyond doubt, the guardian of territory; but on this, as well as every other subject of consideration, in which the Proprietors may, from the political order of things, find themselves involved, there is one axiom which never should be forgotten; viz. That the existing East-India Company should still continue to act agreeably to express compact, as the circulating medium of the public money between Great Britain and her possessions in India.

These, my dear Sir, are your undoubted privileges, and they cannot, either in good faith, or on the solid basis of public justice, be alienated from you, unless, indeed, extreme bad management or inattention on the

part of the Directors, who at present preside over your interest, with so much œconomy and propriety, should render a change absolutely indispensable. Your commercial charter depends more on a due observance of mercantile œconomy and regulation, than on the parchment itself, with all its formalities. In the present age of calculation, when we hear of the wealth of the country, it does not imply any great addition, either to the riches or the comfort of the subject. The advantage of national wealth is, that it renders the state more powerful, by the political absorption of money into the public treasury, and, in proportion to that accession, enables it to grant better security to the property and lives of the people. By a proper application of the finances, externally as well as internally, we hold a higher rank in the scale of surrounding nations, and obtain benefits denied to others. The Proprietors of East-India Stock, as well as every other public body, and individuals of the empire, are therefore called upon to exert all justifiable means to increase the resources and preserve the independence of their country.

In regard to the policy of retaining under the present system the territorial and commercial interests of India, it appears of very little consequence to your concerns in what manner they are conducted, so that you are not deprived of those privileges which certainly belong to you. One thing is certain, that the transfer of your army to government would very shortly be followed up with the deprivation of the territory. But, what then would be the consequence? You would be exonerated from a great share of responsibility, and no longer be troubled with voluminous applications from your numerous servants.

Again it must be considered, that, from the changes and fluctuations introduced into the physical and political order of things by the lapse of time, a system in itself perfect half a century ago is not by any means applicable

at the present conjuncture.—A vast accession of territory has totally altered the face of your affairs; and such regulations must, therefore, be adopted as are suited to the appearances which these assume. The Proprietors have themselves authorised innovations in regard to the shipping interest, as well as to that class of men denominating themselves the free-traders to India; and you must expect that they will be succeeded by others, perhaps, no less justifiable and necessary.

The efforts of the present governor-general in your service are far above my praise, and perhaps beyond what you yourselves can appreciate. With the most undisputed abilities, as well as strictest veracity and soundest judgment, the Marquis of Wellesley has made very important changes in the internal government of your possessions in India: he has, by the conquest of Mysore, and the destruction of the government of an implacable tyrant, introduced into that country a system of political security never before established. By his wisdom and energy, British India is become more valuable, and, I trust, a more permanent appendage to the crown of these realms. A nobleman, bred up in the general polity of courts, could scarcely be supposed to descend to the minutiæ of commerce. Still his penetrating mind was early directed to this important object: he opened with a liberal hand a freedom of commerce, which reflects on his administration the highest credit; inasmuch as it tends to combine the interest of his country with the prosperity of individuals. A relaxation in the restrictions from exclusive trade will promote the manufactures of India, and prove a considerable accession of income to the East-India Company.

When so much regard, Sir, has been paid to the security of India and to public justice, we should regret that any portion of the Indian community, from whatsoever cause, short of the greatest political necessity, should be likely to become a sacrifice to internal regulation.

Contracts, it has been frequently observed, are either in themselves positive or implied. Implied contracts are perhaps more binding, when they regard the state of civil society and social happiness, than those of a more positive and defined description. The first most commonly affect a few, whilst the others may disturb the domestic enjoyment of a great number. Besides, in foreign countries, where we are far removed from the endearing community of those we esteem, the very semblance of injustice should be more than carefully avoided. I allude here, Sir, to the report of an intended transfer of the two provinces, of Canara and Malabar, to the Presidency of Fort St. George. The very surmise of such a measure has already created very serious alarm in the minds of the Bombay servants of every denomination, as it has also warmly interested the feelings of their numerous friends in this country in their behalf. Those with whom the decision of this proposition is ultimately left, if any such is in agitation, and of which I entertain considerable doubt, will certainly, when they judge of the expediency of the transfer, balance in their public judicial capacities the probable advantages with the evident injury. The essence of distributive justice consists not in any specific advantage conferred on any one party or individual, but in the quantum of good which it extends indiscriminately, and with impartiality, to a whole society. By these criteria are to be appreciated the degree of despondency and despair, not to say of indignation, which, in case of the transfer supposed, would naturally take possession of the minds of your Bombay servants, civil, military, marine, and medical: men, who, many of them, have spent their best days in your service under a tropical sun, relying with unbounded confidence on your patronage and justice. The intended transfer would not convey to any part of British India,—no! not even to that Presidency which would most benefit by it, either the greatest possible

encouragement to be derived from emulation in your employment, or the most strict adherence on the part of the Company to the civil rights of their servants. The spirit and energy of rising settlements would be for ever crushed. After the uniform good conduct of your army on the coast of Malabar, and the services rendered by them in the reduction of Mysore, so warmly and highly applauded both by the commander in chief and the governor-general, in public orders *, what must their feelings be, when they reflect that, as a body, they are in a manner annihilated? To what end, must they suppose, do acknowledged services and great exertions lead? If not to reward, certainly not to degradation. Argument, Sir, on a subject self-evident, is unnecessary; and it would be a waste of words to prove what is already acknowledged, "That the best national policy is that which "is founded on sound justice." We have little apprehension but on this maxim the matter will be settled, in such a manner as will effectually remove the lively emotions to which the idea of a transfer has given rise.

The press has lately teemed with publications on East-Indian affairs; which plainly show the great consequence of our Indian establishments to the country at large. As this has increased, and still continues to increase, the desire of information has been proportionally augmented. Some writers have instructed, whilst others have misled; but my object is to exhibit a compendious view of India, as it is connected with Great Britain, in their general as well as most important reciprocities; and particularly to rest on the political and relative situation of Hindoostan, at such a juncture as the present.

This subject, on account of the urgency of its nature, I shall resume in my next. In the mean time,

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

* See Appendix.

LETTER II.

Considerations on the Expediency of annexing the Territorial Possession on the Coasts of Canara and Malabar, obtained by Treaty and Conquest from the late Sultaun of Mysore, to the Presidency of Fort St. George—Consequences and Injustice of that Measure to the Servants on the Bombay Establishment.

DEAR SIR, London, March 5, 1800.

TO avoid all injustice, or appearance of injustice, in the public as well as private acts of government, is not more upright than wise policy: good faith and a steady adherence to ancient establishments, customs, and privileges, should be the main spring of all its actions. On this ground I feel the strongest confidence, from the known moderation and wisdom of those who preside over East-Indian affairs, that the alarm which certain circumstances have very generally excited, is as groundless as it would be inexpedient and unjust.

The transfer of the coast of Malabar to the Presidency of Fort St. George would, no doubt, be a measure extremely likely to create great discontent abroad: but the anxiety which has on every occasion been shown to prevent injurious distinctions, in the more remote corners of our empire, is an additional argument why, on the present occasion, we have nothing to apprehend.

Certain circumstances, I must allow, have carried with them a considerable degree of suspicion. Amongst others, may be mentioned the appointment of collectors from another establishment, to the revenue department of the Canara districts.

A salutary regulation lately issued by the governor-general, may in some degree, *pro tempore*, have influenced these appointments. To extend and diffuse the native languages of the country among all the servants of the Company, appeared the best means for encouraging their cultivation. The office of collector is now open to all their servants without distinction, in all departments, civil, military, and medical. The best qualified for this important office are to be selected, not from the different presidencies generally—The Company's servants, on their respective establishments, are to enjoy the territorial collectorships under their distinct presidencies.

Since the acquisition of the Malabar province, in the year 1792, the study of the Canara language has, by the Bombay servants, been particularly attended to. There are now many who can both write and speak it with the greatest facility. It is nevertheless harsh, rapid, and monotonous, and not very easily attainable. From this circumstance, it is very probable that there are not a sufficient number of Bombay servants as yet qualified to fill situations which the recent accession of the Canara districts may demand. The servants on the Madras establishment have, for a great length of time, been accustomed to the Canara dialect. It is in fact the common dialect of the coast of Coromandel, and it, consequently, has been persevered in by them in the same manner as the Hindoostany, or Moors, the common language of Bombay and its dependencies, has been, by the servants on that establishment.

It is therefore probable, that the appointment of gentlemen from Madras has been made merely with a view to arrange the affairs of the Canara province, previously to its being finally given over to the presidency to which it naturally appertains. The financial accounts of that province must necessarily, from recent events, be in great confusion, and in want of that attention which is necessary, in order to ascertain its real value, and the extent of

its resources. To effect this important measure in the first instance, may require men habituated not only to the language of the people, but also well acquainted with the nature of such complicated accounts, especially when it is for the interest of the inhabitants, as it is also their disposition, to conceal all the transactions of their former government. These circumstances have occurred more on the eastern than on the western side of India, and account, in some measure, for the innovation. All this may be inferred, without imputing either blame, or want of genius or application, to the Bombay servants: but it by no means argues that they are less capable or less deserving than their brethren at Fort St. George. Such reflections are illiberal, and, consequently, not congenial to the expanded sentiments of the rulers of India. The generous feelings of men high in office, whether in this country or abroad, will, no doubt, consider all the servants of the Company as deserving of equal attention, and as entitled to equal privileges, protection, and emoluments. They will not depress, or rather degrade, some, in order to exalt others. This would be an outrage to justice, and an insult on common sense and integrity. Thank heaven! we live not under a government of despots: nor does that government treat us as such, but as men equally qualified with themselves to judge of the expediency of any particular measure, both in respect of political propriety or advantage, and the peace and comfort of private life: objects utterly incompatible with an undue preference to come before others with equal rank, and equal pretensions to favour. Acts of injustice will never be permitted by any of the exalted characters who hold a share in the administration of India.

On the occasion to which I have now alluded, the appointment of Madras servants to the collectorships of the province of Canara, the Bombay civil servants, quickened by apprehension, and alive to the nice feelings

of sensibility and honour, have addressed the Governor-General. It is to be hoped, nay, it is past a doubt, that the distinguished character, who enjoys the greatest dignity under the crown of Great Britain, will pay every just attention to the merits of their memorial, and to the claims of all those who appeal to his undoubted justice and integrity. We should, therefore, be inclined to believe that the next packets from India overland will bring the gratifying intelligence that every alarm has subsided, and that matters are going on with the utmost harmony and concord. It would, indeed, be very much to be regretted, if any jealousies should be extrinsically excited between the presidencies of Fort St. George and that of Bombay. The gentlemen on these establishments are all of them well known to each other; they have shared more than once the same glory, the same toils and perils;—they have divided in the gloomy dungeons of Seringapatam equal hardships; and they have tasted from the same cup the bitter draughts of cruel and unexampled captivity. Can these men be therefore disunited? or can selfish and sordid views take place of genuine friendship and esteem? No! that is yet beyond the depravity of human nature of the basest kind, and totally unknown to the generous and noble feelings of our countrymen in India. The British inhabitants of that country are connected by indissoluble bonds,—ties which are commensurate with the situation, and with the space which divides them from their friends and connections in the western hemisphere. Let us therefore not reckon on rivality between the two presidencies, or suppose that the Government of Madras, were they so inclined, will find either instigators or abettors amongst their servants, who will in any way advise, I may say, so unconstitutional a measure as the transfer of the coast of Malabar to the Presidency of Fort St. George.

It is also to be hoped, that government will by no means lose sight of

those incalculable mischiefs to be apprehended from any measure that might discompose, shake, and perhaps ultimately overturn, that interior political balance which has hitherto happily regulated and harmonised our affairs in India. Under the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, a sort of equipoise has been established *. They have existed in perfect security for a considerable length of time; and as innovations are at all times dangerous, there can be no necessity for a change of that system which has already been approved, and found so excellent.

The impracticability of such a transfer as that now alluded to, if it required any illustration to convince us of its impropriety, is perfectly demonstrable. On what principle of justice it could possibly take place, I am at a loss to discover. The accession of such a body of servants to the Madras Presidency would create the greatest confusion and disorder; it would inevitably produce a continual scene of murmuring and complaint. After all, some servants of every description must remain at Bombay. Now, would not those men have a right to exclaim, as being left without consequence, and without hope, at a degraded and impoverished settlement? The civil servants would be mere agents or factors, and the military stationed at Bombay and Surat, become, as it were, the invalids of the garrisons of Plymouth and Dover, or Stirling and Blackness Castles.

In regard to whatever part of the military might be transferred, on whom it would certainly fall lighter than on the civil servants, to whom it would prove total destruction, what must be the feelings of a military officer of Bombay incorporated on the Madras army with his old rank, after so many promotions, perhaps, of younger officers, have been

* It cannot be literally said to be an equipoise, if extent of dominion is to be the criterion from which this is to be estimated; but on commercial and other considerations it may very fairly be put into the scale.

made at Madras *?—Such a measure would not be more unjust than impolitic.

Since the changes that have lately taken place, there may indeed be a necessity of removing the seat of government from Bombay to the coast of Canara or Malabar. The situation of Mangalore appears to be particularly eligible for this purpose; it is nearly in a line with Fort St. George, Seringapatam, and the Straits of Babelmandel. Here the whole intelligence of Europe and India might be concentred with the greatest advantage †. There is not the smallest doubt but that the harbour or port of Mangalore ‡ is capable of very great improvement, and that it may, with attention, become a very useful rendezvous for shipping, as well as serviceable in repairing, and also in building vessels of considerable dimensions.

Should political expediency require that the seat of government be removed to a more convenient spot, it would not affect the servants on the establishment. Bombay would be still retained as an ancient and respectable settlement of the Company's, essential to their interest from its excellent dock-yard and extensive commerce. It could be garrisoned by European troops, and regiments of marines, formed of the same castes as now compose the marine corps on that establishment.

I am apprehensive that I have by this time tired your patience on a business which most probably will never take place. It is not possible that

* We understand that the Madras military establishment has been increased since the capture of Seringapatam by four regiments of native infantry, one of cavalry, and a battalion of artillery.

† On this subject I mean to be more particular on a future occasion.

‡ This port under Tippoo Sultaun enjoyed considerable trade, and was provided with an excellent dock-yard, where he built ships of war, mounting 60 guns. It was a favourite object with that prince; and the reduction of it in 1783, by the Bombay troops, was sufficient to induce Tippoo Sultaun to withdraw his whole army from the invasion of the Carnatic, and to march to its relief.

government will ever think of offending the Bombay Presidency by so flagrant an act of injustice, and, indeed, I may almost say, contempt. Besides, the Court of Directors, and also the General Court of Proprietors, both of whom would, no doubt, take cognisance of such a measure, would be justly alarmed at the great extent to which the Presidency of Fort St. George, by so considerable an accession as the provinces of Canara and Malabar, would consequently be swelled. We have seen, that in proportion as any of our eastern settlements have increased by conquest, in the same degree has their pretensions been extended. Bengal would become jealous of the power of Madras, and Madras would soon insist on privileges and advantages equal, at least, if not superior, to those enjoyed by the servants at Bengal. To what extent this system of rivality might be carried, and with what injury to the interests of the Company, need not to be mentioned. On the whole of this important subject, it appears to be most wise and expedient to increase the Bombay establishment, from the recent conquest of Mysore, at least to a size, in regard to territorial posession, equal to its expenses. This may safely be done without disturbing the harmony of our settlements in India, or destroying the structure on which our political existence in that country may be said to be founded. One act of injustice leads to many others, which in the end enervates and corrupts a state, and renders it an easy prey to its enemies. In India, especially, our enemies are at all times extremely ready to improve the opportunity of anarchy and disorder. Nothing could be more gratifying to the native powers of India, and especially to the numerous disaffected princes of Malabar, polygars, and others, than to see jealousies excited amongst the servants of the Company. Let this then by all means be avoided! and our empire is safe.

From the plain and simple means which I have pointed out to support

the equilibrium of our Indian possessions, it may be added, that Seringapatam, from its central situation, would form a grand link in the chain of connection between the coast of Coromandel and that of Malabar. Between the two settlements a constant intercourse could be upheld at all seasons of the year, mutually assisting and supporting each other.

If, however, contrarily to my expectation, there should really appear any well-grounded necessity for making a material alteration in the system of our government in India, I trust, in that case, that a complete transfer of the whole Bombay establishment, without distinction, will be the consequence; for in no other way can it be done, consistently with justice and fair dealing. The civil servants to be incorporated with their standing in the service; and the military, as in his majesty's service, to be placed on the list from the date of their captain's commission,—the subalterns from the date of their respective appointments. If the seat of government of the southern provinces of India should therefore be transferred to Seringapatam, or these provinces united in any other situation, it is to be hoped Bombay may at once be made an invalid garrison, to which a regiment of Europeans, sent from this country, and another of marine sepoys, to be occasionally relieved, might be added, as perfectly adequate to its defence. Bombay, even in this situation, from the facilities which her excellent harbour gives to trade, must always be the resort of merchandise from all quarters of the world; and her commercial advantages still continue to afford her pre-eminence and distinction.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER III.

Importance of Egypt to the French—Their great desire to retain that Country until the Period of general Pacification—Interest of the Arabs in excluding Commerce by the way of Suez—Contrary Views of the Turks—Their imbecillity the Reason why they promote the Views of the East-India Company—Interest of the Nations of Europe bordering on the Mediterranean Sea in regard to Egypt—Necessity for expelling the French from thence.

DEAR SIR, London, March 10, 1800.

THE importance of Egypt, as a colony in the hands of the French, could any doubt remain of that circumstance being, next to their own political independence, the chief object of their pursuit, would be clearly exhibited by the correspondence recently intercepted between the French army in Egypt, and the late directory of France. The consolidation of the magnificent establiſhment of Egypt is an object of ambition, after which the French republic, no doubt, ardently aspire. To effect this, they would sacrifice honour, principle, good faith, and public as well as private justice. It must appear evident to the most indifferent observer, that the French will never lose sight of the re-establishment of their trade in the Levant, on which the southern provinces of France solely depend. The possession of Egypt would grant to that country more than a command of the Levant trade; as a direct communication with India, by the Red Sea, would be the natural and inevitable consequence of such possession.

The French have discovered that no good purpose can be obtained by continuing the war. But then, say the Machivellian casuists of that country,

" Peace would only be the pretext to postpone our claims to a happier pe-
" riod. In the mean time let us retain Egypt as long as it is practicable,
" and employ every measure to effect this desirable object until the period
" of a general pacification. Propose terms to the Porte; talk of restoring
" Egypt, or rather of keeping it in trust for the Grand Seignior. But then,
" remember to take time, and avoid the evacuation of the country; pro-
" crastinate, by every means that hypocrisy and chicane can devise, as much
" as possible: proceed in the negotiation by slow degrees; and after every
" scheme of sophistry has failed, a convention between the grand-vizir,
" and the commander in chief of the French army in Egypt, is no treaty;
" it must be ratified in Paris, and, if suitable to existing circumstances,
" disavowed and annulled. The very opening a negotiation would lead to
" a suspension of hostilities, and, besides, the advantage of gaining time
" and retaining possession of Egypt till a general peace."

The very idea of a negotiation between France and the Porte would create alarming jealousies to Russia, which would soon terminate in direct offence. A rupture between Russia and the Porte is the axis on which the hopes of France continually preponderate. France would, in the mean time, give up every thing to Great Britain for its neutrality in any contest, wherein they could become associates with the Turks in a war with Russia. Here again, the navigation of the Black Sea, the Levant trade, and a colony in Egypt, is the avowed impulse and the mark to which their exertions are directed. There is very little doubt but that the old court of France produced the ablest politicians in Europe; and it would appear that a considerable germ of a *caractère diplomatique* still remains in that country, under the influence of the present active and intriguing government. To excite and encourage rivality between the courts of Petersburg and St. James's is a favourite axiom with the rulers of France, who are persuaded, says Pous-

sielque, " that the Engliſh cannot see, without some uneasiness, and with-
" out a secret kind of jealousy, the progress of the Russians—a progress
" much more dangerous for them than our continental power; now that
" our navy is destroyed, and that we have lost our maritime conquests."

Subjects of so much political importance I ſhall hereafter take an opportunity of examining; and, in the mean time, trouble you with such observations as may be necessary to establish certain general principles, from which may be derived certain particular results.

The observations to which I allude, refer, first, to the necessity of supporting the Arab government on the coast of the Red Sea, and in Egypt; secondly, to the political necessity of driving the French from Egypt without delay; and, finally, establishing a Mahommedan government in that country.

As far back as the month of December, 1798, I esteemed it my duty to deliver such sentiments as occurred to me on the most effectual way in which the invasion of Egypt was to be repelled; and I have every reason to suppose, had the plan been acted upon immediately after the fall of Tippoo, that the war in Egypt would long since have terminated with success. But even now, it is not too late to attempt the expulsion of the French from Egypt by succours from India. At that period, I took the liberty to represent, that the Nile, which is known to fertilise the country through which it runs, flows, by a long and straight course, through the kingdoms of Abyssinia and Nubia, before it descends into the lower country, where it forms, by many branches, the Delta of Egypt. The mutual intercourse of these countries, by means of the navigation of the Nile, is very great; and, notwithstanding the prolific and abundant soil of Lower Egypt, it is very much in want of many supplies from those countries, through which the Nile runs, and waters in its course. The situation of the coast of Malabar, and its vici-

nity, to the Straits of Babelmandel, the great plenty of shipping, together with our naval force in those seas, would enable the East-India Company to detach from their settlements on that coast an army of native troops, to occupy the banks of the Nile, and entirely to cut off the communication between Upper and Lower Egypt. These troops might, by the way of the Red Sea, be landed at Cosseir, from whence they could be marched to Ghennah on the Nile. The Arabs would fully attract the attention of the French on the side of Syria, and towards the Delta and the Mediterranean Sea.

Another circumstance, of no inconsiderable import, ought to be attended to. The Arabs, who inhabit the shores of the Red Sea, cannot fail to regard the invasion by the French with a jealous eye, and would, no doubt, cheerfully exert themselves to drive out the invaders. The native troops of India being of the same religion with the Arabs, at least many of them being so, it must be supposed that, from a similarity of manners and customs, they would readily assimilate and act together on the same principles of opposition towards the French. The French, at all events, having a powerful body of Arabs in their front, and a considerable force ready to fall down the Nile on their rear, would be reduced to the greatest extremities, and ultimately forced to surrender at discretion. It may, however, be reasonably expected that this event has already taken place: but, ſhould any apprehension of the success and power of the French create serious alarm in the minds of Government, and the East-India Company, so as to justify a measure dictated by political expediency, and which necessity only can approve, there is no doubt that the plan of the great Albuquerque could be carried into execution, and the current of the Nile diverted into the Red Sea—Egypt would become an uninhabited desert, and the present people would be obliged to retire into Syria, there to cultivate, what are highly capable of improvement, its extensive uninhabited plains: and it might be a consolation,

that the degenerated Egyptians, under the influence of a different climate, might possibly become more useful, and, as members of society, better deserving encouragement and protection.

Such were my ideas on this important subject: and I was anxious, at the same time, fairly to describe the genuine interests of the Turks and Arabs, as they relate to our commercial security.

It is to be observed, that the existence of the Turkish power in Egypt can neither be accessary nor necessary to Great Britain, as a commercial nation: on the contrary, the Arabs are the natural guardians of those countries, provinces, and seas, which divide Europe from an immediate communication with India. It is the interest of the Arabs to maintain the sovereignty and independence of the deserts of Arabia, of Suez, and of Thebaïs; and the chiefs of that country, and not the Turks, impose on the trade with India those restrictions by which the commerce of the Company is so much strengthened and concentrated. Fortunately for this body, existing circumstances, opinions, and superstitions, operate powerfully in their favour, and prove the best and surest bulwark to prevent European nations from opening a commerce with the Red Sea. The late Tippoo Sultaun, although a Mahommedan, and a powerful as well as ambitious prince, was never able to promote a direct communication between his own country and the city of Constantinople and European Turkey. His object was to establish factories at Mocha, and in other parts of the Red Sea, where the commodities of India might be sold, and where he could procure, in exchange, whatever articles he stood in need of from the European market.

The Arabs are extremely tenacious and jealous of their trade in the Red Sea; and private intrigue has prevented a general extension of commerce in those parts. The influence of the Sherreef of Mecca has been particularly exerted, with the view of drawing to his own port of Gedda the

whole of the customs, and prevent any participation in the high parts of that sea.

The interest which the Turks have, or rather wish to possess, in this trade, is obvious. The policy which induces the Turks to be aiding and assisting in precluding Europeans from any communication with India by Cairo and the Red Sea, to the total deprivation of European trade in that quarter, is evidently calculated to lay open that commerce to themselves, and to engross all the advantages thereof, which the East-India Company have uniformly endeavoured to prevent. The object of the Turkish empire is, to close the ports in the Red Sea against all European powers whatever; at the same time, to have them open for the importation of the manufactures of India, in vessels belonging to Mussulmen of that country. This trade, with the coffee, gums, and the rich produce of Arabia, would exclusively be carried into European Turkey. Constantinople would become the grand emporium of eastern commerce by the Red Sea. It is the imbecillity of the Porte that prevents the completion of a plan so beneficial to the Turkish government, and which would render all farther attempts on the part of the East-India Company against it nugatory and abortive. It is, evidently, not from political relation, or from any coincidence of mutual and reciprocal interest, that the Turks are induced, and so readily incline to listen to the remonstrances of our ambassador: it is their imbecillity, and not their inclination, we have to thank. The Arab Sheicks, and not the Pachas sent by the Porte, have now the controul on the borders of the Red Sea: it is the interest of the Sherreef of Mecca, of the King of Yemen, and of all the principal leading men in Arabia, to deal with Europeans: by whose medium they receive India goods, which are vended in Arabia and Turkey, and on which the Arabs impose heavy duties. These duties by no means flow into the treasures of the Grand Seignior, but, on the contrary,

are retained by themselves. The Porte, notwithstanding its inability of dictating to the Arabs, finds its advantage in assisting to keep shut the overland communication; and, while it does not possess the power of engrossing the trade to itself, is still endeavouring to prevent the Europeans from participating of it: for this reason, that the Arabs, as a component part of the empire, should continue to enjoy the benefit of this trade, rather than that any other nation should deprive them of it. The question, therefore, is, Which is for the interest of Great Britain—to aggrandise an empire, whose commercial views interfere so much with our own; or that the Arabs should be protected and encouraged, as the natural guardians of the barrier between Europe and the East Indies by means of the deserts; and whose advantage it is, while they permit a free trade in the Red Sea, at the same time to prevent the port of Suez from being the resort either of European or Turkish traders, for the purpose of conducting commerce with any part of Europe?

The present crisis, from what I have already observed, as well as from a multiplicity of other circumstances, is very interesting; and, at the same time, involves the affairs of the East-India Company with the security of their territorial possessions. It becomes the duty of those who preside over the British interests in the East, not to rest altogether satisfied with mere appearances, but carefully to examine the views and designs of our enemies, more particularly as they relate to our settlements in India. On this subject, the plans of the French, in regard to Egypt, are deserving of their particular attention.

The inertion of the Turkish government, enfeebled and relaxed as it is become now, added to that diversity of interests, necessarily engaged in the management of a country so very extensive as the Turkish empire, is one of many reasons why the remains of the French army have not long

since been totally driven out of Egypt. It is a serious consideration, and every day becoming more so, that the French, in full possession of Lower Egypt, together with some part of the Upper province, have extended their conquests and influence even to certain ports on the Red Sea.

It is unnecessary to observe, that the situation of Egypt renders it by far the readiest medium of communication between the East and the West. Its amazing fertility, and rich productions, point it out as a country desirable for colonisation, especially for any kingdom bordering on the Mediterranean Sea, not in the possession of territory in India.

France, unable openly, and by force of arms, to wrest from us any part of our Eastern dependencies, sought, by indirect means, to accomplish what they imagined the most effectual method to injure the trade, and thereby affect the opulence of this country. The invasion of Egypt, and the reduction of that country, was the blow meditated against the British power in the East: the plan was accordingly put in execution, and, in the course of a few months, the whole of the Delta of Lower Egypt, inclusive of the capital, came under the dominion of the French. The only severe check, which they received in the outset, was the important victory obtained by Lord Nelson; but, unfortunately, the whole of their stores and ammunition had been previously landed; by which means the French army was in a condition to act with promptitude and effect. No person, at this period, but supposed that the expedition to Egypt was in itself chimerical and absurd; but the want of energy in the Turks, and the degraded state of the inhabitants of Egypt, rendered that country an easy prey.

Since the month of July, 1798, the French have, against all opposition, kept possession of Egypt; and there cannot be a doubt, that the longer they remain, the more danger is to be apprehended—they will endeavour to make their position, in that country, more secure and formidable. It con-

sequently follows, that, in proportion to the increase of danger, the more should our suspicion be awake, and the greater promptitude used by the executive power to compel the French to abandon that country. Egypt is a situation from whence the possessors of it can menace or threaten that security which it is so much for the interest of this country that our Indian possessions should enjoy.

It is not fit that a great commercial people should be deceived by false appearances, or view their situation through a wrong medium. Let it not be supposed, that the command of the navigation of the Red Sea, and possession of the Straits of Babelmandel, insures to us complete safety, or that our Indian settlements are not to be approached, and our trade diverted from the present channel, by the way of Egypt, at some period or other. At all events, this is not impossible. The want of the co-operation of Tippoo, since the destruction of his empire, has very greatly damped the expectations of the French; and it may be questioned, notwithstanding the report that the recall of Bonaparte originated with Sieyes, how far the fall of that prince accelerated the departure of that general from Egypt, since he could have known it before he left that country? The French government cannot at present indulge a thought of being able to penetrate to India by the Red Sea, or, in the smallest degree, to disturb our tranquillity at the present moment in that quarter. But the rulers of France look to establish a permanent colony in Egypt; and it is for the legislature of this country to appreciate the consequence of such an establishment. The consequences, in the first place, regard our trade; and, in the second, the very existence of our territorial possessions. It must be evident to every person who understands the relative situation of Egypt, its natural connection with India, and the favourable avenues of communication which, at particular seasons, are open to and from that

country, by every description of sea conveyance, that Egypt, as a colony in the hands of the French, or in the hands of any power hostile to the commercial interests of this country, would, in the course of a very few years, be the means of exciting great commotions in India. The possessors of it are so ready, in point of situation, and so well disposed to promote the views and disaffection of the native princes, who are restless and ambitious, that the worst consequences might be reasonably expected, and the security of the British empire in India be greatly endangered. The trade, in the mean time, would be drawn by degrees to the Levant, by its ancient channel; and the facilities which the French, from their ingenuity, would give to this very valuable branch of commerce, must very considerably interfere with the interest of the Company, and lay the foundation for a new order of things in regard to India, which, in the end, would prove highly prejudicial, if not destructive, to British commerce in that quarter. But, without entering minutely into arguments on a question so extremely important to national prosperity, and involving the best interests of our country, it may be most prudent merely to observe, that, with the experience of three centuries, during the whole of which period Egypt has been subject to the Mahommedan power, no attempt has been made, by the rulers of that country, to foment disputes or create jealousies in India, or in any shape to interfere with the progress made by European powers in that country. On the contrary, the Mahommedans, more particularly the Arabs, have, in almost every instance, seconded the views of those nations * who have possessed the greatest share of eastern commerce by the Cape of Good Hope, in keeping shut the easiest road by which the commodities of India could

* The Portugueze, the Dutch, and the English, have alternately struggled for pre-eminence in India; and the French, though last, have not been the least desirous of acquiring power in that country.

be transported into the western world *. With this knowledge, which, the best criterion of truth, the test of time, has approved; and, with the perfect knowledge too of the contrary intention of the French, it cannot be supposed that any innovation can place Great Britain in a better situation; or that Egypt, having changed masters, can possibly add to the security of our eastern establishments. The very contrary may be supposed to be the case; and it requires but little penetration to calculate on the result: should the French continue to consolidate their power in Egypt, to attach the inhabitants to their interests, to open a trade in the Red Sea, which they have already begun to do at the port of Cossire, and finally to introduce salutary laws, and the arts and sciences; and, by furnishing hereafter a proportion of industrious inhabitants, to colonise and improve the country to the fullest extent. This reasoning, it is true, is speculative, and the probability of affecting the whole, or indeed of any part, may, with exer-

* It would be difficult to give an instance of any interference of this sort. We can, however, call to our remembrance the jealousy which the intrigues of the Venetians, with the Sultauns or Soldans of Egypt, raised in the minds of the Portugueze. The Venetians, who enjoyed the greatest share of the over-land trade by Egypt, and the Red Sea, previous to the discovery of the passage by the Cape of Good Hope, lost it by that discovery. The Portugueze, under the celebrated Albuquerque, encouraged by the Arabs, who were anxious to confine the East-India trade to their own country, acquired complete dominion in the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea; and the Venetians, with little or no support from the people of the country, superadded to the great difficulty of transporting from Alexandria to Suez the frame-work of vessels of sufficient force to attack the Portugueze on the Red Sea, were obliged to relinquish their design. The western world were at this time in darkness, unacquainted with the advantages of commerce. The Portugeze, by promoting discovery and adventure, were the most enlightened; and the capacious mind of the great Albuquerque knew how to appreciate the value of a trade with India. He proposed, in case of serious opposition, that the banks of the Nile should be cut in Higher Egypt; and, by diverting the course of that river into the Red Sea, not only draw the trade of a great part of Africa into a new channel, but at the same time render Lower Egypt a barren desert, and by that means prevent the possibility of colonisation in Egypt, and oppose a strong barrier between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The inhumanity of this measure gave way to the political necessity by which it was dictated.

tion on our part, be rendered impracticable: but then an effort must be made; and the sooner it is made, with effect, so much the better it will be for the safety of India.

I hope I shall be forgiven if I enter into the political situation of public affairs, at least so far as they appear to be connected with the prosperity and safety of British India, and that it is to our purpose to do so. It must be allowed, that the interests of the coalesced powers, independently of the strong inclination of the French to participate in eastern commerce, and to accomplish our destruction, are not such as are likely to encourage the continuance of British influence in the east. It is for the interest of all the Italian states, and generally for the interest of all the civilised kingdoms which surround the shores of the Mediterranean, that the trade to and from India should be conveyed by the Red Sea. But what appears to be a more serious danger, should the court of Vienna, on the eve of a peace, find themselves deprived of Austrian Flanders and the port of Ostend, and be left in possession of Venice, and the command of the Adriatic, they will, it is to be feared, tacitly acquiesce in the opportunity of opening the old communication between the East and West by Egypt and the Mediterranean; more especially if, in the event of a general pacification, the French should retain possession of Egypt. The question would not be, Are the French to evacuate Egypt in order to gratify Great Britain, and to promote and encourage the trade of the English to India? The point agitated would be this—"Is it for the general interest of Europe that Egypt should be the "medium by which the riches of India are to be brought to the Mediter- "ranean, and from thence diffused over all that great part of the western "world which lies contiguous to it, and by which every nation shall enjoy "a share of this lucrative commerce." The French, it will be said, are already in possession of Egypt, and that they make a *sine qua non* of retain-

ing it:—let it be so! but allow the communication to be open to all nations; it will, at all events, make a grand revolution in commerce, and divert that trade which formerly enriched Amalfi, Venice, Genoa, and Florence *, into new sources, and into hands which cannot profit from it by other means.

Should we turn to Russia, for the sentiments of the monarch of that country?—But on this subject it is prudent to be silent, and to pass it over by observing, in general, that Russia possesses, on the borders of the Black Sea, the finest country in the known world; that the government of that empire is emulous to acquire establishments in the Mediterranean; and that the growing population, industry, refinement, and commerce of the people, render them every day more formidable to their neighbours. The active part which Russia has taken in the present contest is not likely to make her neglect the benefits to which, on a general arrangement at the close of the war, she may consider herself from that part, as well as her great power, to be entitled.

This arrangement is what Great Britain has to contemplate; and, by prudent management and a due attention to her own interest, and by taking advantage of her present powerful situation amongst the nations, to prevent the bad effects of insidious policy which the occupancy of Egypt, by any European power, would unquestionably create.

If I have diverged from the subject, it was to introduce the relative situations of other countries in regard to India, and which I have endeavoured to do without hazarding the dangers to be apprehended from those new combinations and projects which might be suggested by new views of this

* It should not be forgotten, that the general influence of this trade by the route of Bruges, then the most elegant city and considerable mart of the north, by means of eastern commerce, extended to all Germany, and even to the shores of the Baltic, and the north-west coast of Europe.

subject, and that too at a time when great general commercial affairs are about to be settled and adjusted. I allude here to that momentous crisis—a general peace—in which the interest not only of Europe, but of the greatest part of the civilised world, will be deeply involved.

The expulsion of the French from Egypt becomes therefore an object of the first importance to this country; and delay is, in the present conjuncture of public affairs, by all means to be avoided. To permit the French to remain in their present situation in that country, would be to allow a deadly and inevitable blow to be struck against us, as a nation, in the great and preponderating scale of eastern commerce. This is no idle effusion, but a fact of the most alarming nature, and to which the most early attention should be paid; it imperiously demands the immediate exertions of the British Government and the East-India Company.

I am, &c. &c.

LETTER IV.

The French not to be driven from Egypt by Means of the Turks—Imbecillity of their Empire—Subject to frequent Revolts—Janizaries of Constantinople—Mamalukes—Arabs—Reasons why the French met with so little Resistance in Egypt, particularly from the Arabs—Plan for expelling the French from that Country—Detail of the Means by which it is to be done—Troops should be sent from India, up the Red Sea, to co-operate with an Army of British Troops and Russians from the Side of the Mediterranean—Troops from India should land at Cossire, and cut off the Communication between Upper and Lower Egypt—The Surrender of the French Army indubitable.

DEAR SIR, London, March 15, 1800.

IN contemplating the means by which the French in Egypt are to be attacked, we are to consider the resources of the Turkish empire, and the many reasons that occur why that people do not, by a grand effort, restore to themselves an ancient dependency of the empire, so advantageously situated, and possessing so many commercial and other advantages.

The solution of this question is simple in the extreme. The division of the Turkish empire into Pashalics, or subordinate provinces, has considerably weakened the Ottoman power; every Pasha has his own particular interest, by which he regulates his conduct; and by this means the energy of the empire is diminished, and the fœderation of a great military aristocracy virtually lost. It is besides to be observed, that it is not for the interest of the governors of distant dependencies, where allegiance is merely nominal, that the power of the Grand Seignior should be too great; for, in the proportion that he acquires power, so much must their inde-

pendence be endangered. The revolt of the Pasha of Widdin is now of long standing, and the total inability of the Turks to restore subordination and order in that Pashalic, has long been obvious. The recent conduct of the Pasha of Damascus, and of Dghezzar, Pasha of Acre, to the imperial army of Turkey, commanded by the Vizier in person, are strong proofs of the imbecillity of the Porte. The troops of such governors, whose interest it may be to support the Ottoman throne, are an undisciplined rabble, badly paid, desirous of plunder, and, in fact, totally unfit for military purposes *. The standing army of the empire is principally composed from the Janizaries of Constantinople, or troops drawn from the garrisons of European Turkey;—an effeminate set of men, haughty, dissipated, and mutinous. The Mamalukes, or chosen bands of the Egyptian Beys, were not numerous enough to withstand the repeated attacks of a regular army, provided with excellent artillery, composed of men who had been used to conquer, and commanded by experienced officers. The inhabitants of Egypt were pusillanimous in the extreme; they had but little interest in the fate of their country; and were ready to become the slaves of any new master, as they had formerly been under the government of the Beys. The Arabs were never roused to action; and the conciliatory policy of Bonaparte towards them, together with the protection which he uniformly afforded to their caravans, and the respect he professed for the Mahomedan religion, produced a certain degree of forbearance on their part. The recollection of the tyranny of the Beys, added to the general dislike of the Arabs to the government of the Turks, or of that description of Mahomedans, whom they equally detest and despise, either gradually appeased the vindictive sentiments of the Desert Arabs towards European in-

* I could confirm this by some instances which fell under my own observation in the course of my journey from England to India by the route of Syria, particularly on the revolt of the Pasha of Payas.

vaders, or rendered them less anxious to give their assistance to restore the authority of the Mamalukes. The French army, however, suffered very considerably at first from the Arabs, and that people gave great cause of uneasiness and alarm to the veteran troops of France.

From these circumstances, we cannot place much reliance on the assistance of the Turks;—we should depend on our own exertions, and on those resources it is in our power to apply against the French, to effect their expulsion from Egypt. The Russian troops in British pay, now at the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, aided by a few thousand seasoned troops from this country, could be employed with advantage in a descent on Egypt. The command of Alexandria, Rosetta, and the principal branch of the Nile, would be speedily obtained. On that river the co-operation of an armed flotilla would greatly facilitate the movements of the army. The great number of boats used by the inhabitants for the navigation of the Nile would in a little time be found particularly useful in transporting every thing that could be wanted for the use of the troops; while the British fleet would furnish ample supplies. It is so far in the power of the executive government of this country to shield the East-India Company from the danger which threatens them: and as the Directors of that Company have on all occasions evinced the most ready disposition to co-operate with his Majesty's Ministers in promoting the general interests of Great Britain, so at the present moment, when the welfare of the Company is at stake, they will no less cheerfully come forward to lend their assistance.

The Red Sea is entirely open to us, and perfectly free at the proper seasons to the navigation of British ships. The Arab chiefs on the eastern coast of that sea are friendly and well-disposed towards this country, as they are, on the contrary, inimical to the French. The Sherreeff of Mecca could

be induced to support and assist us in various ways in the expulsion of the French; and his influence and authority over the Arabs is unquestionable. The proximity of our possessions in India, and the ready manner in which vessels can be procured in that country, would furnish the means to convey a body of troops, both European and native, with a sufficient quantity of provisions, stores, and ammunition, to the coast of Upper Egypt. These troops could be more easily spared at this time, when the power of Tippoo is extinct, and the peninsula of India likely to enjoy uninterrupted peace, provided the French should not be suffered to remain in their present position in Egypt, now dangerous to our interest in India, but which in time might become much more so. Many objections, no doubt, will be started to an expedition of this nature, by men who, from prejudice, are inclined to think badly of every scheme which is in itself novel, or has originality to recommend it: but I do not hesitate to assert, that it is perfectly practicable to land a body of men at the port of Cossire, in Upper Egypt, and for those men, with a proportionate quantity of ammunition, and other necessaries, to reach in a few days the banks of the Nile. This army, by establishing themselves on that river, would effectually cut off all communication between Upper and Lower Egypt, deprive the French of supplies from the Upper country, or through any ports in the Red Sea, and considerably lessen the possibility of their retreat and the means of protracting the war. Were matters to be conducted in this manner by a prudent and able commanding officer, there remains no doubt of success; and the probability would be, that the French, finding themselves surrounded on all sides by British troops, by Arabs, and inhospitable deserts, would gladly surrender at discretion, on condition solely of being sent to France as prisoners of war. It is to be apprehended,—indeed we have sufficient experience of the truth, that the French can

never behave well for a length of time in any country, especially in that where they consider themselves conquerors. There is little doubt but, at this time, intolerable insolence, extortion, and levity, has entirely satiated and disgusted every person with whom they are connected; and, in consequence, that their expulsion would be highly gratifying to all descriptions and casts of people in both Higher and Lower Egypt. We learn also, by the latest advices, that the French army in Upper Egypt are continually engaged in a desultory warfare. If this is the case, there is an evident necessity for reinforcing and supporting those men who shall hold out against the French, and, if possible, to rouze the dormant spirit of the inhabitants. There are men in plenty, and they only want to be stimulated by example to punish the invaders. A force sent from the western side of India, by an active and well-directed co-operation with the Mediterranean army, would contribute essentially to the object of the expedition. Gun-boats could also be employed in this situation to advantage, the frame-work of which could be constructed at Bombay, and conveyed on camels from the Red Sea to the Nile.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER V.

Reflections on the Danger of permitting the French to occupy Egypt, especially at the present Juncture—Power of the French in India—Its Decline since 1756—Their East-India Company ruined—Prosperity of the English in India—Policy of the French to undermine it—By what Means they will probably attempt it—Their Argument subtile, plausible, and dangerous—Endeavour to engage the other Powers of Europe in their Scheme to draw Part of the Trade to India into the Mediterranean by Egypt and the Red Sea—This to be apprehended from the conciliatory Conduct of Bonaparte, and his Endeavours to disunite the Coalition—Demands made by the Free Trade of this Country favourable to his Views—Should be considered and settled—Plans of Ambition of Foreign Nations to draw Capital from Great Britain by affording great Encouragement to Traders—Should be counteracted—General Remarks—The great Albuquerque's Ideas on the Importance of the Eastern Commerce to the Crown of Portugal.

DEAR SIR, London, March 20, 1800.

I DO not pretend in my last letter to have by any means done justice to the plan proposed, or to have entered into the particular details of it. The general outline in the mean time is sufficient: but what appears to be of the first necessity, is, fully to comprehend the material points of the subject; to consider the danger which may arise out of the present situation of affairs, if suffered to continue as they are; and, finally, to determine on the best means to avert the blow which is aimed against our trade by the French from the side of Egypt. It is not politically wise to give full credit to the French accounts from Egypt, various and contradictory as

they are, in regard to their situation in that country. The commanders there, no doubt, require immediate succour from France; and it may be necessary for them to impress the necessity of it, on the rulers of that country, in the way most likely to obtain what they want. It may also be observed, that Bonaparte, the Chief Consul of France, will not neglect this important object; and it must be allowed, that French fleets, squadrons, and single ships, have, on some occasions, eluded all our vigilance and care *.

It must be remembered that the power of the French in India has, ever since the war which commenced in 1756, been on the decline. Their East-India Company has been reduced to ruin; their settlements and factories have several times been wrested from them; and at this moment they do not possess a single foot of territory in any part of India. Their influence in that quarter is entirely lost by the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, and the late conquest of the country of Tippoo Sultaun. All this has not been the work of a day; it has had its beginning, its crisis, and its termination. The ministers, under the old monarchy of France, saw with regret the rapid successes of the English in India, and the certain decay of their own power. Their ingenuity and political cunning was stimulated; and as they had nothing to expect from naval exertions, owing to the inferiority of their fleets, they endeavoured to find out, as has been already observed, other means by which they might enjoy a considerable share of the trade of India. Egypt presented itself as the means by which the commerce of France was again to flourish, and we accord-

* The French army in Egypt expect supplies and reinforcements from France in the winter, or early in the spring; and it is to be apprehended that the distribution of our fleet in the Mediterranean has not been such as to prevent, nor was it possible to prevent, at least some part of a numerous convoy from effecting their purpose.

ingly find a survey of that country ordered by the ministers of the unfortunate Lewis the Sixteenth. From this æra, therefore, are we to date the designs of that nation on Egypt; and it will not be disputed that they have, at least, made some progress towards the attainment of their object.

If it be allowed that the position of the French in Egypt either is at this time, or hereafter may become a matter of jealousy or mistrust on the part of the government of this country, or of the East-India Company, it is then to be considered, whether it would be prudent to wait the issue of a general pacification, or whether it would not be expedient to take the advantage of the hour of hostility, with abundant means in our hands, at once to dislodge a dangerous and artful enemy.

The necessity for the thing being done, is a strong argument for its being done speedily; and the way to have it speedily done, is, not to wait the tedious issue of negotiation, which can commence only on the termination of the war. Besides, it is to be considered in this case, that matters must be taken up as they actually stand, when the negotiation takes place. When that period shall arrive, should Egypt then remain in possession of the French, the question, no doubt, would be agitated, Whether that country should be restored to the Grand Seignior, or remain a province subject to France? Would not this discussion open the door to numberless demands, all tending to the prejudice of Great Britain? The cunning and crooked policy of French negotiators, by private intrigue, and also by insidious representation, would industriously point out the advantages which not only France, but Germany, Spain, and Italy, would enjoy, by the trade of India renewing its ancient channel. Would not even Russia be included in this combination? The opening of a new route for the India trade, by the way of Egypt, being unquestionably favourable to the views of the French, can we depend on foreign cabinets to interpose their in-

fluence in our favour, at the expense of their own interest? Might it not be said, 'that Great Britain, possessing the territory of India, its external as well as internal commerce, its revenue and resources, together with the Island of Ceylon, the Dutch settlements of Malacca, the valuable Spice Islands to the eastward, and the Cape of Good Hope'—might it not be said, 'that the possession of all these advantages is by far too great a proportion of the most lucrative trade in the whole world for any one nation to enjoy?' It would be observed, 'that the English should make restitution of what they have acquired on their part, during the war, before they ask that Egypt should be given up to their conveniency.' It would also be said, 'let Europe have its share of eastern commerce; for it is not distributive justice that England should arrogate to itself the whole trade to India. The northern and western coasts of Europe should have liberty to pursue the trade by the Cape of Good Hope, and the shores of the Mediterranean; and its contiguous countries should have access to India by the old channel, which formerly enriched those countries. Commerce,' they would say, 'is free to all, and should not be cramped by partial restrictions—restrictions that have ruined the trade of the Levant.'—These are some of the arguments which would be used by the emissaries of the French; and as the present is an age of calculation and commercial policy, it is to be feared that this sort of reasoning would carry too much weight. The trade to India is the axis on which commercial men of all countries ground their future speculations. This idea is equally prevalent on the continent as it is in this country; it is regarded as the only source by which the great losses sustained by individuals in the course of a long and expensive war can be compensated; and to have them compensated, the trade must be laid open. France, in particular, ruined by the duration of the war, deprived of commerce by the loss of all her foreign settlements,

and degraded in character as a nation, can, only by encouraging habits of industry and trade, and discovering and promoting sources of adventure and enterprise, expect to regain the good opinion of mankind, and render her subjects prosperous and happy. 'Let us,' say the people of France, 'examine in what manner the nations of Europe are to enjoy their natural share of the commerce of the world, and particularly of India, so great and lucrative as it is now become. Permit us,' they will say, 'to cast our eyes over the map of the globe, and trace on its surface those lines and boundaries which Nature seems to have prescribed to all countries, in regard to the distributive justice of commercial arrangement. The coasts of Europe, from Cape St. Vincent to the extremity of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland,' say the subtle politicians of France, 'appear one great division for mercantile enterprise and adventure,—a range perfectly sufficient for competition and rivality among those nations whose dominions extend towards the Western Ocean. There is abundance of scope for activity and speculation in the limits of that trade, which is naturally connected with the western and northern shores of Europe and the West-Indian Islands, the coast of America, the whale and other fisheries, and in the carriage too of bulky and weighty articles to and from India. Let all this be fully enjoyed by the inhabitants of the western coasts of Spain and France, by Portugal, by the Low Countries, Hamburgh, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, and by Great Britain.'—But let us inquire into the situation, and, what will be termed by those to whom it relates, the natural prerogatives of another great division of the civilised world. In this they will comprehend the whole shores of the Mediterranean, Spain, the states of Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Russia,—an extent of coast, and a population far exceeding the northern division already mentioned. It will be argued, that the Levant trade, or that between the East and West, by the

medium of Egypt and Syria, is the natural right of those countries; that the wants of so large a portion of mankind are to be attended to equally with others; and that seventy millions of inhabitants should not depend solely on the exertions of other people, when they possess, to such a degree, the facilities of eastern commerce. Here it will also be contended, that the road to opulence is open, by that means, to an intelligent and industrious people. These arrangements are, I am sorry to say, extremely plausible and alluring, especially when circulated by an impoverished set of men, full of schemes of aggrandisement, and obstinately tenacious of their civil rights. The publicity of those, and similar insinuations, would, it may be supposed, have very considerable influence on other nations; and the French left in possession of Egypt, on the termination of the war, would, no doubt, industriously propagate such dangerous opinions, and illustrate them in all the glowing colours of which their language is so capable.

The pride of the Ottomans, hurt by the separation of Egypt from their empire, would be very little attended to, and the pretensions of the Turks totally overlooked;—first, in the general interest of Europe; and secondly, in the contemplation of the particular benefit which an open and free trade would probably occasion to each nation individually.

Another danger to be apprehended is, the conciliatory conduct which Bonaparte is observing in France. With sufficient experience to avoid those detestable systems which have deluged France in misery and blood, destroyed confidence, and occasioned so many revolutions, he may probably seek to establish and consolidate his power by milder and more efficacious means than those of his wretched predecessors. Measures of moderation and prudent policy, unremittingly pursued, will probably, in time, detach from the general cause some part of the coalition:—every part so

detached will render the task of peace more arduous, and the accomplishment of it on terms favourable to our India commerce more difficult and precarious.

Independently of these matters, so alarming to the national interests of this country, let Great Britain not lose the favourable moment, but strike while the impression may be made, and by that means afford the best possible chance for the continuation of our prosperity as a commercial nation, by securing to ourselves the trade to India. On this subject it may be further observed, that the world is beginning to learn that the truest policy is the most perfect justice, and that the freedom, extention, and security of commerce, is the reciprocal basis of union, not only between man and man, but between nation and nation. It is the cement of society, and the only medium by which foreign or domestic intercourse can be established and upheld. These sentiments, which influence mankind in general, have made very considerable progress in our own country. A number of men, denominating themselves the Free Trade, have combined to demand what they term a fair participation of eastern commerce. 'Foreigners,' they observe, 'will have it, and indeed actually possess it; and are then,' they say, 'the subjects of this country to be debarred from enjoying it, at least equally with them?'—Should their claim not be considered, there is no saying what influence, in the scale of nations, a set of mercantile men, with a capital of five millions sterling, may carry with them. They would be invaluable to foreign countries; not more from their wealth than their experience: and, it is a question, Whether their representations might not procure the negotiation of the cabinet of Vienna, and the courts of Denmark and Sweden, not to mention Russia, in regard to the freedom of commerce with India. A measure of this sort would open the eyes of those and other nations, more than ever, to the grand and overflowing sources of opulence to be de-

rived from eastern commerce. And, as the expenses and ravages of the present war will leave most nations poor and destitute of capital, they will naturally look to such means as will most probably procure it.

The legislators of commercial countries, will, by wise and salutary regulations in favour of mercantile adventurers, especially foreigners, hold out such favourable terms as may induce them to withdraw their capital from home, where they are restricted, and embark in commerce supported and encouraged by the government of another country.

These plans of ambition ſhould be counteracted and palliated as far as they relate to Great Britain; and that too before they have begun to operate, for then it may be too late. It is not now the time to ſlumber over danger: the world is awake, and we ſhould be vigilant.

I mention these things only to point out the bad policy of allowing, if it is possible to be prevented, any discuſſions relative to Egypt in the event of a convention being again aſſembled to negotiate a general peace: it is to be hoped, that all differences relating to our poſſeſſions in India, eſpecially those recently acquired, together with the poſſeſſion of the Cape of Good Hope, may be ſettled on the fair terms of reciprocal juſtice, allowing to this country its full indemnity for the expenſes of the war. But this ground, ſo extremely tender, ſhould be lightly trod, to prevent as much as poſſible the jealouſy and rivality of foreign nations, more eſpecially of Ruſſia, whoſe ſituation, reſources, population, and growing induſtry of the inhabitants, added to the active character of the preſent Emperor, might, in a little time, become terrible to the Britiſh intereſts in India.

In taking leave of this ſubject, I beg to repeat, that the object of expelling the French from Egypt, and the coaſts of the Red Sea, and eſtabliſhing the former government of the Beys, or perhaps an Arab one, is too important to admit of delay; and, without a wiſh to detract from the merit of Sir Sidney

Smith, whose exertions entitle him to the highest degree of distinction and praise, I submit to your consideration, whether the negotiations that officer is now carrying on with the Porte will tend much to facilitate the expulsion of the French from the only situation where they can become formidable to us, or from whence they can threaten the stability of our possessions in India. The nature of mankind is not in a moment to be changed; nor will Sir Sidney Smith, with all that energy which he possesses, be able to inspire feelings similar to his own, in a people lost to martial virtue, and divided amongst themselves by a flagitious and enervated government, torn in pieces by ambition, tyranny, and avarice, and whose sole dependence seems to rest on the uncertain support which it may receive, either from its nominal subjects, or from its allies. We should not, therefore, place any reliance on the Turks, or deceive ourselves with hopes of success, by permitting them to carry on the war, without decided support from this country. The French must be driven from Egypt, and the Mahomedan government restored in that province: let the French be attacked from the side of India: let the operations in the Red Sea of one of the first characters the world has produced, the immortal Albuquerque, be remembered; and, let it also be remembered, that this great man estimated the complete destruction of Egypt as a nation, a sacrifice not too great, in order to secure the trade of India to the crown of Portugal.

Whatever measures may be adopted in forwarding assistance from India, it must be observed, that such is the current of the winds in the Red Sea, that no expedition could leave the coast of Malabar sooner than the middle of August.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER VI.

General Reflections on the bad Tendency of French Principles—The Impression already made, or likely to be made, by their Means, on the Courts of Europe—System of Compensations—Views of the House of Austria in regard to Venice, likely to disturb the Repose of Mankind—Overland Trade to India—Dangers and Jealousies to be apprehended in Consequence—Occasion new Wars—Perhaps the Partition of the Turkish Empire, and the Restoration of the Greeks—Certain Nations designed to favour and mutually to assist each other—Russia a natural Ally to Great Britain—At the same Time Russia may be dangerous to the Interests of Great Britain—How far so, by leaguing with the Northern Powers of Hindoostan against us—Particular Facilities of Communication between the Empire of Russia and the North-West Frontiers of India—The Ambition of Russia likely to be stimulated by Success—Great Resources—Plan to attach Russia firmly to Great Britain—How to concentrate the Prosperity of both, but with greater Advantage to this Country—Particular Advantages which Russia would derive on the one Hand—On the other Great Britain greatly benefited—Attack to be made on Zemaun Shaw by the Route of Bucharia and the Defiles of the Hindoo Khoo—Would serve to preserve Tranquillity in British India—Commercial Treaty with Russia—The Means of disposing of many Articles of India Produce—Balance of Trade with Russia rendered more favourable to Great Britain.

DEAR SIR, London, 25th March, 1800.

IT is a melancholy fact, that the French revolution, by altering the moral system of affairs, lays a deep foundation for changes and unfair transactions. I mean to say, that so extensive and powerful a nation, both by its example and its means of corruption, will have, and has perhaps already had, a great influence on the political conduct of states and kingdoms. Nor will I yield the point, though I am told, that other countries are too

honourable to follow the example, or listen to their proposals. The attack made on Venice by the French was not more unprincipled than the conduct of the Emperor in accepting that independent and ancient city from the robbers who had plundered it. This extraordinary transaction leads to an inquiry into the motives of the Emperor, and to account why the possession of Venice is so precious to that sovereign. Is it not because a trade to India can be carried on by that means? and may it not therefore be supposed, that the Emperor wishes success to the expedition of Egypt? Some weighty consideration must have been balanced against the honour of the House of Austria; for Venice, unless its ancient splendor could be revived by its ancient commerce, was not a sufficient object to occasion, far less to justify, such an aberration. As other nations will join in wishing England to be rivaled in the trade to India, *force, while we are in arms, is our only remedy.* It well deserves to be remembered, that our unfortunate contest with America occasioned the greatest joy to all the courts of Europe. The intelligence of every action, no matter on whose side the advantage fell, was equally matter of triumph. This triumph did not proceed from a regard to the particular success, or to the justice of the cause of either party, but from a jealousy and rivality of the prosperity and opulence of Great Britain: it is much to be lamented that the ambitious views of certain European courts, contaminated, perhaps, by the baneful influence of French morality, afford, at this juncture, so much well-founded cause for alarm. As reciprocal relations have varied, and the situation of Europe has been in consequence politically changed, it became necessary to introduce new maxims, and to establish an order of things commensurate with their necessity. The political structure of Europe is now founded on a system of compensations and equivalent reciprocities. The ruptures of the present day, as indeed have always been the case, originate generally

in avarice, flowing from commercial jealousy and rivality. The present instance is indeed an exception, it being a war of monarchy; but there is no saying what may arise out of the convulsion into which every thing has been thrown *. War is now reduced to mathematical accuracy in regard to its ultimate object and advantages. Compensation is become the basis of the law of nations; and it is equal to all political operations: it has divided Poland, and will probably destroy the empire of the Turks. It has been well observed, that modern statesmen and politicians have deviated from the principles of religion and morality, on which the law of nations was originally founded, and have introduced a superseding principle, called the law of *political necessity;* and more recently, that of *existing circumstances,* the fatal effects of which have been, and indeed are now, severely felt on the continent of Europe. Under the sanction of these new tenets, some of the Christian powers of Europe have gone to war with each other, without any previous declaration; have parcelled out, and divided amongst them, neighbouring kingdoms; have broken through the strongest engagements, and closest treaties of alliance; have deserted the most laudable confederacies; and have entered into clandestine separate treaties of peace with the common enemy.

In the midst of the present war, the secularisation of the ecclesiastical states of Germany has been deemed expedient. Prussia looks to compensation; and the Emperors of Russia and Germany no doubt do the same. It may be reasonably inferred, that the application of this term, the most dreadful in the political dictionary, may be converted to purposes extremely injurious, if not destructive to the repose of mankind. We have

* Wars may be defined under three heads: 1st, Those proceeding from religion and enthusiasm: 2dly, Wars arising from commercial jealousy and rivality; and 3dly, Wars for the establishment of sovereigns, or of the liberties of states and kingdoms.

every reason to believe that Russia is already disposed to entertain considerable jealousy, and has indeed betrayed great uneasiness, because the Emperor of Germany has declined to restore to its ancient privileges the state of Venice. This dispute cannot be reconciled, but by compensation; and that must be adjusted at the expense of some right, or by the alienation of some property. The relative situation of Austria may be useful to the Turks, and promote the system of aggrandisement pursued by that ambitious power. The Emperor may, for instance, preserve peace and subordination in European Turkey. At any time a column of Austrian troops might cross the Danube, penetrate to Widdin, and enable Austria to present the head of Paswan Oglou, or any other rebellious subject, to the Grand Seignior. Might not Egypt, on the score of compensation, as a distant and troublesome province, be the equivalent for these services? Austria, in possession of the Adriatic and Egypt, would, without doubt, attempt a trade to India;—an attempt which would stimulate the jealousy of Russia, and alarm all Europe *. It is then probable the world would be again in arms to decide this difference, grounded on the ambition of two powerful nations, of which the probable result would be, the partition of the dominions of the Ottomans, and the renovation of the empire of the Greeks. That this will one day take place, needs not the foresight of a prophetic eye. These circumstances are rendered more terrible from the

* The greatest evil that arises out of the present fashionable system is, that it compels all nations to resort to the same means, and to act on similar principles. Without this they could not treat on terms of equality. In the present war, the political object is still a secret. The Emperor of Russia is the only power who has publicly declared, in a generous and manly strain, his avowed sentiments and ultimate determination. But it is to be apprehended, that the virtuous resolutions of that monarch may be thwarted, and that prince, contrarily to his inclination, be obliged, on the just principle of retaliation, to abandon the line of conduct in which the unfair proceedings of other kingdoms will not suffer him to persevere. It is to be regretted that oppressions cannot be repelled by acts of benevolence, but by reprisals.

unpromising aspect of public affairs, and the vicissitudes which still continue to obscure the horizon of politics.

The apparent danger which threatens the civilised world, particularly excite the emotions of mankind; and, like the polar magnet, irresistibly attract their attention to the affairs of the North. It is natural, in cases of difficulty, like the present, to contemplate such means as are sufficiently powerful to remove; or, if not sufficiently powerful to remove, to avert the evils of which we are apprehensive. For attaining the object of the war, Great Britain must depend on the wisdom of her councils, her vaſt resources, and the arms and gallantry of herself and her allies.

But with regard to the mutual affinities of nations, it has been with equal truth and justice observed, that kingdoms, as well as families, are connected by reciprocal ties. The same incidents in point of locality, and habits of industry and commerce, equally operate on both. Let the situation of either be near or distant, they tend, from physical and political causes, to the same measures of mutual prosperity. Russia may be considered, on the extended scale of political œconomy, as the natural, and perhaps the only ally necessary to Great Britain. Were the intereſts of those powerful countries more immediately united, and their facilities for mutual interest and advantage more maturely considered, and better adapted towards each other, a doubt cannot exist, but a basis would be established, productive of the greatest relative advantages.

The present posture of public affairs bids fair to accelerate this point of union, unless indeed jealousies be excited, by the insidious means of French politics, circulated through the court of Berlin, to the continental powers. '*Divide et impera*' may be a motto favourable to the French, become an organised band of military robbers, and also consolatory to the keen eye of the Prussian eagle, eager for a participation of the prey. But firmness and

unanimity established between Russia and Great Britain may bid defiance to the efforts of the world.

Russia, from many causes, is daily becoming of greater consequence in the scale of nations. An extensive empire, increasing population, natural productions, and creative industry, are amongst the number. A race of illustrious sovereigns have enlarged the resources of the empire, by opening an unbounded freedom of commerce, and encouraging agriculture and manufactures; and, by obtaining an accession of inhabitants from all countries, by wise colonial establishments, have received into the bosom of the state foreign capitalists and artists of every description.

We cannot sufficiently admire the wisdom of the late Empress, in the numerous acts of her long and prosperous reign. Amongst many other measures dictated by sound policy, was the abolition of several monopolies of the crown. On this subject the Empress was particularly tenacious, and seldom or ever granted exclusive rights, either corporately or individually. Regal monopolies, of certain articles produced in the country itself, may, in some instances, be admissible; but an exclusive privilege, in the hands of a few, is utterly inconsistent with that competition and emulation—that general mass of industry and exertion on which the prosperity and wealth of nations depend. Uncertain in its nature, it is inadequate to its purpose; nor can public scarcity be a pretext to demand or enforce what it is either unwilling or unable to supply. In its ultimate termination, it is exhaled, with little benefit to the state, or any adequate advantage to the great mass of the people, whose interest, as the source of national prosperity, should chiefly be consuted.

It is on the solid basis, therefore, of free and unlimited commerce, so instrumental to industry, and so liberal in its principle, to all ranks and degrees of the subject, that the government of Russia has commenced a

structure which will one day astonish the world—a structure which other countries may imitate without being able to rival or excel. It will however prove, that trade, free and unconstrained, under the genial influence of an equitable government, is a fruitful source of national greatness. Monopolization is a current, equally turbulent, capricious, unproductive—nay, destructive. Free trade is a grand national reservoir, from whence are to flow, as it were from the purest source, numberless refreshing rills, whose equal steady course diffuse their salutary streams to the utmost extremities of the empire.

Russia has to extend and promote her commerce, whereas Great Britain has only to preserve and maintain what she now enjoys. Let both be satisfied on terms of reciprocity and mutual interest. Great Britain, from her population and extent, has neither the wants nor the means of Russia; but that widely-extended country has to look forward to future improvement, and by that means to allure commerce. Her advantages are great; and, *amid the oppressions and shocks which are felt in a great part of Europe, Russia will be a welcome country to thousands of mankind, denied protection or bread in their own.*

The object, therefore, is to take advantage of circumstances favourable to the physical situation of Russia and Great Britain; and, by a due attention to the interests of Russia, to secure her powerful friendship at a general pacification.

In the first place, I shall endeavour to point out in what manner, and in what ratio, Russia may be formidable to us; and, in the second, by what means any inducements to counteract our interest are to be removed; and a closer or more immediate connection, formed on a system of mutual prosperity, between Russia and Great Britain.

It is to be observed, in speaking of the danger which may be appre-

hended from the government of Russia, and in what manner that country can be formidable to Great Britain, that it cannot be expected that other nations will sit down contented, and see England engross the whole commerce of the world. Some nations will attempt openly, and others secretly, to wrest from us those possessions which give us so decided an advantage over them, and they will naturally try different methods from those they have attempted without success.

Russia, about a century ago, could scarcely defend herself against Sweden, and its own rebellious Boyards. Since that time, by a succession of able sovereigns, Russia has become a first-rate power; and, should it continue to be managed by the same wise system which, since the days of Peter the First, has so much contributed to its prosperity, will soon, from its interior amelioration, excite fear in every nation. Civilisation is giving to the inhabitants of that country the same wants as to those of others, and nature points out the means of supplying them.

At the greatest distance from India by sea, Russia is the nearest by land to India of any nation. Situated for the most part in a cold and ungrateful climate, she has the most occasion to trade with India, which produces all the aromatics which the inhabitants of cold climates want; and a settlement on the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea would answer every purpose. There, without possibility of opposition from any European power, a settlement might be made on the borders of one of the finest countries in the known world.

In this situation, it is to be apprehended, that the great powers in India, far up the country towards Persia, and to the west of Delhi, aided by European engineers and officers, with ordnance and artillery-men, would march against our settlements down the Ganges, and we should not have time even to take leave of India. It would not then be Tippoo Saib, with

his comparatively small dominions, but Zemaun Shaw, king of Candahar, Cabul, and Chorasan, with numberless Mahomedan auxiliaries, whom we should have to resist. Their innumerable cavalry and infantry would be recruited as they proceed; they would come down upon us like a torrent; and, finally, the Affghans, Rohillas, and Patans, ardent in their nature, and long and impatiently waiting the opportunity, would lend their assistance to re-establish the Mahomedan power in India. The interior broils of the country would be laid aside for the moment, private animosities would cease, and the business of our expulsion be complete.

When we cast an eye on the map of Hindoostan, we are far from being astonished at the successful irruptions of the Mahomedan conquerors into India. The provinces of the Panjab were at all times a granary, whilst Moultan supplied cloathing and other necessaries in great variety and abundance. The city of Lahore became the winter-quarters* of the hardy hordes collected from the north of Persia, the mountains of Hindoo Khoo, or Caucasus, the banks of the Indus, and the platform of Tartary. The return of the fair season, the period of active operations in the field, opened the greatest facilities for invasion. The fertility of the Upper Provinces, the benignity of the climate, and the inviting access to the luxurious district of Oude, as well as Rohilcund and the Dooab, were more than sufficient to favour the approach of a barbarous army. But nature, as if conducive to the many revolutions which have afflicted Hindoostan, has contrived, by means of large navigable rivers, the readiest mode of conducting an invading enemy to the bosom of its fairest provinces. The Ganges and the Jumna direct their course towards the capital, to Oude, and other rich and flourishing cities of the empire. These rivers enter

* The rainy season in India is synonymous with the winter of our own country.

the plains of Hindoostan by an extensive and fruitful valley, intersected by innumerable streams, extending, from the Jumna to the mountains of Hurdowar, two hundred and eighty British miles. The extent of this valley, with plenty of forage and water, renders it particularly accessible to the large bodies of horse with which the northern parts of Hindoostan particularly abound. The Vizier's dominions form the frontier of our possessions in Hindoostan, and which are those immediately opposed to the inroads and ravages of the northern hordes. These dominions, having the Company's provinces to the east, and the Tibet mountains to the north (which form an impenetrable barrier), are exposed to invasion from the south and west only. This boundary extends from Illahabad to Hurdowar, a space of about five hundred miles. From Illahabad to Etyah, two hundred and forty miles, the Jumna forms a feeble barrier; for being in many places fordable during the dry season, and in all parts narrow, cavalry would find little difficulty in crossing it, plundering the country, destroying the harvest, and re-crossing, without infantry having it in their power to molest them: but the Jumna, from Etyah upward, being everywhere fordable for the greatest part of the year, if cavalry that had crossed lower down found themselves pressed by infantry, they could always make their way upward, cross the Jumna, and be in perfect security. From the Jumna, near Etyah, to the Ganges, at Ramgaut, one hundred and forty miles, the boundary takes an oblique direction across the Dooab: this space is entirely open and defenceless. From Ramgaut to Hurdowar, one hundred and forty miles, the Ganges forms the boundary (except the district of Anoopsheher, which lies to the west of the river); but being in all parts fordable for cavalry, from November to July, it must be considered more an ideal than a real barrier * :—circumstances which readily

* Letters on Oude.

account for the rapidity with which revolutions have been accomplished in that country, under various leaders from Tartary and Persia; all of them external, and with little or no encouragement from the inhabitants themselves.

When, with the aid of Russia leaguing with the northern powers of Hindoostan, we should be driven out of Asia, some part of the trade to India might be carried on advantageously by land. Although the main commerce to India never could be carried on this way, still many things wanted in Russia would come over from Persia by it cheaper than by any other conveyance. This conveyance would be aided by a canal between the Don and the Wolga, and which Peter the Great began. This navigation will one day or other be completed, for it is the best and easiest method of giving value to the most central part of what may be called the Continent of the World. Trade has for more than a century been extremely variable; but the grand æra in commerce, the most important since the discovery of the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope, is reserved for the *Russian monarch*, who shall unite the *Wolga* with the *Don*. Time, by its unremitting depredations, has considerably changed the physical appearance of the world. The art of man, on the other hand, has, in every age, by a contrary operation, tended to its cultivation and improvement, with a view to ameliorate the condition of mankind. Navigable canals, and cuts, by which lakes, rivers, and seas, are induced to intermix their respective streams, together with other works of industry, such as the making of public ways, serve to cement and approximate society. By these modes of facilitating conjunction, distant or more remote provinces and countries are made as it were to approach each other. It naturally follows, that a canal which will intersect the great continent of the world, almost wholly insulate Europe, and form the junction of the *Baltic*, the *Caspian*, the *Euxine*, and the *Mediterranean Seas*, with the *At-*

lantic Ocean, will be a project equally magnificent and useful.—When it shall be possible for a ship to sail from the *Gulf of Finland* to the *Caspian,* from thence by the *Bosphorus* to the *Black Sea,* and by the *Dardanelles* and the *Straits of Gibraltar* to return to the *Baltic,* the world will assume a new appearance.

It is somewhat remarkable, that this communication, of so much real importance to mankind, has been thrice begun, although never yet accomplished. It has been attempted at periods very distant from each other. By *Seleucus Nicanor,* by *Selim the Second,* and by *Peter the Great.* This brilliant event will no doubt excite the industry of the present day—an epoch when commercial enterprise appears to engross the attention of all nations, and when mankind is making great progress in every branch of useful improvement. The *empire of Russia,* in particular, by the due exercise of wise and salutary laws, directed by a race of benevolent sovereigns, is likely to become, by certain gradual means, a great, rich, and happy nation.

The length of this canal would not exceed thirty miles; the distance being small, and the country not unfavourable, neither the labour or the expense would be great: both, indeed, would be trifling, when compared with other stupendous works of art and industry. But the evil which we have to apprehend is the loss of that commerce by sea which is now carried on by the Cape of Good Hope. This communication would be opened to all nations, in a complete manner, after we should have been driven from India.

The ambition of the Russian monarchs, ever since the time of Peter the Great, has been conspicuous; and, by directing it well, they have grown into great power. Divided Poland, and the reduction of the Crimea, are proofs that the same ambition which has hitherto been chiefly turned to interior improvement has occasionally been directed to external aggran-

disement; and, if a spirit of military glory, which the recent atchievements of Suwarrow are well calculated to create, should once serve as a stimulus, there is no saying how far they may go.

It is also much to be dreaded, that jealousies which have already shown themselves, and which it is to be feared may be strengthened and promoted by certain causes arising out of the complex nature of coalition, may tend considerably to excite dereliction from the general interest. National views may interfere; and it is natural for mankind to seek to repel that which they consider either as an insult or an act of injustice, by such means as are physically possible, and such as, perhaps, may be suited to the genius, interest, and wishes of the people.

Russia possesses all the vigour of a new state. As for its size and population, they are so immoderately great, that its efforts, if well directed, will produce effects that are almost incalculable. Another great empire contiguous to it is just in the opposite extreme, and which, though possessing some of the finest territories in the world, seems to be falling to pieces from age and enervation. What with the vigour of the one, and lassitude of the other (the other changes in Europe being taken in account), no balance of power nor permanent order of things, nor certainty of retaining the India commerce, will for many years be obtained.

It is by no means my intention to enter into any discussion of the variety of interests, connected with the different courts of Europe, or, in any shape, to agitate questions which it may be either the inclination or the interest of the French to bring on the tapis previously to, or at the time of a general pacification. On the contrary, it is our wish to avert the bad effects of insidious policy. It is sufficient, on this subject, to observe, that the French suppose the present to be "an epoch from which the most extra-"ordinary events are to be dated," and that *their politics*, in whatever way

they are to be viewed, are in themselves immediately *in contradiction to the interests of Russia, and indirectly so to those of Great Britain.*

My object, as has been again and again observed, is to promote the prosperity and future aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of our enemies, and to secure to Great Britain, against future intrigue or contingencies, the commercial advantages she now enjoys. To combine the reciprocal views of both nations on such a basis, would, if possible, be a pleasing and a grateful task; or, if that should be not altogether practicable, to accomplish the system as nearly as it can be done. The convenience of Russia must, in this case, be consulted in some new arrangement, in which the security of the British empire in the East may be considered; and it may not be very difficult, by a fair and candid examination of physical relations and situations, to advance the resources of Russia without encroaching on the prosperity of Great Britain,—and, by promoting the natural advantages of both countries, to concentrate their prosperity.

Russia and Great Britain are natural allies; and what may promote the interest of the one, may also add to the security and increase the resources of the other. It is on this principle, therefore, that I feel myself interested in offering such remarks as appear to me important to them both; especially when the interference of the European powers will shortly, it is hoped, be called in to determine the great civil and commercial rights of mankind.

The circumstances which arise out of the physical as well as the political order of affairs, in regard to the commercial interests of Great Britain and Russia, naturally arrange themselves into three divisions.

1st, The political state of France, with its relative situation in regard to other countries of Europe.

2dly, The political and natural situation of Russia;—and

3dly, The means by which Russia and Great Britain may render to each other reciprocal benefits, with the advantages arising from a closer connexion between the two countries.

From a due consideration of these topics, may be derived a competent knowledge of what is proper to be concerted between the courts of St. Petersburg and St. James. By securing to Russia certain advantages, in regard to trade, highly important to her interest—to obtain, in others not less so to Great Britain, *security to our possessions in India, permanency to its commerce, and a ready market for the produce and manufactures of that country.*

The advantages which we propose to Russia will tend, by means of Great Britain, progressively and gradually, to extend her foreign commerce, and increase her shipping as well as the number of her seamen. The plan proposed will assist her with capital; and, by opening, on favourable terms, the ports of British India to Russia, enable her to import into the southern provinces of the empire the productions of that country—productions particularly necessary to Russia, not only to supply the wants of the inhabitants, but to encourage industry, and promote manufactures. The important benefits to be derived from a firm alliance between Great Britain and Russia is a subject on which much might be said. It is at present necessary only to remark, that the increasing population and improvement of the province of Taurida, the Ukraine, and, generally, of those extensive and valuable regions on the borders of the Euxine and Caspian Seas, demand, as a natural prerogative, the free navigation of the Mediterranean and Black Seas: and, as the prosperity and civilisation of the people depend on the introduction of commerce and manufactures, and on the importation of such articles as tend to promote civilisation, and to feed the manufactures so introduced, it follows, that a direct communi-

cation with India, by sea, is also indispensable. By the Dardanelles, and the Canal of Constantinople, to the shores of the Black Sea, the productions of India and China could be conveyed to the numerous inhabitants of the southern provinces of Russia: from whence they would be diffused throughout the whole empire, by the means given to commerce in the abundance of both land and water carriage in that country. With the aid of the Wolga, the Don, Duna and the Duina, the Caspian and the Euxine, are connected with the Gulf of Finland, the Frozen Ocean, and the Baltic.

The facilities of inland navigation in the *empire of Russia* are superior to any in the world. Merchandise can be conveyed by water-carriage three thousand wersts, or two thousand English miles, in all directions.

The principal navigable communications are:

1st, *The junction of the Caspian with the Gulf of Finland*—a distance of nine hundred and fifty wersts, or six hundred and forty-seven English miles. This communication, from *Astrakhan* to *St. Petersburg*, is effected chiefly by means of the *Wolga*: from that river, by the sluices of *Vishney-Volotshok*, into the *Volkhof*. The *Volkhof* flows into the *Ladoga Canal*, which is connected with the *Neva*, a noble river which discharges its waters into the *Gulf of Finland*.

2dly, *From Siberia and the confines of China to St. Petersburg*. Merchandise is embarked at *Kiachta*, and, by the *Selinga*, conveyed to the *Lake Baikal*; from that lake into the *Angara*; from the *Angara* into the *Yenissey*; and from the town of *Yenissoesk*, by a short land-carriage of forty wersts, into the *Ket*; from the *Ket* into the *Oby*, and by the *Oby* to the *Tobol*. From *Tobolsk*, commerce is carried on with the internal provinces by the means of great markets and fairs; but the navigable intercourse is intercepted by a land-carriage of four hundred wersts, or three hundred

English miles. Should goods be intended for the *Baltic*, they must be conveyed from *Tobolsk* to the *Tshussovaia*, from thence to the *Kamma*, which flows into the *Wolga*, and so to *St. Petersburg*.

3dly, The navigation of the *Duna*, which rises near the sources of the *Wolga*, and falls into the *Baltic* near *Riga*. It is navigable almost the length of its course, and facilitates greatly the intercourse with different provinces of *Russia*, *Poland*, and the *Duchy of Courland*.

4thly, The navigation of the *Duina*, which flows from the centre of *Russia*, and is discharged, together with a great accession of waters, into the *White Sea* at *Archangel*. To these may be added the *Boque*, the *Dnieper*, and the *Don*, with numberless others, diverging, in various directions, through the extensive territories of *Russia*, into the *Baltic*, the *Caspian*, the *Black Sea*, the *Eastern* as well as the *Frozen Ocean*.

Tea, the use of which has not only increased in a very great degree, but also has had a direct as well as happy tendency to diminish that use of spirituous liquors, would be both more abundantly and more cheaply supplied. Sugar could, in like manner, be imported from India, as well as raw cotton and cotton cloths, indigo, spices, drugs, and coffee from Arabia, besides a variety of other articles of commerce calculated to feed and nourish manufactures. The exports would be collected from the various productions of the empire, of which there are many well suited to the India market, or returns might be made directly to Great Britain.

A land-carriage trade to an extensive empire, encircled on many sides by vast seas, as well as possessing, internally, great inland seas, lakes, and large navigable rivers, all of them having communications, either immediate or indirect, with the Ocean, cannot be an object to be put in competition with the commercial advantages of a great nation. It is besides to be observed, that a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of Russia are daily

acquiring more and more habits of maritime affairs. The precarious and uncertain trade which Russia carries on with China, Persia, and India, by land, or by the way of the Caspian, the Wolga, and the Don, is not to be compared to a regular intercourse upheld with those nations by the means of shipping. An increase of shipping, of which Russia is in want, would proportionally augment her number of sea-faring people, and encourage naval enterprize and exertion.

The Indian Ocean, the China Seas, the Gulfs of Arabia and Persia, and the Red Sea, would be opened by degrees to the ships of Russia.

In order to accomplish a system which embraces, in a very extensive degree, the ultimate aim of every wise and prudent government that directs its attention to the moral, civil, and political institutions of the people, the empire of Russia will, no doubt, previously to a general pacification, possess herself of establishments in the Mediterranean, as well as in other situations *. A great national establishment, on the principle laid down, might be formed to promote industry and commerce in all its branches, under the immediate inspection of the legislature. By encouraging the India trade, which hitherto has enriched every nation enjoying it, the northern and southern extremities of Russia, although divided by an immense distance, would, as it were, approach and be united to each other. Mutual exchange of commodities, produced by the difference of soil and climate, would irresistibly create a re-action of domestic commerce, extremely beneficial, and at the same time essentially necessary to the existence of a trade with India from the dominions of Russia. By these means national industry would be stimulated, commerce augmented, the arts multiplied, and agriculture and manufactures flourish.

* Malta, and perhaps the island of Candia, may appertain to Russia on the close of the war:—the first by conquest, the second by concession.

But in the formation of a grand national establishment, especially in a country neither wholly destitute of capital nor abounding with it, every means should be devised, by which the money of other nations might be brought in aid of such establishment, on terms advantageous to the lender; and by which, ultimately, through the combinations of powers differing, distant and distinct from each other, be able to produce an effect by which the whole capital, borrowed from foreign countries, would, in the course of a few years, prove a clear and certain gain. That a system of this nature is practicable, is, I believe, fully demonstrable. With considerable increase of property, without the establishment feeling any diminution of its profits, and at the same time preserving its capital unimpaired, the lenders would be repaid in a few years by the infallible operation of their own money. By the means of borrowed funds, judiciously employed, under the sanction and controul of a government sustained by good faith and great public credit, an establishment might be reared which would prove a mine of wealth to the country adopting it, and also to those concerned in its progress and success.

The manner in which Russia may be essentially benefited by a closer connection with this country, I trust, has been more than generally explained, on the basis of allowing to Russia a participation of the trade to India, on terms favourable to Great Britain.

The reciprocities which are due to Great Britain come next under our consideration.

In order to preserve the trade of India to Great Britain, or at least as much of it as she may be able to manage, regard must be paid to national justice. On this subject regulations must be formed to prevent rivality in commerce, and conciliate, as much as possible, the interests of other countries with our own. This can only be effected by supplying foreigners both liberally and cheaply.

It is of little importance to the consumer, how the article he wants comes into the country; the price and quality are all he looks to; and as for the merchant, his aim is to employ his capital to the greatest advantage for himself. It is therefore only, when the wild ambition of the ruler of a nation leads him to fight for a branch of commerce, that it is not the wish nor interest of his subjects to possess, that such a branch of commerce, wisely conducted, is wrested from the hands of those who have the conducting of it.

So much is undoubtedly due to foreign nations, as well as to the interests of this country. But Russia should unite with Great Britain, to keep shut the communication with India by the way of Egypt and the Red Sea, and in preventing the Cape of Good Hope from again changing hands, or becoming a dependency subject to any other European power than that which now possesses it. The Cape is now occupied by British troops at a great expense: it is a serious affair; and the possession of that place will probably become an object of high contention at the period of a general pacification. These are great and momentous concerns, which never should be lost sight of, as the grand hinge on which the prosperity of both countries are incessantly to turn. Next to these considerations may be reckoned the assistance Russia can afford Great Britain to repel the attacks of the northern hordes on the south-west frontier of our Indian possessions. Hindoostan has, for successive ages, been the prey of the Tartars; and in the present one a very formidable power has recently started up. Zemaun Shaw, who has been already mentioned, with a powerful army, has threatened the security of that country. Independent of an extensive kingdom, his influence as a great Mahomedan power, since the subversion of Delhi by Nadir Shaw, is scarcely to be calculated. His dominions extend to Balk, Samarkand, to the Persian Affghans, the Patans, and Rohillas. He is the only chief that is now formidable to the

Engraved for Letters on India.



Fairburn sc. Minories.

British sovereignty in India. Such means are, therefore, to be attempted as will prevent hostilities from that quarter; and Russia, on this occasion, must necessarily be resorted to.

The Russian empire extends its extremities to the Sea of Aral, along the banks of the Amoo, the ancient Oxus. An army of Russians and Cossacs might be led, by the city of Balk, to the frontiers of Hindoostan.

The fertility of the country through which the Amoo flows, the Lesser Bucharia, frequently attracted the avarice or ambition of invaders. The sources of the Amoo and the Behat are but a few miles asunder. On the latter stands Cabul, the seat of empire of Zemaun Shaw. Both rivers arise near Bamian, a considerable town in Zabulistan, not far from the mountains of Hindoo Khoo. The Amoo, by a north-westerly course, together with other rivers, forms the Sea of Aral. The Behat flows to the south-east, and discharges its waters into the Indus. By the defiles of the Hindoo Khoo, the delightful province of Zabulistan is readily approached, in the centre of which Cabul is situated.

An army, well appointed, would be more than a match for the irregular tribes of Zemaun Shaw. An attack on his principal territories would preserve tranquillity in India. The Russians on the back part of his dominions, with the co-operation of the Seicks from the country of Panjab, assisted on the north-west frontier by the troops of Bengal, would insure success;—Oude would be protected, and the possibility of invasion be rendered impracticable.

What remains to be done, is, to form a commercial treaty with Russia, by which the shipping of Great Britain might be advantageously employed. By its means, the commodities of India and China might be exchanged for the more durable, and perhaps more necessary, productions of the north. The plan which I have already hinted at might be made useful to this

country, and have a gradual operation in promoting credit, and in assisting the public funds of Great Britain.

I have delivered my sentiments on the utility of Russia to Great Britain, and also in regard to that kind of equivalent to the former which is in the power of this country. If it should be imagined, that too much is proposed for the benefit of Russia, it ought to be remembered, that it is better to give encouragement to a certain friend than a probable enemy; and it is greatly the interest of Great Britain, that the surplus produce of India should be carried away, and consumed by the inhabitants of that country, than that it should serve to enrich a nation, perhaps our commercial rival. The balance of trade with Russia, by pursuing the measures I have proposed, would both directly and indirectly take another turn, more favourable to our commerce, but, at the same time, with evident benefit to the interest of both countries.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER VII.

Account of Zemaun Shaw, and his Connection with the late Sultaun of Mysore—Invasion of his Country from the Side of Tartary the best Security to British India—Embassy to Persia in Consequence—Decline of Persia—Better to employ Russian Troops—Their probable March from the Caspian by the Amoo to Heraut and Cabul, by the Defiles of Hindoo Khoo—Reflexions on the Invasions of India by Alexander, Tamerlane, and Nadir Shaw by that Route—Origin of the Kingdom of Candahar, of Ahmud Shaw, Abdallee Timur Shaw, &c.—Description of the Country—Short Account of the Government of the Seicks, their Power, &c.

DEAR SIR, London, March 30th, 1800.

LONG before the commencement of the late successful war against the tyrant of Mysore, I explained the connection which subsisted between that prince and Zemaun Shaw the king of Candahar. I represented that an intercourse subsisted between Tippoo Sultaun and the northern powers of Hindoostan, in which the Affghans and others of the Mahomedan persuasion were concerned. That these insinuations were well grounded, subsequent facts have sufficiently verified. Of the maturity and extent of the Sultaun's schemes, I had myself no doubt; and that they went far beyond an alliance with the French republic, appeared to me as certain. I perfectly knew, that Hyder Ally, the founder of the sovereignty of Mysore, and the father of the late Tippoo Sultaun, took for his model the famous Mahmood, emperor of Ghizna; and became to the Hindoos of the Peninsula of India what that prince had been to the inhabitants of Hindoostan. The son, no less cruel, trod in the footsteps of his father, and looked forward to establish a new dynasty of Mahomedan emperors

over all the southern provinces of India. To effect these objects, he regarded the assistance of Zemaun Shaw, the successor to the throne of the empire of Ghizna, as essential to his success.

The fall of Tippoo has destroyed this powerful combination; but the apprehenſions which I took the liberty to explain in my last, relative to the king of Candahar, still continue to exist. To prevent his long meditated invasion of the northern provinces of Hindoostan, with the view to place on the throne of Delhi a new race of emperors, or to regenerate the present race, is to us an object of the greatest importance. It is a measure evidently necessary to be executed before he has time to accomplish the object of his ambition: for it is much easier to use prevention in political exigencies, than it is to repel an attack after it has been made.

The principle on which I now proceed, has struck the great and enlightened mind of the Marquis Wellesley. The invaſion of the province of Chorasan, of Heraut, and those countries which lie on the side of Persia, and have been wrested from it, is part of the plan formed by the Governor-General for the safety of British India. An ambassador has, I understand, been dispatched from our Asiatic government to the court of Persia, offering the assistance of the Company's troops to restore the dismembered parts of that extensive empire to their former allegiance. Happy would it be if the political ſituation of Persia could give stability to such a measure: happy would it be for the subjects of that devoted country, if the duties of government were administered in such a manner as to give the smallest hope, not of external exertion, but even of internal tranquillity.

The extent of Persia comprehends three different climates, and, generally, each region is governed by an usurper, sometimes of little consequence or rank, each of whom is afraid to venture beyond his respective bounds. What then can be expected from such a government, under which the

people are not only enervated, but distracted by the most horrible acts of cruelty and oppression, and where the vices and example of the sovereigns have vitiated the morals of the subject? They cannot in any shape be trusted, and are totally incapable of the relations necessary in either mercantile transactions or political arrangements. Efforts from the side of Persia cannot be relied on, and we must at last have recourse to Russia, to effect our purpose. Let us not detach our native troops to such a distance*, but keep them nearer our own provinces, where they can act with better effect.

I may, perhaps, find some opponents to the measure which I have here proposed. Some may object to the practicability of it on the ground of distance between the confines of the Russian empire and the dominions of Zemaun Shaw: but let those gentlemen remember the recent marches of the hardy Russians from their own country: of troops from the Don and the Wolga to the plains of Lombardy and the mountains of Switzerland. On a fair comparison they may probably find occasion to alter their opinion. As another example of our own day, we have only to advert to the march of the Moldavians and Wallachians from the banks of the Danube, and the Croats from the Save and the Drave, to Belgium and Holland, during the present contest,—a distance of fifteen hundred miles.

An army of Russians might be embarked at Astrakhan, or Kisliar on the Terek†, and landed on the opposite shores of the Caspian; perhaps on one of the deep bays which extend inland towards the Amoo. From the extremity of the Gulf of Balkanskoi‡ to Shabat on that river, the distance

* The march of the Bengal troops from Anopsheer, on the western banks of the Ganges, to the province of Zabulistan, would be six hundred miles; and from the upper parts of the Rohilcund to Cashmere, nearly the same distance.

† The mouths of the Terek are much choaked up with sand: the best harbour for shipping is a little bay sixty miles from Kisliar.

‡ The bays of Balkanskoi, and that of Mangushlak, have very secure road-steads.

scarcely exceeds two hundred miles: from thence to the city of Balk the distance is about four hundred miles; and to Cabul two hundred and fifty more. Should it be preferred that they should land on the south-east corner of the Caspian, at Ester-Abad, or at Orcan, the distance to Heraut, the capital of Chorasan, is about three hundred miles. This city, wrested from the empire of Persia, by Ahmed Shaw Abdallee, is now in the possession of Zemaun Shaw: from which destination to the frontiers of Hindoostan, which are bounded by the mountains of Hindoo Khoo, the distance may be computed nearly three hundred and thirty miles *. These mountains, the India Caucasus, although extremely elevated and unequal in almost every direction, afford an easy and practicable opening to the province of Cabul. It has been noticed by an ingenious and well-informed writer, that "Alexander had the merit of having first discovered "the way through the defiles of the stoney girdle which constitutes the "northern barrier of India. The most practicable avenue to every coun-"try (he observes) is obviously formed by circumstances in its natural situ-"ation, such as the defiles which lead through mountains, the course of "rivers, and the places where they may be passed with the greatest ease "and safety. In no place of the earth is this line of approach marked and "defined more conspicuously than on the northern frontier of India. "Alexander, Tamerlane, and Nadir Shaw, in three distant ages, and with

* Another route might be pointed out, by the river Sirr to the Amoo, and by Bucharia to India. The Sirr flows from the Aral through the country of the Khergies, who are a sort of tributary or trading allies to Russia. This route is perfectly practicable, and would afford ample supplies to assist the march of any army, far more that of a Russian one. The soldiers of that country are capable of undergoing hardships, and enduring fatigue, far beyond the limited powers of other European troops: their energy is such as naturally fills the mind with the greatest wonder at their indefatigable constancy and perseverance. It has been justly said of barbarous nations, that chiefs of armies fight for glory, and the soldiers for their chiefs. Never was this better illustrated than in the instance to which we allude.

" views and talents extremely different, advanced by the same route with " hardly any deviation." What therefore is to prevent the Russians, in these days of civilisation, from performing enterprises of a similar kind, when the rigours of war, from experience and attention, become more easily to be endured, and the operations of arms more certain in their effect.

Having shown the practicability of conducting the troops of Russia to the cities of Cabul and Candahar, the gates of India, from the side of Tartary and Persia, it may be both amusing and instructive to give some account of the origin of the king of Candahar, as well as an account of his dominions.

It would be a laborious task to trace the different irruptions into the plains of Hindoostan: it is sufficient on this occasion to observe, that on the division of the empire of Alexander, there arose in the countries situated between Parthia and the Indus, and lying to the south of the river Iehon or Oxus, a very considerable kingdom, known by the name of Bactria. This kingdom, after many vicissitudes, came under the extensive and powerful dominion of the Saracen Caliphs of Bagdad. Towards the close of the ninth century, the period when their empire fell into decline, this country, as well as Bucharia, was seized on by one of the governors under that caliphat. As the history of the countries between the Caspian Sea and Eastern Tartary has been a continued series of rebellion and revolt, so in the year 960, Abistagi, the governor of Chorasan, withdrew his allegiance from his sovereign the king of Bucharia, and founded the empire of Ghizna. This usurper established his capital at the city of Ghizna, situated on the river Cow Mull, at no great distance, westward, from the Indus. Subuctagi succeeded Abistagi, who made some predatory incursions into the Panjab: but the glory, if there is any, of being the first Mahomedan conqueror of

India, devolved on his son Mahmood Sultaun, a prince of great enterprise and military spirit. At this period the empire of Hindoostan had not been contaminated by foreign invasion. The inhabitants spoke the language of their ancestors; which is now disused, and known to few others beside the Pundits, or learned Bramins. These happy people enjoyed at this period the free exercise of the Hindoo religion, undisturbed by savage and ferocious conquerors.

Mahmood Sultaun, having added Bucharia to his kingdom, resolved to cross the Indus, and to turn his arms towards Hindooſtan. Accordingly, in the year 1000, he set out on this expedition. The Rajapoots, who then inhabited the districts of Moultan and Lahore, opposed him for eight years, with great bravery, and with various success. Notwithstanding the combination of the Hindoo princes against him, this successful and determined invader, after repeated expeditions, in the year 1011, made himself master of Delhi. It does not appear that this conquest gave him unlimited empire in the East; for the Rajapoots of Agemire he found it impossible to subdue. From the effect of a religion newly acquired, the rage of Mahmood was particularly directed against the temples of the Hindoos, and other places of sacred institution. But he found means to establish his authority over the Panjab *; and he subdued and nominally retained all the country from the Ganges to Guzarat, inclusive, leaving the Deccan and the Peninsula of India to future conquerors.

Since the time of Mahmood, this empire has undergone many viciſſitudes. The line of the Ghiznian emperors continued in the possession of this vast kingdom till the year 1158, when the irruptions of the Gaurides, a people inhabiting a territory beyond the mountains of Ghurgistan, seized on the

* The Panjab is that tract of country watered by the five great rivers to the eastward of the Indus, and which fall into that river.

western part of that empire. Mahomed the Second, called Mahomed Gori, from the name of his former country, was the successful leader of these hordes. This prince attacked Cusroe, then emperor of Ghizni, and drove him from the greatest part of his dominions. Nevertheless Cusroe was able to retain that part which was contiguous to the Indus, and Lahore became his capital: but this was only for a while; for the successors of Cusroe were dispossessed of the portion which remained to them by the same Mahomed, who carried his arms to Benares, the seat of Hindoo elegance and literature.

The Mahomedans of the Patan or Afghan dynasty pursued their conquests with success till the reign of the great Aurengzebe or Allumgire, when the empire of the Moguls arrived at the zenith of its glory. During all the time of their reign the western part of this vast extent of territory was under the management of governors, appointed by the court of Delhi; and, amongst other countries, those comprehending the original Ghiznian empire.

The invasion of Nadir Shaw separated all the countries lying to the westward of the river Indus from the empire of the Moguls. All those countries were, for a time, ceded to the crown of Persia. On the death of Nadir Shaw, his immense empire, like that of Alexander, was torn in pieces by the chiefs he had advanced. Ahmed Shaw Abdallee, one of his generals, was the son of a chief or independent prince, of the tribe of Abdal Afghans, in the vicinity of the city of Heraut, in the province of Chorasan. While in his infancy, he was taken prisoner by Nadir Shaw, and educated by that prince. The Persian monarch, having despoiled the young Abdallee of his dominions, gave him the post of Yessawul*, or mace-bearer, and by degrees promoted him to a considerable command in his

* Vide Scott's Hist. of Deccan.

army. Upon the assassination of that monarch, he had the good fortune to possess himself of a considerable treasure, with which he retired to his native country, and assumed his hereditary honours over the Afghans of his tribe. He then marched against the fortress of Candahar, which submitted to his arms, and prevailed upon Nasir Khan, the Soubahdar of Cabul, to acknowledge his authority, permitting him to continue in office, on promising to pay down five lacks of rupees. Nasir Khan would have performed his agreement; but the chief inhabitants of the province refusing to contribute the sum, and persuading him to resist, he withdrew his allegiance: upon which Ahmed Shaw marched against him. On his approach, the people of Cabul deserted their governor, and Nasir Khan retired to the village of Peshawir, where he held out for some time: but fearful of falling into the hands of Ahmed Shaw, as his provisions were exhausted, and he had no hopes of a supply, he made his escape towards Delhi, leaving his family and effects behind him, which, with the fortress, fell into the hands of the besiegers two days after his departure. During this siege, Shawnowauz Khan, Soubahdar of Lahore, offered to join the fortunes of Ahmed Shaw Abdallee, on condition of being appointed his vizier, and his proposal was accepted; but, at the remonstrance of his uncle, Kummir ad Dien Khan, vizier to the Mogul emperor, Mahummud Shaw, he repented of his treachery; and when Ahmed Shaw, on the fall of Peshawir, claimed performance of his engagement, he declined it. The Shaw, being enraged, marched against Lahore, which fell into his hands after a short resistance. Shawnowauz Khan made his escape, with a few attendants, to Delhi. Emboldened by this success, and the weakness of the empire, Ahmed Shaw resolved to attempt the conquest of the capital of Hindoostan, and accordingly began his march from Lahore. Mahummud Shaw, being at this time too much indisposed to take the field, dispatched his only son,

Prince Ahmed, against the enemy, with several other chiefs, and a great army. They advanced to the banks of the Suttulludge without meeting the enemy, who had artfully passed them, and plundered the rich city of Sirhind, where the heavy baggage of the prince was deposited. Upon intelligence of this misfortune, the prince returned; and, on his arrival near the enemy, threw up entrenchments round his camp. The Afghan, Ahmed Shaw, did the same; and for some days several skirmishes took place between the two armies. At length, Kummir ad Dien Khan, the Mogul's vizier, being killed, as he was at his devotions in his tent, by a cannon ball, a panic prevailed in the army; and Eusuree Sing, rajah of Jeypore, with his rajapoots, fled from the field. Meer Munnoo, the vizier's son, and Suffderjung, the soubahdar of Oude, however, by their address, restored order in the camp. The next day, a magazine of rockets taking fire in the enemy's camp, a number of the troops were wounded by the explosion, and Ahmed Shaw Abdallee, either disheartened by this loss, or satisfied by the plunder gained at Sirhind, thought proper to retreat towards Cabul, which he did unmolested. Mahummud Shaw, being near his end, upon intelligence of the enemy's defeat, commanded the prince to return to Delhi, having first conferred the government of Lahore on Meer Munnoo, as a reward for his services. Before the royal army reached Delhi, the Emperor expired.

Ahmed Shaw, the founder of the Patan dynasty in the kingdom of Candahar, laid the foundation of a new empire. This territory, nearly the same with the ancient Ghizna, comprehends Candahar, Cabul, Cashmere, and Chorasan. He was a brave and powerful prince. The conquest and plunder of Hindoostan was his favourite object. Inclusive of the time he accompanied Nadir Shaw to Delhi, in the year 1737, he visited India seven times, but without being able to make any lasting impression on that country.

On the death of this prince, which happened in 1773, he was succeeded by Timur Shaw, a prince of little enterprise or military ſkill. His military establishment has, however, been stated at 200,000 men. He had some seapoys clothed in British manufactures, after our fashion. The trade in the necessary articles of clothing was carried on by the way of Scindy, up the *Indus*, and by its branches to *Cabul*.

Zemaun Shaw, the present monarch, succeeded to Timur by lineal deſcent a few years ago. The views of this prince, in regard to India, have already been taken notice of. He is powerful and ambitious; and, for the repose as well as the safety of British India, his motions should be narrowly watched.

The extensive dominions of Zemaun Shaw extend 800 miles in length; but their breadth is much less *. The province of Cabul appears to be the most fertile he is possessed of. It is, by every account, a country highly diverſified,—being made up of mountains covered with eternal snows; hills of moderate height, and easy of ascent; rich plains, and stately forests, and these enlivened by innumerable streams of water. It produces every article necessary to human life, together with the most delicate fruits and flowers: it is sometimes named Zabulistan, from Zabul, one of the names of Ghizna, which was the ancient capital of this country, and of which Candahar was then reckoned a part.

The chief city of the province is called Cabul, and situated on a river of the same name; but at Jalahabad, sixty or seventy miles below the city, it takes the name of Kameh, or Kamah, and falls into the Indus, opposite to the city of Attock. The river Kameh at Jalahabad becomes navigable for jalebs, or rafts of a particular construction. From the circumstance of

* Vide Major Rennell's Memoir.

no boats being made use of, but only rafts, it is supposed that the stream of the river is interrupted by rapids; and we also find that the Mogul Emperor made voyages on that river in the same way.

The city of Cabul, the capital of Zemaun Shaw, is situated near the foot of the Indian Caucasus, or Hindoo Kho; and the proximity of this ridge occasions the most rapid changes in the temperature of the atmosphere. Its situation is spoken of in terms of rapture by the Indian historians, it being no less romantic than pleasant,—enjoying a wholesome air, and having within its reach the fruits, and other products, both of the temperate and the torrid zone. The subjects of Zemaun Shaw are chiefly Afghans, the rest Persians and Tartars, of almost every denomination; and he can bring into the field a very numerous army, both horse and foot. It appears, that he has of late turned his arms to the westward, on the side of Persia. From every account, Zemaun Shaw is a very enterprising prince, whose views are no doubt hostile to our interests in India.

The tribe of the Abdallees are better known by the epithet of Dourâni, from the custom of wearing a pearl in one ear. Their government, according to Mr. Sullivan, is perfectly feudal. The country, says that gentleman, is divided into districts, which are severally ruled by a distinct chief, absolute in authority, and independent of the lord-paramount,—excepting in some cases, in which, by certain tenures, military aids are established. The revenues are considerable. The last prince, Timur Shaw, never reduced his army to less than thirty thousand men; and then he was careful always to have them either of Persian or Tartar birth. Besides the standing force, all composed of cavalry, and which he clothed and paid regularly, he could, whenever he resolved on any foreign expedition, call upon his chiefs for their assistance; and such assistance, it is averred,

amounted to upwards of two hundred thousand men. Every man provided his own horse and arms. The country is populous, the climate good, and the natives remarkably hardy and robust.

Notwithstanding the formidable power and great resources of Timur Shaw, matters were, during his reign, kept tolerably quiet in that quarter of the East, from the intervention of various causes. His situation with respect to Persia, which for some years flourished under the active administration of Currem Cawn, and the alarming growth of the Seicks, had probably the greatest weight with him.

The alarm has, however, more than once been spread, that Timur Shaw had advanced to the banks of the river Attock, with a view of penetrating into Hindoostan. Nor was the report always without foundation: he indisputably meditated it at different times; and on the plausible ground of securing to the wretched descendant of Tamerlane (to whose family he was allied by marriage *) more respect and support from his aspiring Omrahs, or at once to re-establish him in the full possession of all his rightful authority. These have been the reasons publicly assigned: but however well inclined Timur Shaw might have been to have embarked in such an enterprise, his own circumstances may have been too unfavourable to admit of it;—chieftains in alarming divisions amongst themselves; a considerable part of his subjects disatisfied; and a brother in open rebellion.

Thus situated, it is evident that Timur could not, either with prudence or with safety, have ventured on an undertaking, the issue of which would have been at best but problematical: moreover, he was certain of a determined opposition from the Seicks of Panjab and Lahore, through

* Ahmed Shaw, while at Delhi, shortly after the invasion of Hindoostan by Nadir Shaw, married one of the princesses of the house of Timur.

whose dominions he was necessarily to pass; an opposition which his father, as he well knew, though possessed of more power than himself, had with difficulty surmounted; nay, to which he was, in more than one instance, obliged to give way.

But, though neither the means nor the political situation of affairs was favourable to Timur Shaw, it yet cannot be denied that an invasion of Hindoostan was more practicable with him in the year 1779, when Mr. Sullivan wrote, than it had been at any other time since his accession to the government. The internal disorders of his own kingdom had at that time entirely subsided: his ambitious brother, Secundar Shaw, had become a vagrant fugitive; and the faction which supported him been entirely annihilated. The change in the affairs of Delhi occasioned by the death of Nudjif Cawn, the captain-general of the Mogul armies, and the assassination of his kinsman and successor, Mahommed Suffei Beig, was also particularly favourable to foreign interposition. Besides all this, such divisions had crept in among the Seicks as must have greatly facilitated a progress through their territories. Notwithstanding such favourable appearances, the meditated blow was never struck. But, should the nation of the Abdallees ever engage in such an enterprise, they may acquire an influence in the political scale of Hindoostan, which may be deemed somewhat visionary to suggest, and which we hope will long be averted.

Hindoostan was visited seven different times by the Dourâni Ahmed Shaw, as has already been observed: first, with Nadir Shaw, in the year of Christ 1737; secondly, in 1746, when he took Lahore, and sacked Sirhind; thirdly, in 1749, when he settled, in imitation of Nadir Shaw, certain tributes to be paid him by the Mogul government, for the provinces of Guzurat, Sealkoat, Aurungabad, and Peshawir; fourthly, in the year 1751, when he defeated the imperial general, and afterwards appointed him his deputy in Lahore;

fifthly, in 1756, when, in revenge for the expulsion of his governor of Lahore, he entered and plundered Delhi, and advanced to the eastward, even as far as Agra; sixthly, in 1759, when his son Timur Shaw opposed the Seicks, Mahrattahs, and Adina Beig Cawn, a revolted governor of Lahore; and when he himself, the year after, gained the decisive victory of Panniput: seventhly, in 1761, when the Seicks, by this time grown into considerable strength, taking advantage of his absence, attacked and killed his viceroy in Lahore, and by that means possessed themselves of that city and its dependencies.

Such are the nation or tribe of the Abdallees, from whose internal resources, and great influence and power over the northern hordes of Hindoostan, the greatest danger is to be apprehended.—It is, however, a very fortunate circumstance, that the dominions of Zemaun Shaw are so vulnerable themselves, from the side of Tartary; from whence myriads of warlike tribes, under the auspices of Russia, might be poured in on his Persian provinces, as well as on his fertile countries bounded by the Indian Caucasus. The Seicks, on the other hand, present a strong barrier on the side of Oude; whose friendship, together with the Rajapoots of Agimere, ought particularly to be conciliated by the East-India Company.

By attention to the map of India, and the position of the Seicks, we shall find, with proper attention to the interests of that nation, very great resources to oppose the march of Zemaun Shaw, or of any Asiatic power, to the frontiers of Oude and the province of Bengal. The whole of the country of the Seicks is intersected by five large rivers, to the eastward of the Indus, and inhabited by a warlike and powerful race. These people were first noticed in the reign of Shah Jehan, who began his reign in the year 1628, about which time they became settlers along the mountains which form the boundary of Hindoostan to the north. They differ

considerably from the Hindoos, being tolerant, and admitting proselytes amongst them, although they hold Mahomedism in great detestation. The Seicks became formidable in the reign of Bahadar Shaw, about the year 1707, and obliged that monarch to oppose them in person with a considerable army; but in the year 1716 they were so powerful, that the grand army of the Mogul empire was under the necessity of marching against them.

The Seicks may be reckoned the most western nation of Hindoostan. Since the complete downfal of the Mogul empire, they have acquired very extensive domains; but their power ought not to be estimated in the exact proportion to the extent of their possessions, as they do not form one entire state, but a number of small ones, independent of each other in their internal government, and only connected by a federal union. They have of late years extended their territories very rapidly on the south-east; that is, into the province of Delhi: and perhaps the Zemindars of that country may have found it not inconvenient to place themselves under the protection of the Seicks, in order to avoid the more oppressive government of their former masters. Certain it is, that the eastern boundary of the Seicks' dominion has been advanced to the banks of the Jumnah river, above Delhi, and to the neighbourhood of that city; for the adjoining territory of Sehaurumpour is subject to their depredations, if not actually tributary to them; and they make excursions to the very banks of the Ganges. On the south, they are bounded by the northern extreme of the sandy desert of Registan; and on the south-west their boundary meets that of Sindy, or Tatta, at the city of Behker, or Bhaker, on the Indus: on the west, the Indus is their general boundary, as high up as the city of Attock, near to which begin the territories of Zemaun Shaw; and their northern boundary is the chain of mountains that lies towards Thibet and Cashmere. This being the case, they will be found to possess the whole soubah or province

of Lahore, the principal part of Moultan, and the western part of Delhi; the dimension of which tracts are above four hundred British miles from N. W. to S. E. and from one hundred and fifty to four hundred broad in general: although in the part between Attock and Behkar (that is, along the Indus) the extent cannot be less than three hundred and twenty. Their capital city is Lahore. We know but little concerning the state of their government and politics, but the former is represented as being mild. In their mode of making war, they are, unquestionably, savage and cruel. Their army consisted almost entirely of horse, of which they are said to be able to bring at least one hundred thousand into the field. Ahmed Shaw Abdallee was accustomed to pass through the country of the Seicks during his visits to Delhi, as has already been observed, and meditated the conquest of it; but it is not probable that, in the present state of dominion and power of the Seicks, any king of Candahar will attempt either the one or the other. It was reported that the Seicks were in amity with the late Timur Shaw, king of Candahar, and meant to allow his army a passage through their territories. This, however, appears highly improbable,—the progress of an Indian army effecting nearly an equal degree of desolation, whether it enters a country on terms of hostility or amity *.

On the whole, it must be allowed that the Seicks are a brave and powerful people, and will at all times offer considerable resistance to any invasion from the nations on the west of the Indus. However, too much dependence should not be placed on their support: on the contrary, the troops of the East-India Company should be always prepared to aid their efforts, as the government should also be desirous of establishing amity and good understanding with the Seicks. By upholding their independence,

* Major Rennell.

and by preventing intrigues influenced by gold, the king of Candahar, with the support of some European power, might possibly be prevented, for a considerable length of time, from effecting a passage through the difficult country of the Panjab, and thereby effecting a junction with the disaffected Mahomedan tribes of Hindoostan. It is, however, now generally allowed, that there is more danger to be apprehended to the repose of British India, from the invasions of the Abdallees, supported by their Tartar and Persian hordes, than from the combined efforts of all the native powers of Hindoostan.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER VIII.

Reflections on India—French Politics and Liberty.

DEAR SIR, London, April 4th, 1800.

WHEN we reflect on the recent capture of Seringapatam, and the successful termination of the war in the Mysore, we are compelled, irresistibly, to turn our thoughts to the scene of those brilliant actions which must long continue to be remembered in the annals of British India.

The victory of the Nile was the fore-runner of these events, and we contemplate with pleasure, that energy and courage was never employed in a more interesting cause, or more fully acknowledged, than at the present moment.

The French, during the time of their monarchical government, watched with jealousy and envy the rising power of Great Britain. The war of 1744 laid the foundation of that rivalship in the East-Indies which has ever since continued unextinguishable between them. Previously to the revolution which has desolated France, the aim of that court was to attack Britain on the side of India. The blow intended against our Eastern dependencies was projected in conjunction with Tippoo Sultaun, who had ambassadors in Paris to effect a treaty against the English, in which the Dutch were to have become a party; but, previously to which, the removal of the Stadtholder, from his situation in Holland, was judged indispensible.

It is unnecessary to relate the causes which, about this time, brought on the revolution in France. Suffice it to say, that France, from being a *great*

nation, is, by her crimes, sunk below the level of other countries. The allied powers, or rather, perhaps, the good sense of the French themselves, directed by moderate and wise rulers, will, it is to be hoped, transmute the gigantic republic to a happier form, at least one more congenial to humanity and the spirit of the times in which we exist. But France, exalted as it was once amongst nations, has debased herself. And it would be a subject no less instructive than curious to trace, from the annals of history, the means by which nations have risen to celebrity; and, on the other hand, after having attained the summit of their prosperity, by what causes they have fallen into decay. It would appear, from an attentive consideration of these facts, that in all states improvement is natural and progressive till it arrives at a certain level; from which point of elevation, whatever it may be, as all matter tends to dissolution, the greatest care is required to prevent its receding.

The relative situation of Great Britain, in regard to the other kingdoms of Europe, and more particularly in regard to France, requires some elucidation.

Nations, in general, have been obliged for their pre-eminence to circumstances and events adventitious and fortuitous. Amongst other causes, the discovery of the polar magnet, the subsequent knowledge of a new world, and of a passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope, have not a little contributed. The world has not a great deal to expect from similar efforts; and, as very little can be added to our geographic information, the most must be made of that knowledge of which we are already in the possession. Matters of this kind being now nearly reduced to a certainty, the nations of Europe start with equal pretensions, and the restoration of peace will exhibit to the rising generation the most interesting epoch known in history.

The predominant passion of the present times is commercial enterprise and political œconomy; and the science of calculation and commercial

arrangement becomes closely connected with the polity of states and kingdoms. This being the case, it will be held difficult to temper and restrain whatever may be the spirit of the times within the just limits of prudent moderation. But all ideas of ambition and aggrandisement are for a while absorbed in the prosecution of the depending war.

This object occupies the resources of sovereign powers. Unjust and inordinate ambition in any state or country carries with it a menacing air to all its neighbours; and hence confederacies which sooner or later effect, if not the ruin, yet the fall of their power; witness the league of Cambray against Venice; that of Holland, France, and England, towards the close of the sixteenth century, against Spain and Portugal, at that time under one head; the much agitated dispute of *mare liberum* and *mare clausum*; and the present alliance against France. That this confederacy is incumbent on the powers of Europe, under the existing circumstances of French despotism, cannot be doubted; nor yet that it is equally necessary for the repose and tranquillity of mankind, as it is for the liberty and safety of the French people themselves. The bad example set by the French, and the evil consequences of their destructive system, make the war a common cause of civilised society and established order. France is no longer a country where the subject may repose with safety and comfort under the shade of his own vine. It may be asked, Is it a country where property is secure, or where licentiousness does not assume the name of liberty? Let these points be candidly investigated, and we shall discover a total relaxation from every principle, moral, political, or divine. The subject is torn from the bosom of his family by arbitrary conscriptions;—the antient hereditary property of the kingdom has been changed, and is continually changing, according to the will and pleasure, or the caprice and whim, of a fluctuating government. With evils so deeply rooted in the

core, what could have been expected but a continued series of inconsiderate, rash, and presumptuous conduct towards all the world, involving themselves in ruin, misery, and disgrace? But it must be allowed that all injustice has in its nature something rotten at bottom, which tends to undermine the fabric of which it is made the foundation.

It has never been doubted, by the best and most approved political writers, that real not fictitious liberty, and the protection of the subject, form the grand contour of all well regulated governments. Liberty has been defined "an action of the mind determining the will to assent to "what is good and reasonable:" from hence is derived virtue, good laws, and order in society, subordination, and the approximation and connexion of ranks and degrees in life, which form the basis of social order. From the security of property proceeds emulation, industry, and the cultivation of the arts, liberal and mechanical. It is on these grounds that a constitution must be reared, and on these only that it can be maintained. But in the formation of this great machine, attention must be paid to the springs which are to animate the whole, and which, by its own action and the increased re-action of the inferior movements, accelerate and best support the noblest system of human invention—*an equitable government*. A pure monarchy, and a well regulated republic, are by no means in themselves essentially different: they are both derived from one source, and must both be supported on principles best calculated to give security to property and protection to the people. The same stimulus, the same organs and impulse, are necessary in both. There must be in the one as well as in the other a power to hold the sword, to reward virtue, to punish vice, to soften the necessary rigour of the law, to excite emulation in the mind, promote the inclination to noble deeds, and to direct its pursuits to honourable attainments. If the deliberative constitution of a coun-

try be vested in the people, still it is the prince or chief ruler, by whatever title he is denominated, who is to apply, to modify, and to put in execution, the laws recommended and approved by the country itself.

In no republic, whether ancient or modern, has this equilibrium been neglected: but in that deluded country, France, the contest has hitherto been—in whose hands shall the usurped power be placed? and they have been the most successful candidates for the iron sceptre of despotism, whose atrocities best qualified them for the offices they assume, and who, by an approved system of terror and coercion, carefully circulated in clubs and private meetings, give him the dreadful and detestable pre-eminence over a degenerated people. The free action of the mind is shackled by arbitrary decrees, and, in place of being allowed to adopt what is good and reasonable, it is compelled to acts of injustice, cruelty, and horror.

When these scenes shall be closed, and order is again restored to society, the public mind will revert to new habits of industry and enterprise; the extension and participation of commerce through all the world will become the favourite object with European nations; jealousy will be excited; and it will be a difficult task to adjust, equalise, and satisfy, the different pretensions of each contending power.

In this struggle, Great Britain has perhaps the most to lose, and the least to gain; and, in regard to the existence and safety of our Eastern possessions, it is an object of the first political importance to the legislative power of this country, as well as it is deserving of the mature consideration of the grand accessary spring of the British constitution, the East-India Company.

To those who have paid any attention to the history of Europe, it will readily occur, that East-India commerce, and a participation of the wealth it affords to the nation enjoying it, has been productive of more jealousy and wars than perhaps any other cause which has ever attracted the ambi-

tion or the avarice of mankind. Whether the exertions which have been employed to acquire possession of this commerce has been productive of good or evil is a subject at least worthy of investigation. In tracing it to the source, we shall discover to what extent human-nature has been indebted to the softer climate of the East for its refinement and civilisation; how much the luxury of Europe is indebted to the productions of India; and how little that country owes to its connection with the western world. The interest which Great Britain must have in the contemplation of this subject is considerably increased by the remembrance that, on return of peace, English commerce with India will be the target at which all Europe will shoot.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER IX.

Short Account of the Indian Trade from the earliest Period of History.

DEAR SIR, London, April 9, 1800.

THE trade to India, it is well known, has, from the earliest periods, excited the desire of all countries to participate in it. Those nations who have been so fortunate as to obtain this pre-eminence have been raised to a degree of wealth and power unattainable by any other means; and it is only when the current of Eastern commerce has been diverted fortuitously into other channels that the people who enjoyed it have ceased to be opulent. To this commerce Egypt owed its celebrity; it accounts for the riches of Tyre and Sidon, and for the prosperity of Jerusalem in the reigns of David and Solomon. The mouldering shafts of Palmyra and Balbec owed, in former times, their proud and enviable situation to the same cause.

It would be useful and instructive to trace minutely the whole of that connection which subsisted between the antients, in regard to India; but that discussion would exceed the bounds of the present work.—It is, however, necessary to observe, that Asia was the portion of the globe the first inhabited, and consequently the first civilised. Intercourse with Asia, from a desire to possess some of her valuable productions, led to the refinement of the human race. The Arabs, who were very early navigators, became soon acquainted with the opposite peninsula; they skirted the coast of Arabia and India by the shores of the gulf which separates these countries, and they returned home by the same course. The situa-

tion of Arabia may, with great propriety, be compared to that of an island; for it is washed on three sides by the sea, and the one by which it is closed towards the north is a desert, solitary and unfrequented. The Arabians, a cunning and crafty people, imposed the commodities of India on their neighbours as the productions of their own country *; they suffered no strangers to enter their peninsula; and they asserted, the perfumes which they brought were gathered from places almost inaccessible, and at the imminent risk of their lives. The trade was carried on by the means of caravans, and they, for a length of time, with great advantage to themselves, supplied Egypt and Syria with the commodities of the East.

Time, which discloses all secrets, and produces both causes and effects, opened the eyes of Sesostris, who reigned over Egypt one thousand six hundred and fifty-nine years before the Christian æra, to the advantages of Indian commerce. Egypt, immediately adjoining to Arabia, was nearly equally well situated with Arabia itself, to benefit from a connection with India; but the prejudices of the people had hitherto prevented the Egyptians from trusting themselves on an uncertain element †. The ambitious views of Sesostris surmounted all difficulties, and he established a communication by the Red Sea between his own kingdom and India. The trade being brought nearer to the Phœnicians, it became to that industrious and enterprising people more apparent, and less hazardous. Early initiated

* Notwithstanding what we have heard of the perfumes of Arabia, that country produces neither aromatic nor spice, excepting frankincense: some myrrh, of an inferior quality, and balm of Gilead, are to be found; but they are not perfumes; neither does it produce articles of merchandise, nor afford either gold or silver;—they must, therefore, have been in fact only the carriers of the produce of India in the early ages of commerce;—they are at this moment so by numberless caravans, but with much less advantage, and at more risk.

† Before the reign of Sesostris, the Egyptians, who, from the natural fertility of their soil, had few or no wants to satisfy, shut their ports against all foreigners, and regarded sea-faring people as unworthy and profane.

into the navigation of the Mediterranean, as the Arabs had previously been in that of the Indian Ocean, the Phœnicians boldly attempted to establish themselves on the borders of the Arabian Gulf. They seized from the Idumeans, a mercantile colony of Arabs, several ports in the eastern extremity of the Red Sea. The grand depôt of Eastern wealth, at this time, was Tyre, the capital of Phœnicia, whence it was circulated to the surrounding shores; and the Phœnicians now obtained by their own efforts what they had before received only through the medium of the Arabs.

The Persians too, before the days of Alexander, owed their greatness to Eastern commerce, particularly under the first Darius, when the empire of Persia had not a rival *.

The Phœnicians civilised Greece; and civilised Greece panted to possess the riches of the East. Alexander was stimulated, by the accounts he had heard, to visit that delightful country. He penetrated to India, and was gratified with the sight of those happy climes which had administered so amply to the refinement and luxuries of mankind. From this period a new route was established, and an overland trade, both by Egypt and Syria, was laid open to the Western world. To this circumstance Palmyra and Balbec owed their origin and wealth, and Alexandria its greatness and power.

Egypt and Syria flourished, and Greece continued to increase for nearly three centuries in every elegant attainment. These countries, from their connection with India, surpassed all other nations in riches and grandeur,

* This Darius overthrew Philip of Macedon, and obliged him to pay an annual tribute of 40,000 pieces of gold, and which the Persians assert had been for years before paid by his predecessors. His son and successor, Darius the Second, was in his turn defeated by Alexander the Great, reputed son to Philip. Darius the First conquered some part of India; and we are told that he fitted out a fleet from the river Indus, which, in the prodigious space of two years and six months, navigated the Arabian Gulf, and discovered to Darius the riches of India.

till the Roman empire in the West wrested from them their liberties, and, with that, all the sources of their opulence *. The lustre of the Roman name for many ages astonished and commanded the whole world. The commerce with India, principally by the way of Egypt, produced the many jewels, fine clothes, pearls, perfumes, and rich silks, with which the Roman empire formerly abounded.

To such a height was Roman extravagance carried by means of its Eastern commerce, that Lollia Paulina, the niece of a Roman governor of a province, wore in her ordinary dress jewels amounting to upwards of 300,000*l.* A Roman fortune frequently exceeded 200,000*l.* sterling. Many other instances might be adduced, in order to show their great and unexampled wealth. Neither can the oriental pearls of the Egyptian

* About the time that Egypt became a Roman province, it surpassed all other countries in opulence and luxury. Ptolemy, and his wife Cleopatra, both traded to India, by which means immense riches were acquired, not only by the sovereign, but also by the people. Egypt was the centre of the commerce of the world from the days of Alexander to the termination of the race of the Ptolemys,—a period of nearly three centuries. The amazing wealth of that country astonished Cæsar and Antony, although accustomed to the pomp and riches of Asia. Octavius, the conqueror of Egypt, amongst the most magnificent of the Roman emperors, recruited from the spoils of that country his exhausted treasury, rewarded his soldiers, and presented to the people large sums, accompanied by shows and entertainments of the most sumptuous kind. The city of Alexandria, inferior only to Rome, the capital of the world, contained 600,000 inhabitants. As a Roman province, Egypt no longer, it is true, supported its exalted character in history, but it nevertheless continued to improve in commerce, industry, and manufactures. The revolutions which this devoted country has since undergone, the invasions of the Persians, the irruption of Amrou the Saracen commander of the Caliph Omar, the madness of the crusades, and the usurpation of the Sultauns of Damascus, the disaffection of the Mamalukes, and their subjugation by the Turks, together with the recent reduction of Egypt by the French, has not been able to accomplish its destruction. Egypt, with a capital, containing 400,000 souls, is sufficient to convince us, that at least some part of its former magnificence still remains. Neither can we calculate on the consequence, or the result, to the nations of Europe, or to what state it may not again revert, if commerce, the arts, sciences, and manufactures, could be again established in the hands of an industrious and virtuous people.

queen Cleopatra be forgotten. Two of those which served to decorate her ears cost upwards of 160,000*l.* sterling *. .

Egypt had not been very long under the subjection of the Romans, before Hippalus, a celebrated navigator, steered a straight course from the Babelmandel to the coast of Malabar. By means of this intercourse the Romans became perfectly acquainted with the monsoons and periodical winds in that quarter, which are so favourable to communication and to commerce. Previously to this great discovery of Hippalus, the trade between Egypt, Arabia, and India, had been carried on, coastways, by the circuitous route of the bottom of the Arabian Sea, into which flows the river Indus.

The Goths, and other barbarous nations in the fourth and fifth centuries, obliterated the greatness of imperial Rome. The rich fled to Constantinople, where, by this time, Eastern commerce had assumed her seat. Constantinople, from situation the most favoured of cities, was speedily raised, by the means of that commerce, to the highest pitch of pre-eminence and power.

The trade with India was now carried on from the Gulf of Persia by the Deserts of Syria and Arabia, assisted by the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. There was besides another route by which the commodities of the East were conveyed to the West. Merchandise was conducted by inland navigation, as well by land carriage, from the banks of the Ganges and Indus to the south-east quarter of the Caspian, and from thence to Trebisond on the Black Sea. The upper parts of Hindoostan, and even China, fur-

* Pearls were in those days esteemed beyond the lustre of the diamond. The taste was just; for pearls modestly adorn, while the lustre of diamonds attract an attention not always favourable to the pretensions or the merits of the wearer: both were, however, to be had in abundance, as well as rich perfumes for the use of public worship, and the burial of the dead. Silk was in such high repute, that one pound weight of that precious article was sometimes exchanged for a pound of gold.

nished their supplies, by numerous rivers and caravans, to the banks of the Oxus, the Jaxartis, and the Don; from the Don to the Wolga, and from thence to the Sea of Asoph, and the northern parts of Europe.

For more than two centuries, this exalted city, from its connection with the East, flourished in the extreme. But the introduction of the Mahomedan religion, and the establishment of the Saracenic empire, began to undermine its greatness. Notwithstanding repeated losses on the side of Syria, and along the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris, it still retained a considerable trade, and it besides required a length of time to impoverish so rich a place as Constantinople had already become.

During the ninth and part of the tenth centuries, the inhabitants of Amalfi, a small principality, of Roman origin, in the Bay of Salerno, were the principal traders with the Archipelago and the Levant. This little colony originally consisted of a few Roman families, driven by arbitrary power from the capital of that empire. In their way to Constantinople they were shipwrecked in the Bay of Salerno. The rocky promontory of Minerva in that neighbourhood, emblematical of liberty, security, and commerce, offered at once an inviting and convenient asylum. In this city there was established a court of high admiralty, to which all the nations surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, and even Constantinople itself, resorted for equitable decisions in all maritime disputes. The natives of Amalfi acquired in a short time considerable wealth, and obtained great respect from the city of Constantinople, by their attention, skill, and knowledge, in mercantile affairs. The intriguing spirits of other Italian states, all of them eager to engross the lucrative trade with India, managed successfully to draw the trade of India from Amalfi, into their own hands.

The Venetians, in particular, industrious and enterprising, were at the commencement of the crusades the first maritime people in Europe. In

conjunction with the Genoese and Pisans, who were also considerable at sea, they furnished transports for all the expeditions which had been fitted out by the other powers of Europe for the reduction of Palestine. The Venetians were instructed, from the intercourse which this occasioned, that Eastern commerce had elevated the city of Constantinople above all others; and avarice stimulated them, after the failure of the fourth crusade (Anno 1204), to turn their arms against that imperial city. They succeeded in their enterprise, and secured to themselves Eastern commerce. It is to be regretted, that this is not the only instance of dereliction from moral rectitude which attended the quarrels of religion—differences, grounded only in opinion, of which the object was to reconcile the philosophy of the human mind, and to enable mankind to digest the best possible system for their guidance and conduct; but which object unfortunately has been stimulated by resentment, and perverted by haughty and ambitious men to the worst and most fatal purposes.

About the middle of the thirteenth century the spirit of commerce awoke in the North. To defend themselves against the pirates which infested their seas in those times, the cities of Lubeck and Hamburg entered into a league of mutual defence; in a short time eighty of the most considerable cities, scattered through those vast countries which stretch from the coast of the Baltic to Cologne on the Rhine, acceded to the confederacy. This was called the Hanseatic League, and the towns which composed it the Hanse Towns.

This confederacy became so formidable, that its alliance was courted, and its enmity dreaded, by the greatest monarchs. The members of this powerful association formed the first systematic plan of commerce known in the middle ages, and conducted it by common laws, enacted in their general assemblies. They supplied the rest of Europe with naval stores, and pitched on different towns, the most eminent of which was Bruges in Flan-

ders, where they established certain staples, in which their commerce was regularly carried on. Thither the Lombards brought the productions of India, together with the manufactures of Italy, and exchanged them for the more bulky, but not less useful, commodities of the North. The Hanseatic merchants disposed of the cargoes which they received from the Lombards in the ports of the Baltic, or carried them up the great rivers into the interior parts of Germany.

As Bruges became the centre of communication between the Lombard and Hanseatic merchants, the Flemings traded with both in that city to such extent, as well as advantage, as spread among them a general habit of industry, which long rendered Flanders and the adjacent provinces the most opulent, the most populous, and best cultivated countries in Europe.

Genoa, rival to Venice, became jealous of the influence and superiority of the Venetians, and, taking the advantage of the regenerated spirits of the Greeks, assisted them to restore the dynasty of their former emperors; for which service, they had the Pera, or suburbs of Constantinople, allotted them. They speedily established themselves in the Crimea *, and by that means acquired the trade with India by land carriage through the northern parts of Asia, and the deserts of Arabia, as well as the commerce of the Gulf of Persia, the Euphrates and Tigris, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, in the same manner as the Greek empire had formerly enjoyed it.

* On the borders of the Euxine Sea, Caffa was their principal sea-port, where many remains of Genoese magnificence are still visible. They retained possession of it for upwards of two centuries; and to so great a pitch had their arrogance arisen, that the Genoese actually prohibited the Greeks and Venetians from frequenting any port beyond the embouchures of the Danube, and they even formed the idea of levying a toll at the Bosphorus.—After the expulsion of the Genoese from the Crimea by the Turks, the trade of Caffa still continued. During the stay of Sir John Charden at that place for forty days, no less than four hundred sail of vessels entered or departed from that port. The number of its inhabitants was stated at 80,000.

The Venetians, in a manner driven from Constantinople, with the loss of the India trade, by the Genoese, had only the mode left by which the ancients conveyed the manufactures of India to Europe; the route by Alexandria was again resorted to, and a treaty negotiated by the republic with the Sultauns of Egypt. By this time the Mamalukes had declared their independency, and separated themselves from the empire of the Caliphs, whose powers had been for many years gradually falling to decay.

The Venetians, by the medium of the Red Sea, which is the most immediate and direct communication between Europe and Asia, as having by much the shortest land conveyance, outstripped the Genoese, whose carriage by land through the northern parts of Asia was much more uncertain, tedious, and expensive. The Venetians became by far the greatest commercial people in the known world. It was the policy of the Venetians to exclude, by means of their interest with the Sultauns of Egypt, all the other commercial states of Italy; but this measure *involved them in long and bloody wars*. The League of Cambray originated in the inordinate ambition of retaining this exclusive trade, and brought along with it consequences which terminated nearly in the ruin of the republic.

In the thirteenth century, as has already been observed, the northern parts of Europe were yet barbarous,—till commercial intercourse, and the introduction of articles of indulgence and elegance, began to operate on civilisation. The Florentines became at this period great importers of East-India goods, and they contrived, by the medium of the Flemings, to establish also their depôts at Bruges and Antwerp. Thither they carried all the elegancies and riches of India, and sold them either to the merchants of the Hanse Towns, or to itinerant dealers, who frequented the fairs and markets of northern Europe. Auxburg, at this period, was the medium by which the middle districts of our own quarter of the world

were supplied. At this period travellers and merchants were of very considerable use in the refinement of those unhappy and gloomy times; the introduction of certain articles of commerce into the barbarous countries of Europe paved the way for imitation, and insensibly convinced human-nature of its wants, its dignity, and resources. So great was the desire of all orders and classes of men to possess the commodities of the East, that their horses and cattle were disposed of, and their very children were sold, to obtain them; every thing was sacrificed to be arrayed in the manufactures of the East, or to enjoy the luxury of its various productions. But regret too often succeeded this unlimited indulgence. The merchants found it necessary to keep the minds of their unruly purchasers in a continual state of fermentation, in order to prevent acts of cruelty and murder, the result of their despair. Shows by this means were introduced all over Europe, and the caravans of merchants were amply supplied with mountebanks and jugglers—and even prostitutes were not forgotten in their train.

The Florentines, who had hitherto been the bankers of Europe, and great importers of East-India goods, by the conquest of Pisa obtained a sea-port on the shores of the Mediterranean; and we find them animated, by the brilliant example of the Venetians and Genoese, to possess themselves of maritime commerce. On application being made to the Sultauns of Egypt, the Florentines had the same privileges granted as those enjoyed by the Venetians; and they acquired a share of the lucrative trade carried on with India by the Red Sea.

As commerce increases the means and wants of the inhabitants of any country, so it induces luxury,—and luxury is the forerunner of enervation and decay. The energy of the Turks, a new people ready for war and devastation, and willing to take advantage of the effeminacy of the Greeks, eagerly sought, not for the trade to India, for they were inexperienced in maritime affairs, but for the plunder and possession of a city so magnificent

and opulent as Constantinople presented to their view. The literature, the riches, the pride of the world, was centered in this splendid city; but the want of virtue and courage, the infallible consequence of great wealth, and the relaxation from military pursuits, rendered the enfeebled Greeks an easy prey to the inordinate ambition and unconquerable rapacity of the Turks.

Mahomed the Second established his throne at Constantinople on the ruins of the Greek empire [A.D. 1454]. Shortly after this usurpation [A.D. 1474] that prince dispossessed the Genoese of all their territories in the Crimea; by which means the trade to India was lost to Europe by the way of Syria and northern parts of Asia. Communication with India was, however, still open by the means of Egypt, where the Venetians were unrivaled, and where the Genoese in vain attempted to establish themselves.

When Constantinople, the mart of Europe, had fallen into the hands of the Turks, the trade and improvement of the Greeks again resorted to the shores of Italy. In that happy country the arts found a refuge from tyranny and superstition, and the man of letters an asylum; commerce revived; and companies of Lombards and Italian Jews settled in different countries, and carried on, as they had formerly done, almost the whole commerce of that period. To the ports of Egypt the rich productions in India were brought; and from hence they were conveyed to Europe by the Venetians, and from them the merchandise was purchased and distributed over Europe by the Lombards and other merchants.

A period was, however, at this time nearly approaching, which totally changed the commercial system of the civilised world—an æra which produced a new portion of the globe, and led to the discovery of the passage by sea to the most ancient, and at the same time the most opulent countries in the universe.

The elements of navigation are no doubt very remote. In all countries, even the most savage, the use of the canoe, or boat of some kind, was perfectly understood. Human-nature, in all stages within the sphere of our knowledge, when most scantily supplied with articles necessary for existence, and debarred all the comforts of life, found great resources in numerous lakes, rivers, and seas, from the plenty of fish and other productions of the waters. In warm climates, it may even be said to have been a luxury in the inhabitants to seek that element, and to solace themselves with agreeable coolness during the continuance of a scorching sun: half immerged in water, and with the head protected by a covering made of broad leaves, and perhaps without any covering at all, it was no uncommon circumstance for the rude islander to encounter singly the dangers of the ocean, in order to support the cravings of nature from the want of food. In later periods, the nations that lie round the Baltic, and along the coast of the northern seas, distinguished themselves early as an enterprising maritime people. The depredations of these, under the names of Danes and Normans, or Norwegians, have been severely felt in these islands. It is even said that they were well acquainted with the coasts of North America long before that continent was discovered by the southern nations of Europe. Their contiguous situation, together with the business of fishing, so necessary for their support, and the possession of the island of Iceland, lying between their country and America, reducing one perilous voyage to two voyages less hazardous and tedious, seems to give the account an appearance of probability. Be this as it may, their discoveries were kept a secret to themselves. But the discovery of America by Columbus, and the passage to India, by the Cape of Good Hope, by Vasco de Gama, opened, by means of shipping, a very extensive, although a fluctuating and uncertain commerce, which many nations have partially enjoyed, but which none has yet been able entirely or durably to appropriate to herself.

It was in the latter part of the fifteenth century [A. D. 1498.] that the Portuguese discovered a passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope. Prior to this important discovery, the Spaniards attempted to sail thither by the west, under the command of a native of Genoa, the adventurous and steady Columbus. This great man fell in with the American islands, which is called the New World, or the West Indies, to distinguish the newly-discovered countries from India in the East. From this period, the western nations of Europe appear to have increased in political consequence, to have improved in arts and sciences, and to have flourished in commerce; they acquired possessions in the opposite quarters of the earth, and became acquainted with every climate in the world. It was the interest of the people, whose possessions were thus enlarged, to improve with diligence the art of navigation; but the perfect knowledge of this extensive science includes that of almost every other. Whatever observations are made in contemplating the starry heavens, in measuring of lines, superficies, and bodies on the surface of our earth,—whatever discoveries in the physical world, and whatever improvements in the science of mechanics,—even the study of languages, and a knowledge of mankind, their complexions, manners, and dispositions, their countries, laws, commerce, &c. all seem peculiarly interesting to the mariner.

This discovery of the passage to India deranged the plans of the Venetians, and their monopoly was transferred to the Portuguese. These people, hitherto insignificant as a nation, were enabled, by a sea conveyance, to supply, more abundantly, and at a cheaper rate, the markets of Europe with the production of India, and they in consequence became extremely opulent. As the taste of the inhabitants of the Western World improved, so was civilisation promoted; and the desire of all nations to participate in a trade with India, with these objects kept equal pace. If, on the one hand, the loss of the trade to that country made the Venetians poor, on

the other it enriched the Portuguese, and opened to them new avenues of commerce: it has, at different periods, and under different circumstances, added considerably to the prosperity of the Dutch and other nations. But the trade of India appears fugacious, not easily to be secured to any country: it has been compared to a wandering but brilliant meteor, which has first illuminated and then consumed all those nations through which it has hitherto passed.

This short history of East-India commerce, without novelty to recommend it, has, I trust, from the brevity of it, and the concise manner in which I have endeavoured to arrange the variety of revolutions the trade has undergone, proved deserving of your attention. I should be happy could we discover, from the experience of so many centuries, that future revolutions in India, whether commercial or political, were not to be expected,—and that it were possible, by the adoption of any system, to prevent or avert them;—we should then have some hope that the crown of Great Britain might, by wise and prudent measures, continue to enjoy the commerce and substantial resources of British India.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER X.

General Reflection on the Expediency of preserving a direct Communication by Land with our India Possessions for the Purpose of conveying Intelligence—Outlines of a Plan for that Purpose—Distances by different Routes—Red Sea—Monsoon—Expenses of the Plan.

DEAR SIR, London, April 13, 1800.

AMONGST the numberless advantages which the East-India Company may possibly reap from the recent acquisitions in India, we may reckon the facilities which the possession of the kingdom of Mysore will afford to the overland conveyance of public dispatches as well as private letters. The direct communication from Mangalore to Fort St. George, rendered safe by the overthrow of Tippoo Sultaun, is of very considerable importance. The distance from that part of the Malabar coast to Fort St. George is only between three and four hundred British miles, and may be travelled, with the greatest ease, by tappals, in the space of four days.

This subject had long occupied my attention. Its various benefits appeared of sufficient consequence to engage the interference of the governments of India in promoting its success. As the political and commercial interests of India are more intimately interwoven with the general prosperity of the empire, and those interests better understood, and more beneficially and ably conducted, than at any former period of the connection between those remote countries, it is more incumbent firmly to establish such a communication.

Soon after my return to India, and while the impression of the difficulties of the journey by Bussorah was recent, I drew up " some considera-

" tions on the propriety and practicability of sending dispatches from In-
" dia by the way of Suez, and from India to England by the same route,"
which were presented to Major-general Abercromby, then Governor of Bombay, accompanied by an offer to make the attempt in one of the Company's cruisers, and to trust to the liberality of the Court of Directors for reimbursement, should the event justify the expectation I had formed. It is evident General Abercromby thought the scheme both practicable and expedient, for he accepted the proposal; and an armed vessel, belonging to the Company, was detained on the coast of Malabar, from November, 1790, till February, 1791, for the express purpose of conveying me to Suez with public dispatches. It happened unfortunately, however, that no event occurred in that interval of sufficient importance to require a particular dispatch;—the idea was at that time given up, and I was under the necessity of returning to England. I was happy, however, to learn that the government of Bombay had afterwards established an overland post by the way of Bussorah; and, I trust, it is not assuming too much, to presume that the memorial I had the honour to lay before that government, in the year 1790, has contributed to it.

I am sorry to understand, that this communication has hitherto not entirely met the approbation of the Court of Directors, from the great expense the Company is put to in conducting it;—which has been stated at no less a sum than 10,000l. per annum. I am confident that proper regulations would very much reduce, if not totally annihilate, all outgoings on this score. It is to be hoped, when the world shall be restored to the blessings of peace, and the mad spirit of disorganisation, which has spread abroad, subsided,—when the introduction of order and tranquillity shall again re-establish the relative ties of amity amongst the nations of Europe,—that, along with other improvements arising out of the confusion into which

every thing rational and moral has been thrown, Government and the East-India Company will establish a regular post between this country and British India; and, as the first step towards so desirable an object, promote and facilitate the navigation of the Mediterranean by packet-boats, built on a proper construction for that sea.

To an object of such acknowledged importance as the conveyance of intelligence in a safe and expeditious manner, too much attention cannot be paid. Many considerations are, however, to be attended to.

1st; the choice of the route.

2dly; the expense.

3dly; the navigation of the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

It is a difficult task to do justice to so complicated a subject, especially when so much is left to the uncertainty of the elements; and considering that the track lies through countries yet barbarous, and not much disposed to social intercourse. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which appear to me not insurmountable, I shall take the liberty of submitting my opinion in regard to public intelligence, or, more properly, in regard to the means which should in the present instance be used to convey it; and close the whole by a few general remarks.

The object which we have in view being to combine as much as possible the distribution of general intelligence; and, as expedition is material, and ought to be chiefly considered, the route by Suez appears, at certain seasons, the most eligible for the purpose.

Egypt is justly described by the Abbé Raynal as situated between two seas, one of which opens the road to the East, and the other to the West: placed in contact with Africa and Asia, it seems intended to connect them with Europe. It is likewise furnished with a majestic navigable river, which, by its inundation, renders it the most fruitful soil in the universe,

whilst its course appears anxious to join the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, and to yield its assistance in forwarding the communication.

The route by Suez, situated on the extremity of the Red Sea, within seventy miles of the Nile, as I have already observed, is certainly to be preferred to any other. Delays are inseparable from any plan of conveying intelligence by the way of Bussorah, and three months and a half is the least period that can be allowed, on the best arranged plan, for sending dispatches by that channel. The records of the Company will establish this fact, and will show how few dispatches have been received either at the India-house, or at any of their Presidencies abroad, by the Great Desert, within that time.

By the way of Suez the journey by land is greatly shortened, while the voyage by sea is not much prolonged *; and it is particularly observable, that the course of winds and currents is extremely favourable for the navigation by this route, many months in the year; whilst that by the Persian Gulf is protracted by many adverse circumstances. Besides, we know that vessels sailing from the coast of Malabar for Arabia and Persia, during the south-west monsoon †, are under the necessity of running from three to seven degrees to the southward of the line, where the south-east winds ‡ carry them obliquely to the westward, till they meet the south-west winds near the African shore §, to convey them to the northward ‖. During this season, by preferring the Red Sea to the Gulf of Persia, the

* In the journey there is a difference of 800 miles, in favour of the route by Suez.

† See the India Directory, sect. xxvi. p. 39.

‡ See ditto, sect. xx. p. 37.

§ See ditto, sect. ccv. p. 176.

¶ See Captain Hardy's Journal of a Voyage in the Viper cutter.—He sailed from Bombay the 9th of July, 1793.—He met the S. E. trade wind, lat. 4° 11′ South.

whole distance from Cape Guardafoi to Cape Roselgate, which includes ten degrees of latitude, is evidently saved *.

During December, January, February, and part of March, the passage from the coast of Malabar to Suez can be performed in less time than is required for a passage to Bussorah in the most favourable months.

In the months of June, July, and August, the Persian Gulf has an advantage over the Red Sea, in navigating to the northward; but when it is considered that the passage to Bussorah, even during this interval, requires from fifty days to two months, the delay defeats the advantage. At all other seasons of the year, the passage from the coast of Malabar is nearly equal in point of time both to Suez and to Bussorah †.

It being admitted that both voyages may be accomplished in the same space of time, the advantages of that by Suez becomes evident; for dispatches received at this port are nearly nine hundred miles nearer home than those received at Bussorah ‡.

With regard to the conveyance of the dispatches subsequent to their arrival at Suez or Bussorah, much depends on the season of the year, and the prevailing winds in the Mediterranean ||.

* Vide Chart of the Indian Ocean.

† See the East-India Directory, p. 176, for the best methods and times for navigating ships from port to port in India.

‡

	Brit. m.	Geo. m.
From Suez to Cairo	70	
Cairo to Rosetta	—	100
Rosetta to Alexandria	33	—
Alexandria to Messina	—	825
	103	925
Bussora to Latakea	903	—
Latakea to Messina	—	1080
Making a difference of	800	55

Total distance 855 miles nearer London by the route of Suez.—Aleppo is 1860 miles S. E. from it, and Cairo 1920.

|| The northerly winds during the summer season in the Mediterranean, and in Egypt, are highly

Of forwarding Dispatches from Great Britain to India.

First, by Suez, during the most favourable season of the year (*a*).

			Distance.	
	Days.	Hours.	By Land. Br. Miles.	By Sea. Mar. Miles.
From London to Messina, by Hamburg, Nuremberg, Trent, Florence, Rome, and Naples	16	0	1381	300
Messina to Alexandria *(b)*	10	0	—	825
Alexandria to Rosetta *(c)*	0	8	33	—
Rosetta to Cairo *(d)* *(e)*	2	0	—	100
Cairo to Suez *(f)*	1	12	70	—
Suez to the coast of Malabar *(g)*	20	0	—	2920(*h*)
Total number of days to Bombay	49	20	1484	4145
			Total .. 6629	

favourable to the communication from this country to India by the way of Suez.—We are informed by Pliny, in his Hist. Nat. XIX. 1. that the Roman vessels from the port of Ostia, bound to Alexandria, with a favourable wind, performed the voyage generally in nine and ten days; and to the Pillars of Hercules in seven.—The port of Ostia is in the dominions of the Pope, on the mouth of the Tiber, twelve miles west from Rome, where small vessels are still procurable, notwithstanding the harbour is much choked up.—The Pillars of Hercules was the name given by the ancients to the Straits of Gibraltar.

(a) In this calculation, delays are not included; and it will become the grand object to guard against them, as far as they depend on individual exertion.

(b) Colonel Capper says, that a passage from Marseilles, or Leghorn, to Latakea, in a tolerable good sailing vessel, seldom exceeds eighteen, and is often performed in ten or twelve days; and Volney, vol. i. p. 58. observes, that a vessel may expect to anchor in Cyprus, or at Alexandria, the fourteenth, and sometimes the eleventh, day from Marseilles. Mr. Stanley, his Majesty's Consul at Trieste, on the 25th of December, 1780, wrote to the Court of Directors, "That two gentlemen, in "their way to India, embarked the latter end of July, and arrived at Alexandria in fifteen days." Colonel Wood states in his Journal, that on the 7th of May, 1779, the island of Corfu bore E. by N. distant five leagues; on the 9th he put in at Zante, and on the 16th day of the same month, at six in the evening, he landed at Alexandria. In the year 1798, the fleet under Sir Horatio (now Lord) Nelson was, in the month of June of that year, only six days from Sicily to Alexandria.

(c) Mr. Savary states the distance at fourteen French leagues, vol. i. p. 471; and Colonel Capper at thirty-three English miles; the Colonel performed the journey in eight hours.

By Bussorah, during the most favourable season.

	Days.	Hours.	Distance: By Land. Br. Miles.	Distance: By Sea. Mar. Miles.
London to Venice	11	0	986	—
Venice to Constantinople by Brindisi, on the coast of Naples, and Butrinto *(hh)*	20	0	900	—
Constantinople to Aleppo	14	0	600	—
Aleppo to Bussorah	16	0	797	—
Bussorah to Bombay	18	0	—	1600
Total number of days to Bombay	79	0	3283	1600
Shorter by Suez	29	4	Total 4883	

By Messina to Bussorah.

London to Messina	16	0	1381	—
Messina to Latakea *(i)*	16	0	—	1080
Scandaroon, or Latakea, to Aleppo *(k)*	2	0	90	—
Aleppo to Bussorah	16	0	797	—
Bussorah to Bombay	18	0	—	1600
Total number of days to Bombay	66	0	2268	2680
Shorter by Suez	16	4	Total 4948	

(d) I should imagine that the small boats of a light construction, described by Savary, vol. i. p. iii. might be usefully employed between Rosetta and Cairo in conveying dispatches backwards and forwards, should the boghaz, or bar of the Bolbetine branch of the Nile, be deemed impracticable. The Egyptian scherms are light undecked boats, with latten sails, and are extremely dangerous, being frequently lost on the bar.

(e) Colonel Mark Wood, M. P. in the year 1779, was, with an unfavourable wind, fifty-three hours on the passage, viz. from one P. M. of the 18th May, to sun-set of the 20th.

(f) Colonel Capper states the distance at seventy miles, and says, the journey is to be performed in eighteen or twenty hours. Volney was twenty-nine hours, with a large caravan, and Dr. Pocock thirty-three hours and a half, in performing it.

(g) Colonel Capper observes, that from Suez to Anjenga, on the Malabar coast, is a voyage of twenty-five days, and to Bombay twenty-eight days, being about the rate of five knots an hour.

(h) It is 1170 miles from Suez to the Straits of Babelmandel, and 1750 to the opposite coast of Malabar.

By Vienna and Constantinople to Bussorah.

	Days.	Hours.	Distance. By Land. Br. Miles.	Distance. By Sea. Mar. Miles.
London to Vienna, by Hamburg	10	0	806	300
Vienna to Constantinople *(l)*	16	0	800	——
Constantinople to Bussorah, by Natolia and the Great Desert *(m)*	30	0	1397	——
Bussorah to Bombay	18	0	——	1600
Total number of days to Bussorah	74	0	2203	1900
Shorter by Suez	24	4	Total 4103	

The dispatches having reached Suez, the passage from thence to the coast of Malabar, in the summer months, would be extremely speedy; during these months strong northerly winds prevail in the Red Sea, and early in May the south-west monsoon begins in the Indian Ocean *. At

(hh) A sea-port of Albania, separated by a strait from the Island of Corfu, at the entrance of the Adriatic.

(i) Vide Chart for the difference in point of situation between the ports of Alexandretta and Latakea, in the north-east corner of the Levant, and the open port of Alexandria, which cannot be so much influenced by partial winds. Scandaroon is sixty miles farther than Latakea.

(k) This distance has been variously stated. Mr. Irwin makes 106 miles, and by my Itinerary 100 miles four furlongs, from Scandaroon.

(l) In a letter from Vienna, dated 20th of March, 1795, it is mentioned that the couriers of Constantinople, retarded by the melting of the snow, arrive so slowly, that the letters of the 10th of February did not reach Vienna before the 12th of March. This is not to be wondered at, when the state of the country, and the roads they have to pass, is taken into consideration.

(m) The distance from Constantinople to Bussorah, by Armenia, Mesopotamia, Diabekir, and Mosul, is computed to be about 1800 English miles. A journey performed entirely on horseback, at least as far as Bagdad, by the Tartars, or couriers of Turkey, who form a regular establishment under that government for the conveyance of intelligence, and have particular privileges accordingly, and have their horses maintained at the expense of government. At Bagdad a small boat is generally taken; and such is the velocity of the Tigris, that they reach Bussorah in four days, a distance of near 300 miles; but such are the obstacles in returning, that the same thing is not done in less than sixteen days, having to tract against the stream up the Euphrates, which is less rapid than the Tigris, as high as Hilla, from whence across to Bagdad the distance by land is fifty miles.

* These monsoons, as well as the trade winds, are now perfectly understood, being very clearly explained by the India Directory.

this period, the voyage from Suez to the Malabar coast might be performed in nearly the same time as a passage from Bussorah to the Malabar coast during the most favourable months.

The practicability of the navigation of the Red Sea having been much disputed and called in question, it becomes very necessary to elucidate this subject by examples and unquestionable authorities, in order, if possible, to do away the unfavourable impressions which have so long prevailed in regard to it. And as, in matters of this kind, nothing ought to be admitted on supposition, I shall, in addition to the dates by land, and the authorities for winds by sea, add some examples of passages by different ways: from all which the inference will be simple and positive.

Captain Robinson, of the Company's marine at Bombay, in the Terrible cruizer, a bad sailer, and altogether a very improper vessel for navigating the Red Sea, sailed from Suez the 21st of July, 1777, and arrived at Mocha the 8th of August. From Suez to Ras Mahomed, the wind was from north to west. From Ras Mahomed to the latitude of 23 N. the wind was principally from the south to the east, and afterwards to Mocha from north to north-west. The Swallow sloop of war had much about the same time sailed down the Red Sea in eleven days, and was only seventeen days from Mocha to Fort St. George.

Captain Robinson, in the Morning Star, another of the Company's cruizers, left Suez at 5 P. M. of the 27th of May, 1779, and on the 8th of June, a little before mid-day, she cast anchor in Mocha Roads. Colonel Mark Wood, late of Bengal, was on board this vessel, charged with dispatches for that government. They passed the narrow part of the Red Sea, which is the northern extremity, in twenty-four hours, having a regular and constant wind from the northward as far as the 21st degree of north latitude. From thence the winds were vari-

able, but chiefly from the south to east,—a proof that the winds allow of some deviation, and that they do not always blow from one fixed point at a particular season. Captain Robinson left Mocha on the 11th of June, and was only six days in crossing the Indian Ocean to the coast of Malabar. On the 2d of July that gentleman arrived at Fort St. George, where Colonel Wood was detained till the 6th, on which day he took his departure, and on the 14th day of July arrived at Calcutta, after a journey of 113 days. It will be observed, that Colonel Wood had many delays to encounter, particularly in the Adriatic; but including all these, he reached the coast of Malabar in eighty-six days.

It has also been represented, that there is great danger in remaining in the Red Sea late in August. Mr. Nieubhur mentions, that he left Mocha in that month, and passed the Straits, with the wind at north, and that he landed at Bombay on the 11th of September following.

In regard to the passage from Bussorah to Bombay, it must be allowed, that the passage is expeditious at certain seasons, from the prevailing winds in the Gulf of Persia. Amongst other instances on this subject, the following may be noticed.

The Lapwing cutter left Bussorah on the 10th of March, 1782, and arrived at Muscat on the 22d. Left Muscat the 8th of April, and arrived at Bombay the 15th. During this season the wind was mostly from the southward.

The Viper cutter, Captain Hardy, left Bussorah on the 28th of September, 1783, and the 31st anchored at Bushire: the Viper sailed from thence the 2d of January following, and arrived at Muscat on the 9th: the next day she sailed, and arrived at Bombay on the 20th of the same month, having experienced fine northerly winds all the way.

In the month of January, 1790, in my passage from Bussorah to Bom-

bay, the winds were chiefly from the northward, and we arrived at Bombay after a passage of twenty-one days.

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By Suez, in the favourable season.

	Days.	Hours.
Bombay to Suez	34	0
Suez to Cairo	1	12
Down the Nile to Rosetta	1	12
Rosetta to Alexandria, by land	0	8
Alexandria to Messina	14	0
Messina to London	16	0
Total number of days to London	67	8

By Bussorah, in the favourable season.

	Days.	Hours.
Bombay to Bussorah	40	0
Bussorah to Aleppo	16	0
Aleppo to Constantinople	14	0
Constantinople to Venice	20	0
Venice to London	11	0
Total number of days to London	101	0
Shorter by Suez	33	16

Route by Messina.

	Days.	Hours.
Bombay to Bussorah	40	0
Bussorah to Aleppo	16	0
Aleppo to Scandaroon, or Latakea	2	0
Scandaroon, or Latakea, to Messina	20	0
Messina to London	16	0
Total number of days to London	94	0
Shorter by Suez	24	16

The Route by Vienna.

	Days.	Hours.
Bombay to Bussorah	40	0
Bussorah to Constantinople	30	0
Constantinople to Vienna	16	0
Vienna to London	10	0
Total	96	0

Making a difference of 28 days 16 hours in favour of the route by Suez.

On a general review of this subject, the only comparative advantage in favour of the voyage, either to or from Bussorah, in preference to that to or from Suez, is on the passage from Bussorah to the coast of Malabar, during the months of December, January, February, and March: the season when our East-India ships leave England, and make the quickest voyages. It may be alleged that the winds in the Persian Gulf are frequently variable, with fresh breezes from the land, by which vessels are able, with perseverance, to make their passages at all seasons: whereas, in the Red Sea, the wind, at certain seasons, is stationary, and blows so strong as to defy all attempts to get to windward. But we know for certain, that there are land and variable winds in the Red Sea as well as in the Persian Gulf*. Small vessels, acquainted with the coast, keeping in shore, and taking the advantage of these winds, and also of the calms, when provided with able rowers †, might, undoubtedly, effect a great deal, and exactly ascertain what progress might at all seasons be reasonably expected.

* Mr. Irwin makes repeated mention of land, variable and southerly winds in the Red Sea, even in the months of June and July, which are the worst months in the year for navigating to the northward. See Irwin's Voyage, vol. i. Also the East-India Directory, sect. xxv. page 39; and sect. xxxvii. page 44.

† Mr. Irwin mentions, that in the month of June, taking the advantage of light land wind, by sailing and rowing, they gained a knot, and a knot and a half, in an hour. Irwin's Voyage, vol. i. page 111.

When we find that the means are in our power to open a communication with India by this channel, and when we consider the posts and packets established through England, and all over the continent of Europe, together with the regular and expeditious conveyance of letters throughout the East-Indies, under the protection of our governments abroad *, it appears to be matter of surprise that no regular permanent plan has been yet adopted for securing and facilitating our intelligence with India †. Instead of preserving to ourselves the navigation of the Red Sea, it has been for many years, with the exception of a few instances, previous to the invasion of Egypt by the French, entirely abandoned, and a much slower mode of conveying dispatches substituted in its stead.

To complete this communication between Great Britain and her Eastern possessions, requires the aid of the Executive Government of this country, and the co-operation of the Honourable Court of Directors. By

* See Major Rennell's Memoir of a Map of India, page 317; Major Grace's Code of Military Regulations for Bengal; and also, The Regulations for the Dawk, or Post, established by the government of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The expedition of the tappals, or postmen, in our own districts, where the relays are placed at the distance of seven or eight miles, is very great. The Nabob of Arcot has procured intelligence from his southern countries, by their means, at the rate of one hundred miles in twenty-four hours.

† Colonel Capper, in his Observations on the Passage to India, already quoted, has strongly recommended, that a regular post should be established between Great Britain and India by the route of Egypt. And this opinion is not founded on speculation, but on personal experience and observation. To show the progress of improvement in this line, it is sufficient to state the increase of the revenue of the British Post-Office. In 1644, Mr. Edmund Prideaux, who was inland post-master, was supposed to collect about 3000*l.* per annum. In 1654, the parliament farmed it to Mr. Mainwaring, at 10,000*l.* per annum. In 1664, D. O'Neale, Esq. farmed it at 21,500*l.* In 1674, it was let at 43,000*l.* In 1685, it was estimated at 65,000*l.* In 1688, the amount was 76,318*l.* In 1697, it was 90,505*l.* In 1710, it was allowed to be 111,461*l.* In 1715, the gross amount was 145,227*l.* In 1744, the inland office amounted to 198,226*l.*; but the total amount of both inland and foreign offices, which can alone demonstrate the extent of our correspondence, was, in that year, 295,432*l.* In 1764, the gross amount was 432,048*l.* and since that period it has frequently amounted to upwards of 700,000*l.*

their united exertions, a Firmaun might be obtained from the Ottoman State, through our ambassador at the Porte, establishing our right, and facilitating the means of our navigation of the Red Sea, by regular packet-boats, to sail at fixed periods *; and permission be given for Arab messengers, with proper passes, after the French shall have quitted Egypt, to convey our dispatches through that country, under the protection of its government. This being effected, it would rest with the Consul-General of Egypt to conciliate the friendship of the Sheick el Balad, or Governor of Cairo, whose good offices might easily be secured; a circumstance indispensably necessary to the security of the messengers, and the safety of the dispatches.

With a view to promote some arrangement of this kind, I submitted to the Court of Directors a plan for the conveyance of dispatches and letters to and from India, by the way of Suez †, already taken notice of; and which, it is hoped, the foregoing facts and observations will have shown to be both practicable and necessary.

This communication should have for its object, in the first place, the

* A vessel of force at all times maintained in the Red Sea would be of little expense, and very considerable advantage. See Irwin's Voyage, vol. ii. p. 128.

† It may hereafter become matter of consideration, whether the port of Cossire may not, with great advantage, be made use of, during certain seasons, in conveying dispatches from India to Great Britain.—The distance from Cossire to Ghinna, on the banks of the Nile, little exceeds one hundred miles; from whence to Cairo the river runs in a straight direction—the distance by land, from Ghinna to Cairo, may be about three hundred and twenty miles—by a communication between these places, one hundred leagues of the worst and most tedious navigation, the upper and narrow part of the Red Sea, would be cut off. At present the route is impracticable, from no pains having been taken to adjust the difference which took place between the crew of the Coventry frigate and the inhabitants of Cossire, in the year 1780, in which some lives were lost. Savary's Letters, vol. ii. page 17; and Capper's Observations.—Mr. Irwin particularly says, in this place, and he again repeats it in another, that a vessel may at all times reach Cossire, from whence to Ghinna by land, where boats may be had in great plenty to Cairo. He recommends this route to a packet-boat from India, at a late season of the year, especially after the month of March. Vol. i. page 189.

conveyance of official dispatches from Government and the East-India Company; in the next, that of general communication, both commercial and private. Those at the head of public affairs are best able to judge how far a restriction of private letters may, on some occasions, be necessary.

Public dispatches from England, as far as the port of Messina, might either be intrusted to the care of a special messenger, or transmitted by the post, according to their importance. All private letters should be sent by the post.

An agent should be appointed to reside at Messina, to receive dispatches and letters, who should have charge of two or more packet-boats, to sail to and from Messina and Alexandria*. The postage on letters should be paid in England, as far as Messina, and the additional postage in India.

* The idea of packet-boats in the Mediterranean is by no means new. Mr. Robert Richie, late his Majesty's consul at Venice, and agent for the East-India Company, has repeatedly, in his correspondence with the Court of Directors, recommended to them to keep two small cutters, as packet-boats, in the Mediterranean. Mr. Richmond Smyth, late of the civil service at Bombay, and who made two over-land journeys to and from England to India, by the Levant, in his memorial to the Court, dated 12th of June, 1780, has strongly enforced the utility of the plan. He says, "That, under "the present circumstances, a passage is not to be had at all seasons in the Levant, and that delay is "always to be expected: in regard to expense, one packet to, and another from India, would stand "the Company near the whole amount of keeping two vessels, which would bring four packets from, "and convey four to India, quickly and securely."—This was Mr. Smyth's opinion, previous to his return to India by land, which he did in company with Mr. Irwin, of the Madras establishment. During their voyage in the Mediterranean, both these gentlemen were but too well convinced of the justice of the above remark; and I shall subjoin Mr. Irwin's words on the subject. "With this con-"viction on our minds," says this gentleman, "it will be no matter of surprise, that, in our repre-"sentations to the chairman of the East-India Company, Mr. Smyth and I attributed the delays we "had experienced chiefly to the perverse disposition and unskilfulness of the Sclavonians; and ear-"nestly recommended an establishment of English packets in the Mediterranean. How punctually "their dispatches might be conveyed at all seasons, from any of the ports of Italy, to the coast of "Syria, or of Egypt, should the latter expeditious route to India be opened again, by a favourable "revolution in the government of that distracted country, I leave to the Directors of that important "body to determine." Irwin's Voyage, vol. ii. p. 204.

These packets should be cutter-built, copper-bottomed, armed, and well manned, though not of a large size. They should always be in readiness, provided with water and provisions, so as to be prepared for sailing on the receipt of dispatches, should wind and weather permit, and no delay on any account be allowed.

On the arrival of the packet at Alexandria, the Consul-General for Egypt should cause the dispatches and letters to be instantly forwarded to Suez, by Arab messengers *.

At Suez, country boats should be constantly stationed, ready to take charge of the dispatches from thence to Mocha †.

These boats should be coppered, and constructed on the best principle for rowing and sailing ‡, under six feet draught of water, both to enable them to anchor near Suez, and to take the advantage of light winds and calms, and to sail unobstructed by the shoals and rocks of the Red Sea §.

* I am authorised to state this, under the opinion of Mr. Dalrymple, whose knowledge and experience give it full credit: he thinks, "No European messenger ought ever to carry the dispatches, "except when such person is entrusted with verbal dispatches, in case of letters miscarrying, or other "circumstances, as such messenger not only occasions delay and expense, but very much increases "the risk of miscarriage."

† Captain Thomas Forrest, late of the Bengal marine, who has published several useful tracts, has informed us of the utility of using country boats, of a particular construction, in narrow seas. This gentleman, with great perseverance and success, sailed on a voyage of discoveries, in a small vessel of this kind, to the Eastern Ocean, when he visited many of the numerous islands in this dangerous quarter. See Captain Forrest's Voyage to New Guinea and the Molucca Islands, in the Tartar galley.

‡ On this subject, I must again recur to the testimony of Mr. Irwin and Captain Forrest: both these gentlemen agree in the utility of oars.

§ I met with a short tract of the Red Sea, translated by order of the Royal Society of London, by Sir Peter Wyche, from the MSS. of a Portuguese Jesuit, upwards of a hundred years ago. This Jesuit was well acquainted with the Red Sea, and his account agrees with all modern navigators. He observes, "Authors divide this sea into three parts; the middle is clear and navigable, not without "some small islands and rocks, which, appearing above water, are of little danger. The other two

The boats should be manned by trusty black people of the Mahomedan cast, of which description Bombay affords a sufficient number, and who should be strictly prohibited from trading *.

At Mocha, two Company's cruisers should be in waiting, one to sail for Bombay, and the other to the coast of Malabar.

The cruisers and country boats should be under the orders of the Bombay government, and might be conducted without additional expense, under the marine establishment of that Presidency. Regulations should be framed, particularly adapted to this line of service.

The dispatches of Bombay, and its northern dependencies, being separated at Mocha from those for Madras and Calcutta, one cruiser should depart from the first-mentioned settlement with its dispatches, whilst the other should sail for the Malabar coast, and land the dispatches for Madras and Bengal at Mangalore. A post-master should forward them from thence to Madras, and so to Bengal.

" parts, near the two shores of Arabia and Ethiopia, are of very bad passage, full of shoals, rocks, " and white coral, which, in the night especially, endanger passengers." Vide the Translation, page 58.

* The Lascars of Bombay are excellent sailors; while the unskilful management of the vessels employed by the Turks and Arabs on the Red Sea is fully ascertained by the testimony of Niebuhr, De Tot, Irwin, Bruce, &c. &c. The people who navigate these vessels are almost totally unacquainted with the common principles of the profession, and frequently, on the appearance of a gale of wind, take to their boats, leaving the ship and cargo, and perhaps the passengers, to their fate. In moderate weather they seldom lose sight of the coast, and uniformly come to anchor at night, let the wind be ever so favourable. This may appear wonderful, when we consider that Egypt was perhaps the first maritime nation, and that commerce and navigation have always been preserved in the Red Sea:—even at this day, Mr. Baldwin, the consul-general of Egypt, in a memorial presented to a committee of the privy-council on the slave-trade, says, " That the trade from Cairo to Gedda, by sea, " employs upwards of fifty ships of two hundred tons each, and some of one thousand tons;" and this independently of a great many smaller vessels. This fact was not generally known, even to men in office, at the time of Buonaparte's expedition to Egypt, although the author had published the circumstance in his Travels over land to India.

By this route, letters could be delivered at Madras in four days, and at Calcutta in twenty, from the period of their arrival at Mangalore, which, if added to forty-nine days twenty hours, the time required by the first statement *, makes, in all, to Madras, fifty-three days twenty hours, to Calcutta sixty-nine days twenty hours.

Mangalore being the centrical point from which the correspondence from Great Britain should be forwarded to our possessions on the coast of Coromandel, Bengal, and its dependencies, so it should also be the place where the intelligence of India should be collected, before it is transmitted home. The public dispatches from Bengal, Madras, the Carnatic, and coast of Malabar, might at this place be added, with evident advantage, to those of Bombay, and our possessions to the northward.

The dispatches being closed, a cruiser should sail direct from this port to Mocha, where the country boats are proposed to be stationed, to carry them to Suez, and from thence to London, by the means already mentioned.

The postage should be paid on India letters as far as Mangalore, and the remainder received on their arrival in England. The post-masters in

* This statement is made on the supposition of the packets being landed at Bombay, calculating the passage from Suez to that place at twenty-five days. The packets to Madras and Calcutta are proposed to be landed at Mangalore, instead of Bombay, by which three or four days' time will be gained, and may fairly be deducted from the above calculation.—Vide difference in distance by the chart. Besides this advantage in regard to the voyage, that from the journey is greatly superior. It will be observed, that, by the present route from Bombay to Madras and Calcutta, by the way of Poona and Hydrabad, through the dominions of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, it requires twenty-six days to Madras, and to Calcutta thirty-six, for the delivery of letters; whereas by the route proposed, which is entirely through our own country, or that of our immediate dependants, excepting 180 miles of the Cuttac, betwixt Ganjam and British Orixa, letters would be delivered at Madras nineteen, and at Calcutta fourteen days earlier;—a circumstance of very material importance, and alone sufficient to justify a decided preference.

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India, who are civil servants of the Company, and appointed by the governments there, would conduct the business in that quarter as a part of the present establishment.

To demonstrate the favourable situation of Mangalore for the purpose, it is sufficient to cast an eye over the map of India*. The Malabar letters would be conveyed there expeditiously, and those from Calcutta, sent to Madras in sixteen days, would be transmitted with the Madras advices, across the Peninsula, in four days, to Mangalore. Dispatches would then be received in London from Madras in seventy-one days eight hours, and from Calcutta in eighty-seven days eight hours †.

It may be necessary to observe, that a small dispatch boat, during certain seasons, would be very useful on the coast of Coromandel. Advices to and from Calcutta could be transmitted to and from Madras in less than eight days. The utmost punctuality should be observed in forwarding advices, whether by sea or land, from the different Presidencies, in order that they might arrive at the central spot within a day or two of each other; a thing perfectly practicable in India, where the regularity of the seasons would authorise calculations of this nature to a great degree of niceness and certainty.

Should a plan be adopted of the nature proposed, a little experience of the periodical winds and currents in the Red Sea (for it is certain that our knowledge of this navigation has till of late been very circumscribed) would enable us exactly to fix the periods at which the packets from England and those from India ought to be made up at the respective stations, and finally dispatched, viz. from London towards India, and from Mangalore to England. Occasional official dispatches could be conveyed by boats

* Vide the Map of India, published by Major Rennell.

† Or rather in three or four days less, for the reason mentioned in the preceding page.

ready for cases of exigency, and these to be considered as exclusive of the regular establishment.

Colonel Wood very properly remarks *, "that, until of late years, the "navigation of the Red Sea has been very little known; and, as northerly "winds generally prevail in the upper part of the Gulf, betwixt Juddah and "Suez, in which part are situated the only dangerous shoals, vessels have "on that account made very tedious passages, having, on account of the "shoals, lost, during the night, the distance which they gained during the "day. As the shoals and channels begin at present to be very well "known, this will no doubt greatly expedite the passage up the Red "Sea."

The only chart that can be at all depended on of the Red Sea, and particularly of the upper part of the Gulf, from Cape Mahomed to Suez, has been published by Mr. Faden; but, nevertheless, much is yet required to form a correct chart. A survey of this sea would not be unworthy the public spirit and patronage of the East-India Company.

Pliny † informs us, that the Romans were well acquainted with the periodical winds in the Red Sea, and the monsoons in the Indian Ocean. In sailing for India, they left the port of Berenice, on the Red Sea, in the summer months, when the wind blows from the north, and made the coast of Malabar in the south-west monsoon, which they met without the Straits of Babelmandel. They returned across the Indian Ocean with the north-east monsoon, when they met with a southerly or south-west wind on their entering the Red Sea. Mr. Bruce, the celebrated traveller, who has made many judicious observations on the Red Sea, from Cape Mahomed to the Island of Perim, remarks, "that it is known to all those who are ever so

* That gentleman's journal of the voyage, in his own possession, and not yet published.

† Nat. Hist. lib. vi. cap. xxiii.

" little versant in the history of Egypt, that the wind from the north pre-
" vails in that valley all the summer months, and is called the Etesian
" winds: it sweeps the valley from north to south, that being the direc-
" tion of Egypt and of the Nile, which runs through the midst of it. The
" two chains of mountains which confine Egypt on the east and west
" constrain the wind to take this precise direction.

" We may naturally suppose the same would be the case in the Arabian
" Gulf, had that narrow sea been in a direction parallel to the land of
" Egypt, or due north and south. The Arabian Gulf, however, or what
" we call the Red Sea, lies from nearly north-west to south-east from Suez
" to Mocha. It then turns nearly east and west till it joins the Indian
" Ocean, at the Straits of Babelmandel. The Etesian winds, which are
" due north in Egypt, here take the direction of the Gulf, and blow in
" that direction steadily all the season, while it continues north in the Val-
" ley of Egypt; that is, from April to October the wind blows north-
" west, up the Arabian Gulf towards the Straits; and from November till
" March directly contrary, down the Arabian Gulf, from the Straits of
" Babelmandel to Suez and the Isthmus. These winds, which some cor-
" ruptly call the *trade-winds*, is a very erroneous name given to them, and
" apt to confound narratives, and make them unintelligible. A trade-wind
" is a wind which, all the year through, blows, and has ever blown, from
" the same point of the horizon: such is the south-west south of the line
" in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. On the contrary, these winds, of
" which we have now spoken, are called *monsoons*; each year they blow
" six months from the northward, and the other six months from the
" southward, in the Arabian Gulf; while, in the Indian Ocean, without
" the Straits of Babelmandel, they blow just the contrary, at the same
" seasons; that is, in summer from the southward, and in winter from the
" northward, subject to a small inflection to the east and to the west.

"It may be necessary here to observe, that a vessel sailing from Suez, "or the Elanitic Gulf, in any of the summer months, will find a steady "wind at north-west, which will carry it in the direction of the Gulf of "Mocha. At Mocha, the coast is east and west to the Straits of Babel-"mandel, so that the vessel from Mocha will have variable winds for a "short space, but mostly westerly, and these will carry her on to the "Straits. She has then done with the monsoon in the Gulf, which was "from the north, and, being in the Indian Ocean, is taken up by the "monsoon which blows in the summer months there, and is directly con-"trary to what obtains in the Gulf. This is a south-wester, which car-"ries the vessel with a flowing sail to any part in India, without delay or "impediment. The same happens upon her return home. She sails in "the winter months by the monsoon proper to that sea, that is, with a "north-east, which carries her through the Straits of Babelmandel. She "finds, within the Gulf, a wind at south-east, directly contrary to what "was in the ocean; but then her course is contrary likewise, so that a "south-easter, answering to the direction of the Gulf, carries her directly "to Suez, or the Elanitic Gulf, to which ever way she proposes going. "Hitherto, all is plain, simple, and easy to be understood; and this was "the reason why, in the earliest ages, the Indian trade was carried on "without difficulty."

It is rather singular that Mr. Bruce, like many others, applies the term Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea. Modern navigators, and most books written on the subject, hold the Arabian Gulf to be the sea which separates the coast of Arabia from that of India; and this distinction appears to be just. What Mr. Bruce mentions as the south-west trade-wind to the southward of the line, is certainly meant for the south-east, which blows constantly between twelve degrees and thirty degrees south, and which from

the end of May to the middle of September extends nearly to the equator; the remainder of the year the north-west winds prevail. The south-west monsoon, which blows to the northward, never reaches the line, and consequently does not prevail to the southward of it.

The Etesian winds, says Mr. Bruce, blow in summer from the north, through the Valley of Egypt; and ancient Egypt, in the times of the Persian monarchy, we understand from Strabo, did not extend to the shores of the Red Sea, but was considered merely as that valley which the Nile covers with its waters, and sheltered on either side by a chain of mountains, approximating in some places within eight miles, and at others still considerably nearer. The position of these mountains in a parallel direction, almost north and south, acts as a kind of funnel, and accounts for the long course of northerly winds met with in the higher part of the Red Sea, where the wind, either set at liberty by the openings of the mountains, or thrown off by the eastern range, takes the direction of the Red Sea, and carries its influence as far as the line of direction will allow, that is, to the twenty-first degree of north latitude. Here it meets the south-east monsoon, which blows strong from the entrance of the gulf eight months in the year, taking in the same manner the direction of the Red Sea, as high as Juddah: these opposite winds create a confused short sea, which renders the in-shore channels more proper than the middle one, both for the navigation and the rowing of a small vessel.

There is only one channel in the Red Sea proper for vessels of burthen, and even that is not without considerable danger, from being so little known to European navigators. The Arabian coast, from the Straits of Babelmandel to Mocha, is bold and free from rocks: above that, on the same side, it abounds with numberless shoals, low islands, rocks, and intricate channels. The western, or African shore, is much more free from

these obstructions, and consequently safer. Its harbours have the peculiar advantage of being clear of bars and banks of sand, which choke up almost all these on the western side, and which may reasonably be supposed to proceed from the set of the current, and the numberless low sandy islands, which, from being continually agitated, collect in great quantities, and occasion the evil complained of.

The harbours in the dominions of the Imamum of Saana, or province of Yemen, bounded on the north by Ras Heli, situated about the eighteenth degree of north latitude, has been mentioned as the most eligible for the resort of Europeans. The intercourse, particularly with the English and other trading nations, has given his subjects a more liberal turn of mind than the Arabians of the Hejaz; and this good effect is considerably assisted by the mild and lenient government of their prince, who cherishes the principles of commerce and universal benevolence. The harbours of note in his dominions are Mocha, Lohiea, and Hoddeda, where water and refreshments of all kinds may be had. In the districts of the Hejaz are situated the ports of Juddah, Yambo, Konfodah, and El-Har: in all of which, particularly the last, refreshments are procurable, though the attempt to procure them is attended with difficulty and danger. After entering the Gulf of Suez, the harbour of Tor affords good anchorage and excellent water. On the western shore, there are several small islands that afford anchorage, some water, and a little wood: the principal are the islands of Masuah and Dahalac, and the harbours of Suakem and Cossire. The river Frat is not clearly ascertained, but supposed to be a navigable river, opposite to Juddah, from which, if exactly explored, many advantages might be derived. At most of these places water is to be had; sheep, fowls, and some vegetables, goats, and other refreshments. The northerly winds that prevail so long in the higher part of the Red Sea, and the dif-

ficulty of entering the Hieropolitic Gulf, at certain seasons, would render a good understanding with the people of Cossire particularly useful. Cossire is the first town in Upper Egypt, and is much frequented by trading vessels from Juddah and other parts of the Gulf, particularly for transporting grain from the fertile countries which are watered by the Nile to the coast of Arabia, where it is in great demand. Cossire is situated in north latitude twenty-six degrees seven minutes twenty-one seconds. Almost due west, not distant more than one hundred miles, stands Ghinna, on the banks of the Nile, to which place a frequent intercourse is maintained by means of caravans that collect in its neighbourhood, from Syene Esne, and the parts adjacent, in the kingdom of Upper Egypt. The passage from thence down to Cairo would be speedily accomplished with the stream of the river, in place of crossing the Desert of Thebaïs, an extent of three hundred and twenty miles over barren sands, infested with robbers and banditti. Packets navigating above Juddah in the months of September, October, and November, could land their dispatches at Cossire, to be forwarded to Cairo; and by this means save a considerable time *, and afterwards proceed on with duplicates to Suez, to be in readiness to return to India with intelligence from Europe.

It may not in this place be either unnecessary or unacceptable to explain something of the nature of the monsoons in the Indian Ocean, and on the peninsula of India, especially as it is so evidently connected with the subject in question.

The word monsoon is taken from the Malay language, and signifies a season. In India, amongst sea-faring people, it means the periodical

* The navigation of the higher region of the Red Sea is the most difficult and precarious, especially the Straits of Suez, which commence at Ras Mahomed, and where the wind generally blows in the direction of that narrow gulf.

winds, which are denominated according to the quarter from which the wind blows, such as the south-west or north-east monsoons.

At land, the word monsoon is applied as a general distinction between the seasons: viz. the periodical rains and the dry season, by prefixing, as is the case with sea-faring people, the quarter from which the wind comes when the change takes place.

The periodical rains in India commence at different periods in different parts of it, and even in the same parallels of latitude: in general their seting-in is attended with heavy storms of wind, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The first fortnight is by much the most severe, and the rain is almost incessant. After this period, the violence of the monsoon is over, and between the showers the air is agreeably cool, and the country pleasant. On the western side of India the Ghaut mountains run in a direction parallel with the coast, from Cape Comorin to the latitude of Surat, and from thirty to fifty miles inland, which forms the coast of Malabar, the Concan, &c. On the eastern side, there is a similar range, but more distant from the Bay of Bengal: the territory situated between the bay and these mountains is generally termed the Carnatic: the intermediate space between these two ranges forms the kingdom of Mysore, the districts of Tippoo, the Mahrattas, and Nizam. The monsoon approaches from the south and west, and I should apprehend that the Island of Ceylon is the first visited by the periodical rains, in the beginning of May.

The cause of these rains is the violent exhalations in the vicinity of the equator, propelled by the strong west winds from the coast of Africa: these clouds, pregnant with rain, are broke in their easterly course by the lofty mountains of the Ghauts, where they are attracted, and hover for a certain period till the lower country is completely overflowed. The rains commence in the latitude of Cochin, Calicut, and Tellicherry, from the

15th to the 20th of May, and as the clouds have to travel to the northward, they are something later in higher latitudes: for instance, at Bombay and Surat the rains do not set in till the 10th or 15th of June, which is generally the commencement of the rainy season all over the Guzarat. It would appear that the clouds having performed their functions on the western side, pass over to the eastern side, also through the attraction of the mountains: for the Carnatic has not the benefit of the rains till the 24th of October, at the time they have entirely ceased on the western side of India. The reason of this is, the clouds being stopped in their easterly direction by the Ghaut mountains, and for a time attached to them, find a difficulty in passing over the elevated countries of Tippoo: and when this is effected, the rains are not so violent as on the Malabar side, from the quantity of rain expended on the first approach of the monsoon from the south-west. The middle country, or table land, partakes of both monsoons; but the rains are not so heavy as in the low country. The immense torrents that rush from the mountains, and the clouds dashing against them, make the fall of water and the quantity much greater than in the elevated plain: the rains all over the peninsula last with more or less violence for about four successive months, during which time the grounds are tilled for grain; and in September or October the crop is gathered in. From this circumstance the kingdoms situated between the Ghauts are not so productive of rice as the low countries of Malabar and the Carnatic: other grains that do not require so much moisture are the abundant produce of these climates. On the coast of Malabar, and to the northern extremity of the Indian Ocean, or rather the Arabian Gulf, the south-west wind prevails during the rainy season, and is therefore termed the south-west monsoon. During the fair weather the north-east is the prevailing wind, although during the season, which is termed the north-

east monsoon, strong southerly and north-westerly winds have their proportion; the former from the end of April to the beginning or middle of June, and the latter in the months of February, March, and part of April. At Calcutta the rainy season commences about much the same time as at Surat and Bombay, viz. the 10th or 15th of June. The reason of this is evident: about the latitude of Surat, the country getting quit of the lofty mountains of the Ghauts, opens on all sides, and gives a free passage to the clouds; which continue their northerly course till they are checked by the mountains of Rungpore. It is also pretty certain, that the clouds, interrupted in their course by the high island of Ceylon, are broken; at which time a division of them find their way up the Bay of Bengal towards the Ganges. The continuance of the rains in Bengal is also about four months, during which time the south-west winds prevail in the Bay of Bengal, as does the north-east during the fair-weather monsoon.

To resume the subject before us, it will, it is to be presumed, be no inconsiderable inducement to give the plan which I have proposed a fair trial, should it appear that it may be done with a very moderate expense to the Company.

The Directors now avail themselves of the regular posts on the continent for the conveyance of their dispatches by Vienna to Constantinople.

The same mode might be adopted, with no increase of expense, for conveying their dispatches to Messina.

It is necessary that an agent should be appointed at Messina, to have under his charge two or three packet-boats *, for the conveyance of the

* The packet-boats in the Mediterranean should be from 70 to 80 tons; those between Suez and Mocha of a smaller construction. I am inclined to think that a vessel something on the model of the Tartar galley, or nearly on the same principle, and drawing about three feet and a-half or four feet water, would answer the purpose.—See Captain Forrest's description of the Tartar galley, in his Voyage to the Molucca Islands.

dispatches from thence to Alexandria, and for bringing back those forwarded to that port from India.

The expense of forwarding the dispatches through Egypt to Suez must be inconsiderable.

The packet-boats proposed to be employed in the Red Sea, and the cruisers between Mocha and the Malabar coast, may be included under the existing Marine Establishment at Bombay, without any additional expense.

Post-masters are already stationed through India; and any small addition to their establishment would be reimbursed by the inland India postage *.

It will appear from this statement, that the only material expense in the plan would be, what might be thought fit, to allow for the establishment of packet-boats in the Mediterranean, and an agent at Messina.

" It will naturally be supposed, that nothing, excepting the fear of in-
" curring a very heavy expense," says Colonel Capper, in his Observa-
tions on the Passage to India, " can prevent or retard the execution of a
" plan founded on both policy and humanity; but it may easily be proved,
" that if an act of parliament should pass to establish a post for India let-
" ters, Government, or the East-India Company, might gain considerably
" by it. It is unnecessary to enter into a long series of calculation to
" prove the truth of this assertion; but if Government will only give its
" sanction and support to the plan, many individuals will be found who
" will make the necessary advance of money, and, in short, defray the
" whole expense, upon being allowed to receive only a reasonable postage
" on the letters.

" By the several ways of the Cape of Good Hope, Suez, and Bussorah,

* The postage on inland letters, as well as on those to and from Europe, if properly attended to, and well regulated, might become a source of considerable revenue to the Company.

" we shall be able to send dispatches to and from India at all seasons; but " being excluded from any one of them, there will be an anxious interval " of some months in every year, when we shall be mutually ignorant of " what is passing in the different countries. To have a constant succes- " sion of intelligence established, almost as regular as our posts at home " would be, but at a very trifling, if any, expense, would afford general " satisfaction to every person concerned in India affairs, and, at the same " time, be productive of innumerable advantages both to Government and " the East-India Company."

As there is no evil, so extremely prejudicial, but what is accompanied by some concomitant good, so, in the present instance, the recent invasion of Egypt by the French may carry along with it some advantages.

That invasion has contributed to give us considerable experience of the navigation of the Red Sea. Our intercourse in that quarter must, no doubt, greatly contribute to our maritime knowledge of the channels, winds, tides, and currents, of those parts, hitherto so little explored by men of observation and science in their profession. The numerous harbours situated on the Asiatic and African shores of the Red Sea have been visited and examined, and the places ascertained where there is the best anchorage, and where wood, water, and provisions, may be procured.

From accidental causes, great benefits have frequently arisen, as well as great discoveries. Let us therefore hope, that, independently of what I have already mentioned, more attention will be paid to the relative situation of Egypt than has been hitherto shown by the British Government. Some sanguine and warm imaginations have already fancied the English paramount at Alexandria, and in complete possession of the communication with Suez. However this may be, our naval superiority in the Red Sea, with an establishment in the Island of Perim, which in some degree commands the Straits of Babelmandel, and the entrance of that sea, is un-

questionable. The advantages to be derived from these circumstances are therefore to be considered. Let them be arranged by those in whose hands the government of our possessions in India are confided. The Turks, as a degraded people, will listen to any overtures; and establishments in the Mediterranean are essential: nay, in the present crisis of public affairs, absolutely indispensable to the prosperity of this country. The only danger to be apprehended is the influence of the French in the Divan of Constantinople. Old attachments, and, indeed, political interests, are not easily overturned; neither can they be well altered from the natural course in which they are to flow. I have before remarked, that the coalition of Russia, Austria, and *the Turk*, was incongruous *, and such as could not long exist. The jealousy and the fears of the Grand Seignior must ever be awake to the encroachments of Austria and Russia. In political affairs, near-neighbours but seldom are friends. Political relations assume the form of a chess-board, where the piece that occupies each intermediate square assumes a hostile position. Scotland, while unfortunately divided by government, though connected by nature with England, was the friend and ally of France. France, contiguous to Germany, was the ally of Sweden; and, from the same circumstance, the friend and ally also of the Turks. For a like reason, Britain, divided from Austria by France, and from Russia by Sweden, the ally of France, was attached, by reciprocal interests and good offices, to both these empires. The Italian states were, and are, better affected to the English than to the French; so also were the Spaniards, before they were first cajoled by the family compact, and afterwards humbled by the French republic.—In short, friendship and assistance must, in all instances, be expected from the back ground; for proximity, in general, is a source of contention.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

* Vide Travels from England to India, published in 1795, by Major Taylor.

Engraved for Letters on India.

CHART
OF THE COMMERCE
of the
EAST INDIA COMPANY
with BRITISH INDIA,
during the present Century.



The upright lines represent every 10th Year — the horizontal divisions are one hundred thousand pounds each.

Fairburn sc. Minories.

LETTER XI.

Thoughts on Commerce—Disquisition on Free Trade to India—Participation required by British Merchants resident in India, and their Agents in this Country—Share which they ought to enjoy—And what should be reserved to the East-India Company, &c. &c.

DEAR SIR, London, April 18th, 1800.

IT has been somewhere remarked, that Divine Providence permits the mutual wants of mankind, that all nations may communicate with each other, and form themselves into an universal republic. Individual families, isolated and solitary nations and tribes, are found in a savage, or at best a barbarous, state. Mutual wants and superfluities draw mankind together from different parts of the world. By intercourses of commerce, intercourses of another kind are advanced: and a comparison of ideas, and a collision of minds, give birth and growth to arts and sciences, and all that bestows comfort and grace on life. In the present age of extended intercourse and knowledge, it is on commerce that sovereign powers chiefly depend for those resources which are indispensably necessary to the complicated apparatus and machinery of war, waged now on a greater scale than formerly, as well as on a more varied and extensive theatre.

We cannot, however, help observing with regret the evils which have been occasioned to mankind by rivality and jealousy, in the prosecution of that very commerce which has advanced modern Europe to the highest improvement in arts and sciences, rewarded the artisan for his ingenious production, the sailor for his toils, and the man of science for his most painful researches. When human nature, impelled by avarice, and forget-

ful of the expanded virtues to which commerce has given birth, seeks after it in the turbid streams of discord, we have to lament those frailties and weaknesses which are inseparable from our existence.

Thus it is that mankind in general are in a continued state of warfare with each other, and that individuals are eternally involved in strife and litigation. Conciliation in either case is difficult, and the greatest evils can be averted only by powerful mediation, judiciously and moderately applied.

The quarrels of nations, on the subject of commercial arrangements, it is to be observed, are not so dangerous as domestic jealousies. The energies of an entire country are firmly united to maintain the general interest; while, on the other hand, faction and party, exceeding the bounds of prudence, and excited by violent detestation and enmity, plunge alternately into the most destructive measures, in opposition to each other. The welfare of the state is by this means neglected; every thing gives place to private resentment; domestic ties are forgotten; and a connection with foreign powers, distinct from that interest which it is our duty to respect, is ultimately formed; capital is removed to other countries; public confidence is destroyed; and commerce, fickle and fugacious in its nature, quits the shores of one kingdom in order to enrich those of another. The dereliction of trade is speedily followed by the loss of every thing that commands respect, or produces superiority.

Were it to the present purpose, we might contemplate with the greatest satisfaction the early connection between commerce and civilisation, and the effects of both in promoting the civil liberties as well as the political institutions of mankind. We should then discover the inestimable properties of commercial intercourse, and know how to appreciate the blessings which we now enjoy. An equal distribution of wealth, and a free

circulation of the precious metals, promotes the comfort and happiness of mankind, as they also tend to establish and preserve social order, good faith, and moral character. With the tide of commerce, all that is enviable in our nature is carried along. At the full, it elevates the mind, and promotes the operation of the noblest passions; while, on the other hand, in proportion as it recedes, it is accompanied in its reflux by the same virtues it had gradually introduced. In the transit of commerce, the unhappy country is left at last poor and dispirited, ready to receive the shackles of slavery and arbitrary power. That which distinguishes a barbarous from a savage nation is the introduction of the agricultural arts. The savage, as a fisherman or huntsman, is sanguinary and cruel;—the barbarian, an agricultural being, far less ferocious; and, between both, the line is not very distant. But, in the ascent to civilisation and refinement, habits of industry and commerce incline the barbarian, by progressive though slow degrees, to the nice and delicate feelings of sensibility and intellectual enjoyment. Were it possible, with the loss of commerce, to retrace our steps to the situation of the barbarian, where martial virtue and honour, in place of political restrictions, serve to guide his way, it would be some satisfaction to the human mind: but where is there a country in the annals of the world, where a great commercial people having lost their independency, without the introduction of a new race of men, were even able to assert a character so honourable, so fair, and manly, as the unlettered barbarian? Vice, enervation, debasement of sentiment, obliterate all the manly virtues in the mind of those who have once tasted the overturned cup of affluence and liberty. In their descendants the corruption is completed; from which state they are consigned, as it were by the hand of Providence, never more to return.

If these are the advantages to be derived from commerce; if these are

the criteria by which commerce was originally attracted; and if its loss must render life terrible and no longer to be endured; how invaluable must it be to Great Britain! A country like our own, whose physical productions are scarcely adequate to the consumption of its inhabitants, whose existence and happiness depend on the success and magnitude of her commercial pursuits, holds a stake of the first importance. With the prosperity of this empire there is involved that of her eastern and western dependencies in both the Indies; and, by a re-action and assimilation in their preservation, there is doubtless concentered all that is dear to Englishmen—*liberty* and *independence*.

Our commerce with India has, for a period of nearly two hundred years, been conducted on the footing of exclusive trade. The East-India Company, from the year 1600 to the year 1794, had enjoyed, with little interruption, all the privileges of an exclusive monopoly of trade to the East Indies, with the exception of a very small share conceded by themselves to the captains and officers in their commercial employment. This they termed, in contradistinction to the comprehensive scale of their own commerce, private trade. This trade was, however, much limited and burthened with heavy restrictions, besides the payment of duties to the Company of seven per cent. on some, and seventeen per cent. on other articles. On the gross sales at the India-House, the government duties and excise were also to be paid.

Monopolies, in general, have met with great opposition, and much disgust has been occasioned by them. Individual adventurers, who are willing to risk their capitals in fair speculations, have declared that competition is necessary to nourish and preserve commerce to any country; as, on the other hand, its suppression is calculated to withdraw both capital and industry to other nations. Liberal as the East-India Company may be,

they have not been able to prevent clamour; and the renewal or extinction of their charter, when the period shall happen, will prove the opinion of Government in regard to the utility of that Company to the state, as connected with the interest of individuals. Rights, it must be allowed, are sacred things, especially when solemnly guaranteed by the faith of parliament; and there is, at the same time, much to be urged in favour of an establishment sanctioned for so considerable a length of time by the wisdom and experience of the legislature. From these circumstances we should be glad to see differences adjusted, and all animosities for ever obliterated between the East-India Company and the individual traders and manufacturers of Great Britain. This great object is only to be attained by a conciliatory mode of conduct, and by adopting, on the part of the Company, the wise maxims of moderation.

In the course of the several investigations which took place prior to the renewal of the Company's charter in 1794, great candour was evidently shown by his Majesty's ministers. A system was recommended at that period, which, if pursued, would have doubtless set at rest all feuds and contention. It was evidently the wish at that time to continue to the present East-India Company a regulated monopoly, and to ensure to our merchants and manufacturers certain and ample means of exporting to India, to the full extent of the demand of that country, the manufactures of Great Britain. It was further intended, that, in so far as the produce of India affords raw materials for the manufactures of Great Britain or Ireland, those articles should be brought home at a rate as reasonable as the circumstances of the two countries would admit.

This basis seemed to afford a well-grounded hope that every body would be satisfied, as a liberal participation of India commerce to individuals of this country was clearly intended. Unfortunately, at the India House, opinions

prevailed in direct contradiction to the salutary measures hinted at by the India minister. Nothing less than the entire advantages of a strict exclusive trade in the hands of the Company, and the complete enjoyment of the carrying trade to and from India in those of the old shipping interest under their protection, was deemed sufficient to extricate the Company from the deplorable situation which recent innovations had occasioned. When men's imaginations are once heated, it is difficult to bring them back to calmness and reason. A spirit of indignation, which had before become pretty general, was now violently roused against all traders to the East not in the employment of the Company, and more particularly those who were natives of this country. By some unaccountable perversion, *clandestine traders* were denominated *illicit traders*, and the evident distinction between these terms totally destroyed. The moderate views of Mr. Dundas were not approved; and that gentleman, in conjunction with Mr. Pitt, in recommending them, said, that he trusted the Court of Directors would soon be satisfied, by experience, that the adoption of them would be no ways prejudicial to their interests; but if Mr. Pitt and himself had not been fortunate enough to convince them in that respect, and they still considered these concessions as sacrificing some part of their commercial interests, then that these gentlemen were at least sanguine in their expectations that, in compliance with their opinions, the Directors would not conceive the sacrifices they were called upon to make of such moment as to justify them in refusing to try the experiment.

The proposals alluded to were inclosed by Mr. Dundas for the information of the Court of Directors, and were principally intended, as indeed it was repeatedly declared in all stages of the business, to draw the clandestine trade from perhaps an irregular course into a more orderly and justifiable channel. It was proposed, that all persons residing in India,

under the protection of the East-India Company, should be allowed to act on agency for any persons who might be pleased to appoint them; the persons so acting to be appointed under covenants with the East-India Company, and liable to the controul of the government in India.

That all persons resident in India should be allowed to send home, in the Company's ships, such goods as they pleased, paying a freight for the same not exceeding 15*l.* per ton, or such further sum as with the freight paid on the goods exported to India in the time of peace, the sum of 20*l.* per ton.

That the charges made by the Company on the sales of goods shipped from India, by individuals, should not exceed 3*l.* per cent.

That his Majesty's subjects in Great Britain and Ireland should be permitted to export all kinds of goods to India, with the exception of military stores, and of certain bulky articles of marine stores, viz. masts and spars, cordage, anchors, pitch and tar, and copper. The freight for such exports to be at the rate of 5*l.* per ton in time of peace.

That it should be lawful for the servants of the Company to recover their property in any foreign country, in the same manner as the rest of his Majesty's subjects are or may be entitled to do.

The declared opinions of such comprehensive minds as those of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the President of the Board of Controul, could not fail to encourage and strengthen the free traders in the expectations they had formed. A committee, chosen by certain mercantile houses in India, from the agents of that body in London, represented to the Court of Directors that they had long foreseen the ill tendency of certain regulations which diverted the trade of India into the hands of foreigners, while British ships and British capitals remained unemployed. They declared their intention was to assist, as much as in their own power, to make London the grand emporium of Europe for Indian commodities, to make the Company

the channel for their introduction, and to give them a beneficial share in the profits of this trade; though not to constitute the Company, as it might once have been, the sole trader.

Not only the free traders of India, but also the great body of the manufacturers of Great Britain, and the Proprietors of the valuable mines and minerals of the kingdom, were permitted in the fullest manner to state their pretensions. They were attended to with great candour and complacency, and at the same time with the utmost impartiality.

It must however be allowed, that, on the part of the East-India Company, great tenacity was shown, very justifiable to be sure in the Court of Directors, as the guardians of the rights of the Proprietors. They were extremely loth to relinquish any part of what they conceived to be exclusive privileges in regard to Eastern commerce, and they would much rather, that favour shown to individual traders should have flowed from their bounty as a concession, than that they should be coerced by any legislative acts to grant a participation of the trade to India. So long accustomed to be without any rival in the British commerce to that country, they could not be expected to regard the relinquishment of any part of it, even that part of it which the Company themselves had abandoned, otherwise than as an object of anxiety and alarm. Roused by the danger of innovations likely to be introduced into the commercial system of the Company, the Directors found themselves particularly called upon to counteract, as much as possible, the views and interests of the free traders; and in doing this, perhaps, there might be more attention given to the preservation of chartered rights and splendor of the Company, than to the welfare of the state, as it is connected with the prosperity of the Company, and as they relatively are connected and depend on each other.

From the whole mass of information thus furnished from all quarters of

the nation, a system, grounded also on experience, and with a reference too to the pretensions of the East-India Company, was formed, which, perhaps, may rather be considered of a probationary nature than as permanent and decisive.

It was intended by this system to unite as much as possible the general interest of all, with that regard to justice which was certainly due to the East-India Company. It was enacted amongst other wise and necessary measures, calculated to encourage the manufactures and promote the export trade of this country, that the Company be laid under an obligation to provide, at reasonable rates of freight, between the thirty-first day of October in each year, and the first day of February in the following year, not less than three thousand tons of shipping for the purpose of carrying out to India the private trade of individuals, and for bringing back the returns of the same, and the private trade of other persons who should be lawfully entitled to import the same into this kingdom; and that further regulations should be made for augmenting the said quantity of tonnage, as circumstances might require.

That in time of peace the rate of freights which the Company should be entitled to charge for the carriage of goods from Great Britain to India should not exceed 5*l.* per ton; and that the rate of freight which they should be entitled to charge for the carriage of goods from India to Great Britain should not exceed 15*l.* per ton, or such further sum as, together with the freight paid on the exports to India, should not on the whole freight, to and from India, exceed 20*l.* per ton; and that in times of war, or preparations for war, between Great Britain and any European power, or under any circumstances incidental to war, or preparations for war, whereby an increase in the rates of freight payable by the Company should become unavoidable, then, and in any of those cases, the rates of

freight to be charged and received by the Company for the carriage of private trade, should and may be increased in a due proportion to the additional rates of tonnage paid by the Company for the hire of ships for their own trade, and after no higher rate or proportion.

These stipulations in favour of free trade did not, by any means, come up to what the merchants in India conceived to be their fair pretensions to a participation of that trade. Accordingly, on the 10th of April, 1795, we find the free merchants of Calcutta represented to Sir John Shore, then Governor General, that, in order to increase the commercial advantages which Great Britain derives from the Honourable Company's possessions in India, a legal channel of conveyance had been opened by the late act of Parliament, which renewed the Company's charter for transporting the goods and merchandise of individuals from India to England. By the correspondence which passed between his Majesty's ministers and the Court of Directors, previously to the renewal of the charter, it appeared to have been the intention of ministers to furnish individuals with a sufficient quantity of tonnage, through the Company's means, at fair and moderate rates, for certain goods enumerated in the act. When the act reached India, the merchants were sorry to observe, that the provisions it contained for this purpose were not likely to produce the effect intended, under a strict adherence to the letter of it. Ignorant, however, as they then were, how the intention of the legislature might operate in this respect, they had waited the result of experience before they presumed to offer an opinion. Two shipping seasons were now nearly elapsed since the operation of the act took place in India, and they are sorry to be under the necessity of representing that they had hitherto derived little benefit from the participation which it held out, of an equitable conveyance of their goods from that country to England.

They represented that the 3000 tons of freight, which the act directs to be appropriated to individuals, was very inadequate to the demand; nor were the rates of 15*l.* per ton, in time of peace, and 22*l.* 10*s.* in time of war, sufficiently moderate for the exportation of gruff goods, or those of great bulk or weight, in proportion to their value. These rates, they asserted, were from 3 to 5*l.* per ton, or 30 to 50 per cent. in the former period, and 7*l.* 10*s.* or 50 per cent. in the latter, beyond the rate of tonnage furnished by foreign ships. The consequence of this disproportion in the rate of freight between the Company's tonnage and that of foreigners, they stated, was sufficiently obvious. These would always be able to undersell British subjects in the European market to that amount, or to overbid them in the same proportion in their purchases in India; a preference which precluded competition in all low-priced goods to Englishmen, and must continue to force all the surplus produce of India, beyond the Company's investment, or the greatest part of it, to foreign ports.

The price, or insufficiency of conveyance, were not the only evils of which they had to complain. There were other causes, that nearly excluded them altogether from any benefit which the act holds out, or that the Company intended, by the appropriation of freight to private traders. They never could know, they said, what proportion of 3000 tons might have been previously taken up in England, or rather what quantity appropriated for individuals in India. The regulations also for receiving tenders of freight in India limited the time for offering proposals to the 1st of September. At this early period of the season very little of the internal produce of the country reaches Calcutta; nor are the prices at which goods of the season can be shipped ascertained. Notwithstanding that, they must previously determine to apply for tonnage, which accident may

prevent them from filling, or the state of the market afterward, or other circumstances, render it ruinous to export; or should goods positively be provided at an early period for exportation on the Company's tonnage, they must be bought at the hazard of being disappointed of a conveyance, by a previous appropriation. It is true that the Company's tonnage had been opened again for private goods after the 1st of September, but the rate of freight was left to be settled in England; and although it could not be less than 22*l.* 10*s.* might, as they supposed, amount to much more, since in war-time it was, in some measure, left for the Company to determine by what they themselves were to pay. Under such an uncertainty in the price of conveyances, nothing but the most urgent necessity could induce a prudent merchant to avail himself of the offer. To trade on these terms is rather a species of gambling than a sober regulated commerce, which is best maintained on moderate profits, whilst those can be secured by the avoidance of any great risk.

In pointing out the obstacles which oppose an increased export trade from hence to England by individuals, the merchants professed to be actuated by no other motive than a wish to see these impediments removed, as far as circumstances would admit, that they might experience the full effect of the benefit which the legislature intended, by drawing the produce of Bengal to England. They were well aware, that unless applications were made in India, and transmitted home previously to the period of taking up outward-bound ships, the Company could not know what tonnage would be wanted, and therefore could not, under any idea of accommodation to individuals resident in India, take up extra tonnage for that purpose, which might not be called for, and the ships return empty. They were all sensible that the Company must be apprised in India, at an early period of the year, of the quantity of tonnage required by private

traders, that time might be allowed for filling up any part that might be unoccupied.

To remove obstacles which prevented individuals from exporting goods to Europe, without inconvenience or loss to the Company, and without interfering with their established European tonnage, the merchants suggested the propriety of employing the British shipping of India. There were, they said, upwards of 30,000 tons of shipping belonging to British subjects resident in that country; of which forty-one sail, carrying upwards of 16,000 tons, had been built at Bengal. These ships, they were legally advised, were entitled to the rights and privileges of British bottoms, on complying with the regulations of the act of parliament of the 26th of George the Third. The terms on which they conceived these ships, or any others built in the British settlements in India, might be employed with advantage to the nation, the Company, and individuals, were, to accept of tenders of ships legally eligible, provided the owner engaged to load the ship himself, or procure a cargo from others, consisting of such goods as the Company permit private traders to export to England. The person tendering the ship to enter into an engagement not to exact a higher rate of freight for that part of the freight which he did not occupy himself, than 12*l.* per ton in time of peace, and 16*l.* per ton in time of war. That the goods exported on these ships should be landed at the port of London, and deposited for sale in the Company's warehouses, from whence they were to be sold in the manner prescribed for private goods laden on the Company's tonnage, and subject to the Company's duty of 3 per cent. That full and adequate security should be given, that all ships tendered for this purpose should be amenable to the Company's orders and regulations, in the same manner as the regular chartered ships; or the owners might be made to sign a charter-party agreement, similar to that executed

in England, for the freight of the whole ship; the Company re-freighting the tonnage to them on the same terms. That these ships should be permitted to return to India, after discharging their cargoes, in ballast, or to bring such goods as private traders are permitted by the Company to export to India, at the option of the owners. That, in case the Company should have occasion to occupy any of the returning tonnage with military or naval stores, they should have a right to fill up one-half of each ship's tonnage, at the rate of 4*l.* per ton, and also to send out troops, on the same allowance as is made to regular ships.

On these outlines, or something similar, the merchants of India conceived a considerable increase would speedily take place in the exports of Bengal, all of which would centre in England, to the improvement of cultivation in India, and the extension of commerce and revenue in both countries.

To these observations these gentlemen added, that should their suggestions meet a favourable reception, there were many of them ready to step forward with tenders of ships and cargoes conformably thereto; but, if what they had ventured to propose was inconsistent with the regulations of the Company in India, they requested that they might be transmitted home for the consideration of the Court of Directors.

The complaints of the free trade were not confined merely to the articles already enumerated. Amongst others, besides these, it was matter of complaint, that the time of lading and sailing of the Company's ships was always uncertain; that the merchants did not know on what ships their goods would be shipped, until they had taken in the Company's cargo; a circumstance which prevented their making insurances in time. They also complained, not without apparent reason, that the times of sales at the India-House were too far distant after the arrival of the goods in Eng-

land; and that, after this great delay, another very serious one occurred, in the length of time taken to make up the accounts of sale, and paying the proceeds. Insinuations were also thrown out, that the duties and expenses were too much for the trade to bear, and that a particular clause in the act of parliament, by which the Company were not liable for embezzlement or bad conduct on the part of those in their service who had the care of conducting the free trade to and from India, left them in a situation extremely precarious, awkward, and unsatisfactory *. Another grievance of which they complained, was their being connected in any obligatory manner with the contingent commercial expenses of the Company. A great trading corporation, possessed of a yearly territorial revenue, yielding upwards of eight millions sterling per annum, had not the same rigid motives of œconomy in freights as was inseparable from the character of a private merchant. The munificence of the one was praise-worthy, while in the other any thing beyond liberality would be deserving of censure. We allude here to the rate of freight, and perhaps other charges in time of war, being left *ad libitum* to the Company.

These murmurings coming from so respectable and affluent a body as the free merchants of India, supported by their numerous connections in Great Britain, and indeed over all the mercantile world, were sufficient to awaken the attention of the Marquis of Wellesley to the true interests of the Company, in the redress of the grievances of which they complained.

The extended mind of the Marquis, directed by liberal and proper motives, knew, by his own reflection, as well as by the opinion and sentiments of his coadjutors in this country, that the East-India Company

* This article, as well as the whole of that part of the act which relates to the exportation of British produce or manufactures, as well as to the free trade, appears so extremely to the purpose, that I have, in the Appendix, abstracted the whole.

greatly over-rated the benefits of an exclusive trade to India. He saw the produce and manufactures of British India daily embarked on foreign ships, because British merchants were debarred the privilege of employing for that purpose their own ships built in India. British capital was, perhaps, employed in this traffic as an act of necessity, although not of choice. Marquis Wellesley, on weighing these circumstances, determined in future, that British capital and British ships should not be separated, in order to enrich foreign countries, but that both the one and the other should be usefully employed under proper and necessary restrictions.

The Marquis, under the 5th of October, 1798, a very short time after he had assumed the high office of Governor-General of British India, ordered experimentally the following regulations to be promulgated.

1st; That the Board of Trade, in pursuance of authority from the Govenor-General in council, purposed to hire, on account of the Company, ships duly qualified according to law, to proceed with cargoes from Bengal to England in that season; and that the owners should also be permitted, under the restrictions stated in the 11th and 12th articles, to occupy the tonnage of their respective ships with their own and other goods, to be delivered at the port of London.

2dly; That tenders of ships should be received at the office of the secretary to the Board of Trade, on or before the 31st of January, 1799; and they must contain the following particulars.

Name of the ship.

Ditto of the owners, and their place of residence.

Ditto of the commander.

By whom the ship was built.

Ship's burthen by carpenter's measurement.

When the ship should be ready to commence loading.

Ditto to leave the river for the voyage.

3dly; Ships not at present in port, but expected, might be tendered.

4thly; The ships to be taken up on their measured tonnage.

5thly; Should any ship not be ready to commence loading at the specified time, or not be ready to leave the river for the voyage at the time specified, the owners to be liable, for failure in the former, to have their ships rejected, notwithstanding the previous acceptance of her; and for failure in the latter, to a penalty (payable in Bengal) of twenty-five Sicca rupees per ton of the ship's chartered tonnage, unless such cause for delay be assigned as the Governor-General in council, or the Board of Trade, may deem satisfactory.

6thly; The Board of Trade to be at liberty, previous to the acceptance of any ship, to cause her to be surveyed.

7thly; The Board of Trade reserve to themselves the right of rejecting any tender, without assigning any reason to the party.

8thly; Every ship, after the delivery of her cargo in England, to be permitted to return to India, and to bring all such goods and merchandise as may legally be brought, ordnance and military stores excepted.

9thly; Each ship, if not already registered either in India or in England, to be registered in Bengal, according to the mode practised with respect to the ships who were taken up in Bengal in the season of 1795-6. And no ship to be permitted to take in cargo until she be registered accordingly, or until the certificate of her former registry be produced to the Board of Trade, as the case may be.

10thly; The goods to be manifested at the export warehouse, for passing on board the ships, in the same manner as is done with private goods, which go on ships taken up by the Company in England.

11thly; The undermentioned commodities are prohibited by the Court of Directors from being carried to Great Britain from India.

China raw silk.

Tea.

Nankeen cloths.

12thly; The Company, if they think fit (and not otherwise) to occupy as far as one per cent. of the chartered tonnage of each ship with stores for St. Helena, allowing freight for the same at the rate of 12*l.* sterling per ton. The amount of the freight to be paid at St. Helena, on the delivery of the stores, and payment will be made either in cash, or by bills upon the Court of Directors, payable sixty days after sight, at the option of the Governor and Council of St. Helena.

13thly; The Board of Trade do not mean to load any goods upon any of the ships, besides the stores mentioned in the preceding articles.

14thly; Each ship to carry, free of charge, such packets as may be sent on board by the Governor-General in council for St. Helena, or for England, or by the Governor and Council of St. Helena for England.

15thly; The ships not to carry any passengers from India to Europe, or from Europe to India, or from any place whatever, without permission, under a penalty of 500*l.* sterling for every passenger so carried without permission.

16thly; Two securities (not being owners of the ships, the partners of a mercantile or agency house to be considered but as one security) must be named for the performance of engagements; and the assent of the security must accompany the tenders.

17thly; For information of further conditions intended to be stipulated, the public are referred to the draft of a charter-party, submitted for general inspection.

The regulations or concessions required by the free merchants trading to and from India are as follow:

1st; The permission granted by the Marquis of Wellesley to indivi-

duals to send home their own ships with cargoes, to be made permanent. This plan to be extended as much as possible to the dependencies under the different Presidencies; and that such ships, after their arrival in England, shall have liberty to return at any after period with cargoes from hence, either on account of the owners, or on freight, and to be allowed on their passage out to call at ports for specie, wines, &c.

2dly; Permission to persons resident in England to carry on trade within the Company's limits.

3dly; Permission to act as principles or agents to and from the possessions within the Company's limits, whether belonging to European or native powers, either direct, or through the Company's settlements, and that by British or foreign built ships.

4thly; A limited number of free merchants to be licensed by the Company to reside in China, and merchants in Great Britain allowed to import certain China articles, which the Company does not trade in, from thence, either direct, or through the Company's settlements, by British built ships.

If the governments of distant settlements, such as Penang, Bencoolen, Ceylon, &c. have not authority to allow ships belonging to individuals to sail direct from thence, much time will be lost, and heavy charges incurred, by their proceeding to either of the Presidencies before they can clear out for London.

The East-India Company *has* demurred to allow ships which had made an intermediate voyage for Government, and even for themselves, to carry out cargo on their return to India, pretending that, if the ships did not go back immediately after their first arrival, their right to take cargo was forfeited. The Eliza Ann, which had been taken up by the Secret Committee, and the Britannia, which had carried out provisions and stores to

New South-Wales on account of Government, and brought home teas for the East-India Company, were both lately refused that permission. It must be acknowledged, that leave was at last granted, on condition that each of them should carry out twenty gentlemen for the army, and this without examining whether the ships had accommodations for them or not. The consequence was, that a considerable part of the cargoes was left out, to make room for their accommodation, although attended with much delay and injury to the owners.

Ships returning to India are often under strong inducements to call at Cadiz, Lisbon, or the Brazils, for specie, and at Madeira and Teneriffe for wines. This latter branch of commerce is entirely in the hands of the Americans and Danes, from the want of the necessary encouragement to British merchants. As the law now stands, no merchant or manufacturer here can export goods from London to the Company's settlements, and afterwards transport them to a second, which, it is obvious, must often be requisite, on account of the fluctuating state of the markets. It is even matter of doubt, whether a partner of a house at Calcutta, or any other settlement in India, who resides in Great Britain, does not trade illegally in every transaction of the house while trading from port to port in India.

It may appear to be asking a great deal to have the permission requested in article 3d conceded to the free trader; but it must always be remembered, that the Company does not engage in that sort of commerce called country trade, and therefore cannot be injured by the enterprises of private merchants. Americans, and other friendly powers, can clear out, and sail direct from London, to those places, and from thence return immediately to a free port on the continent of Europe. It is thus evident, that nothing short of the liberty asked will enable British subjects to enter into

competition with foreigners in this branch, so essential to the export trade of Great Britain.

Permission is required by the free trade, either to proceed directly or circuitously through neutral settlements to the foreign possessions in India; because, in some seasons of the year, it would be very inconvenient to stop at any British port.

When British subjects are bound to a foreign European possession, where they do not admit ships direct from England, it is necessary to call at the Company's settlements, and take a fresh clearance from thence; but, in such case, no import or export duty should be levied at such Company's settlement.

Ships returning direct from any settlement in India belonging to an European power, have their clearances for a port in India, not being suffered to clear for Europe. It is therefore necessary that they should be protected by the British government from cruisers, on account of the irregularity of their papers.

In this branch of commerce, where so extensive a field still remains for cultivation, every facility should be given. It would be therefore extremely proper to make it lawful for British merchants to use foreign-built ships, because it might often happen, that a British subject, when trading at a European settlement in India, would see a favourable opportunity of making a voyage to Europe, but which he must forego if he did not meet a British-built ship in such port. The intended voyage would, by this means, be left for the American or other foreigner, who is not restricted. There is no danger of this indulgence interfering with British ships, as no English merchant could possibly wish, but from necessity, to prefer a foreign to a British-built ship, or to own a ship which he could not employ in every branch of his own commerce.

No person, by the existing regulations, is suffered to remain in China

all the season, except he be in the Company's service. All others, whether merchants or agents, must be fluctuating; except such British subjects as enjoy foreign European protections, and that they cannot be legally employed in any transaction on account of a merchant residing in Great Britain.

The sales of large quantities of cotton *, opium, pepper, tin, &c. &c. from India, Malacca, and China, and the consequent purchases as returning cargoes, require that their agents should be always on the spot, and protected from the caprice of the Company's supercargoes.

This is so much dreaded by mercantile gentlemen, that the principal part of the agency in China from British India is now in the hands of Persees, and other natives of the latter country.

The Company having declared that their imports from China are confined to tea, nankeens, and China raw silk, it is evident, that the other articles, amongst which are tutonague, porcelain, turmeric, sago, mother of pearl shells, cassia lignia and buds, rhubarb, camphor, musk, gamboge, aniseed, a variety of drugs, with many other articles of commerce, must fall exclusively into the hands of foreigners; the privilege tonnage of the commanders and officers of the Company's ships being totally inadequate to the conveyance of such bulky articles.

Should the East-India Company hesitate to permit such articles, not the produce of British India, as they do not themselves trade in, to be exported direct to Great Britain, in country ships, then there surely cannot be an objection to the importation of them into this country through one of their own settlements. Americans and other foreigners can come direct from China to Penang, a Company's settlement, where no duties of any kind are paid, and from thence to a free port on the continent of Europe. There seems no reason why the Company should prohibit British subjects

* In the article of cotton alone, the private trade from India to China amounts to one million sterling per annum.

from engaging in a trade of certain articles, which they (the Company) have abandoned, and left to foreign nations to enjoy.

The above points are all necessary to be determined; for it is not enough to suppose that the East-India Company, however liberal they may be, will not prosecute when they have it in their power. Besides, experience has often too fatally shown those concerned in Indian commerce, that when the transaction is not indisputably legal, the insurances cannot be recovered, and that even the premiums have been lost.

An indemnity in the present situation of affairs would be only an act of justice to the merchants in India, who, it may be fairly stated, have all traded with the enemy's ports since the war; the laws prohibiting such intercourse never having been promulgated there, and custom having long sanctioned what must be acknowledged an offence against the laws of the country; a stop should also be put to law-suits in Great Britain, as it is clear that every person engaged in the Indian trade, has, in many instances, without his knowledge, been doing illegal acts.

There is candour in the acknowledgment of faults, whether they are intentional or otherwise. The free merchants of India have repeatedly declared their total ignorance of any existing regulations which deprived them of the liberty of general commerce on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope: far less did they suppose, that they, as British subjects, were incurring heavy pains and penalties by acting in direct opposition to the laws of their country. They complain of those prohibitory laws never having been promulgated in India, and of their being left in consequence to do illegal acts, without the knowledge of committing them. Let all transactions, which have hitherto taken place, be obliterated; let matters be properly explained and understood, and hereafter no misunderstanding can arise. From every circumstance, regulations in India commerce appear to have been much wanted, and that they are now indispensably necessary,

to give an equal participation to British subjects, in those facilities in India trade which every foreigner belonging to states in amity with us actually enjoys.

On this subject it has even been asserted by some men well informed in commercial affairs, that the laws and regulations necessary to be observed in regard to commerce to and from Great Britain, are, in every respect, incompatible with that trade which supports her distant dependencies. The old system being, in too many respects defective, a new one should be adopted, to give full effect to the great variety and magnitude of Eastern commerce. The exports of British India are immensely great, and should not be restricted by narrow policy, merely because it is sometimes the practice of European nations to do so. What iswanted for the interest of our British settlements in India is, a free vend for the produce and manufactures of those countries. To effect this, the governors of British India should possess an authority to grant licenses, under every necessary restriction, to both natives and Europeans, to carry on trade with the foreign possessions in India under neutral colours. Permissions similar to these are very frequently given in our West-India islands, and particularly in the trade from the island of Jamaica to the Spanish settlements. Trade to a certain extent has, with great propriety, been opened in the course of the present war between Great Britain and Holland, and even France. A free uninterrupted trade between India and the Dutch and Spanish possessions in the Eastern hemisphere would be productive of the greatest mutual advantages.

Having glanced at the concessions required by the free trade of India, and their agents in Great Britain, it is necessary to point out in what manner the export trade of the East-India Company is to be carried on, and by what means the surplus territorial revenues of India, which flows into their treasury abroad, ought to be applied.

In regard to the export trade of any country, it is sufficiently evident,

that it can neither be carried too far, nor too much encouraged, by acts of the legislature. Freedom in the exportation of the manufactured articles of a commercial nation is the surest means to promote the wealth of the inhabitants :—it is, besides, a strong excitement to productive industry, as it prevents idleness and vice, and has a direct tendency to improve and preserve the moral character of the people, while the state is enriched by the profitable returns of the rich or necessary productions of other countries. In this view, it is extremely proper that the exclusive articles reserved for the East-India Company should be few, and such only as in a great measure are necessary to their military and other establishments in India: under this head may be included small arms, guns, shot and shells, cordage and marine stores of all kinds, salted provisions for the use of the navy and army, light woollens for clothing the troops, hats, &c. &c.

All other articles ought to be permitted to be exported without restriction, and every obligation imposed on the Company to export any quantity of a particular produce or manufacture of this country be annulled. This would, without doubt, reduce the price of copper, and of other articles which compulsory clauses tend only to augment, and to render dear not only to the inhabitants of this country, but to the government itself. It is better when any particular produce or manufacture of a state hangs heavy on the hands of the subject, to promote their sale by liberal bounties, than to compel the exportation of any quantity as the price of exclusive privileges. It is also to be observed, that regulations of compulsory exportation prevent the price of a commodity from falling, after being perhaps raised by increased demand.

The material parts, therefore, of the Company's exclusive commerce ought to be in certain commodities, the produce or manufacture of Asia, to be paid for out of the surplus territorial revenues of India, and by money raised, if necessary, on Company's bills, granted to individuals at a short

sight, and at a fair and liberal exchange, particularly to the servants of the Company.

The territorial revenues of British India *, as far as they can be applied, should be employed in doing the greatest possible good to this country; in exporting, on the one hand, such articles as the private trader dare not attempt to do, from the low price such articles bear in India; and, on the other, to import such articles of Indian produce as bears the smallest profit in the European market. By these spontaneous means, flowing from the rich sources of India, would the East-India Company produce the greatest possible incitement to reciprocal industry in both countries, the free trade would be satisfied, and harmony subsist between all parties: for I mean here to be understood, that, as the Company enjoy considerable advantages, they are bound to employ a part of their revenue in such a way as to remunerate the public for the sacrifices which they make; sacrifices which not only promote the prosperity, but secure the very existence of the East-India Company.

It is not, however, my intention to say, that the whole burthen of a losing trade should fall on the Company, for that would be a hardship: on the contrary, the Company should possess the exclusive privilege in several very profitable branches of commerce, the which would prove much more than sufficient indemnity for the loss they might sustain.

The Company should enjoy the exclusive right to the trade with China

* The situation of the East-India Company, in regard to territorial revenue, ought to be considered in two ways.

First, As a great accessory division of the power of Great Britain, not in the immediate hands of the executive government, but subject to controul; and, as being at all times liable, in cases of necessity, to be called in aid of the empire at large: from this arrangement, the best consequences might be expected to follow; for the patronage of India, in the possession of an ill-disposed minister, would afford means of corruption so extensive, as to endanger the pure spirit of the British constitution.

Secondly, As the circulating medium for applying the surplus revenue of India the most advantageously to the nation at large, combining, at the same time, the prosperity of our valuable Eastern dependencies, and encouraging the trade of those possessions.

in teas, raw silk, and nankeens; which is clearly demonstrable from the Company's books to be the only trade beyond the Cape that has been for many years a source of actual profit to them, and that particularly in the article of tea, or the difference between the price of tea in China, and that paid for the same article at the Company's sales in London.

The Company to have a contract for all the opium produced in Bengal, and our other provinces in India, after leaving what may be demanded by the internal consumption of the country, at a fair price.

The Company, in like manner, to have the exclusive right of supplying Great Britain with coffee from Mocha.

The Company to possess, as far as is in the power of Government to grant them, an exclusive monopoly of pepper, cardamoms, and sandal-wood, on the coast of Malabar, and elsewhere in India. And I should be happy if the permanency of the possessions taken from the Dutch, in the course of the present war, would allow of a monopoly of the spices produced in those acquisitions in the hands of the Company.

After this manner is the whole amount of every saving and surplus of revenue, after payment of the necessary expenses, to be remitted to the actual possession of the country. Nor is the safe and neat remittance of the surplus revenue of India the only advantage to be derived. The Company and their commercial conduct would, by becoming simplified, be brought immediately under the eye of the Board of Controul, and afterwards of parliament. Thus, too, there is a greater check on the management of our governments in India than could be had in the mode of remittance by private bills, where no such interference, either on the part of the Board of Controul, or of Parliament, can be applied with effect.

I shall now proceed to state the reasons that justify a monopoly, in the hands of a great corporate body, of the several articles above mentioned.

Opium. A trade in this article is to be carried on with national advantages as a monopoly only, and that in the hands of a great commercial body; because, if the trade in that valuable article should be frittered away among private merchants, the benefit thereof would be lost, through the privilege they possess, and would naturally occasion the underselling each other at all the Eastern markets. It may be asserted, that opium in China is contraband; but the testimony of every commander of a ship in the China trade will evince, that opium is now publicly landed in the Chinese ports at noon day, without interruption. A commercial treaty, however, could it be effected, would at once bring this matter to a certain issue.

With regard to pepper, sandal-wood, and cardamoms, on the coast of Malabar, the trade in those articles was, before the late war, for the most part, in the hands of the French at Mahé, and some other places, and smugglers and renegadoes of all descriptions. On the return of peace, it is probable that foreign factories may be again established, when the same thing will happen anew. On this ground we establish the propriety of granting to the East-India Company a monopoly of the trade on the coast of Malabar in pepper, cardamoms, and sandal-wood.

There were formerly, on the Malabar coast, several foreign factories, resorted to by the lowest order of people, who assumed the character of merchants. Neglected by their own country, they were obliged, in order to obtain a livelihood, to have recourse to artifices of every kind; and on the commencement of the war against Tippoo Sultaun in 1790, they openly employed boats and vessels of every description, under the sanction of foreign flags, to enter the harbours, rivers, and roads of Tippoo, and there purchase, at a low rate, every article of trade, but particularly the Sircar rice, and that at a time when it was daily expected that our western army was on the point of moving, in order to secure the very granaries which

they had emptied. The suspicion of this movement made the inhabitants double their diligence; and so effectually did they, with the assistance of foreign ships, glean the harvest, that not an ounce of rice, pepper, or any other commodity, was left on the coast, from Tellicherry to Goa.

By consolidating this trade in the hands of the Company, a stop will be put to the intrigues of illicit traders, whose object is to undermine and destroy the Company, and a source opened to that body of great commercial advantage. On the other hand, there would be plenty left for the enterprise and industry of the free trader, whose interest it would be to assist and support the East-India Company. Regarding the advantages to be derived from the Malabar trade, we shall here make a few observations. The homeward investments from China cost the present Company a very considerable sum, which sum is principally made up in cash from Bengal, bullion from Europe, and bills drawn at a high exchange on the Court of Directors, and a small proportion of the produce of India, and manufactures of Great Britain. This drain of cash has considerably reduced the current specie of India, and in a few years must affect it still more sensibly. It would, therefore, be gaining a considerable advantage, if, by means of a commercial treaty, this evil could be averted; and it should be the aim, in forming a commercial treaty with China, to have regular duties established on the different articles of trade, in place of the present mode of assessing ships in the bulk, which opens a door for various artifices and malversation; or in the ordinary course of trade, an annual exportation of cash could be saved to the nation, by an agreement on the part of the Chinese, in exchange for their teas and other commodities and manufactures, to receive in return, at least to a certain extent, the staples of India. Now, pepper, sandal-wood, and cardamoms, are articles in great request in China; and with these the East-India Company, by

means of the Malabar monopoly, could furnish that country to a very large amount.

The India Company would be justified in being rigorously severe in preventing others in trading in such articles as are reserved for themselves; but every possible encouragement should be given to those who trade in other branches of this extensive commerce. In general terms, but in those I speak with conviction, British subjects should be put on the same footing with the subjects of neutral powers; and all those who trade to India should be freed from every restraint that is not itself essentially necessary to the preservation of the state, or to the existence of the East-India Company, as a great accessory branch of the government of Great Britain.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER XII.

Necessity of entering at large upon the Question of Foreign and Free Trade, as connected with that of the East-India Company, in order to secure to Great Britain that valuable Branch of Commerce.

DEAR SIR, London, April 28, 1800.

HAVING suggested some ideas for arranging the trade between India and the traders of Great-Britain, I shall pass on to the intercourse that it may be expedient, under existing circumstances, to open between British India and foreign European nations. The predominating passion of the present times, is, commercial jealousy and political œconomy. The phrensy of religion, and the Gothic pride of feudal manners, have given way to the modern system of finance; and the science of calculation and commercial arrangement becomes closely connected with the prosperity of states and kingdoms. But it is difficult to temper and restrain whatever happens to be the spirit of the times, within the just limits of prudent moderation. On strict investigation it will appear, that the desire of engrossing to ourselves any thing beyond a certain proportion of trade to India, is not less impolitic than unjust. For England, single-handed, to do justice, and to improve to the utmost her settlements in the East, is a work far beyond her limited power. To diffuse all the manufactures of the multitudes who own her sway in India, and to court her protection—to encourage and extend their arts; to animate them to new exertions in commerce and agriculture, will require the co-operation of other hands. The internal and foreign trade of India, even as it now stands, including its col-

lateral and accessory connections, is the most considerable upon earth. It is impossible to say to what a height it may not be carried, if the advantages of nature are seconded and improved by a reasonable freedom of commerce, and an equitable and just government. It would surely be the height of impolicy, it would be political insanity, instead of encouraging, promoting, and extending so happy an order and constitution of things, to fall upon it with a hostile overbearance,—to depress and destroy the growing wealth of India, for no better reason than that it requires larger capitals and more hands than we have to employ; and that our minds and views are too contracted for the admission of foreign labourers, even when our vineyard has become too extensive for our own exclusive cultivation. It might be asserted, perhaps, that this would in reality be the case, were the East Indies the only commercial field that we had to cultivate. The argument against the total exclusion of foreign hands becomes stronger, when we consider that we have to attend to our West-India colonies, to our trade to the Mediterranean, our trade to the Baltic, our trade to Africa, and to various other quarters of the world.—It is our interest, it is indeed our duty, to encourage, by all means in our power, industry in all its branches and sources, whether internal and domestic, or dependent and external.

It has often struck me, as a matter of the utmost surprise, that the commercial and political connection between this country and the East Indies has not been made a subject of more serious consideration to the British legislature. From the restrictions laid on the trade with India, it would seem that our Eastern colonies have been regarded not as certain and permanent, but as uncertain and fugacious possessions: not as possessions worthy of cultivation, but as a fortuitous harvest, to be reaped at once, and the grain to be carried off as fast and as completely as possible, without even leaving seed for future crops. Certain it is, that we

have not paid sufficient attention to that manifest and important distinction which subsists between a colony planted, nursed, and raised up from its very cradle (if I may be allowed this expression) from the very rudiments of political existence, under the fostering care of the mother country, and a vast domain acquired in full maturity, and presenting the most ready as well as rare resources to the genius of commerce, of finance, and political œconomy.

Every body knows, for it has been a common-place observation, that the tribute due, and proper to be paid by a colony to its parent state, is a monopoly of its trade. This monopoly, with the want of representation in the legislature, is what chiefly discriminates, in modern times, the colonists from the inhabitant of the mother-country. The same way of thinking, the same system, has been adopted with regard to our possessions in India—a country that yields to Great Britain an annual revenue of upwards of eight millions sterling.

The end and advantages originally looked for by Great Britain from her West-India colonies, was no other than the production of raw materials, for the purpose of furnishing her manufacturers with the means of carrying on their different works, and to provide for the subsistence of their numerous dependants. The increase of navigation, and that of the public revenue arising from that source, were advantages perceived and experienced afterwards. Goods, after being manufactured, will purchase a larger portion of the unwrought material from the same market: but that market must be for ever poor, where, arts and manufactures being discouraged, the inhabitants have to trust entirely to the mother-country for the manufactured produce of their own industry. This prohibition absolutely withholds from our colonies the benefit of their wealth, in order to afford a greater share of subsistence to the inhabitants of Great Britain.

Govern India on these principles,—reduce your East-India and your West-India colonies to the same level, and you will discourage the manufactures, and diminish the wealth of the former, as effectually as you have discouraged the manufactures, and diminished the wealth of the latter. The riches of a populous and productive country will evaporate in the impolitic, and indeed impracticable, desire of engrossing the whole of its various and extensive commerce. The fair prospect of a surplus, which, it is perhaps not too much to say, with good management, may be brought to three millions sterling, will be lost; and a country yielding a very considerable territorial revenue, as well as great commercial advantages, will dwindle to a discouraged and unproductive dependency not worth our preserving. The bad policy of sundry British administrations has, too frequently, upheld their colonies on principles the most ruinous that can be imagined: for what can be more ruinous than to maintain an unproductive settlement, by involving the mother-country in wars carried on at an expense, of which the object contended for, if attained, is scarcely sufficient to defray the interest? For the truth of this position, it is sufficient to mention the unfortunate war relating to America, without alluding to certain colonial expenses of a later date, equally ill-judged and impolitic.

We should never forget, that, in order to support Great Britain, India must also be supported; and that the mutual prosperity of both will be best consulted by uniting, in all our Eastern dependencies, commercial interest with the improvement of the territorial revenue. And this again is an object which can never be pursued with any great success, if we absolutely shut up the ports of India to foreign traders, as well as to the free traders of Great Britain. Yet I would not open our India commerce to foreigners without certain limitations, that should, on the whole, cast the balance in favour of the English trader: still, however, taking special

care that no restriction or limitation whatever should be imposed that might tend to deprive the natives of India of those advantages they possess, whether in domestic situation and industry, or the state of arts and manufactures. In order to encourage the agricultures and the manufactures of India, the exportation of the produce of Indian labour should be encouraged in its greatest extent. These particulars being premised, I would propose, that all goods, wares, or merchandise, being the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain, excepting such as are prohibited by law, may be exported to India, subject to certain duties or restrictions, in British or foreign ships, without any distinction or difference being made in the same duties. That the exportation of the following articles should be particularly encouraged.

Woollens of every description.

Cotton cloths.

Linen ditto *.

Tin.

Copper.

Iron.

Steel.

Anchors and grapnails.

Wrought iron for ship-building.

Cast iron for ditto.

Blocks.

* It is to be observed, that the exportation of cotton or linen cloths to India will answer the market only to a very limited extent, their own manufactures being both cheaper and better adapted to the climate. Even in the cold climate of Persia, some of the most handsome English patterns of cotton, of a thick texture, being sent with a view of sale to Mr. Watkins, chief of Bushire, did not by any means find so ready a market as the cotton manufactures of India; although, at the same time, they were highly praised by the Persians for their beauty. The author was at this period in Persia, on his way to India.

Cordage.

Salted provisions.

British ships importing into India the manufactures of their country, to pay a duty of 2 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Foreign ships carrying the manufactures of Great Britain, to be subject to a duty of 4 per cent.

Foreign ships importing into India any merchandise, the produce or manufacture of their own or any other country, but not of Great Britain, to pay a duty of 8 per cent.

British ships importing foreign merchandise, in like manner to be liable to the like duty of 8 per cent.

No ships, whether British or foreign, to be permitted to trade in, or carry away from the English settlements in India, any of those articles of merchandise which are particularly reserved for the exclusive trade of our East-India Company.

The importation of East-India goods into Great Britain to be regulated by the act of navigation; consequently, none to be imported but on British bottoms, and not even on these, unless imported directly from India.

In the importation into Great Britain of such India materials as are calculated to feed our manufactures, it would be well if the exigences of the state could admit of their being imported duty free: but as this cannot be expected, a duty should be imposed equivalent to what is charged on West-India materials of the same kind. Such articles as are subservient to the luxuries of life will allow of a higher assessment, and will have the farther advantage of falling on the rich, and not on the poor. It should be lawful then for British ships, under certain regulations, to import into Great Britain all goods or merchandise, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the East-Indies, excepting such as are reserved for the East-India Com-

pany, on the payment, by those ships, of such duties as may hereafter be fixed; as also such as might counteract the advantages which the British manufacturers, in certain instances, derive from home monopolies. Notwithstanding all that has been urged by Dr. Smith on the impolicy of granting to the manufacturer home monopolies of his commodity against the consumer, it never has been disproved that the spirit and industry of British manufacturers are to be encouraged and supported only by certain restrictions and prohibitions on every article of foreign manufacture that comes into any kind of competition, or can be applied to the same purposes, with similar commodities of this country. Such substitutes lessen the consumption and demand of the like articles, the produce of British labour. The numerous and heavy taxes imposed on the lower class of the subjects of Great Britain tend greatly to enhance the price of labour: unless, therefore, there be some counterpoise to the bad effects of those discouraging imposts, that may enable the master manufacturer to pay his servants at the rate on which alone they can subsist, beggary must inevitably pervade the most industrious part of the society, and involve even the rich in various difficulties. The population of England, in the present imperfect state of agriculture, which leaves a fourth part of our land without any kind of cultivation, affords many hands that are employed with advantage in arts and manufactures, and gain an ample livelihood by working up the staples of England, or, if those staples fail, can have recourse, for a further supply, to the produce of our distant dependencies. The interest of this nation is fortunately blended, and expands with the expansion of domestic industry; but domestic industry depends, in some cases, on home monopolies: therefore, wherever the beneficial effects of those home monopolies would be counteracted by the importation of certain manufactures from India, the importation of such materials ought to be restrained and prohibited. With

regard to the instances in which the ingenuity, taste, and invention of our countrymen cannot gratify our whims and caprice, it is fit that we should pay for the refinement of our fancy.

The only British manufactures that are liable to be materially injured by our commerce with India, are those of cotton and silk.

The cotton manufacture claims the protection of the Legislature in a particular manner. Its magnitude is immense, and it is still capable of being carried to higher degrees of improvement: it is the most noble and liberal manufacture that any country can boast of: it is not to be rivalled either in execution or effect, or equalled in capital or extent by any establishment in any state or kingdom of modern Europe *.

This manufacture, great as it is, will yet rise to a higher degree of prosperity, when the British Parliament shall have given it that attention, countenance, and encouragement, which its unrivalled importance undoubtedly deserves.

The importation of muslins, and of cotton cloths of all kinds, for HOME CONSUMPTION, from India or China, should be subjected to a duty of 100 per cent. on the invoice price. In like manner the importation of silks, of satins, of silk and cotton stuffs from India or China, for HOME CONSUMPTION, should be subject to the like duty. Should these articles be warehoused for re-exportation, the drawback should be the same with the duty, in order to encourage the carrying trade of Great Britain.

* It is computed that there are, of cotton manufacturers, in England and Scotland,

Men	180,000
Women	110,000
Children	120,000
	410,000

Of cotton imported and manufactured thirty-two millions one hundred and forty-eight thousand nine hundred and six English pounds; which, at 18*d.* per lb. amounts to 42,11,167*l.* 19*s.* What must be the value of this article when manufactured?

It shall be lawful for British ships to export to all foreign markets the produce of India, excepting what is particularly reserved, on payment of the duties established for British subjects.

Foreign ships, on exporting the following articles of India, to be liable to the undermentioned duties.

Raw sugar, 12 per cent.

Muslins, 2 per cent.

Indigo, 12 per cent.

Hemp, 12 per cent.

Bengal silks and stuffs of silk and cotton, 6 per cent.

The duty on every other article to be ascertained in like manner.

British ships exporting to foreign parts cloths either of cotton or silk, or of silk and cotton, to pay a duty of 2 per cent.

Foreigners for pilotage, anchorage, fees at the custom-house, docking their ships, water, provisions, or other necessaries, to be charged no more than British subjects.

British and foreign ships, in every article of merchandise in which it may be allowed a British subject to deal, to enjoy the country trade of India on equal terms.

On this subject, the duties to be imposed on foreign and those on domestic commerce with India, I have further to observe, that it requires the nicest discernment to proportion the duty to the value of the article; and that both relatively to the country where it is produced, and the country to which it is to be exported.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to observe, that before any alteration be made in the present system, it will be proper to revise the duties and customs on all goods and merchandise, the produce or manufacture of our East-India settlements, as also those on our exports from Great Britain; that in all

taxation due regard is to be had to season, climate, and various contingencies; as the wants of the inhabitants, the scarcity of the article from the failure of natural production, or from other causes, and other accidental circumstances. Care must be taken that all duties be imposed according to a fair and equal ratio; that no article of commerce be overburthened; and, above all, to avoid heavy imposts on the raw material, an evil which would hinder the British merchant from underselling his neighbours at foreign markets, and impede the consumption of our manufacturers, both at home and abroad.

I pretend not, by any means, to have done full justice to so complicated a subject. It is not more desirable than it is difficult to admit foreigners, as well as individual traders of Great Britain, to a participation of our trade with India, and at the same time to accord such privileges as may prolong the existence of the East-India Company; to grant such advantages as the subjects of Great Britain ought to enjoy in trade, over those of foreign nations; and to establish such duties as the British Government have a right to expect from so various and extensive a commerce, which has been formed under their auspices, and which it is incumbent on them to protect. Yet the union of all these objects is to be attempted; the East-India Company is to be preserved; the just expectations of individual traders are to be fulfilled; the claims of the British Government respected; and the strong inclination of foreign nations to participitate in the India trade to be gratified.

In order to reconcile, and harmonise so many different, not to make use of the term discordant, interests, I have proceeded in the regulations I have proposed on the grand, conciliatory, and consolidating principles of moderation and equity. It has been the policy of former rulers in India to exclude foreigners from all intercourse with our possessions in India, as

much as possible. Hence a proportionable eagerness, on their part, to acquire settlements in India, independent on the English. To open, to a certain extent, a free trade with India, would abate that eagerness, and add to the security of our dominion in that part of the world. It is equally liberal and wise policy to hold forth to foreigners, as well as to individual traders in Britain, such advantages as may encourage them to trade with British Hindostan; and by so trading, to stimulate the industry and circulate the manufactures both of Britain and British India, and exalt the English power and name to higher and higher degrees of glory. All injustice has in its nature something rotten at bottom, that tends to undermine the fabric of which it is made the foundation. Unjust and inordinate ambition in any state or kingdom carries a menacing air to all its neighbours; and hence confederacies which sooner or later effect, if not their ruin, yet the fall of their power. Witness the league of Cambray against Venice; that of Holland, France, and England, towards the end of the 16th century, against Spain and Portugal, at that time under one head; and the much-agitated dispute of *Mare Liberum* and *Mare Clausum*, which the French Republic, in opposition to this country, endeavour so ardently to revive at the present period. The greatest security, on the other hand, of any dominion, is moderation. On this general principle, the truth of which is proved by the history of all times and nations, the British Government should raise the fabric of that power, which, at the present moment, many favourable circumstances give them an opportunity of establishing. The world is at last beginning, and but beginning, to learn that, in the œconomy of states, as well as in private transactions, the strictest justice is the soundest policy. It is not present plunder that we ought to regard so much as permanent advantage. The excellency of political institutions, to speak in the language of mathematical philosophy, consists in their intensity, mul-

tiplied into their duration. Let justice, as far as possible, be done to the British Government, which ought not to be deprived of that mass of industry, with all that population and wealth, which uniformly attends in her train, and which a free trade would excite, without some valuable consideration; justice to the individuals of Great Britain, who ought to be maintained in their rights, where these can be maintained consistently with the greatest possible good; and justice to all mankind, who, by the law of nature and nations, have a right to exercise their industry, and pursue their own good in every field of exertion not fully occupied, and on every pursuit on which they may enter without prejudice to their neighbours: and this much more when it can be demonstrated that the industry of foreign nations might happily co-operate with our own for mutual consociation and advantage; but especially for the advantage of that party which preponderates and takes the lead, and holds the dominion on the great theatre on which such dominion is to be exerted. Farther still, on the subject of free trade to India; by a liberal freedom of commerce, a grievance against which the British Legislature, as well as the East-India Company, have so stoutly, but with so little effect, set their face, would be cut up by the roots. The Company's servants, instead of giving in their private fortunes at very low exchange to the Company's treasure in India, are in the practice of sending home those fortunes in goods on board of foreign bottoms, and thereby encouraging a foreign trade with India, at the expense of the English East-India Company and nation. A free trade in the way proposed would remedy this evil, either by opening a channel of remittance through the Company's cash at a fair exchange, or through the medium of individual traders to Great Britain, to whom Englishmen would, no doubt, be inclined to give a preference before those of other nations. But, as matters now stand, they have not this option, and are obliged either to submit to the

terms of the Company, or to throw themselves on the faith of foreigners. On this point, which will scarcely seem credible, it may be proper to bestow some illustration.

Foreign ships of every nation, although not directly allowed to fit out from any port of Great Britain, are permitted, under certain restrictions, to repair to all our ports in India without exception. Yet no Englishman, by the laws of his country, can either directly or indirectly be concerned in any trade to the East Indies, on either a British or foreign bottom, without incurring the heaviest penalties. Not only may foreigners fit out ships from any part of the continent of Europe, but even to clear a cargo from the port of London or any other in Britain: nor have they any thing more to do than to return with a British cargo, to the place of their original departure, in order to be provided with passes from their own government to entitle them to proceed to our settlements in India with a mixed cargo half English and half foreign. After administering to the luxury of our countrymen abroad, and draining them of their ready cash, unless they can procure such articles as will yield them a certain profit in the markets of Europe, such as pepper, cardamums, coarse cloths, and blue goods, they proceed to China with the specie of our countrymen, and, by this means, repeated annually, reduce the circulation of cash, which, in the course of time, joined to the treasure remitted for the purchase of teas, must leave our India settlements without money necessary for its internal circulation.

Finally, a general trade to India will, in proportion to its freedom, encourage the seamen of Great Britain to visit that part of the world, and thereby afford ready means of manning our ships of war, the want of which, in the last war, was, as well as the present, an evil, and still continues to be sensibly felt by our fleets and squadrons.

It is unnecessary here to repeat what has already been observed in the

course of this work, relative to the desire that other nations will have, when peace is established, of participating in our trade to India.

I have endeavoured to point out a mode by which the East-India Company, aided by the British Government, may diminish very much the temptation held out to other nations, and the subjects of other sovereigns, to share with us in this valuable commerce: but after having discussed that subject, it is necessary to point out certain dangers, that may very probably attend a contrary line of conduct.

Though we have not to expect any discoveries in the art of navigation, that could shift this trade from its present channel as it did from its ancient course, yet there are several great operations going on that will materially alter the security of our possessions in India, as well as our commerce with thosecountries.

The three great, though gradual, operations, going on are;

First, The great and increasing demand for teas, which are all produced on territory that does not, nor ever can, belong to us.

Secondly, The gradual civilisation and introduction of European military discipline amongst the native powers in India.

Thirdly, The increasing power and civilisation of the Russian empire.

The consumption of tea, an article of commerce scarcely known a century ago, has become so great as to exceed in value that of all the other productions of India; and, as the use of this article, which, till within these ten or twelve years, was chiefly confined to the British islands and America, within that latter period has been introduced with great success on the continent of Europe, a few years more will make the consumption greater than any thing that would seem reasonable to calculate.

Tea was scarcely known in Paris before the treaty of commerce in 1787; but before the year 1792 the use of it was become general. It became

the fashion to entertain by giving tea, and the middling ranks began to know the use of it. Though the French have disgraced themselves as a nation, and that it will be long before they regain the good opinion of mankind, yet the nature of that people is such, that fashions will continue to come from Paris as they so long have done; at least this may fairly be presumed, when we consider that the disgusting manners and habits of the present spurious race at Paris are at this moment copied in other nations, and even by people of the more elevated classes of society.

It might be a very reasonable calculation to estimate the consumption of tea in Europe and America for the year 1810 at four times what it was in the year 1789; a circumstance which will, no doubt, endanger our trade. It may induce other nations to cultivate earnestly a connection with China; and it is not impossible, that all other nations being opposed in interest to Great Britain, they may in this project aid each other; and should they succeed, the other branches of our Asiatic trade would be much less beneficial than they are at present.

Our national firmness and bravery would not serve us much in this event; and therefore if prevention be at all times better than remedy, it is particularly to be preferred in this case, where there does not indeed seem to be any remedy, if the evil once takes place. This danger should not be looked upon as chimerical; for as other nations have certainly given up all idea of contending with us at sea, they will naturally take some more subtle method of undermining and wresting from us this principal branch of our commerce.

A general coalition, for the purpose of an attempt to obtain possession of the China trade, is then the greatest of the dangers that arises from the extended consumption of teas in Europe, and also in America, daily increasing in population. We do not know enough about the Chinese government to

be able to say how far we can count upon its friendship, or fear its enmity. It would be foolish to indulge the fond hope of any exclusive privileges to the English merchants in China. There is a jealousy in the government of that country of all foreign nations, and no preference is given to one before another. The late emperor of China, with equal dignity and wisdom, told embassadors sent by the Dutch, after the dismission of our negotiator *, that it was a maxim with the Chinese to pay equal respect to all nations.

The second danger (which arises from the civiliſation of the native powers) is one that must have been foreseen, and there is no possibility of entirely preventing it; but, what is not so probably foreseen, is, the way in which this will ultimately operate. This subject I shall reserve for the contents of another letter. In regard to the increasing state of the Russian empire, that subject has already been fully discussed.

I have endeavoured to acquit myself, in the best manner of which I am capable, of a task equally important to the nations of Europe, as it is interesting to mercantile men of this and every other country. The result of all that I have advanced on the subject seems to divide itſelf into two branches, differing materially from each other: still both are to be united on terms of reciprocal advantage to all the parties implicated in the most ancient as well as the most lucrative commerce in the world.

In the first place, the rivality of other nations is to be avoided, and the plausible and ruinous schemes of the French Republic, to counteract and destroy our valuable commerce with India, are to be rendered as abortive, as they would prove ruinous, if carried into effect.

In the second, The interests of the East-India Company, and the free trade of Great Britain and India, are to be considered and combined.

On the first I have to observe, that could foreigners find a market in the English settlements of India, where they could dispose of their cargoes,

* Lord Macartney.

and at a moderate and fair price purchase the manufactures of Hindoostan, the consequence would be, that all the European nations would relinquish the idea of expensive establishments in the East Indies, as being totally unnecessary, and carry on the trade with British India on terms at once liberal and secure.

It also might be suggested, that the central situation of the Cape of Good Hope admirably qualifies that settlement as a neutral port, to become the grand depôt of manufactured goods from Europe, and of merchandise from India. Here the private trade of India would be concentred, and the ships of all nations, with a short voyage, and at an easy expense, would meet to exchange the different commodities of their respective countries. This would be forming a commercial establishment, on a scale the most magnificent, and at the same time on principles of sound policy,—as it would unequivocally prove, that the mercantile system of the British empire was moderation and distributive justice towards all mankind.

Respecting the second, after what has been already said, it is enough to mention, that the India trade presents new and almost infinite fields of adventure to private merchants. Under certain regulations, this commerce may be carried on to any extent, not with loss, but even advantage to the East-India Company, as it must pass through their warehouses, and they would thus have a per centage, or sure revenue, without the details of trade. This, it must be allowed, is the only kind of revenue, whether territorial or commercial, that can be long possessed by a state, or such a society as the Company, which for its magnitude and the extent of its concerns is the same as a sovereign republic. But if this nation does not in some way draw more of the Indian trade into its own channels than it now enjoys, it will be absorbed into those of other nations, particularly of America, which already runs away with half the private trade of India.

I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER XIII.

Of the Nature of Landed Property in India, as connected with Husbandry and Manufactures.

DEAR SIR, London, May 8, 1800.

HAVING already hinted at such arrangements as are necessary to diffuse the produce and manufactures of India, and to extend the exportation trade of these kingdoms, we are naturally led to consider of the situation of those who are employed in the fabrics of the East, as also the tenure of landed property, from which the raw material is produced; from a careful attention to which subjects, we may derive some hints that may tend to promote and encourage the natives of Hindoostan in the cultivation of articles proper for the particular manufactures of the country, as well as those fit for the manufactures of Great Britain. There is a natural connection between landed property and manufactures, which cannot be separated. They act in reciprocity; for, as the cultivation of the land promotes manufactures, so have manufactures a tendency still further to promote the fertility of the land. In Bengal the greatest encouragement should be given to the culture of the sugar-cane, indigo plant, poppy, raw silk, cocoa, and coffee. Public granaries should be established, and, when they are full, the ports for exportation should be opened, duty free.—Grain in Bengal, in plentiful years, is too cheap. Granaries provide against scarcity, as also against excessive depreciation in the value of grain. The lowness that is complained of in the price of grain would indeed be partly remedied by throwing a great part of the land out of the culture of grain into that of indigo, poppy, and other produce. The manufac-

ture of muslins employs many hundreds of thousands of the industrious inhabitants of India; the growth of this therefore should be encouraged, as affording the means to the natural industry of the inhabitants, of procuring subsistence to so considerable a number of natives, who would otherwise be left with their families destitute and naked.

The labour of men applied to the cultivation of the earth tends more to increase the public wealth, as being more productive of things necessary for the accommodation of life, or, in other words, labour and varied industry, wherein all real wealth consists, than if it were applied to any other purpose. Rural occupations not only furnish the necessaries and materials for the comforts and elegancies of life, but promote the virtue, the health, the happiness, the population, and strength of a country. Property in land should be diffused among as great a number of people as may desire it; and these last, it will readily be allowed, are the primary objects of attention to political society. Increase of opulence, and extent of dominion, are subordinate objects, to be pursued only as they tend to the increase of happiness or of numbers; to both of which they are in certain cases and respects unfriendly. That manner of life, therefore, which is the most favourable to the virtue of the citizens, ought, for the sake of their happiness and the well-being of the state, to be encouraged and promoted by the legislature: but men employed in the cultivation of the soil, if suffered to enjoy a reasonable independence and a just share of the produce of their soil, are of greater bodily strength, simpler manners, and more virtuous and honest dispositions, than any other class of men. Their industry is not, like that of the labouring manufacturer, insipidly uniform, but varied: it excludes idleness, without imposing excessive drudgery, and is rewarded by an abundance of necessary accommodations, without luxury and confinement. Manufactures and commerce promote both population and wealth:

but agriculture, including pasturage, is the great basis of commerce. Agriculture, besides its subserviency to national wealth, has a better and more essential value; it breeds a race of men, that adorn the state in time of peace, and form its best defence in war. Let a nation grow ever so rich by means of commerce, still, if it loses the agricultural and martial spirit which are so nearly allied, its political dependence on some other nation is not far distant. When it becomes necessary to call upon foreign troops for the protection of a state, that state has little reason to boast of its wealth. No kingdom ever depended on foreign troops, and long preserved its liberty. Witness the Roman empire—the Britons—the caliphs of Bagdat overthrown by the Turks, their body-guards,—and the Dutch retaining the Prussians, the British, &c.

Agricultural occupation nourishes a race of men fit for the army. In proportion as we encourage manufactures and commerce, we should also encourage agriculture and pasturage, and, when it is practicable, fisheries, as all of these tend not only to provide materials for manufactures and subjects of commerce, but also as counteracting and tempering that enervation and effeminacy to which domestic occupation, continued in the same families and districts for ages, infallibly leads sooner or later. Let the farmer be encouraged by the hope of attaining, if not to the property of the soil he cultivates, yet of arising to the happy condition of an independent cultivator, who knows the terms on which he, and his family after him, may hold possession, and who is not exposed to the caprice or the avarice of any tyrant. Let it be made as easy to the farmer to acquire security in his situation, on certain fixed terms, as for the manufacturer to acquire the full property of the raw materials he is to work up into any fabric. I have made use of the terms security in his situation on certain fixed terms; but I might have said, that it should be made as easy for the farmer to ac-

quire the contingent value of the subject on which he is to exercise agricultural industry and skill, as it is for the manufacturer to acquire the contingent value of that on which he is to exercise mechanical labour and invention. For let it be observed, that all right of property is founded either in occupancy or labour. The earth having been given to mankind in common occupancy, each individual has a right by nature to possess and cultivate an equal share. Though by entering into society, and partaking of its advantages, he may be supposed to have submitted this natural right to such regulations as may be established for the general good, yet he can never be understood to have tacitly renounced it altogether. Every state or community ought in justice to reserve for its citizens all opportunities, consistent with the best order and prosperity of society, of entering upon, and returning to, and resuming this their birth-right and natural employment, whenever they are inclined to do so. It is also a maxim of natural law, that every one, by whose labour any portion of the soil has been rendered more fertile, has a right to the value of the additional fertility, and may transmit this right to other men: but besides the original value of the soil, antecedently to all cultivation, and the accessory or improved value, there is a contingent or improved value of the soil, a further value which it may still receive from future cultivation and improvements, over and above defraying the expense of these improvements; or as it may be otherwise expressed, the value of an exclusive right to make these improvements. The estate of every landholder, while he possesses it, is capable of being analysed into three component parts; he must be allowed to have a full and absolute right to the original, the improved, and the improveable value of such portion of his estate, as would fall to his share on an equal partition of the territory of the state among the citizens. Over all the surplus extent of his estate, he has a full right to the whole accessory

value, whether he has been the original improver himself, or succeeded to or purchased it from the heirs or assignees of such improver. But to the original and contingent value of this surplus extent he has no full right; that is a property which must still reside in the community at large, and, though seemingly neglected or relinquished, may be claimed at pleasure by the legislature. It is clearly the right of the legislature, therefore, to make such regulations concerning the original and the improveable value of land, as may be deemed the most advantageous for the public good. It will be necessary, in the first place, in all arrangements respecting land, to separate this contingent value from the accessory and improved value, acquired by labour, by birth-right, or purchase; for the detriment which the public suffers by this separation, and permitting an exclusive right of improving the soil to accumulate in the hands of a small part of the community, is very great in respect both of the progress of agriculture, and the comfortable independence of the lower ranks.

It may not be unnecessary, in the present times, here to enter my *caveat* against any construction that may be put on these sentiments, unfavourable either to the established laws and legislative authorities of this country, or to the right of property. It is not proposed to fly in the face of the established order of affairs by any bold innovation, but, by a gradual and prudent accommodation of the laws respecting the tenure of landed property to the spirit of industry and enterprise, to promote, at once, the interests of the landholder, and the actual cultivator of the soil, and the population and wealth of the country. With all these interests, both entails, and the excessive monopolisation of farms, are plainly inconsistent.

If in England, says Mr. Ogilvie, 100 acres of arable land are sold for 1500*l.* money being at 5 per cent. the contingent value may be reckoned 500*l.*; of the remaining 1000*l.* two or three hundred may be computed to

be the original value of the soil, a judgment being formed from the nature of the adjoining common; and the 700*l.* or 800*l.* remaining is to be accounted the amount of the accessory or improved value*.

If the example be taken from 100 acres in Bengal, or the Lower Egypt, the proportion of the parts may be supposed to be 10, 4, and 1. If from 100 acres of uncultivated moor land in Ireland, or the northern counties of England, the proportion of the parts may be as 1, 0, and 14. The estate of every landholder may, while he possesses it, be considered as capable of analysation into these three parts; and, could the value of each be separately ascertained by any equitable method, as by the verdict of an assize, it would not be difficult to distinguish the nature and the extent of his private right, and of that right also which still belongs to the community, in those fields which he is permitted, under the protection of municipal law, to possess. The succession to farms should be regulated, and the means of acquiring them facilitated. It is of more importance to the community that regulations should be imposed on the proprietors of land, than on the proprietors of money; for land is the principal stock of every nation, the principal object of industry, and that whose use is most necessary for the happiness and due employment of every individual. Proprietors of land, by exacting exorbitant rents, exercise a most pernicious usury, and deprive industry, actually exerted, of its due reward. By granting only short leases, they stifle and prevent the exertion of that industry which is ready to spring up, were the cultivation of the soil laid open upon equal terms.

If it be indeed possible to accomplish any great improvement in the

* It is difficult to separate the accessory from the original value of land, nor is it very necessary, the original value of the soil being virtually treated as a fund belonging to the public, and merely deposited in the hands of great proprietors, to be, by the imposition of land taxes to be drawn from them, and gradually applied to the public use, as the public occasions may require.

state of human affairs, and to unite the essential equality of a rude state with the order, refinements, and accomplishments of cultivated ages, such improvement is not so likely to be brought about by any means as by a just and enlightened policy respecting property in land. It is a subject intimately connected with the proper occupation and the comfortable subsistence of men. It is of a real substantial nature, on which the regulations of law may be made to operate with efficacy, and even with precision *.—So powerful and salutary might the good effects of such an enlightened policy prove, so beneficial such a restoration of the claims of nature and the general birth-rights of mankind, that it might alone suffice to renovate the strength of nations, exhausted by civil war, or by great and unsuccessful enterprises ; and, even in the most flourishing states, it might give rise to a new æra of prosperity, surpassing all example, and all expectation that may reasonably be founded on any other means of improvement.

There are various occasions, conjunctures, and situations, in which steps might be made towards an independent cultivation of the land by as many of the people as may desire it. This may be called a partial and gradual reformation: but there are other occasions and conjunctures, in which a new and perfect system of property in land might be established all at once. Amongst these we include those revolutions that transfer whole countries to new masters, who have it in their power to re-establish, in the subjected states, the inherent rights of mankind and the system of natural justice with regard to the soil. Such a situation of affairs is now presented to the English nation in the East Indies; who, whatever may be said of the voluntary transference of provinces by the Mogul,

* Ogilvie, p. 53.

may justify their right to the possession of those provinces, by doing justice to the people, by patronising and befriending them, by restoring them to their natural rights of a share in the soil, and promoting their health, virtue, and comfort,—and thus, on the whole, co-operating with the benevolent plan of the Almighty Ruler of all nations. Thus would the title and the security of the British government in India be founded in justice. To dispute about abstracted titles to territory is vain and nugatory. That prince or power has the best, as well as the most solid right, who best combines actual possession with the good of the people. But it sometimes happens, that people are averse to innovations, particularly where these are the effects of foreign dominion, and even though they are for their good: it is therefore politically expedient not to lay down a refined system, having for its object the greatest good that can be reconciled with the greatest supposed equity, or the general conveniency of all, but to hold forth some striking advantages to great bodies of men, who may feel that they have a common interest in promoting it. I would therefore propose, as the sound fundamental article of a new territorial code, that all disputes concerning the tenure of lands in Britiſh India should cease, and all subdivisions of the land in that country should be held by their present possessors, and descend to their heirs for ever.

This plan would bid fair to interest the great body of the people in the stability of our government *. This being thrown out of the vessel of

* Professor Ogilvie, whose way of thinking on this subject coincides perfectly with what has often occurred to me in India, but to whom I am indebted for his profound arguments in favour of the system I wish to establish, in his admirable Essay on the Right of Property in Land, says, "The whole landed property of Bengal, and the other provinces which our East-India Com-"pany has acquired, is now absolutely at the disposal of that Company, and of the British go-"vernment. No nobler opportunity, no equal fund for exhibiting to mankind an illustrious pattern "of a just and equal establishment of landed property, was ever, by any conjuncture, thrown into the

state, as a sheet-anchor to hold her fast amidst the civil tempests and storms which might otherwise be expected to arise amidst innovations, other laws would be established, explaining, limiting, and restraining that general arrangement, in such a manner as to support the authority of government, maintain all orders of men in their ancient and just rights, and, above all, to guard and protect the independence of the people, in opposition to the opulent, the luxurious, and the idle, whether natives or Britons. And for this end, which, though last-mentioned, is the chief in importance, as it involves in a great measure the other two, it is proposed, THAT THE RENT OF EVERY FARM BE CONVERTED INTO A FREEHOLD FOR EVER; TRANSFERRING, AT THE SAME TIME, ALL LAND TAXES AND ALL PUBLIC BURTHENS, WITH ALL CONTINGENT AUGMENTATIONS OF THOSE BURTHENS, FROM THE LANDLORD TO THE NEW FREEHOLDERS, FORMERLY HIS TENANTS. BY THIS LAW THE TENANT WOULD RECEIVE SECURITY IN HIS PRESENT POSSESSION, AND THE LANDLORD A LUCRATIVE EXEMPTION, IN PLACE OF THE UNCERTAIN INCREASE OF A RACKED RENT.

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

" hands of a set of men very capable of perceiving wherein the best use of such an occasion would " consist, by making a proper use of it, and by the firm establishment of a beneficial law.

" Landed property.—Some reparation might yet be made to that unhappy country for so many wrongs; " and some testimony might be borne, amid so many ambiguous appearances, to the ancient honour, " and equitable disposition of the British nation; and, what may be more directly regarded, an addi- " tional security might thereby be provided for the permanency of our acquisitions in that part of the " world. To establish a just system of landed property, and to secure it by introducing the trial by " jury, are, perhaps, the only innovations which Britons ought to make in the ancient institution of " Hindoostan."

LETTER XIV.

Examination of the Native Powers of India in regard to Military Tactics—Account of the preponderating Governments in that Country—The Progress they have made, and how far they may be dangerous—General Reflections on the whole, as applicable to British India.

DEAR SIR, London, April 9, 1800.

IT has been already observed, that the East-India Company have been only a very few years in the full enjoyment of their present extensive territory *. The ability of the Company to retain possession of these distant dependencies rests on the nature of the Company's military government, but more particularly on the disposition and knowledge of the native powers themselves. It is a certain fact, and is a subject of great regret to this country, that the native powers of India have, for several years past, been making rapid improvements in tactics, and have in no branch of military science been more assiduous than in that of gunnery, and the management of their field artillery. In this branch which is, next to fortification, the most abstruse, they have been considerably assisted by Frenchmen and other foreigners; and there is little doubt but in a very few years, with the same exertion they now employ, that they will approach very near us in this useful and essential part of the military art.

According as the native powers of India advance in knowledge and experience of military affairs, our situation, as the possessors of extensive territorial dominion in that country, becomes more and more dangerous and uncertain. There is, however, one circumstance which cannot fail to afford great consolation to every one who is interested in the welfare of the

* The Dewanhee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, was granted to the Company in the year 1765.

British empire in the East—the natives possess in themselves but very little energy of character; they are, from climate, indolent; and no impression, but such as they are daily accustomed to receive, can, for any great length of time, possibly remain. It must be allowed, that they have naturally a disposition to military service; but it requires the skill and exertions of European officers to form a regular and well-disciplined army of natives. In the formation of this army, there must be no relaxation from discipline, for then all would be destroyed—even an interval of six weeks from military avocations is, of itself, sufficient to obliterate from the minds of these men every recollection of what they had learnt, and they must return to the drill for fresh instructions. Hence it follows, that the national character of the inhabitants of India is not much to be dreaded from any system of their own; they are machines to be usefully employed under the direction of others; and, as all the Indian governments are absolute, it depends more on the character of the prince, than on any other cause, whether he can assemble a regular well-appointed army, or collect an ill-disciplined, and mutinous rabble.

Princes of a martial and enterprising turn give encouragement to Europeans to enter into their service. These Europeans are generally of low extraction, and therefore more easily reconciled to those humiliations which are inseperable from their situation. Men of this description are, however, entrusted with very high commands, and, in some instances, they have acquitted themselves with reputation and fidelity. But, as it is not to be supposed that all men possess the same energy of mind, it will happen that the zeal, industry, and military talents of the preceding monarch may be rendered useless and abortive, from the enervation of his successor. Another circumstance is the mutability of all Indian possessions, the tendency of the people to revolt, and the propensity of their leaders to usurpation,—these

things destroy the energies of a country, and reduce it below the level of other nations; it becomes in fact a new country and another race. Circumstances such as these, it may be urged, argue strongly in favour of the permanency, at least for a considerable period, of our Asiatic establishments. But more comprehensively and justly to understand the situation of India in a military point of view, it is necessary to take a review of the great military nations which compose so considerable and so productive a portion of the world, a subject which is now become of the first importance to the prosperity of Great Britain.

The great military powers now existing in Hindoostan, and who have risen on the ruins of the Mogul empire, are the Mahrattas and the Nizam, or Soubahdaur of the Decan, for the empire of Tippoo Sultaun is now no more. The Seicks are also deserving of our attention; and the recent apprehension of the invasions of Zemaun Shaw from the countries situated beyond the western banks of the river Indus, are at this crisis particularly interesting; and, although he is not immediately an Indian power, he is, nevertheless, inevitably connected with our present discussion, which is to show the accumulated force of Hindoostan, and the influence they all have on the permanency or fall of our East-Indian possessions.

The empire of the Mahrattas is of the first political consequence. As a warlike enterprising nation, they are the only barrier against the Mahomedan conquests in Hindoostan, and therefore the natural ally of this country. This empire, it may be said, forms the greatest military aristocratic republic in the world, and is entirely upheld on that principle. Their origin has been doubted and controverted by different writers; but all agree, that the founder of the dynasty of the Mahratta Rajahs was descended from the Rajapootes, the best soldiers in India. The Decan, at this period, was under the dominion of the Moguls, then divided into many small principalities,

all of whom paid their quota to the royal treasury. The inhabitants were a pastoral people, and, independently of a few principal chiefs, there were few distinctions in society. The koonby, or farmer, was the first in consideration; next the dungur or shepherd; and, last of all, the gowla or cowherd. These people were again divided into many castes or classes, of which the Dera, Parwarry, and Pariar, were the lowest orders, and termed unclean. The Mahratta is only one degree higher, and consequently no very nice observer of the scrupulous tenets of the Hindoo religion. The highest order of their classes are the Bramins of the Pundit order, who eat nothing that has possessed animal life. From this, the highest and most particular rank, the different emanations of their religion are derived, till it descends to the sole restriction of eating the flesh of the cow, an animal held in the highest reverence by all ranks and degrees of this extensive empire.

The Mahrattas were but little noticed as a military people till the day of Shavajei, of the race of the Oodipoor Rajahs. In the year 1664 this leader sacked the famous city of Surat, and established himself at Poonah, as the capital of his empire. He repeatedly attacked and routed the imperial army of Aurungzebe. The inauguration of this great man, who was to become the father of a race of kings, and the founder of a great empire, took place in the year 1674 at Rajagur *, where he formerly assumed the title of Rajah.

It is not to our present purpose to enter into a minute detail of the usurpations and revolutions which have taken place since that period. It is merely my intention to show the extent and population of the Mahratta country, its resources, and military strength.

" The whole of the dominion, thus newly established, is of vast extent, " stretching near 1200 miles along the frontiers of the late Tippoo, and the

* This place, before this event, was called Royhindgen.

" Nizam, in a north-east direction, from Goa, on the Malabar coast, to " Balasore in Orissa, adjoining to Bengal; and from thence north-westerly " 1000 miles more, touching the confines of the British and allied states, " on the borders of the Ganges and Jumnah, to the territory of the Sieks " at Panniput, rendered famous in 1761 for the last memorable defeat sus- " tained by the Mahrattas in their ambitious contest for empire with the " united declining power of the Mahomedans. From this place, in a " southerly course, with a great encroachment on the old eastern boun- " dary of the Rajepoot country of the Ajmere, it runs about 260 miles to " the little Hindoo principality of Kotta, and thence south-westerly 540 " miles to the extreme point of the Soubah of Guzarat, at Duarka, in- " cluding the whole of that fertile province; from whence, along the sea- " coasts of Cambay and Malabar, to Goa, the distance may be reckoned " 800 miles. Thus the overgrown empire of the Mahrattas may be said " to extend east 19 degrees of longitude, near the parallel of 22 degrees " north latitude, from the mouths of the Indus to those of the Ganges, " and about 13 degrees of latitude north, from the Kistnah to Panniput; " comprehending at least an area of 400,000 square geographic miles, " being considerably more than a third part of Hindoostan, including the " Decan, and equal, perhaps, in dimensions, to all the British and " allied states in India, with those of Golconda and Mysore taken to- " gether."

The revenue arising from this great extent of territory is not so great as might reasonably be expected; it is computed, on the best calculations, to amount to sixteen crores of rupees, or sixteen millions sterling. The estimated force is 210,000 horse, and 64,000 foot. The computation is as follows:

	Crores.	Lacs.	Caval.	Inf.	Total.
Paishwa	4	—	40,000	20,000	60,000
Dowlut Row Scindia	6	—	60,000	30,000	90,000
Bouncela	3	50	50,000	10,000	60,000
Holker	1	50	30,000	4,000	34,000
Guyacquar	1	—	30,000	———	30,000
Total	16 Crores.		210,000	64,000	274,000

The cavalry consits of four classes:

1st; The Kassey Pagah, or household troops.

2dly; The cavalry of the Sella-daurs.

3dly; The volunteers; and,

4thly, The Pindarees, or Looties.

The infantry are divided into regular and irregular.

The artillery is in a wretched state, and, in general, under the direction of a principal officer, who employs as many renegado Europeans as can be induced into the service.

The Kassey Pagah, or household troops, are termed Baurgeers, and receive a monthly pay of eight rupees. Their horses are purchased and maintained at the expense of government.

The Sella-daurs are an establishment extremely curious, and unknown in any country whatsoever. They breed the horses for the use of the Mahratta cavalry, and receive thirty-five rupees per month for each horse they are able to furnish. It is no uncommon thing for a Sella-daur to commence his career with a single mare, and in a few years to furnish thirty or forty horses for the service of the state. He is under no tie or obligation to any particular chief, but seeks employment wherever he can find it. The Sella-daur selects for his purpose a place best suited to his plan; the more sequestered the better he is satisfied. In the midst of a secluded jungle, he rears his horses under the management of his family, while he repairs to camp with whatever number he can spare. His stock is yearly increasing;

for the brood-mares are carefully kept at home for the intended purpose. By this extraordinary attention to the propagation of this noble and useful animal, are the Mahrattas enabled to bring into the field those almost innumerable bodies of cavalry which sweep the country, and, like a torrent, carry every thing before them.

The volunteers are those individuals, each of whom brings his horse, and receives from the Circar from forty to fifty rupees per month, according to the value of the animal.

The Looties, or Pindarees, are the plunderers, who serve without pay, and who trust to their depredations for subsistence. This horrid set of unfeeling wretches carry fire and sword wherever their malignant stars direct, and leave no room for future spoil; neither age nor sex are spared, and friend and foe are equally obnoxious to their fury.

The Kassey Pagah are armed with matchlocks and cimeters, the Selladaurs and volunteers with long spears and crooked sabres. The Looties are not choice in their arms. Each provides himself with a weapon best suited to his views or fancy. It will here be observed that the horsemen are chiefly Hindoos, because it is esteemed the most honourable service.

The infantry are divided into the regular battalions, the Nezibs, or matchlock men, and the Arab Beyracs.

The regulars are exercised in the manner of the Company's troops, and commanded by European officers; but they cannot be said to be altogether uniformly clothed, neither are they very exact in their discipline.

The Nezibs, or matchlock men, are quite irregular in their discipline, and under very little controul in the time of action: and the Arabs, although extremely brave, defy all subordination, and only yield to the orders of their own chief; their mode of warfare is desultory, but very trou-

blesome to a regular enemy; for they act as riflemen, and are as daring as they are expert.

The best infantry of the Mahrattas are neither inhabitants of the Decan, nor of any part of the Peninsula of India; they come from Hindoostan, and are chiefly of the Rajapoot or Purvia castes. They are commonly termed Purdassees, which signifies strangers, or people not belonging to the Mahrattas. The pay of a foot-soldier, or Sepoy, is from six to nine rupees per month.

The Mahrattas divide their army into three divisions. The light troops and rocket-men are put in advance, under the command of the holder of the Jerryput, or grand federal flag, a post tantamount to that of commander in chief. This division is termed the Cherryfoudge. The centre division, called the Beechlashkar, is a body of reserve, unincumbered. The rear division, which the Paishwa commands in person, contains the park of artillery, and protects the stores and baggage of the army, denominated the Boonga.

The principal object of the military achievements of the Mahrattas is predatory collection; every act is influenced by avaricious motives, and their whole system depends on depredation and conquest. Commerce by this means is neglected, but agriculture is encouraged; for it is not till after the Desserah, or grand festival of the Mahrattas, by which time the lands are tilled, and the seed is in the ground, that the hostile tribes assemble together, when they determine on the plan of devastation. They are never at a loss to find pretexts for supplying the exigencies of the state, and enriching the Bramins of the empire. We shall now pass on to take a short review of the

DECAN,

and consider it from that period when it fell under the Mahomedan yoke, under whose subjugation it has continued to the present day.

I have already noticed the irruptions of the first Mahomedan conquerors into Hindoostan, under the famous Mahmoud Sultaun *. By degrees, the descendents of these enterprising and indefatigable despots pushed their conquests towards the South, and the banks of the Kistnah. The *Bamineah Mahomedan kingdom of Beder* formed a very considerable power, till it was rent in pieces by the insubordination of the delegates appointed by the princes to rule over the distinct divisions of that empire. Five of these rulers formed as many separate and independent kingdoms; these princes crossed the Kistnah, and, after various struggles, asserted their superiority over a considerable part of the peninsula, at that time inhabited by the two great Hindoo nations of *Malabar* and *Canara*. Ramrag, the king of *Bejanagur* †, reigned over the Hindoos at that time, a warlike and powerful people. But the good fortune of the Mahomedans prevailed. Great part of the peninsula was subjected to their dominion; and those parts where their arms did not penetrate, branched out, on the destruction of the Bejanagur dynasty, into numberless petty states, under the Hindoo grandees, who assumed the title of Rajah, or others similar.

The empire of the Moguls, during a length of time, had contented themselves with the unqualified controul of the provinces situated in the centre of Hindoostan. Those of Delhi, Agra, Benares, Guzarat, Bengal, Oude, with many others, appertained to that extensive empire. The

* Vide p. 70 of this work.

† The ruins of the immense city of Bejanagur are still visible, and have been often described.

thirst of power strongly inclined the emperor Aurengzebe to bring under his subjection not only that part of India which still remained to the Hindoos, but also those princes who had revolted from the Mahomedan kingdom of Beder. In this attempt, although not altogether successful, he raised the dominion of the Mogul diadem to the highest pitch of its glory and power. Before the death of that great man in 1707, the lustre of the Mahomedan arms shone in almost every part of Hindoostan, and over a vast portion of the peninsula. The revenues of the empire amounted to twenty-five millions per annum, and it was supposed that the like sum, which ought to have flowed into the royal treasury, was absorbed by the avarice and peculations of the rapacious governors of the more distant provinces.

On the death of Aurengzebe, the Mogul empire, which had accumulated to so enormous a height, began to decline. The governors of provinces, and the great officers of state, began to shake off, which they did by degrees, all dependence on the Mogul. From the court of Delhi was derived the nomination of all the Soubahs or governors of provinces, who, in their turn, appointed Nabobs or deputies, to regulate under them inferior districts. The Soubahdary of the Decan was an extensive and lucrative command, and bestowed on Nizam-ul-Mooek by the reigning emperor Mahomed Shaw. This man had enjoyed at Delhi the high office of Vizier, and was descended from an ancient family of the Tartar race; for it required the blood of the hardy Tartars to regenerate the enfeebled sons of Hindoostan, rendered effeminate by climate, luxury, and enervation. Less penetration than the Nizam possessed would have led him to discover the declining state of the once powerful empire of Delhi. Resolving to benefit by its fall, he secretly induced the Mahrattas, now become of consequence in the political horizon of Asia, to wage war against the

Mogul, and he excited the invasion of Nadir Shaw. While the empire was torn in pieces by external as well as internal enemies, the Nizam-ul-Mooek threw off his allegiance, and became the absolute monarch of the Decan. The district of Arcot, dependent on it, was governed by Subdter Ally Cawn, when Nizam-ul-Mooek took possession of his new dignity. On the death of Subdter Ally, the Nizam appointed Anawer Odien Cawn, then Nabob of Hydrabad, to the province of Arcot, and charged him with the care of the infant son of the late Nabob. On the death of this youth, who was murdered by Morliz Ally Cawn, a relation of his own, Anawer Odien Cawn became the lawful Nabob of Arcot. Anawer Odien was father to Mahomed Ally, and to whose interests the East-India Company allied themselves, in opposition to the French, who espoused the cause of Chunda Saheb, a soldier of fortune, and a mere usurper.

It is not to the present purpose to enter into the details of all the conflicts which took place about this period between the comparatively small armies of the French and English. The succession was severely and arduously disputed; during which time the Nizam, or Soubahdaur of the Decan, became the tool of the French. It is to Lawrence, to Clive, and to Coote, that we owe the singular preservation of the British territory on the coast of Coromandel. This country has been indebted to fortuitous circumstances in India for its present exaltation. The feuds of contending princes, the dissolution of the Mogul empire, the rising power of the Mahrattas, with the subdivisions of that power, and the usurpation of Hyder Ally, have all contributed, in a greater or lesser degree, to establish the dominion of the English. The perfidy of the French, their neglect of trade, and the innovation of the descendents of Nizam-ul-Mooek, the Soubahdaurs of the Decan, has rendered the political consequence of that

country, as it relates to the interests of Great Britain, of little importance.

The French, indeed, still continue to regard the Soubah of the Decan as their natural ally; and an attempt was very recently made to introduce into his service a very considerable body of troops, disciplined and commanded by French officers. These troops were, no doubt, intended to act in conjunction with the late Tippoo Sultaun; but the foresight and prudence of the Marquis of Wellesley rendered the scheme abortive. The Marquis represented to the Nizam the folly of such a measure, as well as the danger to himself, of allowing French influence to be predominant in his country. This prince was too sensible of the power of the English to neglect the advice. It fortunately happened that the troops thus raised and disciplined by the French officers were in arrears of pay, and had become extremely mutinous and discontented. They had even proceeded so far as to confine their officers. In this situation they were surrounded by a detachment of Madras troops, and compelled to lay down their arms. The officers were conducted to Madras prisoners of war, and the corps were disbanded.

By a recent treaty entered into between the Nizam and the British Government in India, that prince is debarred from entertaining any French in his service in future. The Marquis of Wellesley has also contrived, by his political and commercial arrangements with the Nizam, to render his interest so much connected with that of the East-India Company, that he is in fact become more a dependent than an ally. By policy equally wise and prudent, from the cession of Circars to the Company, he is shut out from the sea, with which he can have no communication. As an inland power, he must depend on the English for supplies from foreign countries, they being in possession of the surrounding coast which forms

a part of the Bay of Bengal. The internal resources of the Nizam would do little to support a war, should he ever be desperate enough to attempt it. The French have now no chance of renewing their ancient connection with the Decan, a circumstance which, at one period, under the administration of the indefatigable Dupleix, gave them the probability of becoming predominant in India. The troops of the Company will continue to over-awe the unruly rabble by which the Nizam is surrounded, and, at the same time, the protection of the English Government will make him respectable in the eyes of the Mahrattas, whose extensive territories approach him to the west and north. To the eastward, Moodajee Bhoonsla, a powerful Mahratta prince, is the immediate neighbour between him and the provinces of Bengal.

The Nizam is able to bring into the field a considerable force; his standing army may be computed at seventy thousand men, of whom forty thousand are cavalry. The revenues of the districts of Hyderabad, in the brilliant days of Aurengzebe, were rated in the books of the empire at 3,479,250*l**, at this time they scarcely amount to half that sum. It is a remark of importance that the territorial revenues of Hindoostan, in general, have been greatly on the decline since the reign of Aurengzebe, and that usurpation, tyranny, and peculation, have dried up the sources of industry, and destroyed the energies of the people. British India is an instance to the contrary, whose revenues are daily increasing, and will continue to increase, so long as measures like the present are pursued, that private property is secured, and that the love of justice shall be tempered with the happiness of the subject.

Some agrarian regulations are yet necessary to complete the system of our government in the East, and particularly due attention to the code

* This was not much above one-half of the actual revenue; the remainder, as was the case under the Moguls, was dissipated by the collectors and great officers of state.

of penal laws by which only the distinctions of the numerous castes of people in Hindoostan can be preserved. These distinctions ought never to be violated by the laws of European conquerors, as this would tend to the degradation of nations of men, liberal-minded, and whose character and honour is indelibly connected with the simple, though not less interesting, institutions of their forefathers. The Hindoos of India are the most ancient people of the universe now existing. They have preserved, to our knowledge, since the days of Alexander, their ancient manners, customs, and solemnities, uncorrupted. Let not, therefore, the tranquil and peaceable Hindoos be insulted with any undue exercise of laws formed for the more abandoned and licentious manners of European nations.

The Seicks have already been noticed in the course of these letters, as also the nation or tribes of the Abdallees *. A few general observations on these people, in addition to what has already been observed, will suffice to give a competent idea of the extent and power of their respective dominions.

It has already been observed that, in political affairs, near neighbours are seldom friends †. Nature seems to have ordered these matters wisely; for it is to be observed that rivality between neighbours is the impulse which generates liberty and martial virtue.

The empire of the Seicks, although inferior to that of Zemaun Shaw Abdalla, is extensive and powerful. The first, it is said, can bring 100,000 cavalry into the field, while the other can command double that number. Be this as it may, they are both considerable, and, happily for British India, their interests, their prejudices, their manners and customs, insuperably different. The subjects of Zemaun Shaw are imperious, bigotted mussulmen, proud, vindictive, and sanguinary. The Seicks, on the other hand,

* Vide page 65. † Page 132.

perhaps no less ferocious, mingle with their ferocity a spirit of toleration and philanthropy unknown to the other. Although originally Hindoos of the race of Iates, the austerity of that people is softened by milder principles of pure theology. They believe in one God, in a day of resurrection, and the doctrine of rewards and punishments. With these sentiments, some good may be expected from this hardy race. They should not be neglected by the British Government in India, but rather be cultivated, encouraged, and protected in their independence. Opposed to the Abdallees, in conjunction with the English, they will form a certain balance against the irruptions of the combined powers of the Affghans, and the numerous tribes situated in the northern parts of Hindoostan.

Of these tribes I shall say but little, referring you, on this subject, to the excellent analysis of India, written by Mr. Sullivan. In that compendium you will find an account of the Rohillas and Patans, the Rajahpootes, Iates, and the inferior Hindoo princes of Hindoostan. The subdivision of power is not to be seriously dreaded, and it is only continuity and unity that can become formidable to the East-India Company. Possessed of one half of Hindoostan, it would be hard indeed if the resources of so extensive a country, rendered more productive by an equitable government, and great military knowledge and power, should not be competent to preserve the tranquillity of India. Internal commotions, and not external broils, is to be apprehended and guarded against.

Oppose the Seicks to the Abdallees and the Mahomedans of the north of Hindoostan; retain the Nizam, the Soubahdar of Oude, the Nabob of the Carnatic, the Rajah of the Mysore, with those of Tanjore, Travancore, Cochin, Coorg, and the many princes of Malabar, as dependent friends or tributary allies. Support the constitution of the Mahratta empire, particularly in all the subdivisions of their immense power; prevent the growth

and aggrandisement of individual states, provinces, or nations; support the weaker against the oppressions of the more powerful, and inculcate justice; but, above all, be mindful that it is military power and not love that sways, and has always swayed, the sceptre of Hindoostan; be assiduous to retain, and by every means to improve, the confidence of your army; let them be paid well and regularly; avoid severe punishments; but when death is necessary, let it be inflicted. From the subordination and discipline of your army you have every thing to expect; with its loss, on the other hand, every thing to dread: for, as has been well expressed by Mr. Hastings, the empire which we have reared in India is "suspended by a thread so fine, "that the touch of chance might break, or the breath of opinion dis-"solve it."

I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER XV.

Little Attention paid in India to support the Credit of the Company—Their Paper subject to great Depreciation—Money difficult to be borrowed by the Company for the Want of Financial Regulations—Necessity of adopting some System to that Effect—Outline of a Plan to ameliorate their Situation in regard to it—Great Advantages to be derived from it by Individuals, as well as being extremely beneficial to the Company—May excite the Attention of Free Traders and others—Probably, if carried into Execution by the Proprietors, be the Means of ensuring a Renewal of the Charter—A Banking-House in London to be employed in the Arrangement.

DEAR SIR, London, April 18th, 1800.

DURING my residence in India, it often occurred to me as an extraordinary thing, that so little attention was paid to any mode of assisting the Company's credit, or for preventing the depreciation of their paper money in their settlements there;—circumstances which have ever been considered of the first political importance; and there is no country where inattention to them has been more severely felt than in India. The pressing exigencies of the Company's service frequently demanded the immediate loans of large sums of money, the advance of which, from the want of any regular system of finance, opened a wide field for speculations—favourable to individuals, although, at the same time, extremely disastrous to the interests of the Company.

It is well known that those who had the command of money were enriched. But the disadvantages to the Company were peculiarly severe; the loss not only fell heavy on themselves, but particularly so on the pri-

vate men of the army, and generally on all the classes of their numerous servants and dependents. The bad effects arising from such an evil might have endangered the safety of our possessions in India; and were similar events again to happen, which is very far from improbable, there is no calculating on the result.

These reflections have been renewed of late, and have made on my mind a strong impression of the necessity of adopting some mode to ameliorate the situation of the Company.

In a publication which I had the honour of being permitted to dedicate to the Court of Directors, it will be seen that I was aware of the dangers which lately threatened our Eastern dependencies. I was induced particularly at that time, from my experience of the expenses attending a war in India, to arrange my ideas on the utility of employing efficacious means to strengthen the Company's finances, and by their operation not only to facilitate the procuring of money for the public service in cases of future emergency, but at all periods, whether of peace or war, to establish public credit, and prevent individuals from benefiting by the distress, and at the expense of the best interests, of the Company. It must be admitted, that the revenue of a country, however productive and well administered, must at times be aided by well-conducted creative efforts, or otherwise be liable to the combinations of monied men.

The plan which I have now the honour to inclose for assisting public credit in India, although not a perfect one, is a full outline, subject to such degree of extension and improvement as may be deemed necessary or expedient.

On every occasion where it has fallen in my way, I have endeavoured to promote the interest of the Company; and in the present instance I gratified my inclination to be of service, by transmitting a copy of the in-

closed for the consideration of the Executive Power of that body. The silence which has been observed on the subject of it seems to indicate little desire to promote its operation, and consequently that it has not met with that approbation which I should have been pleased it had done. Without further observation, I shall proceed to explain what appears to me an object of the highest importance to the well-being of any corporate body placed in a situation similar to that of the East-India Company.

OUTLINES OF A PLAN FOR LIQUIDATING THE DEBTS OF THE COMPANY, AND INCREASING ITS CAPITAL.

A Company that is above fifteen millions in debt, with an active capital not equal to one quarter of that sum, and avowedly straitened for means to carry on its trade, ought to change the system that has brought it to so dangerous a state, and by which it is open to the depredation of other merchants, foreigners as well as British.

The capital of the Company cannot be increased by any new loan to an amount sufficient to remove its embarrassments, far less to extend its commerce. No relief equivalent to these disorders can be applied by an instantaneous effort. It is even very doubtful whether parliament will countenance any augmentation of the capital of the Company, beyond what is provided for by the terms of the last charter; for there is an evident absurdity in a trading Company going on perpetually borrowing, year after year, perhaps beyond the amount of its dividends.

The real case is, that gradual and well-directed efforts are the only means by which so disproportioned a debt can be reduced, or by which the affairs of the Company may be brought to a regular state.

The great success of Mr. Pitt's sinking fund, in which he has persevered in a manner as honourable to himself as advantageous to the affairs of the nation, added to the plain and simple calculations of compound interest, indicate the manner in which this business may be done with ease and certainty *.

But there are two questions which arise out of this;—First, Where is the fund to come from? And, secondly, Who is to have the administration of it? With respect to the first question, we must consider, that the exigencies which have created these embarrassments, and the *irregular* mode of transacting money matters in India, prevent us from calculating on any resource either from the territorial revenues of that country, or from the commercial interest to which the territory is stated to be in debt †.

From these circumstances a sinking fund, which, in cases of difficulty, *could not be alienated*, is not to be expected from the Company itself; and one that could be *alienated* would be of no value.

Again—it would be useless to calculate on aid from the British Government, for that perhaps cannot be obtained; and, if it could be obtained, it would be but a change of creditor for the Company, as the debt would only change hands, and still would remain to be paid. The question is then nar-

* The accumulation of money by compound interest has the appearance of a *reverie*, owing to the calculation of men who have no other merit than that of being able to add and multiply. "One "penny," say they, "since the birth of Christ, would have accumulated to an immense sum; a sum "equal to 150 millions of worlds of solid gold." It is perfectly true; but, as such accumulations never took place, and never in fact can take place, people are led to consider it as useless or ill-founded theory. This is only because it is a sort of *exaggerated caricature*; and because, when a sum accumulates to be very great, *there is no mode of employing it with safety*.—In paying off a debt, however, to its utmost extent, such calculations are perfectly and minutely exact as well as practicable; this operation will be found to coincide exactly with the theory, but it never will in accumulation to a high amount.

† On this subject I entertain considerable doubt; but the discussion is, in this place, of little importance.

rowed—the stockholders must establish the fund themselves out of their own money.

But how is this to be done? The Company is in England, not in India, and its servants there cannot, for the reason already given, viz. the exigence of the public service, and fluctuating state of affairs in that quarter, answer for the permanent application of such monies to the liquidation of debts. The fund must therefore arise from individual members of the Company, but must not be administered either by the executive power, or by those who conduct their usual affairs under it.

The stockholders are in fact the Company, and consequently they are the persons most interested in its welfare and prosperity: but, as the stockholders have no executive power, they cannot pay off the debts of the Company by the usual mode in which they transact ordinary business.

The stockholder or proprietor must therefore think of another mode to aid himself, and for this purpose it is suggested, that the individual stockholders should, for a series of years, employ under their own direction a small portion of their dividends in establishing a fund to pay off debts already contracted, and to prevent the usurious transactions that, in time of war, take place in India. By this means they would, from the beginning of the operation of the plan, increase the stability of their own funds, and promote very considerably, in various shapes, the flourishing state of their affairs.—This is the answer to the first question.

In regard to the second question—

The Proprietors should have agents of their own, empowered *to buy up bonds or other securities of the Companies, but not empowered to do any thing else.* And such is the *progress of accumulating interest* that it would not be many years before the revenues of the Company could, on its present stock, divide above 30 per cent.—in which case, stock now at 200 would

be worth above 500. While this great end should be obtained, the individual stockholders would only be *trusting themselves*; they would not be giving *credit to strangers*, and they would soon be equal to carrying on a much more extensive trade to India, the participation of which is so eagerly sought after. By these simple, but direct and infallible means, their dividends would be increased in a few years as much as the sacrifice annually made; so that it would only be a few years at the first that any money would be laid out, and that money arising from the trade itself.

The advantages proposed by this are, that a fund adequate to the purpose would be obtained from a *source that is certain*, and be applied in a manner that would render it *unalienable*; which are the things required to be done.

To make the advantages of the plan more clearly understood, it needs only to be mentioned, that had the Company begun by appropriating a sum of 50,000*l.* a year in this manner, (which is not more than the allowance made to some of its pensionaries in India), which sum there could be no difficulty in saving; and, if it had been employed in lending when money was at 12 per cent. or in buying up bonds, when they were transferred at a great loss, ever since the year 1767, nearly 15,000,000*l.* of debt would have been paid off or avoided; and a clear revenue of 1,500,000*l.* a year would be applicable to the payment of the debt, for dividends or for government, which, before the expiration of the present charter, would pay off about 60 millions, leaving the individual stockholders with claims on the stock to that amount, were the affairs of the Company on a scale large enough to admit of it. But, as the time is now gone by, a larger sum must be appropriated, in order that the Company may be effectually relieved.

The following Plan is proposed for that Purpose.

That each stockholder should apply a portion of the half-yearly dividend for the purpose of extinguishing the debts of the Company in India, by the purchase of their bonds and other securities which, at the rate of 10 per cent. would accumulate thus.

YEAR.	Sums paid Annually.	Interest Annually.	Total Capital accumulated.
End of Year the - 1st	200,000	20,000	220,000
2d	200,000	42,000	462,000
3d	200,000	66,200	728,200
4th	200,000	92,820	1,021,020
5th	200,000	122,102	1,343,122
6th	200,000	154,312	1,697,434
7th	200,000	189,743	2,077,177
8th	200,000	227,717	2,504,894
9th	200,000	270,489	2,975,383
10th	200,000	317,538	3,492,921
11th	200,000	369,292	4,062,213
12th	200,000	426,221	4,688,434
13th	200,000	488,843	5,377,277
14th	200,000	557,727	6,135,004
15th	200,000	633,500	6,968,504
16th	200,000	716,850	7,885,354
17th	200,000	808,535	8,893,889
18th	200,000	909,388	10,003,277
19th	200,000	1,020,327	11,223,604
20th	200,000	1,142,360	12,565,964

It is evident that this plan may be executed either on a smaller or larger scale, in which case the advantages would be in proportion to the effort made.

It is, however, necessary to observe, that the rate of interest in India is subject to great fluctuation—from 6 to 12 per cent. per annum. But all things considered, if the Company's credit is to be supported in such a manner as to prevent in future the great depreciation of their paper money, it is but fair to fix the interest at 10 per cent; and the Company themselves would find their account in it.

This measure would induce the Proprietors to come forward, in fact to support themselves, in place of allowing strangers and foreigners to hold such a stock in the funds of the East-India Company as must very soon increase to more than double the amount of their capital, and, in the end, sap its existence to the foundation. For what good reason should the Company's bonds, certificates, and the other species of paper money, which the exigencies of the service require, be retailed to all descriptions of men in India, who lie in wait, in times of necessity, to take the advantage of the scarcity of public money. The Company's paper has been sold from 20 to 70 per cent. loss. The operation of this plan would preclude the same fatal depreciation of the Company's funds which have so much disgraced not only the private acts of individuals, but the public government of the Company.

Such would be the state of things at the expiration of twenty years, and, at the expiration of the Company's charter in 1814, upwards of six millions would have accumulated: now this must be paid off, or the charter renewed, and the debts remain to the individuals; so that, whichever way it were, the speculation as individuals would be immensely advantageous. On a calculation for twenty years, stockholders would get back in one

year nearly as much as they had paid in the *first six years*: from whence it follows, that, on the expiration of twenty years, the interest in one year would be equal to the whole advance made by the Proprietors in six years, *and a clear gain be obtained of more than ten millions.*

All this would be the fruits of a little œconomy for a time, which would be amply repaid afterwards in augmented dividends on stock. But this is not all the object to stockholders; for the debts of the Company are so beyond its power to pay, and have been so rapidly increasing (exception being made of some years), that it will lie entirely in the breast of Government to *take away*, or *renew the charter*; for every charter, whilst it conveys rights, demands an equivalent; and without meaning to make any harsh remark, but only to speak to the fact, a Company continually increasing its capital and its debts, and that is unable at the same time to supply the country with those articles wanted to be imported by its means, must run a risque of having either a ruinous trade to support, or of having its form new modelled, so as to answer the purposes for which it was intended.

It may be thought that the small means pointed out for the accomplishment of so great an end are quite inadequate; but if the basis is solid, of which there can be no doubt, the figures of the calculation must be right. Let us also consider, as has been already observed, that the Company often pay 12 per cent. in India for money, and that its bonds are frequently at 30, 40, and have been 50, and even 70 per cent. discount; so that individuals accumulate immense sums by the Company's distresses, all which would be saved by the plan which I have already submitted *. One more observation is alone necessary, and which is, that calculations of compound

* This plan has already been given to the chairman, Mr. Inglis, whose knowledge of the affairs of India, and attention to the interests of the Company, is universally acknowledged.

interest answer more fully in paying off debts than in accumulating large sums; because in paying off debts, the interest saved is the certain gain. In accumulating a sum, employment is to be found for the money accumulated; and some part of it may be badly employed, which deranges the calculation, and renders abortive the best regulated system.

Had the fortune which lord Clive is said to have brought from India with him been employed ever since in the operation now proposed, without any other aid, it would have accumulated to more than the whole property of the East-India Company.

The debt of India, in case of the adoption of this plan, ought to be all transferred to Bengal, where the sinking fund should have its operation.

The Proprietors of East-India Stock may naturally be anxious to know to what extent their dividends may be called upon to establish the fund now recommended. It will be a satisfaction to learn, that one per cent. and 10-16ths on the original stock, or three per cent. 5-8ths on the accumulated stock, will produce the effect required; or, in other words, the stockholder who purchases his India stock at 200*l.* for every 100*l.* originally subscribed, by giving up annually 3*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.* out of 10*l.* 10*s.* which is the present dividend on that sum, or ten and a half per cent. will still reserve to himself 6*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.* which will afford him 3*l.* 8*s.* 9*d.* per cent. interest for his money, besides being a creditor on the Company's finances, at the expiration of the charter, to a considerable amount.

It is to be observed, that Proprietors may either allow a greater or smaller part of their dividends to be laid out, and for which they would be entitled to a benefit on the like proportion. But to put this plan in a still more familiar point of view, the subscriber of 100*l.* a year would in seven years hold the securities of the Company for 1038*l.*—in ten years for 1746*l.*—and in twenty years for upwards of 5000*l.* Or the capital

sum of 1000*l.* paid in now, would produce in twenty years more than 6000*l.*

But the grand operation in favour of the Company, by having it done by the Proprietors themselves, would be, that for the advance of 200,000*l.* yearly, the Company, at the expiration of the charter, would have discharged upwards of six millions of debt; and if allowed to accumulate for twenty years, produce no less a sum than 12,565,964*l.* to be applied to the same or other purposes *. During this gradual operation, the money which would have gone to the payment of debt already incurred could be applied to extend the commerce of the Company. On the renewal of the charter, *a circumstance which such good conduct would undoubtedly warrant*, the capital thus created might be made an additional fund, on which, at any time, from the prosperous state of the Company's affairs, dividends could be made.

In general, this plan would give a new complexion to the affairs of the Company, by bringing so much ready money yearly into the market, ultimately reduce the rate of interest, and enable the Governments in India to procure more money readily, and on better terms than hitherto.

There is one observation, which appears extremely necessary. The facilities of the proposed plan, and the inquiry it must necessarily excite in those who are at all habituated to calculation, may probably stimulate that description of men who wish to become free-traders to India, as well as British subjects, and many foreign houses, to carry the scheme into execution; the result of which would be, that while it carries the appearance

* Calculations of this kind are deserving of attention, especially where the matter in question can be accomplished. One hundred pounds at compound interest, at the expiration of seven years, amounts to 199*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.* and at the expiration of seventy years to no less a sum than 102,400*l.* The wisdom and justice of the British legislature has very properly put a stop to unjust and partial accumulation, when it is not for the benefit of the existing generation.

of supporting the Company's credit both at home and abroad, they would, in fact, with a certain great profit, accumulating such a mass of debt against the East-India Company as may put that great body completely in their power, and if not in a few years lay the trade open, prevent the renewal of the charter. But, on the other hand, as the plan is meant for the amelioration of the Company's finances, their carrying it into effect themselves, by a judicious appropriation of part of their dividends, will disappoint the hopes of all those who have a desire to profit by, if not to ruin, the East-India Company.

Should, however, the Proprietors of East-India Stock, contrary to all reasoning and calculation, resist their own interest so much as not to give the plan proposed a fair trial, there are persons in Great Britain, without doubt, not inimical to the Company, who, for many reasons, would encourage such an establishment; principally from the unquestionable nature of the security, and the great variety of purposes, the accumulation of money by compound interest may, to private and domestic purposes, be beneficially and happily applied.

The only difficulty that appears in the proposed plan is the mode of making the remittances to India. Great objections may be made to remitting gold or silver, and greater still to sending goods, which might be unprofitably sold. The business, therefore, is, to reduce the whole to the greatest possible certainty, else calculations are useless.

It would be best for the Stockholders here to pay the money into the hands of a banking-house in London, and the house to have a commission for transacting the business, and to defray the expenses of sending out to India a proper agent, for whose conduct the house should be responsible.

The agent to be allowed an establishment, and entrusted with necessary powers to draw on the banking-house in London for the sums applicable

to the plan. A committee of the Proprietors to be empowered to examine the books, and demand an account from time to time. The part of the plan which relates to drawing bills in London might be managed by a letter of credit, similar to those granted by the House of Hammersley and Co. Every bill drawn on London should be written off on the back of the letter of credit, so that the sum intended to be annually employed would be strictly limited.

I remain, Dear Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER XVI.

Recapitulation and Conclusion.

DEAR SIR, London, July 30, 1800.

THE blow is now struck, and the long-meditated plan hostile to English commerce is about to be attempted. Peace on the Continent will inevitably be the result of the present armistice between the Emperor of Germany and the French republic. It is doubtful whether Great Britain, consistently with national character, can possibly stoop to the terms which France will dictate. In this case, our navy will have to oppose the fleets of all the world; unless indeed the Emperor of Russia, by wise and prudent conduct on our part, be detached from the coalition of the northern powers, which has for its object a participation of the trade to India. It has long been known to all the world, that Great Britain was grasping too much, and that the repeated seizure of vessels belonging to the Danes and Swedes would irritate their courts, and bring upon us what has actually happened.

As this is the last letter with which I shall trouble you, I will conclude my correspondence, which was undertaken from sentiments of regard to the welfare of this country, and with a view to avert misfortunes, by touching on the three principal heads which have composed the chief subject of my letters.

First; the political importance of Bombay.

Secondly; The free trade to India.

Thirdly; In what manner the friendship of the Emperor of Russia is to be acquired.

It is no secret, that the French have it in contemplation to establish factories on the coast of Malabar; and they fondly imagine that the Mahrattas will be friendly to them, and forward their views. The coast of Coromandel is considered by that extraordinary people, the French, as not immediately in their parages; for, say they, the division of the Indian Sea points out to the powers of Europe what establishments are necessary. Those nations who trade with China, the Moluccas, and the Eastern Seas of those countries, have a right to the coast of Coromandel, there to establish their resting places. But, on the other hand, those states and kingdoms who surround the Mediterranean, and have a near communication with Suez and Bussorah, derive, from the prerogatives of nature, a kind of right to the coast of Malabar. In this manner do the French argue, unless they are suffered to remain in the possession of the Venetian Islands, in which case, indeed, they intend to become the founders of a revolution of another sort. By obtaining a footing in the Mediterranean and in Egypt, they will open a communication by Aleppo, Alexandria, Cairo, Bussorah, and Mocha, with India. In this plan, they observe, that the possessions of the English in India, and even the Cape of Good Hope in their hands, would offer no obstacle to the attainment of their wishes. This overland connection with the East is what they ardently desire. Possessed of a respectable situation on the coast of Malabar, together with the Isle of France, that of Bourbon, and an establishment at Madagascar, the French nation would form a triangle of important places, which would secure to them the exclusive trade of the Arabian Sea, the Gulfs of Persia and Suez.

Bombay, Goa, or Mangalore, are the places to which they aspire. Bombay they consider of the first importance. It is the only harbour in India where ships of the line can be equipped or refitted. The capture of this place they consider as not very difficult: the great expense to which the

East-India Company are annually put in its defence, together with its vicinity to the Mahrattas, are reasons which make that possession more precarious in the hands of the present possessors.

The government of this country, in possession of these important facts, can never neglect the Island of Bombay: it must be retained at all risques, and at every expense *. It cannot be relinquished, or the force necessary

* The Island of Bombay is situated in lat. 18. 58. N. and long. 72. 38. E. This ancient domain belongs to the East-India Company, being held in fee simple from the crown. It is from this circumstance, as well as prescriptive right, unalienable. Whatever may be the fate of the territorial acquisitions of the Company in India, this possession, while they are able to protect it from invasion, must continue to the Proprietors of India-stock an hereditary property, and a valuable establishment. The harbour is the best in India, and capable of containing any number of ships, to which it affords the most perfect shelter. Its docks admit ships of war of eighty guns: the yards are proportionably large, and well provided with marine stores of every description.

Bombay was, very soon after the discovery of the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope, anno 1498, settled by the Portugueze. From the excellence of its harbour, formed by a long chain of islands, and the continent, it was named by that people the *Buon-bahia*. On the marriage of King Charles the Second with the Infanta of Portugal, anno 1662, the Island of Bombay, and Tangiers in Africa, with 500,000*l*. were the dower of that princess. Lord Marlborough, in 1663, sailed from England with five ships, to receive possession of the island from the Portugueze viceroy; but the obstinacy and bigotry of the clergy would not permit of its being delivered, although by the king of Portugal's order, to heretics. It was not till next year, after the departure of Lord Marlborough, that Sir Abraham Shipman, the governor appointed by King Charles, was able, by means of a treaty with the inhabitants, securing their property and the free exercise of their religion, to obtain possession. The island and castle were shortly transferred by King Charles to the East-India Company for ever. This settlement became the seat of the English power in India, to which all the other settlements were subordinate.

Bombay commands the entire trade of the north of India, together with that of the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia. It is the great mart of Oriental as well as of European commerce, and in the article of cotton alone exports yearly to China upwards of one million sterling. Besides being the centre of trade, it is a place of great importance, naval as well as military. Without a fleet to protect the commerce on that coast, the pirates which infest it would, in a very short time, put a total stop to trade; and without a military force, there would be no check on the Mahrattas, or other native powers on the north-western side of India. The arsenal and magazines are abundantly supplied, and are carefully attended to. Bombay, from its insular situation, guarded very generally by a rocky shore, bids fair to be the most durable of all our eastern possessions, and therefore should be held for the proprietors so long as it is for the honour and interest of this country to preserve the independency of an East-India Company.

for its defence be diminished. The rulers of British India know its importance too well to permit, so long as they can possibly prevent it, any European power from becoming settlers in a spot which enjoys the whole of the trade of the north of India, and which opens a direct communication with Persia and Turkey.

Let it be remembered that it is by the sword that India is to be governed. The army is the palladium which can alone secure that country to the British crown.

On this subject I trust I shall be excused in saying a few words. The late military regulations have restored to the army of India that energy for which they had always been so remarkable. Recent events have proved their courage, discipline, and zeal. But, notwithstanding all that has been done, circumstances have occurred which point out defects even in that system by which the army have rendered to their country such signal services. I allude here to the following points.

First; The distribution of the off-reckoning fund; and,

Secondly, The inequality of rank and pay.

It is the uniform practice of his majesty's service for officers in command of regiments to retain the off-reckonings of their respective corps for life. This being denied to colonels in the service of the Company, much disgust has been occasioned. On the other hand, those officers who are actually in India, in the execution of their duty, no doubt complain, that the small number of regiments, formed by the arrangement from the immense body which compose the armies of India, proves a severe check to promotion, and will be found to impede the progress of rank, beyond that of lieutenant-colonel, more than sufficiently, without the additional and very serious impediment which will be superadded by the continuance of the off-reckonings to colonels commanding regiments after their return to

Europe, and for the rest of their lives. For, however liberally, and however rapid, promotion may be up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, there, by the causes I have just suggested, it meets such an interruption as must confine the attainment, in future, of an higher situation, to a very limited number.

While the commandants of regiments are reaping a partial advantage, at the expense of the general interests of the army, and are enjoying at home the fruits of an income which they have relinquished the intention to earn, others, many of whom perhaps have served an equal number of years with at least equal merit, are doing their duty in India, answerable for the discipline, good conduct, and appearance of the corps, without any extra allowance or prospect of further promotion, till after a period when their services can be no longer useful to their employers, and too late to be beneficial to themselves. In this situation, their only alternative is that of retiring on the pay of a lieutenant-colonel, without any prospect of a better provision, and with the mortification perhaps at an advanced age, and with a broken constitution, to behold an officer whose term of residence abroad may probably be ten years less than his own, possessing emoluments as the reward of long services, which, in justice and propriety, ought to be conferred on the man who has held the subordinate command, and who has remained the greater number of years in India. Can it be asserted that he is not fairly entitled to an equal participation? I am far from thinking but that officers who have arrived at the command of regiments should be allowed to retire on a liberal principle; at the same time I cannot help being of opinion that the surplus of the off-reckonings should be extended to a greater number than at present can benefit from it.

By holding out an inducement to officers whose infirmities might oblige them to retire, the best and most active would be called into action, and raise

the reputation and zeal of the service to a pitch it has never yet attained—a reputation which it is impossible ever to attain, while an encouragement is held out for infirm and worn-out officers to slumber in the service, merely to arrive at the rank of colonel, and to enjoy the emoluments it bestows. In this way, officers who, from bad health or other causes, might wish to retire, would be liberally provided for, without trenching too much on the œconomic system which the honourable Company deem it expedient to adopt towards their military servants, and without hurting their feelings as military men.

On these general grounds it is that I presume to mention a plan, recommended by lieutenant-colonel Richard Scott, which, in my opinion, will meet the wishes, if not to say the hope and expectation, of the army. Should this happily, and fortunately for the service in India, be generally agreed on by the Company's officers, the liberal mind of the President of the Board of Controul will readily accede to any reasonable request, since he has already declared, on a former occasion, that he was willing to alter or model the proposition regarding the appropriation of the off-reckoning fund in any way that they advised, so as the principle was preserved, being convinced that it was just and reasonable.

The interest which the honourable Company must have to improve a service which retains to the empire of Great Britain a country far exceeding in extent the parent state, containing above thirty millions of inhabitants, and producing a revenue to the Company of eight millions sterling, will no doubt excite sentiments favourable to the system which I have now the honour to recommend—a system which I am confident will operate much to the comfort of the service, and be attended with a reciprocity of advantages to the East-India Company, and to the officers themselves.

The alteration required is, that the surplus share of off-reckonings be is-

sued out from the honourable Company's treasury in England, and be settled at 1300*l.* per annum, for each corps in the service, allowing the like sum for the corps of engineers. The honourable Company to clothe their troops in any way they may judge the most œconomical and proper; and, in the event of the army being augmented or reduced, the fund to be increased or diminished in the same proportion.

That it be distributed, as far as it will go, in shares of 500*l.* exclusive of the pay of their respective ranks, to the senior officers of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry, whether on the retired or effective lists: so that officers who have served twenty-five years, including the three years of furlough, and who, from infirmity or other causes, are obliged or who wish to retire, may have the prospect of arriving at this honourable provision for the remainder of their lives, as a reward for long and meritorious services.

That colonels of regiments shall be under the same regulations with respect to leave of absence and retiring from the service, as officers of other descriptions.

Were such a regulation established, the provision for old officers would not depend upon the mere nomination to the command of regiments, and the governments abroad may now and hereafter appoint such officers to high situations as they shall think best calculated to fill them, which cannot happen under the present limited restrictions.

In regard to the equalisation of pay and rank, it may be accomplished without involving the pecuniary arrangements of the Company. The first might be settled by a committee of officers selected from the three presidencies, but without incurring any additional expense.

The second is simple in the extreme: a line rank established in the King's and Company's army throughout India, would remove every ground of com-

plaint, and, without any charge, preserve a just equilibrium of rank in every department of the service. A little attention to those minutiæ on which soldiers so much pride themselves, would certainly obviate misunderstandings, which never fail to give trouble and to create uneasiness to all governments.

A free trade to India has already occupied much of my attention. On this important point I have endeavoured to consult the true interests of the nation and the East-India Company. I shall close this subject, as far as it relates to the individual traders of Great Britain, with some remarks written one hundred and thirty years ago by Sir Josiah Child, the most able writer on commercial affairs of that, or perhaps of any other period.

This enlightened character wrote at the time when the Dutch enjoyed by far the greatest portion of the trade of the world. He was jealous of their success, and wished to imitate their industry and commercial knowledge. At the head of the English East-India Company, and zealous for its interest, what he says on the subject of that trade cannot fail to be received by those who are the most sanguine in its support, with equal attention and respect.

" Companies of merchants," he observes, " are of two sorts, viz. Companies in joint stock, such as the East-India Company, the Morea Company, which is a branch of the Turkey Company, andt he Greenland Company, which is a branch of the Muscovia Company;—the other sorts are Companies who trade not by a joint stock, but only are under a government and regulation;—such are the Hamburg Company, the Turkey Company, the Eastland Company, the Muscovia Company.

" It has for many years been a moot case, whether any incorporating of merchants be for public good or not.

" For my own part I am of opinion, that, for countries with which his Majesty has no alliance, nor can have any by reason of their distance or

barbarity, a non-communication with the princes of Christendom, &c. where there is a necessity of maintaining forces and forts (such as East India and Guinea), companies of merchants are absolutely necessary.

" It seems evident to me, that the greatest part of those two trades ought, for public good, to be managed by joint stock.

" It is questionable to me, whether any other company of merchants are for public good or hurt.

" I conclude, however, that all restrictions of trade are sought, and consequently that no company whatsoever, whether they trade in a joint stock or under regulation, can be for public good, except it may be easy for all, or any of his Majesty's subjects, to be admitted into all or any of the said companies, at any time, for a very inconsiderable fine; and that if the fine exceed 20*l.* * including all charges of admission, it is too much.

" The Dutch, who thrive best by trade, and have the surest rules to thrive by, admit not only their own people, but even Jews, and all kinds of aliens, to be free of any of their societies of merchants, or any of their cities or towns corporate.

" I am yet to learn that any company of merchants, not trading with a joint stock, such as the Turkey, Hamburg, Muscovia, and Eastland Companies, ever purchased their privileges, or built and maintained forts, castles, or factories, or made any wars at their own charge; but I know the Turkey Company do maintain an embassador and two consuls, and are sometimes necessitated to make presents to the Grand Seignior or his great officers; and the Hamburg Company are at some charge to maintain their deputy and minister at Hamburg; and I think it would be great injustice that any should trade to the place within their charters, without paying the

* This was written 130 years ago. The value of money has certainly undergone great depreciation since that period; consequently, therefore, the fine should now be much higher.

same duties or levations towards the Company's charge as the present adventurers do pay: but I know not why any should be barred from trading to those places, or forced to pay a great fine for admission, that are willing to pay the Company's duties, and submit to the Company's regulations and orders in other respects.

"If all may be admitted as aforesaid, then such numbers of shopkeepers and others would come into the society of merchants, as would, by the majority of votes, so much alter the governors, deputy, and assistants, of the respective companies, that ignorant persons would come into those ruling places, to the general prejudice of their trade.

"I answer those that make this observation, that if they be merchants, they know there is very little in it; for that it is not to be expected that twenty shopkeepers will come into any one company in a year, and therefore can have no considerable influence upon the elections; but if many more should come in, it would be the better for the nation, and not the worse for the company, for that all men are led by their interest: and it being the common interest of all that engage in any trade, that the trade should be regulated and governed by wise, honest, and able men, there is no doubt but most men will vote for such as they esteem so to be, which is manifest in the East-India Company, where neither gentlemen nor shopkeepers were at first excluded; neither are they yet kept out, any Englishman whatsoever being permitted to come into that Company that will buy an action, paying only 5*l*. to the Company for his admission: and yet undeniable experience has convinced all gainsayers in this matter,—that Company, since its having had so large and national a foundation, having likewise had a succession of much better governors, deputies, and assistants, than ever it had upon that narrow bottom it stood formerly, when none could be admitted to the freedom of that Company for less than

a fine of 50*l*. And the success has been answerable, for the first Company settled upon that narrow limited interest, although their stock was larger than this, decayed, and finally came to ruin and destruction; whereas, on the contrary, this being settled on more rational, and consequently more just, as well as more profitable principles, has, through God's goodness, thriven and increased to the trebling of their first stock."

These remarks are extremely apposite to the present purpose; neither are his observations on the means which ought to be used to make it the interest of other nations to trade with Great Britain, less applicable at the present crisis.

"Being in a good condition of strength at home, in reference to the navy, and all other kind of military preparations for defence (and offence upon just occasion given), will render us wise and honourable in the esteem of other nations, consequently oblige them not only to admit us to the freedom of trade with them, but the better terms for, and countenance in the course of our trade.

"To make it the interest of others to trade with us, we must be sure to furnish them at as cheap, or cheaper rates, than any other nation can or does; and this, I affirm, can never be done, without subduing usury especially, and doing those other things before-mentioned, that will conduce to the increase of our lands and stock; for our being in a condition to sell our neighbours cheaper than others, must be when it is principally an effect of many lands, and much stock.

"But it may be said, How shall we profit by this rule of selling cheap to foreigners, whereas the contrary is said to be the way to riches, viz. to sell dear, and buy cheap?

"I answer, in a strict sense, it may be so for the private merchant: but in this discourse I am designing how our public national trade may be so

managed, that other nations, who are in competition with us for the same, may not wrest it from us, but that ours may continue and increase, to the diminution of theirs. If there be no others to wage with us, we might, as the proverb says, make our own markets; but as the case now stands, that all the world are striving to engross all the trade they can, that other proverb is very true and applicable,—All covet, all lose.

"The well contrivement and management of foreign treaties may very much contribute to the making it the interest of other nations to trade with us, at least to the convincing of foreign princes wherein, and how it is their interest to trade with us. Public justice and honesty will make it the interest of other nations to trade with us; that is, that when any commodities pass under a public common seal, which is in some sort the public faith of the nation, they may be exact in length, breadth, and nature, according to what they ought to be by their seals.

"If we would engage other nations to trade with us, we must receive from them the fruits and commodities of their countries, as well as send them ours; but it is our interest by example, and other means (not distasteful) above all kinds of commodities, to prevent, as much as may be, the importation of foreign manufactures."

The danger of commercial jealousy among the nations of Europe, a subject which in the present posture of affairs may materially affect us, and, in particular, that which may be apprehended from the attention which the great continental powers have uniformly paid to commerce with India, will derive considerable illustration from the following example.

The emperor Charles VI. established at Ostend an East-India Company. The circumstance which led to it is sufficient to convince us, how frequently great designs originate from the most trifling or accidental causes.

A merchant vessel of St. Malo, commanded by the chevalier de la Mer-

veille, a Breton, arrived on the coast of France from India. He attempted to enter a port; but the French having granted an exclusive privilege to the India Company, the captain of the vessel was informed that he might proceed to the first port of the Austrian Netherlands, and sell his cargo. He accordingly entered the port of Ostend, where he sold his merchandise. The minister of the Netherlands, being informed of the immense profit on this commerce, proposed to the same captain to return to India with some vessels they would equip for that service. He accordingly made several voyages for different individuals; and in the year 1722, the emperor Charles VI. granted his letters patent for a new commercial company. Six directors were appointed, and the fund settled at six millions sterling. This new company had such great success, that on the 11th and 12th of August, 1723, having opened books of subscription at Antwerp, they were immediately filled, not only by the merchants of the country, but also by the Dutch and English.

The three first vessels belonging to this company sailed for China on the 10th of February, 1724, and the year following three more: in the year 1726, five sailed for Bengal and China; and in the year 1727, four to the same destination. On the return of each of those vessels there were public sales at Ostend and Bruges of their cargo, which attracted quantities of people, and caused great circulation of money throughout the country.

This rising company gave so much jealousy to the Dutch and English, and even to the French, that they threatened the emperor to declare war, if he did not revoke the patent he had granted his subjects. In effect, the company was suspended for the term of seven years, by preliminaries settled at Paris the 31st of May, 1727, and suppressed for ever by the treaty of Vienna of the 16th of March, 1731.

On this occasion, in the course of one year, more than two thousand

inhabitants quitted Ostend, to establish themselves elsewhere, while other princes and sovereigns, without opposition, fixed in their states new companies of merchants to trade to India.

It must be remarked, that the situation of affairs are materially changed since the combination that was formed against the trade of Austria to the East Indies. The Dutch are irretrievably ruined as a commercial people; the French, for the moment, cease to be our rivals in trade; Spain and Portugal are sunk in indolence and superstition; and the states of Italy are no longer formidable. All these coincidences, however apparently favourable, by no means secure the trade of India to Great Britain. The northern powers of Europe are exerting all their energy to attract commerce; and that to India, either by the Cape of Good Hope, or by the Isthmus of Suez, will increase the cupidity of all. The Russians, Austrians, the king of Prussia, the kings of Denmark and Sweden, and the States of America, are acquiring daily maritime knowledge, and advancing in public spirit and adventure.

The nations of Europe and America possessing commercial knowledge, zeal, and enterprise, but, perhaps, in want of capital to carry on such extensive and lucrative trade as that to India presents, will suffer no opportunity to escape by which they can retire capital from other countries, in order to enrich their own. They will, no doubt, offer every facility to opulent merchants to settle in their sea-ports, where they may carry on a free trade to the East Indies. Flushing, Ostend, L'Orient, Gottenburg, Copenhagen, and Petersburg, or Riga, will hold out the olive-branch to all mercantile adventurers, who may consider themselves injured, or rather hampered, by too severe restrictions. In this invidious pursuit, what European nation is the most likely to suffer, or from whence capital may be most readily drawn? The capitalists that will the most naturally, and,

above all others, attract the attention, and invite the encouragement of those powers, are those of Great Britain, the richest as well as the most commercial nation; and there is no calculating on the temper and disposition of mercantile men. In proportion as capital is withdrawn to form commercial establishments in other countries, so will the nation, losing the benefit of that capital, be deprived the means of asserting its independency, and of opposing warlike preparation to the encroachments of ambitious rivals. Commerce with us is the soul of war, and the only means of securing our pre-eminence, and asserting our rights, against others more numerous and powerful. The connection between prosperous war, and the means of acquiring pecuniary resources, was well known to Frederic the Great, king of Prussia, who was wont to say in his select parties of intimate friends, "*Give me an army, and give me a treasury,* "*and I shall not fear any combination.*"

Were it necessary, the famous League of Cambray against the Venetians might be adduced as another instance of the avarice and jealousy of nations. This combination convulsed the commerce of that once flourishing republic, and laid the foundation of its ruin.

I shall only trouble you with a few words more on that part of the subject which relates to Russia, and endeavour to point out—

The

The Advantages to be derived from a Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and Russia, in regard to British India.

THE commodities on which commerce principally depend are either articles of the first necessity, or such as tend to encourage manufactures. Experience has proved that a mutual exchange of the redundant productions of the different quarters of the world is equally necessary, politic, and expedient. Articles of fancy, or luxury, form but an inconsiderable part of the commerce of any country, and may therefore be considered as a secondary object, and not to be estimated in the great scale of commercial affairs.

Russia possesses within herself the greatest variety of every thing that may be deemed in the present age indispensable to human existence. What that country stands most in need of, are articles from India, all of them either the productions or manufacture of our Eastern possessions. These may be comprised under the following heads:

Raw cotton, and cotton stuffs.

Raw silk, and manufactured ditto.

Raw sugar.

Indigo.

Raw drugs.

Sandal wood.

Pepper.

Spices.

Gum.

Rice.

Of these goods there was imported in the year 1796-7 at St. Petersburg:

	1796 Roubles.	1797 Roubles.
Raw cotton - - -	12,565 -	13,522
Cotton goods of different kinds	1,458,249 -	833,848
Raw sugar - -	383,558 -	128,653
Ditto ditto, worked - -	251,876 -	65,086
Ditto rafinade - -	4,107,644 -	2,791,845
Indigo - - -	1,599,990 -	1,030,029
Drugs - - -	313,656 -	215,513
Sandal wood - -	111,807 -	35,556
Pepper - - -	131,346 -	69,604
Spices - - -	124,017 -	199,927
Gum - - -	74,652 -	25,659
Rice - - - -	78,060 -	100,190
Raw silk * - -	493,783 -	482,695
Total Roubles -	9,141,203 -	5,992,127
Or £. Sterling -	1,828,240. 12s.	1,194,425. 8s.

Besides arrack, rum, and tobacco, with some smaller articles of merchandise to a considerable value, and coffee alone to the amount of more than half a million of roubles yearly.

The importance of this trade to Great Britain, and our possessions in India †, it is needless to enumerate. The practicability of a direct com-

* Without reckoning cloths of silk, handkerchiefs, &c.

† It may just be observed, that by far the greatest part of the trade between British India and the empire of Russia would be of a permanent, and not of a fugacious nature. Notwithstanding the varieties of the climate and soil of that country, there is no part of it which would ever produce those aromatics so necessary to the inhabitants of northern climates. Sugar is also much in the same predicament; and although the southern provinces of Russia and Persia produce both raw silk and cotton, the cultivation is not sufficiently attended to, and the quality is much worse than those artieles

munication between the southern provinces of Russia and British India, by British ships, is obvious. By consulting the facilities of Great Britain and Russia, uniting their energies, and connecting with those the prosperity of our distant dependencies, a commercial treaty could be established on such a basis as would ensure the greatest mutual and relative advantages.

The balance of trade with Russia is at present very much against us, and must long continue so, from the physical productions of that country. But by conceding certain privileges in regard to East-India commerce, Russia would be induced not only to carry away a considerable part of the surplus productions of India, but also to deal more largely with Great Britain than is at present the case, in the articles of woollens, malt liquor, wrought iron, glass ware *, &c. &c. By efforts well directed, the carry-

produced in India and China. Indigo is indispensable, as there is no domestic dye in Russia to answer the purpose, and the climate will not produce it. But as we can never expect to determine the laws, or to fix bounds to the prerogatives of Nature, we must content ourselves with doing, in the mean time, what may appear to be the best, in commercial as well as political relations.

* The amount of the productions of India yearly imported into the port of St. Petersburg, independently of the other ports, and the commerce of the Euxine and Caspian, may be stated at the sum of 7,000,000 roubles annually. The commodities which Russia might be induced to receive from England would, on a very moderate calculation, probably be as follow:

	Roubles.
Ale, beer, and porter	400,000
Cheese	100,000
Cloths, broad, &c.	900,000
Fish	350,000
Glass of sorts	100,000
Instruments for mechanics, musical, mathematical, surgical, &c. &c.	200,000
Lead	150,000
Paper	80,000
Engravings	70,000
Stone-ware	150,000
Woollens, camblet, baize, &c. &c. to the probable amount of	800,000
Slop goods and cutlery to a great amount (*a*); say	600,000
Total Roubles -	3,900,000
£. Sterling -	780,000

(*a*) In two articles alone, those of scythes and razors, to the amount of 150,000 roubles, are yearly imported into Russia.

ing trade to India, now in the hands of foreigners, would receive a considerable check, and the manufactures and produce of India proceed more directly through our own hands into the circulation of an immense empire. It would, at the same time, afford a considerable opening to reconcile the present disagreement between the free trade and the East-India Company, by rendering unnecessary the protection of neutral flags. This trade would be daily increasing with the population and industry of the Russian empire; for increasing population, growing industry, and refinement of manners, not only create new wants, but make the consumption of the articles wanted more liberal and extensive. The returns of Russia to this country, as well as to India, will naturally occur to the mind of the discerning observers *. They are numerous, and indispensable to the commerce of this country and India, in the same proportion as their exportation is necessary to the prosperity of the Russian government.

The means which appear best adapted to connect the interests of Great Britain and Russia are,

IN THE FIRST PLACE, to render it equally the interest of both nations to prevent the province of Egypt, after the French shall be expelled, from becoming the possession of any European power, or that the trade from India should at any period be conveyed by that medium to the shores of the Mediterranean.

IN THE SECOND PLACE, to make it necessary to Russia, that the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope should continue in the hands of the English, or otherwise to become, in future, a neutral free port.

In order to engage Russia in those pursuits which at present are,

* The returns from Russia are principally hemp, iron, flax, tallow, corn, sail-cloth, leather, timber. In these articles alone thirty millions of roubles are annually exported. The minor articles of exportation are numerous, and may be much increased, and made extremely applicable to a trade with India.

perhaps, totally out of either her commercial or political orbit, and to induce her to enter into a close connection with this country, it will be necessary for Great Britain, in other respects, to promote the views of that empire——

First; By uniting with Russia to have the free navigation of the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, the Archipelago, and Mediterranean, guaranteed in the most ample manner to Russia, and to those states in amity with her, on a general pacification.

Secondly; To secure to Russia the possession of Malta, or some port in the Mediterranean.

Thirdly; By assisting Russia with capital, not from the public funds of Great Britain, but to be raised by individuals in this country.

Fourthly; To grant to Russia a *comptoir* in India, and, if necessary, at the Cape of Good Hope, together with certain facilities in commerce, to enable the former country to uphold an intercourse with British India, by means of Great Britain.

A commercial treaty, to which I have already alluded *, might, on the principle laid down, be carried into effect between Great Britain and Russia. It should be stipulated, that Russia should check as much as possible the irruptions of the northern hordes of Persia and India, and by that means prevent those powerful depredators from disturbing the tranquillity of Hindoostan.

The mutual reciprocities on which every commercial treaty must necessarily hinge, require attention; and a great deal has already been said on that subject †. But to reduce the whole to a very few words, Russia

* Vide General Observations on this subject.

† Vide General Observations.

could take from India product to nearly the value of a million and a half annually, and from Great Britain to the amount of 800,000*l.* sterling.

In return, Russia would acquire a more extensive market for her numerous commodities, as well as greater means of transporting them; and by opening a new trade to the southern provinces, extend, as it were, the present circumscribed sea-coasts of the empire, by example excite industry, multiply the number of seamen and shipping, and, on the whole, by the increased exertions that would attend or follow a revolution in commerce, lead to higher and higher degrees of national prosperity.

To perfect the system which I have ventured to recommend, there remain two things to be done.

First; To draw up such a plan * as will induce British subjects, under a proper guarantee, to subscribe a capital for the purpose of purchasing and transporting a part of the surplus productions of India to the southern provinces of Russia, and from thence to be distributed to the great continent of the world by the means of the Black Sea, the Caspian, and particularly by many canals and navigable rivers, which extend to the extremities of the empire.

Secondly; To frame competent regulations † for conducting the trade between Great Britain, Russia, and India, on fixed principles; and by due observance of justice, to unite harmony and good-will with general advantage and security.

Finally; Russia, from extent and situation, must for many centuries greatly depend on her natural productions; as Great Britain, on the other hand, derives immense resources from her factitious articles. The progress of the inhabitants of Russia towards refinement and opulence will be

* Vide Plan.

† Vide Regulations to this effect.

promoted rather by a system of agriculture and mineralogy, than by the means of manufactures. The want of population fully establishes this hypothesis; for small kingdoms only, fully peopled, can become manufacturing nations. The Russians must be supplied not only with such natural productions as their own climate will not yield, but also with many necessaries, manufactured perhaps from their own materials, as well as from those of other countries. Should Great Britain and India be resorted to, Russia could, in return, pour in the rich treasures of external nature, together with those taken from the bowels of the earth, in the midst of her almost inaccessible mountains.——I have now done, and beg leave to subscribe myself,

Dear Sir, yours, &c.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS

FROM THE

LETTERS OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

TO

THE COURT OF DIRECTORS,

AND OF

GENERAL ORDERS PUBLISHED IN INDIA,

RELATIVE TO THE BOMBAY ARMY.

(REFERRED TO IN THE 6th PAGE OF THIS WORK.)

THE army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant-general Stuart, marched from Cananore on the 21st of February, arrived at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut on the 25th of the same month, and took post at Seedapoor and Seedaseer on the 2d of March, for the protection of the large supplies which had been collected at Verajunder Pett, in the district of Coorga. From these positions, on Lieutenant-general Harris's approach, Lieutenant-general Stuart intended to form a junction with the army of Madras.

At the period when the army of Madras entered Mysore, Tippoo Sultaun was supposed to be encamped in the vicinity of Maddoa, and to be preparing to move in the direction of Bangalore, for the purpose of opposing the progress of the army of Madras, in the event of Lieutenant-general Harris actually passing the frontier; but it soon appeared that, although the Sultaun had so recently affected a disposition to admit an embassy from the British Government, he had probably no other view than

to conceal the design which he had formed of striking a sudden and early blow against the army of Bombay; for, without allowing me the same time to answer his last letter which he had taken for replying to those addressed by me to him, and without waiting to hear of the actual commencement of hostilities on the part of the British Government, he came to the resolution of attacking the army of Bombay, then assembled beyond the line of his frontier, in the district of Coorga, under the command of Lieutenant-general Stuart.

For this purpose, Tippoo, taking with him the flower of his army, appears to have marched from his camp, near Senapatam, on the 28th of February (when Lieutenant-general Harris was still within the Company's territories), and, moving rapidly in the direction of Periapatam, to have arrived there on the morning of the 5th of March, being the same day on which Lieutenant-general Harris entered Mysore on the eastern frontier.

On the 6th of March Tippoo Sultaun passed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant-general Stuart, the total strength of whose entire army did not amount to more than six thousand fighting men. The attack of the Sultaun's force was sustained by a body not exceeding two thousand men, and the Sultaun's army was finally defeated and completely dispersed before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. It is with infinite satisfaction that I inclose, for the information of your Honourable Court, the paper marked (N° 1.) containing General Stuart's account of this brilliant and important action, which took place at Seedaseer on the 6th of March.

After this signal defeat, Tippoo retreated precipitately to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th of March, without making any farther attempt to molest the army of Bombay; the loss sustained by

Tippoo's army on the 6th of March appears to have amounted to near two thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners (which included several officers of rank, and some of considerable distinction); that sustained on the 7th, by the army of Bombay, will appear in Lieutenant-general Stuart's letter.

Adverting to the great disproportion of numbers, and to other circumstances of disadvantage, I am confident that your Honourable Court will be of opinion, that the conduct and success of the army of Bombay, on that day, has seldom been equalled, and never surpassed in India.

Under this impression, I take the liberty of recommending to your favourable notice the several officers and corps named by Lieutenant-general Stuart in his letter of the 8th of March, and I am anxious to request your particular attention to the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant-general Stuart, and Major-general Hartley, as well as of Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop, and of Lieutenant-colonel Montresor. Major-general Hartley had already received a public testimony of my particular approbation of his extraordinary merit, in collecting stores and provisions in the district of Coorga, previously to the arrival of General Stuart on the coast of Malabar.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-general Stuart to the Governor-general in Council, dated 8th of March, 1799.

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. B.
Governor-general, &c. &c. Fort St. George.

MY LORD,

I HAD the honour to address your lordship on the 20th ultimo; and, having marched from Cananore on the following day, agreeably to my intimation of that date, I arrived at the top of Poodicherrum Ghaut on the 25th of the same month.

I informed your Lordship it was my intention to assume a defensive position close to the frontier, and there wait, in conformity to General Harris's instructions, under date the 24th December, his farther orders.

In pursuance of this plan, I moved the corps successively forward, and placed them in such situations as might enable me the most promptly to form the proposed junction with the principal army. On the 2d instant, the right brigade, consisting of three native battalions, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Montresor, took up their ground at Seedaseer, the boundary of the Coorga country, and about seven miles distant from Periapatam. The main body of the army, with the park and provisions, remained at Seedapoor and Ahmootenaar; the first eight miles, and the latter twelve, from the advanced position.

It may be necessary to inform your Lordship, that I was in some measure compelled, from the nature of the country, which is every-where covered with thick jungles, to place the army in several divisions; but I had a farther view in occupying the post at Seedaseer, in order to preserve a a more ready communication with General Harris, as this was the only spot from whence the signals established between the two armies could be observed. Although I had no reason to apprehend any immediate attack, I thought it adviseable to adopt the precaution of encamping the corps at such distances as would either enable me to move without much loss of time into the enemy's territory, or to support, if occasion should require it, any quarter that might stand in need of assistance.

In the course of the morning of the 5th, an extensive encampment was unexpectedly observed to be forming on this side of the fort of Periapatam. This circumstance was discovered at ten o'clock in the forenoon, as the enemy were taking up their ground, by a party of observation, on the summit of the high hill of Seedaseer, which commands a view of the Mysore,

almost to the environs of Seringapatan. Before the evening this encampment assumed a very formidable appearance, and covered a great extent of ground; we were able to count from three to four hundred tents; amongst the number some of large dimensions were distinguished, and particularly one of a green colour, that seemed to denote the presence of the Sultaun. However much the probability of this circumstance might be strengthened by the respectable appearance of the encampment, it was contradicted by the evidence of two hircarrahs, who had recently arrived from Seringapatam. These men generally reported, that Tippoo had marched with all his forces, on the 20th ultimo, to oppose the progress of the Madras army; and that the Benky Nabob commanded the only force in the field that remained in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. This force was represented to be encamped at Canniambaddy, and to consist of five thousand Piadas, or irregular infantry, who were said to be intended as a covering party to seven thousand Benjarees, and directed to bring as much provisions as they could collect about Periapatam to the capital.

In this state of uncertainty, I thought it prudent to reinforce Liutenant-colonel Montresor's brigade with an additional battalion of Sepoys, and waited for more correct intelligence, which I expected hourly, to act with the whole of my forces, as affairs might render it necessary. On the morning of the 6th, Major-general Hartley went forward to reconnoitre; and at break of day, from the hill of observation, the whole of the enemy's army was discovered to be in motion; but their movements were so well concealed by the woodiness of the country, and the haziness of the atmosphere, that it was impossible to ascertain their object; nor, in fact, was this discovered until they had penetrated a considerable way into the jungle, and commenced an attack upon our line, which happened between the hours of nine and ten.

The enemy pierced through the jungles with such secresy and expedition, that they attacked the rear and the front of our line almost at the same instant. This dispatch prevented more than three of our corps being engaged, as the fourth, which was posted two miles and a half in the rear, was unable to form a junction, from the enemy having cut in between them and Seedaseer. The communication was effectually obstructed by a column which, according to the reports of our prisoners, consisted of upwards of five thousand men, under the command of Baber Jung.

Fortunately, before the enemy had accomplished their purpose, Major-general Hartley had time to apprise me of their attack, and remained himself to give any assistance that might be necessary. The best position was assumed for repulsing the enemy; and in this alarming situation the corps defended themselves with so much resolution, that the Sultaun's troops were unable to make any impression. The brigade was on every side completely surrounded, and had to contend against a vast disparity of numbers, besides other discouraging circumstances.

As soon as I received intelligence of the perilous situation of the right brigade, I marched to their assistance with the two flank companies of his Majesty's 75th regiment, and the whole of the 77th. I arrived about half past two in sight of the division of the enemy, who had penetrated into the rear, and possessed themselves of the great road leading to Seedaseer. The engagement lasted nearly half an hour, when, after a smart fire of musquetry on both sides, the enemy were completely routed, and fled with precipitation through the jungles to regain their column, which still continued the attack in front.

On arriving at Lieutenant-colonel Montresor's post, I found his men exhausted with fatigue, and their ammunition almost expended. At twenty minutes past three the enemy retreated in all directions.

For this decisive and, I hope your lordship will allow, brilliant success, considering the small number of troops who engaged, under very great disadvantages, probably the flower of Tippoo Sultaun's army, I feel myself peculiarly indebted to the judicious dispositions for defence made by General Hartley. He embraced the opportunity of observing the motions of the enemy from the hill I have mentioned, and was thus enabled to advise Lieutenant-colonel Montresor of the best method for defeating them. I beg leave also to inform your Lordship, that my best thanks are due to Lieutenant-colonel Montresor for his very active exertions, and to the officers and men, including the artillery of his brigade, for their gallant and steady behaviour throughout the whole of this arduous affair. Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop, and the European division under his command, are likewise entitled to my particular approbation, for their spirited conduct, which finally routed the enemy.

Our loss on this occasion is far less than could reasonably have been expected; and I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a return of this circumstance.

It was impossible to ascertain the exact loss sustained by the enemy, but it must have been heavy, as, in the course of so long an action, they were often exposed in crowds to the fire of grape shot and volleys of musquetry.

Several men of distinction were killed, and some wounded officers have been made prisoners. I have the honour to inclose the information of Mozan Khan Bhuskshy, and the commander of a Kutchary, the prisoner of the greatest rank who has fallen into our hands; but concurring reports state, that Meer Ghofar is amongst the slain.

As the arrival of General Harris at Seringapatam will not happen at so

early a period as he first intended, the immediate possession of the post of Seedaseer was no longer an object of such consequence; and to retain it, while Tippoo continued in force at Periapatam, became an affair of serious difficulty. The secresy and expedition with which he had planned his late enterprise, and the correct intelligence that the leaders of his columns appeared to have obtained of the private routes through the Coorga jungles, led to an opinion that he would not remain satisfied with this abortive attempt, but might endeavour to penetrate by another direction to the southward, still more open than the passage of Seedaseer, where he would only be opposed by Coorgs. This consideration derived a greater weight, as, if he succeeded in forcing this entrance, it would throw him into our rear, and put him, in all probability, in possession of the great depôt of rice collected by the Coorga Rajah. These motives have induced me to relinquish the post of Seedaseer, and to collect the whole of my force at this place. I have accordingly made a disposition, either to defend my position against the Sultaun, if he should again venture to attack it, or to move in defence of any part of the Coorga Rajah's territories that the enemy may threaten, provided it shall endanger our magazine of provisions, otherwise I shall remain on the defensive until I receive advice from General Harris.

Since the action of the 6th, the enemy have continued in their camp at Periapatam, nor have I any intelligence either of the Sultaun's designs or of the motives that induced him to undertake his present enterprise. It is not likely that he will remain longer in this neighbourhood than after he receives intelligence of General Harris having entered the Mysore. As my communication with General Harris is become insecure, I must take the liberty of requesting your Lordship

to inform him of such part of these particulars as may appear to you necessary.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) J. STUART.

Head Quarters, Seedapoor, 8th March, 1799.

P. S. By some prisoners who have been just now brought in by the Coorga Rajah's people, I am informed that the loss of the enemy was very great, and that many men of the first distinction fell. They mention Seyed or Meer Ghofar, and the Benky Nabob, who led the centre attack, among the killed. It is added, however, that the Sultaun is collecting more forces, and is determined to make a second attack.

(Signed) J. STUART.

The important part taken by the Bombay army, since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honourable conclusion, has been such as well sustains its long-established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post at the village of Agrar was seised by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigour with which every attack of the enemy, on the outposts of that army, was repulsed, and the spirit shown in the assault of the breach, by the corps led by Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice, for which the Commander in Chief requests Lieutenant-general Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and men employed.

Lieutenant-general Harris trusts that Lieutenant-general Stuart will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and

assistance received from him during the present service, in the course of which he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of his private friendship.

Copy of a General Order by Government, dated 15th May, 1799.

Fort. St. George, 15th May, 1799.

The right honourable the Governor-general in council having this day received, from the commander in chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam on the 6th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the commander in chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army which achieved the capture of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day.

His lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequal rapidity, animation, and skill, with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

Under the favour of Providence, and the justness of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence, that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honourable issue.

But the events of the 4th of May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor-general in council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendour and glory, unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial ad-

vantages which it promises to establish, by restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India on a durable foundation of genuine security.

The Governor-general in council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that, in this arduous crisis, the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with our countrymen at home, and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in council.

(Signed) J. Webbe, Sec. to Gov.

(A true Copy) J. Webbe, Sec. to Gov.

Extract from the Act passed June 11th, 1793, by which the Possession of the British Territories in India, together with the Exclusive Commerce, under certain Limitations in Favour of the Free Trade, are, for a Term of Twenty Years, from the 1st of March, 1794, continued to the East-India Company.

THAT at any time, upon three years' notice to be given by Parliament, after the 1st of March, 1811, and upon payment of any sums of money due by the public, then the whole, sole, and exclusive trade to the East Indies to cease.

That nothing in the said proviso, or in any other act or charter, shall extend to determine the Corporation of the United East-India Company, or to preclude the Company from carrying on at all times, after such determination of the right to the exclusive trade, a free trade to and from the East Indies, with all or any part of their joint stock in trade, in common with other the subjects of his Majesty, trading to or from the said parts.

If any cession of territory shall be obtained from the Chinese Government, and a new settlement shall be made by the Company upon such territory, distinct and separate from the continent of China, and wholly free from any jurisdiction or authority from the Chinese Government, in that case, so long as the same shall so remain to the Company, it shall be lawful for any of his Majesty's subjects, under such regulations and restrictions as shall be approved by the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, to export British and Irish manufactures in the ships of the said Company, at a moderate rate of freight, the same being consigned to the said Company's supercargoes, or such other persons as the Company, with the approbation of the Board of Commissioners, shall license to reside at such

settlement for that purpose only; and provided that such persons so licensed shall be prohibited from having any connection or intercourse with the continent of China, and from carrying on any other trade or concern whatever, except the sale of British and Irish manufacture as before mentioned, and from all interference with the affairs of the Company; and all such persons shall enter into the like covenants with the Company as other licensed free merchants, or such other covenants as shall be reasonably required by the Court of Directors in that behalf, and also into a special engagement, if the same shall be required, for paying the net proceeds of the sales of such manufactures into the treasury of the Company at such new settlement, for bills of exchange payable by the Company in Great Britain, to be drawn at the actual rate of exchange at the time; *and that no person whatever shall be permitted to reside in any place or places so ceded, or to trade or communicate with any port or place in China, who is not a servant of the Company, or who is not licensed by them to act as aforesaid.*

During the continuance of the Company's exclusive trade, it shall be lawful for any ship or vessel which shall be employed in carrying on the Southern Whale Fishery, under and by virtue of an act made in the 26th year of his present Majesty, intituled, An Act for the Encouragement of the Southern Whale Fishery, and a certain other act, made in the 28th year of the reign of his present Majesty, for amending the said act made in the 26th year of his Majesty's reign, to sail or pass into the Pacific Ocean by Cape Horn, to the southward of the equator, provided that such ships shall not proceed farther west than one hundred and eighty degrees of longitude from London, and provided that said ships shall not proceed without such license, and shall be under and subject to all such regulations as are mentioned in the said respective acts.

For the further encouragement of trade to the South-west coast of Ame-

rica, and the islands adjacent, under the limitations contained in the convention made by his Majesty with the King of Spain, of the 28th of October, 1790, it may be expedient that ships fitted out for those parts should in certain cases be permitted, by license from the Company, to proceed from the said coast and islands direct to the isles of Japan and coasts of Korea and Canton, there to dispose of their cargoes obtained on the North-west coast of America, and to return from thence direct to the same North-west coast or islands adjacent, and there dispose of their returns in trade, the owners and commanders of such ships entering into such covenants with, and giving such security to, the Company, and submitting to be bound by such rules and regulations as shall appear to be best adapted for preserving to the Company the exercise of their commercial privileges, and conduce to the preservation of good order and regularity of the ships' companies, and their observance of the laws prescribed by the native states, during the continuance of such ships on the said coasts of Japan, Korea, and in the river of Canton: that the Court of Directors of the Company shall, forthwith after the passing of the Act, frame and lay before the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, such rules and regulations as they shall think best adapted for the purposes aforesaid, and also the forms of such deeds of covenant or other securities as the Court of Directors shall judge to be proper or necessary to be entered into for the due observance thereof by the owners and commanders of ships to be licensed, and that the Board shall thereupon proceed to revise the same, and to give such orders and instructions to the Directors in relation thereto as they shall think fit and expedient; and that the owners and commanders conforming themselves to the terms and conditions which shall be so prescribed, shall be entitled to such license or licenses; and the Court of Directors are required to grant the same accordingly, unless on any representation made by the

Directors to the Board of Commissioners, containing any specific objections against the granting of any such license, the Board shall order the same to be withheld, in which case it shall be lawful for the Directors to withhold or refuse the same.

That the regulations to be made for the purposes aforesaid, or any deeds of covenant or other securities to be required for the observance thereof, shall not extend to vest in any council of supercargoes, or other officers of the Company, a greater power over any ships, or the commanders, officers, or companies of the same, in the Eastern Seas, or on the coasts of Japan, Korea, and China, which they shall be permitted to visit according to the tenor of such licenses, than such as may lawfully be exercised by the council of supercargoes or other officers of the Company over the ships employed by, or in the service of the Company, and the commanders, officers, and men belonging thereto.

The selling or disposing of any goods or merchandise at any other place or places than shall be mentioned and specified in any such license, or any wilful breach or non-observance of any of the rules or regulations, shall be held as a misdemeanour at law, and may be punished as such, and that the parties offending therein shall be deemed to have traded unlawfully within the limits of the Company's exclusive trade, and shall incur and suffer the penalties and forfeitures imposed by the act for illicitly trading within the limits, and shall besides pay to the said Company such pecuniary penalties as such offenders shall have incurred or forfeited by any wilful breach or non-observance of the stipulations contained in the deeds of covenants or securities entered into or given to the said Company by virtue of the act.

That during the continuance of the exclusive trade in the Company, it may be lawful for any of his Majesty's subjects resident in Great Britain, or in any other part of his Majesty's European dominions, to export, on

their own proper risque and account, in the ships of the Company, or in ships freighted by them from the port of London, to any of the ports usually visited by the ships of the Company on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, or in the Bay of Bengal in the East Indies, or the island of Sumatra, any goods, wares, or merchandises of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the said dominions, except such as is otherwise specially provided; and that in like manner it may be lawful for any of his Majesty's subjects in the civil service of the Company in India, or being by leave or license of the Company, or under their protection, as merchants resident in India, respectively to consign and put on board the ships of the Company, or in ships freighted by them, bound to Great Britain, any goods, wares, or merchandise, except such as is by this act otherwise specially provided, in order to the same being imported, on the risque and account of the owners thereof, at the port of London, under the regulations contained in the act.

During the Company's term in the exclusive trade, it shall not be lawful for any person, save only the Company, or such as shall obtain their special license in writing for that purpose, to export, ship, or carry out from Great Britain to the East Indies, or other parts within the limits of their exclusive trade, any military stores, ammunition, masts, spars, cordage, anchors, pitch, tar, or copper; nor to ship, carry, or put on board any of the Company's ships in the East Indies, or other parts of the said limits, bound to London, or otherwise to bring or import into Great Britain, any India callicoes, dimities, muslins, or other piece goods, made or manufactured with silk or cotton, or with silk and cotton mixed, or with other mixed materials.

The sole and exclusive right in the export trade from Great Britain to the East Indies, and other parts, within the limits of the Company's char-

ter, in the articles of masts, spars, cordage, anchors, pitch, and tar, is by the act reserved to and continued in the Company, with the intent that the Company may not only furnish a sufficient quantity of those articles for consumption at their forts, garrisons, ports, and dock-yards there, but also to send to India those articles, and keep the markets supplied therewith, as far as may appear to be consistent with public security, at moderate prices: and as it is proper that the British and Irish manufacturers of those articles should have every reasonable satisfaction given to them, that the exclusive privilege shall not operate to their injury or prejudice, through the failure or default of the Company in carrying on their export trade in such articles to as large an extent as prudence and policy will admit; it is ordered, That the Court of Directors shall, in the month of February in every year, lay before the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, an exact invoice of the quantities and sorts of cordage, pitch, and tar, and the number and sizes of masts and spars, and the number and weight of anchors exported by the Company in the preceding year; and shall also, when required by the Board, lay before it a similar invoice or account of the quantities, numbers, sizes, and weights, as far as the case will admit, of all the articles before enumerated, which shall be intended to be exported by the Company in the ensuing season; upon any representation made to the Board by any British or Irish manufacturers of any failure or default in the Company, of their exporting any of the said articles to a sufficient or reasonable extent in quantity and value, as well for the proper consumption of the forces of the Company in India, and at their ports, garrisons, and settlements there, as for meeting the demands of the India markets for the said articles respectively, the Board may examine into the grounds of such representations, and the allegations contained therein; and may, according to the circumstances of the case, at their dis-

cretion, make such orders and regulations for admitting individuals to export to India, in the ships of the Company, or those employed in their service, at the like rate of freight as shall be then payable for other goods exported thither in private trade, all or any sorts of the articles before enumerated, as the Board shall from time to time judge fitting and proper, subject to such restrictions and limitations as shall be expressed in their orders and regulations concerning the same; and, if the Board shall see it requisite, it shall be lawful for them to enlarge the quantity of tonnage by the act directed to be provided for other private trade, to an extent not exceeding the quantity which shall appear to the Board to be necessary for the carriage of the articles so permitted to be exported by individuals, and which additional tonnage shall be specifically set apart and reserved for that purpose only; and that Company are required to provide such additional quantity of shipping or tonnage accordingly.

If the Company shall not, on or before the 31st of August in every year, during the continuance of their exclusive trade, contract for and purchase, on their own account, 1,500 tons of British copper, for the purpose of exportation to some port or place within the limits of their exclusive trade, it may be lawful for the proprietors or holders of British copper residing in Great Britain, in every such year respectively, to export that quantity, in ships to be provided by the Company, to any ports or places they think proper in the East Indies, at the same rates of freight, and subject to the same regulations as to the amount of such freight per ton as are expressed in the act with respect to the freight of other species of British manufactures and produce on private account; and that if the Company shall not purchase or contract for so much as 1,500 tons of British copper in any one year, it may be lawful for the proprietors or holders

of British copper to export in ships to be provided by the Company, such quantity or quantities as, together with the quantities purchased by the Company, shall amount to full 1,500 tons, to be exported annually to the ports or places, and subject to the same regulations as to the amount of freight per ton in ships to be provided by the Company as is expressed on the exportation of any other British produce on private account; and that the proprietors or holders of British copper exporting the same shall be at liberty to obtain their returns in the like commodities of India, in the same manner and in the same proportions as provided for the other proprietors of British manufactures or produce exported to India, on their own account, by virtue of the act: In case the Company shall not, on or before the 31st of August in any one year, have bought or contracted for the full quantity of 1,500 tons of British copper for the purposes aforesaid, that then all persons intending to export either the whole or part of the said 1,500 tons remaining unsold to the Company, shall signify the same by a notice in writing to the chief secretary of the Company, between the 31st of August and the 14th of October in every year, provided that the tonnage for the copper to be sent out to India in any of the cases aforesaid shall not be considered as part of the tonnage allowed by the act for the private trade.

If a sufficient quantity of such callicoes, dimities, muslins, or other piece goods of the description already mentioned, shall not be imported by the Company, and the persons by them licensed to import the same, for keeping the market supplied therewith, at reasonable prices, to answer the consumption in Great Britain, as far as any of the said sorts of goods may lawfully be worn or used, and likewise for exportation, it may be lawful for the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India to make such regulations for admitting individuals to import in the Company's ships, or ships

employed by them, into Great Britain, all or any of the sorts of goods before specified, under such conditions, restrictions, and limitations, as the Board shall from time to time direct.

Nothing in the act shall extend to permit any person to export or import in private trade any goods or merchandise contrary to the provisions of any act or acts of parliament now in force, and not by the act expressly repealed, nor to vary, alter, or affect, any act or acts now in force for prohibiting the consumption, wearing, or use of any foreign manufacture within this kingdom; but that all the said acts, and the provisions and regulations therein, shall remain of the same force and effect, to all intents and purposes, as if the act had not been made.

As the ensuring to private merchants and manufacturers the certain and ample means of exporting their merchandise to the East Indies, and importing the returns for the same, may conduce to the advancement of the trade of these kingdoms, it is enacted, That the Company shall, in the proper season of every year, provide and appropriate 3,000 tons of shipping at the least, for the specific purposes of carrying to the East Indies such goods, wares, and merchandise as may be lawfully exported thither by individuals, and for bringing back from thence as well the returns of the same as likewise the goods of other persons entitled to import the same into this kingdom; and if the quantity of tonnage shall be found insufficient, or shall be found to be more than shall be sufficient for the carriage of the private trade, export or import, the Company shall from time to time provide such an additional quantity of tonnage, or lessen the quantity of tonnage to be provided for the carriage of the private trade, as the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India shall, upon any representation made to them, order and direct.

That in case the Court of Directors shall be of opinion that the addi-

tional quantity of tonnage for the carriage of the private trade, which shall at any time thereafter be ordered by the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, is greater than ought to have been ordered, it shall be lawful for the Court of Directors to apply by petition to his Majesty in council, and his Majesty in council shall finally determine the same.

The said Company shall be entitled to charge and recover, from the owners of goods exported or imported in private trade, such rates of freight for the carriage thereof as are specified, and not any higher rate or rates; (that is to say), for the carriage of any goods from Great Britain to any port or place in the East Indies in time of peace, after the rate of 5*l.* per ton, and for the carriage of any goods from any part of the East Indies to Great Britain, after the rate of 15*l.* per ton, computing such tonnage in the same manner as the tonnage of goods shipped by the Company on their own account; and that in times of war, or preparations for war, between Great Britain and any other European power or state, or when the circumstances incidental to war, or preparations for war, shall happen, whereby an increase in the rates of freight payable by the Company shall become unavoidable, then, or as long as such war, or preparations, or other circumstances shall continue, the Company shall be entitled to charge and recover, for the carriage of the private trade, additional rates of freight, after a due proportion to the additional rates of tonnage which shall be paid by the Company for the hire of ships for their own trade, and at no higher rate or proportion.

That when any circumstance shall arise which entitles the Company to make any advance in the rates of freight on private trade, the Court of Directors shall, before they shall increase the same, communicate in writing to the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India their intentions so to do, with their reasons for the same, and the extent of

the increase by them proposed, with such other information or observations relating thereto as shall to them appear material to be known by the Board; and that no increase shall be made in the said rates but such as shall be approved by the Board; and that any increase so made shall be subject and liable to be reduced or discontinued, as circumstances may admit or require, and as said Board shall in that behalf direct.

In the month of August, 1794, and so afterwards in the month of August in every third year, during the continuance of the further term granted to the Company in their trade, the Court of Directors shall take into their consideration how far, and to what extent the then general state of the affairs of shipping may call for, or will reasonably admit of any abatement in the rates of freight on private trade, and to certify unto the Board of Commissioners whether the rates will fairly admit of any reduction or abatement, and to what extent, and whether for the whole or for any, and what part of the term of three years then next following, with their reasons for the same; and that Board shall take the report of the Directors into their consideration, and either approve the alterations proposed by the Directors, or make such other order therein as to the Board shall appear just and expedient; and that the order of the Board in respect thereto shall be valid and conclusive on the Company.

All persons intending to export any goods from Great Britain to the East Indies shall signify the same by a notice in writing to the chief secretary of the Company before the last day of August in each year, for the ships of the ensuing season, and that every such notice shall specify the name of the port or place of destination of such goods, and the quantity of tonnage required for the same, and the period when the goods will be ready to be laden or put on board; and that every person giving any such notice, shall, on or before the 15th of September next ensuing the delivery

thereof, deposit in the treasury of the Company the money chargeable for the freight upon the quantity of tonnage thereby required or therein specified, unless the Court of Directors of the Company shall think fit to accept any security for the payment thereof; and that every such person shall also, before the 13th of October following, deliver to the secretary of the Company a list of the sorts of goods intended to be exported, and the quantities of each of such sorts respectively; and that in default thereof, or failure in providing the goods to be shipped within the time specified in the notice for that purpose, the deposit made, or security taken for the freight, shall be forfeited to the Company.

That all persons intending to export any goods from any port or place in the East Indies to Great Britain shall signify the same by notice in writing to the chief secretary of the Presidency in India wherein the same are to be shipped, in which notice shall be specified the sorts and quantities of goods intended to be shipped, the quantity of tonnage required, and the period when the goods will be ready to be put on board; and shall make a deposit at the treasury of such presidency or settlement of the whole amount of the freight upon the quantity of tonnage specified, or otherwise give reasonable security for the payment thereof in Great Britain; and if any of the persons giving such notice shall not provide their goods to be shipped within the time or times therein specified for that purpose, their deposits made, or securities given for the freight, shall be forfeited to the Company.

If any vacant tonnage shall remain, not engaged by individuals, either in Great Britain or the East Indies, after the times limited for giving such notices respectively, the said tonnage, together with any other vacant tonnage occasioned by the failure or default of any person in the delivery of their goods within the period specified by their notices for that purpose,

shall and may be occupied by the goods of the Company, without any allowance to the persons making such default; and that if the whole quantity of tonnage required for private trade in any year, either in Great Britain or the East Indies, shall exceed the whole quantity to be provided for private trade, according to the true intent of the act, in that case the whole of the tonnage provided shall be impartially distributed amongst the parties requiring the same, in proportion to the quantities specified in their respective notices; and that on every such occasion the distribution shall be made with all convenient dispatch, and the quantity of tonnage appertaining to each of the persons entitled thereto shall be notified to them respectively, by the secretary or other proper officer in writing, seven days antecedent to the day appointed for making the deposit, or giving security for the freight, in the manner before directed.

It shall be lawful for any persons residing in India, in the civil service of the Company, or by their license, not being restricted by their covenants, or otherwise specially prohibited by them or their governments in India from so doing, and not being in any judicial or military capacity, to act as commercial agents, managers, or consignees, on the behalf of such persons as shall think fit to employ them, as well in the disposal of any export goods, not thereby prohibited from being exported by individuals, as in providing such other kinds of goods as may by law be imported by individuals into Great Britain on their private account.

Upon any representation made to the Court of Directors of the Company, by or on the behalf of any private traders, of the want of a sufficient number of persons in the East Indies duly authorised and properly qualified to act for them in the disposal of their cargoes and the purchase and investments of goods in return for the same, the Court shall fail to license a further number of persons to reside in India in the character of free

merchants, to the satisfaction of the private traders, it may be lawful for the traders to represent the same to the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, and that the Court of Directors shall thereupon license a proper and sufficient number of persons to reside at their settlements in the East Indies, in the character of free merchants, with the approbation of the Board.

Officers and servants of the Company, and all other British subjects, during their residence in India, notwithstanding their being employed to act as agents, factors, or managers for private traders, shall continue amenable and subject to the powers and authorities of the Company and their Governments in India, in the like manner as if they had not so acted, or had not been so employed.

During all such time as the Company shall be entitled to the exclusive trade, it shall not be lawful for any British subject, either in their service, or licensed by them, to go, or to live, or continue in India, to reside in any other place than in one of the principal settlements of the Company, or within ten miles of such principal settlement, without their special license of the Governor-general, or Governors of such principal settlement, in writing, for that purpose; nor shall any such British subject or subjects go to, or continue beyond the limits for any longer space of time, or at any other time or times, than shall be specified in his or their license or order of leave in that behalf, on pain of being dismissed the service, and forfeiting to the Company such wages, salaries, and allowances, as shall be due to the person so offending, and of his license to reside in India.

By virtue of an act made in the ninth year of King William the Third, the Company is entitled to receive a duty of 5*l.* for every hundred pounds

of the value of all goods, wares, and merchandises of the growth, product, or manufacture of the East Indies, or other parts within the limits of their exclusive trade, imported or brought into this kingdom in private trade, towards defraying certain charges mentioned in that act. The Company have, over and besides the duty of 5*l. per centum*, been accustomed to charge and retain, for their own use, after the rate of 2*l. per centum* on the gross sale amount of all goods, wares, and merchandises imported into this kingdom from the East Indies in private trade, in recompence and satisfaction for the charges and expenses of unshipping and selling the same, and otherwise in the care and management thereof. For the encouragement of the private trade, the duty of 5*l. per centum* is repealed, and the charge of 2*l. per centum* discontinued; the Company are entitled to receive, in lieu thereof, to recompense them from the said charges on private trade, after the rate of 3*l.* for every hundred pounds on the value or gross sale amount of all goods imported from the East Indies in private trade, including the duties and charges payable in respect thereof. This sum to be in full satisfaction and discharge of the expenses to be incurred by the Company in the unshipping, voyage, cartage, warehouse-room, sorting, lotting, and selling goods, or in any other manner concerning the same over and above the freight.

The said appeal shall not extend to release the payment of the said duty of 5*l. per centum* on the said charge of 2*l. per centum* on any goods, wares, or merchandise, which shall be brought home and imported in any of the ships of the Company, or in their service from China, nor to affect any covenants or engagements now subsisting, or hereafter to be made, by or between the Company, or on their behalf, with the masters and commanders of their ships, or with any other of the officers or servants of the

Company, in whatever employment or capacity they may happen to be, but that all and every such covenants and engagements shall be, and be held, deemed, and taken to be of the same force and effect, to every intent and purpose, as if the act had not been made, the said repeal, or any other matter or thing therein contained, to the contrary notwithstanding.

To encourage individuals to engage in the import trade of several sorts of raw materials, and also for securing to manufacturers the means of furnishing themselves therewith at the said sales, it is expedient that proper rules and regulations should be made for providing for speedy and frequent sales of such materials, and in moderate lots; and for preventing, as far may be, any undue preference being given in respect either of the mode or times of the making sale of any of the said commodities, as between the Company and individuals, or as between one individual and another; it is enacted, that it may be lawful for the Court of Directors of the Company to frame such rules and regulations for the future sales of all raw silk, sugar, yarn, cotton wool, and other wool skins, dyeing woods and drugs, and other articles of raw material, imported either in private trade or the Company's own account, as in their judgment shall appear best adapted for the several purposes, and to lay the same before the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, for their revisal and approbation; and that the rules and regulations which shall be framed and approved shall be considered of the same force as a bye-law of the Company, subject to such future revision and alteration by said Court of Directors, with the approbation of said Board, as circumstances require.

All manner of goods imported in private trade, as well raw materials as others, shall be secured in the Company's warehouses, and sold openly and publicly by inch of candle, or by way of public auction, and in no other

dises of the same kinds or sorts, belonging to the Company, are or shall be sub[illegible] liable unto, and to no other rates, customs, or duties whatever, the duty of *3l. per centum*, granted to the Company for the purposes aforesaid, always excepted.

The Company shall be wholly exempted from the claims of individuals in respect to any compensation or satisfaction which the Company might otherwise be liable to answer or pay as carriers of goods, for any embezzlement, waste, losses, or damages of any goods, wares, or merchandise, during the time of their being on board the ships of, or employed by said Company, or in any of their warehouses in Great Britain or India, or in their transit to or from such ships.

That the deeds of covenant, and other engagements and securities, entered into by any of the officers and servants of the Company, entrusted with the custody, care, or management of goods, wares, and [illegible]s, whether at sea or on shore, for the due execution of the trust [illegible]hem, shall be deemed in law to extend to and include as well [illegible], wares, and merchandise, as are the immediate property of the [illegible], as such as are the property of individuals; and that all or any officers and servants of the Company, so by them entrusted, and all persons having at any time the custody or care of any such goods, wares, or merchandises, by or through whose means, default, procurement, neglect, or want of care, any embezzlement, waste, loss, or damage, shall or may arise or be sustained, shall be liable at law to answer for the same in damages and costs to the proper owners; and that if such owners be desirous of being availed of the benefit of any such deeds of covenant or engagement, and shall give such security or indemnity to the Court of Directors as they shall require for securing the Company, and